Mid-Term Review: BRC/PRC
Typhoon Haiyan - Iloilo Recovery Programme

Peter Chamberlain

April 2015
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Acronyms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRC</td>
<td>British Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFW</td>
<td>Cash for Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGI</td>
<td>Corrugated Galvanised Iron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTR</td>
<td>Mid-term Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non Food Items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODK</td>
<td>Open Data Kit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASSA</td>
<td>Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Post Distribution Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHAST</td>
<td>Participatory Health and Sanitation Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHP</td>
<td>Philippine Pesos</td>
</tr>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>Philippines Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Shelter Rehabilitation Assistance</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Safe Shelter Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPA</td>
<td>Technical Programme Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCA</td>
<td>Vulnerabilities and Capacities Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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Executive Summary

The Iloilo Recovery Programme is a two year response to Typhoon Haiyan which began in April 2014. Practically it has focused on the municipalities of Ajuy and Balasan. In line with the Movement Wide Operational Framework it espouses an integrated approach incorporating shelter repair and construction; cash based livelihoods initiatives, WASH Disaster Risk Reduction and community infrastructures.

This Mid Term Review aims to: “…to take stock of the current situation and the BRC-PRC recovery programme in Iloilo Province in order to directly feed into improved programming and programmes plans for the next phase of the recovery programme.”

The programme can claim a number of important successes. It has already provided shelter repair assistance to more than 3500 households and built core shelters for more than 200. Cash based assistance to rice farmers and micro enterprise grants have already reached more than 5,000 households and 165 savings groups have been established. The livelihoods programme is regarded as a model by other Movement stakeholders.

The programme has also introduced a number of significant innovations. Shelter staff have responded to problems in the supply of coco lumber and feedback from communities by re-designing several aspects of the core shelter, most notably by incorporating plywood into the construction of walls and floors. The livelihoods programme has introduced crop insurance to rice farmers and in WASH a more flexible and appropriate approach to latrine design is being trialled. The programme was also the first in the Movement to set up a Monitoring and Evaluation unit and has been influential in this field.

The Mid-Term Review also identified a number of weaknesses. The initial needs assessment took too long and was not used significantly by the programme. Engagement with communities has not always been linked to implementation; Barangay Recovery Committees were found to be weak and training in safer shelter methods has had little impact. Shelter beneficiary selection has generally been acceptable but weak community involvement has meant that some errors – or perceived errors have been reported.

The design and quality of core shelters have been enthusiastically welcomed by community members – but the speed of production remains an issue. One key bottleneck is the supply of coco lumber which is in short supply – and the use of plywood components is an effective way of addressing this problem. The construction methodology used – involving the prefabrication of walls and roof trusses has been questioned and - at current levels of production, 2,500 shelters cannot be produced within the programme’s current timeframe. The Mid-Term Review concludes, however that it is preferable to scale up prefabrication than to make fundamental changes to the methodology at this point.

Livelihoods initiatives have been very successful and are on track to meet the planned targets. The Livelihoods Technical Working Group has recently visited the programme to learn from its approaches. Questions around the long term sustainability of the benefits to rice farmers and micro-enterprises remain but these will continue to be monitored for the duration of the programme.

Cash-based programming in livelihoods and the combination of cash corrugated iron sheets used in shelter repair are found to be broadly appropriate and constitute good choices when compared with other possible modes of intervention.
Core shelter latrine construction has been significantly under-resourced throughout the programme and there is now a backlog of 200-300 houses either completed or under construction which do not yet have latrines. The need for latrines is one of the most common items of feedback from beneficiaries. The linkages between family latrine construction and the more limited community focused PHAST training and water system rehabilitation are not well understood or established.

A more comprehensive and coherent approach to DRR is required: many creditable activities have taken place but they lack an overall strategy.

The rehabilitation of 23 schools and clinics has not yet begun although PRC have recently provided technical resources to undertake and assessment. The modality for implementation needs to be established: it will almost certainly be contracted out.

Each sector of the programme has tended to pursue its own targets: the approach could not be described as integrated – but rather as multi-sectoral. In shelter and WASH the coherence between the delivery of shelter, latrines and water supply and the training and community engagement strategies (Safe Shelter Awareness, and Participatory Hygiene And Sanitation Transformation) has also been weak. Better operational planning across these sectors – and also involving logistics and procurement is urgently required to eliminate inefficiencies of resource allocation and to identify potential synergies. This needs to be accompanied by better communication with communities and their leaders to clarify the programme’s approach and its planned activities over the coming months.

The programme has been significantly understaffed since the beginning and this has had serious consequences both in terms of progress against objectives - and on the remaining staff who have sometimes had to take on unfamiliar roles and unfair workloads. National counterparts to BRC delegates – and clear plans for their skills development have not always been in place. A concerted effort to attract and retain national and international staff is required.

So far links between the Recovery Programme and the Iloilo Chapter have not been developed significantly. This gap should be addressed; potential linkages related to Disaster Risk Reduction have been discussed in the course of the Mid-Term Review and others may also exist. The review concludes that a number of activities cannot be feasibly completed by March 2016 and discussions between PRC and BRC about the implications of a programme extension need to begin immediately. Livelihoods activities present a different challenge: they are likely to be completed before the end of 2015. The implications of exit (or continuation) should be considered promptly.

The Mid-Term Review makes the following recommendations: those in italics relate not to the current programme – but to future programme of this type which BRC or PRC may be involved in.

**Shelter Rehabilitation Assistance (SRA)**

1. The shelter programme should do a follow-up review of the repairs made by beneficiaries based on the SRA (by trained staff) and encourage beneficiaries to rectify unsafe features. In order to understand the scale of unsafe features the programme should randomly select a number of barangays, review the SRA houses across the Barangay, and use this to make a decision on level of risk posed by the repairs. A small budget could be allocated to make immediate changes.
2. As part of this review, consider following up with Safe Shelter Assistance (SSA) champions to see if there are opportunities for using them to raise safe shelter awareness in the community.

3. Safe shelter training for the remaining 500 households should not at this stage seek to implement the full Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA). Safe shelter training should focus on beneficiaries who are in a better position to understand and incorporate safe shelter messages - including carpenters. Core shelter construction provides a good opportunity for practically demonstrating safety features to a wider group.

**SRA Assistance (future programmes)**

4. Careful consideration is required before modifying agreed approaches such as PASSA. PASSA is specified in the PRC sectoral guidelines and its partial implementation has been problematic.

5. Consider the most appropriate people to train in SSA. Ensure training is practical with demonstration or non-classroom element. Provide simple materials / incentives to help SSA champions to spread messages to others in their community. Conduct monitoring and follow-up on activities conducted by SSA champions.

6. For shelter interventions, dependent on context and markets, a combination of cash and materials should be considered rather than cash only.

7. Ensure that Standard Operating Procedures and guidelines are contextualised to fit the situation and conditions in the context in which they’re being applied (e.g. provide a transport allowance or make alternative arrangements for beneficiaries travelling from harder-to-reach areas).

**Core Shelter Recommendations (for current programme)**

8. Core shelter beneficiary selection requires a light review to identify households who have been wrongly excluded (and if needed replace ineligible beneficiaries or those whose circumstances have changed). It is suggested that the light review is done Barangay by Barangay (in line with core shelter construction starting in the Barangay) and adopts a participatory approach. Removal of people from the list should be done only against strict criteria and in exceptional circumstances. Learnings from beneficiary selection to date should inform the selection of remaining beneficiaries.

9. The transition to the use of plywood floors and walls should be expedited: it will improve quality and speed up the delivery of the programme.

10. The current focus should be on using and improving the current model of production using prefabrication of components. Progress should be reviewed at the end of the dry season (and with a full complement of shelter and logistics staff) to decide if a
switch to alternative models is necessary or feasible within the timeframe of the programme.

11. Incoming shelter and logistics managers should - together with the WASH delegate-review operational plans to ensure efficiency.

12. Logistics systems and record keeping require further enhancement.

13. Prefabrication should be scaled up to achieve an output commensurate with programme targets.

14. The provision of safety equipment and first aid kits to carpenters’ teams should be expedited.

15. Field staff should be encouraged and supported to find solutions to design and delivery problems in inaccessible locations.

**Beneficiary Selection Process Recommendations (future programmes) – applicable for any sector**

16. In future identify existing community structures / groups (such as the Barangay Officials) and work with them to undertake selection. New committees should only be established if there are plans and capacity to support them form and function as an effective group in the medium to long term – including activities they can lead on.

17. More participatory processes should be considered (depending on context) in the future to shift the balance of power from the programme to the community in terms of selection.

18. Review selection criteria so that they are narrower and adapted to the programme. If possible criteria should be identified with communities so they can take into account context-specific vulnerabilities.

19. Include more structured appeals process (with realistic period of time) through which community members can appeal if there are errors in the list and PRC staff can review these systematically. It is recommended that 5% of targets are held back to allow for beneficiaries to be added to the list (if appropriate) based on appeals.

**Livelihoods (Rice Farmers)**

20. Follow up should be provided to ensure that beneficiaries have a good understanding of their crop insurance options, in particular how to sign-up for this themselves.

21. As planned, savings and loans groups should be set up with rice farmers to help with savings and reduce reliance on debt.

22. Monitoring should be conducted to understand pre-cursors for successful adoption of crop insurance and sustainability of savings and loans groups.
Micro-enterprises and Marketable Skills (current programme)

23. Review if marketable skills training can be expanded or if alternative interventions can be designed specifically to target the most vulnerable households, in particular those who rely on daily labour. If it is not possible to do at scale consider how pilots of different options could be undertaken to support PRC implement livelihoods programming for the most vulnerable in future responses.

24. Further monitoring should be conducted for the remainder of the Programme duration to ascertain the sustainability of savings groups, as well as linked to the marketable skills training.

25. Consider introducing insurance linked to micro-enterprise activities such as livestock, health, etc. For both rice farmers and microenterprise PRC/BRC should ensure that livelihoods projects are well documented as potential models for recovery projects in the Philippines and elsewhere.

Micro-enterprises (future programming)

26. Adapt the phasing or cash amount for those people who have to incur considerable costs to travel to collection point and/or markets.

27. For future interventions of this scale (targeting a large number of households) adopt a pragmatic approach to monitoring. It is recommended that where there are two tranches rapid focus group discussions are done between the 1st and 2nd tranche to immediately identify any urgent issues, and post distribution monitoring (using a survey) is conducted with a sample of targeted beneficiaries.

28. Consider in the future the balance between strong messaging on the use of the grant and the possible negative impact of this.

WASH

29. Scale up household latrine production by the allocation of more staff and resources.

30. The delivery of two latrine designs should be trialled for an initial six month period. The acceptability of the designs and the likely pace of delivery can then be properly assessed.

31. Options for integration of WASH activities need to be considered and decided upon. It is too late to redesign the project – but there may be ways of linking Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation (PHAST), latrine construction and water supply in a way which adds value in some communities.
Disaster Risk Reduction

32. The Iloilo Recovery programme should develop an overall DRR plan. This should articulate the changes to be achieved at a community level and make links with other sectoral activities. The issue of timeframes must be considered – but in this and in the activities propose the plan should not limit itself to the constraints of the current project proposal.

33. Ensure that action for DRR is community-owned and community-led with skilled staff conducting training, analysis and action planning with communities.

34. Consider whether the Recovery Committee mechanism may still be used as an entry-point to the communities for DRR activities, perhaps by renaming, re-training and planning for medium to long-term engagement with them beyond the life of the household-level recovery activities.

35. Consider whether livelihoods beneficiary households may be linked up with the community cash for work as a conduit partner for implementation.

Community Infrastructure

36. The modality for the implementation of the community infrastructure projects – and the resources needed to oversee them – needs to be agreed as soon as possible.

Integration and Communication and Coordination

37. Communications with communities should be better planned and coordinated. It should be possible to inform community representatives of significant programme activities across all sectors for the forthcoming month.

38. Whilst it is too late to implement a truly integrated programme, team leaders should identify opportunities for closer cooperation and ensure that synergies between their activities are identified and acted upon.

M&E

39. M&E should work with each of the sectors to understand and plan monitoring needs – either linked to defining and measuring change or in order to test assumptions that are linked to how change will occur. As an example M&E should look to design an approach that can be used to understand the extent to which trainings conducted by various sectors are being applied.

Human Resources

40. A sustained effort to fill vacant positions is needed from both National Societies.

41. The programme organogram should be reviewed to ensure that it reflects reality and to identify areas where resources are not commensurate with anticipated workload.
42. The programme should take steps to improve staff retention – given the problems of attracting and retaining quality staff; quicker issuance of contracts and enhancing opportunities for staff development are possible options.

43. Wherever possible, BRC delegates should have national counterparts and initiate a plan to transfer skills to them.

Links with Iloilo Chapter and Future Directions

44. Discussions between the programme and the Iloilo chapter should be held to clarify what actions can be taken to engage and support the chapter. DRR is one area which may have potential. The continued engagement of the volunteers recruited in the programme area also needs to be considered

45. BRC and PRC should begin a discussion about the extension of the programme: an early “in principle” agreement to extend would remove pressure from the programme team and allow more realistic operational and manpower planning for the project

46. PRC should engage with programme staff as soon as possible to decide on the exit strategy for the livelihoods programme. Are there aspects of the programme which it would like to maintain – or should discussions begin with other organisations with a view to providing continuing support to micro-enterprises?
1. Background

Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Typhoon Yolanda) made landfall on 8 November 2013 causing more than 6,000 deaths, affecting 16 million people and causing devastation across wide areas of the Central Philippines – particularly the Eastern Central and Western Visayas Regions. Although the Philippines experiences around 20 typhoons per year this typhoon was one of the strongest ever recorded and caused unprecedented damage.

The context of the response was even more challenging as it coincided with two concurrent disaster responses in the country – widespread displacement due to clashes in Zamboanga in the South West of the country (September 2013) and the Bohol volcanic eruption (October 2013).

The Red Cross Movement initiated a huge response with total income for the response reaching CHF 345 million. In addition to the Philippines Red Cross (PRC), The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Committee (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) no less than 57 national societies supported the response. Of these, 15 have established a presence in-country for this response, including five societies (Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Finland and Australia) which had pre-existing programmes in the Philippines.

Prior to the response IFRC had a relatively small presence in the Philippines and no separate status agreement with the government. This restricted its ability to take on support roles for other National Societies which increased Movement reliance on the PRC.

The British Red Cross Society (BRC) is one of the largest contributors and has allocated a total of £26 million to the response of which £7.5 million was expended during the relief phase of the operation. In early 2014 it began planning for the recovery phase. BRC is credited with a major role in the Joint Recovery Assessment completed in February 2014 and then set about defining its own recovery strategy. The BRC Haiyan Strategic Operational Framework (March 2014) outlines three broad “pathways” for its engagement:

1. Joint Operations with PRC
2. Provision of financial and technical resources to build PRC capacity and response capability
3. Supporting PRC, IFRC and other Red Cross actors in areas where they can demonstrate an “added value”

BRC has subsequently allocated approx. £3.5 million to activities managed by IFRC and £7,539,569 to the bilateral recovery programme in partnership with PRC in Iloilo province, which is the subject of this report. The table below provides the overall budget the proportion of the budget which each heading comprises and the percentage of expenditure to date:
Budget and Expenditure to February 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expense area</th>
<th>Budget - GBP</th>
<th>% of budget (Rounded)</th>
<th>% spent to 28/02/15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>4,529,286</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>921,429</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>314,285</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>128,571</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Capacity Building</td>
<td>117,143</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational costs</td>
<td>772,499</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>79,589</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>426,768</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,539,570</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
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It should be noted that these figures understate the scale of the WASH budget, since around one third of core shelter costs actually relate to latrine construction. WASH therefore comprises around 20% of the total budget.

It is also important to note that there is considerable underspend at the half way point of the programme and that for four sectors expenditure has barely begun.

Iloilo is one of four provinces on the island of Panay, part of the Western Visayas, Region VI of the Philippines. Iloilo was less severely damaged than some coastal parts of Eastern and Central Visayas - but the rationale for programming centres on its comparative neglect. The Project proposal notes that the Province had been “underserved by the humanitarian sector as well as other movement partners.” The Joint Recovery Assessment outlines extensive needs, and particularly notes the neglect of upland areas of the island.

BRC considered other modalities – such as working with established National Societies with a long term presence in the Philippines, but decided to focus its resources on collaboration with PRC. The two organisations signed an MOU on 31 March 2014 and a Project Agreement for the Iloilo Recovery Programme was finally signed on 4 June.

The Project Proposal and an accompanying logical framework were signed off on 16 May – although the project duration is given as April 2014 – March 2016.

The proposal is situated within the agreed Movement Wide Operational Framework (March 2014) which describes how Movement partners will work together. Its annexes identify the key elements of the plan; they propose an integrated approach and set targets for the recovery phase. Although some informants mentioned disadvantages of somewhat inflexible adherence to a common plan, all recognised that it represented a considerable advance on less tightly organised responses of the past – for example the tsunami response in Aceh from 2004 onwards.

The goal of the project is that:

“People affected by Typhoon Haiyan in Iloilo Province have recovered and are more resilient to future disasters”.

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It has three strategic objectives:

1. *Households have recovered from the typhoon and are more resilient to future shocks*
2. *Communities have recovered and are more resilient to future shocks*
3. *PRC has increased its capacity for disaster response and mitigation*

Key activities envisaged include shelter repair and construction, livelihoods recovery, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), the rehabilitation of community infrastructure and the strengthening of the volunteer network of the Iloilo chapter of PRC. The proposal anticipates that project activities would be done in seven municipalities: in fact the programme has focused all of its efforts to date in two municipalities; Ajuy and Balasan. Some community infrastructure projects are planned in the remaining five municipalities.

**2. Methodology**

The project proposal anticipates the need for a mid-term review (MTR) which “will determine whether the objectives can be met and if activities and indicators remain relevant.” Terms of reference for this exercise were developed in January 2015 and the MTR was conducted in March 2015.

The Terms of Reference for the MTR (see annex 1) state that its purpose is:

“…to take stock of the current situation and the BRC-PRC recovery programme in Iloilo Province in order to directly feed into improved programming and programmes plans for the next phase of the recovery programme.”

The objectives of the MTR are:

1. **Review the BRC-PRC Iloilo Recovery programme**,
   a. Assess key achievements to-date and look at the relevance, appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of the programme.
   b. Foster a learning process among partner and project staff to support utilisation of the findings as part of re-planning and the next phase of the programme, and providing clear and practical recommendations.
   c. Make actionable recommendations for all components of the next phase of the recovery programme, in light of: the MTR findings; planned activities / targets; project locations and project team structures; and as much as possible information on current and priorities of ‘still-to-recover’ Yolanda-affected households and communities.

2. **Facilitate a validation workshop** for programme staff to present and discuss the findings.

A series of around fifty detailed questions are also included in the TORs.
The methodology adopted aimed to be practical – in order to provide findings which could feed into the second half of the project - and to be consultative involving community stakeholders, programme staff of BRC and PRC, volunteers and other Red Cross Movement actors. It also combined the efforts of an external consultant with those of BRC staff - and the Iloilo programme’s own Monitoring and Evaluation Unit.

The review team consisted of the consultant, and two London based BRC staff with long term connections to the programme, the Performance and Accountability Advisor and the Philippines Programme Officer. They worked closely with the Ajuy- based Team Leader for Monitoring and Evaluation.

Prior to fieldwork more than 200 programme documents were assembled and shared by the team using “Dropbox” and these formed part of the analysis. The consultant conducted around 40 stakeholder interviews with London-based BRC staff, staff of PRC and other implementing affiliates in Manila and a range of PRC and BRC staff in Iloilo and the programme offices in Ajuy.

Over a period of a week and working closely with project team staff and volunteers, the reviewers visited 13 Barangays in Ajuy and Balasan and conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) and interviews with community members including beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, Barangay Recovery Committees and local government officials. A total of 103 women and 63 men were involved in this process. Questionnaires were developed for the main groups interviewed and discussions were documented.

The reviewers were also able to participate in the activities of the Red Cross Technical Working Groups for shelter and livelihoods and attend a meeting of Ajuy programme managers.

The initial findings were then presented at a verification workshop on 25-26 March 2014. This included PRC and BRC management based in Manila and Iloilo, programme staff and community and local government representatives. The purpose of this workshop was not to make decisions, but to check the findings and seek additional feedback from participants on ways forward for further consideration by the evaluators and by management.

It should be noted that the MTR follows on from the BRC Typhoon Haiyan Process Review. This study focuses on BRC humanitarian response processes and looks at how the lessons of the Haiyan response can inform future BRC programming. The role of the MTR is to look in more detail at programmatic issues with a focus on analysis and findings which influence the current programme – although some overlap is inevitable.

This report documents the findings of this process. First it looks at the needs assessment and design process for the programme. The completed and ongoing activities (shelter, Livelihoods, WASH) are then considered, documenting the approach, achievements to date and issues which remain to be resolved. It then considers future activities (DRR, community infrastructure) and a range of significant programme support and cross cutting issues before providing overall conclusions.
3. Design and Needs Assessment

Summary of activities and implementation dates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A M J J A S O N D J F M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beneficiary selection</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC-BRC Project Agreement</td>
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3.1 Design and Geographical Targeting

The project design is tied closely to the Movement Wide Operational Framework, which provided set targets per sector that all partners needed to work within. The integrated approach, key recovery sectors and overall targets for the Haiyan response are provided in the annexes to this document. This framework is in turn derived from the findings of the Multi-Sector Assessment. The Project Proposal provides specific targets for the Iloilo project plus a log frame and Gantt chart. In overseeing and coordinating the response PRC has been careful to ensure that a common approach is adopted by all partner national societies. Changes and modification require sign off at the most senior levels of PRC.

An example of this can be given in relation to shelter design. Red Cross Societies have agreed to implement just two shelter designs across the whole response. In early 2015 procurement problems with one of the key components – coco lumber led the Iloilo project to propose the use of plywood in floors and walls. In order to test the new design trial shelters have been built using the new components and Focus Groups have provided community feedback. The new designs were then approved by the Shelter Technical Working Group on 13 March 2015. However the approval of the changes requires approval at the Secretary General and Chairman level of PRC.

The indicators in the log frame submitted with the proposal must be regarded as incomplete: outputs rather than outcomes are provided and some teams have modified them to reflect the desired changes which should occur. However a former Country Manager affirmed that for reporting purposes, the log frame submitted as part of the proposal and the numerical targets included in the proposal are the definitive ones.

Feasibility of the original programme design:

The goal and strategic objectives contained in the original proposal can be regarded as reasonable – although somewhat ambitious in relation to their timeframe in some sectors. The livelihoods programme seems likely to achieve its targets within the allocated timeframe, but the core shelter programme will not. (See section 4.2 for a full explanation). It is worth noting that all partner national Societies – particularly those without a prior presence in the

\[1 \text{ It has since been clarified that modifications of indicators are allowed.}\]
Philippines have struggled to meet targets for core shelter (including its sanitation component). Other sectors such as DRR and community infrastructure might have been realistic but have not been resourced well.

**Geographical targeting:**

The effective focus of considerable resources on two municipalities in an area which was not the most affected by the typhoon has been questioned by some informants. The selection of these two municipalities was driven by pragmatic concerns. First, it was found that there were more than enough beneficiaries meeting the selection criteria in the first two municipalities to be assessed. Second, the programme struggled to get the human resources to establish the programme and conduct the assessment in Ajuy and Balasan: a wider assessment would have been even more problematic. Third, the prolonged assessments in the two municipalities raised legitimate community expectations that they would be followed by practical support. The programme also found that very few other agencies were working in these municipalities; in Ajuy only CARITAS and ADRA (closing at the end of March 2015) were operating in the recovery phase. This is in contrast to other municipalities such as Estancia and Concepcion where more agencies are reportedly working.

In view of the challenges experienced with the assessment - and subsequently with logistics and procurement during programme implementation a limited geographical focus was probably an advantage. The reasons for the more limited geographical focus are therefore justified – although it would be possible to make a case for other municipalities if the selection were based solely on need.

The number of recovery packages in relation to the number of households – 71% for Ajuy and 89% for Balasan (excluding the six barangays pending shelter targeting) is relatively high and this seems to have contributed to a good level of acceptance of the programme and its beneficiary selection.² It is arguable that a wider geographical spread might have enabled a stronger focus on the most needy, but the human resource constraints would have challenged the programme’s ability to reach them. It should also be noted that the extensive fieldwork conducted by the MTR found that very few selected beneficiaries did not meet the selection criteria.

**3.2 Assessment**

The assessment phase linked to the Iloilo programme has been extensively analysed in the Process Review and it is not the purpose of the MTR to repeat it. In summary, a household survey³ and series of barangay-level VCAs carried out in 57 barangays across two municipalities. The assessment methodology relied on collecting data through a house-to-house survey designed with input from BRC technical advisors and PRC Iloilo Chapter staff using Open Data Kit technology on mobile phones. This data was intended to be analysed first for shelter beneficiary selection, against a set of criteria based on observable level of damage, primary livelihood type and land-owner’s agreement. It was intended to later be analysed by BRC technical advisors in WASH, health and DRR to establish the baseline and feed into the community-based programme design.

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² Note that some families have received multiple packages from different sectors
³ As of 26 June 2014 9,876 households had been surveyed (out of a total of 16,434 households in Ajuy and Balasan).
The reliability of the data was brought into question when the analysis for shelter beneficiary selection was carried out and beneficiary lists were shared with Barangay Recovery Committees. Issues had been faced previously with Recovery Committees putting names of their families and friends onto the list of household names for assessment. When the beneficiary lists were shared back with the Recovery Committees, there were complaints that vulnerable households had been left off the beneficiary list in favour of those that were related to Recovery Committee friends and relatives. One barangay reported that most members of the Recovery Committee were asked to step down at this time and a new committee was formed with much more representation of barangay health workers and officials. Concerns were also raised by the assessment team that not all household data uploaded had been received for analysis. Given the length of time that had elapsed since the start of the assessment process and the reported levels of self-recovery in preparation for the imminent rainy season combined with the issues described above, it was decided at this time that a re-validation process would take place simultaneously with beneficiary registration. This was reported to be successful in selecting shelter beneficiaries, although it was time-intensive.

Further analysis of the survey data was carried out in the following months by technical advisors and sent to the field team, but it is unclear how the results of this analysis were used by the programme – if at all. Opinions on what went wrong with the process vary: for some the problem was personnel gaps and technical support of the assessment; for others the assessment design was unsuitable and there was weak engagement with newly recruited programme staff in the Philippines who were not involved with the process from the start.

The MTR has a specific mandate to look at the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme and to understand more fully its timeframes and from this perspective it is sufficient to note that:

- The assessment process was too long: an under-resourced field team worked under difficult circumstances for three months (April until June 2014) to gather and process data for shelter beneficiary selection whilst simultaneously setting up the programme base. Questions then emerged over the reliability of the ODK data submitted from London, resulting in an extensive re-validation process.
- Data analysis for the purpose of baseline and informing the community aspects of the programme did not occur until much later in 2014. In part this was because there was no plan for analysis from the onset, but also the project activities were phased to prioritise the household-level interventions and therefore household-level data was prioritised for analysis. There is little evidence that the data has been used by programme staff. Livelihoods undertook a separate assessment and subsequent baseline.
- The process was complex and expensive\(^4\). There were issues about the ability of BRC/PRC to manage the Open Data Kit successfully with the resources allocated (particularly to manage the cleaning, analysis and utilization of collected data in-country as opposed to from BRC HQ).
- There is now a disconnect between the beneficiary lists and data collected as part of the assessment (mapping back at this stage would be very time consuming), and shelter and

\(^4\) The ODK component alone is estimated to have cost around £40,000 (equivalent to £4 per surveyed household), not including staff costs associated with leading the process.
livelihoods have a separate system for assigning beneficiary identification numbers. This could have been overcome with greater capacity and thinking on information management following the departure of the assessment support team from BRC.

- There was very limited engagement between the assessment process and the newly recruited implementing team: the incoming Country Manager at the time of the assessment claimed not to have seen TORs for the exercise; the Programme Manager was described as disengaged from the process and assessment team and the livelihoods programme found the data produced unhelpful.

Practically the result of these problems was a significant delay to the launch of the programme. The livelihoods programme effectively did its own assessment and beneficiary identification: the shelter programme did try and use the assessment data but in the words of one participant: “no one really knows how beneficiaries were selected.” Ultimately the beneficiary selection has been broadly successful, but when considering the time and resources involved it was not an efficient process.

It can be argued that other problems – particularly with procurement of shelter and other materials – meant that the prolonged assessment was not the prime cause of delays. However there was a considerable opportunity cost involved: scarce staffing resources were focused on solving assessment and beneficiary selection problems when they could more usefully have been used on planning and implementing other aspects of the programme which were less dependent on materials.

4. Shelter

4.1 Shelter Repair Assistance (SRA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>2014 Targets</th>
<th>2015 Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainy season</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter Repair Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA training</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter Repair Assistance distribution</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>3515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core shelter Construction</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of 57 model houses</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of remaining shelters</td>
<td>2443</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“If the Red Cross had not given this assistance, my house would still not be fixed as I am only a fisherman and my income is only sufficient for feeding my grand-daughter. I would have had to collect scraps to fix the house”

“I wouldn’t have been able to fix my house in time if it hadn’t been for Red Cross assistance. I now have money to buy food and don’t have to borrow anymore”

5 Comments from beneficiaries
Overall approach and SRA realisation to date: The target for this activity as outlined in the project proposal is that: “3,500 households receive shelter repair assistance through the provision of material (shelter kits) and financial support.”

At the time of the MTR 3,515 households had received support and the programme had plans to provide support to another 500 households.

The approach used in this activity was to provide a combination of training, 10 corrugated Galvanised Iron (CGI) sheets and a cash grant of PHP10,000 (around £150) per household. Safe Shelter Awareness training (based on part of the Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA) approach) was to be provided to identified “shelter champions” who were to educate the community on a series of safe shelter building techniques.

SRA was slow to get started. Procurement of CGI proved problematic: an international tender was initially launched in April 2014 which resulted in no acceptable bids. It is unclear what went wrong with this tender process. The programme subsequently sourced the CGI through PRC in Manila: although the dimensions were slightly wrong, the pressure to deliver was intense. Further delays occurred in shipping the material from Manila in the search for the best transport deal. Ultimately the CGI arrived in October and distributions took place in October and November 2014.

Suitability of the SRA design and SRA achievements towards objectives According to the assessment data, over 50% of households surveyed in Ajuy and over 70% in Balasan rated shelter repair as the most urgent need in their community. 79% of surveyed households in Ajuy and 61% in Balasan felt that stronger materials were required to improve their house. Interviews with beneficiaries and community representatives show that the support package was well received. The CGI sheets were appreciated for their high quality which beneficiaries might not otherwise been able to obtain. The provision of CGI also allowed people to start repairs immediately. The cash grants were an appropriate contribution to shelter rehabilitation, although not covering total rehabilitation costs in most instances. The mixture of cash and CGI sheets was also found to be a good combination: the cash allowed beneficiaries to buy other roofing and structural materials to support the CGI – and also to employ carpenters to make the necessary repairs. Post distribution monitoring shows that the use of the funds was overwhelmingly for its intended purpose - on average 74.5% of reported spend was on house repair related items, with 56% of people spending 75% or more on house repair items. Typhoon Haiyan provided a strong motivation for people to want to strengthen their house, and PDM data shows that the main intention behind money spent on house repair was to make them stronger against typhoons or to make them more weatherproof.

SRA – main intention behind use of money linked to shelter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PDM data: What was your main purpose when using the money on your house? (n = 370)</th>
<th>PDM data: What part of your house was the main focus of your improvements? (n = 370)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stronger (to rain standing in typhoons)</td>
<td>Frame of house and/or Roof trusses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Field visits identified three broad approaches to the use of SRA (see annex 3 for photo examples of each of these):

- “Patch-ups”: where the materials had been used unsystematically to address the immediate defects of the typhoon damaged shelter. There are serious doubts about the ability of such repairs to withstand severe weather events.

- “New build”: where beneficiaries had attempted to build a completely new and more robust house for which the assistance provided was insufficient. The examples viewed were incomplete and not yet habitable and there are doubts about the beneficiaries’ ability to complete them in the short to medium term. Until completion beneficiaries continue to live in unsafe typhoon damaged housing or with neighbours. As an example
the barangay official in one location estimated that 20% of beneficiaries had adopted this approach.

• Whole repairs: the resources provided by PRC – usually enhanced by further funds from the beneficiary - have been used to complete a systematic repair of the building resulting in an improved house.

Whilst most SRA houses visited fell into the last two categories and beneficiaries reported feeling safer in their repaired/rebuilt homes, it is not known if repairs have resulted in stronger houses. Of particular concern is the extent to which the provided CGI would withstand future typhoons or is at risk of blowing off risking damage to people, livestock and property.

**Increasing Safe Shelter Awareness (SSA):** Although the Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA) is enshrined in the proposal, a modified and less participatory approach has been used. It is interesting to note that the modification of participatory methodologies - PASSA for shelter and PHAST for a limited number of communities - and communities in which only a minority are provided with sanitation – has resulted in generally weak impacts.

This training does not appear to have been effective: beneficiaries are generally unaware of the 8 safe shelter messages and the strategies promoted have not been consistently adopted. Mid distribution monitoring of 3 barangays concluded that “none of the beneficiaries could name the 8 Key Messages for Safe Shelter.”

SSA training was conducted very quickly: 277 people were trained in a week in Balasan and 375 in roughly the same period in Ajuy, targeting primarily Recovery Committee members and 143 volunteers. Reportedly Recovery Committee members were asked to participate at short notice and training evaluations suggest that the trainers struggled with attendance and uncooperative trainees. Linked to this, there appears to be no clear rationale for the selection of trainees. Beyond the “8 key messages” poster training materials were reportedly unavailable. Follow up appears to have been limited.

Training was sometimes conducted before the distribution of shelter assistance packages and sometimes after, suggesting that overall plan for SRA activities was weak.

Red Cross safe shelter posters translated into the local dialect were observed in many barangay headquarters but beneficiaries and Recovery Committee members were unaware of their contents.

Communities were often unaware of their “shelter champions” These shelter champions were unclear of their intended role and largely ineffective. They were unclear why they had been chosen ahead of more relevant candidates such as carpenters or masons. Shelter champions felt that the training had been theoretical rather than practical.

In conclusion it is unlikely that the project target of 6,000 households with improved knowledge of shelter related hazards and risks through PASSA training has been achieved.

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6 Of these participants in Balasan 80% were women and 20% men, and in Ajuy 64% were women and 36% men.
Interestingly, beneficiaries who had received or observed the building of core shelters – but had no formal training – were better able to articulate the features of a safer house.

**SRA Recommendations (for the current programme)**

1. The shelter programme should do a follow-up review of the repairs made by beneficiaries based on the SRA (by trained staff) and encourage beneficiaries to rectify unsafe features. In order to understand the scale of unsafe features the programme should randomly select a number of barangays, review the SRA houses across the Barangay, and use this to make a decision on level of risk posed by the repairs. A small budget could be allocated to make immediate changes.

2. As part of this review, consider following up with SSA champions to see if there are opportunities for using them to raise safe shelter awareness in the community.

3. Safe shelter training for the remaining 500 households should not at this stage seek to implement the full PASSA approach. Safe shelter training should focus on beneficiaries who are in a better position to understand and incorporate safe shelter messages - including carpenters. Core shelter construction provides a good opportunity for practically demonstrating safety features to a wider group.

**SRA Recommendations (next time)**

4. **Careful consideration is required before modifying agreed approaches such as PASSA. PASSA is specified in the PRC sectoral guidelines and its partial implementation has been problematic.**

5. **Consider the most appropriate people to train in SSA. Ensure training is practical with demonstration or non-classroom element. Provide simple materials / incentives to help SSA champions to spread messages to others in their community. Conduct monitoring and follow-up on activities conducted by SSA champions.**

6. **For shelter interventions, dependent on context and markets, a combination of cash and materials should be considered rather than cash only.**

7. **Ensure that Standard Operating Procedures and guidelines are contextualised to fit the situation and conditions in the context in which they’re being applied (e.g. provide a transport allowance or make alternative arrangements for beneficiaries travelling from harder-to-reach areas)**
4.2 Core Shelter

“I can sleep without worrying at night now that I have a house”

“I will be able to survive even if I’m only picking shells because I have a home”

The key target indicated in the proposal is that “2,500 households receive new safer shelter (full timber frame shelter) and have access to improved sanitation through the provision of latrines as part of the new safer shelters.”

It is important to note that although the provision of sanitation is considered a key part of core shelter, it has in effect, been treated separately. With the exception of a small number of demonstration latrines built early in the programme, the construction of latrines did not progress until the arrival of a sanitation delegate in December 2014. Therefore it will be considered as a WASH intervention.

The Red Cross Movement has adopted two designs for the Haiyan recovery: one incorporating concrete components and one built of coco lumber with walls made of sawali, a type of bamboo matting. It is the latter design which was adopted by the Iloilo programme.

At the time of the MTR, 221 out of the 2500 core shelters had been constructed (see figure above showing rate of construction). So far 1966 households have been identified for core shelter construction with another 534 still to be chosen. Whilst this may seem like slow progress it reflects the difficulties which most agencies have experienced in shelter construction. Precise comparisons are difficult as targets and circumstances vary considerably, but few National Societies are more advanced than the Iloilo programme – indeed three have not yet built any shelters. Even long established players noted the difficulty of the context in Panay: German Red Cross has completed only 155 shelters out of 1500 planned in Capiz and Antique provinces, although its completion rate elsewhere is higher.

During the MTR’s consultations in communities where core shelters have already been built it is clear that beneficiaries are very happy with the design and quality of the new houses. They are seen as bigger, safer and stronger than their previous houses.
Importantly beneficiaries believe that if they had been given money – instead of the house – they would not have built houses of a similar quality: they lack design and building expertise, do not have access to high quality materials, and reported that they would have spent the money on other items such as food, education, debt repayment and so would not have been able to use all for house construction (this was seen by them as a negative thing), as such they would have been tempted to choose cheaper options which would have compromised on quality and safety.

The main concern among core shelters beneficiaries is the long wait for their shelters to be built and the fact that most of them do not yet have a latrine. More than 50 households asked to withdraw from the core shelter programme in early 2015 to make themselves eligible for cash grants for shelter from the Department of Social Welfare and Development even though these grants are of a much lower value than the core shelters.

**Shelter design - and procurement:** The programme commendably made several improvements to the design as a result of M&E and other feedback from the community. The windows in the original design were hinged at the top and difficult to open and close. Windows hinged at the side are now used. Longer nails are also used in the construction of the windows making them less prone to fall apart. Beneficiaries are consulted about the site and orientation of each house.

Procurement problems have led to perhaps the most significant changes in design. The replacement of coco lumber floors and sawali walls with plywood alternatives have been trialled and will be introduced subject to approval from PRC HQ. The trial houses using both alternatives have been visited and beneficiaries have a strong preference for plywood floors and walls.

The availability of coco lumber in two sizes is central to the delays. Walls and latrines incorporate a large number of thin laths of 1”x 2” x 8’ coco lumber as a key component of walls. 220 are used in a single core shelter and another 55 in a latrine. These are difficult to produce as they require accurate cutting, which is often a challenge for local sawmills and timber faults mean that some will be rejected. Suppliers also buy them in 12’ lengths – which means the 8’ specification can involve significant waste.

1”x6”x10’ timber is required for floors; this can only be produced from large, mature coconut trees – which are hard to source. With so many Haiyan shelter programmes being implemented around the country the demand for coco lumber – which is strictly controlled by the Philippines Coconut Authority to ensure sustainability – currently outstrips supply. The use of plywood in floor and wall construction will resolve a key bottleneck in current production.

The availability of high quality sawali and coco lumber has been the driver for design changes, but focus groups conducted by M&E also provide compelling reasons. Beneficiaries reported that the walls do not keep out the rain and deteriorate quickly. One shelter only a few months old required a complete replacement of its walls prior to a high-level inspection. Beneficiaries feel that sawali walls do not provide privacy and security.

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9 It is interesting to reflect if beneficiary feedback on the design alone would have led to such changes. While consultation with beneficiaries during the design phase would have likely found a similar dislike for sawali and feedback from monitoring FGDs found a strong preference for plywood, it is felt that the change would have been far less likely to happen if there was not an issue with supply chains.
One family in Barangay Progresso (Ajuy) whose house is situated next to a road had covered parts of the walls with old CGI sheets to ensure that the wife and daughter were better protected. The only potential problem with plywood walls is uncertainty about how large flat panels will behave in typhoon strength winds. Robust construction and an instruction to open windows to allow a better flow of air are the main precautions. It should be noted that plywood panels are already a common feature of existing houses in Ajuy and Balasan and that ADRA switched to a plywood wall design in Aklan Province in 2014.

Coco lumber floors are also uneven and prone to splinters: children have reportedly caught toes in the sometimes large gaps between floorboards. Plywood is again the preferred material.

**Construction process** The Iloilo construction process is modelled on the approach used by the German Red Cross. It differs considerably the approach used by IFRC and other movement partners. The IFRC process delivers shelter material directly to the building site reducing the need to have large warehouse capacity and the costs involved in prefabrication. The approach does require strong integration of logistics and programme planning to ensure that materials are not left exposed at multiple field locations.

Some informants suggested that the Iloilo programme should switch to the IFRC method. In the view of the evaluators it would be disruptive to change production methods at this point. A technical review conducted by an IFRC delegate in November 2014 suggested that a scale up of the current methodology should be pursued. In the next 2-3 months the programme should monitor the progress of the accelerating production model. Practically there is no shelter delegate, no logistics manager and no logistics officer in place at the time of the MTR and a change of approaches would be very difficult under these circumstances.

The approach used in the Iloilo programme involves the collection of materials at a central location and the prefabrication of roof trusses and wall panels prior to dispatch to the field. This approach ensures a better quality of construction and reduces the build time on site. Lack of space for the production and storage of prefabricated components has been an issue but the programme now has two warehouses in Ajuy and a third opening in Balasan to address this. Programme staff are convinced that with improved work and storage space and the transition to plywood components which have much fewer supply and quality problems, the program is well placed to accelerate its rate of delivery of core shelters. Assuming the rapid approval of the plywood components this will be tested in the next three months, a critical window before the likely onset of the rainy season.

One bottleneck is the speed of prefabrication of walls and trusses. Currently the team of 28 working at the two Ajuy warehouses can produce components for 3 houses per day if all materials are available. This is not enough to reach the programme target by March 2016. Space for expanded production is available at the Ajuy warehouses and prefabrication might also be done at the new Balasan warehouse. Shelter staff believe the use of plywood components will accelerate the process, but this will need to be tested.

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10 The PRC Shelter Officer position is anticipated to be filled in April 2015 for the first time since the role was advertised in May 2014. The Project Engineer who has been filling in for the Shelter Officer is leaving in April.

11 This approach was approved by the Red Cross Technical Working Group in Manila on 13 March and is awaiting approval from senior PRC management.

12 Estimated end date at this rate (assuming houses can also be constructed at this rate) is end of March 2017.
On delivery of materials to the site, teams of carpenters are employed to construct the shelters using the *pakyaw* system, where the builders are paid on satisfactory completion of various stages of the construction. Beneficiaries provide labouring assistance and food for the carpenters. Voluntary communal labour is also used to assist in the movement of materials and in performing unskilled tasks.

The carpenters are self-organised into teams of 6-8 men. Those interviewed received 2 week’s training early in the project, focusing on the safe techniques used in the Red Cross core shelter. Carpenters are enthusiastic about these changes to traditional practises and say they will continue to use them after the completion of the project. One person per team has received first aid training – but they have no first aid kit. Carpenters were issued with boots to address safety issues but are waiting for helmets.

An 8 man team can complete a house in as little as three days, although 4-6 days is more usual. Carpenters reported that now that they are familiar with the quality of construction expected by the Red Cross there is less need for remedial work. The most frequent issue is the rejection of sub-standard timber.

Problems with the timely delivery of materials have led to changes in the processes used. Delivery of incomplete sets of building materials - sometimes lacking just one or two essential components - mean that the remaining materials are left to deteriorate on site. It also increases delivery and supervision costs since multiple trips are necessary.

This has also led to considerable frustration amongst carpenters who often travel to core shelter sites at their own expense to find that they are unable to continue with construction – and therefore cannot obtain the *pakyaw* payments upon which they rely. As carpenters are in high demand, this also means that they forego other work available in the market due to their commitment to the Red Cross programme.

The programme has now halted the partial deliveries: only complete sets of material for stage 1 (foundations, frame, and roof) or stage 2 (walls and floors) of the building process are despatched. The programme is also pausing the delivery of material to new sites until the backlog of incomplete core shelters is reduced to manageable proportions (at the time of the MTR 114 core houses were “under construction”).

Visits to remote sites gave an indication of the difficulties of building in these barangays. For example 17 core shelters will be built in barangay Badiangan: the sites are widely dispersed and often are not open to vehicle access. Materials are taken to drop off points and beneficiaries are then required to move a very considerable amount of material to the site: the amount and the dispersal of communities make it difficult or impossible to use voluntary community labour. One site visited required a steep half hour walk to take materials from the drop off point. The technical supervisor estimated that it would cost the beneficiary up to PHP 5000 to move the materials to site. In this case the beneficiary had recently been bereaved and the funds saved and borrowed for shelter transport were required for funeral costs. The beneficiary asked that material delivery be stopped until he could afford to move them, causing more delays. Sites such as these will be inaccessible in the rainy season.

A flexible approach might be required to building in these circumstances – and there may be opportunities in using local materials. Badiangan has a large number of Acacia Mangium and Mahogany trees which were uprooted by Typhoon Haiyan and are still in good condition.
These are the favoured local building material and are stronger and more durable than coco lumber. One house visited had used Acacia for the posts and other major load bearing components of the house: the beneficiary intended to use the coco lumber provided for an extension. Other coastal and island barangays reportedly have some access to coco lumber grown locally.

Looking ahead, the maintenance of the quality of construction will be a challenge as faster rates of construction are achieved. Currently building sites are checked once or even twice a day by technical staff – and additional checks are undertaken on a weekly basis by the Project Engineer. Maintaining this level of quality control may prove challenging.

Further improvements to logistic systems are also imperative in the coming months. The dismissal of Logistics Officer in March – and the promotion of the BRC Logistics Manager to the programme managerial position mean that logistics is severely understaffed. Currently record keeping is not fully in place: asset registers, stock cards and documentation of stock movement are at best basic – and the amount of stock movements is due to increase considerably as core shelter delivery scales up.

Finally, stronger and more integrated planning between shelter, logistics and WASH should be a priority; at the end of February a departing delegate described the current situation:

“The numbers of shelters to be built were simply divided by the months available before the end of the project …to come up with the monthly need, and then adjusted a little for the wet season by subtracting a few numbers from the wet months and adding these to the drier months. As such the arithmetic adds up, but we should not expect it to work out as easily as the arithmetic does.”

Another delegate warns of the risk of pursuing shelter and sanitation objectives separately:

“There is a real danger that shelter completions will continue to outpace latrine construction leading to a range of potential problems.”

At a more pragmatic level there are still too many cases of partial deliveries of materials to sites, or materials being delivered to sites that are not ready to receive them which represent inefficient allocation of resources.

The MTR concludes that it is unlikely that the core shelter activities will be completed by March 2016, the current end date for the Iloilo programme. As most Partner National Societies are likely to be in this position this is an unremarkable conclusion. Until staffing gaps are filled and more integrated planning conducted it is hard to say exactly how long the completion of 2,500 houses will take, but at this point it seems reasonable to suppose that an additional six months will be needed.

Beneficiary selection and communication: For both core shelter and SRA beneficiary selection has experienced some problems but was generally felt to be fair and acceptable across the communities consulted. The selection criteria were somewhat general\textsuperscript{13} and not well communicated to the community at large. The main strategy of communication of these criteria was through Recovery Committees and posters/ banners placed in barangay halls.

\textsuperscript{13} PRC’s vulnerability criteria that were used as the basis for shelter selection are extensive (with households needing to meet at least one of 10 vulnerability criteria) and therefore in the view of the evaluators not exclusive enough.
Whilst beneficiaries consulted during this process were usually able to name a number of the selection criteria, many complaints to the programme hotline suggest that eligibility criteria for both types of shelter assistance are not completely understood by the rest of the community. Some exclusion errors have occurred (reportedly due to very fast household assessment); and lack of involvement of Barangay Officials in final decision making. No ‘appeals’ process was used to allow errors to be corrected – once lists were finalised by the programme there were no options for adding excluded people. Of those that have complained to the hotline about being excluded, no one has been added to the list. This missed potential beneficiaries who had temporarily relocated due to the damage to their homes. It was found that Barangay Recovery Committees do not generally own or accept the beneficiary selection as theirs.

In a very small number of cases those originally selected are no longer eligible, having moved away from the area, failed to get building permission from their landlords or withdrawn from the programme.

The selection strategy ensured that many landless people weren’t excluded by making provisions for selected beneficiaries who didn’t own their land to sign agreements with their landlords allowing them use of the land for up to 10 years following the construction of the core shelter. The most vulnerable households from a shelter perspective – those with no security of tenure have not been supported with core shelter – but within a programme of limited duration this issue would have been very difficult to address. The situation in one Barangay, Culasi, illustrates why this is so. Barangay officials reported that Caritas was willing to provide shelters for some of some landless households – but had to abandon the plan because no agreement was possible on the provision of land within the barangay.

There is also some confusion about whether the programme should support the relocation of vulnerable households living in “No build zones”. The programme clearly has supported such households where land has been made available nearby, although the extent of this is unclear.

An additional problem related to communication is that while beneficiaries report signing MoUs, they did not know the content or expectations. Some beneficiaries still expect that PRC or carpenters would fix houses in future (including replace Sawali walls in two years’ time).

**Shelter Recommendations (for current programme):**

8. Core shelter beneficiary selection requires a light review to identify households who have been wrongly excluded (and if needed replace ineligible beneficiaries or those whose circumstances have changed). It is suggested that the light review is done barangay by barangay (in line with core shelter construction starting in the barangay) and adopts a participatory approach. Removal of people from the list should be done only against strict criteria and in exceptional circumstances. Learnings from beneficiary selection to date should inform the selection of remaining beneficiaries.

9. The transition to the use of plywood floors and walls should be expedited: it will improve quality and speed up the delivery of the programme.
10. The current focus should be on using and improving the current model of production using prefabrication of components. Progress should be reviewed at the end of the dry season (and with a full complement of shelter and logistics staff) to decide if a switch to alternative models is necessary or feasible within the timeframe of the programme.

11. Incoming shelter and logistics managers should - together with the WASH delegate - review operational plans to ensure efficiency.

12. Logistics systems and record keeping require further enhancement.

13. Prefabrication should be scaled up to achieve an output commensurate with programme targets.

14. The provision of safety equipment and first aid kits to carpenters’ teams should be expedited.

15. Field staff should be encouraged and supported to find solutions to design and delivery problems in inaccessible locations.

**Selection process Recommendations (next time) – applicable for any sector**

16. *In future identify existing community structures / groups (such as the barangay Officials) and work with them to undertake selection. New committees should only be established if there are plans and capacity to support them form and function as an effective group in the medium to long term – including activities they can lead on.*

17. *More participatory processes should be considered (depending on context) in the future to shift the balance of power from the programme to the community in terms of selection.*

18. *Review selection criteria so that they are narrower and adapted to the programme. If possible criteria should be identified with communities so they can take into account context-specific vulnerabilities.*

19. *Include more structured appeals process (with realistic period of time) through which community members can appeal if there are errors in the list and PRC staff can review these systematically. It is recommended that 5% of targets are held back to allow for beneficiaries to be added to the list (if appropriate) based on appeals.*
5. Livelihoods

The main targets established for livelihoods at the household level in the proposal are:

3,500 households have received livelihoods support (to recover or improve their household economic security and improved their resilience to future shocks).

1,000 households have received relevant livelihoods training.

The planned community livelihoods grants using a “cash for work” approach include a significant element of DRR and will therefore be considered in section 7 of the report.

5.1 Rice Farmer Assistance

“Red Cross assistance saved me from debt”

“For farming, my situation is better than before Yolanda because I have been able to free myself from debt”

The livelihoods programme conducted its own assessment in May 2015 as the broader programme assessment was not thought to provide the necessary information for livelihoods. The initial strategic focus was on support to rice farmers – a focus that had two main justifications. First, at the time of assessment the first rice planting season of the year for poorer farmers relying on rain-fed rice growing was about to begin. Timely delivery of assistance could have a critical impact on the local economy. An entire rice crop had been lost due to Typhoon Haiyan. Second, there was a perception that other agencies had focused more on coastal livelihoods – particularly fishing. This appears to be justified: Barangay Culasi Recovery Committee reported five relief phase interventions: four of them involved fishing boats or equipment.
Beneficiary selection appears to have been appropriate, although Barangay Recovery Committees complain that they were not consulted during the livelihoods selection process.

Prior to receiving the grants farmers underwent two days training provided in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture on improved and organic farming practices.

There were delays in the provision of funds to the rice farmers which did not arrive until September: programme information suggests that farmers borrowed to buy seed and used a higher proportion of the funds for fertilisers, pesticides and other inputs. Post-distribution monitoring suggests that funds were used appropriately, with 78% of beneficiaries spending 75% or more of the grant on rice farming related items and total average reported spend of 86% on rice farming items:

**Figure 2: Reported use of cash grants by Rice Farmers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item bought</th>
<th>Average % spent on this</th>
<th>Money equivalent (peso)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>3199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Seeds</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>1778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesticides / weedicides</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debts (i.e. repayment of money borrowed)</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>1743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 1807 households received PHP 10, 000 (£150) each. Post-distribution monitoring found that 89% of beneficiaries thought the amount was appropriate to their needs and 93% thought that it addressed their highest priority need. 74% said that they had recovered very well to pre-Haiyan levels. Farmers interviewed in the course of the MTR were enthusiastic about the cash grants; some claimed to have cleared their debts and even to have had the funds to diversify their livelihoods as a result. They also spoke very positively about the impact of the crop enhancement training provided as part of the intervention, which they claimed had changed their farming practices and increased crop yields – for example using rice husk for composting, rather than burning it.

Poorer farmers who do not have access to irrigation usually grow two crops of rice per year - a first crop planted from in April to June and harvested from September onwards and a second planted from October to December. Typically vegetables and crops used to drier conditions are grown from December to May. In addition to the cash grants farmers were therefore provided with a number of vegetable seeds to plant during this period. However the funds to purchase these seeds were around two months late in arriving and procurement

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16 Farmers with irrigation can grow a third rice crop
was slow, so these were not distributed until December when planting should already have begun, reducing the potential impact of this part of the intervention.

A final component of the support to rice farmers was the provision of crop and accident insurance. Livelihoods staff persuaded the Philippines Crop Insurance Corporation to provide free crop and accident insurance for the first crop of 2014 and negotiated a favourable rate for the second. Unfortunately late remittance of funds affected this coverage and reportedly some beneficiaries were unable to claim, although 23 have made successful claims. The project has negotiated a significantly discounted rate for future crops. All beneficiaries consulted as part of this process spoke positively of the introduction by the project of the concept of crop insurance and claimed that they would continue to insure their crops going forward: However those farmers consulted were unclear on some aspects of the scheme that are key for successful adoption of crop insurance by farmers in future: for example, how to renew coverage, how to claim, and the cost of crop insurance once the favourable rate has ended.

It is important to note that the delivery of cash grants to farmers was important at boosting the credibility of the programme at a time when prospective beneficiaries were growing impatient due to the delays in practical assistance.

However, administrative delays in the transfer of funds to the project have negatively impacted on the timeliness and potential impact of these activities.

The programme is planning a follow up “farmer field school” for farmers in June to continue improvements in farming practices.

The immediate impact of this project has been considerable. However long term prospects are less certain due to unpredictable weather patterns linked to climate change requiring an increasing amount of inputs which may produce lower yields. Additionally it has yet to be seen for how long rice farmers are able to keep money saved for next season or if other needs will demand the use of this money. Certainly other beneficiaries have reported the problem of money ‘disappearing’ on everyday needs. The planned setting up of savings and loans groups with rice farmers may help towards this.

**Recommendations (for the current programme):**

20. Follow up should be provided to ensure that beneficiaries have a good understanding of their crop insurance options, in particular how to sign-up for this themselves.
21. As planned savings and loans groups should be set up with rice farmers to help with savings and reduce reliance on debt.
22. Monitoring should be conducted to understand pre-cursors for successful adoption of crop insurance and sustainability of savings and loans groups.

**5.2 Micro-enterprises**

The second major initiative of the livelihoods programme is the provision of cash grants to small producer groups. Having focused on rice growers in the initial phase the livelihoods support to micro-enterprises has allowed the programme to support coastal communities as well.
Assessment was done against clear criteria: beneficiaries must have an income of less than PHP 6,000 per month, and some pre-Haiyan livelihoods skill. They must also not have received any other assistance for at least two months prior to the assessment. Recovery Committees and Barangay officials sometimes expressed disappointment that they were not more actively involved in beneficiary selection. The barangay captain of Culasi complained that her community had been bypassed by the assessment and successfully argued for its inclusion. The strict enforcement of conditions was sometimes perceived as unfair: up to 80 otherwise appropriate beneficiaries in another barangay were excluded because they received a small PHP 3,000 grant from the Department of Social Welfare and Development which had not significantly affected their situation.

Training of beneficiaries began in September 2014 and cash grants were provided in two tranches in November. In addition to receiving these funds beneficiaries were organised into savings and loans groups. Training in how to set up and run these groups enabled them to be properly organised: to register with the Department of Labour and Employment and to set up bank accounts. A range of basic financial skills was taught and further follow up continues to be a priority given the low educational levels of many of those involved. A ‘treasurers’ summit’ has been held and further hands on training provided to these key group members.

This activity was originally intended to target 2000 households but has already benefitted 3,371. Additional funds have now been provided by BRC to target an additional 500 households. This expansion of activities is a positive development – but will require follow up as the time available to re-establish livelihoods and establish savings groups is very limited.

A wide range of activities is supported: the most popular being the establishment of sari-sari shops or stalls (27% of microenterprises in Balasan and 18% in Ajuy are sari-sari stores). Vegetable vending and pig breeding are also popular, as are a range of fishing related activities. In Balasan 14% of supported microenterprises are linked to fishing of some form and 49% in Ajuy.

Initial signs are that the activities have been very successful. 165 groups have been established and 101 of these are already registered. The total savings of the groups now exceed PHP 1,500,000 (equivalent to £23,000).

Feedback from beneficiaries is very positive: 93% of those included in post-distribution monitoring thought the intervention was appropriate in addressing their priority needs and 85% thought the amount was appropriate. 45% said they had already recovered to their pre-Haiyan situation – a surprising figure given the relatively limited time which they have had to utilise the funds. Assessment data suggests that many people have diverse income streams – and the development of savings suggests that the project is making a difference. According to post distribution monitoring funds have largely been spent as intended, with 63% of people sending 75% or more of the grant on micro-enterprise related items and an overall average reported spend of 78% on micro-enterprise items:

17 42 beneficiaries for livelihoods activities were eventually selected
18 This decision was reportedly made by the community – but these comments were provided by beneficiaries to the MTR
Those interviewed in the course of the MTR are enthusiastic about the help they have received and confident that it is making a lasting difference to their livelihoods. They also express pride at being able to have bank accounts: something they had previously thought beyond them.

Further input from the programme is clearly required: staff attest that the development of financial skills is a slow process and beneficiaries at this point are often unclear about how they will use their savings. A trade fair is being planned to show case the products of these groups and a number of them displayed and sold their products during the recent visit of the Red Cross Livelihoods Technical Working Group. The possibility was also raised at the validation workshop of rolling out insurance more widely than just crops as it currently stands to include livestock, health and accidents.

Although the progress in developing savings groups and micro-enterprises is remarkable, it is too early to assess the long term success of these savings groups on sustainable improvements in living standards. Beneficiaries consulted did not at this point have ideas for how the money would be used, and would likely need additional support if one of the aims of savings is to help diversify livelihoods. There are also some concerns about the sustainability of fishing related livelihoods: local fish stocks are reportedly down as a result of the destruction of natural and artificial reefs and mangroves by Typhoon Yolanda: To its credit the microenterprise project has encourage diversification within fishing based livelihoods and rehabilitation of these habitats is likely to be a component of community livelihood schemes.

The overall reputation of the livelihood programme is high; the Red Cross Livelihoods Technical Working Group including 25 participants from seven national Societies visited Ahoy and Balasan on 19-20 March to learn from the programme. It has already exceeded key targets and is on course to complete the planned activities by the end of the year. It has also provided significant add-ons such as crop insurance, perceived to have added value over and above the planned intervention.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Microenterprise related items</th>
<th>Item bought</th>
<th>Average % spent on this</th>
<th>Money equivalent (peso)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food items (business)</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>4387</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fishing materials</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>1068</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-food items (business)</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>883</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm inputs</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>593</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other livelihood needs</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>540</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other business</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reported use of cash grants by microenterprise beneficiaries
The Livelihoods Programme is planning a further initiative over the next few months. First, it is recognised that the many of the most vulnerable people in the target communities have been bypassed. Landless and unskilled households are not eligible for either rice farming or microenterprise support. A candidate selection process for marketable skills training is underway which will provide training in carpentry, masonry welding and other skills, although the number to be targeted is relatively small at 250 households. The greater availability of these skills should support the progress of the core shelter project.

Community members repeatedly reported that people who rely on daily labour (be it sea or land related) are the most vulnerable and most in need of livelihoods assistance. The forthcoming marketable skills training initiative is a small scale attempt to address this - but could more be done on to support these households?

Recommendations (for the current programme)

23. Review if marketable skills training can be expanded or if alternative interventions can be designed specifically to target the most vulnerable households, in particular those who rely on daily labour. If it is not possible to do at scale consider how pilots of different options could be undertaken to support PRC implement livelihoods programming for the most vulnerable in future responses.

24. Further monitoring should be conducted for the remainder of the programme duration to ascertain the sustainability of savings groups, as well as linked to the marketable skills training.

25. Consider introducing insurance linked to micro-enterprise activities such as livestock, health, etc. for both rice farmers and microenterprise PRC/BRC should ensure that livelihoods projects are well documented as potential models for recovery projects in the Philippines and elsewhere

6. General Findings – Cash Programming

Cash programming has been a key feature of both the shelter and livelihoods programmes. The circumstances were propitious for this. Between 20011-13 BRC had seconded delegates to PRC to develop its use of cash -based programming. The existence of strong markets in the Philippines also made cash based approaches logical. Overall the following observations can be made in relation to future cash based programming:

- **Transfer to men vs women**: Livelihoods gave the money to the women, Shelter to the Head of Household. From PDM data, the reports of who decided how to spend the money are similar. Beneficiaries reported that, it is better to transfer the money to the woman as they budget for the household.

- **Markets**: Based on PDM data roughly 50% reported change in prices since the start of the PRC programme. This was consistent across SRA, Rice Farmers and Micro-enterprise beneficiaries and Ajuy and Balasan. While this is likely to be the result of external factors, it reinforces the need for cash programmes to monitor prices carefully.
• **Cash phasing:** differing reports on whether people preferred the grant split or in one lump sum. This is linked to what they wanted to use it for and ease of collection / distance to markets. People living on an island Barangay talked about the difficulties and expense of travelling twice to collect the money and buy the materials.

• Only 15% of Rice Farmers said they would have preferred “other items/assistance”, compared to just over 50% for SRA and Microenterprise beneficiaries (PDM), based on PDM surveys it is believed that this is linked at least in part to the need for shelter repair assistance and the recognition that high quality materials are expensive or hard to find. This finding is echoed in the data showing what proportion of beneficiaries spend 75% or more of the cash grant on items linked to intended purpose of the grant (see below).

![PDM data: Proportion of beneficiaries who spent "75% or over" of their 10,000 grant on intended items](chart)

Conditions associated with the cash grant and monitoring: the messaging to beneficiaries from staff and volunteers over the use of the cash grant was very strict – even intimidating. People were told they had to spend the cash grant within a very short timeframe (days), that this would be checked and if found not to be the case the household would not receive the second tranche. While the PDM results showing use of the cash grants is impressive, it is worth also considering the impact of this strict messaging on target beneficiaries. Did it affect what people bought and – in relation to SRA – did it result in a sudden high demand on carpenters with a large number of people rushing to make progress before the programme conducted follow up checks? The original plan was to monitor each household after the 1st and then after the 2nd tranche (after the 1st tranche it was intended that the 2nd tranche would be stopped if people had not used the money as intended). Due to the scale of the programme this was not possible. Instead a sample of beneficiaries was surveyed as part of post distribution monitoring and focus group discussions conducted in between the tranches. This allowed monitoring to focus on collecting quality in-depth representative data, rather than large quantities of data from every household in less depth.

**Recommendations for future programming**

26. Adapt the phasing or cash amount for those people who have to incur considerable costs to travel to collection point and/or markets.
27. For future interventions of this scale (targeting a large number of households) adopt a pragmatic approach to monitoring. It is recommended that where there are two tranches rapid focus group discussions are done between the 1st and 2nd tranche to immediately identify any urgent issues, and post distribution monitoring (using a survey) is conducted with a sample of targeted beneficiaries.

28. Consider in the future the balance between clear messaging on the use of the grant and the possible negative impact of this.

7. WASH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>Targets Planned</th>
<th>Targets Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A   M   J   J   A  S  O  N  D  J  F  M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainy season</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrine Construction</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHAST training</td>
<td>6400</td>
<td>1514</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main workload for WASH is the provision of family latrines for 2,500 core shelters additionally the Project Proposal indicates commits to:

- 5 water points rehabilitated to improve access to clean water for 1,250 people.
- 6400 households (32,000 people) have improved awareness of good hygiene and sanitation through the provision of PHAST training.
- 10 Schools have improved water and sanitation facilities, supported by CHAST training.

The initial approach for the implementation of sanitation was that it would be managed by the shelter team. However in December a water, sanitation and health (WASH) delegate was appointed. This probably reflected the preoccupation of other shelter staff with SRA and the main superstructure of the core shelters. Only a handful of demonstration latrines had been built at this point. The delegate had only one health-focused Technical Programme Assistant (TPA) who left the programme in mid-March. Three technically focused TPAs have now been recruited, also in mid-March.

The delegate estimates that around 1/3 of the core shelter budget is allocated to latrines which means that the total WASH budget is about 20% of programme funds.

The key problem facing the sanitation component is to catch up with the shelter component: there is a backlog of over 300 shelters which have been either completed or started. The two components should be planned and implemented together to ensure that the optimal sites

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19 Locations have not yet been decided.
20 To be scheduled after the selection of schools by the community infrastructure component of the programme – see section 9 below.
for shelter and latrines are selected and to ensure efficiency in allocation of human and material resources.

Design issues are complex. The PRC approach allows two models: a twin pit latrine for areas in which the water table is low and a septic tank model for areas where the water table is high. These designs were checked by the local Ministry of Health and broadly accepted\textsuperscript{21} and the programme was instructed that the twin pit latrine was only to be used to be used where the water table was below 3.5 metres.

Septic tanks are reportedly common in the area – but problematic because there is no means of emptying them in the province. It is estimated that with an average sized household (5 people) they would fill up within 5 years; without emptying they would become a health hazard.

The dilemma for the programme is whether to proceed with the two designs – or to go for one design (the septic tank) which would be quicker – and leave others to worry about the potential risk of overflowing septic tanks.

An additional complication is the variation of soil types in the programme area – from heavy clay to light sandy soils often within the same locality. This affects the size and location of latrine and soak pits which must be built.

The modalities for the twin latrine approach have now been developed and production has started. Materials for 457 latrines have already been ordered and a further 600 are in the pipeline. Drilling is conducted to locate the water table to decide which latrine design is appropriate prior to construction. At this very early stage (16 latrines had been completed at the time of the MTR) beneficiary acceptance of both designs seems good although this will need continued monitoring. Given the expressed preference of beneficiaries for plywood in core shelters, acceptance of sawali latrine walls might be considered.

It is very unlikely that 2500 latrines can be built by March 2016 although a realistic finish date is hard to estimate at this stage. The pressure to complete latrines is considerable: M&E cite it as the second biggest beneficiary concern after delays in core shelter construction and it has reportedly been given as a reason for not occupying otherwise complete shelters. Personal dignity – as much as health benefits – appears to be a motivating factor.

PHAST training is required for some – but by no means all of the barangays in which the shelter programme will operate. Some PHAST activities have preceded latrine construction: 1,134 household have received training in Ajuy and 380 in Balasan.

The coherence of the elements of the WASH programme is problematic. Those receiving latrines have been selected on shelter criteria and are not necessarily the most vulnerable in sanitation terms. They are also selected individuals within communities. PHAST is a community based methodology – and motivating whole communities to improve their sanitation situation when a minority have latrines provided by the project – but most do not – is likely to prove difficult. Additionally the scale of PHAST activities envisaged does not match the scale and spread of the shelter component which is active in more than 50 barangays. The rehabilitation of only 5 water points does not seem to have an obvious

\textsuperscript{21} The soak away for the twin pit latrine was deemed non-compliant – but otherwise the design is acceptable
rationale and it is hard to see these elements of the programme combining into an integrated approach to WASH, with a measurable impact on health indicators.

The current programme approach is pragmatic; the early stages of the PHAST approach are used to assess needs and raise awareness of sanitation related problems – whilst accepting that a transformation of sanitation infrastructure at a community level across the programme area is beyond the capacity of the programme.

**Recommendations for the current programme:**

29. Scale up household latrine production by the allocation of more staff and resources

30. The delivery of two latrine designs should be trialled for an initial six month period. The acceptability of the designs and the likely pace of delivery can then be properly assessed

31. Options for integration of WASH activities need to be considered and decided upon. It is too late to redesign the project – but there may be ways of linking PHAST, latrine construction and water supply in a way which adds value in some communities

**8. Disaster Risk Reduction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>Targets Planned</th>
<th>Targets Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rainy season</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness raising activities on DP/DRR</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disaster Risk Reduction is clearly important element of the programme: resilience in case of future disasters is a specific element of the programme goal and the first two objectives whilst disaster mitigation (linked to DRR activities) is a part of the third objective. In part resilience is inherent in the livelihoods shelter and WASH initiatives, and a few separate initiatives (training 15 DRR volunteers, prepositioning 1000 NFI kits) but an overall framework for DRR is unclear. There is general agreement that DRR offers an avenue for strengthening the Iloilo Chapter – which is largely the aim of objective 3 of the proposal: it is the logical body to ensure future disaster preparedness in the province once the Iloilo programme ends.

The opportunity to engage in DRR activities is propitious: a new national DRR law was passed in 2014 and local government units have been given a mandate to strengthen DRR locally.

How this is to be done remains unclear: a report by the BRC DRR advisor in August 2014 proposed one approach which included extension of activities into vulnerable coastal areas, setting up response teams and warehouses in Estancia and Conception. This no longer seems feasible given current capacities and timelines. The project target is split in two: 10 community projects which fall under DRR and 15 cash for work projects (which have now
incorporated a DRR element to them) allocated to Livelihoods. This seems artificial and not conducive to achieving community resilience outcomes.

The starting point must be the work which has been done so far, which includes a number of strands and has taken much effort from the sole staff member. In addition some activities that closely link to DRR are currently held under livelihoods, in particular the community proposals which were originally planned for 2014. Main achievements to date include:

- 23 DRR volunteers participated in a 12 day training course on DRR in January 2015
- 10 communities have received DRR training (2 days each)
- 36 community proposals submitted from communities (many of which include DRR elements which would be realised through CFW)

**Targeting and purpose of DRR training**

The training focuses on general orientation (on the Red Cross, 143 volunteers, introduction to DRR, common disasters). One of the main aims of the training is to gather data from targeted barangays using a variety of VCA tools (including seasonal mapping, hazard mapping, action planning and others). Examples of outputs from VCA have been developed with participants, and these are taken back to the office for PRC to decide what should be done.

Similar VCA tools were used in April 2014 in the same barangays – the outputs of which, such as seasonal map, should be more or less the same as today. Therefore these could be used instead if gathering data is a key need.

However these VCA tools have not yet been used as a starting point to facilitate community-led action. The approach has been on community groups developing an action plan, held by them, which they are then left to take forward. Small level material, financial or technical support may be provided by the organisation to the group to help them realise aspects of these plans but so far there has been limited follow up.

Participants in some locations are Barangay Officials and Recovery Committees; in others interested people from across the barangay (although one woman we spoke to said she came to the training in the hope that more assistance was going to be announced). Depending on the purpose of the training certain audiences will be more appropriate than others. The Barangay Officials and Recovery Committees from one location reported that they hoped the training would lead to practical action.

It was noticeable when visiting communities that ADRA have done work on early warning systems for typhoons (via large posters in communities) and contingency planning with barangay officials. While mostly focused on software they had also provided items such as megaphones, flashlights, life jackets, spin boards. ADRA have also worked to strengthen the Ajuy Municipal DRR office, which may provide an opportunity for the Red Cross Programme.

A positive synergy is that many of the community proposals that fall under the community livelihood grants (originally planned for 2014 but delayed until now) include strong DRR elements. At present there is not a clear link between the DRR training and the community
proposals, and the DRR lead was not aware of the content of the community proposals at the time of the MTR - but links can and should be defined.

Future plans for DRR include setting up Red Cross Youth Groups in schools although there is a need to think what activities these Youth Groups will do once formed – to give them a purpose and help them to be cemented as a group. This could help overcome the observation that Red Cross Youth Groups joined in the past are not always very active. First Aid training is also envisaged for schools and communities.

There is a pressing need to articulate an overall plan for DRR activities: what will be done? How will synergies be created with the work of the different sectors in the programme? How will the largely community focused software approach being taken link with proposed hardware such as contingency stocks? Who are the stakeholders? How could the Iloilo chapter be involved? There is also an appetite for DRR to be mainstreamed across all sectors and it is perceived to have the opportunity of being an integrating factor for the programme, but practical steps for this to be achieved are undefined at the moment.

The imminent arrival of a BRC DRR delegate to support the current DRR officer represents an important opportunity to address these questions.

**Recommendation for DRR and community projects**

32. The Iloilo Recovery programme should develop an overall DRR plan. This should articulate the changes to be achieved at a community level and make links with other sectoral activities. The issue of timeframes must be considered – but in this and in the activities propose the plan should not limit itself to the constraints of the current project proposal.

33. Ensure that action for DRR is community-owned and community-led with skilled staff conducting training, analysis and action planning with communities

34. Consider whether the Recovery Committee mechanism may still be used as an entry-point to the communities for DRR activities, perhaps by renaming, re-training and planning for medium to long-term engagement with them beyond the life of the household-level recovery activities.

35. Consider whether livelihoods beneficiary households may be linked up with the community cash for work as a conduit partner for implementation

### 9. Community Infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>Targets Planned</th>
<th>Targets Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rainy season</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of Schools and Health Centres</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The proposal envisages that: “23 priority community infrastructures damaged by typhoon are repaired and rehabilitated (e.g. school classrooms, health centres, evacuation centres)” It has understood that 20 schools and 3 health centres will be chosen for this project. The targeting of schools was included since they are often used as evacuation centres – although this is discouraged under the current legal framework. PRC has provided engineering staff from other projects to help with the assessment process, but at the time of the MTR the modus operandi for implementation had not been agreed.

There has been a lack of clarity about how these activities will be implemented and therefore progress has been slow. The Iloilo Recovery Programme has some technical staff – but they are fully engaged in achieving ambitious targets in the shelter and WASH components. Additionally they are unlikely to have the specialist skills for overseeing construction projects on this scale – and their focus has been on household level construction.

However the Validation Workshop was useful in making the programme aware of the considerable experience which PRC had in this area even prior to Typhoon Haiyan and which has developed considerably during the current response. From PRC’s perspective there are clear linkages between DRR software activities and rehabilitation of community infrastructure to achieve the overall aim of recovery and building more resilient communities, and this is regarded as a core aspect of PRC’s auxiliary role which they coordinate with relevant government bodies to realise. Other national societies – such as the Korean Red Cross which also works in Iloilo Province – have already made progress in realizing similar community infrastructure projects.

This suggests that some means of contracting out the community infrastructure component should be considered rather than expecting it to be managed from within the current Ajuy staffing complement.

**Recommendation**

36. The modality for the implementation of the community infrastructure projects – and the resources needed to oversee them – needs to be agreed as soon as possible.

10. Integration and Communication and Coordination

The programme’s internal and external communications have not been strong and it is fair to say that the programme is a multi-sectoral programme rather than an integrated one. The situation described by staff is that individuals and teams tend to focus on their own sector targets and there has been limited dialogue on how these components complement each other.

**Internal communication and Integration** Internally the “fixed target” focus has discouraged broader discussions between implementing staff on qualitative aspects of the programme and how integration of activities could achieve better outcomes. This has been exacerbated by a considerable sense of pressure on staff struggling to achieve ambitious targets within a short timeframe. One informant expressed doubt that programme staff were aware of the complete log frame and proposal – rather they are familiar with their targets.

Gaps and weaknesses in management early in the programme have also contributed to a lack of coherence. The positions of Field Operations Manager and Project Team Leader took
some months to fill and it is fair to say that there were significant performance issues with the Recovery Programme Manager throughout 2014. Subsequent recruitments for these positions mean that internal coherence is improving. The institution in 2015 of fortnightly team meetings including Iloilo and Ajuy managers is also a positive development and practical results can already be seen.  

It is not clear what ‘integration’ means for this programme, and at what level it is striving to achieve it. The majority of barangays in Ajuy and Balasan have to date received both shelter and livelihoods support, at household level we do not know what proportion have received both shelter and livelihoods support, as the approach to selection and managing information has been different for each team. The high level of coverage (i.e. high number of recovery packages compared to number of households) suggests that a number will receive two different forms of assistance (a sign of integration) but this will be by accident rather than by design.

Engagement with Communities Accountability to and communication with communities has also been problematic. The Joint Recovery Assessment ensured that the design particularly the focus on shelter and livelihoods was appropriate to needs and the lengthy assessment process in Iloilo ensured that beneficiary selection was generally appropriate. However the level of community engagement has not been optimal. As mentioned above (see section 3) community input on design issues such as plywood building components has not been easy to integrate quickly due to the rather centralised nature of decision making within the response.

Communication with communities has also been affected by the focus on individual sector targets. Communications have been conducted separately and in many cases this has been done on a short term basis. Barangay Officials and Recovery Committees described receiving multiple and uncoordinated visits from different sector teams in rapid succession. They did not have a sense of the overall shape of the programme and of what planned activities would take place over the coming months. Under-communication has had consequences for the programme. For example, a common question received reported by the complaints hotline relates to why all typhoon affected households are not receiving shelter assistance – indicating that the rationale for targeting the most vulnerable has not been thoroughly communicated.

As a result of this mode of engagements the Barangay Recovery Committees – which the proposal sees as “central to the programme planning and implementation” have not generally been the key accountability link between the programme and the community which was envisaged. Following their establishment at the time of the assessment they have not been used to their potential.

There are signs that the team are beginning to recognise and internal and external communication issues: in February 2015 the M&E Team Leader drafted a paper which recognises some of these issues, and ways forward are being discussed by the management group. It was agreed at the validation workshop that ‘need-based integration’ is

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22 At the meeting on 20 March the team avoided the need for separate shelter and sanitation agreements with beneficiaries and agreed to combine them
23 It is known that to date 8,693 recovery packages have been delivered (SRA, Rice farmer, and Microenterprise) and 372 households have received both livelihoods and shelter support. It is assumed that a large number of core shelter beneficiaries will have already received livelihoods assistance, but this is not known.
required going forward. This approach would be based on identifying opportunities for integration which would add value to the individual interventions, a clear example for this being coordinating construction of shelters and latrines. One reflection from the workshop was that better communication and integration may be promoted by shifting planning and reporting from being sector-specific to community-specific. It was also recognised that better integration would require better and more timely planning than has been the case in the past.

**Coordination: Red Cross Movement and External:** At a Manila and Iloilo and Ajuy levels cooperation between PRC and BRC is generally good. BRC staff have learned to operate within the constraints of the administrative procedures which they and their PRC counterparts must work within. They may not regard the rather centralised decision making and approval as ideal, but they have learned how to “work the system” as best they can.

The opportunity provided by the validation workshop for PRC managers to engage at first hand with the Iloilo programme team was considered particularly useful by both sides. PRC express respect for BRC’s record on innovation and its willingness to support processes such as the Joint Recovery Assessment. Some concerns emerged over the familiarity of Iloilo staff (including BRC delegates) with the established technical guidelines which are supposed to guide the response. There is also an understandable determination that the prime role of BRC delegates should be mentoring and skills transfer (see section 12 below).

At a national level coordination between National Societies works well: they work in close proximity and meet regularly in monthly management meetings and through technical working groups which the MTR had the opportunity to observe. Close coordination and a common plan are seen as a success factor: one Country Representative described the joint response as “one of the best operations in the last 20 years.” BRC’ role in this is clearly respected and appreciated.

Relations between the programme and the Iloilo Chapter are discussed in section 13 below.

External coordination at the Ajuy/ Balasan level is not a major issue since there are relatively few agencies to work with: recovery coordination meetings convened at a municipal level in Ajuy have occasionally been held in 2014-15, but there are relatively few agencies to coordinate with. Collaboration with individual government departments has been good – for example the discussion of latrine designs with the Ministry of Health and the engagement with the Ministry of Agriculture for support to rice farmers. Arguably some minor improvements could have been made – such as linking with ADRA in relation to its DRR activities in Ajuy

**Recommendations:**

37. Communications with communities should be better planned and coordinated. It should be possible to inform community representatives of significant programme activities across all sectors for the forthcoming month.

38. Whilst it is too late to implement a truly integrated programme, team leaders should identify opportunities for closer cooperation and ensure that synergies between their activities are identified and acted upon.
11. Monitoring and Evaluation

The BRC/PRC Iloilo programme deserves considerable credit for being a leader in M&E. It was the first in the Red Cross Haiyan response to appoint M&E staff in October 2014 and therefore well placed to lobby for the development of better systems and processes as interest in M&E developed. Since then six national Societies have appointed M&E staff and the M&E Technical Working Group has been established.

The unit has developed monitoring tools and can demonstrate successes in improving the accountability of the programme to community feedback – such as the changes in shelter design mentioned in section 4.2. The number of carpenters to be trained under the Marketable Skills initiative has also been increased on the basis of community feedback.

Mid-distribution monitoring has been conducted for SRA and Livelihoods activities based on focus group discussions. Post distribution monitoring is still being finalised.

The unit is also responsible for the complaints hotline which logs and responds to complaints from the community. Better promotion of the hotline number and the distribution of complaints forms to programme staff have increased its effectiveness in recent months and there is currently no backlog of complaints although it is less clear whether satisfactory conclusions have been reached in all cases. There has been a tendency to “outsource” complaints to M&E – which should not absolve programme staff from their responsibility to listen to the community and respond to their feedback on an ongoing basis. Arguably there is a need to reflect more on what the complaints overall are telling us – rather than simply responding to them individually. (This led to the M&E Team Leader to produce the paper on communications mentioned in section 10 above)

The unit does however face challenges. One is the perception that it is the M&E unit - and not the implementing sectors themselves that are responsible for gathering programme information and for answering complaints from the public, which perhaps reduced the unit’s capacity to focus on performance issues.

The focus on sector targets has also led to a rather limited interpretation of M&E - a factor exacerbated by the original project design. The log frame submitted with the proposal is unhelpful in this respect, providing a range of numerical indicators which do not really examine how the lives of beneficiaries have changed. If, for example, the indicator for marketable skills training is simply “number of individuals receiving skills training” it is difficult to measure the impact of the activity in changing people’s lives. If the sole indicators for core shelter and latrine construction are “the number of households who receive full timber frame shelter” and “the number of households that received latrines” there is little incentive to find out how useful and appropriate houses and latrines have been and what difference they have made. Some of the weaknesses in community participation and structures such as the Barangay Recovery Committees seem to have gone largely unreported as they are not mentioned as “targets.”

WASH has enlisted the support of M&E to define relevant indicators which are lacking in the original log frame, but there could be a stronger emphasis on qualitative indicators. The imminent recruitment of an M&E delegate offers the opportunity to support the continued development of M&E within the programme and address the issues mentioned above.
Recommendation:

39. M&E works with each of the sectors to understand and plan monitoring needs – either linked to defining and measuring change or in order to test assumptions that are linked to how change will occur. As an example M&E should look to design an approach that can be used to understand the extent to which trainings conducted by various sectors are being applied.

12. Human Resources

“We can only go as fast as our support services allow”

An almost unanimous observation from informants to the MTR has been around the difficulties which both PRC and BRC have experienced in ensuring adequate staffing for the programme. Relative stability of staffing for the livelihoods component of the programme is undoubtedly a key success factor – but elsewhere there have been too many gaps and delays in sourcing the necessary staff.

The problems have been slightly different for PRC and BRC. PRC have struggled to recruit skilled staff at project level. There are several likely causes; one is the relatively low salary scales for the sector – although it should be noted that Haiyan programme salaries are already higher than for the rest of PRC. The scale at which PRC has expanded to accommodate project teams may be another reason – according to a PRC key informant, the number of PRC staff across the country has increased rapidly following Typhoon Haiyan from approximately 1000 to 1500 staff. At PRC NHQ level, a separate Haiyan team was created to coordinate the implementation of the recovery programme across the country, but this wasn’t matched by a similar increase in support staff, which stayed the same as before Haiyan. Consequently, there have been long delays over issuing of contracts—meaning that a number of current staff have been working for up to six months without a proper contract. Although some payments have been made to these staff this is not equivalent to their total salary, and the insecurity of not having a valid contract is not helpful to the programme. The programme has also struggled to persuade qualified candidates to relocate to Ajuy which is rural and lacking in the amenities of a provincial capital. Although PRC’s staff retention has been good so far, these issues mean that this may change in the coming months.

The table below summarises the situation for the main positions in the organogram: areas shaded in black indicate delays in approval of the position; areas in white indicate delays in recruitment:

24 Comment from validation workshop
## PRC: Staffing levels and turn-over (PRC-BRC Iloilo Recovery Programme)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Occupancy rate</th>
<th>Turn-over rate</th>
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<td>Ajuy</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>TPA - Shelter (Production Line)</td>
<td>Ajuy</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>TPA - Shelter (CO)</td>
<td>Ajuy</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>TPA - Shelter (Latrines)</td>
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<td>66%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>TPA - Shelter (Latrines)</td>
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<td>64%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLH</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>LLH</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>TPA - Health and WatSan</td>
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<td>PTL - Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>TPA - Monitoring Evaluation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Finance and Admin Officer</td>
<td>Ajuy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Procurement Assistant</td>
<td>Ajuy</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>HR Assistant</td>
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<td>Procurement Assistant</td>
<td>Ajuy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of: 31-Mar-15
For BRC staff turnover has been the problem with too many rotations of staff:

These staffing gaps have weakened the programme. Although shelter is the single largest component of this programme, a Shelter Officer has never been in place, Latrine construction has also not had dedicated PRC staff until recently. BRC delegates have often been called upon to cover more than one delegate role due to high turnover in addition to compensating for key unfilled PRC roles. Attempts have been made to request and send surge capacity from UKO; however finding suitable options acceptable to both the field and UKO have not usually been successful. There have consequently been gaps in skilled programme staff, which when combined with vacant positions, have sometimes come at the cost of joined-up, integrated programme planning.

The Validation Workshop considered at length the need for BRC delegates to pass on skills to the PRC staff that they work with: a capacity building plan is absolutely necessary for delegate roles. However skills transfer will work best when there is an identified counterpart for the delegate and in many cases counterparts have not been in place. In such situations when there is acute pressure to demonstrate progress against objectives it is inevitable that delegates will become more operational.

**Recommendations:**

40. A sustained effort to fill vacant positions is needed from both National Societies.

41. The programme organogram should be reviewed to ensure that it reflects reality and to identify areas where resources are not commensurate with anticipated workload.

42. The programme should take steps to improve staff retention – given the problems of attracting and retaining quality staff; quicker issuance of contracts and enhancing opportunities for staff development are possible options.

25 The Shelter Prefabrication Manager covered the Shelter Delegate’s role from Jan – March 2015, the Logistics PM covered the Programme Manager role from Jan – March 2015
43. Wherever possible, BRC delegates should have national counterparts and initiate a plan to transfer skills to them.

13. Links with the Iloilo Chapter – and Future Directions

Objective 3 of the Program Proposal focuses on the development of chapter capacity: "Philippine Red Cross Iloilo Chapter will have increased its technical knowledge in integrated recovery programming and the PRC Iloilo Chapter will have sustainable management and volunteer capacity"

A stronger chapter is clearly seen as part of the sustainability of the programme and as a bulwark against future disasters. Relations between the Iloilo programme and the chapter have remained cordial, but there have been few practical connections between the two which would develop such capacity. This is an area which needs to be addressed: what are the possible areas of connection? What capacities and resources are needed at the chapter level?

It is also timely to reflect on how the programme is likely to develop over the coming months. For most activities including shelter WASH and DRR it is very unlikely that the planned targets will be reached by March 2016 which is the anticipated duration of the programme and the consequences of this will need to be addressed.

For livelihoods activities, however most targets have already been reached and current planning anticipates closure of the programme by the end of 2015. This presents different challenges, particularly around the micro-enterprises which would almost certainly benefit from continuing support beyond 2015 to become really sustainable. Is PRC interested in providing this support or using any of livelihoods capacity currently in place? If the fixed costs of operating the Ajuy office are to continue beyond March 2015 and if funds are available, is it useful to prolong livelihoods activities as well? These issues need to be addressed soon as the wind down of activities will begin within six months.

Opportunities exist in the form of trained volunteers in the project areas, which may be linked to the chapter although it will be challenging to retain them given the distance of the project areas from the chapter. It was also highlighted at the validation workshop that PRC are looking to develop an overall plan for chapter capacity building (to be released in April/May 2015) on the basis of chapter capacity assessments, and they will be looking to Partner National Societies to support this plan as part of their exit strategy.

Recommendations:

44. Discussions between the programme and the Iloilo chapter should be held to clarify what actions can be taken to engage and support the chapter. DRR is one area which may have potential. The continued engagement of the volunteers recruited in the programme area also needs to be considered
45. BRC and PRC should begin a discussion about the extension of the programme: an early “in principle” agreement to extend would remove pressure from the programme team and allow more realistic operational and manpower planning for the project.

46. PRC should engage with programme staff to decide on the exit strategy for the livelihoods programme. Are there aspects of the programme which it would like to maintain – or should discussions begin with other organisations with a view to providing continuing support to micro-enterprises?

14. Conclusion

Relevance and Appropriateness

The MTR has found that the Iloilo Recovery programme has been both relevant and appropriate to the needs of victims of Typhoon Haiyan in most respects. It has focused on what are widely agreed to be the priority sectors and the delivery methods chosen have met with approval from the affected population.

The beneficiary perspective is generally that the approaches used by the programme so far have been the right ones. The extensive use of cash based methodologies in livelihoods and shelter activities has been found to be appropriate as has the provision of high quality materials such as CGI sheeting.

Whilst the focus on only two municipalities has been challenged, it seems clear that almost all beneficiaries meet the selection criteria and that a focus on a limited geographical area was efficient, given the limited human and logistical resources available.

The main reservation amongst beneficiaries relates to the timeliness of activities, resulting in considerable pressure on the programme to accelerate the speed of delivery particularly in relation to core shelter, where many beneficiaries face the prospect of another rainy season makeshift accommodation.

Effectiveness: The Iloilo recovery programme can be said to have made good progress towards the effective achievement of its goal and objectives. Most notably its livelihoods activities have achieved and surpassed their targets. It has been innovative particularly in its introduction of crop insurance and is widely regarded as a model for livelihoods work amongst other Red Cross Movement partners. One of the critical success factors is clearly that the key human resources were in place from an early stage and that there has been relatively stability in terms of staffing. The involvement of an experienced delegate with strong contextual knowledge has also been part of this. Moving beyond the targets set – and ensuring the sustainability of the outcomes is the key remaining challenge.

Shelter rehabilitation has met its targets – although some questions remain about its quality and sustainability due to weaknesses in the Safe Shelter Awareness training, which was found to have a limited impact. The provision of core shelter is unlikely to be implemented within the envisaged timeframe – but in comparison with the progress of other affiliates progress has been reasonable – particularly given the staffing issues it has faced. Its commitment to improving the shelter design is commendable. The provision of latrines is
also unlikely to achieve the outputs envisaged in accordance with the programme schedule but good signs of progress are evident as a workable and safe approach to latrine design and building is developed. The effective integration of latrines, PHAST and water supply remains a challenge.

For other activities such as community infrastructure, DRR and strengthening the Iloilo chapter there is a need to define and agree approaches before the activities can be fully implanted.

A remaining challenge is to go beyond the achievement of quantitative targets and demonstrate how a linked series of interventions has significantly changed the lives of beneficiary households and communities.

Efficiency: The need to follow “due process” by both PRC and BRC has arguably led to some inefficiency. BRC’s investment in a lengthy assessment which was ultimately overtaken by events – and its failed tender for CGI sheets resulted in delays. Slow approval processes within PRC led to the late arrival of funds for time-critical livelihoods inputs such as rice seed, vegetable seed and insurance premiums. Greater transparency has been achieved, but at a cost in terms of timely programme delivery.

Delays and gaps in staffing the programme properly have had a significant effect on cost efficiency, causing delays in programme delivery which will almost certainly lead to the need to extend the programme. This will result in an overall increase in the fixed costs such as rent, salaries and support costs. Arguably a greater expenditure on staffing in the earlier stages of the programme would have been more efficient.

Planning and management have focused on sector targets rather than overall integration which have weakened the sense of an overall coherent programme. Joint operational planning has been weak and opportunities to achieve synergies and efficiencies through collaboration have been missed.

A more recent emphasis on teamwork can – if complemented by adequate staffing levels – begin to address these issues.

Sustainability

The sustainability of the programme has been weakened by shortcomings in training and community organisation. Safe Shelter Awareness training was not found to be effective and the Barangay Recovery Committees appear relatively weak and unsure of their role. While strong results have been achieved in livelihoods the sustainability of savings groups after a relatively short period of support remains in question. Better articulation of DRR activities, stronger engagement of the Iloilo Chapter and the timely elaboration of exit strategies will be key steps towards sustainability in the coming months.
Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference Mid-Term Review of Typhoon Yolanda Recovery Programme, Iloilo, Philippines - DRAFT

Summary

**Purpose:** The purpose of the review is to take stock of the current situation and the BRC-PRC recovery programme in Iloilo Province in order to directly feed into improved programming and programmes plans for the next phase of the recovery programme.

**Lead:** An external consultant, working in close collaboration with a counterpart from the Philippines Red Cross. The consultant will be supported throughout by a BRC Performance and Accountability Adviser.

**Audience:** BRC (Head of Region, Philippines Country Manager, Iloilo Programme Manager) and PRC.

**Commissioner:** BRC’s Philippines Country Manager (based in Manila).

**Timeframe:** The duration is anticipated to be 22 days, with the bulk of the work taking place in March 2015.

**Location:** Primarily Iloilo Province, Panay, Philippines (with most time spent in Iloilo City, Ajuy and Balasan Municipalities)

**Background to the response**

In November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines as one of the most powerful storms ever to make landfall. With maximum winds of 235 kph and gusts of up to 275 kph, Haiyan devastated many provinces across the regions in Central Visayas, causing extensive damage to buildings and agriculture.

The BRC launched an emergency appeal, and with money from DEC, DFID and other donors, raised a total of £23 million. These funds have been used in the relief phase to support the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), IFRC response and Philippines Red Cross (PRC) through the provision of technical specialists in logistics, emergency shelter, communications, information management; in-kind emergency relief stocks and equipment; cash contributions to support the operation including emergency cash grants and PRCS operational costs.

As part of the recovery phase, BRC is working with PRC as one of their bilateral partners in Iloilo Province. To achieve this BRC has scaled up its presence in-country and is establishing a dedicated team that will support PRCS in implementing an integrated recovery project in the typhoon-affected area of Iloilo Province until March 2016. Recovery priorities include Shelter, Economic Security and Livelihoods, WASH, National Society (NS) support and capacity building, health, community preparedness and community resilience.

**PRCS-BRC Iloilo Recovery Programme**

The Iloilo recovery programme is an integrated programme comprising of projects in shelter (comprising of two components: shelter repair assistance through provision of cash and
inputs and core shelter construction), livelihoods (household and community-level), water and sanitation, health and disaster risk reduction. The programme is centred on three outcomes of household-level recovery, building community resilience and developing PRC’s capacity.

In 2014, the programme focused primarily on set-up and delivery of household level interventions in livelihoods and shelter repair, the bulk of which was completed by November 2014. Another key focus in 2014 was the setting up and testing supply chains and procurement mechanisms for delivering the core shelter component, with approximately 65 shelters constructed by the end of the year. With the help of a pre-fabrication unit for some components of the core shelter combined with skilled carpenters and community support, the shelter project is anticipated to scale up to delivering 50 shelters per week in 2015. This scale-up is currently in progress, but has faced significant challenges including failed efforts at recruitment of skilled national staff and the resignation of the BRC Shelter Project Manager in Dec 2014. This year, 2015, will also see a shift in focus from household-centred interventions to community level livelihoods, disaster risk reduction, health and water & sanitation projects, including the rehabilitation of pre-identified schools and health centres.

This mid-term review will be the second in a series of reviews focused on improving our performance and accountability, the first of which was a process review evaluating the shift in responsibility from response to recovery. It will also build on existing monitoring data, as well as the outputs from review meetings held at programme level.

**Purpose and objectives of the MTR**

The purpose of the review is to take stock of the current situation and BRC-PRC recovery programme in Iloilo Province in order to directly feed into improved programming and programmes plans for the next phase of the recovery programme.

The MTR will include the identification of lessons learnt so far, good practices, challenges to overcome and recommendations to strengthening the delivery and overall impact of all components of the recovery programme for the remainder of the implementation period. The MTR will need to look back at programme components that have been completed but also provide options for taking forward those components (DRR, Health and Schools/Clinics rehab) that have not yet started in late 2014.

The key audience of the evaluation findings are BRC and PRC.

**Objectives**

The main objectives are as follows:

3. **Review the BRC-PRC Iloilo Recovery programme**, 
   a. Assess key achievements to-date and look at the relevance, appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of the programme.
   b. Foster a learning process among partner and project staff to support utilisation of the findings as part of re-planning and the next phase of the programme, and providing clear and practical recommendations.
   c. Make actionable recommendations for all components of the next phase of the recovery programme, in light of: the MTR findings; planned activities / targets; project locations and project team structures; and as much as possible information on current and priorities of ‘still-to-recovery’ Yolanda-affected households and communities.
4. **Facilitate a validation workshop** for programme staff to present and discuss the findings.

**Review: Key questions**

It is anticipated that additional questions will arise during the MTR process, therefore while the below are suggested at this stage, the evaluator is encouraged to probe as appropriate beyond the limits of the questions that follow, albeit within the purposes of the evaluation set out above.

**LOOKING AT BOTH SHELTER AND LIVELIHOODS COMPONENTS (reporting the findings by sector)**

- **Targeting HHs:** To what extent are the most vulnerable population(s) being reached / provided with assistance relevant to their current needs? What were the reasons why a segment of the neediest population was not provided assistance (if there are)?

- **Technical design:** Were technical designs effective and appropriate for the environment? Was the value and phasing of the cash grants appropriate? Was the use of cash appropriate over in-kind/voucher/other assistance?
  - For shelter: Was the training conducted suitable to change behaviour in the context (including: the components of PASSA adopted, the training with the SSA Champions; methods of mobilization of the champions and others; the extent to which this communicated and complemented the 8 Key messages IEC materials distributed to the beneficiaries and in their community?"

- **Programme realisation:** What has been achieved to date (both against the programme logframe/targets and beyond this)? Based on activities to date, to what extent are the shelter (SRA and CORE) and livelihoods components likely to achieve their expected objectives?

- **Timeframes:** How realistic were the original plans? What is a realistic timeframe for completion of the programme?

- **Participation and AAP:** To what extent are (and should) the beneficiaries be involved in planning, design and monitoring of the programme? What is the role of the recovery committees and how effective are these groups as part of programme decision making and implementation? What are our efforts regarding accountability to beneficiaries (AtB) and to the communities (AAP), and are they effective?

- **Collection and use of evidence:** Is needed evidence relevant to the programme and programme delivery collected and used by managers to make informed decisions? Are there any information gaps and if there are what are they? What is the approach to quality control? What mechanisms are in place for measuring programme change?

- **Efficiency:** To what extent were the activities cost-efficient? Were there alternatives that would have been more cost-efficient? Have inputs (human, financial, technical and material) been used in the best way to achieve outcomes and if not why not? Was the recovery assistance provided in a timely manner to meet community needs?
THE PROGRAMME OVERALL – ALSO INCLUDING DRR, WASH, HEALTH AND CHAPTER CAPACITY BUILDING COMPONENTS

Relevance and appropriateness\(^{26}\) (in addition to above questions)

- **Theory of change:** Are the activities (and associated) outputs consistent with the overall programme goal and the attainment of its objectives? Are the goal and objectives right?

- **In line with need:** Are the project priorities (past and future) in line with (or complementing) those of the communities (including those more affected by Yolanda)?
  - To what degree where the outcomes of the community VCA exercises used in the project planning? Were the PRC-BRC project priorities in line with or complementing those of the local government and other national and international humanitarian actors?
  - What are the current priorities of affected households and communities and to what extent will current programme plans meet these?

- **Coordination:** How has the programme coordinated with other actors in Iloilo and across the Movement? Including municipality and local authorities and other national and international organisations? Is there evidence of collaboration or plans to collaborate to better deliver any of the project outcomes?

- **Geographical targeting:** How appropriate is the geographical focus of activities to date? What factors should be used to determine the geographical targeting of the next phase of activities? Should different project components have different geographical focus?

Effectiveness (in addition to above questions)

- **Complaints handling:** To what extent are complaints received, reviewed and responded to and used to take action (as relevant) to improve the programme (i.e. Is there any evidence of beneficiary complaints or feedback used to modify and improve project activities or plans? What options are there for community members (including beneficiaries to provide feedback on the programme)?

- **Communication of the programme:** How well understood is the programme among community members (including beneficiaries)? Volunteers and staff? How has information about the programme (including updates) been shared with them? What are the ways by which internal and external audiences have been provided with opportunities for feedback / communication aside from the Complaints and Response Mechanism (CRM)?

Efficiency (in addition to above questions)

- **Capacity:** Were appropriate human resources (skills, experience and seniority) available to the programme in key areas of management, coordination, technical programme

\(^{26}\) Where relevance focuses on the extent to which an intervention is suited to the priorities of the target group and appropriateness focuses on the extent to which an intervention is tailored to local needs and context, and compliments other interventions from other actors.
design and implementation?

- **Integration**: How integrated is the programme (livelihoods and shelter activities)? How could this be strengthened (if needed)? What approaches for integration could be adopted as part of the next phase?

- **Partnership**: How well has the partnership between the BRC and PRC worked in the programme implementation? To what extent has the relationship aided or not aided programme delivery? What could be replicated or improved?

- **Quality management**: How effective have the planning, priority setting, monitoring and quality management (e.g. internal evaluations and other quality assurance mechanisms) processes been? Are key planning documents being utilised and, if so, to which extent?

**Sustainability**

- Has PRC’s capacity in disaster response management and/or recovery programming been enhanced? What can be done to ensure its sustainability within the partner set-up?
- Are measures being taken to ensure programme interventions are sustainable where relevant? How effective are these?

**Outputs of the review**

- A methodology proposal with accompanying tools that meets the main objectives.
- A validation workshop for programme staff to present and validate the main findings, recommendations, suggested actions. To be held in Iloilo.
- A final MTR report with detailed actionable recommendations.
- A summary presentation of the main findings and recommendations for UKO based staff (either to be conducted in person in London or via video conferencing).

**Methodology**

The review should apply the principle of triangulation by using different sources of information. Methodology will be finalised by the consultant. It is anticipated to include the following aspects:

- Desk review of relevant documentation – programmatic and secondary sources of information on current needs.
- Initial meetings with key stakeholders - BRC UK and Manila, and PRC Manila prior to the field visits.
- Key informant interviews or other methods – with key staff, community members.
- Focus group discussions or other methods at community level (with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries).
- Workshops – bringing together key stakeholders to present findings, agree way forward. Options for including community representatives and beneficiaries as part of this workshop should be considered early on.

Preference will be given to participatory methodologies that encourage and allow for learning to be internalised by staff.
NB: The M&E team based in Ajuy currently consists of one M&E Officer, one M&E Assistant, eight M&E volunteers (data collectors). Depending on the methodology proposed (and other workloads) these staff and volunteers may be able to assist in data collection as part of the MTR. The consultant is responsible for developing any needed tools, guidance, and training for this.

Validation workshop

The workshop will be used to bring together key staff (PRC, BRC) to:

1. Review programme progress to-date.
2. Present and discuss the preliminary key findings from the review (this is an opportunity to validate findings as needed) and agree which of the key findings are priorities for taking into account as part of the next phase.
3. Identify further lessons learnt by participating stakeholders.
4. Develop further recommended action needed (ways forward/next steps)

It is expected that the consultants develop the structure for the workshop with the Country Representative and Performance and Accountability Adviser, and this is presented as part of the methodology proposal. BRC and partners are responsible for the workshop preparation and all related logistics.

Timeframes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date / deadline</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23rd Jan 2015</td>
<td>Finalise ToR</td>
<td>Joy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Feb 2015</td>
<td>Identify consultant</td>
<td>Joy/Emily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st March 2015</td>
<td>MTR consultant starts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th/25th March 2015</td>
<td>Validation Workshop</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th April 2015</td>
<td>Final Report and summary presentation</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(This will not be part of the ToR but I placed it for internal scheduling)</td>
<td>Re-planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Joy and senior managers</td>
</tr>
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Roles and responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name – Job title (organisation, location)</th>
<th>Evaluation role</th>
<th>Evaluation responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXX Consultant</td>
<td>Lead evaluator</td>
<td>Leads evaluation technically, responsible for evaluation design, data collection, data analysis, and data presentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy Singhal – Country Manager (BRC, Manila)</td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
<td>Overall responsible for evaluation, manages and directs Lead Evaluator, in communication with the P&amp;A Adviser. Co-facilitator as needed in the validation workshop. Leading the design of re-planning process and using the MTR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Consultant qualifications**

- Minimum 10 years relevant professional experience
- Experience in recovery programming in response to large sudden-onset humanitarian response, ideally in a management position.
- Experience of working in partnership as part of programme delivery.
- Demonstrated experience of conducting reviews and evaluations, including design of methodology, and data collection and analysis.
- Proven track record of conducting qualitative research, and of training local staff as data collection agents.
- Strong facilitation skills, and proven ability to design and facilitate planning processes.
- Demonstrable skills in writing high quality reports.
- Fluency in English – both spoken and written.
- Experience in the Philippines would be an advantage.
Annex 2: Validation Workshop Timetable and Attendance

PRC-BRC Iloilo Recovery Programme MTR Validation Workshop

25-26 March 2015
Location: Ajuy, Iloilo

Purpose:

- For the MTR team to present back main findings from the MTR.
- To agree and prioritise recommendations and associated action linked to:
  - If implementing a similar programme again ("next time") what could be done differently and what should be done the same.
  - Realisation of the rest of the programme.

25 March 2015 – reflecting on the past year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timings</th>
<th>Session</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0830 – 0915</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0915 – 1040</td>
<td>Key findings: Overall programme achievements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1040 – 1100</td>
<td>Coffee break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 – 1200</td>
<td>Key findings: technical and programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• SRA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Livelihoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>1200 – 1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300 – 1330</td>
<td>Continue from above</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330 – 1500</td>
<td>Key findings: technical and programmatic – Core and WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500 – 1520</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1520 – 1630</td>
<td>Exploring success factors</td>
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26 March 2015 – looking forward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timings</th>
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<tr>
<td>0830 – 0900</td>
<td>Rapid review of Day 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1130</td>
<td>Key findings: DRR; Schools Health Centres; linking activities to the Chapter and exit strategies; Integration; and HR</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30 -</td>
<td>Group work – answers to key questions looking forward at the programme into 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>1200 - 1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300 – 1400</td>
<td>Presentation from group work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400 – 1430</td>
<td>Prioritising recommended next steps and close</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Office</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luben Villarino</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoneth Baylon</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritess Madera</td>
<td>Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menchie Lacson</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Belaro</td>
<td>PRC NHQ Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark Mauro Victorio</td>
<td>Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resty Lou Talamayan</td>
<td>PRC NHQ Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Archieval Molos</td>
<td>PRC NHQ Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brian Kae Enriquez</td>
<td>PRC NHQ Manila</td>
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<td>Enos Oundo</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<td>Ma. Lourdes Eudela</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carmela Jane Castete</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lizel Gestopa</td>
<td>Kalahi, LGU-Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albino Bacia Jr.</td>
<td>Kalahi, LGU-Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Girly Amante</td>
<td>BLGU Brgy Tagubanhan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joel Ruiz</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rey Panganiban</td>
<td>Mangorocoro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sonia J H Morales</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dave Mather</td>
<td>BRC Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyle Eustace Fanega</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Vera De Jesus</td>
<td>PRC Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jessa Serna</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwina Eclarinal</td>
<td>PRC NHQ Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angel Grace Bandianon</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natalie Jette</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawrence Macahiya</td>
<td>PRC NHQ Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shiela C. Tiangco</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<td>King Melchor Sison</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jojet Desamero</td>
<td>PRC-BRC Ajuy Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meghna Manaktala</td>
<td>BRC UKO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Chamberlain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emily Rogers</td>
<td>BRC UKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert Valderama</td>
<td>PRC, Iloilo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: Shelter Repair Types

“patch-up” approach for using Example of SRA assistance. CGI laid over the nippa and tied on using wire.

Example of “repair” approach for using SRA assistance
Example of “new house” approach for using SRA assistance. Instead of repairing their existing house (top left) which flooded in high tide, they decided to build a new house – using the money to build a strong structure and the CGI for the roof.
Annex 4: Programme Location Map
## Annex 5: List of informants interviewed for the MTR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/ Organisation/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Michael Belaro</td>
<td>CTP &amp; Livelihoods Focal Person, PRC Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Maria Vera De Jesus</td>
<td>Field Operations Head, PRC, Iloilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Carmela Castete</td>
<td>HR Assistant, PRC, Ajuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Justin Dell</td>
<td>Former Response Manager, BRC, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jojet Desamero</td>
<td>Finance and Admin Assistant, PRC, Ajuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Paul Anthony Drossou</td>
<td>Country Representative, Canadian Red Cross, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 &quot;Woody&quot; Eastwood</td>
<td>Shelter Delegate IFRC, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Norwena Eclarinal</td>
<td>Operations Head, PRC, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Rommel Elizalde</td>
<td>TPA- Shelter, PRC, Ajuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Patrick Elliot</td>
<td>Operations Manager, IFRC, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Brian Enriquez</td>
<td>WASH Sector Head, PRC, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Manou Lourdes Eudela</td>
<td>Programme Team Leader, PRC, Ajuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Lea Gauthier</td>
<td>Country Representative, French Red Cross, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Menchie Lacson</td>
<td>Livelihood Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Natalie Jette</td>
<td>WASH Delegate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Inma Lopez</td>
<td>Head of Region - E,S,SE Asia, BRC, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Alexander Matheou</td>
<td>Head of Programmes/Partnerships, BRC, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Meghna Manaktala</td>
<td>Philippines Programme Officer, BRC, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dave Mather</td>
<td>Country Manager, BRC, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Bob McKerrow</td>
<td>Country Coordinator, Swiss Red Cross, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Donna McSkimming</td>
<td>Movement Coordinator, IFRC, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sonia J H Morales</td>
<td>Programme Manager, BRC, Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Archieval Molos</td>
<td>Health Sector Head, BRC, Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Enos Oundo</td>
<td>Procurement Delegate, BRC, Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 Christine Rohas</td>
<td>DRR Head, PRC, Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Joel Ruiz</td>
<td>Shelter OIC / Project Engineer, PRC, Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Augustus C H Segovia Jr.</td>
<td>TPA Shelter, PRC, Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Jessa Serna</td>
<td>Livelihoods Delegate, BRC, Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Larry Sorongan</td>
<td>Prefabrication Foreman, PRC, Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Gabriel Sembrano</td>
<td>Programme Manager, ADRA, Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Joy Singhal</td>
<td>Outgoing Country Manager, BRC, Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>32 Resty Lou Talamayan</td>
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<tr>
<td>33 Emilio Tejeira</td>
<td>Country Representative, German Red Cross, Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>34 Shiela C. Tiangco</td>
<td>M&amp;E Project Team Leader, PRC, Ajuy</td>
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<tr>
<td>35 Ted Tuthill</td>
<td>Former DM Team Manager, BRC London</td>
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<tr>
<td>36 Gilbert Valderama</td>
<td>Iloilo City Chapter Administrator, PRC, Iloilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>37 Mark Mauro Victorio</td>
<td>Shelter Officer, PRC, Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>38 Luben Villarino</td>
<td>DRR / Volunteer Officer, PRC, Ajuy</td>
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