

Review of the Tajikistan Cold Wave Response

Shelter and NFI Working Group

Undertaken by

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On behalf of the

**International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies**



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Acronyms

COESCD	Committee of Emergency Situations & Civil Defence
DFID	Department for International Development
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ESC	Emergency Shelter Cluster
GOT	Government of Tajikistan
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NFI	Non-food item
NS	National Society
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCST	Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan
REACT	Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team
SNFIC	Shelter and non-food item cluster
SSI	Shelter sector item
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund

Executive summary

In 2007/8 Tajikistan experienced its harshest winter for three decades with temperatures plummeting below minus 20 degrees Celsius over an extended period. A national and regional electricity shortage led to strict rationing, while the level in the main water reservoir used for generating electricity for the capital Dushanbe fell to a critically low level. The population especially in urban areas faced great hardship as they rely almost entirely on electricity for heating.

On 31st January 2008 the Government of Tajikistan (GOT) asked the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) to assist in mobilising international assistance. The cluster approach was activated in late February 2008. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) assumed the role of coordinator of the shelter and non-food item (SNFIC) cluster with co-ordination staff in country from 28th February to 28th April 2008.

This review was undertaken at the request of IFRC's Shelter Department and focuses on: the cluster activation in January; the role and performance of the shelter cluster coordinators; and IFRC's handover and exit from this role at the end of April 2008.

The aim of the review was to identify lessons which needed to be learned, and to make recommendations to help IFRC fulfil its leading role in emergency shelter. The review relied on interviews with key players and the review of key documents. The consultant visited Dushanbe for eight days in July 2008.

Overall IFRC's role in Tajikistan was ultimately a success and reflected well on the organisation. Three areas however where lessons need to be learned relate to: the limited knowledge and understanding at country and regional level of IFRC's emergency shelter coordination role; the impact of high turnover of coordinators; and the development and implementation of an exit strategy. Detailed recommendations are made in the report to address these issues as well as other questions raised in the Terms of Reference (TOR).

Additional issues which arose but were arguably outside the TOR included: the enormous opportunity offered by the emergency shelter coordinator role for IFRC to achieve its Global Agenda Goals; the challenges of developing Terms of Reference for coordinators which both respect the special conditions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing this role, and are clearly understood and accepted by all main players and partners; and the considerable resource challenges faced by IFRC's Shelter Department in managing and supporting coordinator deployments. Detailed recommendations are again made in the report.

Introduction

This review focuses on:

- The activation of the cluster approach in February 2008 in response to extreme winter weather in Tajikistan
- The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (IFRC's) role and performance as coordinator of the emergency shelter cluster with staff in country during March and April 2008, see Annex G.
- IFRC's handover and exit from this role at the end of April 2008

The aim of this review is to identify lessons to be learned and to make recommendations so that IFRC can better fulfil its leading role in emergency shelter in future natural disasters¹.

Terms of reference

The Terms of Reference for this review are given in Annex A.. Key questions extracted from the Terms of Reference are given in Annex B.. The findings are reported against these key questions.

Background

Tajikistan, the poorest country in Central Asia, has just experienced its harshest winter for three decades with temperatures from early January 2008 plummeting below minus 20 degrees Celsius. A national and regional electricity shortage led to strict rationing, while the level in the main drinking water reservoir for Dushanbe fell to a critically low level and many water pipes burst or froze due to the cold weather.

The population especially in urban areas faced great hardship as they rely almost entirely on electricity for heating; at the same time their water supply was under threat. On 31st January the Government of Tajikistan (GOT) asked the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) to assist in mobilising international assistance. The cluster approach was activated in late February 2008. IFRC assumed the role of coordinator of the shelter cluster with co-ordinator staff in country from 28th February to 28th April 2008 (see) withdrawing at that stage as the emergency phase had ended with the coming of warmer weather in mid March.

Methodology

The evaluation relied on interviews with key players (see Annex H.) and the review of key documents (see Annex F.). Face-to-face interviews were carried out in both Geneva and Dushanbe; other interviews were by phone. The consultant visited Dushanbe from 2nd to 10th July 2008.

¹ The recommendations in this review assume that, for the foreseeable future, the cluster approach will remain an important mechanism in responding to major emergencies, and that IFRC will retain its leading role in emergency shelter.

Findings and recommendations

The findings and recommendations are reported against the questions posed in the Terms of Reference, see Annex B.. The questions are repeated in this section in italics.

Overall

Overall IFRC's role in Tajikistan was a success and reflected well on the organisation; other agencies acknowledged the professionalism of the staff deployed and the value they added in rapidly changing circumstances.

Three points were however often raised, the namely:

- the delay in responding to initial enquiries about IFRC taking on the role;
- the turnover of coordinators;
- what was perceived as a premature and unilateral exit at the end of April.

These points are addressed below.

In addition, a word of caution is required. This crisis did not turn into a major humanitarian crisis. Thus although the IFRC's coordination role had many challenges, it was not tested fully.

Federation's (emergency) shelter coordination role

1. *What was the level of understanding and support of the Federation's (emergency) shelter coordination role within the Country, Regional and Zone Representation and Geneva*

It is worth emphasising at the outset that the cluster approach and IFRC's leadership role within the shelter cluster are both relatively new and still "works in progress"; it is therefore only to be expected that not everyone will share the same understanding or demonstrate the same level of support throughout IFRC.

In addition the recent restructuring and difficulties in recruiting to key posts² have had a negative impact on IFRC's ability to fulfil its mandate.

Overall

- The level of understanding was inversely proportional to the length of the reporting line from Geneva. This is not a reflection on competence or commitment, but rather the opportunities to learn about the Federation's shelter cluster coordination role.
- There was a great desire among those interviewed in both the country and regional office to learn more about the role.
- The level of support was high among all those interviewed within IFRC although for many the first challenge was to understand what that role was, see above.

Detail

Prior to the cold wave emergency the IFRC Representation Office and the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) in Dushanbe, and the IFRC Regional Office in Almaty had at best only a vague idea about the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between IFRC and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in regards to IFRC assuming a leading role in emergency shelter in natural disasters (see Annex C.).

² During the crisis and the review, two key posts were vacant, that of Representative in Tajikistan and the Regional Disaster Management Delegate in Almaty.

No mention is made of the MOU in RCST's contingency plan from 04 May 2007, although the scenario in the contingency plan is a major wintertime earthquake affecting Dushanbe with shelter and non-food items (NFIs) as a major component of the anticipated response. Based on a search on IFRC's web site, job descriptions for regional disaster management posts being advertised in August 2008 do not appear to make any mention of the leading role either. Implicit reference is made in current job descriptions by mention of Humanitarian Reform but no explicit reference is made to the leading role.

Information about the MOU and IFRC's leading role in emergency shelter is available on IFRC's intranet which can be accessed by IFRC staff throughout the world. As with all such information, there are major challenges:

- You have to know that it is there in order to look for it
- You have to know that it is important in order to invest time to understand it
- The potentially enormous gap in knowledge of the subject between those posting the information and those accessing it, can make understanding it more rather than less difficult

Similar information is also available publicly on the Humanitarian Reform web site. The same challenges apply as for IFRC's intranet but in addition:

- There are references to IFRC's lead role in key documents on the Humanitarian Reform website but there are no links from these references to the more detailed information which is by comparison deeply buried.
- While reference is made to the special provisions of the MOU regarding finance, accountability, the specific exclusion of transitional and permanent housing etc. within some key documents, these provisions are not systematically referred to in all documents. The generic cluster coordinator TOR for instance states that the coordinator is accountable to the Humanitarian Coordinator without any reference to this being contrary to the MOU.

In the lead up to Cluster activation, IFRC Tajikistan found themselves in the awkward position of being asked probing questions during Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT) meetings about a role which they knew nothing about. While they sought clarity from the Region, Zone and Geneva, the pointed questions continued.

Despite their frustration at the situation they found themselves in, staff in both country and regional IFRC offices subsequently supported the co-ordinators whole heartedly. During the review they expressed a commitment and interest in learning more about the role so that they could play a fuller and more confident role in future.

Recommendations

- Publicise and make information on IFRC's leadership role in emergency shelter far more accessible not only within IFRC but also to the humanitarian community and general public.
- Conduct usability trials to check that the information provided can be easily found and understood
- Include a section on possible Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC) coordination role in all job disaster management job descriptions, contingency and work plans.
- Ensure that there is further awareness raising and training among staff who may play a vital role in supporting ESC coordinators.
- Ensure that senior management share in reviews of ESC deployments to inform their future decision making especially in the lead up to a possible cluster activation and subsequent exit and handover.

Cluster activation

2. Was the cluster approach activated in accordance with the OCHA Guidance Note?

A key question which has to be asked is whether the cold weather crisis justified cluster activation. This is a question which is far easier to examine with the benefit of hindsight; it is discussed under 5 below.

Leaving this question aside, activation does appear to have broadly been in accordance with the Guidance Note. IFRC's ability however to contribute to the decision making process leading up to activation was severely hampered by two inter-connected issues:

- First IFRC staff members closest to the crisis were not in a position to provide Geneva with that all important on the spot analysis of the situation given their lack of awareness and training in regard to the role, see 1 above.
- Second neither the RC nor REACT appear to have involved the Global cluster leads in the discussions leading up to activation, and the first that Geneva heard about a possible activation was when they received a copy of the RC's letter in late February 2008, see 3 below.

Recommendations

- Ensure greater involvement of the country and regional offices in the analysis as part of the activation process.³
- Advocate for the greater involvement of cluster leads at the Global level in the lead up to the request from the country level for cluster activation.
- See also recommendations under 3 below.

3. What was the extent of the Federation's involvement and influence, as an IASC member, in the decision-making process?

IFRC appear to have taken a passive role. The seriousness of the crisis may have already been in question. The activation was possibly seen as an opportunity for on the job training of ESC coordinators on the roster in an unchallenging context.

Recommendations

- IFRC to take an active rather than a passive role in the decision-making process. This is especially important if either the need to activate the cluster or the appropriateness of IFRC accepting the ESC coordination role is in doubt.
- See also recommendation under 2 above.

4. What was the intended and actually impact of cluster activation on REACT's coordination role?

The intended impact was to "bolster the REACT Sector/Cluster groups", see Annex D. The actual impact was not dissimilar. The picture that evolved from interviews was that REACT was a useful networking and coordination body in "normal" times but faced considerable challenges in demonstrating leadership, and changing gear in this crisis. In a sense the Clusters took on roles which a stronger more dynamic REACT might well have been able to take on alone.

³ There are considerable challenges in achieving this as the MOU restricts IFRC's role to the emergency phase, so IFRC will not necessarily be involved at the highest level at the country level in the lead up to activation.

In addition, although much is made of the fact that REACT is chaired by GOT, the chair is held by the Committee of Emergency Situations & Civil Defence (COESCD) rather than a ministry and therefore lacks the political power to make things happen, and to ensure government engagement in REACT's work. The lack of government engagement is in all fairness not restricted to REACT; it was a common concern among many of those interviewed, some blaming the government and some the agencies. The Clusters therefore certainly bolstered REACT; the larger question is whether REACT will have learned how to respond better to future crisis with or without cluster activation.

Recommendations

- IFRC to continue to support REACT and the establishment of similar organisations in other countries in the region; but ensure that this support includes positive criticism and practical suggestions how the model can work better and explore how REACT and the cluster approach would work together in a major humanitarian disaster

5. *Was the cluster approach activated purely to improve the humanitarian response or were there other considerations as well?*

The cold weather was unusually harsh, and people in urban areas did indeed face extreme hardship while in rural areas valuable food stocks were spoilt. Those interviewed felt that there had been an increase in mortality among vulnerable groups but not on a scale vastly different from a severe cold period in more developed countries. There was of course potential for significant loss of life but the weather improved before this could happen.

There was a general feeling that the cluster approach was activated not solely to respond to the immediate humanitarian needs but also to focus attention and obtain resources for a country which was being neglected despite severe chronic needs. The pressure for activation appears to have come from both within the country and the UN in New York.

Some would argue that this was a misuse of the cluster approach. It could also be argued that if there is no other option available to deal with long-term chronic crises which may evolve into major humanitarian disaster, then the system is at fault.

OCHA

6. *What was OCHA's role in:*

a. *Activation of the cluster with reference to the Guidance Note*

In the period leading up to activation there was no permanent OCHA presence in Tajikistan, so the lead was taken by the RC. One OCHA staff member from Almaty visited Tajikistan on mission prior to activation to support the RC. There was no Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in Tajikistan.

b. *Overall cluster coordination*

Subsequent to activation, the OCHA staff member from Almaty returned for a number of short term missions and two consultants, funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), were brought in to support the RC.

c. *Liaison with Government on behalf of the cluster lead agencies*

As highlighted in 4 above, liaison with the Government is a challenge faced by all organisations in Tajikistan. OCHA did its best and several of those interviewed spoke highly of the role played by the OCHA staff member from Almaty, a Tajik himself, who was prepared to use his knowledge and contacts to help others.

d. Ensuring the cluster process was in support of Government coordination mechanisms

Officially the Government coordination mechanism is REACT and every attempt was made to strengthen rather than undermine REACT. Real political power and decision making however is at a very high level within a relatively few people. See also 4 above.

e. Addressing cross-cluster issues?

Inter-cluster meetings were held and issues appear to have been resolved pragmatically. The common challenge of too many meetings for too few people was present in Tajikistan as elsewhere but was possibly felt more because many doubted the seriousness of the crisis and at least one major NGO was in the process of closing its office in Tajikistan.

Shelter and NFI Cluster (SNFIC)

7. Were all the NFIs dealt with by SNFIC shelter related, and if not what were the implications for SNFIC?

This is a question which applies to the Shelter sector in general. Shelter Sector Items (SSIs) could be categorised as:

- Items relating to the creation or repair of the structure which shelters people, e.g. tents, plastic sheeting, building materials and kits etc.
- Household items required within that structure to make it a living space, e.g. cookers, kitchen sets, water containers etc.
- Personal items required by individuals e.g. clothing and bedding

Some people would argue that only the items in the first category are SSIs, and the other two categories are Non-Food, WASH, Health or general relief items dealt with by other clusters. Others would argue that all the items in all three categories are SSIs and further items should be added such as survey equipment to help in assessments and the formulation of a shelter strategy.

In Tajikistan a realistic approach was taken which was welcomed by many partners; the ESC developed a list of NFIs, see Annex I. Master list of Shelter and Non Food Items, covering all three categories but actual responsibility about which cluster dealt with which items was negotiated.

There are more fundamental issues, however, if SSIs are restricted to those in the first category, and tents and plastic sheeting are relabelled NFIs as part of general relief programmes,

- First, the Shelter Sector is squeezed out of the emergency phase and into the transitional and reconstruction phase. This would run contrary to IFRC's shelter role within clusters which is restricted to the emergency phase.
- Second many organisations could argue that they do not "do" shelter.

If however the wider definition of SSIs is used, the Shelter sector expands and the number of organisations, including National Societies, involved in the sector expands dramatically as well.

Recommendations

- IFRC seeks clarification on the definition of SSIs and promotes the consensus view.

8. What was the impact of the SNFIC on the Federation Delegation and the Tajikistan Red Crescent?

The impact was positive. Staff in both IFRC's country office and the RCST learned about the cluster approach and the role of ESC coordinator. The demands in terms of logistics and administrative support were within acceptable limits, and they had the necessary resources to support the coordinators.

It is worth noting however that there had been an almost complete change of senior RCST staff just prior to the crisis. This, combined with the low level of understanding of IFRC's leadership role in emergency shelter in the country, see 1 above, meant that although the impact was positive in regard to RCST, there is still a long way to go before they would be able to take a more active role in any future cluster activation.

Recommendations

- Further awareness raising and training is undertaken with both the Delegation and RCST to improve their ability to take a more active role in future cluster activations.

9. *How well was the SNFIC designed and implemented, and what were its strengths and weaknesses? In particular, was the SNFIC:*

a. Adequately staffed, equipped and funded?

Given the scale of the disaster, the SNFIC was adequately staffed indeed at least one coordinator reported having to look for something useful to do. One coordinator reported having to source/borrow equipment locally rather than arriving with all the necessary equipment, ready to hit the ground running. There were no concerns raised about funding although there was some confusion about the payment of per diems. The high turnover among coordinators was an issue, views ranged from some regret that it had been so high through to astonishment and almost anger at the constant changes.

Recommendations

- Ensure that coordinators have access to essential equipment before departure; the list of essential equipment needs to be agreed, publicised and adhered to; the responsibility for meeting these needs for IFRC and NS staff, and Independent Consultants to be agreed in advance⁴.
- Make every effort to ensure that each coordinator is deployed for a period of months rather than weeks.

b. Adequately supported by the Secretariat?

There were two key issues where the coordinators felt that they did not necessarily have the full backing of the Secretariat, namely:

- The decision to provide useful services to the clusters by looking first at the spring thaw contingency plan and subsequently the SSI list once the cold weather crisis was over.
- Preparation for and implementation of the exit and handover.

⁴ Coordinators in Tajikistan included IFRC Geneva and National Society staff, and independent consultants: their equipment needs are the same; the only real difference which can arise is who is expected to meet these needs. Independent consultants for instance can be asked to be responsible for providing their own laptop, but this needs to be agreed at the latest at the contract negotiation stage and even then this may be too late if departure is imminent.

It would of course be unrealistic to expect there to be no issues like this, but it may be useful to present the differing ways of looking at each. These are not direct quotes, rather synthesis of what came out of the review.

“The first rule of cluster coordination is you have no real power, so you have to provide value if you are to have any influence. In Tajikistan we achieved this by working on the spring thaw contingency plan and the SSI list. Both activities enhanced the cluster approach and IFRC’s reputation”

vs.

“One of the biggest dangers in any response is mission creep and that is what happened in Tajikistan. We should have been leading and coordinating, not providing technical assistance. We were right to exit rapidly and unilaterally, we should possibly have done so even earlier.”

“We should have started discussing and planning for the exit and handover from day one and kept our partners fully involved. Locally, understandings and agreements could have been made which would have assured a smooth and timely handover.”

vs.

“The team on the ground were doing nothing to limit mission creep and lacked the experience to manage the exit and handover, those further away had to take firm control to rectify the position and handover officially at the Headquarters level.”

Recommendations

- Discussions about IFRC’s exit and handover of the coordination role should be shared with senior staff and independent consultants occupying key posts in IFRC Geneva, the Zone, Region and Country offices from day one, and externally soon afterwards; this is especially important given the restriction in the MOU of IFRC’s role to the emergency phase.
- A broad understanding and consensus on the exit strategy needs to be reached between the same senior staff and independent consultants. Geneva should lead this process.
- The exit strategy needs to be shared and understood by IFRC’s partners in a timely manner.
- The Shelter Department should seek ways to increase its capacity to manage all elements of the deployments, from identifying suitable coordinators, through negotiating contracts and arrange travel, to debriefing.

c. Able to address all shelter and NFI related issues from the outset?

Given that the cold weather crisis was over within days of the first coordinator arriving in Tajikistan, this question is redundant.

d. Able to share responsibility for addressing these issues between appropriate agencies within SNFIC?

This question is again arguably redundant; the ESC coordination team did obtain full collaboration from other SNFIC members in developing the spring thaw scenario and the SSI list.

10. How did the SNFIC relate with

a. other clusters

The SNFIC related well to other clusters with the spring thaw contingency plan and SSI list seen to be of real value by the other clusters. The only issue which arose was reporting on SSI/NFIs as organisations were concerned about possibly having to report the same information through several clusters in different formats. This issue was quickly resolved.

b. the UN system

The SNFIC related well to the UN system although the exit and handover did raise particular problems for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), see below.

c. the Government?

Establishing an effective relationship with GOT is challenging for all organisations. There was no indication that SNFIC fared better or worse than any other agency. One of the IFRC team knew the country well and spoke Russian fluently; this allowed the team to obtain far more information than if they had had to rely on interpreters alone.

Recommendations

- Language skills should be an important criteria in selecting members of ESC coordination rosters and teams

11. Was there value in either linking or separating the SNFIC and the Red Cross relief operation?

Given SNFIC did not have any real operations, this question is in a sense redundant. That said, the Coordination team clearly recognised the value of acting and being seen to act independently of the IFRC country and RCST team.

Recommendation

- Recognise the value of not “double-hatting” people and ensure that the Coordination team can and are seen to be acting independently of the IFRC country and NS team.

Exit/handover strategy

12. Was the exit/handover strategy well designed and implemented?

Three interrelated issues are addressed here:

- Timing – was IFRC abrupt in departing at the end of April?
- Consultation – did IFRC act or at least appear to act unilaterally?
- Negotiation – how well were the negotiations handled with UNHCR?

Timing

The MOU is clear to those who have had the opportunity to study it; IFRC’s commitment is to the emergency shelter phase and is not open ended. Given the evaporating crisis and depending on the definition of the shelter sector, arguably the ESC coordinator should have been withdrawn by mid-March rather than the end of April.

The question of abruptness however is more one of partners’ perception. Their perception is understandable given that there appears to have been little discussion with partners

about exit and handover until mid-April at which stage a deadline of end-April was imposed given the planned departure of the then coordinator.

Consultation

The tight timing from the time that the exit/handover was first tabled to the departure of the last coordinator inevitably meant that it was difficult to consult and that actions appeared to be unilateral. The high turnover of coordinators and their differing understanding of their role in regard to the exit and handover also did not help.

Negotiation

UNHCR agreed in Dushanbe to take over the role of SNFIC coordinator provided that the arrangement remained informal. This was agreed by the Coordinator.

At the level of the Zone and Geneva level there was concern that a formal handover was required and an official letter announcing the handover was written. This caused consternation within UNHCR both in Geneva as they had not been involved in the discussion and in Tajikistan as they had agreed to the arrangement on condition that it remained informal.

Recommendations

- See recommendations made under 1, 3, 9 & 10

Visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross

13. What was the impact on visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross of assuming the cluster lead role?

The visibility of the International Federation and the Red Cross was raised by assuming the cluster lead role. IFRC's reputation was enhanced by the speed of response following cluster activation and the professionalism of those deployed.

The lack of understanding of IFRC's ESC coordination role at the country level prior to activation, the turnover of coordinators and the perceived abruptness of the exit and handover were mentioned by many partners as being of concern but for the vast majority did not significantly affect their overall evaluation of IFRC's contribution. A vocal minority did however feel that IFRC's reputation had been damaged.

Additional issues coming out of the review

Decision making

Accepting or refusing the ESC coordination role in any emergency is an important decision for IFRC as is the definition of the role and the exit/handover strategy.

The potential impact of getting it right in terms of saving lives is immense as is the potential for enhancing the reputation and visibility of both IFRC and NS. In addition closer involvement in cluster coordination can help IFRC and NS strengthen their role as a, if not the, leading humanitarian player in many countries, and that all essential sense of partnership with other organisations. During the review several people interviewed remarked on IFRC and NSs' immense capacity but at the same time lamented that they all too often appeared isolated from peer organisations.

Recommendations

- The enormous opportunities of IFRC's role as ESC coordinator to save lives is recognised and valued as a key means to achieve IFRC's Global Agenda Goals.
- The decision making process is reviewed to reflect the importance of getting it right.

Reporting lines and terms of reference

The reporting lines and terms of reference of an ESC coordinator are inevitably challenging to define. Coordinators have to relate to the coordination structure in the field, especially the RC or HC; they also have to relate to the country office and the regional and zonal offices as well; finally they have to relate to the Secretariat, especially the Shelter Department.

There appears to have been considerable confusion about reporting lines and terms of reference in Tajikistan despite Geneva feeling that clear written TORs had been provided. It is unclear how this confusion arose: one person interviewed reported that they had only received a verbal TOR; another reported finding several versions on file with no clear indication which one was in force; it was also unclear at times whether people were referring to the TOR for the coordinator or for the cluster as a whole.

Recommendations

- These relations and their nature need to be defined in written TOR for the coordinator; they need to be clear and workable; only one designated person should have the authority to approve the TOR and any subsequent revisions. Posting a reference copy on IFRC's intranet might be one way of reducing confusion.
- These TOR need to be compatible with the generic TOR developed by the IASC, and any major differences due for instance to the MOU need to be highlighted, understood and where necessary brought to the attention of both IFRC staff and partners

Logistical and administrative support, and human resource management

By the very nature of emergencies, ESC coordinators have to be deployed rapidly and given the inevitable difficulties in availability of suitable candidates, many will be external consultants and all will be on shorter than ideal assignments necessitating effective handovers.

This leads to considerable challenges in providing logistical and administrative support and human resource management. These challenges were not always met in the Tajikistan operation: problems were reported with travel arrangements, equipment, the payment of per diem, debriefing, in addition to the issues relating to TORs as above.

To an extent this is inevitable in the circumstances, but another way of looking at the problem is to recognise that the Shelter Department has taken on additional responsibilities for maintaining a roster of coordinators and deploying them in emergencies, and therefore needs to ensure that all the necessary systems and associated resources are in place to fulfil its responsibilities.

Recommendations

- The forthcoming ESC coordinators meeting is used as the ideal opportunity to identify what went well but also areas where improvement is necessary in terms of logistical and administrative support, and human resource management.
- Checklists and standard operating procedures are revised or developed accordingly
- Shelter Department's capacity to provide logistical and administrative support and human resource management is reviewed and gaps addressed. This may well require additional dedicated resources within the Department rather than relying on either current members of the Department or other sections of the Secretariat.

Annex A. Terms of Reference

A Review of the Tajikistan Cold Wave Response

Shelter and NFI Working Group

Background to the Tajikistan Shelter & NFI Working Group Review

Under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding between IFRC and UN OCHA, “subject to available resources, constitutional limits, and the rules and regulations of the Federation, the Federation will assume a coordination role for emergency shelter in specific emergency operations within an agreed coordination system”.

Tajikistan experienced its harshest winter for three decades with temperatures from early January plummeting below minus 20 degrees Celsius. Reports indicated that the combination of unusually cold weather and electrical shortages had a negative impact on human life and welfare beyond what was normally the case during winter in Tajikistan. Tajikistan's potential to produce electricity through its hydroelectric capacity is estimated to be the highest in the region, but it depends on its neighbours, notably Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, for electricity during the winter months. However, due to power shortages in those two countries, the amount that could be sent to Tajikistan had been vastly reduced this winter. This has left people in some villages with only one or two hours of electricity a day. The capital of Dushanbe also experienced severely reduced supplies of electricity with the Tajikistan power company introducing strict rationing since 7 February. The supply of daily electrical power was reduced to ten hours – five hours of electricity in the morning (from 5:00 AM to 10:00 AM) and five in the evening (from 5:00 PM to 10:00 PM), meaning no electricity overnight. The rationing has affected all residential buildings and businesses, with the only exceptions being “facilities of state-wide importance.” Taking into consideration that the centralized heating systems in Dushanbe and other cities have been almost entirely paralyzed since the early 1990s, residents in apartment blocks have no alternative means to heat their homes in the absence of energy from the city. An additional difficulty was that water levels in the main reservoir had fallen to the critical level of 860 metres above sea level; this is drawing very close to the dead point, meaning a shortage of water. The Asia-Plus information agency reports that the Tajikistan electricity system is taking urgent measures to avoid such a critical situation. Many antiquated water pipes around the country have either burst, become frozen or have clogged up. This evidently has had a major impact on the availability of water, and with sub-zero temperatures expected to continue, water shortages will remain an added hardship for the population, already struggling through this harsh winter. The government of Tajikistan has requested assistance from the international community in the form of an appeal for fuel and food.

The crisis developed in Tajikistan cannot be attributed to a single cause, but is rather the effect of a combination of interlocking shocks that have left the population in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The slow-onset nature of the crisis was accelerated by the plunge in electricity supply. On 31 January 2008 the Government of Tajikistan requested the United Nations Resident Coordinator's assistance in mobilising international assistance. The emergency response was managed through Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT), Tajikistan's Disaster Management Partnership comprising civil society, NGOs, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST), IFRC country office and United Nations. Following the global cluster approach, REACT was subdivided into sectoral groups for which UN agencies and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC) provided coordination support. Rapid assessments were carried out by the involved sectors, namely water and

sanitation, health, food, education and shelter and non-food items. A Rapid Response Coordination Team was used to process the work of the sectoral groups into this flash appeal and provide the link to the UN Resident Coordinator. The results of the REACT assessments showed that cumulatively, the health, lives and livelihoods of two million Tajiks were affected by the compound crisis and required urgent assistance.

On 21st February 2008, the UN Resident Coordinator in Tajikistan formally advised the UN ERC of the use of the cluster approach to “optimize our collective efforts, strengthen coordination among partners as well as to highlight the areas where additional resources are need to cover priority needs”. The International Federation agreed to convene the Shelter & NFIs cluster in support of the Government under the leadership of the Committee on Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (COESCD). The Zonal Representation of the International Federation requested support to enable the Disaster Management capacity of the International Federation in country to focus on the emergency operations.

IFRC was in charge of the coordination of the Shelter and No Food Items Cluster for two months, from 28/02/08 until 28/04/08. At the end of March with the easing of the cold wave, the attention of the cluster focused on developing strategies to address the spring thaw and the anticipated flooding and landslides. With the ending of the cold wave emergency and scaling back of distribution activities, at the end of April 2008 the International Federation Shelter & NFI Cluster Coordinator indicated that the International Federation would formally cease its cluster convener role, as ratified by the official letter sent by IFRC Zonal office to the UN Resident Coordinator

Objective of the Tajikistan Shelter and NFI Cluster (SNFIC) Review

The objectives of the SNFIC review are to:

1. review and analyse the experience of the International Federation with respect to the establishment and operation of the SNFIC, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations;
2. provide a foundation for establishing policy and guidelines for emergency shelter coordination (cluster) leadership at a national level, including identification of the appropriate mechanisms and procedures to support shelter leadership at the national level within the Secretariat;
3. provide recommendations with regard to the International Federation’s leadership of future emergency shelter coordination (cluster) activities both at global and at national levels.
4. examine if there were aspects of the Federation's cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.
5. Recommendations in designing exit/handover strategy: what did work and did not work in the emergency context.

Scope of the Review

The review will encompass, but not be limited to, the following areas:

1. The activation of the cluster process and the extent of involvement and influence of the Federation, as an IASC member, in the decision-making process;
2. the understanding and support of the Federation’s shelter coordination role within the in country delegation, the Zone, Regional Representation and Geneva;
3. the impact of the SNFIC on the Federation Delegation and the Tajikistan Red Crescent;

4. the design and implementation of the SNFIC, including factors and determinants which provided the SNFIC's strengths and weaknesses;
5. the value of linking and/or separating the SNFIC and the Red Cross relief operation;
6. the design and implementation of the exit/handover strategy;
7. relations with other clusters, the UN system and the Government;
8. the staffing of the SNFIC and the support provided from the Secretariat;
9. the equipping and funding of the SNFIC;
10. issues with regard to visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross.
11. specific aspects related to the No Food Item assistance instead of shelter assistance and implication in short, medium and long term perspective

Key issues that should be addressed include:

1. The cluster activation process, the involvement of the International Federation as an IASC member in this process, and the extent to which this activation was in accordance with the activation process as stated in the OCHA Guidance Note.
2. The extent to which the UN RC and UN OCHA considered the established REACT coordination under the leadership of the Committee on Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (COESCD) to be improved with the activation of the cluster system and what was the expected impact of the cluster system on the REACT coordination (permanent or transitional).
3. What had been the underneath consideration and advantages to use the cluster system to improve the response of the Humanitarian Community, according to the different stakeholders active in the country.
4. The role of OCHA as the cluster coordinator, including OCHA's role in the activation of the cluster process with reference to the Guidance Notes, OCHA's liaison with the Government on behalf of the cluster lead agencies including ensuring the cluster process was in support of Government coordination mechanisms, and OCHA's addressing of cross-cluster issues.
5. The role of the SNFIC in addressing all shelter and NFI related issues from the outset, the sharing of that responsibility between appropriate agencies within the SNFIC.
6. Exit strategy in this particular emergency context: challenges and opportunities to design an efficient exit strategy.

Methodology

The methodology employed by the reviewer/s in gathering and assessing information should include:

- A field visit to Dushanbe;
- Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the SNFIC (reference to the SNFIC Google/email group and website);
- Interviews with key internal stakeholders within the Secretariat in Geneva, (by 'phone) with Regional Delegation in Almati, Country Office in Dushanbe, and the Tajikistan Red Crescent;
- Interviews with other key stakeholders;
- Interviews with UN OCHA and the UN RC's office, UNDP office;

- Interviews with shelter agencies participating in the SNFIC;
- If feasible, interviews with beneficiaries (beneficiary perceptions regarding the extent to which the NFI response and the cluster approach is fulfilling their needs, and their satisfaction with their involvement in planning processes).

Proposed Timeline

The exercise will be implemented over a period from 30/06/08 to 30/09/08, with the first day spent in Geneva with Secretariat interviews.

Outputs

1. Concise, written document with key recommendations and supporting information. This document should be of use for discussing the IFRC experiences of the cluster process internally and also with key donors and other stakeholders.
2. Additional notes, summaries of interviews etc. as appropriate, or supporting documentation.
3. Summary of review activities undertaken, including interviews, visits, documents reviewed etc.

Key reference documents provided:

1. IFRC-UN OCHA Shelter MOU
2. IFRC Shelter Working Group Coordination Team TORs
3. All documents (meeting minutes, strategy documents etc.) from the SNFIC website.

Annex B. Questions posed in the Terms of Reference

Federation's (emergency) shelter coordination role

1. What was the level of understanding and support of the Federation's (emergency) shelter coordination role within the Country, Regional and Zone Representation and Geneva

Cluster activation

2. Was the cluster approach activated in accordance with the OCHA Guidance Note?
3. What was the extent of the Federation's involvement and influence, as an IASC member, in the decision-making process?
4. What was the intended and actually impact of cluster activation on REACT's coordination role?
5. Was the cluster approach activated purely to improve the humanitarian response or were there other considerations as well?

OCHA

6. What was OCHA's role in:
 - a. Activation of the cluster with reference to the Guidance Note
 - b. Overall cluster coordination
 - c. Liaison with Government on behalf of the cluster lead agencies
 - d. Ensuring the cluster process was in support of Government coordination mechanisms
 - e. Addressing cross-cluster issues?

SNFIC

7. Were all the NFIs dealt with by SNFIC shelter related, and if not what were the implications for SNFIC?
8. What was the impact of the SNFIC on the Federation Delegation and the Tajikistan Red Crescent?
9. How well was the SNFIC designed and implemented, and what were its strengths and weaknesses? In particular, was the SNFIC:
 - a. Adequately staffed, equipped and funded?
 - b. Adequately supported by the Secretariat?
 - c. Able to address all shelter and NFI related issues from the outset?
 - d. Able to share responsibility for addressing these issues between appropriate agencies within SNFIC?
10. How did the SNFIC relate with
 - a. other clusters
 - b. the UN system
 - c. the Government?
11. Was there value in either linking or separating the SNFIC and the Red Cross relief operation?

Exit/handover strategy

12. Was the exit/handover strategy well designed and implemented?

Visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross

13. What was the impact on visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross of assuming the cluster lead role?

Annex C. Memorandum of Understanding

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

**INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES**

And

**UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS**

**In regards
to the International Federation Assuming a**

Leading Role

in

Emergency Shelter in Natural Disasters

This Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) is entered into by and between:

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (the “Federation”)

And

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”.

1 Introduction

1.1 The Federation and Emergency Shelter

In the context of the Humanitarian Response Review initiated by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) gaps were identified in the ability of the humanitarian community to respond to humanitarian needs in several areas, including emergency shelter in natural disasters.

Based on a decision of the Federation’s Governing Board, the Federation’s General Assembly, held in Seoul in 2005, adopted a resolution supporting “The Federation’s offer to the [UN] Emergency Relief Coordinator to take a leadership role in the provision of emergency shelter in natural disasters, on the basis of the conditions established by the [Governing] Board [of the Federation] and an agreement to be negotiated by the Secretary General and ratified by the Board.”

The first steps towards reaching an agreement with OCHA on the Federation’s “leading” role in Emergency Shelter were taken through an exchange of letters concluded on 9 December 2005, between Mr. Markku Niskala, Secretary General of the Federation and Mr. Jan Egeland, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (see attached annex A). In these letters, the parties agreed that subject to a certain number of conditions being met, the Federation’s offer of a “leading” role in Emergency Shelter coordination and provisioning would be accepted. These conditions included:

1. the Federation shall at all times be able to adhere to the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,(the “Movement”) its policies and procedures as well as those of the Movement, relevant to international disaster response (including the Seville Agreement);
2. the Principle of Independence is upheld in respect of extra funding required to exercise this lead role;
3. the Federation will not accept accountability obligations beyond those defined in its Constitution and own polices; and

4. the responsibilities of such leadership are clearly defined, leaving no room for “open ended” or unlimited obligations.

The Federation’s offer to assume a “leading role” included scaling up its operational and coordination capacities and strengthening its capacity in the areas of shelter delivery, policy, technical expertise and the coordination of shelter requirements as well as agreeing to convene a network of interested humanitarian organizations.

2 Purpose

In compliance with the Federation’s General Assembly decision, the purpose of this MoU is to set out the terms and conditions under which the Parties will cooperate together to best assure that the emergency shelter needs in natural disasters are met.

3 Term

This MoU shall enter into force upon ratification by the Federation’s Governing Board and shall continue until terminated as set out herein.

4 Mandate and Governing Principles of the Federation

The Federation has a membership composed of 185 recognized National Red Cross and National Red Crescent Societies (the “National Societies”). It is organized as an international humanitarian organization with a recognized international legal personality headquartered in Geneva on the basis of a Status Agreement concluded with the Government of Switzerland. Its delegations in the field benefit from similar arrangements with the applicable Governments. It is one of the components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the “Movement”).

Among its functions, the Federation is mandated to “bring relief by all available means to all disaster victims” and to “organize, coordinate and direct international relief actions in accordance with the Principles and Rules adopted by the International Conference.”⁵

Constitutionally⁶, all Federation activities must be carried out “through or in agreement with” the National Society of the Country.

As per the Statutes of the Movement, “components of the Movement, while maintaining their independence and identity, cooperate whenever necessary with other organizations which are active in the humanitarian field, provided such organizations are pursuing a purpose similar to that of the

⁵ Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement art 6 para 4 c and e.

⁶ Art 3 para 2 Constitution of the International Federation: “In each Country the Federation shall act through or in agreement with the National Society and in conformity with the laws of that country.”

Movement and are prepared to respect the adherence by the components to the Fundamental Principles.”⁷

The activities of the Federation are further governed by the following instruments, among others:

- i. The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (attached as Annex B);
- ii. The Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement;
- iii. The Resolutions and Decisions of the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and of the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, including but not limited to “The Movement Regulations on the Use of the Emblem of the Red Cross or the Red Crescent by the National Societies”;
- iv. The Resolutions and Decisions of the Federation’s General Assembly and Governing Board; and
- v. The Agreement on the Organization of the International Activities of the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the “Seville Agreement”).

5 Definition of Emergency Shelter

For the purposes of this MoU, it has been agreed that “Emergency Shelter” is defined as:

“the provision of basic and immediate shelter needs necessary to ensure the survival of disaster affected persons, including “rapid response” solutions such as tents, insulation materials, other temporary emergency shelter solutions, and shelter related non-food items.”

This definition explicitly excludes transitional and permanent housing. The Federation reserves the right to amend this definition subject to its development and approval of emergency shelter policies by its General Assembly.

⁷ Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement art 7 para 5

The term 'Disaster' is used in the broad sense to include natural and technological hazards, but excluding situations of armed conflict.

Disaster: A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. *A disaster is a function of the risk process. It results from the combination of hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk.*

Natural hazards: Natural processes or phenomena occurring in the biosphere that may constitute a damaging event. *Natural hazards can be classified by origin namely: geological, hydrometeorological or biological. Hazardous events can vary in magnitude or intensity, frequency, duration, area of extent, speed of onset, spatial dispersion and temporal spacing.*

Technological hazards: Danger originating from technological or industrial accidents, dangerous procedures, infrastructure failures or certain human activities, which may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. *Some examples: industrial pollution, nuclear activities and radioactivity, toxic wastes, dam failures; transport, industrial or technological accidents (explosions, fires, spills).*

6 Activities Assumed by the Federation in a “Leading Role” in Emergency Shelter

In assuming a “leading role” in Emergency Shelter provision, the Federation in cooperation with interested National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, will deliver on the following objectives:

A. Globally:

6.1 Lead a Network of Interested Organizations. The Federation will coordinate a group of interested stakeholders in 'emergency shelter' the objective being to:

- establish a broad partnership base that engages in enhanced standard setting, monitoring and advocacy;
- establish and strengthen surge capacity and standby rosters;
- secure consistent access to appropriately trained technical expertise;
- establish or improve material stockpiles;
- improve response capacity through pooling and complementarity of effort and resources.

Specifically, the Federation will ensure:

- that assessments of the overall needs for human, financial, and institutional capacity for emergency shelter in natural disasters are undertaken;
- that currently available capacities and means for their utilization are reviewed;

- that the network's work is linked with other areas of activity, including preparedness measures and long-term planning, standards, best practice, advocacy, and resource mobilization;
- that action is taken to ensure that required capacities and mechanisms exist, including rosters for surge capacity; and
- that training and system development at the local, national, regional, and international levels is undertaken.

Through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) the Federation will aim to ensure that the work of this group is shared and coordinated with agencies working in related areas.

6.2 Scaling up its Operational Capacity: The Federation aims to scale up its global operational capacity in Emergency Shelter to support international responses to the emergency shelter needs of persons affected by natural disasters. The Federation will do its best to (1) make the humanitarian community aware of emergency shelter needs, and (2) mobilize a response to these needs.

6.3 Limitations

Neither the Federation nor the National Societies shall be held responsible for meeting the emergency shelter needs of affected persons when these are not being met by other agencies. The Federation will, insofar as adequate resources are made available, ensure adequate needs assessment, project design, budgeting, fund-raising; advocate for and do its utmost to ensure an adequate and appropriate response as far as the network's capacities, resources, as well as the access and security situation allow

B. Specific Emergency Operations:

6.4 Coordination role: Subject to available resources, constitutional limits, and the rules and regulations of the Federation, the Federation will assume a coordination role for emergency shelter in specific emergency operations within an agreed coordination system. When the Federation determines that it is not able to play this role it will inform the ERC immediately to allow for swift alternative action.

In a specific emergency operation, the Federation will seek to strengthen coordination within the network it will establish for emergency shelter in natural disasters by clarifying the division of labour among organizations, better defining roles and responsibilities.

Specifically, the Federation will ensure:

- that needs assessment and analysis of emergency shelter in natural disasters is undertaken fully inclusive of partners and with the participation of affected populations;
- identification of the capacities of network participants and other relevant actors;
- development of response plans to address priority needs;
- appropriate delegation and following-up on commitments from network participants to act in particular areas;

- awareness for emergency shelter needs in natural disasters, resource mobilization, and interaction with other groups that coordinate specific areas of activity;
- sustaining mechanisms through which the network as a whole monitors and assesses its performance.

7 Financing

It is agreed that IFRC will fund its own activities as set out in this MoU. The United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and OCHA will encourage donors to contribute to emergency shelter activities, including the Federation's emergency shelter activities, according to emergency needs on the ground. In line with the leadership role in the provision of emergency shelter in natural disasters, IFRC will coordinate, with other agencies in the emergency shelter network, the HC/RCs and OCHA, the preparation of Appeals and other funding activities to ensure coherence in the emergency shelter response.

8 Public Representations

It is agreed that any OCHA press releases and any other public announcements concerning the role or activities of the Federation and/or the National Societies in Emergency Shelter, will reflect the terms agreed in this MOU and the Exchange of Letters.

Specifically, the Federation shall be referred to as the "convener" of the Emergency Shelter Network.

No Party shall use the name, emblem or trademarks of any other party, its subsidiaries, and/or affiliates, or any abbreviation thereof, in connection with its business or otherwise without the express prior written approval of the other Party in each case.

9 Reporting/Coordination

The Federation agrees to regularly keep the ERC and the HC/RC informed on the progress of the activities set out above, through the mechanisms established by the IASC and through any specifically agreed coordination mechanisms established for individual operations.

10 Final Provisions:

10.1 Subject to Available Resources All Federation activities envisaged under this agreement shall be subject to available funding and capacity for shelter related activities.

10.2 Termination:

- a. Either of the Parties may withdraw from this MOU for any reason at any time with ninety (90) days prior written notice.
- b. Either Party may immediately terminate this MOU if (i) its name, logo or emblem suffers disrepute as a result of the acts or omissions of the other Party, or (ii) after having brought to the attention of the other Party a grave violation of the present agreement provided the other party has not rectified that violation within fifteen (15) days of receipt of notification.
- c. In case of termination, the Parties undertake to continue to collaborate in good faith with a view to allow for the smooth winding down of any activities governed under this agreement.

10.4 Dispute Settlement:

Should there be disagreement between the signatories to this agreement or the Country Level or Project Level agreements on a course of action, the matter will be sent to the relevant Headquarters to be resolved through negotiation

10.5 Amendment:

The MOU may be modified at any time in writing as agreed by the Parties. Material modifications will only go into effect once ratified by the Federation’s Governing Board.

10.6 Privileges and Immunities:

Nothing in or relating to this MoU shall be deemed a waiver, express or implied, of any of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, including OCHA, nor of the Federation or its membership.

In witness whereof, both Parties have initialed each page and signed the day first herein referred to:

Markku Niskala
 Secretary General
 International Federation of
 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Jan Egeland
 Under-Secretary General
 for Humanitarian Affairs
 and Emergency Relief

 Signature:

 Signature:

 Date and Place:

 Date and Place:

Annex D. UN Resident Coordinator's letter to ERC 21.02.08



Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Tajikistan

21 February 2008

Ref: UNRC/NV/MN/FO/08/030

Mr. John Holmes
UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and
Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs
OCHA New York

Dear Mr. Holmes,

DESIGNATION OF CLUSTER LEADS IN TAJIKISTAN EMERGENCY

As you are aware, Tajikistan has experienced severe weather conditions recently, imposing an urgent requirement for humanitarian responses in several sectors.

Following consultations in the humanitarian country team, we have agreed to use the cluster approach to organise our response to the current disaster in Tajikistan. The cluster approach will enable us to optimise our collective efforts, strengthen coordination among partners as well as to highlight the areas where additional resources are needed to cover priority needs.

In Tajikistan, the Rapid Emergency Assessment and Response Team (REACT) coordinates humanitarian response at the operational level under the Committee on Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (COESCD). REACT is co-chaired by COESCD and the UN Resident Coordinator and is comprised of INGOs, UN agencies and relevant Government departments. REACT has proven an effective information sharing forum and coordination mechanism that places the Government in the 'driver's seat' while ensuring maximum cohesiveness between Government and the international community. The pre-existing sectoral working groups and designated leads within REACT are as follows:

Cluster	Lead agency	Government lead
Emergency Preparedness	UNDP	COESCD/REACT
Health	WHO	MOH
Water and sanitation	UNICEF	MOH, MOM&WS
Food Security	WFP	MOA&E
Education	UNICEF	MOE
Emergency shelter & NFIs	IFRC	COESCD
Logistics	UNJLC	COESCD, MTC
Energy & Early Recovery	UNDP	MOE&I/MOED&T


We would wish to retain the existing REACT mechanism to avoid establishment of

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parallel mechanisms. The Cluster Approach which would enable UN agencies and donors to bolster the REACT Sector/Cluster groups and to facilitate logistics, procurement, customs clearance and information management and reporting. Please note the Logistics Cluster would be activated pending results of a WFP/UNJLC assessment to be deployed over the next few days. An interagency Logistics Support Unit has been established under WFP's lead to cover requirements in the interim.

I would be grateful for your support in mobilizing the required resources outlined in the flash appeal to meet the urgent humanitarian needs in Tajikistan. I would also be grateful of you could inform the global sector/cluster leads of these arrangements in place for the humanitarian operation in Tajikistan, and if you could confirm that there are no objections to these arrangements.

Yours sincerely,



Michael P. Jones

UN Resident Coordinator, Tajikistan

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Annex E. Message from the ERC on the Cluster Approach in Tajikistan 27.02.08

Letizia Rossano/OCHA/NY

27.02.200823:04

Message from the ERC on the Cluster Approach in Tajikistan

THE FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE FROM JOHN HOLMES, EMERGENCY RELIEF COORDINATOR

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter dated 21 February on the designation of Cluster Leads in Tajikistan Emergency in support of the Government of Tajikistan. I have sent a message to IASC members on the eight priority areas you have mentioned as reflected in the existing Rapid Assessment and Response Team (REACT) under the Committee on Emergency Situation and Civil Defence (COESCD) of the Government of Tajikistan.

There were no objections to your proposal to retain the existing REACT mechanism, as well as the agreed arrangement regarding the designation of WFP as the cluster/sector lead agency for the Logistics cluster, rather than UNJLC.

Annex F. Key documents

1. Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan Contingency Plan, confirmed by RCST HQ decree (from May 04 2007)
2. End of Mission Report, Steve Barton, Australian Red Cross, 15th April 2008
3. Delegate's Final Report, Ene Mai Oks
4. Minutes of SNFIC meeting 4th March 2008

Annex G. IFRC Coordination team in Tajikistan

Name⁸	Role	Dates, all 2008	Comments
Malcolm Johnstone	Assessment and Coordinator	28 th February to 10 th March	Shelter Department, IFRC, Geneva
Jyri Rantanen	Coordinator	3 rd to 17 th March	
Graham Eastmond	Coordinator	4 th to 27 th March	Mentored by Jyri Rantanen
Lucien Lefcourt	Information Manager	6 th to 27 th March	
Steve Barton	Coordinator	24 th March to 14 th April	
Ene-Mai Oks	Coordinator	6 th to 28 th April	

⁸ See Annex H. for contact details

Annex H. Contacts

Name	Position	Organisation	Based	Phone	Mobile	Email	Notes
Ene-Mai Oks	ESC Coordinator, Tajikistan	Australian RC				ene.mai.oks@gmail.com	Phone interview 1st August 2008
Steve Barton	SNFIC Coordinator, Tajikistan	Australian RC				steveb@netcon.net.au	Phone interview 1st August 2008
Dylan Winder	Head, DFID Tajikistan	British Embassy	Dushanbe, Tajikistan	(+992 37) 224 2221	(+992) 90 771 53 66	DF-Winder@dfid.gov.uk	Meeting in Dushanbe 9th July 2008
Marianne Taning	M&E manager & Temporary Emergency Coordinator	CARE	Dushanbe, Tajikistan			marianna@care.tj	Meeting in Dushanbe 9 th July 2008
Adam Vinaman Yao	Head of Office for Central Asia	ECHO	Dushanbe, Tajikistan			adam.yao@echo.tajnet.com	Meeting in Dushanbe 8 th July 2008
Jyri Rantanen	ESC Coordinator, Tajikistan	Finnish RC				jyri.rantanen@mac.com	Phone interview 30th July 2008
Jamolidin Vohidov	Construction Manager	Habitat for Humanity	Dushanbe, Tajikistan			jamolidin@habitat.tj	Meeting in Dushanbe 8th July 2008
Samiza		Habitat for Humanity	Dushanbe, Tajikistan			samiza@habitat.tj	Meeting in Dushanbe 8th July 2008
Anna Maria Selleri	Senior Officer, Sheltering and Shelter Policy	IFRC	Geneva, Switzerland	+41 (0) 22 730 4528	+41 (0) 79 217 3337	annamaria.selleri@ifrc.org	Phone interviews and meetings in Geneva before and after visit to Tajikistan
Drina Karahasnovic	Regional Representative for Central Asia	IFRC	Almaty, Kazakhstan	+7 (727) 291 88 38	+7 (701) 74 44 331	Drina.Karahasanovic@ifrc.org	Phone interview 23rd July 2008
Graham Saunders	Head of Shelter	IFRC	Geneva, Switzerland	+41 (22) 730 4241		graham.saunders@ifrc.org	Phone interviews before and after visit to Tajikistan

Leon Prop	Deputy Head of Europe Zone	IFRC	Budapest, Hungary	+36 (1) 888 4502	+36 709537701	leon.prop@ifrc.org	Phone interview 28th July 2008
Malcolm Johnstone	Shelter Project Officer	IFRC	Geneva, Switzerland	+41 (0) 22 730 4504	+41 (0) 79 217 3358	malcolm.johnstone@ifrc.org	Phone interviews and meetings in Geneva before and after visit to Tajikistan
Robert Mister	Coordinator - Inter-Agency Cooperation	IFRC	Geneva, Switzerland	+41 (0) 22 730 4418	+41 (0) 78 614 3409	Robert.Mister@ifrc.org	Meeting in Geneva 24th July
Shamsudin Muhudinov	DM Programme Manager	IFRC	Dushanbe, Tajikistan			shamsudinmuhudinov@ifrc.org	Meetings in Dushanbe during visit
Shavkat Ismailov	Programme Coordinator	IFRC	Dushanbe, Tajikistan			Shavkat.ismailov@ifrc.org	Meeting in Dushanbe 9th July 2008
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Brandy Westerman	Country Director	MercyCorps	Dushanbe, Tajikistan			brandy@tj.mercycorps.org	Meeting in Dushanbe 8 th July 2008
Ali Buzurukov	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA	Almaty, Kazakhstan	+7 (727) 2582 643 ext 1246	+992 (919) 23 44 75	buzurukov@un.org	Phone interview 15th August 2008

Alinazarov Oavlatbek	Head of Disaster Management	RCST	Dushanbe, Tajikistan				rcstjdm@mail.ru	Meeting in Dushanbe 7 th July 2008
Khusrav Sharifov	Manager, Disaster Risk Management Programme	UNDP	Dushanbe, Tajikistan	(+992 47) 441 0737	(+992 918) 707858		khusrav.sharifov@undp.org	Meeting in Dushanbe 7 th July 2008
Ilija Todorovic	Representative	UNHCR	Dushanbe, Tajikistan				todorovi@unhcr.org	Meeting in Dushanbe 8 th July 2008
Golam Mahmud	Emergency Adviser	UNICEF	Dushanbe, Tajikistan				gomahmud@unicef.org	Meeting in Dushanbe 9 th July 2008
Ruth Leano	Deputy Representative	UNICEF	Dushanbe, Tajikistan				rleano@unicef.org	Meeting in Dushanbe 9 th July 2008
Michael P Jones	Resident Coordinator	United Nations	Dushanbe, Tajikistan				michael.jone@undp.org	Meeting in Dushanbe 9 th July 2008
AnneMarie van den Berg	Deputy Country Director	WFP	Dushanbe, Tajikistan				annemarie.vandenberg@wfp.org	Meeting in Dushanbe 7 th July 2008

Annex I. Master list of Shelter and Non Food Items

31.3.08 SNFIC coordinator IFRC Dushanbe Tajikistan

General notes:

- The items are listed in groups but these are not suggested as kits but as a list to select suitable items from depending on the assessed need of the beneficiary
- The list assumes an average family size of 7
- Column P indicates level of priority as follows A = highest priority B = Secondary priority
- Column S indicates a season or location specific item. C = Cold W= Where potable water not available U = urban
- Item number column gives each item a specific number to assist identification and ordering
- Photo column shows if there is a photo of this item in the photo list

No	P	S	Item	Description	No per Family	UOM	Estimated Cost/item TJS	Total cost per family	Comment
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Emergency Relief Items

Household emergency relief items: For household (7 members)

HER 1	A		Bucket	Plastic, 10ltr with lid (cover)	1	Item	25	25	Food storage etc
HER 2	B		Wash tub	Plastic	1	Item	25	25	Clothes and other washing
HER 3	A		Kitchen kit	Metal 7ltr & 5ltr (1 of each) , Bowls, plates, cups, spoons forks and knives (7 of each) Kitchen knife (1)	1	Kit	100	100	Cooking and eating
HER 4	B		Teapot	Metal 10ltr	1	Item	20	0	For boiling water
HER 5	A		Pot	2.0 liter, Non-glass inner	1	Item	20	0	For water storage
HER 6	B	C	Thermos flasks	20Ltr, rigid or collapsible, food grade plastic, screw cap	1	Item	20	20	For carrying water
HER 7	B		Jerry can	10Ltr, rigid or collapsible, food grade plastic, screw cap	2	Items	15	30	Must have multi language instruction sheet
HER 8	A	W	Water purification tablets					0	Lighting
HER 9			Kerosene lamp		1	Item	6	0	Lighting
HER 10	B	Y	Candles	Hurricane lamp	2	Packs	6	12	Lighting
HER 11	A		Matches	Pack of 20				0	
HER 12	A		Hygiene kit		1	Kit	150	150	Hygiene and basic first aid
HER 13	A			Towel (5), soap (4 bars), powdered laundry detergent (2 kg), powdered dish washing detergent (2kg) dental paste (2 tube), tooth brush (5), toilet paper (5) sanitary napkins (kotex) (112), basic first aid kit, wide cotton bandage, bandage, white headscarf, adhesive plaster, iodine.					
HER 14	A		Mattress	Mattress, 0.9m x 1.90m, high density foam, (or if local purchase 6kg cotton) strong cover	7	Items	56	392	
HER 15	B		Pillow	Cotton 1.5kg	7	Items	48	0	
HER 16	A		Quilt	Cotton 4kg 2.05m x 1.45m	7	Items	48	336	
HER 17	A	C	Blanket	BLANKET, woven, 100% synth., 1.5x2m, high thermal resistance	7	Items	100	700	Winter use
HER 18	A		Blanket	BLANKET, woven, 50%wool, 1.5x2m, medium thermal resistance	7	Items	25	175	Summer use
HER 19	A		Bed linen kit	Sheets (2) quilt cover (1) pillow slip (2)	7	Kits	15	0	
HER 20	B	C	Hot water bags	3 ltr, rubber, preferably non China production					

household emergency relief*

Household emergency tools list:

HET 1	A	Y	Shovel	Shovel, long (wood) handle pointed tempered steel head	1	Item	15	15	
HET 2	A	Y	Hoe	Hoe, head 230 x 175 mm. 1.36kg in forged steel with separate wooden	1	Item	15	15	

No	P	S	Photo	Item	Description	No per Family	UOM	Estimated Cost/item TJS	Total cost per family	Comment
HET 3	A	Y	Y	Axe	handle	1	Item	15	15	
HET 4	A	Y	Y	Bucket	With wooden handle	2	Items	11	22	
HET 5	A	Y	Y	Claw hammer	Claw Hammer, Weight 0.5 kg, wooden handle	1	Item	25	25	
HET 6	A	Y	Y	Saw	Length 750 mm for wood, tempered steel, hardened and set	1	Item	25	25	
HET 7	A	Y	Y	Nails 100 mm	Steel	5	Kg	0	0	
HET 8	A	Y	Y	Roofing Nails	Capped Roofing Nails with attached rubber washer 75mm x 3mm (3"), twisted and galvanized preferred,	3	Kg	0	0	
HET 9	B	Y	Y	Pickaxe	Steelhead, chisel and point, detachable handle	1	Item	35	35	
household emergency tools*										
Household emergency stoves:										
HES 1	B	Y	Y	Stove (kerosene)	1.5 - 2 ltr	1	35	0	0	
HES 2	B	Y	Y	Stove (wood)				0	0	
HES 3	B	U	Y	Stove (gas)	Mounted direct to 5kg gas bottle	1		0	0	
HES 4	B	U	Y	Stove (gas)	Table top model single burner	1		0	0	
HES 5	B	U	Y	Stove (electric)	Single ring element	1	25	0	0	
household emergency stoves*										
Household emergency shelter materials list: Quantities recommended for 1 household (7 members)										
Note: Households except in extreme circumstances will probably prefer shelter recovery items										
HESM 1	B			Summer tent	20 - 28 m2	1	Item	0	0	
HESM 2	C			Winterized tent	20 - 28 m2	1	Item	0	0	
HESM 3	A			Tarpaulin	Woven plastic, 4 x 6 m, white/white, piece	2	Items	0	0	
HESM 4	A			Plastic sheet	Woven plastic, weight 170g/m2			0	0	
HESM 5	A	Y		Rope	Polypropylene, diam. 8 mm, twisted	50	Meters	1	50	
HESM 6	A			Tie wire	Diameter 2mm 5m long roll	5	Meters	0	0	
HESM 7	Y	Y	Y	Nails 100 mm	Steel or galvanized	5	Kg	25	125	
HESM 8	Y	Y	Y	Roofing Nails	Capped Roofing Nails with attached rubber washer 75mm x 3mm (3"), twisted and galvanized preferred, (12 per sheet)	20	Kg	7	140	
household emergency shelter materials*										
Household emergency clothing list:										
HECL 1				Clothes for female adult	Coat or sweater ?	?	?			
HECL 2				Clothes for male adult	Coat or sweater and long work pants ?	?	?			
HECL 3				Clothes for female child	Coat or sweater ?	?	?			
HECL 4				Clothes for male child	Coat or sweater and long work pants ?	?	?			
HECL 5				Shoes for female adult	Rubber boot ?	?	?			
HECL 6				Shoes for male adult	Rubber boot ?	?	?			
HECL 7				Shoes for female child	Rubber boot ?	?	?			
HECL 8				Shoes for female child	Rubber boot ?	?	?			
HECL 9										
HECL 10				Second hand clothes summer						

No	P	S	Photo	Item	Description	No per Family	UOM	Estimated Cost/item TJS	Total cost per family	Comment
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HECL 11				Second hand clothes winter						
				households emergency clothing*						

Recovery items

Family tool kit: One kit to be distributed to share between 2 or 3 families.
NOTE: Includes items detailed above that may have already been distributed in emergency phase.

HRTK 1	Y			Claw hammer	Claw Hammer, Weight 0.5 kg, wooden handle	1	Item	15	15	
HRTK 2	Y			Nail drawer (pinch bar)		1	Item	15	15	
HRTK 3	Y			Two man saw		1	Item	40	40	
HRTK 4	Y			Handsaw	Length 750 mm for wood, tempered steel, hardened and set	1	Item	15	15	
HRTK 5	Y			Hand Plane		1	Item	35	35	
HRTK 6	Y			Spirit level		1	Item	25	25	
HRTK 7	Y			Tape measure	Steel, 5 or 7.5 meter	1	Item	8	8	
HRTK 8	Y			Small trowel		1	Item	7	7	
HRTK 9	Y			Large trowel		1	Item	10	10	
HRTK 10	Y			Crowbar		1	Item	0	0	
HRTK 11	Y			Sledge Hammer		1	Item	0	0	
HRTK 12	Y			Metal bucket		1	Item	0	0	
HRTK 13	Y			12mm rope (10m long)		1	Item	0	0	
HRTK 14	Y			String line		1	Item	0	0	
HRTK 15	Y			Pickaxe	Steelhead, chisel and point, detachable handle	1	Item	15	15	
HRTK 16	Y			Pliers		1	Item	0	0	
HRTK 17	Y			Tin snips		1	Item	17	17	

household recovery tool kit*

Household shelter recovery materials list: Quantities recommended for 1 household (7 members)

HRSM 1	Y			Nails 100 mm	Steel or galvanized	5	Kg	25	125	
HRSM 2	Y			Nails 150mm	Steel or galvanized	5	Kg	25	125	
HRSM 3	Y			Roofing Nails	Capped Roofing Nails with attached rubber washer 75mm x 3mm (3"), twisted and galvanized preferred, (12 per sheet)	20	Kg	7	140	
HRSM 4	Y			Roof Iron	Corrugated Galvanized 0.8m x 2m, thickness: Minimum 28G(.37mm)	80	pcs	35	2,800	
HRSM 5	Y			Cement	Portland 45, 50kg, bag	40	pcs	0	0	
HRSM 7	Y			Framing timber						
HRSM 8	Y			Door						
HRSM 9	Y			Door hinge						
HRSM 10	Y			Window						
HRSM 11	Y			Window hinge						

household recovery shelter materials*