Children standing in front of the newly built houses

Final Evaluation

Floods Operation 2011 (MDRKP003)
November 2012

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We are grateful to all supporting partners and donors to the emergency appeal and the evaluation which we hope that the lesson learnt could contribute to further enhancement of effective emergency response and recovery.
Table of Contents

Page 1: Cover Page
Page 2: Acknowledgements
Page 3: Table of Contents
Page 4: Executive Summary
Page 5: Introduction
  Overview of the Floods in 2011
  Overview of the Evaluation
  Constraints & Limitation
Page 7: Results and Findings
  Overview of the IFRC/DPRK RCS Response
  Key Findings and Analysis
Page 14: Recommendations
Page 16: Concluding Remarks
Page 17: Appendixes
  Terms of Reference for the Evaluation
  Information Gathering
  Abbreviations
Executive Summary

The IFRC/DPRK Floods operation was initiated in August 2011 after several floods and a strong typhoon Muifa imposed serious impact to the country. Some 9,500 houses were destroyed, leaving 25,000 people homeless. The flooding caused severe damage across the country, especially in the southern & northern regions of the Hwanghae province.

As an immediate response, a DREF with CHF 453,413 was allocated to DPRK RC to provide relief items. A subsequent emergency appeal\(^1\) was approved to scale up the response with a budget of CHF 3.49 million. In June 2012, the appeal was revised \(^2\) with a budget downsize to CHF 2,392,728.

The operation included the relief distributions, shelter, emergency health and care, water, sanitation and hygiene promotion components. Included in all this were the necessary logistic arrangements and communications to stakeholders and the media. 

The purpose of this evaluation is to examine the extent to which the goal, objectives and expected results of the Flood operation were achieved. Specifically in terms of its relevance, the evaluation intended to measure the effectiveness & timeliness of the operation when answering to the needs of the beneficiaries. In so doing, the evaluation will highlight what worked well and what might have been done differently as lessons learnt to be applied in future operations.

Key Findings

Overall speaking, the Red Cross responses during the DPRK floods have been extensive, achieving immediate impact in the emergency phase. In the same time recovery plans was implemented and successfully provide support to the targeted population with shelter, safe drinking water supply and health components. The decision of such interventions proved to be correct and relevant.

The DPRK Red Cross Society, with its trained emergency capacity has been granted the privileged access and support from the government to allow rapid deployment to help with an efficient assessment and response. Branch level staffs, community and trained medical volunteers were highly involved the process. Impact of this special status could be further magnified with enhanced technical skills in particular assessment reporting, analysis and subsequent planning. Disaster response capacity could also be enhanced through more proactive engagement of the IFRC country delegation in assessments and monitoring within the allowed framework. The DPRK RCS shall continue paying its vital role as facilitator of such and the IFRC’s role is to make sure the operation maintains a high level of accountability throughout the implementation process.

Implementations of some of the operation’s components were delayed but overall speaking, these components were able to complete within the operation timeframe. A number of factors had contributed to the delay, which included: adjustment of the program scale due to low funding and changing circumstances; underestimated time needed for procurement and delivery process, a particular example taken was the procurement of construction materials and the medical ri-kits which took longer a few months more than the originally planned.

Throughout the operation, the IFRC country delegation maintained good communication & coordination in Pyongyang with both DPRK RCS and other non-RC partners. At the operational level the national society communicated well with its branches, contractors and other partners, especially while working through the recovery phase of the operation.

As mentioned by the DPRK RCS’s vice chairman and other program personnel, the DPRK RCS leadership and the DPRK government have noted an enhanced reputation of the national society based on their response to the flooding. Inclusion of shelter component has changed the governmental view on DPRK RCS’s traditional role in disaster response. However it should be noted that the evaluators were not able to meet and interview relevant government officials.

\(^1\) Original appeal published on August 2011: [http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/11/MDRK003EA.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/11/MDRK003EA.pdf)

\(^2\) Revised appeal published on June 2012: [http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Appeals/11/MDRKP003EA2.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Appeals/11/MDRKP003EA2.pdf)
Introduction

Overview of the Floods in 2011

The DPRK is a country vulnerable to floods and typhoons. These climate risks possess seasonal hazard and bring manifold damage to infrastructure and livelihoods. Floods and typhoons in DPRK have long had their largest impacts in rural areas of the country in terms of deaths, serious injuries and impoverishment.

In June 2011, reports from the news agencies, DPRK television channels, Red Cross partners and other agencies in-country indicated that successive torrential rains and tropical storms had caused extensive damage for nearly two months. The situation proved critical when Typhoon Muifa hit the country in August. Buildings, infrastructure and croplands in most parts of the DPRK suffered significant damage from the flooding. South and North Hwanghae, including South Hamgyong, and Kangwon provinces were among the most affected. The accumulative effect of the floods as well as the sudden onset of the typhoon severely jeopardized not only the infrastructure but also the coping capacities of many communities. 9,663 homes were destroyed, leaving more than 25,000 people without shelter. The disaster took 68 lives and damaged 133,536 hectare of croplands. Water supply systems were badly damaged in many communities. Extensive flooding posted a serious threat to food production in the country as the most seriously affected place is where the food basket lies. In a country where securing food is the constant question, the floods in 2011 are seen as more disastrous compared to those in previous years. In this regard, the DPRK governments appeal to the international community to help with the emergency relief as well to support some of the recoveries in the most affected areas was vital.

Overview of the Evaluation

The operation was evaluated internally by the IFRC in assessing the relevance and effectiveness of the operation; to identify best practices, key lessons learnt and any unplanned or unintended changes that the project brought; to monitor the sustainability of local level activities; and to assess the project management structures. The IFRC expected that the lesson learnt would contribute to future
responses in the country.

The evaluation was conducted in DPRK during 2-11 August 2012. It included a visit to North Hwanghae Province and all four target villages, stakeholder meetings with 3 community leaders. In Pyongyang, meetings with the DPRK RCS’s and IFRC country delegates were held.

The terms of reference identified the following criteria for the evaluation missions’ success:

- Compliance with standards/expectations
- Relevance and appropriateness
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency (including cost effectiveness)
- Coverage
- Impact
- Coherence
- Connectedness and accountability to beneficiaries.

The detailed evaluation criteria and questions are provided in the ToR in the appendixes section. Key findings, analysis and recommendation will be structured based on the operational sectors, while considering the relevant criteria under each sector.

The evaluation team was comprised of two members: one from the IFRC Asia Pacific zone office and one from the IFRC East Asia regional delegation. This is meant to be an internal evaluation with the target audience as the national society, IFRC country delegation as well partnering national societies.

Constraints and Limitations

When considering the evaluation findings, the following limitations were taken into account:

In order to meet with the schedule of key stakeholders within the timeframe requirement of the Emergency Appeal, the evaluation was scheduled during the peak season for floods and typhoons. While some field visits and interviews were completed, the evaluation team, as it composed of the key disaster response persons for East Asia region, was requested by the national society to help with the assessment and planning of response for the current flood situation. These unique circumstances strained the available time for a more in-depth comprehensive field visit for impact comparison purposes.

The absence of a complete plan of action had made the evaluation team unable to compare the progress with the means of verification and clear indicators. Also the lack of baseline survey in country, which was known as the general challenge for most programs & agencies in DPRK, had contributed to certain level of difficulties in verify and measuring the impact of the operation at large.

With these limitations, the evaluation methodology focused on desk top review, field visits that compared the achievements to-date with the expected results stated in the Emergency appeal (Revised) document. As the evaluation was conducted within only one year since the operation began, as well meeting with government officials was not scheduled by the DPRK RCS, it had been difficult for the evaluator to draw on conclusions on a more in-depth analysis on sustainability.

Movement restrictions in the country and tight time limits also made random selection of communities impossible. However, the national society and the country delegation had maximized the number of community visits under these limitations. Thus, overall the evaluation team feels confident that the methodology of this evaluation met minimum standards to draw an outlook of the key lessons learnt and recommendation.

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3 Delegates are requested to exit the country for a certain period of time for visa renewal purposes. The evaluation was planned at a time for the program coordinator, however, the disaster management delegate returned to the country in order to better coordinate the evaluation.

4 A draft of the plan of action was presented which is based on the IFRC emergency appeal PoA template. The draft was not finalized or completed.
Results and Findings

Overview of the IFRC/DPRK RCS Response

Alert & Assessment
Since the onset of the floods, the IFRC DPRK country delegation and the DPRK RCS disaster management (DM) department have been monitoring the situation. According to normal preparedness procedures, the DPRK RCS activated its emergency task force at headquarter, provincial and county levels, which coordinated with the flood prevention committee in each of the level\(^5\). Provincial and county Red Cross branches served as the first assessor of the situation on the ground and prepared reports which were made available to the task force on July 18, 2011. In subsequent days, two rapid assessment teams were mobilized, one to the north and one to the South Hwanghae provinces on 19-21 July and August 1-5 respectively. Each team was comprised of three national disaster response team (NDRT) members from the health, water and sanitation, and disaster management departments. The main function of the NDRT initial visit was to verify the situation reported by the branches.

After the NDRT teams reported back from the field assessments the DPRK RCS headquarter and the IFRC country delegation conducted three joint visits to North and South Hwanghae provinces on 25-27 July and again on 9-10 August with the aim to verify the situation described in government reports and by provincial branches’ assessment.

Plans were drafted and decisions were taken based on the results of these visits, as well as an analysis of the background information provided from secondary sources, including information gained and shared by other in-country agencies.

At the community level, it was reported that the county RC branches maintain early warning functions in helping with disseminating information to the communities, based on the data provided by the county meteorological bureaus.

Immediate Relief Action
The DPRK RC, with support from IFRC, maintained a prepositioned emergency stock sufficient to support 23,000 families in total\(^6\) in the national society’s disaster preparedness warehouses. While the assessment was ongoing, non-food items (NFI) including quilts with cover, cooking sets, plastic sheeting, jerry can, water purification tablet, and family hygiene kit were distributed to 3,076 families in ten counties in North and south Hwanghae as well South Hamgyong provinces by the end of July.

A Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) amounting to CHF 453,413 was allocated from the IFRC on August 2, 2011, aiming to support replenishment of the stocks already mobilized as a first response mentioned above. The action also included providing these families with hygiene promotion knowledge and safe use of water purification tablets.

On-going relief and long term recovery
The six month DREF operation was later escalated into an Emergency Appeal in the same month that the DREF is approved. The decision was made after further assessment, discussions, and with the approval from the government which authorized the DPRK RCS to go for an international emergency appeal. The Emergency Appeal absorbed the original plans of the DREF proposal in NFI replenishment, while expanding the target from 3,076 families to target 6,000 families. Apart from that, food items (rice and maize) were included in the immediate relief component. Longer term support was also planned in shelter, health & care, as well as water and sanitation sectors. In total the Emergency Appeal sought CHF3.49 million as a one year action targeting 30,000 beneficiaries.

The revised appeal process started 6 months after the original appeal was posted and was only published 3 months after the revision process began. The publication took the form of a 9 month

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\(^5\) The National Flood Prevention Committee is the cabinet apex body in DPRK, where DPRK RCS is a permanent member in the committee.

operations update specifying that a budget reduction of 31.4% (a total of CHF 2,392,728). The original decision from the DPRK RC and the country delegation is linked to the coverage rate amounting to 69% of the original amount of available funds, while on a deeper analysis, the appeal was revised based on operational change instead. It was noted after the fact that the coverage rate shown in reporting after the adjustments would then indicate a 99% coverage rate.  

At the time of the evaluation, actions reportedly accomplished included:

**Relief distributions (food and basic non-food items)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned outcome</th>
<th>Progress at the time of evaluation / changes from original plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To provide emergency food to 6,000 families who are most vulnerable to food insecurity as the result of the floods.</td>
<td>• 6,051 families (24,827 people) in 23 communities of Haeju, Chongdan and Pongchon counties in South Hwanghae province received a total of 288 metric tons of rice and maize. It was calculated under Sphere standard for sufficient food ration per person per month. The period of coverage had been shortened from the original planned 2 months into now a 1 month period. • The original plan to replenish some 3,100 relief items already distributed in the early stage of the flood was cancelled. The reason for change was stated in the revised Appeal document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Improve the DPRK RC response capacity</td>
<td>• A total of 139 volunteers (original target 60 staffs/volunteers) were trained with a relief &amp; emergency workshop. Content of the workshop focus on relief assessment &amp; planning, as well reviewing the initial stage of the flood operation. • A manual was developed and distributed in the training.</td>
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**Shelter**

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<tr>
<th>Planned outcome</th>
<th>Progress at the time of evaluation / changes from original plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To provide good quality construction materials and technical support for the reconstruction of 600 flood-resistant houses (approximately 2,400 people) in Chongdan, Yonan and Pongchon counties in south Hwanghae province.</td>
<td>• 600 vulnerable families (2,400 people) were selected. The original target was to provide 1,000 families with permanent housing, changes were captured in the revised Appeal document. Materials were delivered to the beneficiaries with some subsidies on the transportation cost under the operation plan in December 2011. • All construction work was basically completed. Final inspection by the IFRC country office was yet to be done at the time of the evaluation. • Commissioned by the Red Cross, a construction manual was developed by the State Academy of Science, content included design of the houses, introducing the construction materials, basic structure of critical part of the structures with diagram (beams and columns) • Latrines were built along with the 600 houses as planned (original targeting latrines for 1,000 families, target number downsized</td>
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7 It should be noted that under emergency appeal guideline, the operation can only be revised with operational change but should not be revised because of low funding. This is not fully understood by the national society and country delegation when the revision process is initiated but was adjusted during the discussion process.

8 Target number of beneficiaries of permanent shelter, along with the water supply system and latrine reduced from 1000 to 600 – Local government has asked affected population to move in with their neighbors thus need for the provision of housing is less eminent. Cost for construction materials deemed lower than the onset of the disaster when the budget was estimated.
Emergency health and care

**Planned outcome:** The health risks among 7,500 flood-affected families (approximately 30,000 people) in Chongdan, Yonan and Pongchon counties in South Hwanghae province will be reduced.

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Improved knowledge and practices of the population on the prevention and care of diseases related to floods.</td>
<td>All training components (ToT of CBHFA –with a focus on PSS and prevention of water-related diseases; health promotion to community based volunteers; mother &amp; child-care in emergencies to doctors) were completed by early December 2011. Numbers of person trained were reportedly meeting the target in original plan.</td>
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Water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion

**Planned outcome:** The risk of water and sanitation related diseases has been reduced through the provision of safe water, appropriate sanitation as well as hygiene promotion for up to 15,000 families (approximately 60,000 people) in Chongdan, Yonan and Pongchon counties in south Hwanghae province.

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<tr>
<th>Planned outputs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Safe water is provided to the 10 worst affected communities through reconstruction of damaged water supply systems.</td>
<td>9 worst affected project communities (approximately 1,309 people (adjusted from the number 2,500 in 10 counties from the original appeal where water supply systems are not properly functioning due to the floods) The beneficiaries list included the same 600 most vulnerable families receiving assistances through the shelter program.</td>
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<td>Appropriate household latrines and wastewater collection facilities are provided to the 600 most vulnerable families in the 10 selected communities.</td>
<td>Procurement and delivery of construction materials to the households and communities to reconstruct latrines and wastewater collection systems in accordance with the design in 9 communities (not 10 after the selection process)</td>
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<td>The health status of the population is improved through behaviour change and hygiene promotion activities.</td>
<td>60 volunteers were trained in hygiene promotion and conducted promotion campaign with printed IEC materials.</td>
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Key findings and analysis

**Assessment, distribution of relief items and planning stage:**

Secondary information (background information) was provided by the government which served as the only source of disaster statistics. Rapid assessment was done...
mainly by the DPRK RCS county and provincial levels using basic assessment tools like interview and direct observation. It is identified that there is room for improvement in the assessment process, especially on gathering sufficient information to complement the information coming from official sources. Analysis and initial planning which were integral parts of the assessment process could be enhanced by building up knowledge of existing national society staffs and volunteers, or bringing in technical advices for specific sectors like shelter.

A written report detailing the decision process for the launch of the appeal is not available. However it should be noted that the DPRK government would normally not request international support or invite international aid workers into the country. By allowing the launch of the appeal and access of foreign aid workers indicates that the situation had become critical.

On another note, the IFRC country delegation indicated that according to the standard procedure in DPRK, when arranging expatriate staff, together with counterparts, for field trips, in normal circumstances it would take approximately one week for clearance through DPRK RCS. For emergency situation where the presence of an expatriate is proved to be useful or important, the government may consider expediting the clearance process base on national society request. On this subject, the DPRK RCS explained to the evaluators that whenever the expatriate staff felt important for a field visit, it could be arranged without any restriction.

The Deputy Head of the World Food Programme (WFP) in DPRK stated that international staffs under WFP, as soon as they are registered in the country, do not require any additional clearances for field trips but rather clearance is needed for local staff, and travel for expatriates must be accompanied by DPRK nationals. The evaluation team further observed that when travelling outside Pyongyang, expatriates did not require to show documentation at any of the checkpoints, while local staff were checked. It is very important to note that the evaluation does not have any intention to evaluate any of the clearance procedures, but would make essential remarks if the procedure would potentially affect the operation in some aspect. In this regard, there appeared to be a different understanding between the IFRC country delegation and the DPRK RCS on accessing the affected area. This gap of understanding needs to be clarified for future operations. While the IFRC needs to realize the rules and regulations of the country, the DPRK RCS also needs to recognize the requirement for IFRC delegates to carry out on-site assessment, and monitoring – random or planned – to make sure the programs and situation are well assessed and planned, as well as that the information provided is in accordance with management and donor expectation.

Distribution of relief items was in general timely, relevant and effective, due to the pre-stocking system and the well placed warehouses. DPRK RCS’s branch volunteers played a significant role in this element of the operation in part because of their good local networking. However, the delivery of the relief items was made difficult due to torrential rain and flash floods destroying roads. Some beneficiaries had to walk long distances, sometimes 5 km each way, to receive relief items. The evaluators consider this could be a situation for flood or emergency situations proving acceptable but improvements in distribution arrangements should always be reviewed from time to time. Accountability of the distribution was considered acceptable with clear signature and distribution records available in the provincial RC branch. Photo records showing on site distribution existed and IFRC delegates were invited to oversee the distribution process of maize in two communities.

**Provision of emergency food:**

![Village leader explaining the relief and distribution process and result.](image)
Although the originally planning in providing two month food had to be reduced to one month mainly due to low funding level, the provision of emergency food to the affected population still had successful addressed to the need exposed by the assessment procedure. While the WFP was the organization in country mandated to provide regular and sometimes emergency food supplies, the amount of food last year, according to the WFP, could not fulfill all the needs especially after the floods. In line with the evaluation team’s point of view, WFP also recognizes and supports the role of the Red Cross in providing emergency food as part of the emergency response.

_Shrelter:_

With 6,029 homes damaged or destroyed, and target communities living in either transitional shelters or tents, the shelter programme has been the focus of the recovery phase in the operation which took up to 63% of the total appeal (revised) budget. This was also the first time the DPRK RCS piloted permanent, community/tenant driven reconstruction.

There was no subject expertise (e.g. Shelter delegate/staff) in-country involved during the planning and implementation stage neither from the Federation nor from DPRK RCS.

The program was designed in a way that the State Academy of Science was contracted by the national society to provide design, quality control and technical support throughout. This institution is situated in Pyongyang and was selected because of its overall reputation, although they do not have a network in province or county like other construction monitoring bureaus have. In this operation, they were considered as an independent quality control apart from the government routine quantity assurance procedure. One main technician was deployed in the province as a focal point to oversee and guide all the construction in the communities. The national society had considered adding a headcount to provide additional monitoring, but it did not materialize as it is very difficult to increase a number of designated staff in the existing structure and all the staff of the DPRK RC DM had been stretched with other projects, the monitoring of quality relied heavily on the State Academy of Sciences.

Interviews with representative of the State Academy of Science indicated that from their point of view, as the design of the houses was simple, they felt they are very capable to monitor the construction quality of all the houses. However, in the evaluation field visit, the evaluator found defects in the basic building quality in a number of houses, for example a few leaning walls or broken door steps where a poor cement/gravel/water mixture was most likely a contributing factor. On-spot explanation suggested that sometimes, the communities diverted the cement for other community needs. At the start of the shelter program certain communities eagerly started the process without proper training. Upon request from the IFRC country delegation, however, it was later corrected by suspending the construction until technicians were arranged for and stricter reinforcing and quality control measures put in place. Trained construction technicians were engaged to build foundations, columns and load bearing walls of the homes.

The DPRK government is responsible for the quality control and compliance with the national housing standards, the DPRK Red Cross did not participate in the quality control aspect of the shelter program. The provincial government and community leaders provided final approval of the constructed shelters prior to the beneficiaries moving in.\(^{10}\)

The overall cost per beneficiary (CHF 2,833) adequately covered a basic house design construction in DPRK standard. The original planning of the construction schedule was delayed for a few months as the construction materials did not arrive until winter time when it became impossible to make good concrete, which caused suspension of the construction work. It resumed at full speed after the winter, with all construction almost completed by the time of the evaluation.

Interviewed beneficiaries express high appreciation for the homes as it is much better than the homes they lived in before. During the time of the field visit, there were no clear signage of RC contribution

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\(^9\) There is no private property ownership in DPRK

\(^{10}\) All constructions in DPRK are subject to formal technical inspection and approval for them to be put into use after construction or major retrofitting.
but according to the country team, visibility boards would be installed. It is suggested that the message of Red Cross as supporting organization of the shelter reconstruction, as well Red Cross value be integrated and disseminated throughout the implementation process.

**Emergency Health and Care:**

The vast majority of health facilities were either destroyed or badly damaged by floods; health workers were operating in the field and seriously injured people were evacuated to closest hospitals.

There were reports about affected people suffering from diarrhoea and water borne diseases, but there were no major outbreaks of contagious diseases. The health component in the operation was considered to be a small scale (less than 2% of the overall revised budget). Although psychosocial support was one of the main focuses in the objective together with other CBHFA components, the national society's branches had confirmed that PSS was not part of their health package.

There was no baseline data available which made measurement of impact impossible. As there was no recording/reporting/feedback system from the trained doctors & volunteers, it is questionable on how to measure how many people were reached and positively impacted through health promotion activities.

**Water and Sanitation, Hygiene Promotion**

To a large extent, this component was integrated into the shelter programme managed by the disaster management department. The plans to rehabilitate or build water and sanitation facilities was well developed and was based on needs of affected communities. The implementation plan (which included WatSan technical workshops and 5 one-day on-the-spot workshops on constructing latrine were well placed. The training sessions covered all essential and important elements and helped to equip participants with the knowledge about construction, operation and maintenance of the facilities.

However, as the evaluators observed in communities, the quality of latrines was not up to construction standard. There was no precise planning for a maintenance schedule at the community level. Waste water collection systems were not present on the surface (as they were already built underground) making it difficult to comment on.

The community members and volunteers interviewed by the evaluators were not aware of how the water source was selected. Program staffs indicated that one of the reason could be as water quality was checked and ensured by the Ministry of Public health, community members were not provided with the information of where the water source were located and how it was selected. There was minimum level of community participation in this WatSan component.

At the headquarters level, there were approximately 10 technical staff in the Watsan department in charge of different programs. Two technical staff were responsible for one province in the operation implementation. A final evaluation trip by the national society national society is not yet in the plan.

It was difficult to evaluate the impact of the hygiene promotion element since no baseline was available.

**Organization Development: Capacity Building of DPRK RCS:**

The capacity of the DPRK RCS is in general good and competent especially at the headquarter level. This is due to the relatively low turnover rate that allows for retaining of trained and capable staff. The close network with the DPRK government, the IFRC country delegation as well other movement partners allows for a trusted working relationship which is considered a good asset of the DPRK RCS.

At the extended level (provincial & county), however there is no adequate capacity to cope with a large scale disaster. Although the provincial branch had acquitted themselves well with great determination, the headquarters was required to provide additional support to essential steps like assessment, analysis, coordination as well as resource mobilization.

Lessons learnt from the operation had contributed to an overall willingness in the national society as
well as from the IFRC country delegation to further explore capacity building needs. For example in how to conduct comprehensive assessment, analysis and planning, design and quality control in shelter programming capacity of psychosocial support programming as such.

**Support Services:**

**Human resources:**
The structure in managing the appeal is adequate in the national society as well as in the country delegation. However, there is a need to consider more technical support especially on construction. Having technical expertise would have been advantageous to work alongside the programme coordinator, DM, Health and WatSan delegates to monitor the quality and progress of the construction for shelter, as well as for latrines and waste water collection system.

While the structure itself is adequate, however, frequent personnel changes in the IFRC country delegation hindered a more in-depth planning support to the national society. Delegates in most departments at this moment (DM, Health, WatSan, program coordinator, finance) were either not yet there in the country or totally new to the country context when the operation was formulated. It should also be noted that the unfortunate medical evacuation of Head of Country Delegation in March had caused some loss of institutional knowledge, a gap of understanding and guidance to the national society in implementing the operation.

**Logistics and procurement:**
There has been a general good co-ordination between logistics and relief team in the DPRK RCS. On the other hand, while standard procurement documentation was kept and managed by the IFRC country delegation per IFRC standard, some tendering and quality check (e.g. food quality) documentation was available in Korean and kept by the DPRK RCS logistic department. The national society logistics department was in charge of the quality check, etc. While the mechanism was in place, there was a need to further clarify the quality control process, for example sampling of rice and other items.

*Beneficiary feedback mechanism / accountability.*
There is no systematic beneficiary feedback system in place. Feedback from beneficiary was mainly done by random interviews during monitoring field visits.

**Financial Management:**
The financial aspects of the operations together with the pledge management procedures have been handled well.

The operation has been well supported by the finance manager in the AP Zone office.

**Communications and Reporting:**
The profile of the DPRK RCS’s and to a lesser extent of the IFRC in the eyes of both the Government and the general public has been raised significantly through this operation. Mainly because of the focus on recovery had changed the perspective of the DPRK government on the DPRK RCS and its previous work.

Operation updates, appeals and situations reports have been professionally produced at timely intervals. Except for revised appeal (combined six month report) which is postponed nearly 3 months after deadline for understandable reasons.

**Security:**
There have been no specific aspects of security management that have caused concern.

**Cross Sectoral threads:**

**Gender:**
There has been a gender specific approach to the operation, save for the insistence lactating women were targeted with emergency food distribution.
Co-operation and co-ordination between the IFRC country delegation and the DPRK RCS’s national HQ has been good throughout the operation.

At an operational level, specifically during the emergency phase, the intervention was well coordinated within the Federation, and also through the DPRK RCS with government structures.

**Beneficiary Selection, Participation and Accountability:**
During the relief phase, selection of beneficiaries was done mainly at the grassroots level of the government with little participation from Red Cross. The selection criteria was clearly set and agreed by both DPRK RCS and IFRC country office before the operation, targeting vulnerable population amongst the communities. List of beneficiary names were kept in the community level and was not shared with the IFRC. Actual selection process in the community was not recorded in documentation.

For the shelter component, government beneficiary lists for the shelter program were verified by the IFRC team. However, it is unclear if there were any processes for appeal as the provision of lists.

**Integrity:**
There does not appear to have been any integrity issues surrounding any of the components.

**Monitoring:**
As mentioned earlier in the report, monitoring was an issue for the IFRC expat staff because of restriction of movement in-country. In many cases, monitoring was delegated to IFRC local staff, the national society and provincial branch staff.

**Policies and procedures:**
The Federation interventions had been managed according to emergency appeal policies and procedures. There were no reported non-compliance issues.

DPRK RCS senior managers and department heads had a reasonable understanding of how the IFRC operate during a large scale disaster. This level of understanding, however, would not be available in a provincial/county branch which would need an information/dissemination session to improve their knowledge of Red Cross procedures and standards.

Programmes in the operational plan (CBHFA, shelter, WatSan, procurement of food product) had brought with them operating guidelines and lesson learnt for the DPRK RCS to follow. How well these will be adopted in future is yet to be seen and will depend on how firmly the IFRC are able to convey their importance.

**Key recommendations:**

### Assessment, distribution of relief items and planning stage
- To enhance the assessment capacity of DPRK RC branches to provide timely and comprehensive assessment report that could complement the government data and facilitate timely decision and planning in headquarter level in emergencies.
- Post distribution survey should be in place after distributions of relief items which also serve as a mean of reviewing suitability of the items, distribution procedure and obtain beneficiaries feedback.
- Investigate possibilities and planning for baseline study in IFRC project areas in DPRK for better impact study.
- To investigate inclusion of longer-term recovery aspects, such as livelihoods support, in future disaster interventions.

### Health/Water and Sanitation
• To further build up DPRK RCS psychosocial support capacity in emergencies by establishing links with IFRC technical points and other partner national societies with experience in this field.

• To reduce the risk of outbreaks of diseases in disaster affected areas and to develop DPRK RCS capacity in helping to prevent epidemic-prone and communicable diseases through establishment of early warning and alert systems. (e.g. include data collection from service providers and communities, its analysis and dissemination in cooperation with the Ministry of Health through regular meetings, joint trainings/workshops and efficient exchange of information).

• To facilitate inclusion of DPRK RCS’s health department representative in interagency health cluster meetings.

Shelter

• A final review on the quality of the shelter should be undertaken with DPRK RCS, IFRC, the State Academy of sciences and relevant government authorities.

• Realistic timeline should be expected and set depending on essential factors that would affect construction process such as climate, farming season, labor availability and time needed for procure and deliver materials.

• To employ a construction delegate in overseeing shelter component in future operation. This can also be substituted by employing a short-term shelter technical advisor to a recovery operation to provide the technical support to the DPRK RCS.

• Review current shelter programming procedure for an aim to draft shelter programming guidelines (for shelter in emergency, transition and recovery).

General

• To review and obtain a clear & common understanding between delegation and national society on the needs, requirement and mechanism in regular monitoring. Consensus should be made on intervals of visits, composition of monitoring team, issues on delegate’s application for field visit, roles and responsibilities, delegation of responsibility visit while delegate’s presence is not possible in any events. The common understanding should then apply to relief distribution and also schedule to subsequent recovery programming for the next disaster to happen.

• To built up the understanding and knowledge on effective monitoring especially in provincial and county RC level. Practically, this would contribute to records of activities and results, and signal problems to be remedied along the way and contribute to enhanced standard of accountability.

• Enhance understanding of the IFRC procurement requirement and procedure with key departments in the national society and the IFRC delegation, DPRK RCS logistic department to facilitate the common understanding on how the IFRC procurement requirement and procedure applied in DPRK context, to clearly define the challenges and constrain, and measures to ensure compliance to Federation guidelines in emergency procurement.

• Feasibility study in establishment in beneficiary communication and feedback system.

• Revisit the current response mechanism, including contingency plans, trigger point for launching emergency appeals. The revisit process should be designed in an annual basis, and should include movement partners for a better common understanding of the plans and better resources mobilization in future operation.
Concluding remarks

The flood emergency operation 2011 in DPRK was to a large extent successful in fulfilling its planned targets. Although there were still gaps managerially and technically needs to be reviewed and filled, the collective effort from the headquarters of the DPRK RCS, branches as well as support from the IFRC country office were key factors for the immediate success. The operation brought immediate relief and contributed to positive change in the lives of the beneficiaries, alongside building up the capacity of the national society. The implementation process and the working partnership with the national society also brought the IFRC team with important institutional knowledge in the country.

It is unfortunate that the funding level does not reach the original target which in a way resulted in reduction of size of the operation. It should be encouraged that the DPRK RCS, with support from the IFRC could revisit the contingency plans and disseminate it, together with their long term planning framework, with partners in and outside CAS to facilitate efficient resources mobilization once emergency response would be launched.

On a final note, the evaluation team would like to thank the IFRC country team, as well the DPRK RCS for the great coordination and cooperation in the preparatory stage as well during the evaluation process.

Karen Poon, Operations Coordinator, Disaster Management Unit, AP Zone
Baktiar Mambetov, Development Delegate, East Asia regional delegation
Appendix 1: Term of Reference for the evaluation

Summary

**Purpose:**
The evaluation is part of the essential process of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Red Cross Society (DPRK RC) / International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Floods Operation 2011 for accountability and improvement through lessons learnt. It will assess the full duration of the operation in the scope of compliance with standards and expectations; relevancies and appropriateness; effectiveness; efficiency; coverage and impact; accountability to beneficiaries and supporting partners. Based on these assessments, key lessons and recommendations will be identified to inform future responses.

**Audience:**
The key audience for the findings of this evaluation is the IFRC, DPRK RC and other Red Cross Red Crescent supporting partners.

**Commissioners:**
This evaluation is being commissioned/lead by the IFRC Asia Pacific Disaster Management Unit (APDMU). The IFRC DPRK country delegation and the DPRK RC will provide in-country guidance with support from the regional delegation as appropriate. Both APDMU and the IFRC DPRK country delegation will be responsible to review and approve outputs of the process.

**Reporting Line:**
The evaluation is internal in nature. The evaluation team will be composed of Red Cross Red Crescent staff members with no external consultant(s) involved. There is no formal management or contractual reporting line within the team. A member of the team will be assigned as team leader (in this case the leader will be representative from the APDMU) as representing the evaluation team as a whole for all issues including final confirmation of sampling procedures, defining methodology, organization of the report and recommendations related to the evaluation. Roles and responsibilities of team member(s) will be specified and will report to team leader for matters related to the evaluation.

**Timeframe:**
August – September 2012 (including preparation and submission of final report)

**Location:**
DPRK: Pyongyang, South Hwanghae
China: Beijing (wrap up and debriefing)

**Background**
The IFRC/DPRK Floods operation was initiated in August 2011 after several floods and a strong typhoon Muifa imposed serious impact to the country. Some 9,500 houses were destroyed, leaving 25,000 people homeless. The flood had posted severe damage across the country, especially in the South and North Hwanghae province.

As an immediate response, a DREF with CHF 453,413 was allocated to DPRK RC to provide relief items. A subsequent emergency appeal\(^{11}\) was approved to scale up the response with a budget of CHF 3.49 million. In June 2012, the appeal was revised \(^{12}\) with a budget downsize to CHF 2,392,728.

The operation included major components of relief distributions, shelter, emergency health and care, water, sanitation and hygiene promotion alongside with necessary logistic arrangements and communications to stakeholders and media. Detailed objectives and target for the operation was indicated in the appeal documentation.

Evaluation Purpose & Scope

1. Purpose
The evaluation is part of the essential process of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Red Cross Society (DPRK RC) / International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Floods Operation 2011 for accountability and improvement through lessons learnt. It will assess the full duration of the operation in the scope of compliance with standards and expectations; relevancies and appropriateness; effectiveness; efficiency; coverage and impact; accountability to beneficiaries and supporting partners. Based on these assessments, key lessons and recommendations will be identified to inform future responses.

The key audience for the findings of this evaluation is the DPRK RC, IFRC and other RCRC supporting partners.

2. Scope
The evaluation will mainly examine all components for the processes, outcome and impact as stated in the revised emergency appeal from August 2011 to August 2012. It will include desk studies of progress and financial reports, reviews and monitoring reports over the operation period, as well field studies to affected areas, interviews with beneficiaries, internal and possibly external stakeholders. Management and coordination of the operation will be reviewed through interviews with the DPRK country delegation and DPRK RC.

3. Evaluation Criteria and Key Questions
The review will be assessed based on the following criteria and key questions, which should be taken as a guide where the evaluation team is to expand the list where appropriate.

- Compliance
  (i) Were activities conducted in compliance with the Red Cross Red Crescent’s Fundamental Principles, Code of Conduct and Sphere standards 2004 and appropriate within the country context?

- Relevance and appropriateness
  (i) Did the assessments carried out by DPRK RC staff and volunteers, provide an adequate picture of the communities affected by the floods, including their locations and needs? How did this affect the planning for the relief phase of the operation?
  (ii) To what extent, were the strategies employed to meet the needs and priorities identified by the targeted communities, tailored to the local context? Note: This should consider how well the intervention took into account for example the economic, social, political and environmental context, thus contributing to ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness.
  (iii) Were the operation’s strategies and priorities in line or complement those of the authorities and other international humanitarian actors? If not, why?
  (iv) To what extent did the intervention support the targeted communities’ own problem-solving and decision-making to address local needs?

- **Effectiveness**
  (i) To what extent has the Floods Operation achieved the proposed objectives of the relief and recovery phase?
  (ii) What NS/IFRC mechanisms and tools were used to promote good practice (e.g. Sphere, BPI, emergency assessment tools, Plan of Action template, VCA etc)?
  (iii) What were the factors that helped to move the Floods Operation effectively forward, and what factors hindered progress?
  (iv) What changes in capacity, capability, understanding and learning have occurred within the DPRK RC as a result of the operation so far? Are these appropriate?

- **Efficiency**
  (i) Could the operation have adopted more cost effective alternative strategies or approaches to achieve the same results?
  (ii) How was the actual timeline as compared to the planned timeline of the operation? What are the factors behind? How has the operation dealt with these issues?

- **Coverage**
  (i) Could the IFRC have expanded its appeal to cover more of the affected communities?

- **Connectedness**
  (i) To what extent did activities planned and carried out during the relief phase took into account the longer term recovery aspects? Examples where this was done.

- **Impact**
  (i) How did the support provided to the targeted communities impact on their well-being?
  (ii) What were the positive and negative consequences/changes in the communities as a result of the support provided?

- **Accountability to beneficiaries**
  (i) Is there a beneficiary feedback mechanism, and is it effective?

4. **Methodology**

The methodology will include:
- Desk review of key documents and records including:
  - the IFRC revised emergency appeal;
  - operation updates;
  - Floods operation Plan of Action;
  - Field visits to selected target communities and provinces to undertake surveys;
  - Focus group discussions and key informant interviews with:
    - Staff and volunteers (where appropriate) at NHQ and branches;
    - IFRC country team;
    - Target beneficiaries;
    - IFRC AP DMU;
    - Other organizations, including UN agencies

6. **Deliverables/Outputs**

The key deliverables/outputs from the evaluation are:
6.1 Inception report
The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the evaluation and will include: the proposed methodology, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides; the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team; a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables; and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team. The scoping exercise will allow the team to gather initial information and draw first impressions of the key issues to be covered.

6.2 Debriefings
Before leaving the country, the evaluation team will report its preliminary findings to the:
(i) IFRC in-country team, DPRK RC.

It will take on board any pertinent comments or corrections.

6.3 Draft report
A draft report, identifying key findings, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted within two weeks of the team leader/member’s return from the field. The in-country team and the KL support team will have one week to comment.

6.4 Final report
The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report covering:
- the background of the intervention evaluated; and
- a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations.

It would contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final report will be submitted two weeks after receipt of the consolidated management feedback.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the Federation. The team leader and / or members will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his or her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

7. Proposed Timeline (or Schedule)

The evaluation team will be recruited by the 22nd of June 2012. The review in-country will be undertaken from 23-27 July, and finalized no later than 31st of August 2012. The initial findings from the field mission will be shared in the middle of August.

The schedule will be confirmed during the inception period. A draft outline is provided below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July18 – Aug 3</td>
<td>1. Desktop study: review intervention documentation, and related primary/secondary resources for the evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Development of detailed inception report, or data collection/analysis plan and schedule, draft methodology, and data collection tools.</td>
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</table>
Aug 4  | Evaluation team arrive Pyongyang
---|---
Aug 5- Aug 10  | Field visits to target communities – surveys, FGDs, Key informant interviews and debriefing with DPRK country team and NS
Aug 11  | Departure to Beijing
Sept 15  | Feedback on draft report by IFRC country team, AP zone support team/reference group, PRCS and other key stakeholders
Sept 30  | Submission of Final Report

8. Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards.
The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation:


The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

i) **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.

ii) **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.

iii) **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.

iv) **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.

v) **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.

vi) **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.

vii) **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.

viii) **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at:

www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

The evaluation team will comprise the following:

(i) a team leader, in this case of internal evaluation will be a representative by the APZ DMU

(ii) a senior level manager not in any way related to this operation at any point of time

*End of ToR*
Appendix 2: Information gathering

1. Secondary reading (please see evaluation methodology).

Appeal documentation and situation updates were taken from the Federation website and absorbed prior to the team’s arrival in DPRK. This was added to by the IFRC country delegation who had amassed a collection of reading material upon request from the evaluation team, mainly Plan of Action of the appeal, published IEC materials, construction plan and guidelines relevant to the operation, operational record including signing record from beneficiaries and distribution record.

2. Key informant interviews:

A. Undertaken at DPRK RCS headquarter:

   **Sunday August 5th – Pyongyang, DPRK**
   PAK Un Gyong, Coordinator of Health and Watsan Department, DPRK RCS

   **Monday August 6th – Pyongyang, DPRK**
   Annamari RAIKKOLA, Health Delegate, IFRC DPRK country delegation
   *The interview is a very short and brief one as both Annamari and the evaluation team is going to the field the same day but in different location.*

   **Wednesday-Friday August 6th – Pyongyang, DPRK**
   Paek Yong-ho, Vice chairman, DPRK RC
   YU Ju Yong, Acting Disaster Management Director, DPRK RCS
   KIM Yong Il, Disaster Management Officer, DPRK RCS
   KIM Song II, Coordinator of Watsan Unit, DPRK RCS
   Kamal NIRAULA, Disaster Management Delegate, IFRC DPRK country delegation
   KIM Gwang Son, Disaster Management Officer, IFRC DPRK country delegation
   KIM Ik Son, Watsan officer, IFRC DPRK country delegation
   Jim DAWE, Programme coordinator/Acting head of country delegation

Abdur Rahim SIDDIQUI, Deputy Country Director, World Food Programme
Rose DEW, Country Director, Eups 2 (Save the children)
Ramesh BHUSAL, Chief, WASH Programme, UNICEF

B. Undertaken in the field

   **Monday and Tuesday August 6th – 7th – South Hwanghae province, DPRK**

   PAK Jong Pil, Secretary of South Hwanghae provincial Red Cross branch
   MUN Yong Il, Chairman of Pongchon County Red Cross committee
   KANG Sin Man, Hanchon-ri, Pongchon County
   KIM Myong Chol, Chairman of Chongdan County Red Cross committee
   KIM Il Ryong, Chairman of Yonan County Red Cross committee
   JANG Yong Sik, Jayang-ri, Yonan County
   MIN Gyong Gu, Donam-ri, Yonan County

   And Unnamed beneficiaries in each of the community visited.
Appendix 3 – Abbreviations:

IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
CBDP: Community Based Disaster Preparedness
CBHFA: Community Based Health and First Aid
CHF: Swiss Francs
DPRK RCS: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Red Cross Society
DM: Disaster Management Programme
DREF: Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction
EA: Emergency Appeal
HP: Hygiene Promotion
NFI: Non food items
OD: Organizational Development
PHAST: Participatory hygiene and sanitation transformation
PNS: Participating National Society
PSP: Psycho-social Support Programme
RC: Red Cross
WatSan: Water and sanitation
WFP: World Food Program