Shelter Cluster Review

2009 Indonesia Earthquakes

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## Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNPB</td>
<td>National Board for Disaster Management</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>DM</td>
<td>Disaster Management</td>
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<td>DMU</td>
<td>Disaster Management Unit</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>EoM</td>
<td>End of Mission</td>
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<td>EQ</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
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<td>ER</td>
<td>Early recovery</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Shelter Cluster</td>
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<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
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<td>HoD</td>
<td>Head of Delegation</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>Inter-cluster coordination</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IM</td>
<td>Information management / manager</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
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<td>PMI</td>
<td>Indonesian Red Cross</td>
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<td>PNS</td>
<td>Partner National Society</td>
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<td>SCT</td>
<td>Shelter Coordination Team</td>
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<td>T-shelter</td>
<td>Temporary/transitional shelter</td>
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<td>TL</td>
<td>Team leader</td>
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<td>TNT</td>
<td>Government Recovery Agency</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
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<td>TWIG</td>
<td>Technical Working Group</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Contrary to previous independent reviews on shelter cluster deployments, this evaluation covers two disasters – the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes – as they happened in geographic and temporal proximity and where the humanitarian responses of one affected the other.

1.1 West Java

The earthquake that struck South-West Java on 2 September 2009 left approximately 60,000 families homeless and a similar number living in damaged structures across the 15 districts to south of West Java and one district in Central Java. Schools and government offices, shops and other community structures were badly affected.

Rugged terrain and the remoteness of many villages combined with the seemingly random nature of the EQ impact made it difficult for humanitarian agencies to respond effectively.

The SCT was deployed two weeks after the EQ following a request from OCHA to strengthen the shelter response, the most affected sector.

The initial general impression of this disaster was that it was relatively small, and yet a large and strong coordination team was deployed by IFRC more to test and perfect coordination issues than representing a proportionally relevant deployment.

The late activation of the SC posed problems for coordination as active agencies had already established some form of communication network, which for some made the SC to be seen as adding another layer. Still, the local NGO participation was significant and feeling of ownership increased both due to the limited international response and for the bilingual communication in and documents.

While the destruction and needs in West Java were significant, the relatively low death toll and the destruction in pockets with difficult access resulted in low media interest, delayed donor funding and agencies racing off to West Sumatra.

The decision to handover the cluster to UNDP appeared to based more on the needs and desires of both organizations than on measurable indicators to show a clear change in shelter recovery. In reality, emergency shelter needs were insufficiently dealt with, although even this remains a moot point as a proper of shelter needs assessment was also lacking.

In West Java at the time of handover of the SC, perhaps only around 30% of the emergency shelter needs had been covered.

Overall, the diversion of attention and assistance from the West Java Earthquake Response left some serious concerns regarding the cluster process in general and, consequently, vulnerable groups within the area.

While leaving room for improvement, the IFRC-led Shelter cluster team was the only cluster activated on the ground and the key group for coordination in the West Java Earthquake Response, providing real value to cluster members, donors and government.

1.2 West Sumatra

On 30 September 2009 and 1 October 2009 two major earthquakes (EQ) hit an area off the coast of West Sumatra causing 1,195 deaths and injuring 1,798. The EQs damaged public and
agricultural assets and devastated housing in both rural and urban areas. Damage assessments identified approximately 180,000 houses as being severely or moderately damaged.

**Shelter** was overall the dominant sector in the ensuing response with Transitional shelters (T-Shelters) as the single largest component. By early 2010 most relief distributions were complete. The Shelter Cluster (SC) report from March 2010 estimated that 75% of the shelter need had been covered with focus on the rural areas. This included government’s permanent housing for approximately 8,000 houses, agencies transitional or temporary shelter assistance for 52,000 houses, and self-recovery process for around 72,000 houses.

The IFRC deployed three consecutive rotations of **Shelter Coordination Teams** for a total of seven months. The attendance at the SC meetings was exceptionally high throughout starting with 100+ agencies in the first meeting and regular subsequent attendance of around 25-35 agencies during the first months of emergency response.

Team compositions in all rotations worked well given the dual technical/coordination capacity of many of the team members ably assisted by professional and motivated national staff.

Having SC **co-located with UN partners UNDP, OCHA and MapAction after the early emergency phase** was a useful arrangement and greatly facilitated the necessary cooperation and coordination.

**Handover** to UN-Habitat was seen as exemplary in its thoroughness although engagement by the successor from the beginning of the cluster work with clear protocol and criteria would have been beneficial.

The technical professionalism and good reputation of shelter SCT deployments are widely acknowledged. However, many of the opinions and statements in the humanitarian field - even within the Red Cross Movement - reflect some lack of appreciation and limited understanding of the purpose of the Cluster Approach in general and the IFRC’s role and responsibilities as the global cluster lead for shelter in particular. Some of the **concerns and issues within the Red Cross Movement** – revolving around politics, Red Cross image, and resourcing methods and priorities - are understandable.

The predominant SC approach to **strategy** development throughout the seven-month deployment was based on receiving feedback to draft documents from cluster participants that allowed a wider ownership of the process.

Despite the fact that SCT performance was generally applauded for its professionalism and responsiveness, the attempts at forming and adhering to common beneficiary-driven strategy led to some disappointing results by the shelter sector that included (i) intra-community equity problems during implementation and several agencies fighting over operational area, (ii) meager response to the significant urban shelter needs, and (iii) poor occupancy rate (50%) of the T-shelters provided.

**Communications** relied heavily on the Google group that was well set up, active and emulated by other clusters.

The most vocal and universally voiced shortcoming of the SC work was the non-availability of simultaneous translation of meeting and unavailability of key documents in **local language from the outset**. This effectively excluded the key interest group local NGOs from engaging in the shelter cluster work.

As is the case in most disasters, the agencies landed to a very unclear situation with an immediate and clear need for a shelter needs **assessment** to guide activities. The lack of dedicated
funds and resources to conduct an assessment greatly hampered the effectiveness of the shelter efforts and the entire response.

The database created by the SC Information Management was ultimately adopted by almost all of the other clusters greatly strengthening both the shelter clusters position and the IM network generally. Shelter was by far the biggest component in the overall response, but even agencies and people who were not planning to do shelter programs came to the SC meetings as SC had the best (organized) data of all clusters.

Government participation in large coordination meetings was limited. Whilst the SC provided information on shelter activities as requested by the various government agencies, the SC struggled to get either detailed damage data or up-to-date information of government distributions and plans.

The level of organization gave an impression that the Shelter Cluster knew what it was doing and the high attendance at coordination meetings was testament to their value. In addition to serving to improve coordination between agencies within the Cluster the degree of organization attracted agencies – even those not directly involved in shelter activities - to the shelter sector.

The fact that SC was able to capture and add value to the operations of the key international agencies with the largest shelter volumes belies the fact that SC was unable to engage fully the GoI and PMI as well as many potentially useful local NGOs with unique understanding of the local communities and their needs.

There were parallel systems in aid coordination with the GoI (and PMI) on one side, and the clusters on the other. This despite the fact that special consideration was demonstrably given by SC Coordinators to keeping the Red Cross/PMI updated on the activities of the Shelter Cluster, particularly as PMI were a significant actor in the shelter sector but were not regularly represented in the Shelter Cluster Meetings nor forthcoming with their plan numbers.

The most value-adding component of the Inter-Cluster Coordination was in the realm of IM where the close collaboration between OCHA IM specialists and the SC IM came up with systems and training/tutoring that benefitted all clusters.

PMI engagement in the SC left a lot to be desired in terms of quantity and quality. Discussions with PMI and IFRC revealed that PMI was prioritizing its commitments vis-à-vis the GoI with the SC – which was seen as part of the UN system - receiving only limited attention. A very practical reason for the less-than-enthusiastic involvement in SC was the overloading of the PMI reporting system and lack of assessment capacity. With the new dynamic and outspoken PMI leadership, there are some more recent signs of more openness toward the SC.

1.3 General

The need to be able to modify programs during implementation is becoming crucial. As the in-country donor representatives tend to be risk-averse, a dialogue is warranted on a global level between SC and key institutional donors on how to allow more flexibility to change programs according to the evolving (shelter) needs of the affected populations.

The ever more prominent, well-resourced and assertive government, the private sector, civil society and PMI in disaster response on the one hand, and the decreasing funding for Indonesia from international institutions on the other, will affect the humanitarian agencies and the clusters. The net effect of these significant and rather rapid changes in the fabric of the Indonesian Disaster Management scene are likely to spell a different, if not smaller, role for the international
humanitarian community. It is foreseen that the emphasis of future cooperation between national and external players will be even more on technical and consultative, rather than financial and operational, support. **For fruitful cooperation to exist in the future, regardless of the form it takes, requires that the international community approach the emerging key national DM actors with a respectful attitude and stronger commitment to relationship building also between disasters.**

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the above developments played a part the West Sumatra response and had implications for the SC work.

The quality of service that the SC provides at the crucial early stages of a response to the government, donors and the international agencies generally outweighs the negatives. Yet, the following paradox remains: The better job the SCT does technically, the more it risks reinforcing the current dominant dysfunctional paradigm of ‘plug ‘n’ play’ in the delivery of relief assistance, which for the lack of peace time engagement with communities and the emerging strong national actors in disaster management may cause more harm than good.

These risks cannot be effectively managed or minimized in the full-on disaster response mode in the field but need to be dealt with during peace time through the building of trust, the gaining of understanding the key players’ agendas and aspirations and efforts at building common understanding and strategies. Given that the shelter is the dominant sector in most disaster responses in Indonesia, it is incumbent on SC to take the lead in approaching the key national players to see what platforms may be created for unified response in future disasters.

To ensure that also the root causes, not only the symptoms, are dealt with, the key underlying concrete recommendation for the SC based on the findings of this review is the following:

**In consultation with the in-country IFRC leadership and PML, undertake a fact-finding trip to meet with CSR executives of selected private sector companies, religious and political groups and GOI to (i) understand each other’s agendas and mandates, (ii) manage each other’s expectations and build trust in view of disaster response situations, and (iii), open a dialogue on how to improve cooperation during and between disasters.**

Other recommendations are embedded in the narrative of the report and summarized in chapter six.

## 2 INTRODUCTION

### 2.1 Aim and Scope

Commissioned by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC/Federation), the global shelter cluster lead in natural disasters, the aim of this review is to offer recommendations based on the lessons learned from the activation, activities and performance of the Shelter Cluster (SC) following the 2009 earthquakes in West Java and West Sumatra.

Covering the period when the SC was led by IFRC, the review focuses on the examination of processes relevant to the provision of IFRC-led shelter cluster coordination services. Shelter operations themselves and the achievements thereof are only referred to where they support the main focus of this review.
2.2 Methodology

The evaluation process comprised a desk review of relevant material followed by interviews with stakeholders by phone/Skype and in person during a two-week week field trip to West Sumatra, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur.

The material of the desk review included the following literature:

- Terms of Reference (provided in Annex 1)
- IFRC Ops Updates West Sumatra & West Java
- UN Humanitarian Response Plan, West Sumatra 2009
- IFRC Mid-term Review, West Sumatra EQ 2009-2010
- IASC guidance note on Information Management
- IFRC/UNOCHA Memorandum of Understanding on Emergency Shelter Cluster
- UN-HABITAT Support to UNDP’s RISE (Recovery Initiatives Sumatra EQ 2009-2010)
- Building Back Safer Houses in West Sumatra
- Review of the International Federation’s Shelter Cluster Commitment (2010)
- Reviews of selected previous SCT deployments
- Selected SCT End of Mission reports

The Terms of Reference of the SCT was used as a basis to formulate a loosely structured interview process. Data from the respondents were then validated through cross verification with the literary sources to arrive at as balanced analysis and recommendations as possible. The realities and challenges of the particular operating environment were also taken into account in assessing the performance of the SC.

A total of 36 interviews were conducted for the review. The individuals consulted represented a mix of government authorities, SC partners, local NGOs, academia, UN agencies, SCT members and RCRC representatives (PMI, IFRC Asia-Pacific Zone and Jakarta delegation). A list of the persons consulted is provided in Annex 2.

2.3 Limitations

The 2009-2010 West Sumatra SC deployment, that extended over seven months comprising not only three consecutive Coordinators and rotations but also an emergency response phase as well as early recovery, can hardly be given full justice within the scope of this review.

The review was carried out 15 months after the activation of the SC and many potential informants had finished their missions and were difficult – and often impossible - to track down. Also, recollecting relevant events way over a year after the SC activation proved difficult with a number of interviewees.

Many of the relevant individuals that could be contacted were not available during the Christmas and New Year holiday period allocated for this review. The total number of days made available for the review had to be divided between two SC deployments in two far-apart locations which led to the focusing on one review (West Sumatra) at the expense of the other (West Java).

This has led to a lopsided report with inadequate verification of information received on West Java response and the role and performance of the SC. Though the two disasters both were of significant magnitude, the SC activation process and subsequent dynamics and length of the cluster activity were very different which may offer some valuable comparisons and lessons learned.

In several cases meeting/interviewing local informants without translation support proved less
than a workable arrangement, notably during a visit to two beneficiary communities. Therefore, while several in number, the impact of these interviews on this review are disproportionally low, a definite drawback for an evaluation of this nature.

The above constraints, however, allowed for a somewhat liberal interpretation of the Terms of Reference of this assignment leading to a discussion and analysis also on more fundamental drivers and causes behind the relative strengths and weaknesses of the shelter cluster in West Sumatra.

2.4 Shelter Cluster

The MoU signed with UNOCHA in 2006 committed the Federation to taking a leading role in the provision of shelter in response to natural disasters. Apart from the pledge to increase its own operational capacity the Federation became the co-lead or ‘convener’ of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Shelter Cluster at global level. The Federation further pledged to coordinate at field level agencies providing shelter in natural disasters that call for an international response.

By better defining the roles and responsibilities among organizations within the different sectors of the response, the cluster approach is about addressing gaps and strengthening the effectiveness of humanitarian response. The aim is to ensure better predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies and to make the international humanitarian community a better partner for host governments, local authorities and local civil society.

Partners in the global Shelter Cluster are Care International, CHF International, Norwegian Refugee Council, OCHA, Oxfam, Shelter Centre and UN Habitat. At country level, a global member, local and national government and any NGO involved in emergency shelter may be a cluster partner. Emergency Shelter is one of only two clusters co-chaired by agencies other than UN or IOM.

When activated, The Shelter Cluster provides an organized forum for agencies in the shelter sector to coordinate. With a core team deployed – Coordinator, Information Manager, and Technical Coordinator – it typically provides a managed website, email/discussion group, minuted meetings, Technical Working Groups (TWIGs), technical shelter assistance, and representation. Through an information management service it helps with de-duplication, needs analysis, who-what-where, advocacy and gap filling. In addition, the SC Team (SCT) facilitates the forming of a joint strategy and access to donors for organizations seeking funding. The SCT liaises with government departments, OCHA, local NGOs and other clusters providing information from the Shelter Cluster and reporting back to the Shelter Cluster on the plans of these stakeholders.

The IASC has designated Global Cluster Leads in 11 areas of humanitarian activity. The most relevant sister-clusters for SC in most interventions are Water & Sanitation (UNICEF), Camp Management & Coordination (IOM), Protection (UNHCR), Early Recovery (UNDP) and Logistics (WFP). Unlike the UN organizations and IOM as leads for their respective clusters, IFRC is not a provider of last resort.

Since 2006, the Shelter Department has deployed Shelter Coordination Teams on a total of 15 occasions. To date, the SC has been activated in the following countries: Indonesia Philippines, Mozambique, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Burkina Faso and El Salvador.
3 CONTEX

3.1 2009 Earthquakes in West Java & West Sumatra

The earthquake that struck southwest Java on 2 September 2009 left approximately 60,000 families homeless and a similar number living in damaged structures across the 15 districts to south of West Java and one district in Central Java. Schools and government offices, shops and other community structures were badly affected.

Rugged terrain and the remoteness of many villages combined with the seemingly random nature of the EQ impact made it difficult for humanitarian agencies to respond effectively. The below map of 14 districts to south of West Java highlights the challenge.

On 30 September 2009 and 1 October 2009 two major earthquakes (EQ) hit an area off the coast of West Sumatra. According to authorities, up to 1,195 people died and another 1,798 people were injured in the disaster. The EQs damaged many public and agricultural assets and also devastated much housing in both rural and urban areas. Damage assessments identified approximately 180,000 houses as being severely or moderately damaged.

T-shelter activities were the largest shelter intervention conducted, and started soon after the emergency phase. With budgets of approximately USD 3,000 per unit 37 agencies committed to providing support to more than 52,000 households.

The area most seriously affected by the EQ covers an area of about 100 km along the coast of West Sumatra and around 50 km inland. The affected area comprised seven districts in the West Sumatra Province – all within a three-hour drive radius. Damage was in a mixture of urban areas, flat rural areas and mountainous rural areas, which were also plagued by landslides.
OCHA registered no less than over 300 agencies on the ground keen to respond. Many agencies had originally come to Indonesia following the Ache Tsunami and, by the time of the West Sumatra EQ they had less to do and even less funding to do it with. These agencies and NGOs congregated in West Sumatra in hopes of setting up new programs and obtaining fresh funding to help the affected populations and keep their own organizations afloat. The number of agencies was disproportionate to the scale of the disaster and created a coordination challenge for the clusters and a disconnect between the national and international responses.

Critique was also directed at the IFRC and SC for having “abandoned” the West Java response with a similar case load (following the September 2010 earthquake) in favor of West Sumatra on false assumption that the emergency shelter needs had been met, a more permanent solution had been figured out, and a clear coordination structure was in place to hand over to. Whatever the criteria for this decision, it appears not to have been based on measurable indicators.

The agencies responsible for cluster coordination in West Sumatra, on the other hand, had a tough time securing surge capacity given the concurrent disasters elsewhere in the region, including Philippines, Vietnam, Samoa and Bhutan.

The IFRC deployed three consecutive rotations of Cluster Coordination Teams for a total of seven months. The first two coordination teams from October till end December focused on emergency response (tarps/tool kits etc.) and laid the groundwork for the coordination of a significant temporary shelter (TS) response until the handover to UN Habitat at the end of April 2010.

The attendance at the SC meetings was exceptionally high throughout starting with 100+ agencies in the first meeting and regular subsequent attendance of around 25-35 agencies during the first months of emergency response.

3.2 Shelter aspects
The housing situation in West Java is quite unique with small communities living in very small geographical areas with very high-density populations. Houses are often joined rather than separated and very little land is utilized outside of the house.

After the EQ, affected families began rebuilding very quickly. This self-recovery occurred almost exclusively on existing plinths though construction methodologies were poor. The need to first clear debris from existing plinths and the close-knit society resulted in a significant number of host families/communities.

Typical of earthquakes, it is the man-made structures that are responsible for most of the damage and casualties. Much of the housing in West Sumatra is built with bricks, a practice which in many cases, due to inappropriate design, causes houses to collapse leaving only limited possibilities to repair them.

In West Sumatra, the traditional and time-tested EQ-resistant house design with wooden structure is less in vogue with families preferring to emulate the colonial/western architecture primarily for status reasons. While sound building techniques exist for brick houses, notably confined masonry, many families are more interested in the appearance of the house at the expense of quality and function and corners are typically cut for cost reasons.

While communities have largely forgotten how to build traditional EQ resistant wooden houses, they may not have acquired the skills to build sound structures out of brick. The high price of timber exacerbates the issue – logging bans coupled with increased export have driven the
timber prices beyond the reach of many households.

This problem is more pronounced with the poor, most vulnerable, populations. Farmers and fishermen are typically also handymen and, while lacking resources, they can within a reasonable timeframe and with proper technical assistance and materials be taught how to build structurally sound homes.

Another aspect of the problem is that, after a major earthquake in a developing country, agencies typically build masses of houses that are not always culturally appropriate, nor sustainable. Often, the homeowner is only minimally involved in the decision-making and construction process. The opportunity to build local capacity is often missed, and in many cases, the houses built after the funding and technical assistance cease is not earthquake-resistant.

Earthquake, while being an imminent disaster, the use of materials from the destroyed houses typically allows for speedy self-recovery for resilient communities.

3.3 Institutional considerations

On a macro and institutional levels, there are important changes taking place in the Disaster Management (DM) context of Indonesia. It is important to see the forest for the trees, as the changes in the context are fundamental, happening fast and affecting everyone in the humanitarian sector.

The Government of Indonesia (Gol) is more and more viewing Disaster Management as priority having also learned valuable lessons of recent major disasters of Aceh Tsunami and Yogy and on how to deal with external actors. One of the manifestations is the recently (2008) established

Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management (BNPB) - a coordination body appointed by and reporting to the nation’s president - and BNPD, its arm at the district level. The Gol is weighing more carefully its options whether to call upon external assistance in the wake of disasters, as happened, for instance in the 2009 West Java EQ where the Gol chose not to request external assistance despite the considerable damage; only in-country assistance without appeals was welcomed.

The private sector involvement in disaster response work is also rapidly getting stronger. Typically within the framework of their respective Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs, major national and multinational companies are allocating major funding toward disaster response work building entire villages with schools, mosques and water & sanitation systems. As an example, following the October 2010 eruption of the Merapi volcano, the private sector invested USD 50 million in the response totally overshadowing the resources from all other institutional sources. The challenge to date has been the reluctance of the private sector to be coordinated and the lack of appreciation for standards, made all the more pronounced given the significant and no doubt increasing funding streams from this sector.

Civil Society – including not just national NGOs but also religious and nationalistic political groups – is becoming more assertive and well resourced. Here, also, the willingness to engage in coordination – particularly if the coordination entails external influences - or to adhere to any particular standards is lagging behind the eagerness to simply act and contribute. External input may be interpreted as interference and therefore frowned upon.

Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) continues to be the most prominent agency in the national disaster management scene. With its unique status as auxiliary to the Gol and access to and presence in local communities makes it an attractive and important partner to national and international actors
Reco

The new, dynamic and outspoken leadership of PMI with its strong resource base is in the process of adding early recovery to its strong focus on emergency response, and, with the support of its international partner network within the Red Cross movement, is developing the necessary structure, competences and Standard Operating Procedures to accomplish just that.

The staggering number of NGOs and other agencies that landed in Indonesia in the aftermath of the Aceh Tsunami – many or whom were able to continue their activities following the funding made available after the Yogya disaster – are running out of financial resources and need to adjust their organizations and operations accordingly. Indonesia is classified as a middle-income country and, as such, will be attracting less and less funding from the external donor community.

The net effect of these significant and rather rapid changes in the fabric of the Indonesian Disaster Management scene are likely to spell a significantly smaller role – or at least significantly different – for the international community. It is foreseen that the emphasis of future cooperation between national and external players will be even more on technical and consultative, rather than financial and operational, support. For fruitful cooperation to exist in the future, regardless of the form it takes, requires that the international community approach the ever more assertive, competent and better-resourced key national actors with a respectful attitude and stronger commitment to relationship building also between disasters.

Regrettably, the stalling Cluster Approach in Indonesia is preventing effective “peace time” engagement by the key international humanitarian actors with relevant national players. This, according to the in-country cluster leads, is primarily due to limited funding for cluster-related preparedness activities, limited capacity for cluster management, and lack of policy guidance on how to relate to the host government.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that all the above developments played a part the West Sumatra response and had implications for the SC work as will be discussed in the following chapters. Outcome would be a better balance of efficiency (private sector) and effectiveness (humanitarian sector).

Dialogue and partnership building are crucial in Indonesia where earthquakes – which are imminent disasters – feature prominently in the hazard profile. The international humanitarian community in general and the Red Cross Movement in particular should stop beating a dead – or dying – horse. The role of institutional donors will diminish both in relative and absolute terms. Opportunities to maintain – and even increase – the relevancy of clusters exist in engaging with the local emerging disaster response actors.

RECOMMENDATION:

- In consultation with the in-country IFRC leadership and PMI, undertake a fact-finding trip to meet with CSR executives of selected private sector companies, religious and political groups and GOI to (i) understand each other’s agendas and mandates, (ii) manage each other’s expectations and build trust in view of disaster response situations, and (iii) open a dialogue on how to improve cooperation during and between disasters.

It seems obvious that the time for shelter and other clusters to act is now, as an edge achieved now will result in cumulative advantage over time increasing the chances for the cluster to maintain - or even increase – its relevance.
4 SHELTER CLUSTER – SET-UP AND HANDOVER

4.1 Cluster activation

In West Java the cluster activation was more about strengthening of the cluster approach to the disaster rather than a full roll out. The SCT was deployed two weeks after the EQ following a request from OCHA to strengthen the shelter response, the most affected sector.

The late arrival posed problems for coordination as active agencies had already established some form of communication network, which risked the SC to be seen as simply adding another layer.

The late deployment does not necessarily reflect badly on SC given the unclearness by the GoI about needs and its statement early on that no assistance was required. This affected the ways in which many agencies responded and made it difficult to attract donor money with few agencies appealing for funds.

Post West Sumatra EQ and following the recommendation of the in-country Humanitarian Coordinator, the inter-agency standing committee (IASC) clusters were activated to ensure effective humanitarian response. Along with Inter-Cluster Coordination by OCHA, the following clusters were activated: Agriculture, Early Recovery, Education, Food, Health, Logistics, Telecommunications, Shelter, WASH and Protection.

In accordance with its global commitment, IFRC deployed a coordination team for the emergency shelter cluster. The SC was originally expected to continue under IFRC leadership until 15 December but, later on, requested by regional government and other stakeholders to extend the coordination role, until the end of April 2010. As activities were winding down, shelter coordination was taken over by UNDP’s early recovery network and a shelter working group lead by UN Habitat in close cooperation with the local government. Coordination also took place at district level and was chaired by the local authorities including the mayor.

The Shelter Cluster was set up in the early days of October, 2009, following discussions between the UN Country Team and the GoI. The IFRC SC Coordinator, assisted by an assistant coordinator and an information management team, started coordinating the inputs of some 50 NGOs, both Indonesian and international, which were active in different forms and at various degrees in the emergency shelter response.

4.2 Staffing

In West Java, the SCT was activated using IFRC and self-funded delegates or personnel funded from different national societies and from an INGO. Though an excellent initiative there appeared areas of confusion and potential conflict.

The team consisted initially of a coordinator, paid with per diem and accommodation costs covered; a volunteer who was not paid but all costs covered: an INGO representative paid via lump sum with no costs covered and a representative from Geneva, both paid and costs covered.

The team members and their deploying national society/INGO were not always aware of their responsibilities and costs to be covered.
One of the problems faced was with accommodation. There was in instant of differing views on where the team should stay and the cost of this. Also, a person not actually being paid could at some point be expected to feel some resentment toward working long hours without direct reward.

Clear unified and similar contract conditions would ease the burden on teams.

The rather robust SCT - composed of TL, deputy, Tech Coordinator and two IMs (initially) - was blessed with competent members and spoiled for choice for TL. The SCT Technical Advisor with his prior successful SC coordination and living experience in the area and with local language skills was a particularly useful asset. The drawback of this was insufficient relaying of these local language communications back to the rest of the team.

The contracting of the Technical Advisor – appointed SC Coordinator after hand-over to UNDP - through Oxfam proved successful for both parties. Oxfam felt more involved in the cluster, which contributed to a strong Oxfam shelter program in the field. In addition, there was value for having a semi-independent agency outside the team that the hired individual could debrief with and discuss details and strategies with.

The initial general impression of this disaster was that it was relatively small, and yet a large and strong coordination team was deployed by IFRC. This gave the expectation in the team that this disaster was being used for other purposes beyond a proportionally relevant deployment. The mentoring arrangement with two IMs for the first five days of the deployment was deemed a successful pilot in creating capacity as well as more and better alliances in IM.

When the disasters in Padang and Manila occurred, within a few days the entire situation was reversed, and without transparent justification or reference to measurable indicators, emergency needs in West Java were concluded as met and the situation was promptly handed over to UNDP with no office or dedicated resources in the area.

This was at least partly due to the other situations/disasters having been viewed as more dire with more actors and more need for coordination. UNDP had from the beginning of the response expressed interest in taking over the coordination role with OCHA expecting only one or two people to attend for the SC so the cluster was not necessarily viewed as short of resources as such. The issue was equally the case of a non-IFRC leading the cluster necessitating a quicker than ideal handover.

Three distinguishable rotations of SC teams were deployed in West Sumatra over the seven months of IFRC-led coordination:

- First rotation from October till November
- Second rotation from November till January
- Third rotation from January till April

There were individual exceptions and overlaps between the rotations, allowing a handover between coordinators.

The role of the cluster evolved with the nature of the response. In broad terms the first rotation – comprising a Coordinator, Deputy Coordinator, two Information Managers and a Technical Coordinator - dealt with the setting up of the SC and its key services with the aim of (i) coordinating the efforts to provide shelter materials to protect the affected populations from the elements, and (ii) laying the groundwork for support for self-recovery and T-shelter assistance.

The second rotation with a Coordinator, Deputy Coordinator and two Information Managers was largely about maintaining the momentum of the SC. They also transitioned meetings to bi-lingual and ensured key documents were produced in Bahasa as well as in English, and developed a
proposal and secured funding for the SC to continue four months into Early Recovery (January to end April 2010).

The third rotation dealt with the challenging transition of the shelter sector into Early Recovery (ER) with the team comprising a Coordinator, an Information Manager and local staff.

On the whole, the SC team members – both national and expatriate – found their respective missions demanding but rewarding creating a good dynamic within the respective rotations. Team compositions also worked well helped by the fact that not only were all expatriate members trained in some key aspect of SC – general, technical and/or Information Management (IM) - but also many of the members had dual capacity (construction & IM or general coordination & construction). Such individuals are valuable as it offers flexibility in the team composition. For instance, in the second rotation that had no specific Technical Coordinator, the function was covered by the coordinator and deputy coordinator that had relevant construction experience. The third rotation functioned well with a Coordinator and an IM with crucial and much valued input from locally hired professional staff.

In the emergency phase, the SCT of six contained five international staff. In the Early Recovery phase, the team of six contained two international staff. Many of the positions were only possible with national staff, adding immense value and context to the team activities.

The most common criticism by several SC team members was the significant and unjustifiable disparities in the level and basis of compensation resulting from the varying remuneration policies of the various sponsoring partners. The team members’ pre-deployment expectations in this respect were also not properly managed. These disparities inevitably surface and it is vital that risks that potentially affect individual work morale, team dynamics and/or a team member’s interest in future SC deployments are eliminated to the extent possible. It is a waste of resources to train new ESC members just to see them leave for other agencies, or the humanitarian field, after the first mission due to the feeling of having been short-changed.

The chronic problem of late arrival of support/staff for SC was another criticism directed at the deployment process. It is vital that the SC be functional in the immediate aftermath of the disaster in order to get the potential shelter actors on board, on the right track and pulling together from as early on as possible. In West Sumatra, whilst the Coordinator of the first rotation was able deploy very quickly to the disaster area, it took 14 days from the EQ for the team to be complete.

This said, the fact that the coordinator that first deployed in West Sumatra transferred from the same job in West Java was much appreciated as – in addition to allowing a relatively rapid re-deployment - he came with a good understanding of in-country dynamics which proved valuable for cluster actors on the ground in West Sumatra. In West Java, this resulted in a rapid handover to a competent successor (previous technical coordinator of the shelter cluster) who was, however, no longer fresh having worked in the field since the deployment of the West Java cluster and now having to face the coordination challenges with a smaller team.

Having SC co-located with UN partners UNDP, OCHA and MapAction after the early emergency phase was hailed as a great success by all parties. This arrangement greatly facilitated the necessary cooperation and coordination.

Having two concurrent professional IMs cover the first two rotation got mixed reviews. Predominantly the feedback was positive and the arrangement ensured a very robust and much-acclaimed service to stakeholders. On the other hand, there were issues in the beginning as to the defining of the roles (the more junior IM had arrived in the country before the somewhat
more senior one) and during the second rotation it was felt that one IM would have sufficed. The working relationship between the two IMs ended up being very fruitful and complimentary although an unjustifiable and significant disparity in salaries between the two caused some annoyance. Once the roles were clearly defined, the advantages of having two IMs included (i) the mentoring of a new IM manager could take place; and (ii) the division of tasks meant that the IMs could spend more time in the field and working with key members of the cluster.

Deploying two IMs should allow sufficient capacity for field visits for the understanding of the context and needs first hand. As the quality of field intelligence in general and assessment data in particular play a crucial role in the provision of useful IM service, and ultimately, in the design of appropriate programs for affected communities, the undertaking of regular due diligence by IM is fully justified and to be encouraged.

A similar issue arose with the deployment of the 1st rotation deputy coordinator whose ToR was identical to that of the Coordinator causing confusion amongst the team members, if not with the Coordinator and his deputy themselves.

None of the Shelter Cluster coordination team were deployed with appropriate work visas, and so had to go on visa runs or pay fines on exit. This is wasteful in terms of time and money and should be avoided.

The senior IM ended up staying with the SC for the full seven months and the continuity this allowed was generally well received by team members and stakeholders alike, although some understandable slight symptoms of burn-out in the IM were detected by fellow team members. Staying that long on a relatively demanding mission such as 2009 West Sumatra would with most people lead to burnout jeopardizing an important component of the SC. In the exceptional cases when such long mission may be justified, the Coordinator/TL needs to ensure that adequate time is set aside for R&R as a necessary preventive measure.

Secondments from SC partner NGOs worked reasonably well administratively and otherwise, although there were delays in the contract procedure between IFRC and Oxfam that one seconded team member found frustrating. Care International understood what the cluster system is about and the seconded team member felt they were very supportive of the SCT member’s role within the cluster.

The only reported significant shortcoming with the secondments was the security briefing. While those SC team members that were on a Red Cross contract were clearly under the security umbrella of the Federation, it was never very clear who was responsible for the security briefings of the seconded team members. One seconded team member was finally requested by CARE UK to sign an IFRC document that referred to other documents she was never given a chance to read but which she was expected to comply with.

The Shelter Coordination Team members were was sent in with virtually no briefings as to the country context. It seems extraordinary that despite the considerable number of prior SC deployments there were no documents regarding lessons learnt internationally or in Indonesia.

A competent environmental advisor was deployed after much delay and was available for a few weeks only. This delay was disappointing as there was strong interest shown by cluster agencies and it seems very clear that considerable impact on programming is possible and that awareness raising is a powerful tool for this issue.

A crucial role was played by the Community Liaison Officer, who, regrettably, was not hired until the third rotation of the SC. The SCT was able to identify a very capable and strong advocate (activist) for the community who was hired primarily to capture the voice of the affected people
voice regarding their problems and needs, identify community responses and, based on her findings, give feedback to the SCT and suggest activities to be undertaken. Having direct access to a community voice was invaluable for the SCT particularly in shaping decisions and for interacting with all levels of local government.

She offered the following somber opinion during the interview - an opinion that is felt by many but expressed by precious few:

“The mindset of foreign agencies should change and they should realize that they cannot resolve all the housing and other issues of the affected households but only to contribute to their bigger aspirations. Discuss people first before shelter and houses. Ensure that what is delivered does not waste time, energy and resources of the agencies themselves - or of the beneficiaries. Do not view the affected families and communities as ignorant victims only, as incidentals needed to run programs and to get funding. Do not burden the already burdened with something they do not need or want.”

RECOMMENDATIONS:

• Develop/streamline the pay schemes of the ESC team. It makes more sense to invest effort in a just and transparent remuneration policy than in training new SC team members whose potentially worsened work morale during mission - due to unjustifiable and unequal salaries amongst the team members – risks having a negative impact on the team dynamics and interest in future SC deployments.

• To allow for flexibility in SC team composition and to increase the speed of deployment, develop a flexible and dynamic SC roster with emphasis on individuals who, amongst other considerations, (i) possess more than one of the skills relevant to running of the SC - combinations of general coordination/leadership, technical, IM; (ii) have first hand working experience in countries – such as Indonesia - with frequent and major shelter responses; (iii) are used to or have ambitions toward dynamic and hectic short term missions.

• As a priority amongst priorities, ensure strong translation skills (written and spoken) in the team from day one till the day of handover in order to establish and maintain a strong cooperation with local communities, GOI and local leadership and to tap into the local response capacity and potential. Include simultaneous translation kit in the Shelter Cluster Coordination Box and use it in meetings from day one.

• In selected countries and regions, establish a relationship, understanding and a procedure whereby local staff – ideally with the support of the RCRC national society - could be contracted without a risk of liability issues. Create a roster of local staff for future (inevitable) responses. Consider the hiring of local staff from the beginning of the deployment as useful extra capacity and/or replacement of expatriates.

• On future deployments of the SC, seek as the first preferred option, to be co-located with the key UN partners. Reach an understanding and agreement on an institutional level with the UN partners that such preference for co-location is a shared goal.

• In cases where two IMs get deployed for the same rotation, encourage field visits by the SCT to better understand and appreciate the field realities and needs and in order to validate the numbers through more qualitative means. Include field visits in the IM ToR.

• Acquire from PMI/IFRC country delegation a commitment to support the visa applications of

• SC team members for all future responses that entail the SC activation.

• Share CVs - or short bios - of SCT members prior to deployment to manage expectations and to facilitate quick “gelling” of the team on the ground.

• When double manning of a position in the SC team is justified, have TL divide the
responsibilities upfront so as to avoid potential confusion and frustration and loss of effectiveness of the SC. Consider drafting at least tentative ToRs for such eventualities bearing in mind that a degree of flexibility in the content is warranted to allow local adaptation to the situation at hand.

• With SC missions of longer than one month of duration, ensure that – as a policy - adequate R&R is provided to prevent burn out and consequent negative impact on team dynamics and proper functioning of the SC.

• Streamline security policies with all partner NGOs and ensure there are no gaps or misunderstandings/misperceptions regarding security management of the SCT members. Ensure that the Coordinator as Team leader is aware and supportive of these security policies and procedures regarding all staff under his responsibility.

• Establish and maintain a centralized archive of key material of the most disaster prone countries and distribute to SC coordinator upon deployment. Re-design a semi-structured EoM format and manage the reporting process to gain longitudinal and cross-functional data on progress and issues related to SC management. Include EoM in the respective ToRs. Benchmark with corresponding FACT procedures where appropriate.

• Deploy an environmental adviser as early as possible – and prepare for a longer than a one-month deployment - in order to influence agency programming and to provide basic training and documents to cluster coordinators.

• Include the role of Community Liaison Officer as a regular SCT member from the outset.

• Ensure a roster is developed and kept of suitable candidates to ensure speedy hiring process on SC activation. Develop an appropriate ToR for the position.

• Continue mentoring approach in IM and other functions in future ESC missions.

4.3 IFRC (PMI, PNS) support

Many of the opinions and statements in the humanitarian field - even within the Red Cross Movement - reflect not only a lack of appreciation for but also limited understanding of the purpose of the Cluster Approach in general and the IFRC's role and responsibilities as the global cluster lead for shelter in particular.

Apart from the challenges faced by SCT in the field, there are some important institutional issues that affect the management of the team directly and indirectly. While acknowledging the good reputation and technical competence of the SCTs, many influential individuals in the Movement see the IFRC role as the global lead for the SC compromise some of the traditions and basic principles of the movement. The cluster approach is perceived by many as a “UN system” ill-befitting the basic principle of neutrality and as compromising the IFRC commitment to the National Societies.

Another point of contention is the resourcing of the cluster deployments. According to some, Emergency Appeals are there to raise funding for the National Societies of disaster affected countries, not for SC that is not seen as having direct enough relevance for IFRC supported operations, particularly as the SC acts under the IASC, not IFRC, banner.

Equally, the efforts required of IFRC in-country management to deal with the SC coordination are often perceived as an extra burden – and an extra layer in the national DM structure – and by no means a priority. Also, active involvement of RCRC National Societies in cluster work remains very much a moot point due to reasons of national politics and resources. According to skeptics there is a disconnect between expectations and reality when it comes to greater involvement of NSs in the management of the in-country SCs.
The SCT in West Sumatra was largely self-sufficient and the firewall between the RC Programme and the SCT was intact. The Red Cross largely interacted with the SCT in the same way as with an international NGO.

SCT recognized the useful contributions of selected PNSs. French Red Cross seconded a technical expert who at no cost to SC and without prior SC experience successfully coordinated a TWIG which created the toolkit components for the cluster. Also, German and Spanish Red Cross both provided input and assistance with meetings and logistics in the first 3-4 days.

The PMI chose not to support any member of the coordination team with visas as, according to a senior PMI officer, the SCT was seen as part of the UN system and not related to the Red Cross.

It was unsettling for some members of the SCT that the SC status and role were not well understood by all in-country IFRC delegates, PMI and PNS colleagues. This is no doubt testimony to the fact that across the Movement, there is a poor understanding and buy-in to the SC, its commitments and purpose. Far better support in terms of the basics - security briefing, visas, other logistics – had been hoped for and there could have been much stronger participation in the SC by PMI. The dynamics might have turned out different had IFRC from early on deployed a Shelter Delegate in its team.

Regarding West Java deployment, the IFRC Indonesia deputy HoD was actively involved in the early days cluster activation process at the Jakarta end which proved helpful. She also acted as Jakarta based liaison for the SC. This said, her involvement in the process was felt to be by default, not, apparently, because that was “what she should have been doing”, according to the understanding at the Jakarta office.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

• Make relevant IFRC in-country delegates aware of the IFRC responsibility for carrying out SC obligations, and train them not only in Emergency Shelter but also in the Cluster Approach in general. Write this goal in the ToR of the Head of Delegation (HoD). Encourage in-country and regional DM delegates to deploy as SCT members and ensure debriefings carried out by country HoDs.

• Together with the DMUs of the IFRC zone offices, identify which NSs might be appropriate, capable and willing to act as pilot case to assume a role in SC in-country work and agree what the respective roles could be. Engagement with SC should not have negative impact on the status vis-à-vis the government and other partners.

4.4 Handovers

4.4.1 Internal

Contrary to what had been the reality in previous SCT deployments, in West Sumatra there was an appropriate handover period for both incoming coordinators. The days together were seen as invaluable to allow the incoming coordinator to observe the dynamics of the team, the situation and be introduced to a number of counterparts. Handover notes alone, no matter how comprehensive, could not have replaced this overlap in mission periods.

That said, more thought should be given to establishing clear guidance and protocol for handovers, a system that would from day one of the deployment take into account the inevitable upcoming handover to a successor.
4.4.2 External
Due to the earthquake in West Sumatra the pressure to hand over in West Java was significant. The coordination team had already lost members to respond to disasters in Africa and the Philippines leaving the West Java SCT with few options. While having showed interest in taking over the SC from the outset, the sudden departure of the SC Coordinator (for West Sumatra) placed a great deal of pressure on the UNDP that they were not ready for.

The two key staff handed over by IFRC to UNDP could not totally salvage a proper handover process to an agency with no fulltime staff on the ground, no office and with slow hiring and admin procedures, and – as with most big agencies at that point – newly shifted focus on West Sumatra.

While the destruction and needs in both West Java and West Sumatra were significant, the relatively low death toll and the destruction in pockets with difficult access resulted in low media interest, delayed donor funding and agencies racing off to West Sumatra.

The decision for handover of the cluster from IFRC to UNDP appeared to based more on the needs and desires of both organizations than on any measurable indicators to show a clear change in shelter recovery. In reality, emergency shelter needs were insufficiently dealt with, although even this remains a moot point as a proper of shelter needs assessment was also lacking.

Ideally the Shelter Strategy as agreed to by the cluster should include clear and measurable indicators to show that the emergency phase of shelter coordination is over and IFRC’s responsibilities have been addressed.

One rough draft example for emergency shelter handover indicators was drafted by the SC Tech Advisor which is included in the below table:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

• Establish a simple standard operating procedure for handover including ”10 key documents you need to read”

• Agree on a standard protocol on how to hire local staff in Indonesia. Include instructions for the local IFRC delegation also on how to assist SCT in this respect
## Example Handover Indicators for Emergency Shelter Cluster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency shelter needs</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Shelter Needs have been resolved</td>
<td>• The majority of Emergency shelter needs have been met and plans are in place to complete the remainder within a reasonable time</td>
<td>• 90% of all families with destroyed homes have received tent/tarp across the entire affected area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional shelter Needs</td>
<td>Transitional solutions are defined and have commenced</td>
<td>• The cluster has resolved the next forward post emergency shelter and have largely resolved designs and plans in conjunction with Gov</td>
<td>• Cluster has produced an Interim Shelter strategy that has been agreed upon by government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Housing needs</td>
<td>Permanent long term solution to shelter Insecurity has been now clear</td>
<td>• The long term shelter security of the affected community will be addressed</td>
<td>• Government plans are in place for permanent shelter assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for coordination</td>
<td>Ongoing coordination mechanism are in place for clear handover</td>
<td>• Undisturbed effective and timely coordination of the shelter sector</td>
<td>• Another agency has agreed to take on board coordination and has sufficient resources in the field OR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In **West Sumatra**, it fell on the second SCT rotation to develop various handover scenarios that would take into account a number of options on how – and by whom - the management of SC could most effectively and appropriatly be carried forward. With advocacy support from the ER Cluster Coordinator (hired by UNDP), funding was made available by OFDA, and it was decided for the IFRC team to carry on with the task of SC coordination until the handover to UN Habitat on April 30th.

This process took vast amounts of time and energy of the SCT team. Burdening the team with these discussions and negotiations without having the authority to decide was seen as inappropriate and frustrating and much more of these deliberations should have taken place in Geneva.

UNOCHA and UNDP developed an Early Recovery Network (ERN) to assist the government to liaise with and coordinate the activities of non-government stakeholders beyond the cluster phase. UN habitat was also planning programs in recovery and reconstruction and the SCT completed a comprehensive joint handover to these two bodies in late April with UN Habitat taking on the role of shelter focal point.

The end April 2010 formal handover of the SC – backed up by detailed hand-over documentation - was seen as exemplary and received much praise from both UN Habitat and OCHA for its comprehensiveness and organization and for managing to keep the momentum of the shelter sector.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Balance responsibility and authority in such a way that the bulk of the (handover) discussions
and negotiations take place where such decisions are taken.
• Improve understanding and effectiveness of the handover process by starting the process early with engagement from day one of the cluster activation by the agency meant to take over. Agree on criteria and conditions for handover. This process should not be a question of whether or to whom but once the pre-agreed criteria are met, handover results. Ensure two-pronged approach with simultaneous work and attention by Geneva decision makers.

• Develop and include in the Cluster Strategy documents clear indicators for the end of emergency shelter phase. Handover triggers might include the following: (i) Emergency shelter needs met according to measurable indicators; (ii) More permanent solution and the bridge to T-shelter phase figured out, and (iv) Clear coordination structure to hand over to exists.

5 CLUSTER ACTIVITIES

5.1 Strategy

Early on in the West Java operation the shelter cluster formed an umbrella strategy that broadly guided the response while the creation of a more detailed strategy was difficult due to the ambiguousness and lateness of GoI plans.

The cluster continuously faced external pressure to rapidly develop clear concise strategic frameworks for its operations. The development of the strategy was not particularly successful or meaningful process as there was only limited ‘ownership’ of the strategy by cluster members, being perceived as an alien top down process. This perception is probably well founded as, reportedly, the deputy SC wrote the strategy by himself and brought it to the SC meeting where “no-one was ever going to object to it.”

With this kind of approach there is a risk of SC adding an extra layer with limited value-added and effectiveness.

Although all three SCT rotations in West Sumatra put significant effort into strategy development, they all used different approaches and processes to do it.

On October 8, SCT had developed a provisional strategy that was well structured but at the time still based on imperfect available data and relying on the collective prior experience of the SCT from previous similar disasters. The document highlighted needs, concerns and planned activities for the SC with the idea that the document serve as a basis for debate and discussion in the SC and be improved in the process. Approximately five weeks into the disaster the initial strategy was followed up by an ER focused strategy draft. This kind of approach, while perhaps somewhat aggressive, may be the only reasonable alternative in the early weeks of a disaster. A second more ER focused strategy paper document was drafted at the end of October.

The second rotation chose a somewhat different approach. Having inherited the rough ER focused strategy from the first SCT rotation, they strived for a finished product before releasing it. Despite, or because of, consulting SC partner in the process, this stalled the strategy process and left the SC officially without forward-looking strategic guidance. This, however, was not too big a problem in practice as the strategy for emergency was still being applied and the SC otherwise was functioning well.

It was the third rotation that arguably put the most emphasis on SC strategy development looking at the related issues both from practical and academic perspective. The main challenge perceived/faced by the team was the constant and rapid state of change and how this impacted the activity of agencies. As soon as a strategy could be developed it would become redundant.

The answer the team found to the problem was to simplify the SC cluster management process.
Under a new method – highlighted in the below graph\(^1\) - a situation report that identified current needs and responses was produced on a regular basis and from this the cluster strategy developed and updated and a work plan for the SCT was determined and revised. The three interacting documents were simultaneously revised and a strategic advisory group (SAG) was formed for those agencies planning involvement in permanent housing.

![Graph showing the relationship between TOR, Situation Report/update, Stakeholder (cluster) Strategy, and Cluster Working Documents]

The third rotation strategy focused on the following:

- T-shelter programs with the specific output of a temporary shelter;
- T-shelter programs with a flexible range of options for households;
- Permanent Housing Support i.e. construction of part or full permanent houses.

The government promoted confined masonry as the preferred design option for home reconstruction. However, when built poorly from the technical or material perspective these buildings become potential death traps. The GoI was reluctant to engage in debate over the issue, and, in the end, agencies adopted a wide range of responses.

As households shifted emphasis from temporary shelter to permanent housing and as the government started implementing its cash grant program, more flexible approaches by agencies would have been warranted. This, however, proved very difficult with the agencies having locked-in to their respective plans and were quite reluctant to change them despite the constantly changing circumstances and needs of the beneficiaries.

Despite a common SC cluster strategy, the lack of authority by SCT to police it led to agencies deviating from standards and adopting program designs that led to the following important shortcomings in the shelter sector:

- The adoption of widely varied budgets (from 1500 – above 3000 USD) caused major intra-community equity problems during implementation and several agencies had disputes over operational areas.
- Although roughly 30% of all damage was in the urban area of Padang, responses planned by agencies were disproportionately low for this area – initially only 3%.
- An estimated 50% of the TS are still unoccupied at the time of this writing with some of them

\(^1\) From the document “100421 Coordination of fluid situations.docx”
being used for livelihood purposes, as shops and warehouses etc²

It is a delicate balance between the coordination team’s “need to act quickly” & “experience in having done it before” and the needs of the cluster. Currently, the adopted approach with characteristics of “plug ‘n’ play” does not necessarily adequately go through a process of creation and ownership. Whether drafting strategies and putting them to the cluster for approval is the way to go, remains a moot point. Ultimately, for strategy documents to serve their purpose they must reflect cluster desires and are all about inclusion and ownership – a tall order for any cluster team to coordinate.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Develop a standard/recommended format for strategy.

- Position the SC strategy document as a "living document" and improve the content upon receipt of feedback – don’t wait/polish it till its perfect, “the process is the perfection”. Consider refining the methodology for “dealing with fluid situations” and offer it as a useful straightforward coordination tool.

- Coordinators to make every effort to establish program budget consistency in strategy – one agency offering double the support of another in the same area may create more problems than it solves. Address this also at the Global level with donors.

5.2 Communications

5.2.1 Google group

In West Java, in addition to the Google group, the Dropbox system proved very effective, thanks to reasonable internet access. The effectiveness could be further enhanced with one global shared Dropbox folder that follows the same file structure as that used by the team containing best practice examples in key folders ready for use by the team. Handing over the Dropbox to UNDP was a helpful aspect in the otherwise challenging handover.

The Google Group created for the SC in West Sumatra worked well and was reported to have been more active than in previous SC deployments. Informal feedback from Cluster agencies was very positive – the page was well structured and user friendly and was emulated by other clusters. The Group provided an all-in-one source of information and updates as well as a discussion board for members. This vastly facilitated coordination amongst agencies, allowing them to take an active role in the process.

This said, there are still limits to its usefulness in terms of Internet access and language. Lack of Bahasa Indonesian was the main drawback to the website.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Use the West Sumatra format as a basis for future missions.

- Define what the key documents are and find a way to communicate the translated versions via Google groups, or otherwise, to local NGOs.

- Include in future websites a prominent list at the top which recommends the top few documents to download: the strategy, situation report, latest shelter reports, and coverage maps.

² This estimate was supplied by two sources: a representative of the local academia specialized in shelter and a professional individual working within the communities in the affected region.
• Analyze which are the “must have” have components of the website and design a template and layout that caters also for local language content and interaction.

• In consultation with relevant key partners (UNDP, UN Habitat and IOM) create a “Best Practice Dropbox” for shelter sector that runs parallel with the SCT Dropbox.

5.2.2 Language
Quite early in the deployment the SCT in West Java was able to receive translation equipment from UNDP and hired a translator. This was extremely valuable in encouraging local NGOs to meetings and facilitated a much greater understanding of the process.

In the first week however the team was fortunate to have a relatively fluent Indonesian speaker on the team. While valuable, it also proved at times too easy to rely on this team member for translation, which put extra pressure on the individual. Having local language skills in the core team is, however, no substitute for having good liaison officers and translators. Translation is a very specific skill set, best undertaken by an objective third party.

Meetings conducted bilingually resulted in significantly greater participation by local actors and a smoother transfer to what later on turned into meetings conducted fully in the local language.

The majority of stakeholders that took part in the cluster work in West Sumatra applauded SC for being approachable – “they listened” - and for responding well to emails and phone calls. SC set an example for the other clusters.

However, against prior cluster management experience in Indonesia, the SC meetings were initially run in English which was one of the most commonly raised criticisms of the SC. Even by SCT own admission, the lack of local language skills in the coordination team was its greatest weakness, as it restricted engagement with local agencies and government counterparts.

With the local NGO’s invaluable and intimate knowledge of the communities coupled with the fundamental and fast changes in the Indonesian DM context (see discussion in the ‘context’ section) – not to say anything about common courtesy – the clusters without proper local language communication strategy and capability were partly out on a limb and seen by many as an exclusive international club.

The language issue was felt to be a major contributing factor to the sidelined of local NGOs into their own local forum as well as to the separate government coordination efforts with only limited, if any, capacity building by the SC. This almost certainly increased the growing antipathy between local NGOs and the national disaster management authority and the international cluster system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the language was one of the key reasons why GoI and PMI chose not the engage fully in the SC.

To highlight the importance of the simultaneous translation, the participation of local NGOs went up significantly once the service was provided. It would be tempting to speculate how the shelter strategies and agency programs might have been more effective had there been (i) a stronger input from local stakeholders - those closer to the affected communities, and (ii) more national staff to engaged at the community level at an earlier stage – from the beginning. At any rate, it is likely that a more balanced SC forum would have contributed to higher than 50% TS occupancy rates and to fewer funds spent on tents that were mostly inappropriate and expensive given the culture and context.

RECOMMENDATION:
• Recruit as soon as possible on deployment local staff with professional written and oral translation skills; Make all key documents available in the local language; Offer simultaneous translation at all key meetings; Include simultaneous translations equipment as standard equipment in the SC kit.

5.3 Information Management

Information management by SCT worked well both in West Java and in West Sumatra. The subsequent section focuses on the latter where material for review was more readily available.

The database created by the SCT IM in West Sumatra was ultimately adopted by almost all of the other clusters greatly strengthening both the shelter clusters position and the IM network generally. Shelter was by far the biggest component in the overall response, but even agencies and people who were not planning to do shelter programs came to the SC meetings as SC had the best (organized) data of all clusters. As a representative of one major agency commented: “SC asked: what would you like to know? - and then delivered.”

Government participation in large coordination meetings was limited. Whilst the SC provided information on shelter activities as requested by the various government agencies, the SC struggled to get either detailed damage data or up-to-date information of government distributions and plans.

District and sub-district level government damage data was available, but no consolidated data below this level was ever shared. There were also questions as to the accuracy of this damage data, as well as skepticism around the government housing damage classification process.

Also, the reporting template proved too complex for many agencies, particularly local ones. The initial reporting format introduced to the agencies included P-codes that were no longer valid with a mismatch between the codes and locations. This caused considerable confusion and waste of time.

It was subsequently felt that with the robust IM capacity, the SC would perhaps not have needed a reporting format at all. Having agencies submit whatever they normally do for their internal reporting requirements for the coordination team to then enter it into the database would have made the process more inclusive and effective. Filling in any gaps in these answers by speaking to people would then be more straightforward than deciphering poorly completed reports.

The database was shared online, which enabled agencies to check the information on their activities and to look at details on other agencies’ activities. Not everyone could access the Google group regularly and not everyone was comfortable with Excel, but this was probably worth doing for those that were.

As long as the amount of data on activities was large and there was a lack of detailed and accurate damage and needs data, efforts made to produce analytical maps showing coverage / gaps seemed somewhat wasted. Also, maps are dangerous to the extent that the data they are based on is inaccurate as maps are a very powerful and impactful. Good IM tool does not rectify poor data, it only reinforces it.

In the beginning, when accurate data was difficult to come by, the SCT found the straightforward ‘who, what, where’ maps, as well as very simple tables more effective and appropriate. Once more reliable damage data was available in January 2010, the emphasis switched to coverage maps, which proved valuable in identifying areas for assistance.
Annex 3 highlights the following samples of the tables and maps produced by the SCT:

- District coverage of emergency shelter support, without self"recovery rate
- District coverage of transitional shelter support, with self"recovery rate
- Summary of agency activities by District
- Early recovery phase A0 map showing transitional shelter coverage

Even with these easy to read “who-what-where” maps overlaid onto accurate maps with detailed damage estimates, and the direct discussion this allowed in SC meetings, the agencies often proved reluctant to relocate or modify programs in case of overlap. Requests for sharing of assessment data had a poor response. Agencies were surprisingly reluctant to relocate or modify programs especially when specific results had been promised to donors or management.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- When government data might be delayed or not expected to come at all, organize without delay the collecting of data from secondary sources by a coordinated assessment process. Focus on rough & ready survey and simple tables, hire people to do it.
- Introduce a simpler reporting format, a list of questions, for a more inclusive, effective and speedy process and for a simpler information management overall.
- Consider introducing a simplified reporting format based on email answers to the following questions: (1) Where are you working; (2) What partners are you working with?; (3) What are you distributing / providing?; (4) How many households will receive this?; (5) What are your start and end dates?

5.4 **Assessments**

The IFRC team deployed in West Java faced the challenge of non-availability of assessments. While acknowledging the need for additional resources and training, it appears only sensible that this be considered as a standing component of coordination deployment.

UNDP offered to facilitate a multi-sectorial needs assessment, though this apparently never occurred. This is by all accounts a key issue for the SC, as without clear assessment it hard for the cluster to be well directed.

Maps showing actors against needs were only available two months into the disaster and the lack of GIS capacity within the team proved a clear shortcoming.

As is the case in most disasters, the agencies in landed to a very unclear situation in West Sumatra with an immediate and clear need for a shelter needs assessment to guide activities. The lack of dedicated funds and resources to conduct an assessment greatly hampered the effectiveness of the shelter efforts and the entire response.

There was a decision taken in the very early days of the disaster to use a joint assessment tool developed by the ECB agencies to provide the initial rapid assessment. The ‘rapid assessment’ form was a cumbersome 10-pager and the results of this exercise were considered unsatisfactory both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Although nearly roughly 30% of all damage was in the urban area of Padang responses planned by agencies were disproportionately low for this area – initially only 3%. The SC and agencies were not keen to take on the challenge to find out or attend to shelter needs in the urban area. Potential liability issues with rehabilitation of buildings and the lack of access to land by many affected families were factors that made the urban needs a “taboo” for the agencies.
To finally respond to this major gap and at the request of the shelter cluster the SCT conducted a major assessment in Padang in March 2010. With funding secured from Oxfam and Mercy Corps the assessment was completed over a six-week period using a consultant with over 70 Red Cross and university volunteers who interviewed over 2,000 households. The assessment data provided was well received and encouraged agencies to approach an area previously avoided.

Much neglected factor by agencies in West Sumatra is the female influence in the communities which are largely matriarchal. According to research, it is the women who build 60-70% of the shelters. Female morbidity and mortality rates are also twice that of men. Despite this socio-demographic reality, the data collected following the disaster was gender blind.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Complement early assessments with several spot surveys in the field. Ensure constant direct contact with the conditions in the field for a realistic shelter strategy.

- Tailor a joint assessment to the particular emergency rapidly and secure resources – “seed money” to which other agencies can contribute. Arrange the training of assessors, carry out the assessment and compile the results.

- Build on the methodology used by SCT to develop a useful assessment tool for future assessments in an urban environment.

- In future similar context to 2009 West Sumatra EQ, the way forward could be as follows: organize training for 20-30 local NGO persons in rapid assessment methodology and analysis. Equip the team with GPSs & vehicles for 10-14 days in the field.

- Ensure the assessment data collected is gender segregated.

- Map the need for GIS capacity for the SC roster and, if needed, build capacity through training and/or partnerships

**5.5 Coordination & Leadership**

The SC meetings in **West Java** attracted steady attendance from around 20 agencies. The late availability of funding meant that proposals for shelter beyond tarps were not approved until about two months into the response, which then finally triggered the forming of Technical Working Groups.

Cooperation with BNBP suffered from a basic lack of understanding of the cluster, its aim and mandate. Also, GOI was often missing from the SC meetings, which contrasts with the idea that GOI should actually need to at least co-chair the meetings for reasons of protocol and lest they lose interest.

With all its shortcomings, the IFRC led Shelter cluster team appears to have been the key group for coordination in the West Java Earthquake Response, providing real value to cluster members, donors and the government.

From the beginning, the attendance at the Shelter Cluster in **West Sumatra** was strong with approximately 40 international organizations involved in the twice-weekly (initially) meetings and various technical working groups. Other important stakeholders included OCHA and other cluster leads. Cluster lead meetings and general coordination meetings also took place twice a week.
The level of organization reflected the fact that the Shelter Cluster knew what it was doing and the high attendance at coordination meetings was testament to their value. In addition to serving to improve coordination between agencies within the Cluster the degree of organization attracted agencies – even those not directly involved in shelter activities - to the shelter sector.

The team did well throughout in sharing the responsibility for preparing and presenting; structuring meetings clearly; and keeping good records of discussions and actions.

Each SC Coordinator had his individual leadership style but they were all generally viewed as professional, enthusiastic and good at mentoring. The Coordinators were able to gain the respect of both the stakeholders and the team members under their leadership.

A SCT performance management survey was administered 'live' amongst SC participants. Enjoying a response rate of 75% the ESC work was seen as relevant and gave a reasonably clear idea about the strengths and weaknesses of the cluster. The interview feedback from agencies that actively participated in the SC generally applauded the professionalism, enthusiasm, fairness and transparency of the SC corroborating the results of the survey.

The drawback of the survey was the fact that it did not capture the crucial voice of many of the local NGOs, PMI and GoI. Online approach was considered but response rate was expected to have dropped by a very large percentage. The cumulative tracking of the attendance did not allow for longitudinal observation of stakeholder participation, normally a good indicator of the relevancy of the cluster.

The fact that SC was able to capture and add value to the operations of the key international agencies with the largest shelter volumes belies the fact that SC was unable to fully engage the GoI and PMI as well as many potentially useful local NGOs with unique understanding of the local communities and their needs.

Government participation in large coordination meetings was limited and one-on-one meetings with government representatives proved more effective, if not the only choice.

It was felt by some that not only did the Clusters not complement in-country capacities, they obliged Government structures to adapt to them. This in part led to the perception that there were parallel systems in aid coordination with the GoI (and PMI) on one side, and the clusters on the other. This despite the fact that special consideration was demonstrably given by SC Coordinators to keeping the Red Cross/PMI updated on the activities of the Shelter Cluster, particularly as PMI were a significant actor in the shelter sector but were not regularly represented in the Shelter Cluster Meetings nor forthcoming with their plan numbers.

This, again, points to the necessity for the clusters to build trust and networks outside of disasters – engage on a more strategic level - and recognize that the role of the cluster will inevitably change with the fast and fundamental changes of the DM context in the country.

Some of the critical decisions by the shelter sector – some against the better judgment of the SC - were seen by some as having detrimental and possibly long-lasting effect on the DM of Indonesia:

- The authorization of sub-standard tarps, on the grounds that others were not available in country, reversing the exact opposite decision that was made in Yogyka earthquake.
- The decision by SC to impose Sphere standards by publicly disapproving of the work of one well-resourced and politically connected local NGO, that led to that NGO losing face and causing the temporary evacuation of international staff from Padang due to security
concerns. In all fairness, however, it seems clear that, at least to an extent, the SC and the international community fell victims of exploitation for political gain in the run-up period to elections without which the incident might have passed without too much public notice.

- T-shelters provided were not readily accepted by the communities – 50% of the TS are unoccupied at the time of this writing and the beneficiaries are staying in their old unsafe homes. This donor-driven one-size-fits-all approach crowded out a larger and arguably more appropriate distribution of cash grants (with strings attached) – and/or material distributions to support self-recovery - with technical assistance.

The UN was involved in an update of the country contingency plan and the Coordinator of the SC third rotation on behalf of IFRC Indonesia took part in these discussions. The most interesting possibility to arise from this was the suggestion that trainings in cluster coordination could be conducted for Indonesian nationals and that these persons could be deployed with international coordinators to co – chair clusters.

A number of TWIGs were set up in the early days of the response to address, in the first instance, self-recovery that had gotten under way rapidly.

TWIG–generated strategy based on the adapting of pre-existing material from previous earthquakes in the region was a good one, although this did not happen in a timely and efficient manner. This appeared to be partly due to lack of clear communication as to who was leading the TWIG as well as lack of adequate follow-up from the cluster in the early days.

On arrival of the Technical Coordinator, two TWIGs had already been set up: one on bamboo – its suitability and availability; and the other on tool kit (with French Red Cross support). The outcome of the latter was two agreed sets of tool kits: Individual emergency tool kit and community shelter (clean up) tool kit. Oxfam had also led a brick survey throughout the affected region. Focus was shifting rapidly onto the issue of transitional shelter. During the second rotation a TWIG for Public Outreach and Build Back Better was set up with active participation by the UN Habitat.

Actively participating agencies participating in transitional shelter TWIG included: Build Change, CARE, CHF, CordAid, CRS, Emergency Architects, Habitat for Humanity, IRD, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, PMI/IFRC, Relief International, SLA, UN Habitat, UNDP and USAID/OFDA.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Continue with the ‘live’ SC performance surveys on SCT performance. Provide local language version of the survey, simplify the wording and limit/focus questions for added user friendliness and easier management of the process and interpretation of results.

- Track the number of stakeholders attending each meeting to serve as an important indicator of the evolving relevancy and usefulness of the SC work.

- Follow up with the UN on the discussions on training Indonesian national as co-chairs for the cluster.

**5.6 Advocacy**

Both West Java and West Sumatra had significant needs but only the latter received an agency and door response anywhere near proportionate to the requirements (part explanation is provided in the section on context). The SC Coordinator – once transferred from West Java to West Sumatra – did lobby with shelter actors for a more robust response for West Java. Any success of this effort has
not been measured/documented.

All of the three SCT rotations in West Sumatra were active in advocacy according to the changing requirements of the operational context. The main focus of the first team was on promotion of T-shelters. The advocacy work was no doubt well executed as it made significant waves even at the HQs of important institutional donors. Despite the good effort the impact on funding availability was limited due to the GoI not supporting T-shelters and most donors' hands being tied by bi-lateral policy agreements with the GoI.

The second SC rotation endorsed cash grants and technical assistance through a well-formulated advocacy letter on the relevant best practices that was about the "provision of technical assistance that helps channeling spending of cash grants in line with standards for safe and durable construction, close on-site monitoring to ensure correct use of cash grants, encouragement of the use of salvaged materials and mobilization of community solidarity toward vulnerable groups."

One of the more important advocacy contributions from the third SC rotation was the work done on the progression of the needs of the affected households and the need for the agencies to be flexible to cater to the changing needs. These important, simple and yet groundbreaking deliberations were summed up in an academic research paper co-authored by the head of a partner agency and presented at a UN conference one year after the EQ.

A proposal outlining the government position was drafted by the SCT and the close relationship between the government recovery agency (TPT) and the SCT resulted in the TPT issuing a letter very supportive of cluster activities which contrasted with the earlier concerns by the shelter cluster that all programming would have to cease for being in conflict with the GoI recovery plan.

Even though the level of participation in the SC remained high and while many of the larger international agencies were familiar with and supportive of it, there was room to improve the understanding of the Cluster’s functions and how participating agencies could contribute.

SCT tried to lobby for the shelter sector to play a prominent part – proportionate to its weight in the overall response - in the CERF funding mechanism but the process was handled by the UN team in Jakarta. The IFRC in Jakarta was not consulted. The funding made available through CERF to the shelter cluster members came eventually to a modest $200,000 (of the total CERF of around USD 7 million) which all went to IOM. A senior OCHA in-country representative offered the following explanation: CERF by design only caters for eligible agencies such as UN and its funds, programs, and specialized agencies and the IOM. In this case IOM was seen as the only UN-related agency with the ability to manage a shelter program.

This deviates from the practice in previous emergencies where cluster leads have been involved in the decisions relating to the allocation of CERF funding and, accordingly, SC Coordinator would be lobbying for funds to SC partners through a UN agency or IOM, as has happened successfully in the past.

DRR multi-hazard approach is critical in the context of Indonesia but it emerged as a weak point in the response, including the responses given by Shelter Cluster agencies to the management questionnaire.

It seemed fairly clear that inappropriate building practices and knowledge was the major cause for people dying in the EQ. It was also clear that most of the required information was available
although needing compilation and streamlining.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

• Put out a simple one-pager in English and Bahasa explaining what clusters do and why and how participants can contribute. Disseminate it widely and continuously during the lifetime of the Cluster.

• Build on SC team's a brief ‘dos and don’ts of distribution’ document, and prepare (or collate existing) basic best practice tools in advance, so that they are readily available. Offer basic guidance on needs assessment, risk analysis and community participation.

• Provide good guidance and clear advocacy messages on DRR directed at operational agencies, governments and donors. Endorse a risk analysis, including a hazard map, as a priority agenda item in the early meetings.

• Prepare first advocacy statements should in the first week of a disaster to capitalize on the media coverage; Select the right journalists – some newspapers reach the countryside; Consider producing a SC newsletter, max 4 pages, directed at local communities; Simplify posters – people won’t read complicated ones.

• Discuss and agree with OCHA that in future disasters SC will (again) be given a fair chance to make a case for CERF funding for the SC members proportionate to the shelter sector's weight in the overall response.

5.7 Training

The West Java SC worked out of the Combined Coordination Centre and coordinated directly with the Department of Public Works and the Department of Housing. Though efforts at capacity building through coordination were attempted at every stage, this was not altogether successful. West Java experience shows training needs and plans are perhaps best achieved through cluster strengthening both during and between disasters.

However, in broad terms, the inclusive participatory, bilingual approach of coordination team helped ensure participation by local civil society and through this, it is safe to assume, strengthened their role and capacity.

In West Sumatra, there was no formal generic or IM related training arranged by the STC. Instead, training and advice were given on an ad-hoc basis after cluster meetings. This arrangement seems to have worked well enough

T-shelter workshop, carried out at the end of the second week after the emergency, was initiated prior to the arrival of the Technical Coordinator with the facilitation taken up by cluster partners CHF International and CARE. The objective was to reach an agreement amongst humanitarian community and GoI on the need for transitional shelter and its parameters. With the number of participant reaching over 60 people, this did not happen. Instead, the issue over GoI’s policy of one-step reconstruction vs. transitional shelter was discussed, leading to conclusion that a concept paper on T-Shelter would need to be presented to GoI to support its decision making process.

Even though the objective of the WS was not met, the WS was seen as a useful step in introducing the concept of T-Shelter in this emergency although GoI never fully endorsed the construction of T-shelters.

Concept Note Working Group was formed as a result of the workshop with participation of local BNPB staff who gave advice on current and emerging GoI’s policy on rehabilitation and
reconstruction. The concept note was drafted with support from members of the TWIG and BNPB staff. This concept note and the design parameters were later widely distributed through various channels in GoI.

What was sorely missing was training on how to carry out assessments, as discussed under the section on assessments.

5.8 Application of Standards

In West Java, all relevant standards were discussed and agreed upon by cluster members though in reality some sub-standard tarpaulins were used by non-cluster members. This remains an issue in Indonesia where Sphere standard tarps are only available through imports and where some donors and agencies appear willing to accept a sub-standard product mostly to expedite delivery.

According to estimates, the shelter sector cluster achieved only around 30 percent coverage of the total emergency shelter needs, hence the minimum standards of acceptable shelter were never achieved prior to the cluster handover to UNDP.

The initial strategy developed on plastic sheeting in West Sumatra endorsed the quality described in the plastic sheeting guidelines. Agencies claimed that this quality was not readily available and, in the end, the SC ended up accepting the use of locally sourced and pre-stocked inferior variety.

This much-debated decision, while expedient, puts the SC on a slippery slope as the compromising of minimum standards is arguably unethical, setting a dangerous precedent and also calls to question the very ethics of the agencies wishing to cut corners. In the Yogyakarta response, sourcing sheeting quality that complied with minimum standards was never an issue and, arguably, should not have been in West Sumatra either. Mandates aside, and regardless of how much agencies might have wished to rid themselves of their stocks of inferior product, SC should not automatically lead to endorsement of such practice by the SC. Some felt that a significant amount of pre-West Sumatra disaster preparedness work and agreements on standards was wasted for giving in on this particular point.

During the third rotation, the SC received reports regarding groups of households displaced in camps due to landslides. The accommodation arrangement according to the SC was as much as 50% below Sphere standards. Anecdotal evidence on balance suggests that the NGO was approached with reasonable amount of respect but the end result remains that the issue led to serious security concerns and the team had to be evacuated for a short period of time.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Continue efforts to find from the main agencies their supplier details so the quality plastic sheet used in West Sumatra could be ascertained.

- Engage and build trust with the influential political and religious groups – increasingly active and well resourced in the disaster response arena – between disasters (see discussion and recommendations in the section of Context/institutional considerations). Incorporate Minimum standards (Sphere) into strategy documents. Ensure Sphere is available and distributed in the local language.

5.9 Coverage

In West Java at the time of handover of the SC, only around 30% of the emergency shelter needs had
been covered.

The SCT March 2010 report estimates that 75% of the shelter needs in West Sumatra had been covered which was mostly spread across the rural areas. This included government's permanent housing for approximately 8000 houses, agencies transitional or temporary shelter assistance for 52,000 houses, and self-recovery process for around 72,000 houses.

A significant shortcoming of the shelter community was the non-attendance to the Kota Padang urban district, which represented 35-40% (around 70 000 units) of the total needs and where only 16% of the needs covered by GOI and the agencies. Even in the T-shelter phase this problem persisted as the coverage rate as it stood in April 2010 was well below the average. Annex 3 details the coverage of the shelter sector per district and type of assistance.

While, on the whole, the shelter response in light of numbers may seem like a reasonable success, it belies the fact that, according to unofficial reports, around 50% of the T-shelters remain unoccupied and 30 000 households still have not received the GoI subsidy to rebuild at the time of this writing.

5.10 Inter-Cluster Coordination

In West Java ICC was not a big issue as SC was the only cluster deployed on site. The links with WASH cluster in the capital were handled by the deputy HoM of IFRC in Jakarta.

In West Sumatra, according to most interviewed agency representatives, the OCHA-led Inter-Cluster Coordination (ICC) in the early stages of the response was rather weak. Suffering from a lack of surge capacity (there were at least five simultaneous disasters in the region to deal with) the UN staff on the ground changed frequently hampering efforts at effective network building and coordination. It was generally felt that OCHA was unable to confront issues - constantly catching up rather than providing leadership. Cross-cutting issues were barely discussed. Relationship with GoI may have been cordial but, according to several interviewees, OCHA, at least in the beginning of the response was not included in many of the GoI relevant meetings and decisions. Reportedly, OCHA performance improved with the change of personnel and as the intensity of the response diminished some weeks and months into the response.

The most value-adding component of the Inter-Cluster Coordination (ICC) was in the realm of IM where the close collaboration between OCHA IM specialists and the SC IM produced systems and training/tutoring that benefitted all clusters.

On the whole, the interviewed OCHA and cluster coordinators were quite pleased with the support received from SCT. The strategic input from SCT helped OCHA’s discussions with donors. In IM, the SC systems were emulated by other clusters - WASH, Education and Health - within the IM network. An important factor was the SC being co-located at the UN building, which facilitated cooperation.

RECOMMENDATION:

- Keep building on the key relative strength of ESC IM and discuss on a global level with other cluster leads what they, in turn, could bring to the table as their respective relative strength useful to all clusters.
5.11 Local Agency Involvement

In **West Java**, the local NGO participation was significant and feeling of ownership increased both due to the limited international response and for the communication in meetings and documents being bilingual. SCT was able to gather much valuable information from local NGOs as a result.

Although PMI was the largest actor in both emergency and Transitional Shelter, they were also one of the hardest organizations to coordinate. They rarely if at all, attended the SC meetings and there was great difficulty in getting consistent data on their assessments, distributions and plans. The time and energy spent attempting to get cooperation and information from the PMI was more significant than any other agency whilst the return was minimal.

In **West Sumatra**, PMI remained an enigma for the SC and quite independent and aloof with its plans and operations. This was perhaps due to external aid in general and SC in particular playing a relatively small part in the PMI strategy and operations.

The PMI response in West Sumatra was significant (over 13,000 Sphere-compliant, EQ resistant T-shelters with 80% occupancy rate), but, according to the first SC coordinator, the reporting back to the cluster was not. Also, PMI proved very difficult to include in the coordination and their attendance at meetings was sporadic at best with very little feedback given and virtually no assessment information forthcoming. Similar issues with PMI were experienced also by other clusters.

PMI engagement in the SC left a lot to be desired in terms of quantity and quality. Discussions with PMI and IFRC revealed that PMI was prioritizing its commitments vis-à-vis the GoI with the SC – which was seen as part of the UN system - receiving only limited attention. Interestingly, many key PMI senior staff hold a position also in the GOI, certainly a relevant factor in the overall dynamics.

Also, PMI preferred to start small and building up rather than commit to big shelter numbers from the outset (apparently PMI had gotten burnt before when media had misquoted the PMI intentions and numbers in an earlier disaster). A very practical reason for the less-than-enthusiastic involvement in SC was the overloading of the PMI reporting system and lack of assessment capacity as well the PMI head of operations not knowing English (PMI asked to have hard copies of the key SC documents revealing serious issues in elementary IM and language capacity).

It is noteworthy that PMI chose not the support SCT visa applications which had to be processed with the support from OCHA who also had noticed PMI not only becoming more powerful but also taking distance and acting increasingly outside of any coordination.

With the new dynamic and outspoken PMI leadership, there are, as of late, some signs of more openness toward the SC. In the fall of 2010 a Shelter Technical Training (STT) was given to Indonesian participants over 50% of whom where from PMI.

The participation of local agencies in the Cluster was poor, although it did improve after the first month. Again, language was a key constraint, as most meetings were conducted and materials produced in English. At meetings of local agencies there was frustration amongst participants that their voices were not being heard, and also a misunderstanding of the remit of the Cluster.

Conducting coordination activities in both languages was very important. Meetings run in English, with translation to Indonesian through headsets, were much better attended by local NGOs and government. Meeting minutes in both languages were well received, and emails to the group in both languages reached a wider audience.
Some NGOs that had been operating in West Sumatra prior to the 2009 EQ had resources already developed and contacts to both beneficiaries and government established. Despite the ESC message perceived as "you have to go through us" the cluster cooperation allowed bigger impact and enabled the leveraging of resources of these organizations.

RECOMMENDATION:

- Ensure the opening created with the STT with PMI is followed up and built upon. Get a commitment from PMI for next steps in the context of SC cooperation that would ideally include improving PMI post disaster assessment and reporting capacity.

5.12 Transition to Early Recovery

In West Java, coordination was challenged by the uncertainty of the intentions and plans of the GOI which in turn contributed to the slow ECHO funding decision and arrival. As a result, the response may have lost up to two months and the targets had to be reduced. Still, the local ECHO rep was commended for having finally succeeded in pushing through the funding decision despite adversity and lack of request for assistance by the GOI (which, according to some informants, may have kept other key external institutional donors away).

According to SC partners, the cluster was very useful providing resource and expertise in liaising with ECHO and the GOI. It also appears that the activation, presence and work of the SC contributed to the positive ECHO funding decision.

The SCT third rotation in West Sumatra developed the below diagram to illustrate the incremental process of movement from disaster to durable solution which was used as a framework in the SC work. The model distinguishes between interventions that support temporary as opposed to permanent housing. It also served as a simple format to show the sequence of events and the differing stakeholder inputs.
The diagram also lends support to favoring transitional over temporary shelters and to the notion that the sooner the planning and work on recovery begins, the sooner the affected areas are stabilized and the shorter and more effective the recovery process is likely to be. However, many agencies were ‘locked’ into temporary shelter programs and were reluctant to adapt to the changing needs of affected households.

After the emergency phase – when GoI allowed agencies to act virtually “without impunity” - a date for the shift to Early Recovery was set in a way that to most agencies seemed arbitrary, yet logical given GoI focus on more permanent solutions.

5.13 Donors

According to one SCT member in West Sumatra, in the emergency phase, donors indicated that they would only fund agencies that were following the guidance given by the cluster. In effect this meant that they were adhering to a $300 maximum for a Transitional Shelter that met the parameters given by the Cluster.

This contrasts with a statement by a representative of a major institutional donor: cluster endorsement made no difference to their funding policy! This may be due to the fact that many key donors have bilateral agreements with the GoI and will therefore not fund the types of programs that are not in line with the GoI priorities. Still, the same interviewee praised the work and info sharing of the SC without which, according to him, “there would not have been clusters”.

Whatever amount of power the SC may have, it is worth ensuring that the guidance dispensed is the best available and, insofar as that happens, it is incumbent on the SC to be assertive with its recommendations – the context dictates the response.

Donors do not feel responsible for the inflexibility of agency programming in the face of changing needs of the affected population, but see the issue more as a problem of poor assessment work in the first place. A key agency representative, on the other hand, was of the opinion that, as a rule, donors tend to take a risk-averse approach and are loath to support or encourage program changes in mid-stream.

RECOMMENDATION:

- Open a dialogue on a global level between SC and key institutional donors on how to allow more flexibility to change programs according to the evolving (shelter) needs of the affected populations.

6 CONCLUSION

The overriding message and recommendation this review endeavors to convey is the following: In order to stay relevant, the Shelter Cluster needs to focus also on work outside of the cluster bubble and leverage its widely recognized technical competence by reaching out toward both the local communities and the emerging national players on the fast-changing disaster management scene.
7 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Developments in the context
1. In consultation with the in-country IFRC leadership and PMI, undertake a fact-finding trip to meet with CSR executives of selected private sector companies, religious and political groups and GOI to (i) understand each other's agendas and mandates, (ii) manage each other's expectations and build trust in view of disaster response situations, and (iii) open a dialogue on how to improve cooperation during and between disasters.

Staffing
2. Develop/streamline the pay schemes of the ESC team. It makes more sense to invest effort in a just and transparent remuneration policy than in training new SC team members whose potentially worsened work morale during mission - due to unjustifiable and unequal salaries amongst the team members - risks having a negative impact on the team dynamics and interest in future SC deployments.

3. To allow for flexibility in SC team composition and to increase the speed of deployment, develop a flexible and dynamic SC roster with emphasis on individuals who, amongst other considerations, (i) possess more than one of the skills relevant to running of the SC - combinations of general coordination/leadership, technical, IM; (ii) have first hand working experience in countries – such as Indonesia - with frequent and major shelter responses; (iii) are used to or have ambitions toward dynamic and hectic short term missions.

4. As a priority amongst priorities, ensure strong translation skills (written and spoken) in the team from day one till the day of handover in order to establish and maintain a strong cooperation with local communities, GOI and local leadership and to tap into the local response capacity and potential. Include simultaneous translation kit in the Shelter Cluster Coordination Box and use it in meetings from day one.

5. In selected countries and regions, establish a relationship, understanding and a procedure whereby local staff – ideally with the support of the RCRC national society - could be contracted without a risk of liability issues. Create a roster of local staff for future (inevitable) responses. Consider the hiring of local staff from the beginning of the deployment as useful extra capacity and/or replacement of expatriates. 6. On future deployments of the SC, seek as the first preferred option, to be co-located with the key UN partners. Reach an understanding and agreement on an institutional level with the UN partners that such preference for co-location is a shared goal.

7. In cases where two IMs get deployed for the same rotation, encourage field visits by the SCT to better understand and appreciate the field realities and needs and in order to validate the numbers through more qualitative means. Include field visits in the IM ToR.

8. Acquire from PMI/IFRC country delegation a commitment to support the visa applications of SC team members for all future responses that entail the SC activation.

9. Share CVs - or short bios - of SCT members prior to deployment to manage expectations and to facilitate quick “gelling” of the team on the ground.

10. When double manning of a position in the SC team is justified, TL should divide the responsibilities upfront so as to avoid potential confusion and frustration and loss of effectiveness of the SC. Consider drafting at least tentative ToRs for such eventualities bearing in mind that a degree of flexibility in the content is warranted to allow local adaptation to the situation at hand.

11. With SC missions of longer than one month of duration, ensure that – as a policy - adequate R&R is provided to prevent burn out and consequent negative impact on team dynamics and proper functioning of the SC.

12. Streamline security policies with all partner NGOs and ensure there are no gaps or misunderstandings/misperceptions regarding security management of the SCT members. Ensure that the Coordinator as Team leader is aware and supportive of these security policies and procedures regarding all staff under his responsibility.

13. Establish and maintain a centralized archive of key material of the most disaster prone countries and
distribute to SC coordinator upon deployment. Re-design a semi-structured EoM format and manage the reporting process to gain longitudinal and cross-functional data on progress and issues related to SC management. Include EoM in the respective ToRs. Benchmark with corresponding FACT procedures where appropriate.

14. Deploy an environmental adviser as early as possible – and prepare for a longer than a one-month deployment - in order to influence agency programming and to provide basic training and documents to cluster coordinators.

15. Include the role of Community Liaison Officer as a regular SCT member from the outset. Ensure a roster is developed and kept of suitable candidates to ensure speedy hiring process on SC activation. Develop an appropriate ToR for the position.

**IFRC (PMI, PNS) support**

16. Make relevant IFRC in-country delegates aware of the IFRC responsibility for carrying out SC obligations, and train them not only in Emergency Shelter but also in the Cluster Approach in general. Write this goal in the ToR of the Head of Delegation (HoD). Encourage in-country and regional DM delegates to deploy as SCT members and ensure debriefings carried out by country HoDs.

17. Together with the DMUs of the IFRC zone offices, identify which NSs might be appropriate, capable and willing to act as pilot case to assume a role in SC in-country work and agree what the respective roles could be. Engagement with SC should not have negative impact on the status vis-à-vis the government and other partners.

**Handovers**

**Internal**

18. Establish a simple standard operating procedure for handover including “10 key documents you need to read”

19. Agree on a standard protocol on how to hire local staff in Indonesia. Include instructions for the local IFRC delegation also on how to assist SCT in this respect


**External**

21. Balance responsibility and authority in such a way that the bulk of the (handover) discussions and negotiations take place where such decisions are taken.

22. Improve understanding and effectiveness of the handover process by starting the process early with engagement from day one of the cluster activation by the agency meant to take over. Agree on criteria and conditions for handover. This process should not be a question of whether or to whom but once the pre-agreed criteria are met, handover results. Ensure two-pronged approach with simultaneous work and attention by Geneva decision makers.

**Strategy**

23. Develop a standard/recommended format for strategy.

24. Position the SC strategy document as a “living document” and improve the content upon receipt of feedback – don’t wait/polish it till its perfect, “the process is the perfection”. Consider refining the methodology for “dealing with fluid situations” and offer it as a useful straightforward coordination tool.

25. Coordinators to make every effort to establish program budget consistency in strategy – one agency offering double the support of another in the same area may create more problems than it solve. Address this also at the Global level with donors.

**Communications**

**Google group**

26. Use the West Sumatra format as a basis for future missions.

27. Define what the key documents are and find a way to communicate the translated versions via Google
groups, or otherwise, to local NGOs.

28. Include in future websites a prominent list at the top which recommends the top few documents to download: the strategy, situation report, latest shelter reports, and coverage maps.

29. Analyze which are the “must have” have components of the website and design a template and layout that caters also for local language content and interaction.

Language

30. Recruit as soon as possible on deployment local staff with professional written and oral translation skills; Make all key documents available in the local language; Offer simultaneous translation at all key meetings; Include simultaneous translations equipment as standard equipment in the SC kit.

Information Management

31. When government data might be delayed or not expected to come at all, organize without delay the collecting of data from secondary sources by a coordinated assessment process. Focus on rough & ready survey and simple tables, hire people to do it.

32. Introduce a simpler reporting format, a list of questions, for a more inclusive, effective and speedy process and for a simpler information management overall.

33. Consider introducing a simplified reporting format based on email answers to the following questions: (1) Where are you working; (2) What partners are you working with?; (3) What are you distributing / providing?; (4) How many households will receive this?; (5) What are your start and end dates?

Assessments

34. Complement early assessments with several spot surveys in the field. Ensure constant direct contact with the conditions in the field for a realistic shelter strategy.

35. Tailor a joint assessment to the particular emergency rapidly and secure resources – “seed money” to which other agencies can contribute. Arrange the training of assessors, carry out the assessment and compile the results.

36. Build on the methodology used by SCT to develop a useful assessment tool for future assessments in an urban environment.

37. In future similar context to 2009 West Sumatra EQ, the way forward could be as follows: organize training for 20-30 local NGO persons in rapid assessment methodology and analysis. Equip the team with GPSs & vehicles for 10-14 days in the field.

38. Ensure the assessment data collected is gender segregated.

Coordination & leadership

39. Continue with the ‘live’ SC performance surveys on SCT performance. Provide local language version of the survey, simplify the wording and limit/ focus questions for added user friendliness and easier management of the process and interpretation of results.

40. Track the number of stakeholders attending each meeting to serve as an important indicator of the evolving relevancy and usefulness of the SC work.

41. Follow up with the UN on the discussions on training Indonesian national as co-chairs for the cluster.

Advocacy

42. Put out a simple one-pager in English and Bahasa explaining what clusters do and why and how participants can contribute. Disseminate it widely and continuously during the lifetime of the Cluster.

43. Build on SC team’s a brief ‘dos and don’ts of distribution’ document, prepare (or collate existing) basic best practice tools in advance, so that they are readily available. Offer basic guidance on needs assessment, risk analysis and community participation.

44. Provide good guidance and clear advocacy messages on DRR directed at operational agencies, governments and donors. Endorse a risk analysis, including a hazard map, as a priority agenda item in the early meetings.
45. Prepare first advocacy statements should in the first week of a disaster to capitalize on the media coverage; Select the right journalists – some newspapers reach the countryside; Consider producing a SC newsletter, max 4 pages, directed at local communities; Simplify posters – people won’t read complicated ones.

46. Discuss and agree with OCHA on a global level that in future disasters SC will (again) be given a fair chance to make its case for CERF funding for the SC members proportionate to the shelter sector’s weight in the overall response.

**Application of Standards**

47. Continue efforts to find from the main agencies their supplier details so the quality plastic sheet used in West Sumatra could be ascertained.

48. Engage and build trust with the influential political and religious groups – increasingly active and well resourced in the disaster response arena – between disasters (see discussion and recommendations in the section of Context/institutional considerations). Incorporate Minimum standards (Sphere) into strategy documents. Ensure Sphere is available and distributed in the local language.

**Inter-Cluster Coordination**

49. Keep building on the key relative strength of ESC IM and discuss on a global level with other cluster leads what they, in turn, could bring to the table as their respective relative strength useful to all clusters. **Local Agency Involvement**

50. Ensure the opening created with the STT with PMI is followed up and built upon. Get a commitment from PMI for next steps in the context of SC cooperation that would ideally include improving PMI post disaster assessment and reporting capacity.

**Donors**

51. Open a dialogue on a global level between SC and key institutional donors on how to allow more flexibility to change programs according to the evolving (shelter) needs of the affected populations.
8 ANNEXES

8.1 Annex 1 – Terms of Reference
A Review of the West Sumatra IFRC-led Emergency Shelter Coordination Cluster.

I. Summary

Purpose: The Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) seeks to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the coordination services given by the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster Coordination teams to the Indonesia West Java and West Sumatra earthquake response in 2009 to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future response.

Audience: The IFRC and in particular the Shelter & Settlements Department will use the evaluation to improve future deployments. Shelter coordination team members will use it to learn. Cluster partners, donors, and other humanitarian actors will use it for general information.

Commissioners: This evaluation is being commissioned by IFRC as Global Shelter Cluster Lead for natural disasters.

Reports to: Miguel Urquía, IFRC Shelter and Settlements Department.

Duration: 25 days

Timeframe: from 10 December 2010 to 15 January 2011

Location: Home based with travel to the Indonesia (12-15 days). The visit to the field should take place in the month of December.

II. Background

An earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale hit Tasikmalaya district in West Java province in the afternoon of 2 September 2009. Affected districts and municipalities included Bogor, Cianjur, Sukabumi, the municipality of Sukabumi, West Bandung, Bandung, Garut, Banjar, Ciamis, Tasikmalaya, the municipality of Tasikmalaya and Purwakarta. The Head of the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) and BNPB said the government would not refuse assistance or aid from international organizations or other countries, but they would not request it. The cluster approach, already in place, was strengthened at the local level in Shelter, Education and WASH as well as the Early Recovery network. Between the 16th and 20th of September, the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies deployed a Shelter Coordination Team to convene the Shelter Cluster, a Coordinator from Netherlands Red Cross, a Deputy Coordinator from Spanish Red Cross, an Information Manager from American Red Cross and a Technical Coordinator from OXFAM. A Google Group was created for this response: http://groups.google.com/group/WestJavaEarthquake?hl=en . 

In accordance with the commitment of IFRC to coordinate emergency shelter and not transitional or permanent, the handover of coordination responsibilities from IFRC to UNDP were agreed and took place on the 3 October 2009.

Two major earthquakes off the coast of West Sumatra, Indonesia, left hundreds of people injured and thousands without shelter. The first quake, measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale, occurred on 30 September 2009 17:15 local time 57 km southeast of the city of Padang, with the second earthquake striking on 1 October at 08.52, measuring 6.8 on the Richter scale, 225 km southeast of Padang in Jambi province. The Government of Indonesia welcomed any international assistance offered which was to be coordinated through the government. The in-country Humanitarian Coordinator recommended that the emergency shelter cluster is formalized and that the International Federation convene it. The International Federation sent a Shelter Coordination Team to support the Indonesian government in the inter-agency coordination of shelter actors. This team varied in size but included at least a Shelter Coordinator, a Technical Coordinator, an Information Manager. Other roles such as Deputy Coordinator, Deputy Information Manager, Recovery Advisor, and Environmental Advisor were added at different moments of the duration of
the cluster. After the emergency period was over, the Government of Indonesia, the Resident Coordinator, and the humanitarian actors asked IFRC whether it would be possible to extend this mandate to the recovery phase. Given the fact that funds and people were made available, IFRC decided to continue leading the Shelter cluster until the 27 April 2010 when it was handed over to the UNHABITAT- led Shelter Working Group. A Google Group was created for this response: http://groups.google.com/group/SUM09.

III. Purpose and Scope

The objectives of the review are to:

1. Appraise the service provided by the International Federation as shelter cluster coordinator to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actor 2. Review and analyze the experience of the International Federation with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Coordination Group, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations;

2. Provide recommendations with regard to the International Federation’s leadership of future emergency shelter coordination activities at both national and global levels;

3. Examine if there were aspects of the Federation’s cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent;

4. Provide recommendation on how the International Federation can improve shelter preparedness for future disasters in Indonesia;

5. Examine the options for the IFRC to continue to have a lead role in the cluster during non-emergency periods and the resources required to perform such a role.

The review will encompass, but not be limited to, the following areas:

• The activation of the coordination group and the extent of involvement and influence of the Federation, as an IASC member, in the decision-making process;

• The understanding and support of the Federation’s shelter coordination role within the in country delegation, the Zone and Geneva;

• The impact of the Shelter Cluster on the Federation Delegation, the Indonesian Red Cross and other operational Red Cross Red Crescent Societies;

• The design and implementation of the Shelter Cluster, including factors which provided the Shelter Cluster’s strengths and weaknesses;

• The value of linking and/or separating the Shelter Cluster and the Red Cross relief operation;

• The design and implementation of the exit/handover strategy;

• Relations with other clusters, the UN system and the Government;

• The staffing of the Shelter Cluster and the support provided from the Secretariat;

• The equipping and funding of the Shelter Cluster.

• The involvement of the Shelter Cluster in the transition from meeting emergency shelter needs to permanent housing and resettlement;

• Issues with regard to visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement.

IV. Methodology

The methodology employed by the evaluator(s) in gathering and assessing information should include:

• Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the Shelter Cluster (Most of the materials can be found on the Google group sites mentioned above);
• Interviews with key internal stakeholders within the Secretariat in Geneva, IFRC Zone Delegation in Kuala Lumpur and Country Delegation in Jakarta, the IFRC Asia Pacific Disaster Management Unit in Kuala Lumpur and the Indonesian Red Cross;

• A field visit to Indonesia;
  o Interviews with other key stakeholders, in particular Government officials where possible;
  o Interviews with UN OCHA, UNDP and the UN Resident Coordinator’s office;

• Interviews with shelter agencies participating in the Emergency Shelter Cluster, and in particular UNHCR, UN Habitat and IOM.

Note: A suggested list of interviewees will be provided separately. V. Deliverables

1. Concise, written document with key recommendations and supporting information. This document should be of use for discussing the IFRC experiences of the cluster process internally and also with key donors and other stakeholders.

2. Additional notes, summaries of interviews etc. as appropriate or supporting documentation.

3. Summary of review activities undertaken including interviews, visits, documents reviewed etc.

4. Short written document on the appropriateness of IFRC permanent leadership/participation in the shelter cluster and the desires of the country delegation to this effect.

VI. Timeline

The exercise will be implemented over a period of 25 days between 10 December 2010 and 15 January 2011. 12-15 days of this period will be spent in the field. The report must have been submitted, reviewed and accepted by the Shelter and Settlements Department and all financial transactions must have taken place before the end of this period.

Vii. Quality and ethical standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Evaluation Policy; www.ifrc.org. The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

1. Utility: Evaluations must be useful and used.

2. Feasibility: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.

3. Ethics and Legality: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.

4. Impartiality and Independence: Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.

5. Transparency: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.

6. Accuracy: Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.

7. Participation: Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.

8. Collaboration: Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at:
VIII. Evaluator

The evaluation will be carried out by an external independent consultant. Support will be provided to the consultant by the Shelter and Settlements Department, Zone Office and Country Delegation as necessary and appropriate.

IX. Appendices

Key reference documents to be provided:
1. IFRC-UN OCHA Shelter MoU
2. ToRs of the IFRC Shelter Coordination Team members
3. Email to Global Emergency Cluster informing on the deployment of the SCG
4. List of relevant people to be interviewed with contact details
5. Emergency Shelter Cluster Handover documents
6. All documents (meeting minutes, strategy documents etc.) available from the Indonesia Shelter Cluster websites
7. Reviews of IFRC-led shelter cluster coordination in Nepal (Floods 2008), Myanmar (Cyclone 2008), Bangladesh (Cyclone 2007-2008), Tajikistan (Cold weather 2007), Pakistan (Floods 2007), the Philippines (Typhoon 2006), Bangladesh (Cyclone Aila 2009) and Pakistan (Baluchistan earthquake 2008). These reviews can be found at:
8.2 **Annex 2 – List of Interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Elizabeth Hasler</td>
<td>CEO, Build Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Barton</td>
<td>Coordinator, SC West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Annear</td>
<td>Head of DMU, IFRC Asia-Pacific Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus Palkovits</td>
<td>Deputy Coordinator, SC West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neil Brighton</td>
<td>Information Manager, SC West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregg McDonald</td>
<td>Coordinator, SC West Sumatra &amp; West Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neil Bauman</td>
<td>Information Manager, SC West Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felix de Vries</td>
<td>Shelter Delegate, IFRC Asia-Pacific Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heikki Väätämöinen</td>
<td>Operations Coordinator, IFRC Asia-Pacific Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Bradbury</td>
<td>Head of PMER, IFRC Asia-Pacific Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagan Chapagain</td>
<td>Interim Director, IFRC Asia-Pacific Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel Urquia</td>
<td>Sr. Officer, Shelter and Settlements Department, IFRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Panico</td>
<td>Head of Operations (acting), IFRC Asia-Pacific Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham Eastmond</td>
<td>Second Rotation SC Coordinator WS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave Hodgkin</td>
<td>Technical Coordinator, SC West Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christina Hammond</td>
<td>IM Coordinator, SC West Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amara Bains</td>
<td>Former Deputy Head, IFRC Indonesia Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petra Schneider</td>
<td>Development Advisor, IDEP Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Ray</td>
<td>Inter-Cluster Coordinator, UNOCHA West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Collins</td>
<td>Program Manager, Build Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gernet Frank</td>
<td>Field Manager, Swiss Caritas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak Sugimin Pranoto</td>
<td>Head of TPT, West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak Arwin</td>
<td>ER SC Advisor, West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak Dayat</td>
<td>Head of Operations, PMI West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne Ulrich</td>
<td>Disaster Management Delegate, IFRC Indonesia Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Kern</td>
<td>Head of Office, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Charlesworth</td>
<td>Head, IFRC Indonesia Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignacio Leon</td>
<td>Head, UNOCHA Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia Speckman</td>
<td>World Relief, West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Fauzonz</td>
<td>Construction Clinic, West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Rezki</td>
<td>Community Liaison Officer, SC West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lulu Muhammad</td>
<td>UNDP liaison with BNPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak Irman Rachman</td>
<td>Liaison Officer for RCRC Movement, PMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeong Park</td>
<td>Disaster Management Advisor, AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Marsden</td>
<td>Country Manager, Australian Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebastien Fesneau</td>
<td>Humanitarian Advisor, Oxfam GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claire Quillet</td>
<td>Coordinator, WASH West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig Williams</td>
<td>Regional IM Officer, UNOCHA Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xavier Chanraud</td>
<td>French Red Cross</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.3 **Annex 3 – Tables & Maps**

### District Level Summary of Emergency Shelter Support

**Rangkuman bantuan hunian transisi di tingkat Kabupaten**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District / Kabupaten/Kota</th>
<th>Need / Kebutuhan</th>
<th>Emergency shelter support / Dukungan hunian sementara (2)</th>
<th>Coverage / Cakupan</th>
<th>Gap / Kekurangan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Damaged houses / Rumah rusak (1)</td>
<td>Government / Agensi pemerintah</td>
<td>Total / Jumlah</td>
<td>Total coverage / Jumlah cakupan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agam</td>
<td>15,593</td>
<td>2,208 / 20,667</td>
<td>23,075</td>
<td>148%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kota Padang</td>
<td>69,413</td>
<td>6,340 / 4,739</td>
<td>11,079</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kota Pariaman</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>8,829 / 9,028</td>
<td>17,857</td>
<td>165%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padang Barat</td>
<td>74,222</td>
<td>14,008 / 65,764</td>
<td>99,772</td>
<td>134%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesisir Selatan</td>
<td>6,206</td>
<td>1,180 / 5,722</td>
<td>6,992</td>
<td>119%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total / Jumlah</td>
<td><strong>181,066</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,597 / 135,565</strong></td>
<td><strong>170,162</strong></td>
<td><strong>94%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. Severe and moderately damaged houses (Damage and Loss Assessment, 2009) / Rumah Rusak Sedang dan Berat (Damage and Loss Assessment, 2009)
2. Figures denote number of support kits distributed by agencies, not necessarily the number of households that received support.

This table is an Information Management output of the Indonesia Shelter Cluster. The figures below are those obtained from agencies as of 05 April 2010. Questions or comments should be addressed to Neil Bright (sc.surabaya.informasi@gmail.com), Information Manager.

*Date produced: Tanggal dibuat: 06 April 2010*  
[http://groups.google.com/group/SUM09](http://groups.google.com/group/SUM09)
## District Level Summary of Transitional Shelter Support

**Rangkuman bantuan hunian transisi di tingkat Kabupaten**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District / KabupatenKota</th>
<th>Need / Kebutuhan Damaged houses / Rumah rusak (1)</th>
<th>Transitional shelter support / Dukungan hunian sementara Self-recovery / Pembayaran mandiri (2)</th>
<th>Government pilot project</th>
<th>Agencies/ agencies</th>
<th>Total / Jumlah</th>
<th>Coverage / Calupan</th>
<th>Gap / Kekurangan</th>
<th>Total coverages / Jumlah calupan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agam</td>
<td>15,593</td>
<td>6,237</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>6,003</td>
<td>13,771</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kota Padang</td>
<td>89,413</td>
<td>27,765</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>2,209</td>
<td>32,297</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>37,206</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kota Pesisir</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>4,320</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>4,696</td>
<td>9,474</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>1,326</td>
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<tr>
<td>Padang Warteri</td>
<td>24,222</td>
<td>29,849</td>
<td>3,635</td>
<td>37,937</td>
<td>71,282</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padang Pariaman</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>4,662</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesisir Selatan</td>
<td>4,752</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,092</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solok</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total / Jumlah</strong></td>
<td><strong>181,066</strong></td>
<td><strong>74,246</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,634</strong></td>
<td><strong>55,539</strong></td>
<td><strong>135,755</strong></td>
<td><strong>74%</strong></td>
<td><strong>45,628</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Severe and moderately damaged houses (Damage and Loss Assessment, 2009) / Rumah Rusak Sedang dan Ringan (Damage and Loss Assessment, 2009)

(2) Anecdotal evidence suggests that 80% of the affected population have provided themselves with sufficient transitional shelter. This will need to be verified.

Diketahui bahwa 80% luar beluma dapat menyediakan hunian sementara secar mandiri. Hal ini masih perlu verifikasi lebih lanjut.

This table is an information Management output of the Indonesia Shelter Cluster. The figures below are those obtained from agencies as of 23 April 2010. Questions or comments should be addressed to Neil Brighten (toks.sirena.ims@gmail.com), Information Manager.


*Date produced / Tanggal dihasilkan: 23 April 2010*  
*http://groups.google.com/group/SLM09*
## District Summary of Shelter Support by Agency

### Rangkuman dukungan pembangunan rumah dari agency

**Note:** Figures denote support to households / Catatan: Angka tersebut menyebutkan dukungan pada kepala keluarga

**Note:** Data is collected (and available) at the Nagari and Korpindo level / Catatan: Data sudah terkumpul (dan terdapat) di Nagari dan Korpindo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency / Lembaga</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Total Confirmed</th>
<th>Total in progress</th>
<th>Total Completed</th>
<th>% Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 1</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 2</td>
<td>1,493</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 3</td>
<td>3,409</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 4</td>
<td>2,928</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 5</td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 7</td>
<td>398</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 8</td>
<td>306</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 9</td>
<td>379</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 10</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 11</td>
<td>2,294</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 13</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA 14</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total / Total: 7,634 / 4,442 / 6,154 / 41,663 / 2,138 / 2,181 / 0 / 63,012 / 6,643 / 32,175 / 51%

For the purpose of this report, transitional shelter support, from disaster to durable solution, includes the two areas below:

Untuk tujuan dari laporan ini, dukungan hunian transit, dari bencana menuju solusi yang tahan lama, termasuk dua wilayah berikut:

1. **Temporary Shelter Support**, including:
   - Dukungan sementara, termasuk:
     - Housing Unit / Hunian
     - Basic Shelter / Hunian Dasar
     - Complete Shelter / Hunian Lengkap

2. **Permanent Housing Support**, including:
   - Dukungan hunian permanen, termasuk:
     - Core House / Hunian Sederhana
     - Permanent House / Hunian Permanen

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This table is an information management output of the Indonesia Shelter Cluster. The figures below are those obtained from agencies as of 23 April 2010. Queries or comments should be addressed to Helen Biggin (helbin@icrc.org), Information Manager.

Tabel berikut ini adalah hasil dari berbagai laporan yang diperoleh dari berbagai agensi hingga 23 April 2010. Masukan atau komentar dapat disampaikan kepada Helen Biggin (helbin@icrc.org), Manajer Informasi.

Date produced / Tanggal disunting: 23 April 2010

http://groups.google.com/group/SU09

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