

**International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies**

**Mid Term Review of IFRC support to the Typhoon Haiyan
Response Operation in the Philippines**

28 August 2015

Executive Summary

On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) tore through the central Philippines. More than 6,300 people lost their lives and there was extensive destruction and damage to housing, livelihoods and infrastructure, which led to a drastic reduction in living conditions, income, and access to basic services for the affected population. In total, more than 16 million people (some 3.4 million households) were affected. An estimated 5.9 million workers lost income sources due to Haiyan, primarily as a result of infrastructure damage, lack of market access, and disrupted cash flow; with more than 1 million houses reported as destroyed or damaged.

On 11 November 2013 a state of national calamity was declared signalling a request for international assistance. Subsequently, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee system-wide Level 3 emergency response was activated. In response, local communities, authorities, humanitarian actors, civil society and corporate players mounted interventions in affected areas. Humanitarian actors, including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, mobilised/deployed maximum resources and launched operations of a scale that they had not mounted before in the Philippines.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Typhoon Haiyan Emergency Appeal Operation - for which this review is concerned - consists of seven integrated sectors: relief; emergency shelter, shelter repair and rebuilding; livelihoods; water, sanitation and hygiene promotion; health and care; National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development; and, community preparedness and risk reduction.

The overall objective of the Operation is to assist typhoon-affected communities to recover, adapt, and learn improved coping strategies to become less vulnerable to future disasters. The Operation focuses on the islands of Cebu, Leyte and Panay, and is formally scheduled to finish by 31 December 2016. This mid-term review covers the period from when Typhoon Haiyan struck through to initial response, the relief interventions and recovery interventions until the time the evaluators collected the data at the end of July 2015.

The emergency relief phase of the Operation consisted of the distribution of immediate essential household non-food items, unconditional cash grants and emergency shelter materials. This phase was fully completed by April 2014, with relief supplies, health services, water and sanitation etc. reaching more than 160,700 households. Specific achievements during the relief phase included: 8,235 PRC volunteers mobilised across the Operation; 114,669 people reached with health care and essential non-food items; 148,210 households receiving tarpaulins, tents and/or shelter toolkits (148% of target); and 57,000 households provided with unconditional cash grants. All targets for the relief phase were exceeded, with significant beneficiary numbers being reached very quickly after the Typhoon struck. Given the massive scale of the Operation in a logistics hampered environment, the relief phase was extremely effective with PRC mobilising a highly impressive humanitarian response.

The shelter repair and rebuilding interventions comprised core shelter provision and shelter assistance/repair kits combined with awareness raising training. This phase sought to ensure typhoon-affected households rebuilt or repaired back better and safer. Achievements to date include: 18,334 households supported to repair and retrofit damaged houses (122% of target); and 4,264 core shelters completed, all with latrines.

The Early Livelihoods Recovery Programme aims to provide timely assistance to affected households and 'kick-start' their recovery process, while simultaneously addressing community long-term recovery and rehabilitation needs. Achievements to date include: 24,877 families receiving conditional cash grants (103% of target); and volunteers and staff with increased livelihoods knowledge, specifically cash transfer programming skills.

The water and sanitation programme objective is to sustainably reduce the risk of water-borne and water-related diseases in target communities. The programme supports rehabilitation and construction of water points in barangays and schools; with 9,000 latrines scheduled for construction as integral components of core shelters. Achievements to date include: construction of 4,264 latrines in core shelters; 2,556 shelter beneficiaries reached with hygiene promotion; and 27 schools targeted for safe water supply and sanitation facilities.

The health and care programme objective is to contribute to community resilience by reducing vulnerability and improving the health status of affected populations. This involves rehabilitation and upgrading of health facilities; and implementation of community-based health and first aid (CBHFA) integrated with psychosocial support. Achievements to date include: twenty-two health/blood facilities scheduled for rehabilitation or construction; CBHFA implemented in 68 barangays; and two health care emergency response health units deployed - one with surgical capacity resulting in 4,100 out-patient and 1226 in-patient consultations.

Strong results have been secured in National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development. Achievements to date include: a response beyond scale of previous experiences; profound impact with increased PRC reach; increased National Society (NS) reputation, capacity to organise, mobilise and perform; a doubling of staff capacity and an improved staff skill base.

Importantly, the Operation has provided a good learning platform allowing the NS to test various sector approaches in the context of a large-scale operation, and this has resulted in a pool of chapter staff and volunteers with increased relief and recovery knowledge and skills. The PRC Red Cross 143 Volunteer programme employed during the Operation has been a highly effective community preparedness and risk reduction initiative; with all the recovery sector interventions making positive contributions to building resilient and safer communities.

The vast majority of stakeholders and beneficiaries interviewed for the review expressed high satisfaction with the Operation's response and support, which once concluded, is likely to have a highly positive impact at community level. Importantly, the Operation has enabled the community to 'get back on its feet', notably contributing to community/social cohesion by providing affected populations with livelihood, shelter, health, water and sanitation solutions; and an opportunity to increase their resilience to future disasters.

There have been some limitations in the Operation. Most of these relate to delayed implementation of activities caused by lack of materials, lengthy decision-making protocols etc., but given the overall context and scale in which the Operation has taken place these can be considered 'opportunities for future improvement' rather than operational failings.

There are also some challenges ahead, particularly in relation to the way the Operation effectively transitions/exits in the coming months and is able to address the current funding shortfall. As of May 2015, the appeal was 88% covered with 64% already spent for relief and recovery needs. This means a funding gap of CHF 10.38 million remains, and significantly impedes the completion of shelter, livelihoods, health, and water and

sanitation interventions. While this gap persists, skills training options for youth remain stagnant, while households, schools and health facilities selected for construction and rehabilitation cannot be completed, leaving families without safe housing; young adults with limited livelihoods opportunities; and, damaged rural health clinics unable to serve remote populations. However, with PRC and Movement commitment these issues should be readily resolved.

Overall, the review established that, to date, IFRC support to the Typhoon Haiyan Response Operation in the Philippines has been a success. Both the relief and recovery phases have been relevant, appropriate and effective with significant sector results secured early and in full accordance with the intervention design. The Recovery Plan of Action, in terms of logic and coherence, has been a valid and appropriate approach to securing the Operation's overall goals. The priorities of target groups have been largely met or are in the process of being met, with coverage being of significant scale, fair, transparent, and tailored to account for local needs and contexts.

It is inspiring to see a National Society led operation that has 'challenged' IFRC's traditional coordination role, and it is also encouraging that with some 14 months to go, PRC and Movement partners are already working on the transition from recovery. Importantly for the Movement, there has been enormous solidarity from the global network enabled by PRC being very open to partnership. This solidarity and openness to cooperation has resulted in strengthening the success and reach of the Operation, and in generating significant learning across multiple Movement actors (much of which is currently being used in support of the Nepal earthquake response).

With many expected results already secured, the Operation is 'well positioned' to achieving its intended results in a timely and effective manner. PRC has rightly earned the reputation of an organisation that is able to deliver emergency relief and recovery operations at enormous scale; and the IFRC should be acknowledged for its professional implementation role that has contributed significantly to resourcing and delivery of Movement targets.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

BOCA	Branch Organisational Capacity Assessment
BRC	Barangay Recovery Committee
CBHFA	Community Based Health and First Aid
CHAST	Children's Health and Sanitation Training
CHF	Swiss Franc
CHV	Community Health Volunteers
CMLP	Community Managed Livelihood Projects
CPRR	Community Preparedness and Risk Reduction
DRR(M)	Disaster Risk Reduction (Management)
ELRP	Early Livelihoods Recovery Programme
ERU	Emergency Response Units
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LGU	Local Government Unit
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTR	Mid-term Review
MWOF	Movement Wide Operational Framework
NFI	Non Food Items
NHQ	National Headquarters
NS	National Society
OCAC	Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OD	Organisational Development
ODK	Open Data Kit
PASSA	Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness
PHAST	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
PMER	Planning, monitoring, evaluation, reporting
PNS	Partner National Society/Societies
PRC	Philippine Red Cross
PSS	Psychosocial support
RAT	Recovery Assessment Team
RPoA	Recovery Plan of Action
RTE	Real-Time Evaluation
ToR	Terms of Reference
TWG	Technical Working Group
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WatSan	Water and Sanitation

Movement partners supporting Operation Typhoon Haiyan

For purposes of context it is useful to acknowledge the key actors engaged in Operation Typhoon Haiyan.

The Philippine Red Cross (PRC) is the host national society for the Operation. PRC is the nation's largest humanitarian organisation and works through 101 chapters covering all administrative districts and major cities in the country. The national society (NS) has approximately 1,000 staff at national headquarters and chapter levels, and approximately one million volunteers and supporters, of whom some 500,000 are active volunteers. At chapter level, a programme called 'Red Cross 143' is in place to enhance the overall capacity of the National Society to prepare for and respond in disaster situations.

Red Cross Red Crescent Movement partners actively involved in the recovery operation and present in the Philippines include: The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as American Red Cross, Australian Red Cross, British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, French Red Cross, German Red Cross, Japanese Red Cross Society, Netherlands Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, Republic of Korea National Red Cross, Spanish Red Cross, Swiss Red Cross and Qatar Red Crescent.

Other partner national societies (PNS) that have supported the Operation include: Austrian Red Cross, Bahrain Red Crescent Society, Belgian Red Cross (French and Flanders), Danish Red Cross, Hong Kong branch of Red Cross Society of China, Indonesian Red Cross, Irish Red Cross, Italian Red Cross, Singapore Red Cross, Swedish Red Cross, Taiwan Red Cross Organisation, Thai Red Cross and Turkish Red Crescent.

1. Background and introduction to the review

On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) tore through the central Philippines. More than 6,300 people lost their lives and there was extensive destruction and damage to housing, livelihoods and infrastructure, which led to a drastic reduction in living conditions, income, and access to basic services for the affected population. In total, more than 16 million people (some 3.4 million households) were affected. An estimated 5.9 million workers lost income sources due to Haiyan, primarily as a result of infrastructure damage, lack of market access, and disrupted cash flow; with more than 1 million houses reported as destroyed or damaged.

On 11 November 2013, a state of national calamity was declared by the Government of the Philippines signalling a request for international assistance. Subsequently, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) system-wide Level 3 emergency response was activated.¹ In response, local communities, authorities, humanitarian actors, civil society and corporate players mounted interventions in affected areas. Humanitarian actors, including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, mobilised/deployed maximum resources and launched operations of a scale that they had not mounted before in the Philippines.

In November 2013, IFRC launched an emergency appeal to support the PRC in its relief and recovery interventions for people affected by the Typhoon Haiyan disaster. The IFRC Typhoon Haiyan Emergency Appeal Operation² - for which this review is concerned - consists of seven integrated sectors: relief; emergency shelter, shelter repair and rebuilding; livelihoods; water, sanitation and hygiene promotion; health and care; National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development; and, community preparedness and risk reduction.

The overall objective of the Operation is to assist typhoon-affected communities to recover, adapt, and learn improved coping strategies to become less vulnerable to future disasters. During early 2014, a Real Time Evaluation (RTE) was commissioned by IFRC, the recommendations of which helped informed the final design of the Operation plan. The Operation focuses on the islands of Cebu, Leyte and Panay, and is formally scheduled to finish by 31 December 2016.

With relief interventions now long concluded and the response fully in recovery phase, a mid-term review (MTR) was commissioned to assess aspects of the IFRC-supported Operation and inform the ongoing and future support to the PRC and partner operations at country, regional and global levels.

2. Review method

This review covers the period from when Typhoon Haiyan struck through to initial response, the relief interventions and recovery interventions until the time the evaluators collected the data at the end of July 2015. The review was conducted between 20 July and 3 August 2015 by a team comprising:

¹ The highest category, requiring global mobilisation and response.

² Emergency Appeal No. MDRPH014. In July 2014, the appeal was revised to CHF 99.88 million to accommodate the evolving situation in the recovery phase.

- Aurélia Balpe (IFRC)
- Dr. Kate Davies (Australian Red Cross)
- Humprey L Garces (National consultant)
- Karen Poon (Hong Kong branch of Red Cross Society of China)
- Dr. Mark Shepherd (Team Leader – independent consultant)
- Lena Tynnmek (Swedish Red Cross)

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for this review can be found at Annex A. The timeline for the review can be found at Annex B.

The MTR adopted a mixed method approach that included:

- Desktop review of operation background documents including evaluation reports from previous appeals in the Philippines.
- Semi-structured interviews were used to gather primary data relevant to the ToR objectives (see Annex C for key informant list).
- Focus group discussions and group interviews with institutional stakeholders and beneficiaries.
- Field visits/observations to selected sites in Manila, Leyte, Cebu and Panay islands (see Annex D).

The review team aimed to interview a representative and relevant sample from each of the key stakeholder groups (PRC, IFRC, PNS, ICRC, volunteers, barangay recovery committees, institutional stakeholders and beneficiaries). During field visits the team visited a selection of health units/stations, shelters, school latrines, risk reduction interventions provided/upgraded/repared through the recovery effort; and observed select software activities.

Following initial stakeholder interviews at IFRC Asia Pacific Offices in Kuala Lumpur (20-22 July), the review team conducted the following exercises in the Philippines:

- MTR briefing for IFRC, PRC and PNS.
- Briefing for PRC Chairman and Secretary General.
- Manila based interviews with IFRC, ICRC, PRC, PNS and external stakeholders.
- Telephone interviews with key informants outside of the Philippines.
- Field visits to Leyte, Cebu and Panay – observation, interviews and group discussions with beneficiaries, volunteers, barangay recovery committees (BRC), schools, local government unit (LGU) representatives, IFRC, and PRC.
- A validation of review findings and initial recommendations workshop with IFRC, ICRC, PRC and PNS; including a review debriefing.
- A review debriefing with PRC Chairman and Secretary General; including a discussion related to key findings, limitations and tentative recommendations emerging through the review.

On return to the IFRC Asia Pacific Office (3 August) a review debriefing was held for IFRC as commissioner of the MTR.

Key findings obtained during the review were cross-referenced against the Recovery Plan of Action (RPoA) to establish congruence or lack thereof: the purpose being to determine whether the Operation adhered to its stated implementation methodology and plan.

The limitations to the review mostly centre on constraints related to time available in the field to conduct stakeholder interviews/group discussions, particularly with beneficiaries;

and the broad ranging nature of the review itself, which required the review team to be economical in presenting findings, discussion and analysis.

The key findings obtained through the review process are detailed in Section 3 below.

3. Findings

This section of the report presents the main findings obtained through the review. It considers the extent to which the response to date has achieved expected results, and how relevant and appropriate the intervention has been to the needs of the target groups; along with how the various delivery mechanisms utilised facilitated their attainment. The section also identifies some best practices and gaps in recovery programming. Later sections of the report consider whether results to date have been secured in timely, efficient, effective and accountable manners.

Each of the seven operational sectors is considered in turn. The review team identified 'key achievements' for each sector, and considered what had worked well and what could be improved. Each sector analysis begins with a brief description of intended activities for context purposes.³ Included in each sector analysis is a table that shows achievements to date against expected results as per the RPoA detailed operation plan.⁴

It should be noted that many 'findings' were established during the review and it has not been possible to include them all in this report. The section below contains the most significant findings as agreed upon by Movement partners during the workshop held in Manila on 31 July 2015.

3.1. Emergency relief phase

It should be noted that the emergency relief phase was a massive response, and it is difficult to do justice to the work undertaken and achievements secured within the parameters of this review. It is however worth highlighting that PRC/IFRC were reportedly the largest relief agency responding across multiple locations; with PRC (with assistance from the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement) reaching more than a million people with relief items, relief cash grants, clean water and improved sanitation, emergency health services, medical supplies, hygiene promotion, psychosocial support and family reunification services.⁵

The emergency relief phase of the Operation consisted of the distribution of immediate essential household non-food items (NFI), unconditional cash grants and emergency shelter materials. The phase was fully completed at the end of April 2014, with relief supplies, health services, water and sanitation etc. reaching more than 160,700 households.⁶ Achievements during this phase included:

- More than 8,235 PRC volunteers mobilised across the Operation.
- 114,669 people reached with health care and essential non-food items.
- 148,210 households provided with tarpaulins, tents and/or shelter toolkits.

³ For a full description of each sector readers should refer to the RPoA.

⁴ Section C of the RPoA pp. 13-31. All figures in tables illustrate IFRC's support for the Operation and are separate from Movement-wide figures.

⁵ IFRC/PRC Summary of recovery assessment report April 2014.

⁶ Source: IFRC Operations update no. 10.

- 57,000 households provided with unconditional cash grants.

Achievements to date against expected results are shown in Table 3.1 below:

Table 3.1: Relief: Food, essential household items and unconditional cash grants

Objectives/Results	Indicator	Achievement
Outcome 1 Essential household needs of typhoon-affected households are met	% of households which report that food and non-food assistance was timely and appropriate to their needs	Data not available (DNA) ⁷
	% of assisted households which report that unconditional cash grant assistance was timely and appropriate to their needs	98% (Source: Cash Surge ERU M&E analysis)
Output 1.1 100,000 affected households have access to appropriate food rations and essential non-food items to meet immediate needs	Number of households that receive appropriate rations to support immediate food needs within six months	DNA
	Number of households that have received at least one type of non-food item to support immediate household needs within six months	160,727 (Source: IFRC Ops update no. 10)
Output 1.2 45,000 affected households provided with unconditional cash grants to meet immediate needs	Number of households that have received unconditional cash grants within six months	49,844 (Source: IFRC Ops update no. 10)

The review established that all Operation targets for the relief phase were exceeded, with significant beneficiary numbers being reached very quickly after the Typhoon struck. Overall feedback from recipient households reached during the relief phase was highly positive. Key success factors include the pre-Haiyan Movement memorandum of understanding (MoU), which provided a valuable cooperation framework between IFRC and PRC for implementing activities funded through IFRC, including Long Term Planning Frameworks, Emergency Appeals, and Disaster Relief Emergency Fund.

The pre-Typhoon training support from Movement partners in basic disaster management (DM), first aid and equipment provision ensured that barangay disaster action teams were prepared, and this helped with early needs assessments. Complementary to this was the pre-Typhoon communication between PRC NHQ and chapters which ensured volunteers and barangay captains were on stand-by, prepared, and in some cases, out conducting rescue work, assessing needs, and establishing welfare desks within one hour after the Typhoon moved on. PRC's previous experience and preparedness to undertake cash-based modalities was significant in ensuring relief reached beneficiaries in a timely manner, and this has helped position the NS and IFRC as 'leaders' in cash-based modalities.⁸

⁷ Data for this indicator was scheduled to be collected through the Post-distribution survey, but was not available at the time of the review.

⁸ The joint effort of PRC, IFRC, American Red Cross, British Red Cross, Danish Red Cross and German Red Cross in delivering cash grants has been assessed as producing high levels of beneficiary satisfaction.

Given the scale of the Operation in a logistics hampered environment, the relief phase was extremely effective. The RTE noted that the IFRC response was perceived externally to be 'robust and rapid', with PRC mobilising a highly impressive humanitarian response. The review team shares this finding.

3.2. Shelter – emergency phase

Shelter was afforded a top priority in the Operation.⁹ The emergency shelter response consisted of distribution of items such as tarpaulins, tents, and toolkits. Emergency shelter targets were exceeded, with 148,210 households receiving tarpaulins, tents and/or shelter toolkits (148% of target).

In the overall humanitarian response as reported by the Shelter Cluster, the Movement supported about 20% of the total shelter needs and was the biggest single agency in this sector area. Achievements to date against expected results are shown in Table 3.2 below:

Table 3.2: Shelter/emergency shelter

Objectives/Results	Indicator	Achievement
Outcome 2 The immediate shelter needs of the target population are met	% of assisted households living in shelters meeting cluster standards for emergency shelter	DNA
Output 2.1 Emergency shelter assistance is provided to 100,000 households affected by the typhoon	Number of households provided with emergency shelter assistance <i>within six months</i>	139,462 (Source: IFRC Ops update no. 10)

The emergency shelter analysis is combined with 'shelter recovery' in Section 3.3. below.

3.3. Shelter – recovery phase

Shelter recovery interventions comprised two distinct packages - core shelter and shelter assistance/repair kits - both supported with awareness raising training and information educational and communication materials. This phase sought to ensure typhoon-affected households rebuilt or repaired back better and safer. Achievements include:

- 18,334 households supported to repair and retrofit their damaged houses (122% of target).
- 4,264 core shelters completed (47% of target), all with latrines and each family receive Hygiene Promotion training.

Achievements to date against expected results are shown in Table 3.3 below:

Table 3.3: Recovery shelter

Objectives/Results	Indicator	Achievement
Outcome 3 Affected households have recovered safer shelter and gained awareness, knowledge and skills to improve resilience to future shocks	Number of households that have undertaken repairs or rebuilt, according to cluster standards, after obtaining appropriate materials and guidance	Data only available following end-line survey (2016)
	% of households assisted with	100% (of those already

⁹ Following the Philippine Government and PRC's food distribution efforts during the first few days after the Typhoon.

	core shelter that can identify key features of safer shelters	assisted)
Output 3.1 15,000 affected households whose houses were damaged have repaired or retrofitted back better	Number of households that have repaired or retrofitted their damaged houses after obtaining appropriate materials and guidance	18,344 complete (as of 26/7/15)
Output 3.2 9,000 affected households whose houses were destroyed have built core shelters that have improved physical durability to hazards	Number of households that have built core shelters to replace their destroyed houses after obtaining appropriate materials, guidance and labour assistance.	4,264 complete (as of 26/7/15)
Output 3.3 Orientation/awareness raising sessions on safer shelter provided to at least 24,000 households in target communities	Number of people who participate in orientation or awareness sessions on safer shelter	12,608 (SRA and core combined as of 26/7/15) - ongoing
	Number of awareness material reproduced and disseminated	Min. 12,608 (see above)

The review established that beneficiaries consistently identified shelter as their top need following the Typhoon. There were clear criteria for beneficiary selection, prioritising vulnerable households i.e. for single-female headed, child-headed, special needs, very low/no income or assets. Good shelter guidelines and standard shelter designs contributed to a consistent approach to quality across multiple sites. The inclusion of latrines and hygiene promotion with core shelters meant that sanitation issues were also addressed. Consequently, core shelter beneficiaries have shelter that is both safe and comfortable. Beneficiaries reported high satisfaction with the quality of the core shelters constructed, which in most cases exceeded their expectations.

The shelter intervention has provided a good learning platform allowing the NS to test the approach in the context of a large-scale operation, and this has resulted in a pool of chapter staff and volunteers with emergency and recovery shelter programming knowledge and skills, which is an important asset for future disaster risk reduction initiatives. Also noteworthy are the recovery-shelter guidelines and Technical Working Group (TWG) mechanism that enabled a consistent approach to the design and quality of shelters; with ongoing monitoring of construction by PRC volunteer teams. Variations on quality tended to relate to individual trade persons who had varying levels of skill in implementing the design.

Following the Typhoon, some destroyed homes were in areas classified as 'no-build zones' (assessed by government as being high risk although this was also a politicised process). For some landless beneficiaries, PRC was able to formulate agreements with landowners to build progressive core shelters, however, there were some genuine cases where core shelter could not be provided because suitable land arrangements could not be made. Here, there is opportunity for PRC to consider advocating for authorities to provide relocation sites to resettle people without 'suitable land' as has been done in previous operations. The review notes that timeframes for constructing core shelters varied across sites, with some achieved quickly, while in other sites, there have been delays associated with slow procurement, material sourcing problems, competition for labour, and unfavourable soil type.

In terms of programme limitations, the review found that although staff, volunteers and carpenters received training on Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA) the training has not had the intended flow-on effect to the community. And while

some beneficiaries reported to the review team that the shelter repair assistance grant was insufficient, it should be acknowledged that the assistance package (combined materials and cash) provided by the Operation was considerably higher than recommended by the authorities or provided by other actors.

It is important to note that the shelter sector faces a projected 24% funding gap with CHF 7.49 million needed to cover the costs of the remaining 3,000 households. Should funding be secured, the current rate of build progress (approximately 120 units per day) would mean all target 9,000 families have new shelters by mid-2016. However, the review team understand that shelter targets will be reconsidered based on the last budget revision along with the results of the fund raising initiative. This is appropriate and a responsible decision by the Operation’s management.

3.4. Early Livelihoods Recovery Programme

The aim of the Early Livelihoods Recovery Programme (ELRP) was to provide timely assistance to affected households and ‘kick-start’ their recovery process, while simultaneously addressing community long-term recovery and rehabilitation needs. A key feature of ELRP was to complement recovery efforts in shelter reconstruction and rehabilitation, water and sanitation, health and hygiene promotion, and thus empower communities to recover in a dignified manner. Achievements include:

- ‘Putting communities back onto their feet’ with 24,877 families receiving conditional cash grants (103% of original target for Phase I).
- Skilling an expanded number of volunteers and staff with livelihoods knowledge, specifically cash transfer programming skills.
- High community participation and empowerment with beneficiaries largely satisfied with the intervention.

Achievements to date against expected results are shown in Table 3.4 below:

Table 3.4: Livelihoods

Objectives/Results	Indicator	Achievement
Outcome 4 Livelihoods are restored among affected populations	% of households that report their income has returned to or exceeded pre-disaster levels	Data collection ongoing
	% of households and groups able to maintain their livelihood ventures six months after receiving assistance	Surveys yet to be carried out
	% of trained youth pursuing vocation six months after graduation	Surveys yet to be carried out
Output 4.1 24,000 affected households have restored livelihoods after receiving working capital and inputs sufficient to resume activities	Number of households that receive conditional grants and re-establish income earning activities	24,877
Output 4.2 Community groups in 100 barangays have restored or diversified livelihoods after receiving working capital and inputs sufficient to resume activities	Number of community groups that receive conditional grants and undertake livelihood protection or enhancement measures	Data collection ongoing

<p>Output 4.3 200 youth are awarded scholarships, pursue vocational training and equipped with tools of trade</p>	<p>Number of youth who have successfully completed vocational training courses, received certificates and provided with tools of trade</p>	<p>576 (ongoing)</p>
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The review established that many beneficiaries were satisfied with the conditional cash grant assistance, with popular schemes being livestock rearing, small-scale agriculture, and establishing small 'sari-sari' shop stalls.

The ELRP design contains strong community participation and empowerment principles which provide a solid basis on which to build longer-term resilience/disaster risk reduction initiatives. Similarly to the shelter experience, the intervention has provided a good learning platform allowing the NS to test the approach in the context of a large-scale operation, resulting in a pool of chapter staff and volunteers with cash transfer programming knowledge and skills (again, important for future disaster risk reduction initiatives). Coordination with key stakeholders e.g. local government institutions was found to be strong, and partnerships with local training institutions meet both institution and ELRP objectives. An important outcome of the ELRP is that many families feel 'dignified' again, which illustrates that empowerment principles have worked well.

The review found several limitations with ELRP. While Phase I (conditional livelihood cash grant; and emergency phase unconditional cash grant) is complete, the timeframe to complete the remaining two phases is considered unrealistic. Phase II is currently delayed due to an underestimation of local training institution ability to handle demand (mostly in Cebu); and delays are also anticipated for the Community Managed Livelihood Projects (CMLP) Phase III. It should also be noted that the overall target for CMLP has been revised to 50 projects (from 100) to reflect the delivery capacity of teams and the programme timeframe.¹⁰

The review team also established that while many have benefited through ELRP, some conditional cash grant recipients (approximately 20% of those interviewed) have not been able to develop viable businesses.¹¹ Reasons established for this include: to many beneficiaries choosing the same business in close proximity e.g. too many small shops in one area, resulting in market saturation and reduced profits; and elderly grant recipients feeling that time is simply not on their side. Here, there may be opportunity for the programme to link with other agencies or government bodies that help small-scale business people to develop entrepreneurial skills and to guarantee sustainability: such as pooling produce to sell to better/more attractive markets, provision of extension services (for animal rearing) etc. The review also noted that the Operation has decided not to press ahead with the Phase II Enterprise Development section of the programme, as the youth seem to prefer to work with employers rather than start their own enterprise.¹²

It is important to note that there is an approximate 13% funding gap in the ELRP, with CHF 1 million needed to cover skills training for 500 youth, and 75 community livelihood projects. This requires all key stakeholders to jointly determine future priority interventions and consider how to reallocate remaining resources.

¹⁰ To date, 19 draft proposals have been developed including two finalised proposals.

¹¹ This finding would benefit from a separate study.

¹² The Operation is committed to re-consider this if there is an interest.

3.5. Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion

The overarching objective for the water and sanitation (WatSan)/Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector was to sustainably reduce the risk of water-borne and water-related diseases in target communities. The programme supports rehabilitation and construction of water points in barangays and schools; with 9,000 latrines scheduled for construction as integral components of core shelters. Hygiene promotion activities are included to improve community hygiene behaviour and mitigate the threat of communicable diseases. Achievements include:

- Construction of 4,264 latrines in core shelters.
- 2,556 shelter beneficiaries reached with hygiene promotion.
- 27 schools targeted for safe water supply and sanitation facilities.
- Strong focus on community engagement using elements of Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation (PHAST). With Children's Health and Sanitation Training (CHAST) linked well with school hygiene activities.
- WatSan facilities in schools provide better evacuation centres.

Achievements to date against expected results are shown in Table 3.5 below:

Table 3.5: Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion

Objectives/Results	Indicator	Achievement
Outcome 5 Risk of waterborne, water-related and vector-borne diseases in targeted communities reduced	% of target schools and households having access to sufficient safe water	27 schools, 22 communities in progress
	% of target schools and households using adequate sanitation	27 schools, 22 communities in progress
	% of students in target schools and people in target communities who have increased knowledge of hygiene practices	3,149 students schools, 4,126 shelter, 5,964 community based PHAST
Output 5.1 Access to safe water by target population in 20 schools and 20 barangays increased	Number of water points installed or rehabilitated in 20 schools and 20 communities	PMER data unclear
Output 5.2 Access to adequate sanitation facilities by target population in 20 schools and 20 barangays increased	Number of household latrines supported through shelter intervention	4,264 (= core shelters completed)
	Number of sanitation facilities rehabilitated in 20 schools and 20 barangays	PMER data unclear
Output 5.3 Knowledge, attitude and practice on safe water, sanitation and hygiene by target population in 20 schools and 20 barangays increased	Number of people reached by hygiene promotion in 20 schools and 20 barangays	3,149 students schools, 4,126 shelter, 5,964 community based PHAST
	% increase in three aspects of personal hygiene knowledge among those reached	Baseline in progress

The review team met with core shelter beneficiaries and school representatives who expressed high satisfaction with the provision of household latrines and sanitation blocks respectively. The WatSan/WASH sector approach targeting core shelters and schools has been a highly effective means for ensuring that selected beneficiaries have sanitation solutions and this represents a good example of programme integration both in terms of cooperation as well as delivery of WatSan hardware (for shelter/schools) and software (for schools).¹³ The approach to WatSan/WASH through the PRC's recovery guidelines – 'Water and Sanitation: Bridging Recovery Programming' represents an example of good practice in how to deliver effective water, sanitation and hygiene promotion in a recovery situation.

However, it was reported that the WatSan software was not 'timely' sequenced to follow the hardware provision (latrines). This could have been better coordinated, with hardware and software components running in parallel or software swiftly following the hardware provision so households have 'on-time' hygiene knowledge and skills for more effective communicable disease control. And while using the core shelter programme for the majority of sanitation solutions is an excellent strategy,¹⁴ opportunities for wider community sanitation solutions could have been more fully explored; for example, through a more innovative application of 'owner-driven' (conditional) cash grants i.e. encouraging non-core shelter households to construct latrines.

The supply of water to barangays (via water-metered lines) – or lack thereof – was a problem consistently raised by community members. This is largely beyond the control of the Operation, but it is important to acknowledge the knock-on effect this has on safe water and sanitation provision to target communities.¹⁵ It is understood that some LGUs are attempting to improve piped water supplies, and this may present a good opportunity for the Operation to secure its objective of sustainably reducing the risk of water-borne and water-related diseases in target communities. There is also opportunity for the Operation to consider, should funds permit, alternative water solutions for communities, for example rain harvesting systems (for health stations and schools) or provision of water filters to households for safer water solutions.

3.6. Health and Care

The broad objective of the health and care programme is to contribute to community resilience by reducing vulnerability and improving the health status of affected populations. This primarily involves rehabilitation and upgrading of health facilities; and implementation of community-based health and first aid (CBHFA) integrated with psychosocial support. Achievements include:

- Twenty (20) damaged health facilities rehabilitated/reconstructed and equipped. 66% of rehabilitation/reconstruction of health facilities accomplished to date.
- Two PRC blood banks in process of construction.
- 59% of total equipment for upgrading health centres procured and delivered to warehouses/health facilities.
- CBHFA implemented in 68 barangays.
- Two basic health care ERU units deployed one with surgical capacity: 4,100 out-patient consultations and 1226 in-patient conducted.

¹³ The sanitation blocks were well constructed, of sufficient size, and accommodating of special needs. Fittings (e.g. taps and valves) were noted to be of poor quality.

¹⁴ It should be noted that the latrine comes from the shelter budget not the WatSan budget.

¹⁵ The responsibility for water provision lies primarily with LGUs and local water authorities.

Achievements to date against expected results are shown in Table 3.6 below:

Table 3.6: Health and Care

Objectives/Results	Indicator	Achievement
Outcome 6 The immediate and medium-term risks to the health of affected populations are reduced	% of people in target communities who can access appropriate health services	Data collection ongoing
Output 6.1 Target population is provided with rapid medical management of injuries and diseases	Number of patients treated in Red Cross supported health facilities	Data collection ongoing
Output 6.2 Gaps in medical infrastructure of the affected population in 60 barangays filled	Number of damaged health facilities that have been rehabilitated	6 completed, 13 ongoing, 1 tender in process
	Number of damaged health facilities that have been equipped as per DoH guidelines	1 complete 18 ongoing
Output 6.3 Community-based disease prevention, epidemic preparedness, and health promotion measures provided in 60 barangays	Number of households reached with community-based disease prevention and health promotion activities	25,126 households 68 communities (significantly exceeding target)
Output 6.4 Mainstream and crosscutting psychosocial support provided in 60 barangays and 5 chapters	Number of people reached with psychosocial support services and activities	Data collection ongoing

A key contribution in health and care relates to the number of damaged health facilities that have been rehabilitated and/or equipped; which is a significant achievement. The use of hardware (health stations, schools etc.) as an entry point for health software has been an effective strategy, and the important role Community Health Volunteers (CHVs) play in the recovery process, particularly in awareness and preparedness for disease prevention, is acknowledged - the Operation has trained some 557 CHVs who appear well trained and knowledgeable. Importantly, CHVs present an opportunity to grow the RC 143 Volunteer network (hereafter referred to as 'RC 143') in barangays which contributes to programme sustainability.¹⁶

The review found the community assessment tool (using Open Data Kit) an effective means of strategizing community health interventions by using data from baselines and health surveys to develop targeted Community Action Plans; this is considered an example of good practice that should be replicated in future operations.¹⁷ PRC's well-established relationships with provincial/municipal authorities have enabled field level health staff to be effective in their coordination with relevant health authorities.

There is some concern around sustaining health and care interventions post-Operation (as funding effectively ceases), and it will be important to analyse the chapter health

¹⁶ The RC 143 Volunteer programme is considered the backbone of PRC's operations. It aims to place a team of at least 44 volunteers – 1 leader and 43 members – in all 42,000 barangays across the archipelago and provide them with the appropriate training, skills development and equipment to be able to be first-line responders in any emergency.

¹⁷ An application which could be made stronger if harmonised with other sector data such as vulnerability and capacity assessments/mapping.

capacity requirements and resource them accordingly if the programme is to secure its 'sustainability' ambitions. There is also a need to better link emergency health/recovery with longer-term health programmes; and secure better sector programme integration between CBHFA and WatSan.

The review noted that the programme's psychosocial support (PSS) component has been slow to roll-out and the target for the intervention has been reduced from 68 to 25 barangays based on recent community assessments. PRC's social services team understands the importance of recognising volunteers and the value of PSS for staff and volunteers, and while a basic level of service has been made available through the health programme, there is a need to better promote PSS awareness within the NS and recognise its centrality to holistic health and well-being.¹⁸

3.7. National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development

This section considers National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development along with how the various interventions have contributed to developing PRC capacity.

The Movement Wide Operational Framework (MWOFF) for the Operation outlined PRC's overall ambition for capacity development and this was mirrored in the RPoA. The MWOFF called on partners to support the PRC's RC 143 approach; establish regional disaster management and logistics centres with prepositioned stocks and capacity; equip PRC chapters with appropriate hardware and equipment; develop leadership and decision making capacity of chapters; and establish the PRC Training Academy. Achievements include:

- A response beyond scale of previous experiences.
- Profound impact with increased NS reach, reputation, capacity to organise, mobilise and perform.
- Mobilisation of 8,000+ volunteers (all insured).
- Doubling of staff capacity and increased skills of staff.
- Development of standardised programmatic methodologies.
- Absorbed support from 137 sister NS and from external partners – enhanced coordination skills.
- Provision of core support services to IFRC and multiple PNS.
- Subsequent PRC deployments to East Timor and Nepal.

Achievements to date against expected results are shown in Table 3.7 below:

Table 3.7: National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development

Objectives/Results	Indicator	Achievement
Outcome 7 National Society level of preparedness for future disasters and capacity to deliver sustainable programming and services strengthened	% of financial resources mobilized under this appeal allocated for National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development	10% of income
Output 7.1 Increased skillsets available for the National Society to respond to	Number of staff and volunteers provided with technical, tailored and/or on-the-job trainings	Data collection ongoing (Ref: PRC NS capacity building)

¹⁸ The review team interviewed several PRC/IFRC staff who complained of significant stress resulting from the Operation.

future disasters and deliver programmes and services		framework)
Output 7.2 Increased material capacity is available for the National Society to respond to future disasters, deliver programmes and services	Number of fixed facilities rehabilitated, movable facilities and equipment provided, and quantity of pre-positioned stock	Data collection ongoing
Output 7.3 Improved systems and processes in place for the National Society to respond to future disasters and deliver programmes and services	Number of key documents (including frameworks, agreements, plans, procedures, manuals) updated and adopted	Data collection ongoing
Output 7.4 The capacity of target chapters of the National Society strengthened for them to respond to future disasters, deliver programmes and services	Number of PRC chapters supported to enhance their capacity to respond to future disasters, deliver programmes and services	Data collection ongoing

The Operation has had a profound impact on PRC. Arguably the greatest impact is the experience PRC has gained managing its largest operation by far. The Operation has increased the reach and visibility of the PRC and enhanced its reputation in communities, at all levels of government and within the Movement. More than 8,000 volunteers have been trained and mobilised representing up to an estimated 25 fold increase in active volunteers in operational areas; many of whom are youth, which has brought PRC closer to achieving its RC 143 vision.¹⁹

PRC has an effective national disaster response team system and was able to quickly mobilise staff and volunteers to support the Operation. This has resulted in the transfer of learning from Haiyan to non-Haiyan chapters and vice versa. The Operation has enhanced the skills of staff and volunteers from more than 60 chapters and from headquarters. Volunteers and staff have gained skills and confidence in implementing a range of recovery activities and earned the trust and recognition of partner communities. The Operation has increased the material capacity of PRC through additional transport, equipment and warehousing facilities. The Training Academy was established in 2014 and offers a robust platform for integrating learning from Haiyan into PRC’s national training curriculum.

The operation has increased PRC’s skills in design, implementation, monitoring and reporting of large-scale relief and recovery programmes and managing multiple partnerships. An array of new and refined technical guidelines are in place contributing to the professionalisation of PRC’s programming. Work is ongoing on the development of beneficiary communications and DRRM guidelines; and capacity has been built in newer sectors such as managing field hospitals. PRC is proud to have deployed staff and volunteers to support field hospitals in Nepal and as part of a livelihoods review in East Timor.

While there is widespread agreement that the PRC has skilled staff in all support functions, interviewees highlighted the slow response rate of these services, linking this to the limited delegations of authority within PRC. Some interviewees highlighted the substantial support provided to PRC in logistics development and expressed disappointment that this support had not translated into substantial improvements in capacity.

¹⁹ The challenge for PRC is to retain some of these volunteers at community and chapter level so that it can continue to expand its reach after the Operation concludes.

A separate structure was established early on to respond to needs on the scale required and ensure that chapters were able to continue with their core activities. In some areas; the Haiyan taskforce and the chapter have been challenged to establish a mutually beneficial modus operandi resulting in the chapter feeling disempowered. It has been suggested more could have been done to engage chapters in affected areas to maximise learning and leverage more of the chapter capacity and networks for the benefit of the Operation. And while the skills of Haiyan-affected chapters and National Headquarters (NHQ) staff involved in the response have been built, the chapters and NHQ Task Force members are a fraction of what PRC has nationwide: here, there is a need to ensure that the skills acquired/built and the knowledge gained are replicated widely to benefit other chapters.

From the start of the operation, PRC was resolute that it would directly provide support services to all its Haiyan partners: a bold decision consistent with PRC's ambition to provide strong leadership. However, the NS has struggled to meet the demands arising from this decision, and this missed an opportunity to capitalise on available IFRC capacity to support PRC in coordinating the international PNS response (through service agreements). Using available IFRC capacity/expertise would have allowed PRC teams to focus on delivering direct assistance instead of engaging in demanding coordination-service type processes.²⁰ In its strategic plan, PRC has committed to reduce response times for requests within its core support services but this has not materialised. As a consequence, partners have had to establish parallel systems to enable timely action on human resource, finance and logistics issues.

3.8. Community preparedness and risk reduction

This section considers community preparedness and risk reduction (CPRR). The aim within CPRR is to ensure that all recovery interventions are orientated to building community resilience towards future disasters, with community-based risk reduction embedded within all programmes. A key CPRR feature is to support PRC to expand its reach of the RC 143 programme. CPRR also recognises the importance of relevant laws and regulations, and aims to drive more effective international humanitarian relief, disaster risk management and recovery, through the strengthening of legal and regulatory frameworks.

Achievements to date against expected results are shown in Table 3.8 below:

Table 3.8: Community preparedness and risk reduction

Objectives/Results	Indicator	Achievement
Outcome 8 Communities' resilience to disasters is protected	% of target communities that have in place measures for safety against local disaster and epidemic hazards	CBHFA/CBDP, DRR, LLH CLMP data collection ongoing
Output 8.1 Risk reduction measures are incorporated in disaster recovery programmes	Number of people reached with information on community-based risk reduction	All projects/sectors contributing
Output 8.2 People from target barangays across 5 chapters are trained as first responders	Number of people trained in community-based disaster response	DRR – target 15 communities – data collection ongoing
Output 8.3 Community-based multi-	Number of community-based contingency plans in target	DRR – target 15 communities – Data

²⁰ With no legal status in the Philippines IFRC has had limited scope to support PRC in this task.

hazard contingency plans are developed and pre-tested	communities	collection ongoing
Output 8.4 Legal frameworks for disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response are strengthened	Number of persons (including legislators) and communities reached with an awareness of the legal framework for disaster preparedness, response and/or risk reduction	Data collection ongoing

The RoPA design contains strong intent regarding embedding community-based risk reduction within programme activities, and earlier sections of this report (3.1 - 3.7) contain a number of illustrations and examples of how the various recovery interventions are orientated to building community resilience. At this stage it is a little too early to judge how these have contributed to building community resilience 'towards future disasters', but it is fair to say that individuals, households and communities will have a higher resiliency level resulting from the skills, knowledge and support received through the Operation.

One of the standout successes is clearly the RC 143 programme: this is key to community preparedness and risk reduction and represents a highly effective mechanism for building community resilience in a sustainable way.²¹ The fact that RC 143 are grounded in PRC's Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM) Framework is a noteworthy example of good practice in building a resilient and safe community. The Framework shows PRC's priorities for risk reduction and response, and identifies the organisation of RC 143 as a key platform for community preparedness and disaster reduction through community, school and work.

The DRRM Framework also aims to mitigate identified risk through developing climate and ecosystem smart DRR plans; and, through structural and non-structural mitigation projects. But these are significant responsibilities and tasks for volunteers and chapters, and consideration needs to be given to how this is resourced beyond Haiyan. Specifically, there is need for strategies that:

- Target vulnerable municipalities with a RC 143 network fully trained in standard disaster risk management.
- Detail the development of volunteers, volunteer management, and a volunteer plan aligned with community action plans.

In terms of regulatory and legal frameworks, the Philippines DRRM Act²² and 5% calamity fund²³ represents an opportunity for PRC to drive more effective DRM at national level and secure sustainability of DRRM activities. The various regulatory and legal frameworks provide the NS with excellent opportunity to leverage sustainability, visibility, fundraising, advocacy, and promotion at both national and community level; the latter specifically through RC 143 trainings and community awareness raising.

While the DRRM and DM Development aspects of programme were late to start compared to other recovery efforts, progress is now being made.²⁴ Some notable steps include: IFRC community-based DRM proposal scoping exercises carried out in selected areas; pre- disaster meeting planned for Q3 2015; initiatives to build capacity in Disaster Law; and the Regional Resilience Initiative in the Philippines - an ongoing three-year initiative 2014-2016 with PRC one of the 11 participating regional NS. Positively, the

²¹ Approximately 7-12 people in each BRC are earmarked to join a 143 Network.

²² DRRM Act RA No. 10121.

²³ Note: 5% of the LGU's revenue is the DRRM Fund (formerly the 'calamity fund'), with 70% of this geared for preparedness and risk reduction, and the remaining 30% for quick response.

²⁴ It was reported that initial Operation focus was on *response* rather than future needs.

review was able to establish that both PNS and IFRC are committed to continuing DRRM support post-Operation.

The next section of the report addresses the remaining key review inquiry areas as detailed in the ToR.

4. Key review inquiry areas

4.1. Relevance and appropriateness in delivering assistance based on needs and context

This section considers whether the intervention has been suited to the priorities of the various target groups (relevance) and the extent it has been tailored to local needs and context (appropriateness). Consideration is also given to the extent to which the recovery response has reached all the population groups in need (coverage), and the validity of the intervention design.

The principal mechanism used to determine initial needs and context was the PRC led Haiyan initial recovery assessment undertaken in January 2014. A recovery assessment team (RAT) was established, consisting of 25 members from PRC, IFRC and six Partner National Societies.²⁵ The objectives for the RAT were to: identify geographical and vulnerability targets and gaps; identify response options based on people's needs and preferences; and, ascertain chapter capacity, community capacity and current Movement ways of working with communities.

Following Movement-wide consultations, the RAT focused on Panay, Leyte, Cebu and Palawan, selecting barangays²⁶ for detailed assessment using criteria that included: damage from the typhoon; socio-economic factors; IASC Cluster information; and prior locations of PRC relief distributions. Secondary data analysed included reports from IFRC field assessment and coordination team (FACT), IFRC emergency response units (ERUs), PRC, Philippines Government, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Clusters, and broader humanitarian community. The barangay recovery committees were an ongoing source of information to clarify needs and priorities in the community, and there were opportunities for communities to identify their own needs. The process appears to have been participatory, transparent, and used best available evidence at the time to make informed decisions about reaching population groups in need.

The recovery needs assessment identified shelter and livelihoods as priority community needs, with a serious threat to health and wellbeing resulting from poor water access, poor sanitation, and damaged health infrastructure.²⁷ Six field reports were produced (variously dated February, March and April 2014) as a result of the assessments, which set out recovery needs in detail, resulting in recommendations for interventions being included in the RPoA.

²⁵ Bringing expertise in six technical sectors: shelter, water and sanitation, health, economic recovery and livelihoods, organisational development and logistics.

²⁶ Communities assessed included island, coastal, inland and upland geographic localities, as well as urban, peri-urban and rural settings.

²⁷ Water and sanitation and health issues existed prior to Haiyan. The recovery phase was an opportunity to build back safer and improve the long-term health and wellbeing in the community and reduce risks to future disaster.

The allocation of target areas entailed close coordination with government. During the relief phase and moving into early recovery, geographical locations were allocated through mechanisms such as the Shelter Cluster. PRC coordinated with Movement partners to allocate geographical areas. Red Cross criteria for beneficiary selection supported impartial humanitarian action and the inclusion of vulnerable populations. Complaints from beneficiaries about their eligibility or assistance received have resulted in the establishment of a stronger focus on beneficiary communications within PRC.

The process for selecting shelter beneficiaries entailed community participation, with the BRC's playing a crucial role in social mapping and identifying priority beneficiaries. This approach was transparent, rigorous and community-driven (it was important that the same process was used for livelihoods interventions). Community members were given opportunities to provide feedback about the selection decisions and PRC had verification processes in place (all core shelter beneficiaries and a sample of shelter repair assistance beneficiaries).

The review team found the approach adopted by the Operation ensured that the:

- Subsequent design of the RPoA - in terms of logic and coherence - was well informed by the assessment process and is thus valid and appropriate to the Operation's overall goals.
- Priorities of the target group would be met through the intervention.
- Intervention was tailored to local needs and contexts, accounting as best as possible for interventions from other actors, and economic, social and political considerations.

There was no evidence of locations or populations in need being excluded from the response.

4.2. Extent to which the response has achieved its intended results

This section considers the extent to which the response has achieved its intended results in a timely, efficient and effective manner.

PRC with support from IFRC and PNS was able to deliver one of the swiftest and largest relief operations ever managed. Movement coordination has been strong; the coordination mechanisms within MWOFF have been successful; the IFRC implementation role has added value to resourcing and delivery of Movement targets; and with some 14 months to go, the Operation is working on the transition from recovery. Significantly, stakeholder satisfaction with the Operation is high. With many expected results already secured as evidenced in Sections 3.1 to 3.8, along with the Operation's management view that most remaining outputs will be secured early²⁸, the review concludes that the Operation is 'well positioned' to achieving its intended results in a timely and effective manner (subject to addressing the current funding gaps identified earlier in this report and below).

It should be noted that early in the Operation IFRC advised on the establishment of an interim indirect cost recovery rate that is being applied across the Operation²⁹, but this was not based on a detailed analysis of real costs. However, as PRC does not share its financial statements publicly it has not been possible to view how the revenue secured through the indirect recovery of costs has been utilised. A significant sum is involved here considering that the various sector programmes also cover operational costs such as PRC

²⁸ Estimates suggest July 2016.

²⁹ Six percent (6%) for international procurement and 2% for local procurement.

staff, vehicles and others. Add to this that at least 10% of funds mobilised are allocated for NS capacity development and risk reduction, the funds that remain for direct assistance become quickly 'eaten'. Ultimately, PRC receive significant funds and more transparency and accountability is necessary. Such a situation means determining the extent to which results have been delivered in the least costly manner somewhat problematic.³⁰

At the time of writing the Appeal is some 14% underfunded, and this makes the 'efficiency' of the Operation less easy to determine. The funding gap significantly impedes the completion of shelter, livelihoods, health and water and sanitation interventions. Based on the latest budget revision and the results of the fund raising initiative, the review understands that the Operation will now reconsider targets.

4.3. Response impact at community level

This section gives consideration to the extent the response has had a positive impact at the community level. It should be stated, however, that assessing the true impact of interventions on local capacities, including the social, economic, technical, and environmental effect on individuals, groups, communities and institutions is a longitudinal process, and the review is only able to make some tentative, generalised findings in this regard.

The review team heard many examples of initial positive impact at community level that indicate significant achievements are likely to be secured by final evaluation stage. Importantly, the Operation has enabled the community to 'get back on its feet', notably contributing to community/social cohesion by providing affected populations with livelihood, shelter, health, and water and sanitation solutions. By way of a specific example, one female head of household reported that the ELRP grant had helped her expand her catering business and as a result she now employs three people and is able to pay her son's school fees. The significance in this example is how wide ranging the impact has been – it not only illustrates that a beneficiary family has continued with a livelihood, but also indicates that other community members are benefiting through employment opportunities: crucially, there is a positive impact on future generations through continuing education. The review found many such similar cases. Positive impact is also taking place in technical and environmental areas, with communities being given opportunities to increase resiliency to disasters through community preparedness and DRR initiatives funded through the ELRP Phase III.

It is not possible to speculate what would have happened to target communities without the Operation's intervention; and it is not possible yet to determine attribution by looking at comparative approaches/other theory-based methods that require in-depth case studies. However, given the many comments from beneficiaries as to how the Operation has helped them, the review concludes that the response has had a highly positive *initial* impact at community level and this is likely to become more pronounced as time progresses.

4.4. Options for a National Society organisational development strategy

This section considers options for the formulation of a National Society organisational development strategy drawing on the lessons learned from the Operation.

³⁰ Another significant factor that impacts on efficiency (from a cost-effectiveness perspective) relates to some Movement partners not following agreed logistics procedures and thus adding to the resource pressure/cost of the relief operation.

PRC recognises that the frequency and intensity of disasters is likely to increase and is committed to an organisational review of its DRRM system. A working group has been established to manage the review, co-chaired by PRC and Canadian Red Cross, with participation from IFRC, ICRC and PNS. It is anticipated that the review outcomes will inform Movement support to DRRM capacity development within the Operation more widely. The working group has also recommended that a holistic organisational review take place, covering the PRC's wider structures, systems and processes.³¹ This is sensible and timely. Both reviews represent opportunities to inform PRC's next strategic plan (the current plan expires in 2015) and annual operation plans and budgets.

As IFRC has a key role in supporting PRC in preparing for and implementing these reviews, there is opportunity to approach NS OD needs in a way that builds directly on the learning from this review.³² This is important for two reasons. First, IFRC has a preference for the Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification (OCAC) tool to develop OD strategy, which needs to be offset *alongside* the PRC Chairman's reticence to use OCAC. The principal problem here is that PRC leadership feels insufficiently consulted over the use of OCAC (and may not be convinced of participatory approaches to identifying the NS' strengths and weaknesses). Second, the methodology³³ proposed by IFRC to progress PRC's OD needs draws heavily on self-assessment - principally OCAC. There is need to think more creatively about OD processes, factor in the learning from this and other reviews, and draw on other best practice approaches that exist elsewhere: OCAC might not be the best tool for this important exercise. Consequently, the engagement strategy with PRC on OD needs to be reconsidered (see below).

An important factor in this discussion is the PRC Chairman's acknowledgment that one of the greatest challenges to the NS' ongoing development is its own "bureaucracy". This acknowledgement is significant and a key step in addressing inefficiencies.³⁴ The challenge now is to support leadership to introduce change in a way that both is both non-threatening and demonstrable of the tangible benefits it can bring. In this regard, and drawing on existing OD initiatives already underway (or in consideration), the review team suggest there is opportunity to undertake a holistic organisational review and analysis in the following combined way.

First, senior IFRC Regional Office personnel need to strategically 're-engage' with PRC leadership on the OD agenda. Within this dialogue process, IFRC should determine what PRC leadership see as the primary institutional barriers to NS development. Following this, a separate organisational diagnosis/analysis should be commissioned to explore key 'headline' issues further e.g. the meaning of 'bureaucracy' as seen through the leadership lens. The approach should be framed by a change strategy³⁵ to ensure the required improvement areas are not rebutted by leadership or blamed on other actors. A subsequent change/OD strategy should be developed that draws substantively on change modelling approaches and begins with supporting the NS leadership to create both a long-term OD vision (beyond the RC 143 narrative) and an organisational climate for change. This will require strong 'communication' on IFRC's part, and will need to be

³¹ It is anticipated that the review will inform the future development of PRC's leadership, governance, strategic relationships, internal operations and overall management functions.

³² And other reviews of previous operations, including by other Movement partners and PRC's non-Movement partners.

³³ Draft IFRC consultant ToR to facilitate PRC's OD process.

³⁴ It is believed PRC has commissioned a review of internal processes, which is encouraging. However, results have not been shared with partners.

³⁵ See for example: <http://www.kotterinternational.com/the-8-step-process-for-leading-change/>

grounded in every aspect of the change strategy. Tact and strategizing on IFRC's part will be required, but the final outcome will be richer for the investment.

Second, the many lessons learned throughout this and other reviews should be able to be addressed without contention once the 'headline' issues have been singled out for leadership resolution. The most practical way forward would be to hold a comprehensive learning/OD workshop that has the purpose of translating this review learning into an actionable plan (with support provided by other Movement partners as required).

Third, there is opportunity to work on other multiple OD fronts while the initiative with leadership is developing traction. The DRRM organisational review presents an opportunity for this, and other entry points for OD analysis such as the Branch Organisational Capacity Assessment (BOCA) could be useful while the use of OCAC is reconsidered or reframed.³⁶

4.5. Impact of Typhoon Haiyan response on other operations and longer-term programmes

The evaluation considered the impact of Typhoon Haiyan response on other operations and longer-term programmes. The capacity of current PRC and IFRC structures to deliver the remaining recovery assistance effectively is also considered.

Important to note is that PRC had four other emergency operations underway when Haiyan struck, with Typhoon Ruby arriving in the midst of the Operation. The IFRC Philippines Annual Report 2014 reports on PRC's disaster management planning and highlights the ability of NS to anticipate and plan for disasters and mitigate their impact on vulnerable communities. The report concluded that the NS developed contingency and readiness plans that effectively responded to various disasters that affected the country in 2014, "... with minimal disruption to other ongoing operations".

However, this review has identified some impact on other NS operational areas. First, while having a 'stand-alone' Haiyan team was important for achieving the ambitious implementation targets; one consequence is that capacity developed during the Operation has not 'flowed' to other PRC programming areas (this has been covered earlier in the report). Second, it was reported that the Operation has been very resource intensive, with PRC consistently over stretched in terms of staff, volunteers, coordination and, in particular, administration functions e.g. logistics, procurement, human resources, finance:³⁷ the negative impact of which is well established. A key issue to note is that the Haiyan team receive higher salaries than other PRC staff, which has created a NS wage imbalance. It remains to be seen what impact will result when the Haiyan Task Force/team is disbanded and staff are required to revert to their usual, lower, salaries: the danger being that some staff may move to better-paying agencies.

Third, it is possible that future emergencies will not generate the same level of funds as for this Operation, so not all elements of the response may be 'replicable' next time. Careful consideration needs to be given to how resourcing expectations can be managed especially at chapter and RC 143 level.

³⁶ A wider Branch Development framework could prioritise the most vulnerable parts of the country for capacity building, based on average disaster and longer-term humanitarian challenges across the country. The Resource Management System introduced in 2012 could be especially useful for this exercise, and should be revived if not in use.

³⁷ PRC will need to address how ongoing shelter and livelihoods staff, volunteers and programmes will be retained.

For IFRC, the positive impact is that individual staff have carried lessons from the Operation into the Nepal Earthquake response. The challenge now is to institutionalise these lessons, so it becomes a 'way of working' rather than being dependent on individual knowledge.

All interviewees (from both IFRC and PRC) consulted on the Operation's ability to deliver the remaining recovery assistance effectively expressed confidence in being able to deliver on this commitment: the assertion that expected results will be secured early being offered as the best evidence for this. The review team established no evidence to the contrary, subject to: known funding gaps being met; improvement in select PRC procedures (namely procurement); and development of a formalised exit strategy.³⁸

4.6. Integrating institutional preparedness/capacity development and community preparedness/risk reduction components with longer-term programmes

For PRC to effectively integrate institutional preparedness/capacity development and community preparedness/risk reduction components with longer-term programmes, the NS needs to take action on several fronts. First, there is a need to retain as much Operation capacity (particularly human capacity) as possible within PRC's existing structures. Some steps have been taken towards this transition, including the consolidated mapping of capacity building needs from the ten Haiyan chapters (an exercise that needs to be extended to other chapters). The mapping includes some limited commitments from Movement partners against specific needs, however, does not yet show PRC contributions and is heavily skewed towards provision and upgrading of material capacity.

Second, while steps are also being taken to strengthen and build RC 143, thus anchoring institutional preparedness/capacity development and community preparedness/risk reduction components around vulnerable communities; a proper strategy is required and resources will be necessary to achieve this goal.

Third, while PRC has substantial experience in disaster response, there is a need to consolidate this knowledge and experience into concrete disaster preparedness and response plans. Comprehensive contingency plans therefore need to be developed and tested on a regular basis, and response targets should consider PRC mandates and capacity as well as wider Movement support.

Fourth, it is understood that IFRC has developed a case study of how PRC transitioned volunteers into paid staff and then successfully back into volunteers again through a clearly managed human resource process. This approach should be further institutionalised in PRC. Furthermore, recognising the important part volunteers play in PRC's community level life is key to strengthening youth membership and volunteering in its most gendered and diverse way, which would also successfully transition youth into adult members and volunteers for the betterment of the NS.

The review team found that in 'protecting' chapters from the pressures of the Operation (as highlighted earlier), a significant opportunity has been missed in moving toward integrating institutional preparedness and community preparedness/risk reduction components into longer-term programmes. A more engaged approach with chapters would have leveraged their capacities to: (a) support the Operation more effectively, (b) build chapter capacity in relief, response and recovery skills, (c) improve links to PRC's

³⁸ The review understands that a formal exit strategy, that considers the transitioning of Operation staff, is in the process of development. This process should be completed as quickly as possible.

strategic/annual plans and respective budgets; and (d) engaged PNS that more directly support chapters to facilitate the integration of relevant Haiyan activities into longer-term service delivery.³⁹

4.7. Programme management, quality and accountability, integration and other cross-cutting measures

4.7.1. Programme management and quality assurance

As discussed earlier, a separate Haiyan Team was established with responsibility for overseeing programme management, response coordination, reporting and monitoring; and with broad agreement that this separate structure has been effective in enabling PRC to deliver on its stated Operation targets, the review concludes that programme management for the Operation has been largely effective.

In terms of quality assurance, the sector-specific frameworks and guidelines developed through mechanisms such as the TWGs support a consistent and standardised approach to implementation within the various sectors. Following established sector guidelines, Red Cross volunteers monitor the progress of interventions and the quality of services provided, together with the PRC Haiyan team and with the guidance of IFRC's technical delegates. Feedback from findings is progressively incorporated and adjustments made in implementation of activities to ensure a continuous quality delivery of services. Overall the combined role of programme management and TWGs, along with the development of sector guidelines has ensured a very high quality standard throughout Operation.

The Operation's PMER function is considered effective. Many of the reports reviewed were of high quality, informative and well articulated. There are some areas that require 'tightening' e.g. ensuring consistency of figures in various 'living' reports, but given the scale of the Operation and the multiple sector inputs, PMER aspects are overall undertaken very well.

What is required now is a stronger PMER focus on the expected RPoA results (outputs, targets, indicators) to ensure the fullest data is available at time of final evaluation. In addition, there is a need to strengthen monitoring tools related to collecting sex, age and diversity disaggregated data (see Section 4.7.4 for further detail). IFRC acknowledge this is one of the weaker PMER areas, and that there has not been adequate disaggregation of data/figures by gender in reports. It is important that at the end of the response a clear breakdown of the people reached – by gender and age, as well as other aspects such as people with disabilities, child-led households etc. is available.

4.7.2. Beneficiary communications, community engagement and accountability

Most of the communication with beneficiaries has been undertaken through face-to-face contact via PRC staff, volunteers and the BRCs. PRC staff report that BRCs have been an important tool for community engagement, as they are direct community representatives and thus ensure 'community ownership' of the selection process. Some community members reported that they felt well informed about PRC activities, mainly through attending community meetings and there were processes in place for communities to give feedback about selection processes. However, there were some reports that people were not clear about their ineligibility for relief assistance.

³⁹ The limited engagement of chapters is more pronounced in the class C and D chapters.

The RPoA outlined a commitment to put in place mechanisms to capture beneficiary feedback, which would then link to relevant programme sectors for follow up. The system was only established in January 2015 largely as a response to beneficiaries communicating directly with PRC leadership (often via social media); following which guidelines were developed regarding beneficiary communications, community engagement and beneficiary accountability; with steps now in place to formally deal with grievances.

The review team found little evidence of the Operation using social media or other media (e.g. newspapers or radio) to communicate with beneficiaries. To strengthen this approach, beneficiary communication strategies need to be formalised from the start of the project. The new guidelines under development will be an important tool for ensuring a consistent approach in future PRC operations.

4.7.3. Integration

The Operation aimed to adopt an integrated approach to recovery programming, guided by 'one plan, one team, and one operation model' with the intention being that sectors would work in close partnership to coordinate activities within communities.⁴⁰ It has been suggested that more flexibility in the 'One Plan' approach would have increased responsiveness to community needs, supported innovation, and ensured that partner expertise was more fully brought to bear in support of affected communities.

The review established some positive examples of practice than can be built on for future integration aspirations. PRC staff at HQ and field levels worked closely together across sectors and were familiar with other sector programmes. But the approach was more akin to 'parallel programming' with the different sectors working alongside each other (to varying degrees of effectiveness) rather than in fully connected ways. Nonetheless, within this modality there were elements of effective integration, such as the way shelter and livelihoods programmes used the same selection processes and same BRCs; and the way in which core shelter incorporated WatSan hardware.

In practice, however, each sector conducted its work separately and this missed opportunities to share resources and consolidate work more effectively. There was little integration between Health and WatSan activities, even though they shared common goals regarding changes to health behaviours. There was some integration of DRRM awareness and community resilience programming within the shelter activities: but better integration would have added value to the community's understanding of the role of shelter in disaster preparedness and risk mitigation. Each sector also had its own 'software', so in communities where multiple sectors were working there may have been expectations to participate in hygiene awareness, CBHFA, CHAST, shelter orientation and upcoming DRRM awareness. The CBHFA and DRR prevention work does not respond to an immediate need causing these aspects to be poorly integrated within the rest of the Operation in the early stages.

Effective programme integration is difficult in the best of circumstances, and given the rapidly evolving nature of the Operation, aiming for full integration may have been ambitious. To strengthen integration, software tools need to be consolidated, and common themes across the various training/awareness activities need to be identified leading to opportunities for sectors to jointly deliver components. This will reduce the demand on community participation and also better illustrate the interconnections between sectors.

⁴⁰ Not necessarily that all interventions would be provided to all beneficiaries in all communities.

This will also require that software elements are closely linked with hardware, and afforded sufficient priority in terms of resourcing and delivery timeframes.

4.7.4. Gender, diversity and child protection

The MWOFF places high priority on addressing gender, diversity and violence-prevention issues throughout all aspects of the Operation. This commitment was primarily reflected in the beneficiary selection processes for livelihoods and shelter interventions, which targeted women-headed households, households with pregnant or lactating women, households with people with disabilities and individuals with special needs.

During the emergency relief phase, the Operation developed strategies to monitor community violence and promote violence prevention messaging through CBHFA training (in which gender, diversity and child protection are key components). Child-headed households and households where orphaned children were living with families were identified as priorities for shelter interventions. The WatSan programme specifically targeted children through infrastructure development in schools and through CHAST.

While selection criteria recognised the importance of people with special needs, the interventions did not always offer sufficient flexibility in meeting those requirements. For example, some ELRP participants did not meet criteria to receive the second tranche of funds because they had spent the first tranche on medicines or urgent food needs; and some core shelter recipients indicated that special needs for elderly family members of those with disabilities were not always fully accounted for. There was some/limited available sex disaggregated data to support analysis participation and social impact outcomes according to gender and diversity, but the review established that health programmes tended to attract female volunteers, with DRRM programmes tending to attract male volunteers.

To further strengthen gender, diversity and child protection, interventions need flexibility to respond to people with diverse needs. Monitoring tools need to collect sex, age and diversity disaggregated data. And there should be long-term monitoring of the social impacts of interventions to determine the extent to which gender and diversity have been sufficiently considered.

4.8. IFRC coordination with other Movement partners supporting PRC during the Operation

This section considers IFRC coordination - in recovery programming - with the ICRC and PNS supporting the PRC Typhoon Haiyan response.

Interviewees ranked Movement coordination highly, highlighting a number of success factors beginning with the PRC, IFRC, ICRC preparedness meeting that established the foundations for the Joint Statement⁴¹, which set the tone for effective coordination. The Haiyan Summit further galvanised support for the 'one plan, one team, one operation' model and for a common Movement public voice.

PRC's strong leadership ensured partners worked in line with agreed coordination mechanisms and operational priorities. IFRC's decision to play a supporting role in coordination was well judged and broadly consistent with PRC's capacities⁴² and IFRC's mandate. IFRC played an important role as an "honest broker", supporting PRC to

⁴¹ *Red Cross Red Crescent Movement Response to Humanitarian Needs after Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)* issued by PRC, IFRC and ICRC in November 2013.

⁴² See Section 4.2 for qualifying remarks.

prepare Movement coordination meetings by canvassing opinions on issues ahead of meetings, supporting documentation and other activities. The clear channel for coordination through the dedicated Movement coordination roles within PRC and IFRC has worked well.

The highest level of coordination under the MWOFF, the Movement Platform Group, rarely met and was frequently substituted by PRC/IFRC and PRC/ICRC bilateral discussions (a reportedly effective alternative in the Haiyan context). Based on lessons from previous operations, PRC made a considerable investment in establishing and managing TWGs with strong support from IFRC and PNS. TWGs have been one of the highlights of the Operation in terms of their positive impact on coordination, sector outcomes and the institutionalisation of learning, with many interviewees recommending that TWGs continue beyond the Operation.

It has been suggested that partners with lower levels of resources should have contributed to PRC, IFRC or ICRC operations rather than establishing their own structures. This would have reduced duplication and support costs, and lessened the pressure on PRC systems. The large numbers of partners combined with PRC's lengthy processes impacted on the efficiency of logistics, financial and human resource management and in turn on the implementation rate of some activities. Some partners did not spend enough time inducting their delegates, which resulted in avoidable resistance to agreed approaches and processes.

4.9. Application of RCRC Fundamental Principles in the Operation

This section gives consideration to the recovery interventions have adhered to the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality – as well as the Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance.

It is clear that the Operation has reduced suffering and vulnerability and improved people's well-being. Communities have been involved in decision-making and engaged in managing their own recovery. During the relief phase, the Movement found that women and children were particularly vulnerable to violence, including sexual and physical violence. In response, the Operation integrated violence prevention, mitigation and response into community outreach activities.

The community volunteers in barangay recovery and livelihoods committees, with whom the review team met, reflected the social composition of communities. PRC maintained its autonomy through needs based decision making against objective criteria. The review found evidence of PRC validating government provided beneficiary lists (more effective during recovery than the early response phase). NS neutrality was raised by some interviewees; suggesting a blurred line between RCRC work and political campaigning. PRC also needs to be mindful of the use of military assets and relationship with military bodies during operations. Here, there needs to be clear guidance about Movement perspectives on this in DRM plans.

The Operation involved up to a 25 fold increase in active voluntary service in operational areas. More than 8,000 volunteers have contributed their time. Many Haiyan staff were employed from PRC's volunteer base. The time commitment and professionalism of volunteers has been high. Many recipients of assistance have become volunteers, strengthening their own resilience and that of communities through the skills and confidence they have gained.

The review team heard many positive comments about the unity of the Movement in the Operation - in great part due to PRC's strong leadership – meaning adherence to the Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance was applied. The pre-Haiyan PRC/IFRC/ICRC MoU supported a more fluid application of roles and responsibilities and the MWOFF ensured strong adherence to common goals, targets and approaches including on visibility. Some interviewees felt that IFRC could have done more to support PRC's coordination efforts referring to fragmented negotiations and decision-making between PRC and partners, resulting in inefficient use of some operational resources.

There was enormous solidarity from the global network and PRC was very open to partnership. This solidarity and openness to cooperation have resulted in strengthening the reach of the operation and in significant learning across multiple Movement actors.

5. Conclusion

The review concludes that to date, the IFRC support to the Typhoon Haiyan Response Operation in the Philippines has been a success. Both the relief and recovery phases have been relevant, appropriate and effective with significant sector results secured early and in full accordance with the intervention design. The Recovery Plan of Action, in terms of logic and coherence, has been a valid and appropriate approach to securing the Operation's overall goals. The priorities of target groups have been largely met or are in the process of being met, with coverage being of significant scale, fair, transparent, and tailored to account for local needs and contexts. The vast majority of stakeholders and beneficiaries interviewed for the review expressed high satisfaction with the Operation's response and support, which once concluded, is likely to have a highly positive impact at community level.

It is inspiring to see a National Society led operation that has 'challenged' IFRC's traditional coordination role, and it is also encouraging that with some 14 months to go, PRC and Movement partners are already working on the transition from recovery. Importantly for the Movement, there has been enormous solidarity from the global network enabled by PRC being very open to partnership. This solidarity and openness to cooperation has resulted in strengthening the success and reach of the Operation, and in generating significant learning across multiple Movement actors.

There have been limitations in the Operation, mostly arising through challenges in sourcing materials and bureaucratic decision-making protocols which have delayed implementation of some activities, but given the overall context and scale in which the Operation has taken place, these can be considered 'opportunities for future improvement' rather than operational failings: if, that is, they are resolved speedily and in readiness for future operations. There are also some challenges ahead, particularly in relation to the way the Operation effectively transitions/exits, but given Movement commitment and the skilled human resources available to support this process these issues should be easily resolved.

Important to acknowledge in concluding this report is the dedication and professionalism of volunteers and staff from the NS, IFRC and supporting PNS that has contributed to the Operation's success, complemented by strong and effective NS leadership. For PRC, this has resulted in enhanced stakeholder recognition and appreciation. The NS has rightly earned the reputation of an organisation that is able to deliver emergency relief and recovery operations at enormous scale; and the IFRC should be acknowledged for its

professional implementation role that has contributed significantly to resourcing and delivery of Movement targets.

6. Lessons learned

One of the biggest 'learnings' from this review relates to how IFRC has acted on learning and recommendations from previous IFRC-supported operations (from 2009 onwards, including the 2014 RTE). Of the ten reports made available to the review team, only two contained management responses (related to 2009-2010 typhoons and the 2014 RTE). Where management responses exist, learning appears to have been enacted. For example, the 2009-2010 recommendation to consider 'cash transfers as a beneficiary support modality' has clearly been enacted. The evidence from this Operation indicates that when learning is formalised or made 'tangible' through management responses, recommendations and learning have a greater chance of being implemented. Without a management response, it becomes difficult to illustrate how learning has been 'consciously' implemented.

In terms of enacting recommendations from the 2014 RTE, the management response contains a 'comments' section that indicated level of progress as of May 2014. Many recommendations, however, are longitudinal in nature and 'ongoing', with some likely only to be realised post-Operation (or near the end). Many of those interviewed felt it was still too early to say whether any further progress has been made since May.

The lesson here is that without a management response or similar process to a review or evaluation, the application of learning becomes ad hoc and unsystematic.⁴³ This makes learning less tangible and more difficult to follow-up. The process of learning needs to be systemised and not left to one-off events: determining how recommendations have been implemented needs to be an ongoing management function rather than left to reviews or evaluations to establish.

Many lessons learned are covered elsewhere in this report: the further selection below is considered useful to the review.

- The IFRC Zone Office needs to better understand its learning processes, and how it acts on recommendations and lessons from evaluations/reviews. The creation of a 'learning unit' within the IFRC Zone Office (perhaps overseen by PMER and OD) could greatly facilitate this process.
- Given the scale and size of the Operation, particularly the relief phase, it would have been better to undertake separate reviews for both relief *and* recovery. In the parameters of this review, it has not been possible to do justice to the scale and achievements of the relief phase.
- It is important to strategize and monitor the impact of ongoing nature of social and long-term interventions. For example, PRC has an opportunity to continue working with government to achieve a more consistent approach to supporting landless families and those that rent.

⁴³ If joint partner management responses are too problematic to compile, IFRC should consider developing their own versions.

- There were missed opportunities to address water supply issues in some communities. It is important to consider water solutions in close collaboration with those who have a responsibility for supply much earlier in the intervention.
- There has been substantial development of skills amongst PRC staff and volunteers and it is important to retain this capacity rather than rebuilding it each time a disaster happens.
- Involve Movement partners as early as possible in future operations. For example, engaging PNS' in identifying gaps/need etc. could enhance understanding of relief/recovery needs and result in an adjustment of expectations and commitment towards Movement coordination. A better discussion by PRC/IFRC on the application of Global Tools during non-disaster periods could have resulted in a quicker and more effective response.
- The time provided by volunteers represents a major economic contribution to the operation, which is not captured in the Movement-wide Reporting. This needs to be reconsidered.⁴⁴
- Disasters are traumatic experiences, and staff and volunteers are not immune to this trauma. Better support systems need to be put in place.
- While PRC understands the importance of volunteers and their value to communities, a more tailored recognition system is required. The newly established resource mobilisation system may be an opportunity to do this.

7. Recommendations

This section details the main recommendations stemming from the review findings. Recommendations are grouped by sector but should be considered cross cutting in nature.

7.1. Relief

- 7.1.1. IFRC should determine the existing capacity and structure of a NS before deployment of global response tools. This review would enhance effectiveness by ensuring global tools account for NS capacities. The 2007 Movement Coordination guidelines and toolbox should be updated to account for the coordination mechanisms, tools and approaches developed and refined through Haiyan.
- 7.1.2. If local market conditions permit, cash grants should be increased to enable beneficiaries to purchase NFIs directly from local suppliers. This will likely enable the local economy to recover more quickly, the benefits of which should spin-off to affected communities. If local market conditions do not provide opportunities for the rapid purchase of NFIs, based on 'speed of procurement' judgements, future Operations should consider distributing products *with* cash grants.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ It is understood that a case study has been developed to demonstrate the economic value of volunteers in PRC's core programming, but this has not yet been explored for the Haiyan Operation.

⁴⁵ The review notes that the Operation does not work in isolation to other organisations, and that the Government and cluster do have recommendations for cash grants. The shelter relief assistance impact evaluation and desk study will aid decision making here.

- 7.1.3. In preparation for disaster, chapters should pre-position NFIs stocks and pre-establish agreements with local suppliers (through the chapters, as per the Capiz Chapter model).
- 7.1.4. Given that PRC will likely continue to rely on military assets to ensure relief supplies reach areas where they are needed, it may be appropriate to guide the NS on the civil-military relations agenda. It is understood that initiatives by the IFRC Asia Pacific Office are already underway (guidelines under preparations, focal person appointed) and it is time to move this process forward.

7.2. Shelter

- 7.2.1. There should be a more *prominent* shelter role within PRC's current organisation structure, perhaps in the form of a Shelter Unit. Such a unit could establish links with local universities and other actors to develop various models suited for the different parts of the nation; as well as draw on the good shelter practice developed over the years by PNS operating in the region. The unit would also ensure that strategic, long-term shelter recommendations from this review are implemented. The resourcing of such a role will be an important consideration for PRC.
- 7.2.2. Give stronger consideration to providing water solutions in the initial design of shelters. There is possibility for linking this initiative to owner-driven cash grants.

7.3. Livelihoods

- 7.3.1. Ensure livelihood beneficiaries are supported with appropriate small business/enterprise training for their livelihood projects. This could be done in partnership with local training institutions and include establishing cooperatives, book keeping, risk management, effective marketing etc. as well as specific technical expertise in say livestock rearing.

7.4 WatSan

- 7.4.1. WatSan needs to be better integrated with the health sector, particularly in relation to the software components. There is no reason why health and Watsan cannot be a combined sector programme even if population sets are different.
- 7.4.2. Consider using owner-driven cash grants to promote household latrine provision in non-core shelter programme households i.e. for households that only receive shelter repair assistance. This would lead to the quicker roll out of safe water and sanitation solutions within the broader community.
- 7.4.3. Develop a more strategic approach to community WatSan provision in partnership with LGUs. PRC should commission chapters to lead/engage on this process, and produce community plans/maps illustrating existing/upcoming initiatives and known gaps.
- 7.4.4. Strategize how WatSan needs can be 'transitioned-on' from the recovery phase. For example, engaging in early consultation with PNS that have an interest in more development type programmes that incorporate WatSan and/or health components. This recommendation applies to all relevant sectors.

7.5. Health and care

- 7.5.1. Review how assessment criteria between programmes are harmonised to produce the most holistic view of community needs and priorities. The review team heard from field staff that more data could be incorporated to produce netter mapping. Using ODK and the health databases will greatly facilitate this process and ensure better harmonisation tool with other sector data collection tools such as VCA.
- 7.5.2. As 7.4.1. above.
- 7.5.3. Analyse the health capacity of chapters and ongoing needs and resource accordingly; based on this, develop a plan of action to incorporate the community health volunteers into RC 143.

7.6. National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development

- 7.6.1. Senior IFRC Regional Office personnel should strategically 're-engage' with PRC leadership on the OD agenda. A subsequent change/OD strategy should be developed that draws substantively on change modelling approaches and begins with supporting the NS leadership to create both a long-term OD vision (beyond the RC 143 narrative) and an organisational climate for change.
- 7.6.2. The many lessons learned throughout this and other reviews should be addressed in a comprehensive learning/OD workshop that has the purpose of translating this review learning into an actionable plan.
- 7.6.3. Engage chapters in transition planning at the earliest opportunity. This will allow PRC to capitalise on the reputation built during Haiyan as well as the capacities developed in terms of skills staff and volunteers. Class A and B chapters could apply lessons from their experiences and support transition activities in other chapters.
- 7.6.4. A national logistics capacity review focused on both hardware and systems and processes should be considered as part of the NS capacity development framework to take stock of the current status of logistics across PRC.
- 7.6.5. There is a need for better consideration of how transition strategies from relief to recovery are resourced and supported. At this stage in the recovery process, Movement coordination meetings should address both Haiyan and wider programming and partnering issues. This would support the transition from Haiyan to longer-term partnering and programming. This links to recommendation 7.4.4.
- 7.6.6. PRC need to consider how to effectively retain the talent and knowledge gained during the Haiyan operation. The NS needs to establish benefits that will discourage staff from leaving. Recognising the achievements of staff and providing more work-life balance will improve staff motivation between now and the end of the Operation (and will allow PRC to retain more talented staff).
- 7.6.7. Conduct a meta-analysis of learning and develop a process for institutionalising learning at national/chapter level. This MTR is one of several reviews undertaken by PRC in cooperation with its Movement partners. It is important that a meta-analysis of all learning is undertaken to consolidate findings and recommendations. Multiple reviews by multiple partners places pressure on the NS to engage in parallel learning processes. PRC should consider implementing more collaborative reviews with a group of partners so as to create synergy in learning and reduce the resources engaged in parallel processes.

- 7.6.8. IFRC should develop more participatory and inclusive approaches to reviews. Involving IFRC and PRC representatives in the review design and implementation would build stronger ownership and commitment to findings and recommendations. For Operations of this size/scale, separate reviews for relief and recovery should be considered.
- 7.6.9. Develop as soon as possible a clear written exit strategy for the Operation (for both IFRC and PRC).
- 7.6.10. Beneficiary communication strategies need to be formalised from the start of the Operation. The new guidelines will be an important tool for ensuring a consistent approach in future PRC operations.

7.7. Community preparedness and risk reduction

- 7.7.1. Develop a strategy and plan of action for how to maintain and support the volunteers recruited and trained in the barangays and incorporate them into the RC 143 network and link to Red Cross Action Teams.
- 7.7.2. PRC needs to step-up lobbying and promotion in relation to legal preparedness for international disaster relief (IDRL), law and risk reduction (DRR), and regulatory barriers to emergency shelter.
- 7.7.3. DRRM needs to be introduced much earlier in the recovery phase (there is good opportunity to learn from PNS how to effectively do this). Additional internal promotion regarding resilience/DRR/livelihoods among IFRC/PNSs/PRC/ICRC is required. The implementation of the DRR component for the Operation needs to take into account all assessments made in the earlier implementation phases: CBHFA, livelihoods, PHAST etc.
- 7.7.4. PRC should develop comprehensive contingency plans and test them on a regular basis. Response targets should consider PRC mandates and capacity as well as wider Movement support.

8. Annexes

Annex A – MTR Terms of Reference

Annex B – MTR Timeline

Annex C – Key informants

Annex D – Field schedule

FINAL

Annex A – MTR Terms of Reference

1. Summary

- 1.1. Purpose: The Mid-Term Review (MTR) will assess aspects of the IFRC-supported Typhoon Haiyan response operation in the Philippines to inform the ongoing and future support to the Philippine Red Cross (PRC) and partner operations at country, regional and global levels. Key recommendations from this evaluation will contribute to broader Red Cross Red Crescent learning, including making improvements/adjustments to ongoing or future interventions to better address needs in emergency, relief and recovery, taking into account long-term impact and sustainability.
- 1.2. Commissioner: This MTR has been commissioned by the Head of Operations, IFRC Asia Pacific Office, Kuala Lumpur, and will be directed by an evaluation management team (see section 5). The management group will oversee the conduct and quality of the evaluation.
- 1.3. Audience: Findings of this MTR will be used by the IFRC, PRC, and Movement partners to improve delivery in ongoing operations and to help plan future strategies and interventions.
- 1.4. Review team: An independent evaluation team leader (consultant) and six members comprising of one national (external) consultant, an external partner representative, members from two National Societies, and two members from the IFRC Secretariat.
- 1.5. Duration of consultancy: Up to 30 days (including approximately 15 days in the field)
- 1.6. Estimated dates of consultancy: Early July to Late August 2015
- 1.7. Location of consultancy: Philippines (Cebu, Leyte, Panay and Manila) and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

2. Background

On Friday, 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) tore through Central Philippines with an unprecedented fury — a combination of cyclonic winds (of more than 275 kph), heavy rains and tsunami-like storm surges. Described as one of the most powerful tropical cyclones ever, Haiyan caused colossal devastation. In its aftermath, more than 6,300 people had lost their lives while there was extensive destruction and damage to housing, livelihoods and infrastructure, leading to a drastic reduction in living conditions, income, and access to basic services. In all, more than 16 million people (some 3.4 million households) were affected, with more than 1 million houses destroyed or damaged.

A state of national calamity was declared by the President of the Philippines on 11 November 2013, signalling a request for and acceptance of international assistance. Subsequently, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) system-wide Level 3 emergency response (the highest category, requiring global mobilization and response) was formally activated. In response, local communities, the authorities, humanitarian actors, the civil society and corporate players mounted interventions in affected areas. Humanitarian actors — including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement family — mobilized/deployed maximum resources and launched operations of a scale that they had not mounted before in the Philippines in recent decades.

Now, some 18 months on, emergency and relief interventions have long been concluded and the response of the authorities and humanitarian partners — including those under the joint recovery programme of the Philippine Red Cross (PRC) and the International Federation of Red

Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) — is fully in the recovery phase. The IFRC Typhoon Haiyan Emergency Appeal operation consists of eight integrated sectors including relief, emergency shelter, shelter repair and rebuilding; livelihoods; water, sanitation and hygiene promotion; health; National Society institutional preparedness and capacity development; and, community preparedness and risk reduction. It focuses on the islands of Cebu, Leyte and Panay and is currently anticipated to be completed by 31 December 2016.

3. Evaluation purpose and scope

The IFRC is committed to quality assurance, standards and a culture of learning in its disaster response. The IFRC Framework for Evaluation requires that a Mid-Term Review (MTR) be undertaken for any programme over 24 months in timeframe. Being the midway through the IFRC Typhoon Haiyan Emergency Appeal operation timeframe, now is an opportune time to undertake the MTR, spanning both the emergency/relief and early recovery phases and drawing from the Real-Time Evaluation (RTE) conducted in early 2014.

Though recommendations of the RTE and evaluations of previous operations will be important building blocks, the MTR will be a learning-oriented and forward-looking evaluation. It will review what is working well and what requires improvement, and recommend how the improvements should be made, taking into consideration the context and capacities of Movement components. The evaluation will also suggest options on how organizational development and longer-term community preparedness/risk reduction programmes can be strengthened.

The MTR will also look at the measures put in place to enhance community engagement and accountability to beneficiaries, donors/partners and other stakeholders and provide suggestions for improvement. Attention will be given on the extent to which the response has considered and addressed the needs of vulnerable groups and in particular women, girls and boys and people living with a disability.

Taking into account recommendations of the RTE, the MTR will also look at IFRC coordination – in recovery programming – with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and National Societies supporting the PRC Typhoon Haiyan response through bilateral arrangements but will not pronounce on them. To this extent ICRC and concerned National Societies will be fully briefed on this MTR.

The evaluation will cover the period from when Typhoon Haiyan struck through to initial response, the relief interventions and recovery interventions until the time the evaluators collect the data. The evaluation shall take into account learnings – and pending action points – from evaluations of previous operations and the RTE as well as implementation and coordination of other operations that were ongoing at the same time. It shall note the impact of Typhoon Haiyan response on other operations and longer-term programmes.

4. Evaluation objectives, criteria and key questions

4.1. Objectives

The MTR has the following six objectives:

1. To determine the extent to which outputs and outcomes of interventions completed between the onset of the disaster until the time the evaluators collect the data have been achieved and how the delivery mechanism utilized facilitated their attainment;
2. To capture best practices, lessons learnt and gaps in recovery programming, and provide recommendations for improvements in ongoing or future interventions;

3. To review the application of programme management, quality and accountability, integration and cross-cutting measures and recommend how these can be strengthened;
4. To assess the capacity of current PRC and IFRC structures to deliver the remaining recovery assistance effectively and recommend how this capacity can be right-sized;
5. To assess how institutional preparedness/capacity development and community preparedness/risk reduction components can be integrated into the longer-term programmes and recommend a longer-term direction;
6. To assess how best PRC can conduct a holistic organizational review and analysis drawing from the lessons learned in this operation, and propose options for the formulation of an organizational development strategy for the National Society.

While the main focus will be the Typhoon Haiyan response to date, in order to provide practical options for moving ahead, both a rear-view and forward-looking approach should be maintained. The evaluators shall start with looking at reports of previous evaluations and reviews related to IFRC-supported operations implemented in 2009 onwards – including the RTE of early 2014 – so as to identify recommendations that have not been acted upon. Moving forward, particular emphasis shall be placed on considering the impact of the operation aspects implemented to date against the Typhoon Haiyan Emergency Appeal indicators and programming standards and methodologies. The MTR should propose possible operational options and directions for the ongoing operation based on the findings as well as options on how organizational development and longer-term community-based programmes can be strengthened.

4.2. Criteria

The evaluation will be guided by the following criteria:

- i) Relevance and appropriateness in delivering assistance based on needs and context;
- ii) Coverage in reaching all target population groups in need;
- iii) Efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, especially how resources have been utilized, procedures applied, systems functioned, control mechanisms engaged, quality managed, coordination functioned and integration applied to meet intended results;
- iv) Impact of the interventions on the local capacities and the longer-term and wider effects of it, including the social, economic, technical, and environmental effect on individuals, groups, communities and institutions;
- v) Connectedness and sustainability of the interventions in developing the organization capacity of PRC and enhancing the resilience of assisted people against future shocks and disasters.

4.3. Questions

The questions below provide an initial guidance and will be further elaborated by the MTR team:

1. To what extent has the response, to date, achieved expected results and been relevant and appropriate to the needs of the target groups?
2. To what extent has the recovery response reached all the population groups in need?
3. To what extent has the response, so far, achieved its intended results in a timely, efficient, effective and accountable manner?
4. To what extent has the response, to date, had a positive impact at the community level?
5. To what extent have the interventions contributed in developing the organizational capacity of PRC and enhancing the resilience of communities against future disasters?

5. Evaluation methodology & process

The methodology will adhere to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluations](#), with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

An IFRC evaluation management team will oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of five people not directly involved with implementation; one from PRC headquarters, one from IFRC Philippine Office, two from the IFRC Asia Pacific Office (PMER and DMU), and one from the IFRC South-East Asia Office.

The evaluation team will consist of up to seven people: an international (external) consultant, who will be team leader, one national (external) consultant, an external partner representative, members from two National Societies and two members from the IFRC Secretariat. The latter will also provide the interface with the Secretariat offices and will help to clarify internal processes and approaches for the team. The team will be gender balanced. Ideally the team leader or at least one of the IFRC Secretariat member should have prior knowledge/experience of the Philippine context and ideally all candidates will have some experience with evaluation practices and the IFRC disaster response systems.

The external evaluators will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations. They will not have been involved or have a vested interest in the operation being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation. The MTR team leader will report on progress or challenges to the evaluation management team and will be the primary author of the evaluation report.

National Society members of the evaluation team will support the external evaluator in the evaluation process, and will be able to provide perspectives on the Movement actors and interactions in the operation. The external partner representative in the team will provide perspectives on donor actors and interactions in the operation. It is expected that these members will conduct a reliable, objective and informed evaluation of the operation that has legitimacy and credibility with all stakeholders.

The specific evaluation methodology will be detailed in close consultation between the MTR team and IFRC, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

1. Desktop review of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, including previous evaluation reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data that exist;
2. Field visits/observations to selected sites, Manila and the Asia Pacific Office in Kuala Lumpur;
3. Key informant interviews (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate);
4. Focus group discussions (institutional and beneficiaries).

The MTR team will be briefed in Kuala Lumpur and Manila. It will meet with and interview key Movement stakeholders in the Philippines and the the IFRC Secretariat offices in country, region, zone and Geneva. The team will also consult with other partners/organizations including government, UN, INGO, NGO and FBO actors as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives as well as with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

Consultancy timeframe

Activities	Due dates	Deliverables
Develop inception report	Early July	Inception plan
Review background documents and data collection	July	
Debriefing/feedback on initial findings to management at all levels	End July/Early August	Preliminary findings

Submit draft report with annexes	End July/Early August	Draft report
IFRC submits any requests for clarifications, corrections, changes	Mid-August	
Submit final report with annexes	Late-August	Final report

A draft report will be prepared for review. This review process should occur within 4 weeks of submitting the draft to the evaluation management team, and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

- Week 1-2 post review: the evaluation management team to check content is in line with this TOR and IFRC evaluation standards. Stakeholders who participated in the evaluation to provide feedback on any inaccuracies or clarifications (differences of opinion should not be put forward here but outlined in the management response). Following this, a final draft will be prepared.
- Week 3-4 post review: an evaluation management response team will review the report and compile a management response to be included as an appendix to the final published MTR report.

6. Evaluation deliverables

Inception report: The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the MTR and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team.

Initial findings/feedback meetings: The team will share its initial findings with PRC and IFRC in-country presence in an after-review participatory meeting before departs from the Philippines. A similar meeting will be organized at the IFRC Asia Pacific Office in Kuala Lumpur, involving all technical and support units.

Debriefing/feedback to management: The team will report its preliminary findings to the commissioner and management at the IFRC Asia Pacific Office in Kuala Lumpur. The team leader and at least four other team members – external partner representative, a National Society member and two Secretariat members – should be present.

Draft report: A draft report identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within two weeks of the evaluation team’s return from the field.

Final report: The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, and clear recommendations. The report shall include appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of key informants and any other relevant materials. The final report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from the IFRC.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as their own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

The preliminary and final reports will be submitted through the evaluation management team, which will ensure the quality of the report, providing input if necessary. The evaluation management team will submit the report to the IFRC Secretariat stakeholders interviewed for

review and clarifications. The Head of Operations for Asia Pacific will oversee a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up.

7. Evaluation quality and ethical standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will consider how recovery interventions have adhered to the seven [Fundamental Principles](#) of the Red Cross and Red Crescent – 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality – as well as the [Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance](#).

8. Qualifications

The external evaluation consultant is required to meet the following qualifications:

1. Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programmes responding to major disasters, with specific experience in MTRs preferred;
2. Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
3. Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;
4. Experience in qualitative data collection and data analysis techniques;
5. Experience working with the Movement and knowledge of the IFRC's disaster management systems;
6. Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a team;
7. Excellent writing and presentation skills in English;

8. Knowledge of the Asia and Pacific region, preferably Philippines, would be an advantage;
9. Minimum qualification of a master's degree or equivalent combination of education and relevant work experience;
10. Immediate availability for the period indicated.

9. Application procedures

Interested candidates should submit their application material by 17th June 2015 to the following email: pmer.apzo@ifrc.org. The application should include:

1. Curriculum Vitae (CV)
2. Cover letter clearly summarizing your experience as it pertains to this MTR, your daily rate, and three professional references.
3. At least one example of an evaluation report most similar to that described in this TOR.

Please note that application material is non-returnable. We thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process.

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Annex B – MTR Timeline

Typhoon Haiyan MTR- Timeline 2015		
Timing	Activity & Deliverable	Responsibility
17 to 29 June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shortlist/interview candidates for evaluation team leader and NS team member(s) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EMT
30 June – 6 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contracting evaluation team members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EMT
15 -17 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare and submit inception report: include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team. Prepare draft methodology, data collection tools, and data collection Make travel arrangements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team leader Country Office and Zone Office
20 to 22 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team leader and members to KL MTR data collection in KL (Key Informant interviews) Travel to Manila 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation team leader supported by team members
23 to 24 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Briefings with IFRC and PRC leadership in Manila MTR data collection in Manila (Key Informant interviews) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation team leader supported by team members
25 to 29 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MTR data collection in Cebu, Leyte and Panay islands Travel to Manila on 29 July 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation team leader supported by team members
30 to 31 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complete pending Key Informant interviews in Manila Organize preliminary findings and conclusions Present preliminary findings to IFRC and PRC in Manila 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation team leader supported by team members
1 to 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare presentation of findings and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation team

August	<p>conclusions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travel to KL 	leader supported by team members
3 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presentation of preliminary findings to management at all levels in Kuala Lumpur • Depart from KL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation team leader supported by team members
7 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Submit Draft MTR report with EMT for initial review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation team leader
8-12 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EMT/relevant stakeholders review draft report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EMT/Relevant Stakeholders
15 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EMT feedback to Evaluation team leader on draft report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EMT
17-19 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorporate comments and prepare final MTR report. <i>(this marks the end of the work for the evaluation team)</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation team leader
22 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final MTR report is shared with respective Management for approval 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EMT
25 to 27 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management response (MR) is drafted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MRT
28 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management Response Team approves the MR to be included in final report appendix. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MRT
“	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MTR report (including annexes and MR) is posted on IFRC’s Evaluation database 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMER

Annex C – Key informants

Annex C – Key informants interviewed for the review

In addition to the list below, numerous beneficiaries and volunteers were interviewed at field locations in Cebu, Leyte and Panay.

Interviewee	Role/function title	Interviewee	Role/function title
Richard Gordon	PRC Chairman	Kari Isomaa	IFRC Head of Delegation, Philippines
Gwendolyn Pang	PRC Secretary General	Patrick Elliott	IFRC Haiyan Operations manager
Alexandre Mikadze	IFRC Head of Office/Shelter delegate, Leyte	Camelia Marinescu	Head of Office, Tacloban/Acting Movement Coordinator
Henk Schipper	IFRC Water and sanitation delegate	Davit Macharashvili	IFRC Logistics delegate
Brian Kae Enriquez	PRC Haiyan Team - Head of Watsan	Helena Loh	IFRC PMER delegate
Hajime MATSUNAGA	IFRC Cebu Field Coordinator	Imran Husain	IFRC Finance coordinator
Jan Erik Matiga	PRC Cebu TPA Livelihood	John Mwangi	IFRC Logistics delegate
Jojo Monillas	PRC Cebu TPA Health	Kate Marshall	IFRC Communications delegate
Justin Daniel D. Lucero	PRC Cebu TPA Logistics/Warehouse	Nand Lal Sharma	IFRC Logistics Coordinator
Mark Din Ampong	PRC Cebu Leader for Shelter	Ciaran Cierans	IFRC Livelihoods adviser
Mayor of Tabuelan	Tabuelan	Charles Ranby	IFRC IM delegate
Vincenta T. Bonghanoy	PRC Cebu finance	Lourdes Fernandez Rebolledo	IFRC HR officer
Alejandro Go Edillort III	PRC Cebu Shelter Head	Birte Hald	IFRC Head of Emergency Operations
Megan Cayabyab	PRC Cebu Admin/Reporting	Ashfaque Ahmed	IFRC Field logistics delegate
Manolito Aguelo	IFRC TPA Logistics/Warehouse	Abhishek Rimal	IFRC Health delegate
Alka Kapoorsharma	IFRC Head of Logistics	Riku Assamaki	IFRC Hub Logistics coordinator
Jonathan Brass	Cash delegate, IFRC Zone Office	Colin Price	IFRC Shelter delegate
Kit Roche	Senior PMER officer, IFRC Zone Office	Lucia Cipullo	IFRC Regional Disaster Law
Chris Lee	PMER officer, IFRC Zone Office	Wendy	PMER officer, IFRC Zone Office

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Martin Faller	Head of Operations, IFRC Zone Office		Katherine Roux	IFRC Regional Communication Manager
John Gwynn	Organisational Development Coordinator, IFRC Zone Office		Marko Korhonen	Finnish RC Asia Pacific Representative
Alex Torres	Organisational Development, IFRC Zone Office		Fatima Sibayan	IFRC TPA health
Sumant Kumar	HR Manager, IFRC Zone Office		Mari Morimoto	Country representative Japanese RC
Umadevi Selvarajah	Finance Controller, IFRC Zone Office		Han Goo Lee	Previous country representative Korean RC
Nathan Rabe	HD Coordinator, IFRC Zone Office		Guineviene de Jesus	Country representative Netherlands RC
Wardell (Woody) Eastwood	Shelter Delegate, IFRC Zone Office		Gonzalo Atxaerandio	Country representative Norwegian RC
Marko Korhonen	Finnish RC Asia Pacific Representative		Shir Shah Ayobi	Previous country representative Norwegian RC
Peder Damm	Danish RC Asia Pacific Representative		Joy Singhal	British RC Asia Pacific Representative
Resty Lou Tamalayan	PRC Head of Haiyan Team		Sandra Romero Ruiz	IFRC Disaster Management Development delegate
Mark Mauro Victorio	PRC Haiyan Team, Head of Shelter		Emilio Teijeira	Head of delegation – German RC
Beneficiaries and volunteers	Cebu, Leyte and Panay		Abdallahman Lahmouni	Country representative Qatar RC
Eric Salve	PRC Head of Disaster Management Services		Ana Montoya	Head of delegation Spanish RC
Sebastien Jouffroy	IFRC Project Mgr - Emerg Field Hospital Readiness		Roger Alonso Morgui	Previous head of delegation Spanish RC
Johanna Klinge	Previous country representative Finnish RC		Kunhali Muttaje	Country representative Swiss RC
Gene Clamrence Vanela	PRC/Federation Aklan		Bob McKerrow	Previous country representative Swiss RC
Dennis Pong	PRC Head of Haiyan Operations in Capiz		Andy Li	Taiwan RC
Paul Drossou	Country representative Canadian RC		Sari Nissi	ICRC Deputy Head
Mr Martinez	Officer in Charge, Capiz Chapter		John Kalhoj	IFRC Logistics delegate - Kalibo
Chapter Administrator	Aklan Chapter		Pablo Medina	Shelter cluster coordinator

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Zorni, Junny, Arif, Vanella, Honey Joy, Myk	Aklan Haiyan Operations Head of Operations and Technical Project Assistants		Stig Allan Schmidt	IFRC Construction supervisor
			Ryan Jay Jopia	PRC Manager - Volunteer Service Office

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Annex D – Field schedule

MID-TERM REVIEW of IFRC/PRC TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE			
Schedule of Activities for Field Visits (July 26-30, 2015 - for 3 areas: Panay, Leyte & Cebu)			
	Panay	Leyte	Cebu
Date:	Arrive in Capiz		
Sunday, 26th	17:30 Briefing with Field Delegate	Arrive in Tacloban - check-in at Leyte Park Hotel	Arrive in Cebu City - check-in at Quest Hotel
Monday, 27th	8:00 Pick up from hotel (in Capiz)	9.00 a.m. onwards	7.00 am to 11.30 am Travel to San Remigio, Cebu
	8:30-9:00 Meeting with OIC	Meeting/interviews with:	11.30 am onwards
	9:00-10:30 Meeting with Head of Haiyan and PRC/IFRC team	IFRC acting head of office - Aleksandre Mikadze (Sasha)	Meetings with IFRC/PRC staff:
	10:30-13:00 Field visit Watsan schools	PRC head of operation - Friday	Hajime Matsunaga (IFRC Field Programme Coordinator)
	13:00-13:30 lunch	Logistics hub coordinator - Riku	PRC Technical Project Assistants (Livelihood, Health,
	13:30-15:00 Field visit SRK	Health delegate - Abhishek (interview in Manila 24 July)	Shelter, Watsan, Logistics/Warehouse)
	15:00-17:00 Travel to Kalibo		Mark Din Ampong (PRC Cebu Team Leader for Shelter)
		1.00 p.m. onwards	Lead Foreman
		PM field trip to Dagami	
		Warehouse in Marasbaras	Stay in San Remigio (at Hagnaya Beach Resort)
		Visit to barangay health centre in Abaca	
		Meeting with PRC TPA, barangay chairman, BRC, community health volunteers, mayor or LGU representative	
		Return to Tacloban around 5:30pm	
Tuesday, 28th	8:00 pick up from hotel (in Aklan)	9.00 a.m. onwards	7.40 am onwards
	8:30-9:00 Meeting with OIC	Meetings/interviews with:	Courtesy meeting with Mayors of San Remigio & Talbuena
	9:00-10:30 Meeting with Head of Haiyan/TPAs/ Team Leader	IFRC finance/admin delegate - Rana	Meetings with IFRC/PRC staff (in San Remigio & Bogo offices):
	10:30-13:00 Visit to Health	PRC Shelter TPA - Don	PRC Cebu TPA Admin/Finance

	Programme in Malinao		
	13:00-14:00 Lunch	PRC Livelihoods TPAs	Florianne Adlawan (PRC Cebu Health/WatSan head)
	14:00-16:30 Visit to Shelter Programme	PM field trip to San Miguel	Vicenta Bonghanoy (PRC Cebu Finance Head)
	16:30-17:30 Meeting with IFRC Field Team	Meetings/interviews with:	Marco Abrazado (PRC Cebu Haiyan Operation Head)
		Core shelter beneficiaries	Key Informant Interview and/or Group Meeting
		SRA beneficiaries	a. In municipality of San Remigio:
		Livelihoods beneficiaries	Livelihood, WASH and Shelter beneficiaries
		Barangay recovery committee	Barangay Recovery Committee
		Return to Tacloban around 5:30pm	b. In municipality of Tabuelan:
			CBHFA, Health Construction, Core Shelter and Hygiene Promotion beneficiaries
			Barangay Recovery Committee
			Stay in San Remigio (at Hagnaya Beach Resort)
Wednesday, 29th	8:00-10:00 Travel to Tibiao (in Antique)	9.00 a.m. onwards	8.00 am Leave Hagnaya Resort for PRC Bogo office
	10:00-11:30 Meeting with OIC, Team Leader, TPAs	Meetings/interviews with	8.00 - 9.00 am - Meetings with IFRC/PRC staff (in Bogo office):
	11:30-12:15 Lunch	IFRC watsan delegate - Henk	Eduardo Garrido (PRC Cebu Livelihood head)
	12:15-15:00 Field visit Livelihood Phase 1 and Phase 3	PRC watsan sector head - Karen and TPAs	Alejandro Go Edillort III (PRC Cebu Helter head)
	15:00-17:00 Travel back to Kalibo	PM field trip to Barugo	Megan Cayabyab (PRC Cebu Admin/reporting)
	17:00-18:00 Wrap up, meeting with IFRC team (if needed)	Warehouse	9.45 am - 10.00 am - Travel to Metro Supermarket (Bogo City)
	18:00 Transfer to Airport	Meeting with Mayor or LGU representative	10.00 am - 11.30 - Observations on Food Voucher Activity at
		Visiting schools with latrine construction	Metro Supermarket; also conducted interviews at Metro
	Dep for Manila	Meeting with principal and maybe also with some children who participated CHAST sessions.	Supermarket (with OIC, beneficiary & cashier) on impressions
	Airport pick-up	Meeting with CHVs trained in	on food voucher activity

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	to Quest Hotel, Makati	PHAST	
			11.30 am - 2.30 pm Travel from Bogo City to Cebu City warehouse
			2.30 pm - 3.30 pm Meetings with personnel of Cebu City warehouse
			Albert Munoz (Cebu warehouse in-charge)
			Manolito Aguelo (IFRC TPA Logistics/Warehouse)
			4.20 pm - 5 pm Arrive at PRC Cebu Chapter/courtesy call
Thursday, 30th		Dep for Manila etd 8.30 a.m.	Dep for Manila etd 8.30 a.m.
		Airport pick-up to IFRC/PRC NHQ, Manila	Airport pick-up to IFRC/PRC NHQ, Manila

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