

South Sudan
Population Movement Emergency Appeal
Final Evaluation
10 September – 5 October

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Executive Summary

The International Federation (IFRC) launched an appeal on 27 July 2012 on behalf of the recently formed South Sudan Red Cross (SSRC) to support returnee households from Sudan who had recently lost their citizenship due to the creation of South Sudan on 8 July 2011. The appeal sought CHF 4,131,067 to support 14,000 returnee households with relief items, water and sanitation services, hygiene promotion, first aid and some emergency health.

By late July 2013, the SSRC was able to support nearly 14,000 returnee households with comprehensive relief items supplied by four National Societies valued at over CHF 1.14 million. Seven National Societies provided both earmarked and un-earmarked cash contributions totaling CHF 1.12 million to support the operation, while two of these Societies had also generously provided in-kind support. With the cash contributions the SSRC was able to carry out some capacity-building interventions at HQ and branch level through increased staff and programme-specific trainings for staff and volunteers. Volunteers were able to conduct some hygiene promotion and support households in the proper use of waterguard and ORS.

An evaluation of the operation was commissioned by IFRC (at country, region and zone levels) and SSRC to learn from this experience as it was the first official emergency operation of the South Sudan Red Cross. The evaluation was conducted by a team of four persons – an external, professional evaluator, a logistics expert from Canadian Red Cross, a Disaster Management Delegate from the IFRC East Africa regional office and a PMER advisor from the IFRC Africa zone office. None on the evaluation team members had prior involvement in the emergency operation.

The emergency appeal (MDRSS001) officially closed on April 30, 2013 and remaining monies, CHF 96,962, were transferred to the annual plan to enable SSRC to complete distributions as planned. The evaluation examined the work under the appeal up through the end of July when actions were largely finished.

The evaluation examined five main areas of inquiry. These areas and the main evaluation findings are listed in the table below.

Areas of Inquiry	Main Findings
Appropriateness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Items provided were both useful and well appreciated by beneficiaries. • Items were relief in nature and were not designed to address chronic issues faced by returnees. • Some branches were able to contextualize their response while others felt constrained by SSRC HQ. • Appeal interventions were well within the capacity, experience and interests of the SSRC but key capacity building needs of branches were largely missed . • There was limited ownership by SSRC HQ who could have taken a stronger leadership, management and accountability role given their experience. • IFRC appeared to focus too much on implementation and too little on facilitation. • Both IFRC and SSRC should have clarified mutual expectations of the Appeal; these expectations should have been more fully communicated to branches and all involved.
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Appeal achieved the main outputs with NFI kits distributed to nearly 14,000 households. • The appeal significantly under-invested in emergency health & care, WASH and branch capacity building, in part due to an under-

	<p>resourced appeal but also due to a lack of understanding of key SSRC capacity needs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall the response was not timely but was still appropriate given the previous pipeline and the role of other organizations • The appeal (and the evaluation design) did not appear to build on previous, similar experiences in South Sudan
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning and implementation of the operation was lengthy and hampered by insufficient staffing (IFRC & SSRC) and turnover (IFRC at country, region and zone). • The logistics approach contributed to delays in the operation and may have been influenced by the perceived IFRC track record and high costs. • SSRC has limited logistical capacity and inadequate attention to asset management, although some capacity increased during the operation. • The appeal was never revised along with a negotiated reduction in programming and a consideration of alternatives; the revision did not occur despite a lack of significant appeal resources after Oct 2012 and several meetings on the issue.
Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A relatively robust coordination structure is in place both internally and externally. The MCF was adhered to with reportedly high participation and general acceptance of its usefulness. More could be done to move beyond mere information sharing to problem solving and decision-making. • There were shortcomings in internal coordination within SSRC and this may have been due in part to other SSRC priorities, inadequate planning and low funding for the Appeal. • External coordination was mixed with variation across the states from low or no participation in some branches to a co-cluster lead in another. At the National level, IFRC has not fully engaged in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) whereas there has been some participation in the cluster meetings. This has had implications for the reputation and visibility of the IFRC. Quality of participation and follow up with membership could be improved. • Coordination with the Government of South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) at both national and state levels appeared solid, as SSRC is considered to be a well conforming and engaging partner.
Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Appeal appeared to be planned in a participatory manner initially but it was not sustained throughout the planning process including in the EA, budgeting and operationalization of the plans down to the branch level. • The data management system was lacking and was inefficient (or poorly managed and compartmentalized) leading to gaps in information, missed deadlines and lack of clarity by partners and donors. • Expectations by both SSRC and IFRC of the other were not met and were in part of function of inadequate communication between and within both SSRC and IFRC with significant implications for the operation.

The evaluation noted 27 recommendations in the areas of emergency operations planning, capacity building, programming & implementation, coordination & communication and learning. Below are ten priority recommendations. However, SSRC, IFRC and the membership are encouraged to consider all of the recommendations and use the standard management response plan (included in the annexes) to develop actionable next steps. This will contribute greatly to ensuring these lessons are learned.

Top Ten Recommendations

1. IFRC has numerous DM tools available to support National Societies during emergencies. The SSRC management team should receive a refresher orientation on all of the mechanisms available along with the corresponding protocols. **(IFRC Zone DM with SSRC)**
2. Emergency Operations would benefit from a better understanding of available logistic capacity across the IFRC (i.e. Secretariat and membership). IFRC Zone logistics should assess and promote the capacity of the IFRC (i.e. stock availability and timeliness per standard pipelines). IFRC Zone logistics should coordinate a similar assessment amongst NS members who also provide such support (several NS have invested heavily in logistics centres). With a better understanding of the availability and timeliness of key goods, donors and planners can make more informed decisions to ensure efficient emergency operations. **(IFRC Zone Logistics and National Societies)**
3. Emergency Appeals should be reviewed on a regular basis with key stakeholders including resource mobilization and PMER to ensure operations are aligned with available resources in a logical and coherent way. Appeal revisions or even considerations should be done on a regular basis with the agreement of the NS. **(SSRC/IFRC Country, Region, Zone)**
4. The SSRC must take an active role in the planning and budget development of future emergency appeals, ensuring the plan and budget accounts for reasonable staffing and capacity building needs. **(SSRC)**
5. Data Management:
 - a. The SSRC needs to improve its data management at the HQ level in emergency operations. Programme staff must be held accountable for receiving, organizing, managing and using results, both from branches and HQ. **(SSRC HQ; IFRC or membership should provide technical support as needed)**
 - b. SSRC should set minimum expectations for data management at the branch level. Some branches are doing an excellent job but these are not consistent. Branches do not need a cookie-cutter approach but minimum expectations should be set. **(SSRC HQ, IFRC or membership should provide technical support as needed).**
6. Capacity Assessments:
 - a. A comprehensive branch and HQ assessment for emergency operations should be undertaken with SSRC and supported by the membership and ICRC. This should acknowledge capacity building inputs and results to date and complement an overall organizational development plan for South Sudan.
 - b. The comprehensive branch assessment should be based on an agreement of the minimum qualifications of a well-functioning branch. Such an assessment should include an understanding of minimum standards to support volunteers in emergencies and should complement the recently approved SSRC volunteer policy. Volunteer support considerations should include:
 - ✓ Identity cards
 - ✓ T-shirts/aprons or appropriate identification while in communities
 - ✓ Certificates for all trainings received
 - ✓ Appropriate gear for field conditions e.g. gumboots, raingear as possible**(SSRC HQ, IFRC or membership should provide technical support as needed)**
7. Pre-positioning of items is a good preparedness measure and often the only way to guarantee timely response in remote locations. Given vulnerabilities and limited infrastructure, SSRC should pre-position key items (such as tarps). SSRC should also look into joint warehousing and pre-positioning options with other partner organisations present in the same locality. **(SSRC supported by IFRC and PNS – particularly the DM Consortium)**


8. Pre-positioning must be considered alongside other longer-term or recovery-type interventions to identify relevant interventions given the mandate, interests and capacities of SSRC. **(SSRC supported by IFRC and PNS)**
9. SSRC should maintain an active role in state-level cluster meetings regardless of their operations' status (i.e. don't just go when you have something to report). SSRC should consistently communicate plans in advance rather than communicate activities after they happen. **(SSRC)**
10. Evaluation design for emergency operations should consider the scope, scale and target group in a given country and not always be limited by the timing of one emergency operation. **(IFRC Zone, Region, Country)**

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Acronyms

DSG	Deputy Secretary General
DM	Disaster Management
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EARRO	Eastern Africa Regional Representation Office
EAT	Emergency Action Team
EPR	Emergency Preparedness & Response
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
IOM	International Organization on Migration
MCF	Movement Cooperation Framework
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PHAST	Participatory hygiene and sanitation transformation
PNS	Partner National Society
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
RFL	Restoring family links
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (of the Government of South Sudan)
SSRC	South Sudan Red Cross
SSSRC	Southern Secretariat of the Sudanese Red Crescent
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme




Source: United Nations, accessed at: <http://southsudaninfo.net/maps/> on 4 October 2013. For a map of areas targeted initially by the Emergency Operations Appeal, see Annex 1.

Background

The mass movement of returnees across the border from the Sudan to South Sudan started spontaneously after the January 2011 referendum and the independence of the Republic of South Sudan on 8 July 2011. The influx reached its climax following the announcement by the Government of Sudan of the 8 April 2012 deadline for expiry of citizenship for southerners living in Sudan. By 15 July some 407,000 people of South Sudanese origin had returned from Sudan to South Sudan since the organized returns started in late-October 2010, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Nearly two million people have returned to South Sudan since 2007 as indicated in the table below¹.

¹ IOM, 2013: <http://southsudan.iom.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/IOM-South-Sudan-Transition-and-Recovery-Update-September-2013.pdf>



Source: IOM Annual Report 2012

Many returnees had the means, or relatives with means, to manage starting a new phase of life in South Sudan. However, others have returned without the basic means and are in need of assistance. These returnees have been assigned to transitional settlements from where most of them are flowing into the bigger urban centres, putting pressure on host communities which are already in a very vulnerable situation. Others are waiting for the authorities to allocate them a piece of land to settle on. In the most affected states, the process has been slow and uncertain. In the transitional centres partners, including IOM, WFP and several national and international NGOs are providing assistance but it is not sufficient.

More than half of the registered returnees from Sudan are flowing into urban centres and their surroundings. This puts the communities, who have little or no access to basic facilities such as water, sanitation and healthcare, under additional stress. The population movement appeal was developed to alleviate this situation - to support returnee communities in coordination with Government and national and international humanitarian actors.

The SSRC conducted a needs assessment from March 4 – 7, 2013 in Renk county, identifying NFIs, WatSan, capacity building of EATs and humanitarian coordination, including with ICRC regarding tracing and RFL services, as the main priorities. The IFRC Zone DM unit sent a delegate to support SSRC in response planning, from 19 – 30 March. SSRC was reportedly reluctant to use IFRC response tools such as FACT, but eventually a small RDRT team was accepted. It should be noted that during this time and in the following months, SSRC was preoccupied with constituting assembly; this was a priority and IFRC was also reluctant to interrupt this process.

A three week RDRT assessment was conducted between May and June 2012 to determine the immediate needs of South Sudanese returnees, host communities and the ability of the South Sudan Red Cross branches to respond (at least initially) in the following four states:

1. Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, through the Aweil Branch
2. Western Bahr el Ghazal State, through the Wau Branch
3. Upper Nile State, through the Malakal Branch
4. Central Equatoria State, through the Juba Branch, with support from Headquarters.

In the areas assessed by the RDRT members (including 9 transit camps and 12 settlements across the four states) at least 37,000 households were in need of assistance. The most urgent needs were identified as follows: transport, land, water and sanitation, food and non-food items (NFIs), psychosocial support and in some states, education.

SSRC looked to address the most urgent of these needs, in line with its areas of capacity, and focussed on distribution of NFIs, water and sanitation, improved hygiene, and basic emergency health care for the 14 000 most vulnerable households. The preliminary appeal, launched on 11 May 2012, initially targeted Malakal, Aweil, Wau and their corresponding Red Cross branches, which continue to be heavily affected by the returnee influx. The final Emergency Appeal, launched on 27 July 2012 covered additional four areas, namely Rumbek, Bentiu, Juba and Kwajok but de-emphasized the role of water and sanitation.

Evaluation Purpose

The principle objective of South Sudan Population Movement evaluation is to capture factual, evidence-based data on the operation focussing on five main areas of inquiry, namely, appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, coordination and management. The objective is to learn from this operation and apply lessons, as appropriate, to future operations. The evaluation sought to detail the operation as it happened and provide an analysis of the effectiveness or otherwise of the operational response with the objective of learning as much as possible about the strengths and weaknesses. With this knowledge the opportunity exists to strengthen systems and processes to enable enhanced operational efficiency and effectiveness in the future.

Methodology

The methodology implemented in the evaluation included:

- i. *Secondary data review:* This included review of national and regional humanitarian reports, appeal and assessment reports, monitoring reports, previous response operation reports and the National Society long term planning framework, among other documents.
- ii. *Key informant interviews:* Interviews were conducted with the IFRC Zone, regional and country office key staff involved in the operation, SSRC leadership, key staff both at the headquarters and the branches involved in the operation, Partner National Societies working with South Sudan RC, ICRC and other external partners including the Government of Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, OCHA at national and state levels, IOM at state level and national and international NGOs.
- iii. *Focus Groups/Group discussions:* These were carried out in the 3 branches targeting the volunteers who were involved in the operation and specifically in the registration of the returnees upon arrival, needs assessments, beneficiary registrations, NFI distributions and hygiene promotion activities in the settlement camps and communities. The discussions also targeted those volunteers that had specific trainings in Community based First Aid, WASH and PHAST as well as Emergency Action Teams and volunteer team leaders.
- iv. *Beneficiary interviews/Community Group interviews:* Interviews were conducted with beneficiaries in Alalachok settlement in Wau, Rumbek Way station, Nyangkoot settlement in Rumbek and Warjmac and Apada settlements in Aweil. Interviews were also conducted with community groups in these areas.
- v. *Observation:* Household observation visits and interviews were conducted in at least 5 households in each of the settlement camps and communities visited (as noted above) where a physical verification of the various NFIs received from Red Cross was done and beneficiary feedback was captured. Visits to non-beneficiary households were also conducted to understand their perspectives and observe their living conditions.

Constraints & Limitations

All evaluations are faced with constraints or limitations. When they are identified or acknowledged, they are more likely to be addressed and mitigating measures put in place. Following are the main constraints faced during this evaluation:

Staff turnover and gaps in staffing: There was significant IFRC turnover during the operation and some turnover within SSRC. During the operation, IFRC went through three country representatives (although one was an interim) and had an Operations Manager on four, very short-term contracts over the course of the year; at the regional level the DM department was significantly understaffed and there was turnover in the Regional Representative, Head of Operations, PMER, and Resource Mobilization, among other positions. The Zone also had several staffing gaps or turnover – all of which impacted the sustained attention and support to this operation. This also made it challenging to piece together the main events of the operation and understand clearly how support was provided. This was compounded by some gaps in data management.

Time: Every evaluation team would like more time to conduct activities. The team tried to gear the scope of the evaluation to the time available but even so, the schedule was somewhat compressed with less than 17 days for field work. Compounding this was limited flight schedules to field sites which cut short the amount of time spent with SSRC HQ staff. Given this, the team was not able to meet with some key SSRC HQ departments such as finance and HR and some key, former staff in IFRC were also missed.

SSRC participation: The evaluation team included two IFRC staff (one from the Region and one from the Zone); it would have been good to also include a member from SSRC (someone who was not involved in the operation) such as the PMER officer. Unfortunately the SSRC PMER officer had recently resigned and no other substitutes were readily available.

Data: There was limited concrete data to support the evaluation and what was available was inconsistent. Limited or inconsistent data was further compounded by contradictions in various interviews – several of which we were unable to reconcile during our 2.5 weeks in South Sudan. Data at the branches visited was sound but the same reports and/or information could not be found at the HQ level due to poor information management.

Scope of Learning: The evaluation ToR focused on one operation – the Emergency Appeal from July 2012 to April 2013 (with a transfer of some monies and activities to the Annual Appeal). However, the SSRC had been through similar operations in the past, the most recent one being the Civil Unrest Appeal of 2010 which delivered NFIs to returnee households in some of the same areas as targeted by the current Appeal. A more comprehensive evaluation of capacity, constraints and effects could have been done had a broader timeframe been considered.

Key Findings

Appropriateness

The analysis of appropriateness examined the quality of the needs assessment process, the relevance of interventions given needs and capacity, beneficiary satisfaction, and the utility of the replenishment strategy among other things.

Appropriateness is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly. Appropriateness often looks at the inputs and activities - were they appropriate given the needs & capacities?

OECD DAC criteria in ALNAP, 2006.

Needs Assessment

The needs assessment report by the RDRT² is the main tool to assess the quality of the process. This report was supplemented by interviews with key SSRC staff at HQ and branch level. The report is concise yet extremely comprehensive with tables of numbers of transit camps, returnee sites, priority returnee needs and proposed interventions. However the report overall is of poor quality due to myriad reasons. The report fails to: capture the sources of the information, identify how the assessment process was done, articulate the methods used, identify the constraints in interpreting data, identify how information and proposed interventions were coordinated with other stakeholder and identify the main stakeholders consulted. Furthermore the report acknowledges that these findings are summary in nature and *“For a more detailed assessment, please refer to the team’s individual reports (available on request)”*. EARRO was unable to produce these additional reports suggesting that they remained with the RDRT members; this limits not only the evaluation team’s analysis of the assessment but would have also made it difficult for IFRC and SSRC Management to judge the quality of the process. The SSRC as noted, also conducted a needs assessment March 4 – 7, 2012³; while limited in geographic scope, the analysis appeared to be well done and some discussion of methods was included. Authors were not listed for this report either.

The needs assessment process may have been further impacted by the timing of the arrival of the teams. The Communication’s team arrived first (25 May – 6 June) followed by the Technical Team (29 May – 21 June). If Communication’s had followed the technical they could have perhaps, with the support of SSRC, helped in the logical framing of the Appeal thereby allowing the appeal to be issued more quickly, before July 27.

Interventions

The majority of the appeal ultimately focussed on the delivery of NFI’s and other relief items to beneficiaries, however a small amount of hygiene promotion was conducted and there were some limited interventions to support SSRC capacity building (in Health, WASH, DM and Logistics). The NFIs were appropriate given the needs of the returnee households and were well within the capacity of the SSRC (who had experience in such interventions for some time – both as the newly formed SSRC and as SSSRC). Beneficiaries interviewed (in both community meetings and during individual household visits) were overwhelmingly satisfied with the NFIs – particularly the tarps and mosquito nets as well as kitchen sets. All were observed to be well-used during household visits. These were to have been complemented by approaches in emergency health and WASH but these efforts were minimal. Finally, as will be further noted in effectiveness, items were relief in nature and provided only

“Rain used to get in to the house and make everything wet before we received SSRC tarps” “I didn’t have to give birth on bare floor since we got the SSRC tarp.”

Beneficiary interview in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, September 2013.

² IFRC/SSRC. Population Movement Emergency Appeal South Sudan, 21st June 2012. No author.

³ See South Sudan Red Cross. Returnee Needs Assessment Report. South Sudan Red Cross, March 4, 2012.

a temporary solution; many returnees had been in these conditions for the last 3 years or more as returns began even before independence. At least one branch was able to contextualize the response to the needs in their counties; this branch in some cases split kits based on family size – smaller families got less, larger families got more; this was entirely appropriate. Other branches felt constrained by what they considered HQ directives i.e. one NFI per household regardless of household size. Some beneficiaries complained noting that 2 tarps, 2 mosquito next and kitchen sets serving five did not go far enough for families of 10 or 12. SSRC HQ noted that the guidance given to branches was to consider families larger than 7 as 2 households (the IFRC standard) thereby entitling them to 2 kits. None of the branches visited or interviewed acknowledged having such guidance.

SSRC had capacity in supporting returnee households based on previous appeals as the Southern Secretariat of the Sudanese Red Crescent (SSRC). Four of the current 10 branches had also been in existence since 2005 (Wau, Malakal, Bentiu and Juba); while the remaining six came into existence between 2007 and 2011 – meaning only a few were very new. In addition, SSRC is in the process of establishing sub-branches; two are established and three are in the planning stages. Key staff interviewed e.g. DG, Head of DM, Head of Health, Branch Directors all reported long service with SSSRC either as staff or volunteers; the Deputy SG was a volunteer in Khartoum since the late 1980's. The Head of DM started as a volunteer in 1996 and became staff in 2005. Given this historical experience including the interventions conducted under the 2010 Civil Unrest Appeal (similar interventions to similar beneficiaries), SSRC should have taken a stronger leadership, management and accountability role in the operation; likewise IFRC should have taken a stronger role in facilitation and capacity building.

“The National Society should be supported to lead the operation and not be led.”

SSRC Sr. Management. September 2013

The reasons for this situation remain unclear with each organization reporting disappointment and unrealized expectations of the other. SSRC reported that they did not feel ownership of the design, implementation nor management of the appeal. “IFRC was the manager and decision-maker and told us what to do.” IFRC noted similar frustrations in a perceived unwillingness of some SSRC staff to take responsibility. These challenges were further compounded by a lack of appeal coverage which limited many interventions such as WASH, Emergency Health, branch capacity building etc.

Finally, the preliminary appeal noted a need for replenishment with up to 50% of NFIs/key items being set aside and pre-positioned for future emergencies (and this is further described in emails between Zone and Country); in the end there was no ‘official’ pre-positioning and most branches distributed all that they received given the significant level of returnee needs. This occurred in the previous emergency appeal as well – the design noted a need to set aside and pre-position but in the end, all was distributed. This may be a function of resources. Branches do not have operating budgets and the HQ does not seem to have a stable resource base; given that appeal resources are temporary, the NS may have an incentive to distribute all while the appeal is in place for fear of not having resources in the future to distribute pre-positioned stock. Finally all branches and beneficiaries interviewed agreed: the NFI coverage given significant needs was too low – community leaders noted that more households should have been covered and volunteers struggled to identify households that were most vulnerable. However, during the branch visits, there were some observations of the volunteers targeting well during the needs assessment process as the evaluation team interviewed both recipient and non-recipient households. Pre-positioning remains a significant concern of SSRC given chronic flooding, the location of numerous returnee communities in flood plains and continued instability in states bordering Sudan.

Summary Findings

- The assessment process was fragmented and not well documented, but SSRC appeared to start off strong.
- Items provided were both useful and well appreciated by beneficiaries.

- Items are still relief in nature and do not address the root causes or chronic issues faced by returnees.
- Some branches were able to contextualize their response while others felt constrained by SSRC HQ.
- Appeal interventions were well within the capacity, experience and interests of the SSRC but key capacity building needs of branches were neglected in the Appeal.
- There was limited ownership by SSRC HQ: SSRC HQ should have taken a stronger leadership, management and accountability role.
- IFRC underinvested in capacity building at both HQ and branch levels and appeared to focus too much on implementation and too little on facilitation.
- Both IFRC and SSRC should have clarified mutual expectations of the Appeal; these expectations should have been more fully communicated to branches and all involved.

Effectiveness

The analysis of effectiveness attempted to examine how well the operation achieved its outputs and outcomes, the timeliness of the response and activities, and the costs relative to the benefits or 'value for money'.

Effectiveness: measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.

OECD DAC criteria in ALNAP, 2006.

Key results

The main objectives of the appeal were met but the operation under-invested in WASH, Health, and capacity building. By late July 2013, the operation was able to distribute NFI's to nearly 14,000 returnee households across ten states (Objective 1 – Relief Distributions); the operation was able to expand its capacity at SSRC HQ through the hiring of an emergency health officer (albeit not until January 2013). At the branch level 6,000 households received ORS sachets and waterguard tablets, with local health clinics targeted to receive the remaining ORS supply (Objective 2 – Emergency Health); volunteers from each branch received training (or refresher training) in hygiene promotion including how to teach communities to properly use the waterguard). Under Objective 3 – Water and Sanitation, staff and volunteers from all 10 branches participated in PHAST training, as well as combined water/sanitation, health and hygiene promotion training. Three WATSAN Kit 5 were procured and deployed (but never used). Under the Objective 4 – Logistics, the appeal was able to expand SSRC storage capacity through the placement of 14 containers in 7 branches along with one in Rumbek and two in Juba. Through various logistics support, relief items were successfully delivered.⁴

Although not officially tracked through the appeal budget, the Swiss Red Cross in partnership with the Austrian Red Cross were able to support returnee households in Unity State through the construction of seven boreholes in 2013 along with NFIs for 200 households and 30 first aid kits for the branch to

⁴ See Emergency appeal n° MDRSS001 GLIDE n° OT-2012-000038-SSD Final Report 24 September 2013 for results through April 30, 2013. See 2013 Annual Appeal 3rd quarter report, expected late 2013 for the final results through August 2013.

use via their volunteers. When membership inputs and activities align with the appeal they should be officially counted in the results even if the resources do not go through the IFRC.

A review of the 27 July 2013 Emergency Appeal reveals a number of other interventions and activities that were never done – primarily due to a lack of resources but also likely due to a lack of ownership of and/or awareness of budgets available to conduct activities. For example, one HQ department was inactive between January and April 2013 despite resources for their activities being available and the officer hired under the appeal, in place. For many other items, from M&E activities, beneficiary communications, vector control activities, to branch staffing, vehicles, motorbikes etc., did not occur due to the underfunding of the appeal. Trainings were conducted but in many regards, not applied or applied only minimally. For example volunteers only did hygiene promotion as part of the distributions; communities targeted received distributions only once, meaning at best they had one HP session. Furthermore the logic of the July appeal was not fully clear. In WASH, continuous assessments of water, sanitation and hygiene were to be done (this did not seem to occur except during the February 2013 RDRT) but it is not clear what interventions were planned to address the results. Branch needs did not seem to be well articulated in the appeal with calls for bikes and cars (which are needed) but many branches suffered from poor or no communication's system (internet) while two branches were lacking their own sanitation facilities and water source. Volunteer needs were also not apparent in the appeal design; gumboots, raincoats etc. would have better enabled them while working during raining season and having to cover large settlement areas during assessments. Overall the majority of the budget went to support the distribution of a comprehensive NFI kits which meant reductions in other activities when sufficient resources were not mobilized.

Timeliness

The response was not timely but needs appear to have been serendipitously met given a pipeline from a previous appeal and timing of other organizations' response. See the timeline in the graphic below for additional details. In short, the appeal was launched in late July 2012 but distributions to beneficiaries did not start until February 2013, however needs in the interim were met in other ways.

Volunteer Viewpoints on Timeliness

"Stuff did not come at the right time. We really should have provided shelter immediately. Items still helped but it would have been more effective had it been provided right away."

"Some people, the returnees, may have lost hope."

"Some people were lucky to be assisted by other agencies. We found out some of the gaps. Some returnees are still lacking as our resources were not enough."

Various focus group discussions held with branch volunteers, September 2013


As the 2012 Population Movement Appeal was being launched some returnee needs were being met from the 2010 Civil Unrest Appeal.

"Finnish Red Cross had already supported SSRC by providing the stock to meet the needs of 5,000 households in case of emergency. In total, the stock to be distributed to 19,000 households has been prepositioned in 7 branches. As at June 2012, 5,000 households in 5 branches had been provided with NFIs in response to the population movement operation. For more information on this operation, kindly refer to <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Appeals/12/MDRSS00101.pdf>"⁵

(Source: MAASS001 10 October 2012: page 4).

⁵ However, further review of the referenced report does not clarify where the 5,000 NFIs went. The Mid Year report 2012 also does not appear to be fully accurate as it notes that 19,000 NFIs were already pre-positioned whereas the pipeline analysis showed that 5,000 (not 19,000) NFIs arrived in Juba late 2011 and were shipped up to the branches in early 2012 and distributed between January and June 2012.

Also as the returnee response by the international community and the GoSS was becoming more organized, IOM and others were able to provide returnee households with kits, and 3 months of food (WFP) among other support. SSRC support, which was largely delivered between February and July 2013 in ten states did meet vulnerable returnee household needs as items they had received previously by other organizations were either worn out by then, particularly tarps, or used up (i.e. ORS



and waterguard) or were insufficient quantities to begin with.

*NB: The DREF approved on 11 May was specifically for the PEA which began the same day.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Value-for-money⁶ is a tool examining costs and benefits of interventions in order to maximize the impact of monies spent in both humanitarian and development situations.

Despite having some financial and logistics capacity within the evaluation team, a clear VFM assessment was not conducted. While a cost per beneficiary could be generated through a simple division of total beneficiaries reached by total expenditure there are no real benchmarks to say if this is appropriate or not. IFRC Zone and region also did not have parameters or ranges to say what is acceptable and what costs per beneficiary are unacceptable given the range of contexts. Furthermore, while the team noted they could compare total costs by total beneficiaries reached across at least two similar appeals (one for South Sudan and one supporting the Southern Secretariat of the Sudanese Red Crescent), the comparison would still not be meaningful given a variety of other programme and capacity building interventions. And, while pipeline, logistics and the costs of items

⁶ Various guidance exists, but was beyond the concise scope of this evaluation See White et al, Guidance on measuring and maximising value for money in social transfer programmes – second edition: Toolkit and explanatory text: April 2013 for one example of comprehensive guidance.

could be calculated separately, the other programme and capacity building costs must be considered as they were integral to the successful delivery of items.

In considering alternatives, cash distribution to allow beneficiaries to purchase their own items locally would have been problematic given weak markets, high prices (due to the high proportion of imported goods and high transport costs) and difficulties accessing markets. Financial transfers (such as those through mobile phones) also would not have been possible at this time given the weak (but emerging) banking system in South Sudan and limited (but also improving) mobile phone coverage.

VFM analysis also examines if the intervention achieved the best outcomes for the affected persons. The evaluation concluded that the main intervention of NFIs coupled with some hygiene promotion was effective (and appropriate) given the needs of returnees, the capacities of SSRC and the timing of both SSRC and other organization's interventions, however, more HP could have been done. Interviews with both IOM and OCHA at the State level concluded the NFI's were appropriate and effective given returnee needs and would remain appropriate for some time. It was also noted that further investment in recovery and development needs (economic development, infrastructure, healthcare, education, water, sanitation etc.) by Government and major stakeholders was also critical but slow in coming given resource and capacity constraints of the newly formed government. The best outcomes for returnees would likely be greater investment in water, sanitation, healthcare and livelihoods in addition to emergency support such as that given through the comprehensive NFI kits supplied by the Finnish Red Cross and supplemented by the National Societies of the Netherlands, UK and Canada.

"We should do something which is permanent"

SSRC volunteer commenting on the chronic WASH needs in returnee communities and the temporary relief provided by NFIs. September 2013

Findings

- The Appeal achieved the main outputs with NFI kits to nearly 14,000 households.
- The appeal significantly under-invested in emergency health & care, WASH and branch capacity building, in part due to an under-resourced appeal but also due to a lack of understanding of key SSRC capacity needs.
- Overall the response was not timely but the response was still appropriate given the previous pipeline and the role of other organizations.
- While relief items temporarily met a basic need – they are not a solution; returnee needs will continue: WASH, Health & Care and risk reduction should be considered commensurate with SSRC capacity, interests and resources.
- The appeal (and the evaluation plan) did not appear to build on previous, similar experiences in South Sudan.

Efficiency

Planning

The planning and implementation of the operation was lengthy. The SSRC began monitoring the operation in February 2012 and conducted their own assessment in Renk from 4 – 7 March 2012. The SSRC was supported with a ten day visit from the Zone DMU from 19 – 30 March. The SSRC was reportedly not well socialized to or accepting of other DM tools such as FACT or ERU. This led to protracted negotiations as to the best way to support the operation and the SSRC finally accepted an RDRT in June 2012.

A DREF request and preliminary appeal was approved on 11 May 2012 which sought support for NFIs for 6,000 households. On 27 July 2012 the full EA was issued and increased NFIs by another 8,000 households. The first distributions to beneficiaries began on 20 February 2013, and all NFIs were distributed by the end of August 2013 (save for a few pre-positioned items). The total length of time for the operation was 16 months considering May as the start and August as the end (the time during which distributions and related activities concluded).

It is not clear how sufficiently alternative options for the logistics approach were considered. The Finnish Red Cross had committed to the majority of the NFI stock early on in the appeal process – by June 2012, except a few items. FRC stock for the first tranche (preliminary appeal) began arriving in Juba in late July 2012 and was completed by October 2012; five months after committing to the items. For the first tranche it was not clear if alternative options – such as using IFRC capacity, were considered. At the time it was noted that there were 15,000 NFIs in IFRC warehouses in Dubai that reportedly could have been delivered within 6 weeks. For the second tranche (of 8,000 households) IFRC Dubai did alert FRC that “IFRC had the majority of required items available in stock in Nairobi and in Dubai⁷.”

Soap also impacted the efficient and timely distribution of items. Soap had been on the mobilization tables from the outset of the operation but were not picked up by any donors until the Finnish Red Cross committed to it at the request of IFRC in September 2012. Prior to September, IFRC also did commit to purchasing soap. Soap was not committed until the 25 of September but was delivered fairly quickly - arriving on 14 December 2012.

Several branches noted that they delayed distributions stating that they could not distribute NFIs until the soap arrived per HQ directives. This directive could not be confirmed during interviews with SSRC HQ staff nor IFRC staff. Due in part to this misunderstanding, distributions to beneficiaries did not start until 20 February 2013, nearly seven months after the official appeal launch. The SSRC HQ DM unit and management noted additional factors contributing to the lengthy time for delivery to the field including rainy season, road conditions, truck and barge availability and high prices and lengthy wire transfer processes. A review of delivery data (See Annex 3) and reports of wire transfers did not appear to add an inordinate amount of time to the delivery process. While it was noted that rainy season runs between May and October and sometimes November, the impact could be noted in the months following due to the deteriorating road conditions.

The Branches visited report that once delivery occurred, they spent at least a month to conduct assessments, prepare and submit a budget. The budget was sent to SSRC HQ and IFRC for approval. This process took 4 to 6 weeks. Only once funds were transferred, branches proceeded with distributions.

‘Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.’

OECD-DAC criteria in ALNAP2006:35.

⁷ See email dated 18 August 2012 from Ari Mantyaara [<mailto:ari.mantyaara@ifrc.org>] to the #Mobilisation table distribution list including Marjo-Riitta Mäkelä Programme Officer, Procurement Finnish Red Cross, Logistics Centre marjo-riitta.makela@redcross.fi.

Logistics

Logistics was seriously hampered by various factors including the length of procurement, delivery and import processes. The logistics approach taken by the some PNS contributed, in part, to the delays in the operation. The interest of PNS to do their own logistics may be influenced the perceived poor performance and higher costs by IFRC. IFRC Regional and Zone Logistics believe their regional capacity could have supported a more efficient response based on 5,000 NFIs in Nairobi and 15,000 NFIs in Dubai. IFRC believes they could have stock in place within two months versus the 5 months taken by some PNS. It was determined that at this time, procurement in country would not be recommended as the majority of the items were not available in country (and those items that were available came from outside the country).

Deliveries⁸ of the 6,000 NFI to the branches started on the 10 October but then took an additional five months with last delivery on the 5 March 2013. The procurement and delivery of the additional 8,000 NFI started with their commitment on the 22 October 2012, with arrival in Juba completed on the 20 March 2013. See Annexes for additional details.

It was noted that SSRC has limited logistical capacity. Few of the Branches have logistics officers who could manage the arrival and distribution of the materials. At least one branch was able to hire logistics support for three months but their contract ended before the relief items arrived. Responsibilities were placed on other staff that had some training in logistics. During the field visits it was also noted that SSRC had limited attention to asset management, especially the vehicle fleet. In some branches there were no vehicles to drive volunteers to distribution sites. Branches did not appear to budget fully for their transportation needs or it may not have been approved by SSRC HQ.

Observations

- The operation was delayed at several stages; things could have been done to speed up the process such soap regionally purchased; branches given budget sooner to move distributions forward without soap.
- HR issues may have affected the efficiency of the operation as well (staff turnover, gaps and short term contracts).
- Once all NFI stock was in Juba, delivery of the materials started in October 2012 and was not completed until mid-July 2013, 9 months later. There are months with no operational or logistical activities, specifically – Nov and June. There was minimal activity in all months (one or two deliveries) except April with five deliveries and July with three deliveries.
- Distributions were started in February 2013 and were completed end of July 2013, some five months later. May was the beginning of the rainy season.
- In some branches, no monies were provided to fund trucks for distributions or volunteer obligations until the soap arrived.
- During the evaluation, it not seem that Operations and Logistics in IFRC South Sudan and IFRC Regional sought adequate alternative methods of increasing logistical capacity in the Branches except to look at using air resources, according to various emails and interviews.. Staffing and fleet capacity could have been considered.
- Initially import procedures took one month or more to complete and this is attributed to the changes in government procedures.
- Branches had limited logistical capacity and their fleet are inadequate or non-functioning. While they were prepared to deliver the stock with contracted trucks, they had to wait for money transfer in order for them to contract trucks and distribute items.
- Training did occur in distribution and logistics in targeted branches.
- The IFRC Logistics Officer only notified the Branches of delivery once the trucks were loaded and ready to leave Juba. There was no formal delivery plan prepared and issued in advance.

Findings

- Planning and implementation of the operation was lengthy and hampered by insufficient staffing and turnover.

⁸ It was noted that IFRC and SSRC logistics staff and other logistics personnel used the term 'distribution' to mean delivery to branches. Internationally, distribution is generally used to mean to the 'end-user', the beneficiary. This misuse of the term 'distribution' may account for some inaccuracies in 2012 Operations Updates.

- The logistics approach contributed to delays in the operation and may have been influenced by the perceived IFRC track record and high costs.
- SSRC has limited logistical capacity and inadequate attention to asset management, although some capacity increased during the operation.
- The appeal was never revised with a negotiated reduction in programming & consideration of alternatives, despite a lack of significant appeal resources after Oct 2012 and several meetings on the issue.

Coordination ^{9, 10}

The section that follows below aims to answer questions related to how well internal and external coordination at both national and state levels between different actors worked during the IFRC/SSRC population movement operation and what were the implications for this. The stakeholders involved in the “internal” coordination are the South Sudan Red Cross (SSRC) HQ in Juba, its ten branches, the IFRC Country Delegation in Juba, Partner National Societies (PNSs) and ICRC. “External” stakeholders include the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), UN agencies and partner NGOs, both national and international.

A relatively robust internal and external coordination mechanism at both national and state levels is in place.

The internal coordination system within the Red Cross Movement is based on the Movement Cooperation Agreement, signed in August 2011, and consists of:

- Movement platform meetings (monthly) with the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General of SSRC, Head of Delegation and Cooperation Delegate of the ICRC, and Country Representative of the IFRC.
- Movement coordination meetings (bi-weekly): chaired by the Deputy Secretary General of SSRC and attended by all country or other representatives of the PNS, IFRC Country Representative, National Society Development Delegate, Cooperation Delegate of the ICRC, as well as programme coordinators as relevant for the agenda and who are chairing the technical committees.
- Technical committees (often weekly): All concerned persons from SSRC, ICRC, PNS and IFRC.

The above meetings appeared to take place regularly and staff reported high participation. MoCs were considered useful for bringing everyone together and providing updates on progress. Technical

Coordination is the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilising resources and ensuring accountability, orchestrating a functional division of labour, negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership (ftnt 6).

Coordination is a process through which actors involved in humanitarian response work together in a logical and concerted effort towards an agreed common end (namely to protect those affected, save lives and help resume normal activities), and in order to ensure maximum efficiency with the resources available. *See footnotes 9 and 10.*

⁹ Definitions taken from: Reindorp, N., & Wiles, P. Humanitarian Coordination. ODI, London. 2001: 5/ Minear, L., Chelliah, U., Crisp, J., Mackinlay, J. & Weiss, T. (1992) UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis 1990–1992 (Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies: Providence, Rhode Island) Occasional Paper 13; and

¹⁰ Source: Interagency Standing Committee quoted in, Handbook for coordination: Working together in international disaster response (updated March 2010).

committees were considered useful as they resulted in concrete actions, such as forming of committees (e.g. DM, health and WATSAN) to carry out joint monitoring in the field. However, some raised concerns regarding these forums' problem-solving and decision-making capacity.

Coordination between departments within SSRC HQ and between SSRC HQ and branches seemed to have substantial shortcomings. According to Branch management the appeal was not well communicated and the expectations of the branches were not made clear. SSRC HQ seemed to be aware of this and attributed some of the poor communication to lack of funds allocated to coordination in the appeal. Another reason, stated by the branches, is poor infrastructure i.e. lack of computers and internet connection in some branch offices.

External inter-agency humanitarian coordination in South Sudan is done through the cluster system. According to OCHA, on national level the coordination and engagement between IFRC has been much lower than on the state level with SSRC but great variations exist between different states. Bentiu branch was recently invited as a co-cluster lead for the NFI cluster and is a good example of positive engagement, while in Upper Nile, according to OCHA, "IFRC / SSRC is not visible at all" and efforts to encourage them to share plans has "not been fruitful". However, other interviews suggested that Malakal branch is quite visible and active although management acknowledged that more could be done to ensure coordination with international actors.

There seems to be a differing understanding between IFRC and OCHA regarding the frequency and level of IFRC participation on national level in cluster coordination and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) as OCHA considers the participation level a lot lower than IFRC. The HCT has recently gone through a re-structuring exercise in which IFRC lost its observer status while ICRC retained its status due to a more active engagement. This is perhaps the most alarming sign of IFRC neglecting its responsibility to efficiently engage in inter-agency coordination. The result of this, according to OCHA, is a low level of awareness of IFRC / SSRC and its activities in South Sudan, at least at the national level.

IFRC and SSRC participation in the OCHA-led Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Task Force and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC)-led National Contingency planning process was greatly encouraged by both conveners. Active involvement may also repair the somewhat poor reputation gained due to low participation in inter-agency coordination meetings.

IFRC & SSRC staff who participated in cluster meetings generally considered the meetings useful on both national and state level. Active participation was report in NFI, WASH and, to a lesser extent, the health clusters. However, questions were raised by OCHA, IFRC & SSRC, how to ensure meetings went beyond mere information sharing. In some cases it was noted that SSRC shares information after the fact (e.g. after assessments or distributions). In one State the evaluation team noted overlap in distributions had occurred with IOM (both agencies distributed NFIs to the same beneficiaries in one community). This can be avoided by timely and active participation in coordination meetings. The independent status of SSRC was also sometimes reported to have been misinterpreted: some branches reportedly do not share information or participate in coordination mechanisms as they interpret this as interfering with their status as an independent agency.

PNSs considered coordination crucial but also challenging, due to busy schedules and overlapping meetings. PNSs felt that the coordination amongst them could be improved. However, MoC meetings were considered useful for bringing everyone together to be updated on progress and for PNSs to bring in their perspective. It was also recognised that PNSs should take a more active role in encouraging SSRC to actively participate in cluster coordination.

"We are now one family. There is a great difference."

PNS commenting on change in management of IFRC Country office and impact on the work of the membership. September 2013

meetings. PNSs felt that the coordination amongst them could be improved. However, MoC meetings were considered useful for bringing everyone together to be updated on progress and for PNSs to bring in their perspective. It was also recognised that PNSs should take a more active role in encouraging SSRC to actively participate in cluster coordination.

Coordination with the GoSS, particularly with South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC),

which coordinates all humanitarian actors, seemed to be solid on both national and state levels. RRC has a high opinion of IFRC /SSRC as they inform RCC of their activities, register with the Ministry of Justice and generally “play by the rules” thus making it an easy partner to work with. RRCs main counterpart is OCHA and cooperation between the two was described as good. A separate INGO Forum, currently chaired by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on a yearly rotational basis, also exists but coordination with the INGO forum also takes place through the cluster system.

Findings

- A relatively robust coordination structure is in place both internally and externally. The internal coordination meeting structure was adhered to with reportedly high participation and general acceptance of its usefulness. More could be done to move beyond mere information sharing to problem-solving and decision-making.
- There were shortcomings in internal coordination within SSRC and may have been a sign of other priorities, inadequate planning and low funding of the Appeal.
- External coordination was mixed with variation across the states from low to no participation to a co-cluster lead (for at least one branch). At the National level, IFRC has not fully engaged in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) whereas there has been some participation in the (technical) cluster meetings. This has had implications for the reputation and visibility of the IFRC. Quality of participation and follow up with membership could be improved.
- Coordination with the Government of South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) at both national and state levels appeared solid, as SSRC is considered to be a well conforming and engaging partner.

Management

Management is the process of planning, organizing, leading and controlling various resources to achieve defined objectives and goals effectively and efficiently¹¹.

During the evaluation process, the evaluation examined the management process of the operation by attempting to answer key questions to understand the appeal planning process, the impact of the low response to the Emergency Appeal, main roles of the various SSRC technical departments and how these departmental roles affected the overall coordination of the operation. Furthermore the evaluation examined the NS data management system to understand who was responsible for data management at branch and HQ levels in order to assess the extent to which the operation could report accurately on distributions and replenishments.

The evaluation was also to examine the IFRC and SSRC financial systems and their capacity to respond to an emergency operation as well as note any significant challenges that SSRC had with the working advance system – however given time and other constraints, this was only partly done through the analysis of the financial reports generated by IFRC as well as interviews with the IFRC zone finance team. The evaluation also examined how well the management systems namely;

¹¹ Uytterhoeven, Hugo et al, Strategy and Organization: Text and Cases in General Management. Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

leadership, logistics and PMER were structured to support the operation (See Efficiency section as well as annexes 3 – 6 for a review of the management of the logistics systems).

National Society Capacity

Although the National Society was officially created on July 8, 2011, many staff and volunteers had prior experience supporting service delivery under the Southern Secretariat of the Sudanese Red Crescent. As noted earlier, four of the current 10 branches had also been in existence since 2005 (Wau, Malakal, Bentiu and Juba); while the remaining six came into existence between 2007 and 2011 – meaning only a few were very new. The current SSRC leadership had been providing support since the late 1990's. The Deputy SG served as the Deputy Director General for the SRC southern Secretariat. At the branch level, a number of staff in Bentiu, Malakal, Wau, Rumbek and Warrap also served at the Southern Secretariat. A number of branches including Wau, Malakal, Bentiu and Juba had prior experience in relief distributions.

In addition to the 10 branches, 5 sub branches are under development and there are plans to increase the number of the sub branches in order to have more reach at the grassroots level. Technical staff are now in place at the HQ in part due to support from the PNS.

Appeal Planning and Management

The Emergency Appeal budget of CHF 4.1 million was 52% funded by the close of the operation in April 2013. It was evident that it was unlikely that the appeal would receive substantial additional resources beyond December 2012 and even with this knowledge the appeal was not revised. Due to the cost of the pipeline combined with the low response to the appeal, the relief component and the logistical facilitation of the items to beneficiaries was prioritized. Minimal activities on emergency health component were implemented in the settlement camps while National Society capacity building was done at very low scale and as a result NS capacity building was not comprehensively addressed as was envisaged at the planning stage. The appeal planning at the initial stage appeared to be well coordinated between the IFRC country offices, SSRC, ICRC and PNSs. Regular Movement Coordination (MOC) meetings were conducted during which the progress on the response operation was discussed and information shared. However, many of those interviewed felt that this was not sustained throughout the operation. There were shortcomings in internal coordination within SSRC and the interviewed departments felt that the internal coordination amongst them was not optimal and could have been more collaborative.

Data and Financial Management

The mutual expectations for IFRC and SSRC in the operation were not fully clarified nor disseminated down to the branches involved in the implementation. Communication on funding realized for the appeal was not clear and this appeared to create mistrust and a lack of transparency between parties involved in the operation. Many of the NS staff interviewed at headquarter and branch level had the impression that the appeal was well funded and that all planned activities should have been accomplished. The branches interviewed were not regularly provided with the relevant information on the operation with some not having seen the appeal document or the budget and had no information on the specific budgets for their branches or the amount of NFIs they expected to receive. Data management was compartmentalized and each department and branch seemed to have their own data regarding their specific areas of intervention. There was limited evidence that this data was verified and consolidated at the national level to feed into the IFRC country office data on the operation. This may have had implications on the timeliness and quality of the operations updates as well as final report.

Financial Analysis

As noted, the evaluation PMER was not able to conduct a full financial analysis of the operation but notes the following facts:

- The appeal budget was CHF 4.1million
- The appeal was funded at 52%
- The majority of the budget was spent on relief items, logistics, transport and storage -

- The relief items combined with logistics and transport constituted 63% of expenditures
- 46% of the appeal was comprised of in-kind donations from 4 NS
- 52% of the appeal came from cash donations, 43% of which was earmarked
- CHF 96,962 was moved to the Annual Appeal in agreement with the donor to support the completion of activities

Pledges to the appeal were made early. The following represents an analysis of the cash commitments; similar information on the timing of in-kind pledges were not obtained in time for the evaluation report – but most were made early with the last one being the soap in September 2012 (as it was not picked from the resource mobilization table prior to that).

Income by date			
Amount	Date	Cumulative	Percentage Received
135,267	5/29/2012	135,267	
39,659	5/30/2012	174,926	
12,013	6/5/2012	186,940	
134,518	6/13/2012	321,458	
300,264	6/13/2012	621,722	
39,500	6/28/2012	661,222	54.16
11,000	7/27/2012	672,222	
96,800	8/28/2012	769,022	
32,371	10/18/2012	801,393	65.65
6,021	11/5/2012	807,414	
153,474	12/17/2012	960,888	78.72
259,819	12/17/2012	1,220,707	
-96,962	12/17/2012	Moved to Annual Appeal in agreement with the donor.	

The majority of income (66%) was received by the third week in October; subsequent income was earmarked to support the logistics and distribution associated with the second tranche of NFIs to 8,000 households.

Findings

- *Planning:* the Appeal appeared to be planned in a participatory manner initially but it was not sustained throughout the planning process (including EA, budgeting, operationalization of the plans, and down the branch).
- *Data management:* the system was lacking and was inefficient (or poorly managed and compartmentalized) leading to gaps in information, missed deadlines and lack of clarity by partners and donors.
- *Communication:* Lines of authority were also not clear within IFRC and SSRC at all levels; expectations by both SSRC and IFRC were not met and were in part of function of inadequate communication between and within both SSRC and IFRC with significant implications for the operation.

Conclusions

The evaluation has attempted to clearly articulate the myriad findings across the five areas of inquiry. There is overlap in the areas of inquiry and hence overlap in a few findings; some findings are more significant than others. Based on this and follow-up stakeholder interviews the evaluation notes the conclusions below. These are followed by recommendations that are designed to address the conclusions.

Emergency Operations Planning

The SSRC began monitoring the returnee situation early on and coordinated well with IFRC leading to early assessments and eventually a preliminary appeal which appeared to be designed in a participatory manner. During the planning process and carrying over into implementation, SSRC appeared to have lost ownership of the programme which had knock-on effects throughout the operation. The evaluation concluded that:

- Lack of ownership may have been a function of the Appeal planning process, the lack of capacity within HQ departments whose time and attention was also needed by the membership and attention to other priorities, including governance and policy matters necessary to become a recognized Society.
- The appeal failed to fully assess and plan for capacity-building needs at both HQ and branch level and did not fully build on previous operations lessons learned (in myriad areas including branch functioning, PMER/data management, asset management, logistics, volunteer management etc.).
- The programme attempted but failed to align programme implementation with resource mobilization.
- The programme delivered the key results despite challenges in staffing including within IFRC at all levels.

Programming & Implementation

The appeal met returnee needs and appeared to be coordinated with local and national actors. The programme was not efficient but was appropriate and effective. The evaluation concluded:

- Implementation was hampered both by context (which could have been addressed through the planning process/appeal design) and by lack of investment in key programme areas as mentioned above
- There is significant logistics capacity across the International Federation including across the membership. However assessing who is best placed to provide materials and support during operations planning and implementation does not appear to happen as a matter of course; this means that operations may not be benefitting from efficiencies in the system.
- Coordination was relatively good but there is room for improvement, particularly on the national level. The returnee situation remains a priority – both for new returns and for returnees who have not fully integrated into society; many returnees have been relocated to flood-prone areas increasing their short-term and long-term vulnerabilities.
- Implementation was largely hampered by limited branch capacity and funding, lack of ownership and poor communication within HQ, between HQ and branches and between IFRC and SSRC.

Capacity Building

Capacity building was noted to be a very important component in both the preliminary appeal and the appeal. Some capacity building was achieved in the form of inputs to HQ, some staffing support to HQ and branches, storage capacity at HQ and field level and training. Overall the evaluation concluded that:

- Capacity building was noted to be important but the appeal did not seem to be based on a solid assessment of branch capacity nor did it appear to build on previous capacity building inputs or lessons learned.
- Volunteers were the primary implementing arm of the operation yet received very limited support and recognition; support primarily came in the form of refresher trainings and some longer trainings for targeted volunteers.
- Capacity support was needed in operations management, data management, communications and basic branch support among other areas.

Learning

The appeal was by and large successful but could have done more to build on the experiences of and with the South Sudan Red Cross (and in its former capacity of the Southern Secretariat of the Sudanese Red Crescent). It did not appear to build on lesson learned in general, in population movements. The evaluation noted:

- IFRC, at all levels, did not fully recognize and build on experiences historically with SSRC/SSSRC.
- The evaluation design narrowly focused on the current emergency appeal and may have missed some significant learning opportunities.

Recommendations

In view of the findings and conclusions, the Evaluation makes the following recommendations for consideration by SSRC at HQ and branch levels, for IFRC at country, region and zone and for partner National Societies. In considering the recommendations, SSRC, IFRC and the membership need to focus on the main findings, along with their own capacities, interests and resources. The evaluation recommendations come with some understanding of these parameters but it will be up to the individual organizations (SSRC, IFRC and membership) to fully contextualize the recommendations based on their own expertise, interests and resources. Recommendations are not in order of priority.

Emergency Operations Planning

11. Needs assessments should be well documented and reports should include authors, methods, constraints, stakeholders consulted, dates and clarify how coordination was done. Technical annexes should be included and maintained by IFRC (and not leave with the individual or RDRT member). **(IFRC Zone and Region)**
12. IFRC has numerous DM tools available to support National Societies. The SSRC management team should receive a refresher orientation on all of the mechanisms available along with the corresponding protocols. **(IFRC Zone DM with SSRC HQ)**
13. Design of operational plans should be led by the NS and supported/facilitated by IFRC all the way through the budgeting process; they should be based on clear capacity assessments and historical experiences. If time is limited, the operational plan should be updated within the first 2 months based on a joint understanding of capacity needs. **(SSRC & IFRC, country, region, zone)**
14. Emergency appeals (plans and budgets) should be kept updated and posted publically (in a manner that is accessible for staff and volunteers at both HQ and branches). Branches must be familiarized with the plan at the outset and throughout the operation as the plan is updated. **(SSRC supported by IFRC Country delegation)**
15. Emergency Operations should have an exit strategy that builds on preparedness measures and/or recovery actions; if the exit strategy cannot be addressed as planned, this should be clearly noted in operations updates. **(SSRC/IFRC Country, Region, Zone)**
16. Emergency Operations would benefit from a better understanding of available logistic capacity across the IFRC (i.e. Secretariat and membership). IFRC Zone logistics should assess and promote the capacity of the IFRC (stock availability and timeliness per standard pipelines); IFRC Zone logistics should coordinate a similar assessment amongst NS members who also provide such support (several NS have invested heavily in logistics centres). With a better understanding of the availability and timeliness of key goods, donors and planners can make more informed decisions to ensure efficient emergency operations. **(IFRC Zone Logistics and National Societies)**
17. Emergency Appeals should have natural reflection points with key stakeholders including resource mobilization and PMER to ensure operations are aligned with available resources in a logical and coherent way; appeal revisions or even considerations should be done on a regular basis with the agreement of the NS. **(SSRC/IFRC Country, Region, Zone)**
18. IFRC should have a roster of experienced operations managers, not just RDRT members, who are able to deploy quickly. With additional human resource capacity, IFRC should be able to avoid very short-term contracts of Operations Managers within 12 month appeals. **(IFRC Zone DM, Zone HR)**

19. Future Emergency Appeals in South Sudan should be led by a well-capacitated *SSRC Operations Coordinator*. This person should have the appropriate authority over programmes and then be held accountable for plans, resources and results. **(SSRC)**. IFRC should clearly communicate the expectations and accountabilities for such operations and provide technical support as needed. **(IFRC)**.

Capacity-building

1. The SSRC must take an active role in the planning and budget development of future emergency appeals, ensuring the plan and budget accounts for reasonable staffing and capacity building needs. **(SSRC)**
2. A comprehensive branch and HQ assessment *for emergency operations* should be undertaken with the SSRC and supported by the membership and ICRC; this should acknowledge capacity building inputs and results to date and complement an overall organizational development plan for South Sudan. **(SSRC, IFRC Country, PNS, ICRC)**
3. The SSRC needs to develop and manage an asset management system across the organization. Too many inputs are lost or not well managed, limiting the effectiveness of emergency operations or development programmes that spent money to rebuild lost capacities. This must include a fleet management plan and logistics assets plan. **(SSRC with technical support from IFRC)**
4. Emergency Operations must budget for PMER regardless of appeal coverage; this includes, at a minimum, resources for monitoring, data management and final evaluation. Natural account codes should be separated for these categories rather than combining them with 'distributions'. **(IFRC country, region, zone, including Zone Finance who may need to create another natural account code)**
5. The SSRC needs to improve its data management at the HQ level in emergency operations. Programme staff must be held accountable for receiving, organizing, managing and using results, both from branches and HQ. **(SSRC HQ; IFRC or membership should provide technical support as needed)**
6. The SSRC should set minimum expectations for data management at the branch level. Some branches are doing an excellent job but these are not consistent. Branches do not need a cookie-cutter approach but minimum expectations should be set. **(SSRC HQ, IFRC or membership should provide technical support as needed)**.
7. The comprehensive branch assessment should be based on an agreement of the minimum qualifications of a well-functioning branch. Such an assessment should include an understanding of minimum standards to support volunteers in emergencies and should complement the recently approved volunteer policy. Volunteer support considerations should include **(SSRC HQ, IFRC or membership should provide technical support as needed)**:
 - ✓ Identity cards
 - ✓ T-shirts/aprons or appropriate identification while in communities
 - ✓ Certificates for all trainings received
 - ✓ Appropriate gear for field conditions (e.g. gumboots, raingear as possible)

Programming and Implementation

1. Pre-positioning of items is a good preparedness measure and often the only way to guarantee timely response in remote locations. Given vulnerabilities and limited infrastructure, SSRC should pre-position key items (such as tarps). SSRC should also look into joint warehousing and pre-positioning options with other partner organisations present in the same locality. **(SSRC supported by IFRC and PNS – particularly the DM Consortium)**
2. Pre-positioning must be considered alongside other longer-term or recovery-type interventions to identify relevant interventions given the mandate, interests and capacities of SSRC. **(SSRC supported by IFRC and PNS)**
3. Appeal reports should comprehensively acknowledge all membership inputs, results and outcomes when interventions, geographic and population targets align with the appeal even if resources are not programmed through the IFRC. **(IFRC)**

Coordination & Communication

1. IFRC should take an active and consistent role in the HCT and cluster meetings at the national level, particularly in the EPR Task Force with SSRC as appropriate. **(IFRC Country)**
2. SSRC should maintain an active role in state-level cluster meetings regardless of their operations' status (i.e. don't just go when you have something to report). SSRC should consistently communicate plans in advance rather than communicate activities after they happen. **(SSRC)**
3. The leadership of IFRC, SSRC and ICRC should agree on how to efficiently engage in inter-agency coordination including through the cluster system without compromising the fundamental principles. This should be well socialized to branch staff and volunteers. Currently there are some misunderstandings regarding coordination with external organizations which is resulting in inefficiencies in response and missed opportunities for cooperation and funding. **(SSRC, IFRC Country, ICRC Country)**
4. Encourage and actively participate in inter-agency/ joint needs assessment missions in order to enhance coordination and maximise fundraising potential. This could include sharing of RC volunteers with other organisations as was done with the floods response with UNHCR in Rumbek. **(SSRC HQ and Branches)**
5. Explore ways to build on the quarterly branch meetings to build stronger communications and relationships between HQ and branches. **(SSRC)**
6. SSRC with the support of the membership must ensure minimum capacity across the branches such as functioning computers, internet access, latrines and water. **(SSRC, IFRC Country, PNS)**

Learning

1. Evaluation design for emergency operations should consider the scope, scale and target group in a given country and not always be limited by the timing of one emergency operation. **(IFRC Zone, Region, Country)**

2. SSRC should reflect on timelines based on the past several years experiences for key processes; this would include time needed for: **(SSRC)**
 - ✓ Tax exemption letters
 - ✓ Delivery by road from Juba to each branch (in both rainy and non-rainy season)
 - ✓ Average time for bank transfers
 - ✓ Such reflections should be built into appeal and programming timelines to ensure more realistic plans.

- Total time for the 8,000 HH NFI from 27 July EA to delivery in Juba is 8 months. Total time from various commitments is 5 to 6 months depending on the item.

Delivery of NFI to various Branches.

- The delivery to branches of Pipeline A: 6,000 HH NFI.
- The delivery of NFI to branches commences on the 10 October 2012 with 2 shipments (Aweil, Bentiu) with 1,000 HH each, arrival time 16 and 17 October 2012.
- There were no deliveries to Branches in November.
- The next delivery occurred on the 4 December, one delivery to Wau of 1,000 HH. This delivery arrived in the branch on the 11/12 December 2012.
- The Soap arrived in Juba on the 14 December but it did not get delivered to the branches that received NFI earlier until 24 January 2013. The remainder of the soap went with the NFI when delivered.
- One delivery of NFI in January 2013 to Malakal
- Two final deliveries in February 2013 to Malakal and Bentiu.

Pipeline A delivery started on the 10 October and finished on the 5 March 2013: Five months to complete, with no deliveries in the month of November.

The delivery of the Pipeline B: 8,000 HH NFI.

No deliveries in March perhaps due to the 8,000 HH NFI were being delivered to Juba.

Five deliveries in April: Warrap, Rumbek, Bor, Kwajok, Torit

Two deliveries in May to Juba and Mundri

No deliveries in June.

Three final deliveries occur on the 27 July 2013 to Aweil, Tonji and Juba.

Pipeline B delivery started on the 3 April 2013 and finished on the 27 July 2013: Almost Four months to complete. No deliveries were organized in March or June 2013.

The rainy season in South Sudan is from May to October approximately. October to May is the dry season and travel is easier. In 2013 there was a lot of flooding due to the amount of rain. In areas around Wau, there was still flooding in September however the roads were passable.

Distribution in Branches.

Once NFI stock arrived in the Branches, the EP&R Officer prepared a budget to hire trucks for distribution of material, as well include the cost for volunteer transport, meals, and water. This budget was submitted to SSRC National Office, who submitted to IFRC Operation manager. Once the budget was approved, it would take 2 weeks to transfer the money to the Branches. The budget process took 4 to 6 weeks.

One of the branches that received NFI stock in 2012 stated they were directed not to distribute the NFI until the soap arrived. Soap arrived 25 January 2013. There are inconsistencies in who or why this was thought in the branches. The Branch staff stated they were told by the SSRC HQ and Operations Manager, whereas the SSRC HQ and IFRC Operations manager state the delay was caused by the branches having a difficult time to organize their budgets.

When questioned why the branches did not do assessment in January, the branch staff stated they needed funding to pay for volunteers. The first transfer of funds to one branch was the 11 February 2013, with the first distribution on the 20 February, however the second distribution did not occur until 5 April. The Branch stated they needed time to finish assessments before the next distribution.

Distributions started on the 20 February and were completed on the 27 July 2013, total time for branch distributions took five months. On average, the Branches distributed stock within 2 to 3 months upon arrival of the NFI. The branches state that once funding was transferred they completed the distributions quickly.

IFRC Logistics completed the appropriate waybills for delivery. The branches visited had proper paper trail of the stock with waybills, stock cards, bin cards, and beneficiary reports.

Findings:

Planning and implementation of the operation was lengthy possibly due to the fact that the PNS' logistics initially lead the operation with its procurement and delivery timetable. It is not clear how sufficiently alternative options were considered at all levels - including IFRC at regional and zone. Gaps in procurement and arrival of stock were missed by IFRC region - possibly in part due to understaffing and turnover.

Gaps were missed by SSRC/IFRC Logistics in their preparation for the arrival and delivery to branches of stock in August even though items came one month late.

Communication between the field Logistics and IFRC Region and Zone Logistics did not appear effective. The field staff stated the lack of information or responses required them to make best decision on the information they had. The IFRC assessment team did not receive various mobilization tables and commitment tables until specifically requested.

There appears to be no formal delivery plan in order for the branches to start the budget process before delivery of the NFI. The information on delivery was passed to the branches once the trucks were loaded and ready to leave Juba (from the IFRC Log Officer)

The operation was delayed at several stages; specifically the soap was not committed until 25 September, some four months after the NFI commitment. Finnish RC was asked by IFRC on the 9 September and committed on the 25 September. Soap delivery took less than 3 months.

There seems to be several months of no operational or logistics activity both in IFRC Juba, SSRC and in the Branches.

It is not clear why delivery took so long seeing that it was the dry season and travel would have been better. Logistics staff talk about the increase of fuel prices in the rainy season and lack of trucks only the rainy season. The trucking contract was not provided to review.

HR issues may have affected the efficiency of the operation as well (staff turnover, personnel issues between SSRC and IFRC, 3 month contracts of Ops Manager, no SSRC Ops Coordinator)

IFRC leadership were possibly not consulted or informed of potential issues. IFRC leadership seems to have overlooked the running of the operation.

The logistics approach taken by the some PNS contributed, in part, to the delays in the operation. The interest of PNS to do their own logistics may be influenced by poor performance or perceived poor performance and higher costs by IFRC.

IFRC believes their regional capacity could have supported a more efficient response based on available 5,000 HH NFI stock in Nairobi and 15,000 in Dubai. IFRC Logistics believes they could have the stock in place within two months versus 5 months that PNS' took.

All import procedures into South Sudan took one to two months to complete and this is attributed to the changes in government procedures and new processes implemented several times throughout the operation. Some of the tax exemption letters took 2 weeks to process and receive, others letters took 6 weeks.

There does not seem to be a national fleet strategy. Each branch has fleet, some branches have five vehicles and others only one.

Some of the SSRC fleet have high mileage and they were in poor condition. In discussions with several Branch Directors, they receive no funding to completed vehicle maintenance. Repairs only occur when the vehicle breaks down. All branches visited reported shortfalls in budgets noting that they do not receive enough resources from HQ (or other sources) to support the minimal functioning of the branch.

The EA identifies hiring of Logistics Officers and other staff in Branches. This did not occur except in Juba where a Logistics Officer and an assistant were hired during this operation. The assistant has ended her contract and this could not be verified. There appears a few capable volunteers in the branches that could have taken on this role for short term contracts.

Recommendations:

Policies and procedures should be in place to coordinate logistics for all PNS' and IFRC to determine the best operational activity and to meet the needs of the beneficiaries in a timely fashion. IFRC should be able to provide a track record of procurement to help assist PNS' decide on who to use.

NFI stock from IFRC could have been used as the first delivery while waiting for PNS' to complete procurement process and arrival.

The delivery plan of the material needs to be prepared and disseminated to Branches in advance to allow Branches to start budget process and have it approved before the stock arrives. Assessment of beneficiaries could be done one week prior to stock arrival. Then distribution could commence as soon as stock arrive in branches.

Delivery of stock to branches should be completed as quickly as possible with multiple deliveries per month and then they could avoid the rainy season.

Communications between all levels (IFRC, PNS', SSRC) needs to be timely and clear. SSRC Logistics need to be trained in Fleet management and Procurement.

SSRC needs a National Fleet Strategy taking into consideration all vehicles in country and adjusting levels as required. This strategy would also address an adequate maintenance plan and budget for the fleet.

Review of commitment table would have identified the issue with soap. Then alternate arrangements could have been identified to address this issue, specifically taken from IFRC stock in Nairobi, or procured locally to move distributions forward.

The appeal HR plan needs to be implemented by IFRC and SSRC to fill all positions as identified. There are adequate volunteers in the branches who could fill these positions quickly for predetermined times as driven by the needs of the delivery plan and beneficiaries.

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