



# Real Time Evaluation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' Response to the MENA Civil Unrest

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## Acronyms

DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
TRC	Tunisian Red Crescent
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
TCN	Third Country Nationals
NS	National Societies
DoZ	Director of Zone
Zone Office	Middle East and North Africa Zone
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
PMER	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EUNS	European Union National Societies
HR	Human Resources

## Acknowledgments

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## Executive Summary

As a result of unprecedented civil unrest across a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), national societies and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) have responded to the humanitarian crisis resulting from population movement and conflict.

The current amount appealed for in the Emergency Appeal is CHF 15,145,920 targeting a total of 300,000 beneficiaries. This covers operations in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. The IFRC has deployed many of its global tools in response to the crisis including allocations from DREF, the deployment of surge capacity in the form of FACT and ERUs. Regional resources including RDRTs have also been deployed as well as bilateral coordinated responses from sister national societies in the region.

The International Federation has commissioned this evaluation to “assess the on-going IFRC response to the MENA crisis to inform continued response and preparedness in the MENA region, as well as future global emergency relief operations”.

As of the 30<sup>th</sup> of June the IFRC Emergency Appeal was 69% covered, with approximately half of the budget allocated to support the Tunisian Red Crescent response to an influx of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) and Refugees. Staff and volunteers worked hard and were motivated to do their best in support of the operation. A number of factors contributed to inefficiencies in the management of operations by the IFRC. This included lack of leadership and experience among some staff in the Zone office to manage such an unexpected complex emergency. In addition, the lack of a position/policy in the Secretariat on camp management concomitant with a lack of investment in such a specialized set of skills meant that the Al-Hayet camp took a long time to set up. Although of good quality, the camp may have served a larger number of TCNs had it been opened earlier and may have been more cost effective.

The Global tools, such as Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT) and the Emergency Response Units (ERUs) proved to be useful preparedness and response measures specifically for the operation in Tunisia. However the deployment of FACT was delayed as a result of a lack of understanding about the mechanism within the MENA Zone. Regional resources such as RDRTs were also used, however despite having cultural awareness and Arabic as a first language, difficulties were encountered when having to work with international teams that did not speak Arabic. There were also delays associated with visa requirements for RDRTs which delayed their deployment and once deployed they did not always have the required skills.

While adequate financial management resources were available in the Zone, the Regional and field offices in Tunisia lacked adequate staffing with the pre-requisite skills to undertake budget analysis and forecasting. The availability of financial surge capacity both from Geneva and the Zone supported the operation in Tunisia, however alternative surge capacity mechanisms are required for finance management.

Operational updates were regularly done, however these did not provide all the necessary information for Participating National Societies (PNS) to raise resources or know how best to support the different operations. In addition confusion was evident in the Zone office as to the responsibilities of the PMER and the Performance and Accountability functions.

Human resource recruitment caused many operational difficulties. These resulted from a lack of experience of HR personnel at the Zone level as well as delays caused by the sign off procedures for recruitment by Zone Senior Management. Despite efforts to increase Zonal HR capacity, which were refused, there continued to be slow recruitment processes due to a lack of trust between the Zone and field operations. In addition, individuals recruited for less than three months are contracted as consultants, not delegate employees, as the secretariat's insurance supplier will not insure staff employed for less than 3 months. This places both individuals and the organization at risk.

Appropriate security advice has been provided to managers throughout the operation. However it appears that there is confusion about the role of security advisors and the role of operation and other managers in security management. Clearer dissemination of the distinction between security advice and security

management is needed for staff throughout the organization. The application of Integration Agreements in insecure contexts should be reviewed. It is unlikely in insecure contexts such as Yemen that IFRC with the presence of one delegate can fulfil the services under such agreements particularly where obligations relate to security.

There is a lack of clarity among members of the Federation and the staff of the organization about the roles and responsibilities of different parts of the Secretariat. Recent efforts<sup>1</sup> to describe these have helped but further work is required to describe in detail how operations should be managed.

The IFRC has lacked the human resources to undertake coordination at Zonal level. Despite offers of support from the Geneva Secretariat office, these were predominantly refused and the Zone for the most part did not have the appropriate experienced staff to coordinate the operation either at a managerial level, or a technical and support services level; in some cases staff with significant operational experience were not accorded suitable responsibilities. The presence of new staff who did not know how the IFRC systems and mechanism functioned and who did not receive managerial and technical support exacerbated the situation. The lack of trust that developed between the Zone and other offices both within the Zone and with the Geneva Secretariat ultimately made coordination erratic and haphazard. This impacted on coordination with PNS and the ICRC and reduced fundraising opportunities.

At country and operational level coordination with PNS, the ICRC and external partners was positive. However, the IFRC was often unable to fulfil its mandate to have representatives working with national societies to ensure that capacity and organizational development could take place at the same time as response. In addition for a crisis of this nature it would have been useful to have an overall operational framework agreed among Movement components at an early date. This would have helped harness national society interest and resources as well as created a common platform from which to operate. A resource mobilization strategy could have been used to ensure that commitments were in line with the requirements of the operation.

Unilateral action was undertaken by some national societies. However, these were eventually coordinated to varying extent with the IFRC and the host national society. It remains important to ensure that the Fundamental Principles of the Movement are disseminated in such contexts in order to reduce unilateral action that is a threat to the principle of Unity.

The Federation Secretariat, among others, was not prepared for the events which unfolded in MENA. The Emergency Appeal highlighted the need for contingency planning as a priority. However to date national society contingency plans have not been revised and the Zone contingency and response plan is inconsistent with the Federations guidelines for contingency and response planning.

The use of RDRT in the operation was a positive development, however not all the members had been trained to work in this context and did not always have the required skills. The Zone also does not have a mechanism for managing RDRT members, which made it difficult to deploy team members.

Many of the national societies in the appeal are likely to undergo organizational change and development as a result of the crises in their societies. This will require IFRC support to promote effective and transparent processes to be put in place for change to follow legal and constitutional processes in order to ensure that capacity development occurs in a positive manner.

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<sup>1</sup> Moving Forward Together paper submitted to the Governing Board in May 2010

## 1.0 Introduction

Since January 2011 the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has experienced unprecedented civil unrest across a number of countries. The geopolitical consequences are yet to unfold in the region. However, the humanitarian consequences were quickly apparent with concern for the protection of civilians as well as humanitarian needs resulting from violence and population movement.

In addition to country based allocations from the Disaster Relief Emergency fund (DREF) to both Tunisia and Egypt for internal civil unrest<sup>2</sup> the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) allocated an initial CHF 59,374 from DREF in support of National Society actions. This was followed by a Preliminary Regional Emergency Appeal which was revised a number of times to reflect the evolving nature of the crisis in the region. The current total sum appealed for is CHF 15,145,920 (Appeal ref: MDR82001REA). Current appeal coverage is 69%<sup>3</sup> of the total requested. This coverage represents both in kind and cash contributions to the appeal.

The appeal targets 300,000 beneficiaries and has used the skills and resources available through the International Federation disaster response mechanism including delegates, Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT), Emergency Response Units (ERUs) and partner national societies (PNS).

The International Federation commissioned this evaluation to “assess the on-going IFRC response to the MENA crisis to inform continued response and preparedness in the MENA region, as well as future global emergency relief operations.”<sup>4</sup>

The evaluation adheres to the IFRC Framework for Evaluation including an examination of evaluation criteria such as appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. The evaluation also ensured that findings contributed to:

- improvement of IFRC work and mission to help those in need.
- organizational learning.
- upholding accountability and transparency.
- promotion and celebration of IFRC work.

## 2.0 Background

The evolving situation in the Middle East and North Africa was not predicted by humanitarian organizations working in the region and did not historically form a fundamental part of preparedness planning. This is a different typology of crisis. In most of the countries involved the crisis is not a traditional internal conflict<sup>5</sup> and is in fact based on popular uprisings demanding socio-political change.

### 2.1 Country Contexts

As a result of civil unrest in Libya large numbers<sup>6</sup> of people have fled the country, the majority to neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia. Initially those fleeing the country were Third Country Nationals (TCNs), predominantly migrant workers in Libya. More recently there is an increased trend of Libyans fleeing their country. This is evident in the increased numbers being hosted throughout different areas of Tunisia.

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<sup>2</sup> These DREF allocations are not being studied during this evaluation but are mentioned in order to set the context in which the national societies were operating in, i.e. internal political tensions existed and continue to exist in both Egypt and Tunisia.

<sup>3</sup> As of 30<sup>th</sup> June.

<sup>4</sup> Terms of reference for a Real Time Evaluation of the IFRC response to the North Africa/Middle East crisis 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Libya being the exception, with internal conflict perhaps best describing the current situation.

<sup>6</sup> In June 2011, it was reported that approximately 850,000 people had fled, however reports vary and in addition the numbers are constantly fluctuating.

In Syria the continued civil unrest and confrontation with the government has resulted in deaths and injuries as well as large numbers fleeing the country into Turkey. These refugees are housed in tented camps close to the Syrian border.

Yemen also continues to suffer from civil unrest which has resulted in death and injury as well as internal displacement among the population. There remains no end in sight for the unrest and the potential for a civil conflict remains high.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is working to support the National Societies in these countries to respond to needs and to prepare for potential escalation of tensions and humanitarian needs.

## 2.2 The IFRC in the region

The Federation Secretariat has two offices in the MENA region. The zone office is in Amman, Jordan and the Regional Office for North Africa in Tunis, Tunisia. The recent history of the Federation Secretariat in the region has been erratic. At the inception of the Zone office in 2007 it was decided that the former regional office in Amman would be closed and the Zone office would be based in Doha, Qatar. However, despite many attempts an agreement was never reached and the Federation Secretariat then attempted to open an office in Cairo, Egypt. This also never materialized and the Zone office was ultimately opened in Amman, Jordan in 2009. This has meant that the Zone office was in essence functioning without a base for some time, unable to hire staff and have a stable base from which to operate and support national societies. The Zone has also had two managers over a short period of time including the current Director of Zone, who at the time of writing was departing his post at the end of his two year contract. This was mirrored in the Regional Office for North Africa which did not have a Regional Representative for a period of 8 months prior to the arrival of the current Regional Representative one week prior to the crisis in North of Africa.

## 2.3 Middle East and North Africa National Societies

The national societies in the MENA region that have responded to the crisis have varying capacities. Two of the national societies, i.e. the Egyptian and Tunisian Red Crescent, had only recently experienced internal civil unrest that resulted in the fall of their respective Governments followed quickly by the need to respond to an influx of TCNs and Refugees from Libya. The respective national societies are therefore operating in a volatile and unprecedented environment in responding to the Libyan crisis. The same is true of national societies such as Syria and Yemen where continued civil unrest places the national society in a difficult position with respect to its responsibilities as auxiliary to public authorities and the need to uphold the fundamental principles of the Movement.

Two other key characteristics describe the national societies in the MENA Zone. These are:

- The increasing capacity and capability of a number of the national societies to operate internationally in solidarity with sister national societies in the MENA region and other regions.
- Many of the national societies have close working relationships with their respective Governments and this relationship can in some circumstances support a perception of a lack of independence, with consequences on perceptions of neutrality and impartiality.

## 3.0 Scope and Objectives

The Real Time Evaluation (RTE) covered the work of the IFRC<sup>7</sup> in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, the Zone and Geneva. Please see Annex 1. for the Evaluation Terms of Reference.

The RTE focussed on the actions falling under and contributing to the Regional Emergency Appeal (Appeal ref: MDR82001REA). It excludes actions undertaken in relation to internal civil unrest that took place earlier

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<sup>7</sup> The IFRC for the purposes of this RTE will include the Red Cross and Red Crescent NSs supporting the operation within the IFRC Secretariat system and the Secretariat at all levels (country, regional, zone and Geneva).

in Tunisia and Egypt<sup>8</sup>. In addition, the evaluation will not include the actions of the ICRC as they relate to the internal civil unrest but does include reference to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement coordination mechanisms that have been put in place in a number of the countries.

The evaluation analysed *“the overall management and performance of the response and related preparedness actions, and how effective they were / are in delivering services throughout the ongoing response.”* With the specific objectives to understand:

*Efficiency & Effectiveness of operational management:* to what extent have internal systems, structures and mechanisms affected the management and timely and cost-effective service delivery?

*Coordination:* to what extent the IFRC response was managed in a cohesive and effective manner, including communication, collaboration, and coordination among key stakeholders?

*Preparedness:* To what extent were contingency planning and basic response preparedness measures planned and carried out in an effective, efficient, relevant and appropriate manner - at country, regional and Zone level?

## 4.0 Methodology

The RTE, commissioned by the IFRC, was conducted by a team of three persons; An independent consultant who was the team leader and two team members from the Australian Red Cross and the Norwegian Red Cross respectively.

The RTE was planned and carried out during July and August 2011 and included 20 days of field work in Geneva, Amman, Tunis and Zarzis<sup>9</sup>. The following methodology was applied:

*Desk study:* Relevant documents<sup>10</sup> such as appeals, operational updates, internal and external reports, end of mission reports, e-mail correspondence, strategies and policies, were reviewed. Prior to meeting in Geneva the team prepared an inception report, which included interview guides for the different stakeholder groups. An online survey questionnaire was also developed and later sent to internal stakeholders in the operation.

*Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions:* Interviews and focus group discussions were held with a total number of 72 people. The informants included IFRC-, ICRC-, UNHCR-, HNS-, PNS staff, as well as TRCS volunteers and a few beneficiaries. A full list of people and institutions consulted is provided in Annex 2. Additionally, the RTE received 48 responses to the online stakeholder survey (using Survey Monkey).

A combination of open questions and semi structured interviews were used in the data collection process. Triangulation of findings was done in order to validate information obtained. Additionally, observations were made in the different IFRC delegations visited, in two refugee camps and in one warehouse. Draft zero of the report was shared with the the IFRC evaluation management team and a first draft was shared with all interviewees for comments before the final report was published.

*Methodological limitations:* The scope of the RTE is wide due to the regional nature of the Emergency Appeal. Information on the operation in Tunisia was sufficient, however collecting and analyzing information on the activities in Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Syria was more difficult. In some instances this was a result of lack of documentation and in others e.g. Libya due to the lack of activities by the Federation Secretariat. As noted in the Inception report of the RTE the time allocated for the RTE, as well as the unstable security situation in these countries, also prevented the team from visiting them and hence to collect sufficient data.

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<sup>8</sup> The IFRC supported the Egyptian and Tunisian Red Crescent through DREFs for these operations and they are separate to the Regional Emergency Appeal being studied by the evaluation team. In addition the Turkish Red Crescent Response to the Syrian refugee influx as well as other responses in the Europe Zone are not evaluated.

<sup>9</sup> The town from which field based operations were managed.

<sup>10</sup> For further details see Bibliography

Phone and skype interviews were conducted with stakeholders in the above mentioned countries. In addition, the team met with three PNS representatives normally based in Yemen while in Amman.

The RTE was implemented at a time when many of the strategic operational decisions had been made. This is particularly true of interventions in Tunisia, the largest operational component of the Emergency Appeal. However, the RTE is able to contribute through findings and recommendations on contingency planning to the ongoing and likely prolonged crisis in the MENA region as well as longer term improvements in the Federation Secretariat's response. In addition the RTE has enabled staff to share their experiences and to vent their frustrations.

Finally, the focus of the RTE has been on the internal workings and mechanisms of the IFRC and not on beneficiary perceptions, which would have provided the ultimate corroboration of success of the operation.

## 5.0 Main Findings and Conclusions

This section contains the findings and describes the conclusions of the RTE. The IFRC has worked to support national societies in their response to the crisis in their respective countries. This support has been diverse in nature including the provision of financial assistance as well as first aid, health services, food and non-food item distribution, shelter, water and sanitation, ambulatory services. In addition, the IFRC has provided capacity development inputs in disaster management.

### 5.1 Efficiency and Effectiveness of Operational Management

Much of this section reflects the evaluation teams visits to the Zone office and Tunisia. The evaluation does not attempt to comment on the efficiency and effectiveness of operations in countries it did not visit. When possible reference to other countries is made, but it should be noted that at the time of writing the IFRC did not have a presence in Libya or Egypt.

#### 5.1.1 The Secretariat Management Structures

The IFRC has recently completed the development of a new Strategy<sup>11</sup> and a process of decentralisation. Strategy 2020 states that *"the Secretariat is organized to carry out its functions with impartiality and professionalism through a geographically decentralised structure that deploys resources and authority closest to where these are most relevant in supporting national societies. At the same time there is strong strategic direction and oversight from headquarters in Geneva so that its operational strategies are globally consistent and provide a high quality, predictable foundation for the collective work of the International Federation."*

Annex 3. contains the structure of the Zone office. Historically the MENA Zone office has been funded poorly resulting in an inability to recruit delegate positions to fulfil the Zone's responsibilities. Despite an organizational structure that mirrors the Geneva Secretariat structure many of the posts are either vacant or undertaken by individuals fulfilling multiple roles. The MENA Zone office underwent a turbulent period prior to the start of the crisis in the region. Following the recruitment of the Director of Zone (DoZ) in October 2009 a number of experienced staff departed the Zone which exacerbated the situation further. This should have raised concerns among Senior Managers in the Geneva Secretariat. Their departure resulted in the weakening of the Zone office prior to the crisis.

The DoZ proceeded to adopt a new strategy to recruit from the region based on the availability of human resources from within the region and the need for cultural awareness and language skills. While in theory this is a positive strategy it ultimately resulted in many new staff in key positions. Many key positions including the Zone Disaster Management Coordinator and the Regional Representative for North Africa were only filled in January 2011. In addition, the Zone Health Coordinator was Acting Head of Zone Operations, resource mobilization was tasked to a new staff member without the requisite knowledge about internal

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<sup>11</sup> Strategy 2020 Saving Lives, Changing Minds

IFRC mechanisms for resource mobilization, and the HR Manager for the Zone had left. Without experience of the internal mechanisms of the organization and without experience of managing an international crisis of this nature and complexity staff members were placed in a difficult if not impossible situation to support the operations. Adopting this human resource strategy required a level of continuity of senior experienced staff able to coach new recruits. The senior management of the Zone failed to recognize this.

With a relatively small core budget allocation to the Zone consideration should be given to how best to scale up to meet the needs in such crises. The organization should consider a flexible surge capacity that redeploys existing personnel from Geneva and other Zones based on corporate organizational priorities. In addition further review should be given to how cost-effectiveness can be increased, perhaps through increased sharing of resources between Geneva, the MENA Zone and the Europe Zone.

The Regional Representative for North Africa, on his first mission with the IFRC, recognized the need for support and was happy to request both FACT and ERU deployments in response to the identified need for a transit camp. However, this required continuous justification to the Zone office, which initially was not in favour of such a deployment, further delaying response and deployment of the FACT.

### 5.1.2 Assessment

While assessments of the situation in the various countries in the appeal have been done, there has been no documentation of these assessments. In Tunisia, the FACT reports have represented the evolution of the situation and identified needs, but there is no documented overall assessment. This made it impossible for the evaluation team to determine the appropriateness, effectiveness, and efficiency of the assessments undertaken in the MENA region.

The lack of documented assessments makes it difficult to have a record of the analysis and thinking prior to decisions, for example the decision to open a transit camp in Tunisia. A document<sup>12</sup> detailing a series of scenarios was developed by the FACT team in Tunisia. This document was used as the basis of planning by the FACT team. However, it was produced on the 7<sup>th</sup> of March and was never updated despite the paper itself recognizing the rapidly evolving situation and the fact that "uncertainty is very high". The document was used as the basis for further strategic planning and the production of concept notes<sup>13</sup> e.g. providing options for exit out of camp management.

There is evidence that the Federation Secretariat has physically done assessments. For example, it is reported that the shift currently taking place from management of the transit camp to support to Libyan refugees is based on assessments<sup>14</sup>. In addition, the recently produced Plan of Action for Libya is based on an assessment undertaken, by the Head of Operations for North Africa, to Benghazi in July 2011 to determine the support needs of the national society. However, the Federation Secretariat should document such assessments in order to understand the needs identified and ensure transparency in how decisions are made and how needs assessments are determining plans of action. Needs assessment are also an important tool for having a common situational analysis with member national societies and enabling resources to be mobilized.

At a regional level the Zone office did produce a document "Civil Unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, MENA Zone report on Events and Trends, with Assessment of the Humanitarian Consequences and the Red Cross Red Crescent Preparedness and Response." The document provides some analysis of the situation at that point in time but it is unclear what the purpose of the document was as it was never widely circulated nor used during the crisis. With such a fluid situation in the region regular shorter assessments would have been more efficient and effective in identifying needs as they arose and as the situation evolved. This would

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<sup>12</sup> Tunisia civil unrest and population displacement operation FACT Assessment, Analysis, and Planning (AAP) Paper

<sup>13</sup> Concept Papers produced included; Prospects regarding TRC-Federation transit camp closure and Emergency Operations in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia

<sup>14</sup> These assessments were delayed by the delayed handover of the transit camp which meant that resources could not be diverted to do assessments.

permit regular updating of plans (both action plans and contingency plans) and implementation of immediate interventions that are required.

### 5.1.3 Resource Mobilization

As of 30<sup>th</sup> June 2011, the appeal coverage was 69%, with coverage ranging from 92.28% for Tunisia, and 23.76% for Yemen. (Libya was only at 0.47% but was only introduced into the recent Operations Update, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2011). The timing of launching the Preliminary Emergency Appeal was good to maximise donor interest, with few competing Appeals/DREFs<sup>15</sup> released at that time. Resource mobilization systems should have accelerated into action with a joint effort between the Secretariat, Zone and Regional Office. The Federation Wide Resource Mobilization Strategy has the following goals to:

1. Maintain leadership in resource mobilization for emergencies
2. Grow non-emergency income for international and domestic work
3. Increase resource mobilization capacity of National Societies (NSs).

The strategy recognises that national societies are all at different stages of development and with different levels of potential for resource mobilization. The strategy therefore maintains the need for a supportive role by Geneva and Zone offices in resource mobilization.

In the past, the Resource Mobilization role was facilitated by the Zone Head of Support Services, alongside other significant activities of this role. A new MENA Relationship Management Coordinator was recruited in October 2010 to work at the Zone office. Initially the role was not responsible for resource mobilization, but this was added to the role a few months later. At the Regional Office, there was no capacity for resource mobilization, except possibly by the Regional Representative directly, which was problematic given the operational role he played at the start of the operation. Consequently, the responsibility for resource mobilization for the appeal in the Zone was not clear from the beginning and little was done in an organized and coherent manner.

Initial resource mobilization collaboration between the Zone and Geneva was excellent, with Geneva playing a supportive and coaching role, as well as taking on most of the function. The Relationship Management Coordinator of the Zone attended an induction on Humanitarian Diplomacy in Geneva, and this assisted with the collaborative approach that was developed between the teams.

A key to raising resources in any operation, is the regular and timely provision of information to interested PNS and donors. Although the Geneva Secretariat office encouraged the Zone office to hold a teleconference to provide such information early on, it was not held until the 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2011, three weeks after the release of the appeal. Furthermore, a close link between resource mobilization, humanitarian diplomacy and communications could have facilitated greater donor response. This was not evident in this response.

The fact that IFRC either had no presence or direct action in some of the countries (e.g. Libya and Egypt) made it difficult to get information from the field to inform potential donors of what was happening on the ground. However, this lack of information was also associated with the hesitance of some of the national societies, e.g. the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to internationalise the crisis as a result of the politically sensitive operating environment.

Key informants stated that there was donor interest available at the beginning of the operation, however this lack of information flow impacted on the appeal coverage. To facilitate information flow, it is therefore crucial that resource mobilization roles are involved in operational meetings and information sharing both at the Geneva and Zone level.

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<sup>15</sup> [www.ifrc.org](http://www.ifrc.org) : 2<sup>nd</sup> March - Chile Earthquake Revised Appeal MDRCL006; 8<sup>th</sup> March Bolivia floods and landslides (MDRBO006) Emergency Appeal; 11<sup>th</sup> March, Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, although no Emergency Appeal was released for this disaster.

The draft plan of action shared on 14<sup>th</sup> March primarily focused only on the activities in Tunisia, and this further resulted in the PNSs not having any clear information about what was happening in the other countries in the regional appeal. Operations Update No. 7 included Libya into the appeal. It is unclear why this was done in such a low profile way for the country at the centre of the crisis. What is clear is that by doing so and offering such a low profile the potential for resource mobilization is reduced. This lack of information flow to PNS was later compounded by a request from DoZ demanding resource mobilization staff in the Zone to stop direct contact with PNS and national societies for resource mobilization and information sharing and that this contact should go through the senior management in the Zone resulting in a bottleneck.

#### *5.1.3.a ECHO grant issues*

Initially the collaborative nature of the joint management of the ECHO grant was evident. However, possibly due to the ambiguity of roles in resource mobilization, and also some of the ECHO project reimbursement issues, there followed a direct request from the DoZ for Geneva to stop direct resource mobilization activities.

ECHO released a call for proposals, and on 2<sup>nd</sup> March agreement was reached between Geneva, the Zone and Regional representation in North Africa that Geneva would draft a proposal based on an agreed sum of 2 million Euros following a teleconference with interested European Union national societies. The Spanish Red Cross were included at a later date in the application based on an individual request they had made to the ECHO bringing the total monies applied for to 2.5 Million Euros. Geneva was informed by ECHO that the proposal had been accepted on 19<sup>th</sup> of April.

In May 2011, PNSs commenced contact with the Secretariat regarding their reimbursement of costs for the operation through this ECHO grant. During the time of the proposal, there was no promise or agreement made to the EU NSs regarding reimbursement of costs to the operation, (except with the Spanish RC). Most of these requests were quite reasonable, and were discussed with Amman and Tunis. PNS fielding ERUs were contacted to ascertain preliminary value statements.

The collective proposal from IFRC and PNSs for this ECHO grant is only the second time that EU National Societies and the Secretariat have jointly applied for funds from ECHO<sup>16</sup>. This is in line with the Federation Wide Resource Mobilization Strategy of working together as a Red Cross family, and submitting proposals collectively as opposed to individual PNSs. In addition, when applying to ECHO funds, due to the non-competition agreement between national societies and the IFRC, EU National Societies (EUNS) have priority to the funds. In addition, ECHO has also requested not to receive individual EU National Society applications, but prefers to receive collective Red Cross proposals coordinated by the IFRC.

Unfortunately, when the question of PNS reimbursements was raised, the understanding of the collaborative approach to the proposal was not clear to senior leadership in the zone office, and tension was raised in terms of reimbursements of the funds from a proposal that they viewed was funding for future activities. This is evident as the zone had planned activities with the ECHO funds in mind. The Zone was therefore surprised to learn that reimbursement of costs was being discussed at the Geneva level. This required the Resource Mobilization team in Geneva to explain the process of this new multi-stakeholder approach. As a result a process has started in the Geneva Secretariat for the drafting of guidelines for managing these multi-stakeholder approaches.

#### *5.1.4 Finance*

Finance as a service received very positive ratings in the Survey with 90% of respondents rating the service from average to very good.

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<sup>16</sup> The first being for the Pakistan floods for a sum of 10 million Euros

Two DREF allocations were made in January 2011 to support operations working on the civil unrest in Tunisia and Egypt. Later, on 25 February 2011, a DREF allocation was made to enable the Zone to conduct an emergency field mission in Egypt and Tunisia to assess the impact of civil unrest in Libya<sup>17</sup>.

Table 1. below details the dates and values of the Emergency Appeal and the sequential addition of countries to the appeal based on the evolution of the crisis in the region.

Table 1. The Emergency Appeal Evolution

Date	Appeal	Value CHF
1 March 2011	Preliminary Emergency Appeal (Egypt and Tunisia)	4,458,090
24 March 2011	Emergency Appeal (Egypt and Tunisia)	12,269,102
17 May 2011	Revised Emergency Appeal (Syria and Yemen added)	14,840,345
22 June 2011	Operations Update 7 (Libya added)	15,145,921

Table 2. below shows the budget, income and expenditure by country as of 30th June 2011.<sup>18</sup> The overall appeal coverage is at 69%, with coverage ranging from 92.28% for Tunisia, and 23.76% for Yemen. (Libya was only at 0.47% but had recently been included in the appeal). With the significant inclusion of the EUR 2,500,000 ECHO grant, this is better coverage than some other appeals launched at the similar time of January – March 2011.<sup>19</sup> However, overall coverage of the operation has not been fully maximised by the resource mobilization activities and has largely been in-kind not cash. Expenditure of the budget has been primarily for Tunisia at 55%, while the majority of the expenditure for Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen is ranging from 7-9%.<sup>20</sup>

Table 2. Emergency Appeal Budgets, Income and Expenditure

	Income	Expenditure	Closing Balance	Budget	Variance	% of Overall Budget	% of income vs budget
Middle East and North Africa Civil unrest <sup>21</sup>	803,556	-139,396	664,160	1,334,072	1,194,676	8.81%	60.23%
Civil Unrest – Egypt	1,202,829	-160,817	1,042,012	1,159,252	998,435	7.65%	103.76%
Libya Civil Unrest	6,846		6,846	1,443,103	1,443,103	9.53%	0.47%
Syria Civil Unrest	377,696	-2,476	375,220	1,365,596	1,363,120	9.02%	27.66%
Tunisia Civil Unrest	7,752,973	-4,096,833	3,656,140	8,401,462	4,304,629	55.47%	92.28%
Yemen Civil Unrest	342,718	-132,958	209,760	1,442,436	1,309,478	9.52%	23.76%
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,486,618</b>	<b>-4,532,480</b>	<b>5,954,138</b>	<b>15,145,921</b>	<b>10,613,441</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>69.24%</b>

\* All figures are in Swiss Francs, (CHF)

Due to the regional nature of the appeal significant financial oversight and operational support was required. At an operational level, there were some delays in providing finance surge capacity, primarily related to not having an adequate pool of experienced human resources available to draw on to cover Emergency Operations.

Three factors contributed to increasing financial accountability risk during the operation. These were:

<sup>17</sup> The DREF operations are not in the scope of this Real Time Evaluation.

<sup>18</sup> MDR82001 - North Africa, Interim Report for reporting timeframe Jan 2011 – June 2011.

<sup>19</sup> As at 28<sup>th</sup> July 2011, coverage for other appeals launched in Jan- March are: MDRKE014 Kenya Population Movement (8%), MDRKE016 Kenya Drought (39%), and MDRLK003 Sri Lanka Floods (51%).

<sup>20</sup> Note – the cost allocations (approximately 1 million CHF) for PNSs as part of the ECHO grant have not been taken out of these figures at the time of this RTE.

<sup>21</sup> This includes funding for the MENA Civil Unrest contingency planning

- Delays in recruitment of financial human resources
- Lack of adequate time for handover of financial systems and information
- Combining the administration and finance function at field level meant financial oversight at field level was limited to cashier/payment services, rather than budget analysis and forecasting

The recruitment of local staff in Tunisia to assist with basic finance/cashier roles was explored, however the existing human resource capacity was low.

In the Regional Office, there is a Finance Officer and a Finance Assistant. Their role in this operation has primarily been related to cash transfer, bank transfers and facilitating some bilateral PNSs with establishing of banking in Tunisia. The role of the Regional Office in forecasting and budget planning for this operation has been minimal. It is suggested that further support should be provided to the Regional Office to assist the finance office with increased financial oversight.

The MENA Zone office fulfilled the role of financial technical support and advice. There is an experienced Zone Finance Manager who supports operations in MENA as well as supporting some financial activities of the Geneva Secretariat. The Finance Manager was able to deploy to Tunisia early in the operation for approximately one month. This allowed the establishment and ownership of the financial systems and requirements. This support from the Zone has been appreciated by the Regional Office and the field teams in the Tunisia operation. However, surge capacity should be improved to ensure that qualified, trained IFRC finance professionals are available at short notice for 3 month (or less) missions.

There was a lack of clarity throughout the operation on who was the budget holder responsible for the operation, particularly in the early stages when there were FACT rotations. Initially, at the field level in Zarzis, sector coordinators were responsible for individual components of the budget, and the overall ownership was maintained with the Regional Representative in the Regional Office. Unfortunately, the distance from the field operation and limited financial management support available in the Regional Office meant overall financial management was potentially weak. This improved once the Head of Operations for North Africa was appointed, however there was still residual lack of clarity by some field, zone and Geneva staff as to who was the ultimate responsible budget holder. This coupled with a lack of forecasting capacity in Tunisia and other countries in the appeal suggest the potential for underspends/overspends resulting in reallocations.

It is clear that the IFRC global financial systems have supported this operation. Without these tools, and without the experience of some key financial staff, the operation would have struggled to account for expenditure and commitment. However, consideration should be given for a tool/system that tracks financial commitments in real time. This is currently lacking in the IFRC financial systems and would allow for the ability to make decisions based on commitment accounting and expenditure. An attempt was made, during the operation, to introduce this type of tracking but it was not regularly maintained, followed or understood.

### 5.1.5 Human Resources and Surge Capacity

#### 5.1.5.a Human Resources

More than half of the survey respondents rated human resources services as poor or very poor (55.6%, n=36).

In line with the IFRCs decentralization plan, Operational Human Resource recruitment is the responsibility of the MENA Zone office. The Geneva Secretariat, learning from previous experience, immediately recognized that recruitment would be a key component of the operation in Tunisia and potentially for other countries. Support, in the form of an HR delegate, was offered to work alongside the Zone HR officer. Despite efforts to recruit an HR Delegate to support the Zone office this did not happen, leaving an officer in charge of human

resources throughout the operation. The Zone office HR did not have an in-depth understanding of issues such as the standard length of deployment of FACT and ERU and the need to revert from this surge capacity to longer term delegates.

Despite efforts to find suitable candidates from within the Zone for longer term deployments it was often not possible to do so. Recent recruitment of an Iraqi national for the post of Programme Coordinator in Libya has been a rare positive achievement.

Efforts by the Zone office to recruit staff from the region, while positive, should not replace the necessity for diversity throughout the International Federation Secretariat structures. Through its members that span 186 countries the Federation Secretariat had the potential to harness skills and experience to improve its response to the crisis. This did not happen effectively or efficiently resulting in delays in decisions and action throughout the response. An example of this was the disputed position<sup>22</sup> of Camp Manager for the Tunisia operation.

The Zone office recruitment process was often slow and resulted in both delays and the loss of available personnel. Unfounded accusations of nepotism in email exchanges raised tensions unnecessarily and contributed to a failure to recognize the efforts individuals were making to ensure the success of operations. Had the original offer of a human resources delegate, by Geneva Human Resources Department, been approved many of the procedural delays and policy debates could potentially have been avoided.

The operation in Tunisia is currently staffed by many individuals on a consultancy contract due to a policy by the Federation's insurance supplier to only provide cover for delegates of three months or more. This means that the organization is not legally responsible for the health and accident insurance of these consultants. It also raises some concerns including:

- The fact that the individuals undertaking delegate tasks are consultants means that they have limited access to assets of the organization and cannot for example drive the vehicles of the organization. This is untenable in environments that are insecure.
- As was recently experienced consultants would not be authorised to sign off on financial transactions and bank withdrawals.
- The IFRC is relying on individuals to have appropriate insurance cover
- Should an individual suffer a medical condition or accident and be treated differently to other colleagues as a result of this policy the reputational risk would be severe.
- Individuals hired as consultants were not permitted organizational emails with the potential of reducing credibility among other organizations

There is a need to review this recruitment strategy and ensure that it does not place the individuals concerned and the organization at risk.

#### *5.1.5.b Surge Capacity*

While the gravity of the situation in Libya and the consequent population movement across the border to Egypt and Tunisia commenced in early February, it was not until the 25<sup>th</sup> February that the Secretariat first noted there may be a need for a FACT deployment. A draft TOR was developed at this time. The decision to

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<sup>22</sup> The Zone office did not think there was a need for a Camp Manager to be deployed to Tunisia due to the imminent handover of the camp. This handover took much longer than expected and had there not been a camp manger the operation would have suffered greatly.

deploy a FACT was not taken until the 27<sup>th</sup> of February when the High level mission team, with the Regional Representative went to the Ras Ajdir border. The deployment of a fourteen person team commenced from 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 7<sup>th</sup> March 2011. The first ERU arrived in Tunisia on the 1<sup>st</sup> March 2011.

There has been criticism from the majority of key informants that the decision to deploy a FACT was delayed by 5-7 days. This delay was related to hesitation from the Zone office as a result of not having knowledge of the role, scope and depth of the global response tools such as FACT and how they can support operations.

Overall, key informants acknowledged that the Geneva based surge capacity of global tools and operations support was effective and provided the required support in Tunisia. The FACT members were experienced, effective and fulfilled the roles required. The FACT included:

- Logistics
- Relief
- Health
- water and sanitation
- IT/telecommunications
- Information management and reporting.

FACT members are not mandated, equipped or resourced to do operational roles. However, in this operation they quickly became the mechanism through which IFRC established the operation. Their activities included:

- operational management
- supported the Tunisian RC volunteers
- requested and supported deployment of human resources
- established the logistics operation
- the initial set up of the Al-Hayet Transit camp.

Should this become a regular role for FACT, standard ToRs should acknowledge that their role may expand beyond the existing assessment and coordination function. Concomitantly, there would be a need to identify appropriate, capable and experienced persons for such operations.

RDRT members were also deployed as part of the surge capacity. However, as mentioned in section 5.3 below these deployments were delayed and were often too short. In some instances the requisite skills for working in this context were not available.

The deployment of the ERU global tools was positive. A Base Camp ERU, Mass Sanitation Module ERU, Logistics ERU staff, IT/Telecoms staff and equipment as well as Relief ERU were all requested and came with appropriate human and material resources and were organized and functioned well. ERUs provided a number of experienced staff and were key to IFRCs ability to scale up the operation rapidly. However, both the ERU and FACT teams are set up and trained to work in natural disaster contexts. More emphasis should be placed on working in insecure environments which often requires a greater degree of flexibility in application of the tool.

The Base Camp ERU was used for a relatively short period of time due to a security incident raising concerns as to the cost benefit of deploying such a tool<sup>23</sup>. In addition the relief ERU appeared to have a narrow definition of its role and needed to be more flexible given the unusual circumstances it was being asked to operate within. This may have been overcome had a clearer briefing and camp set up plan been given to the Team Leader.

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<sup>23</sup> This is particularly true since accommodation was available approximately one hour from the camp and the majority of delegates preferred not to stay in the base camp.

### 5.1.6 Reporting

Given that activities and resources in the first months focused primarily on Tunisia, information and reporting coming out of this part of operation has been good and timely. This part of the operation has not been hampered by lack of information at the field level, as opposed to other country operations in this appeal. In Tunisia, the first rotation of FACT, included an experienced Information and Reporting Delegate, who set up a data reporting format. This reporting format was used to capture data from all the sectors, and was consistently used by the relief, water and sanitation and health teams. Later, when the ERU and FACT rotations were finished, the data collection was handed over to the TRCS (particularly for health), and after some small challenges it is now continuing to work as data collection tools. The data was initially filled in on a regular basis, and the 'dropbox' software was used to store and update the data by the team. Later a Google group was set up to share information with PNSs on a more regular basis. The information is provided, and accessed, but there is not much feedback from the PNSs as to whether or not the information has been useful to them.

In Tunisia, the Field Information and Reporting delegates were responsible for the field Situation Reports, and these have been posted on a consistent basis, and of good quality information regarding beneficiary numbers and progress of activities. There were attempts to train TRCS volunteers on reporting, but this was not fully successful. TRCS volunteers however did get involved in the collection of data in the Al-Hayet camp, and using the established data collection system this was quite successful. Likewise, the information from the ERU reports has also been useful and timely. The Information and Reporting delegates have also assisted in some web based stories from the Al-Hayet Transit camp which have been posted on the IFRC website. On the second rotation of the FACT team, the Info and Reporting delegate assisted with the clarification of the existing indicators in the Appeal and initial Plan of Action, to better match the reality on the ground.

Unfortunately, reporting from the other country operations has not been as extensive and as informative. This is primarily due to the lack of activities on the ground, and also because of the lack of information being provided by the national societies in country (for many reasons including the sensitive operating environment). There has also been a lack of dissemination of monitoring reports from Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen to PNS following monitoring visits by Zone staff. This overall situation has lead to frustrations reported by PNSs about not having enough information to feed back to their back donors.

Operational Updates were published regularly, and since the start of the operation there has been 8 Operational Updates. However, the Operational Updates did not consistently include the donor response/financial reports, which is a good way for PNSs and back donors to see the commitments made and the existing gaps. The decision to not include the financial reports was made at the operational zone level, as it was felt not necessary each time due to very little change in commitments.

At the beginning of the operation, it was suggested by the Disaster Services Department in Geneva, that in between the Operational Update publications, that the zone office produce a short email on a semi regular basis of some 'informal' information that might assist PNSs with any back donor queries/interest. This has been used in past operations and helps to alleviate PNS pressure to provide information at the most crucial stage of the operation. This concept however, was incorporated into the MENA Update Bulletins, which were produced monthly by the zone. Although these bulletins did provide additional information, it resulted in another layer of reporting that was primarily for Movement communication.

PMER support to the operation is primarily the responsibility of the Zone office. The zone had a PMER Senior Officer who was responsible for all reporting and a Performance and Accountability Coordinator who was responsible for internal performance development issues despite initially being recruited for monitoring and evaluation. These two roles were not clear to the evaluation team, as there was obviously an overlap in the roles. This also caused some confusion about responsibilities among the staff members themselves. Nonetheless, there was very little input from the zone in terms of monitoring of any of the country programs, partially due to the National Societies unwillingness, lack of expressed need for a monitoring support. There was consistent information to suggest that the support from the zone in terms of reporting

was limited and consisted of collating, editing, formatting and publishing reports. It was often seen, by operational delegates, as an additional workload pressure to produce reports as well as deliver operationally. However, it is the responsibility of field teams to produce information for reports, and also to meet the deadlines that are agreed upon. A further constraint to reporting was that the information was often only provided in Arabic making it difficult to convey the information further.

#### 5.1.7 Security

Security services were rated as average to very good by 77% of survey respondents. This is an important finding as security is a fundamental concern in the region.

The security situation in the region remains volatile with demonstrations continuing in all the countries under the appeal with the exception of Libya where conflict persists. In addition elections are due to be held soon in Tunisia and Egypt which could increase tension.

The MENA Zone office has a Security Advisor based in Amman providing advice to managers and doing security assessments throughout the region<sup>24</sup>. The Security Advisor deployed to Tunisia joining the FACT team to give advice on the camp set up. This was followed by the deployment of the Security Officer from the MENA Zone to manage security in the operation for delegates and staff of the IFRC. Overall the support provided by the Security function in the Zone was appreciated by the field and Regional Representation in Tunisia.

There are two countries within the appeal where specific security issues have raised concerns. In Tunisia, the Security Unit in Geneva advised against the site location of the transit camp in close proximity to the border. However, this advice was not acted upon due to advanced discussions that were being held by the FACT team with local authorities and the UNHCR. These discussions ultimately concluded on the current location for both the transit camp and the base camp. The reasons for this were:

- The need to locate the transit camp within easy reach from the border
- The need to act fast and be visible
- The perceived ability to move the camp later should it be deemed necessary

In addition the placement of the base camp<sup>25</sup> in close proximity to the transit camps was based on the need to reduce travel time and distance to the transit camp. This was thought to reduce the risks posed by travelling on the roads and enable a quicker more effective response. However, the limiting of evacuation routes that arose as a consequence of the location of Base Camp (between the UNHCR and RC transit camps) should have precluded its positioning here.

Security threats in this context emanated predominantly from:

- The conflict from Libya spilling over the border
- The host community, with high unemployment rates and reliance on trade across the border to Libya (along the road where the Al-Hayet, Shousha, U.A.E. Red Crescent and Base camp were located)
- Demonstrations by Third Country Nationals or refugees
- The presence of sex workers in the camps
- Road traffic accidents

One of these security threats materialized when the host community in the largest town, Ben Gardane, close to the transit and base camp did react violently on May 23<sup>rd</sup> to an obstruction, created by camp residents, on

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<sup>24</sup> It has been reported that there is not always a fundamental understanding by managers that the Security Advisor is only mandated to advise and that the decisions on security are taken by responsible managers in the different countries and Zone office.

<sup>25</sup> Where delegates and TRC volunteers would reside.

the main road. This resulted in the burning of 90% of the UNHCR-managed Shousha camp. At the time both delegates and volunteers were present in the base camp and the affair was traumatic for those involved. This resulted in the relocation of all staff and volunteers to Zarzis.

This emphasises the need to consider host population needs when managing camps. In this case the IFRC had employed 270 local day labourers<sup>26</sup>, but perhaps more efforts to engage with the host population may have improved relations.

It is the opinion of the evaluation team that the security threats from demonstrations, and the host community were underestimated by the field team<sup>27</sup> and should have influenced the siting of both the transit camp and the base camp. Should a conflict of opinion have arisen with the local authorities then the Federation Secretariat should have refused to open the camp and continued to provide services in the Shousha camp reducing security threats by locating delegate and volunteer housing in Zarzis.

It is also notable that there was also a lack of alternative communication hardware, i.e. radio equipment in case of loss of use of mobile networks, which are often one of the first communication networks to be cut during conflicts. This was due to the inability to secure licenses for radios.

The second country that has raised security concerns during the evaluation is Yemen. Yemen has over recent years been an insecure environment. Recent demonstrations demanding the removal of the Government have become violent and at the same time different regions in the country are reportedly under the influence or controlled by various factions.

The IFRC had an Acting Federation Representative in Yemen from August 2010 until June 2011. Initially recruited as a Programme Coordinator she was asked to act as Federation Representative soon after arriving in country. The shift from a developmental approach required initially to a conflict emergency response approach that requires different skills is challenging. There were four PNS working in Yemen under a signed Integration Agreement<sup>28</sup>.

As the security situation deteriorated the Federation Representative intensified communication and information sharing on the security situation with PNS, ICRC and the UN. Close links were maintained with the UN and ICRC throughout to ensure that security information was updated and disseminated.

Despite these efforts concerns continued to be raised by the PNS about security. It was not for example clear to PNS delegates that in certain circumstances e.g. if the airport was blocked, that the safest option may well be to remain in country until calm was restored. There were repeated demands on the Acting Federation Representative to determine other evacuation routes, despite clear explanations.

There are two issues of concern with regards to how security was handled in Yemen. These are:

- Too few IFRC delegates to undertake programme coordination and general management including security.
- Delegates, whether working for the IFRC or a PNS, did not assume personal responsibility for their own security. If made uncomfortable by the security environment then they should have considered the possibility of leaving their post.

It is clear that the IFRC was not able to meet the obligations under the Integration agreement signed with PNS. This is of concern as security was a component of this Integration Agreement. It is important to ensure that liabilities and risks to the organization are reduced in such circumstances. It may therefore be necessary in some circumstances to suspend integration agreements as finally done in June 2011.

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<sup>26</sup> This resulted in security threats when 40 daily labourers were made redundant in one day.

<sup>27</sup> These threats and concerns were raised by a confidential document submitted to the Senior Management of the Secretariat in Geneva early on in the operation.

<sup>28</sup> An agreement whereby the IFRC provides services to PNS for a fee.

### 5.1.8 Camp Management

This section specifically relates to the operation in Tunisia as the only country under review where a camp was set up.

#### 5.1.8.a The Decision to take on Camp Management

There are differing opinions among stakeholders as to whether the decision to open a transit camp at the Ras Ajdir border area, Tunisia, was a good strategic operational decision. It is clear that the decision to open a camp was made based on a rapid assessment of the situation, with the best intentions and after an assessment of the risks involved. The organization must continue to recognize that operational decisions of this nature should continue to be made in the field and that decisions made in a rapidly fluctuating context are of high risk. Deployed personnel should continue to be given the space to make these decisions without due concern for sanctions should the decision prove to be incorrect. Without this commitment the organization could suffer from indecision and a lack of action in the service of vulnerable populations.

Large numbers of TCNs were stuck at the border and were trying to enter Tunisia during the first few days that the FACT team arrived at the border area. Some FACT members described distressing and alarming scenes at the border. The TRC was already present at the Ras Ajdir border providing basic assistance through the presence of volunteers at the border. This assistance included first aid, water and food.

The situation at the border fluctuated rapidly with many of those at the border being rapidly repatriated through International Organization for Migration (IOM) mechanisms. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had also set up Shousha camp to house those that needed to wait for repatriation and for those claiming asylum or refugee status, as well as persons of concern. FACT team members and the TRC initially provided services such as food distribution and improving sanitation in Shousha camp in cooperation with UNHCR.

The decision to construct and open a transit camp was made based on three scenarios developed by the FACT and documented in "Tunisia civil unrest and population displacement operation FACT Assessment, Analysis, and Planning (AAP) Paper". The paper suggests the possibility of three scenarios occurring and recommends that the organization prepare for the worst case scenario *"which assumes continuation or escalation of the violence in Libya that affects the civilian population and forces mass migration of additional migrants and Libyan families across the borders into neighbouring countries."*

This analysis prompted the decision to open a transit camp and even have contingencies in place for expansion of the camp. Once this decision was made and agreed with the TRC and local authorities it would prove difficult to reverse because:

- The Federation's response and draw down on global resources was geared to the set-up of the camp
- A site was allocated for both the transit camp and a base camp<sup>29</sup>
- Commitments were made to the TRC, UNHCR and local authorities and reversing these would have changed perceptions/damaged relationships with stakeholders

The evaluation team recognizes that there is now the benefit of hindsight, however a few factors suggest that the decision was inappropriate. These are:

- The length of time it took to construct and open the camp
- The low numbers that stayed in the camp throughout its management by the TRC/IFRC
- The existence of a UNHCR camp where service provision to improve the situation of the existing caseload of TCNs, asylum seekers and refugees would have been more cost-effective<sup>30</sup>
- The delay in providing services to Libyan refugees<sup>31</sup> crossing further south than the Ras Ajdir border

<sup>29</sup> For a discussion on site selection please see the security section

<sup>30</sup> Note that the ICRC continued to improve the water system in Shousha camp even while the evaluation team visited.

<sup>31</sup> The majority of whom were housed in host families

- The long term financial commitment required to manage camps

As of 30<sup>th</sup> of June, total expenditure in Tunisia totalled 4,096,833 CHF. The majority of this expenditure has been spent in support of Al-Hayet camp.<sup>32</sup> The total number of people that stayed at the camp were 8,784 as of July 17<sup>th</sup> (the day the camp was handed over). It can therefore be crudely estimated that the cost per beneficiary was \$466<sup>33</sup>.

The Federation Secretariat does not have an official position or policy on camp management. This makes it difficult for operational decision makers faced with this type of situation to know what to do. The Secretariat and its deployed operational personnel are likely to face a similar decision in the near future and there is need for clarity.

The opinion of the evaluation team is that the strength of the Federation Secretariat and its global mechanisms lies in service provision rather than camp management. It is also notable that the majority of contributions to the Tunisia response were of an in-kind nature, making it increasingly difficult to undertake camp management which requires a greater cash input.

#### *5.1.8.b Camp set up and operation*

From 29 March – 6<sup>th</sup> April 2011<sup>34</sup>, the total number of people crossing the Libyan-Tunisia Ras Ajdir border was fluctuating, but remained on average at 2,800 per day<sup>35</sup>. Of these, approximately 780 were third country nationals (TCNs). The number of people departing from Tunisia was fluctuating as a result of the IOM facing funding challenges for repatriation flights. The following week, from 7 April – 13 April 2011<sup>36</sup> the daily number of people crossing from Libya to Tunisia at the Ras Ajdir border had reduced to approximately 2300 people per day, with 250 TCNs<sup>37</sup>. Following weeks saw an overall increase of Libyan nationals crossing the border, but on average a decrease in TCNs crossing the border each week.

Once the decision to open the transit camp was made, the process of getting the camp constructed and operational was slow. Overall, the IFRC system did not have the institutional or technical experience to manage a camp management operation in a quick, flexible, and adaptable way. The field teams (IFRC and TRCS volunteers) were extremely committed to ensuring the camp opened<sup>38</sup>. However, whilst acknowledging this commitment and the expertise of the Relief and Base Camp ERUs and the TRC volunteers, it took over 6 weeks to open the transit camp. In contrast, during this time, the United Arab Emirates Red Crescent Society arrived in country, and constructed and opened a further transit camp, at a much faster pace than the TRC/IFRC Al-Hayet camp. In terms of security and camp infrastructure, it appears that the initial field teams saw the need to ensure a secure and safe camp for the population, volunteers and staff. Attention was given to protection and security for women and minors in the family area. However, some of this essential infrastructure was not completed until after the camp was already opened<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> Some of this expenditure also relates to efforts of the TRC to provide services at the border of Ras Ajdir and to support provided to the UNHCR Shousha camp.

<sup>33</sup> The number of person nights spent in the camp totalled 65,200. Hence, it is possible to calculate that the cost per night per person was \$63.

<sup>34</sup> FACT Update Report number 16 – Tunisia Operation, Period covered: 29 March – 6 April 2011

<sup>35</sup> Population movement Report (IOM, 7 April 2011) – as quoted in FACT Update Report Number 16

<sup>36</sup> FACT Update Report number 17 – Tunisia Operation, Period covered: 7 April – 13 April 2011

<sup>37</sup> Population movement Report (IOM, 13 April 2011) – as quoted in FACT Update Number 17


<sup>38</sup> The sandstorms that damaged the camp on the 30<sup>th</sup> April, destroyed 53% of its total tent capacity, including the 292 4-person tents mainly in family area, as well as other parts of camp infrastructure. A second sandstorm hit on 2 May and destroyed more tents and additional infrastructure, including the single men food distribution site. The commitment of the IFRC field teams and the TRCS volunteers is demonstrated by this event, as within days the camp was rebuilt and was able to continue to cater for the needs of the population, albeit for a smaller population for a short time.

<sup>39</sup> FACT Update Report, number 18 – Tunisia Operation, period covered: 14 April – 21 April 2011

The Al-Hayet transit camp, opened on the 6 April 2011, with the role of sheltering individuals and families in transit until they can return home. The initial camp capacity was for 2000 people in transit. The transit camp in the first week of opening, hosted 1,479 people in transit, and by the second week (20<sup>th</sup> April) hosted 1,925 people in transit. From this week onwards, the camp population decreased each week, until as of the 17<sup>th</sup> July when it was handed over to UNHCR it hosted only 88 persons. Table 1 and Graph 1 below describe the population served by the Al-Hayet camp from the 6<sup>th</sup> April until the 17<sup>th</sup> July 2011.<sup>40</sup>

The TRCS and Federation provided a number of services within the Al-Hayet transit camp including, food, water and sanitation, health services, shelter, non-food items, registration and de-registration, information services and Retracing Family Links. The quality of the camp and the services provided were very good, however this was not balanced appropriately by the need for a rapid response.

The appeal generated a lot of interest for in kind donations. In some instances unsolicited materials were provided which were not in the Logistics Resource Mobilization Table. This resulted in the clogging up of warehouse facilities in Tunisia. Some informants also questioned why purchase of some items could not occur in-country particularly where items were known to be present and the purchase would be more cost-effective.

Table 1. Disaggregated data of the Al-Hayet camp	Graph 1. Nationalities that stayed at Al-Hayet Camp																																										
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Camp Population at 17<sup>th</sup> July 2011</td> <td>88</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total Arrivals</td> <td>8,784</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total Departures</td> <td>8,696</td> </tr> <tr> <td>People in families</td> <td>56</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Single Men</td> <td>32</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Single Women</td> <td>-</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Children</td> <td>37</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Unaccompanied minors</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Adults</td> <td>50</td> </tr> </table>	Camp Population at 17 <sup>th</sup> July 2011	88	Total Arrivals	8,784	Total Departures	8,696	People in families	56	Single Men	32	Single Women	-	Children	37	Unaccompanied minors	1	Adults	50	 <table border="1"> <caption>Nationalities that stayed at Al-Hayet Camp</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Nationality</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Mali</td> <td>30%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Pakistan</td> <td>22%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nigeria</td> <td>17%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sudan</td> <td>11%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Chad</td> <td>5%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Niger</td> <td>2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bangladesh</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Burkina Faso</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ivory Coast</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Liberia</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mauritania</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Nationality	Percentage	Mali	30%	Pakistan	22%	Nigeria	17%	Sudan	11%	Chad	5%	Niger	2%	Bangladesh	1%	Burkina Faso	1%	Ivory Coast	1%	Liberia	1%	Mauritania	1%
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At the start there were reports that water consumption in the camp was high, despite installing of water economizing taps on the water points. Reports indicated that the average water consumption rate was around 43 litres per day per person, which is well above the SPHERE standards. Further, the water made available was from the local community water pipeline, and this water was high in salt content<sup>41</sup>, at acceptable ratios to make it safe, but unpalatable to drink. Bottled water was only provided to families with young children.

The camp was finally handed over to UNHCR on July 17<sup>th</sup>. Delays in handing over the camp resulted from lengthy negotiations initially with the U.A.E Red Crescent and latterly with the UNCHR. While a handover to the U.A.E was agreed initially the handover was not possible due to their demands for the camp to be emptied of residents and that staff working in the camp should be made redundant. These demands were not acceptable to the IFRC and therefore negotiations were started with UNHCR. While initially hesitant, ultimately UNHCR<sup>42</sup> saw a value in having the camp as a contingency measure in case of future increased influx resulting from the conflict in Libya.

<sup>40</sup> Given that the camp was established to provide shelter and services for TCNs in transit, the IFRC operations team also reported figures based on 'person nights' as a reflection of the actual volume of beneficiaries assisted. Using this calculation, number of beneficiaries is total of 65,200 person nights from 6<sup>th</sup> April - 17<sup>th</sup> July 2011.

<sup>41</sup> The salt content of the water was discussed in many coordination meetings and agreement was reached to continue to provide the piped water in all the camps.

<sup>42</sup> In addition UNHCR thought the Al-Hayet camp was set up well and was of high quality.

### 5.1.9 Gender

A large number of survey respondents 29.7% did not know to what extent different gender needs were factored into operations, however 51.3% of respondents also rated average to very good the factoring in of gender needs into the operations.

The focus on gender seems to vary at the different levels of the organization. There is no longer a gender focal point at the Secretariat in Geneva and no one had been appointed specifically to follow up on gender issues in the Emergency Support Group. Ideally, the gender perspective is supposed to automatically be taken into account in the planning and implementation of all programs and operations. However, most stakeholders interviewed at the Geneva level were not aware of how the gender perspective had been ensured in the Tunisia operation.

At the MENA zone there is a gender focal point. According to staff members, there has recently been an increased focus on the different needs of men, women, boys and girls at the zonal level. As an example, during the last visit of the RTE team in Amman, a four day long working group meeting with the purpose of developing an Arabic gender sensitive manual in the field of Disaster Risk Reduction was held. Participants of the meeting were representatives of six regional national societies.

The organization has sought to have a gender balance amongst its staff and volunteers at field level. However this has been difficult to achieve due to, among other things, availability of people and the nature of the tasks in the operation. In the first FACT rotation there were 9 men and 3 women and the ERUs were predominantly consisting of male delegates. According to IFRC staff, the gender mix gradually became more balanced during the operation. However, in the current set up at IFRC office in Zarzis, only one of the delegates is a woman. At its peak, 120 TRCS volunteers worked in the Al Hayet transit camp and approximately 40% of these volunteers were women, which is an acceptable balance. At the peak of activity, 270 local staff members were employed in the camp, but only around 10% of these were women. The low percentage of employed women can be attributed to the fact that most of the positions were, in this context, traditionally male tasks related to construction, security and manual labour.

Based on observations made by the RTE team, the camp set-up was well adapted to the needs of the different groups. For instance, the shower and toilet areas were clearly marked for men and women, both in Arabic and French. Delegates spoken to also mentioned that information about the arrangements in the shower and toilet areas were disseminated on daily bases. However, according to beneficiaries, the signs were not always respected by many of the male refugees. Single women were often stalked when going to the toilet and shower area, which made them feel unsafe.

In order to protect single women they were placed in the middle of the family area which was fenced. A tent was also set up where the children could play and where they were kept busy by volunteers.

### 5.1.10 Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and Protection

IFRC representatives attended regular inter agency<sup>43</sup> SGBV meetings at field level. During these meetings Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Prevention of and Response to Gender Based Violence were developed and agreed on. A reporting form was also developed and these forms were to be centralized in the UNFPA psycho-social consultation tent.

Several informants mentioned to the Team that there had been reported SGBV cases in the Al Hayet camp. The number of cases reported is not clear to the Team as the number differed from the various informants. The lowest number mentioned was one and the highest number was eight. The informant who mentioned that there had been eight reported cases said that these cases included two assaults on boys. A rapid assessment<sup>44</sup> conducted by the UNFPA in the Al Hayet camp towards the end of April, confirms that several

<sup>43</sup> Other agencies represented in these meetings were UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, UNFPA and MSF

<sup>44</sup> Collaboration UNFPA – FICR en matière de SSR et VSFG (Report based on a rapid assessment conducted by UNFPA in the Al Hayet camp 23 April – 24 April 2011)

cases of SGBV had been reported in the camp. It states that the majority of cases were related to young girls aged between 12 and 19 years and also that some boys aged between 13 and 17 years had been affected.

The RTE team did not succeed in tracking down an overview of the exact number of SGBV cases and none of the informants knew where to find such an overview. Even though, according to informants, the SGBV cases were reported to the UNFPA and the SOP was followed, there was no clear reporting system within the Al Hayet camp. Consequently, this information was not formally forwarded to other levels of the IFRC, which again was confirmed by the fact that most informants at regional-, zonal and at the secretariat level, were not aware of this issue.

After the first of the reported SGBV cases lighting was provided in the camp so as to ensure that women could safely visit the toilets during the night. Additionally, all women in the camp were provided with whistles. The effect of the whistles might have been limited as they were also used as toys for the children.

While in the field, the Team was informed by IFRC delegates, as well as TRCS staff and volunteers, that there had been, and still were, several active sex workers in the camp. It also became clear that the UNHCR managed Shousha camp also had sex workers in it. Not all delegates spoken to at field, regional and zonal level were aware of this issue and none of the staff members interviewed at Geneva level were informed about their existence.

Among those who did know about the sex workers, the number observed ranged from 4 to 20. There was no formal follow-up system of sex workers.

Considering the context, it is likely that many of the sex workers might have been victims of trafficking. An indication in support of this assumption was reports that some of the women seemed to have someone controlling them within the camp.

It appears that it had not occurred to the informants spoken to that these women could be victims of trafficking. Some informants even mentioned that allowing the sex workers to do their job may potentially protect the other women in the camp.

Some of the sex workers had been talking to the health staff in the camp, as well as with representatives of the UNFPA, but they had claimed that they were selling sex voluntarily. It is, however, a fact that these women were in a vulnerable situation and it is not unlikely that they were afraid of telling the truth. The evaluation team witnessed what appeared to be violent confrontations in the camp at the site of the sex workers tent.

The sex workers which had been identified had been sensitized on the risk of catching STI's and HIV/AIDS and they had also been provided with condoms.

Some important measures and procedures had been implemented in the camp in order to protect women. Protection issues were, however, not dealt with adequately. Routines on registering SGBV cases internally, as well as clear procedures on how to follow up on sex workers were missing. Additionally, it is a weakness that the above mentioned cases were not reported to the Zone office and further to the Geneva Secretariat. The presence of sex workers in the camp posed a security threat that placed individuals at risk. Those at risk included both the residents of the camp but also the staff of the organization. The threat to security is based on the violent altercation witnessed by the evaluation team and the potential for this to spill out to the wider resident population of the camp. The presence of active sex workers in the camp places a reputational and credibility risk to the organization, however this coupled with the protection issues related to the possibility of the sex workers being trafficked increases the risk further.

## 5.2 Coordination

### 5.2.1 Internal Federation Secretariat Coordination

There remains a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the management structures of the IFRC. The lack of understanding may have been exacerbated by the number of new and internationally inexperienced staff but this is not the only explanation for the confusion. This lack of clarity exists within the organization as well as among PNS. The recent efforts of the Senior Management set out in a November 2010 document “Business Practices: Framework for designating roles and responsibilities” is a step forward but is not detailed enough. Operational procedures will be needed to clarify detailed management and technical responsibilities and roles.

The senior management in the Zone failed to harness the enthusiasm, hard work and motivation of the new staff in the zone and didn't guide them appropriately in order to support the operations adequately. This has resulted in poor teamwork and the dynamics in the office have become counter-productive with groups forming that are inhibiting cross departmental collaboration. Despite a regular coordination meeting held at the Zone this did not always include all relevant personnel and the evaluation team encountered a lack of willingness amongst Zone staff to share information with one another as well as poor or inadequate communication. This under normal working circumstances would be difficult for an office to cope with. When coupled with the largest humanitarian crisis the Zone has faced in recent years the result has been an inability to support the operations appropriately.

In addition, there is at least one example where the DoZ requested Zone staff not to communicate with support functions in the Geneva Secretariat directly<sup>45</sup>. In doing so senior management in the Zone failed to recognize the need for new staff to seek support and clarification from the Geneva Secretariat. This was further illustrated by the length of time it took to accept the offer of support from the Geneva Secretariat for additional human resources to be deployed to work alongside the Zone staff.

The surge capacity options discussed and offered to the MENA Zone office included:

- A Senior Operations Advisor
- Contingency Planning Delegate
- Human Resources Delegate
- Planning Monitoring and Evaluation/info Delegate

These were agreed as priorities, however, despite the identification of appropriate candidates, none of the positions noted above were filled in a timely way. A positive offer was made by Geneva in brokering the secondment of a staff member from Asia Pacific Disaster Management Unit to the MENA Zone office to support the Zone DMC. This deployment lasted only one month.

Failure to take up this offer of support promptly meant that the Zone remained short staffed to deal with this crisis and that those staff present did not have the capacity to support operations efficiently and effectively.

Furthermore, early on in the crisis the Geneva Secretariat suggested to the DoZ to use existing Zone staff, with operational experience, to undertake the oversight and management support required for such an operation. This suggestion was only belatedly taken up when a member of the Zone Senior Management Team was assigned resource mobilization and reporting responsibility in relation to the MENA civil unrest in May for a period of two months. While a positive move it was too little and too late to have the required impact.

In emergency situations it is vital that decisions are taken in a timely fashion. In order to take decisions in a timely manner they must be delegated to appropriate functions. Too often decisions were not delegated to

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<sup>45</sup> Please see the Resource Mobilization Section.

the appropriate function in the Zone office. The management of the Zone during the response did not *"encourage faster action closer to National Societies, reduce bureaucracy, or clarify accountability while fostering matrix team working between the Zone and Geneva."*<sup>46</sup>

More recently the Zone has taken action to fill the post of Contingency Planning delegate with a member of RDRT. In fact efforts to bolster the disaster management capacity in the Zone appear to have progressed considerably in the short term, with deployments of Emergency Health specialist from the RDRT to the Zone.

It was common perception among staff in the Geneva Secretariat, and the Zone office that the Zone was unable to deliver on the requirements for such an emergency. This has resulted in lost opportunities, with national societies holding back funds because of a lack of information to be able to allocate funds appropriately and accountably.

Where a Zone office is not fulfilling its obligations and is not willing to accept adequate support to do so, it is the responsibility of the Geneva Secretariat office *"to take initiative where they see actions lacking, and the directors of zones need to have good reasons to decline acting on their advice."*<sup>47</sup> The current management structure would require intervention by the Secretary General of the International Federation's Secretariat, as line Manager of DoZ, in order to make such a decision. Such a decision should obviously not be taken lightly as it may weaken staff morale<sup>48</sup>, and the confidence of stakeholders and partners in the Zone function. However, in such a high profile, high risk and complex operation it is the opinion of the evaluation team that an intervention by the Secretary General of the International Federation demanding the Zone to accept support was necessary.

#### 5.2.2 Movement Coordination

57.1% of survey respondents indicated that coordination of the early response among the Movement was average to very good. 51.5% thought coordination with the PNS was average to very good while 52.8% of respondents thought coordination with ICRC was average to very good. This indicates a general feeling that Movement Coordination was positive.

The Secretary General of the Federation took the initiative to launch high level missions to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. These missions were carried out by the former Deputy Secretary General of the IFRC and the Head of International Department of the Finnish Red Cross. The missions were important steps providing the basis for relationship management and a clear signal to national societies that the IFRC was engaged and available to support national societies overcome political sensitivities and operational issues in response to the internal civil unrest. These missions were well received by the concerned national societies and the ICRC, who facilitated the mission to Libya. The use of high level missions recognized the importance and necessity for a senior dialogue to facilitate operational action. Perhaps where a clear Movement approach is required joint IFRC and ICRC high level missions may facilitate stronger coordination.

A number of the national societies under the appeal were allocated responsibilities by their respective Governments for the coordination of the response to the crisis. This placed national societies at the forefront giving them visibility in a number of cases and providing opportunities for humanitarian diplomacy. Little support was received by national societies in this area which has resulted in commitments and agreements being signed by them with multiple non-Movement partners. This in itself is not negative, however the IFRC should have supported national societies to ensure that the commitments made were achievable and that national societies were not over committing themselves. In addition, the national societies needed support in negotiations with external partners to ensure that they received adequate compensation to enhance their capacities to deliver on agreements as well as fulfil their obligations to the Movement.

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<sup>46</sup> Moving Forward Together paper submitted to the Governing Board in May 2010

<sup>47</sup> Moving Forward Together paper submitted to the Governing Board in May 2010

<sup>48</sup> Which at the time was already low, resulting in the poor function of the Zone office.

National societies and the IFRC have coordinated their response with a number of external actor including the UNHCR, WFP, OCHA, IOM as well as Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) e.g. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). There is also an increasing trend for the United Nations as well as other actors to use national society volunteers in their response. While positive, this may have profound impacts for Movement coordination and requires careful study, particularly in complex emergency environments.

Efforts to integrate capacity and organizational development into operations should be considered early in an operation. Some capacity development approaches have been applied, however these are not part of a systematic overall review of national society capacities and are often not incorporated into Emergency Appeals. In addition, affected national societies in the region are likely to undergo change in the coming months and years, reflecting the change in their countries. The IFRC and Movement partners will have a fundamental role in ensuring that this process of change follows an organized and constructive process and follows the fundamental principles of the Movement. The evaluation team notes the presence of a capacity and organizational development assessment under way in Tunisia and is of the opinion that this is needed in other countries under the appeal.

In general, there has been a positive relationship with the ICRC. The Seville Agreement and Supplementary measures have guided the actions of the components of the Movement. Agreement was reached on a joint statement released on March 8<sup>th</sup><sup>49</sup>. Coordination and cooperation structures<sup>50</sup> as well as agreements<sup>51</sup> were evident in all countries. At field level the ICRC and the IFRC worked closely and constructively in support of national societies, regular meetings, teleconferences and operational cooperation was also evident. While well positioned and coordinating its efforts the IFRC has not always fulfilled its obligations. For example, delays in providing support to the Libyan Red Crescent and the limited presence in Yemen have been noted as weaknesses on the part of the IFRC operation. It is essential that the IFRC have a presence in these countries in order to fulfil its role and obligations to support the efforts of the Libyan and Yemen Red Crescent Societies. Should there be a decision made not to be present Movement partners should be informed in order to take relevant actions.

The opportunity of holding a strategic meeting on the Libya crisis at the 7<sup>th</sup> MENA conference in Abu Dhabi was taken. While appreciated, it was noted that an earlier meeting bringing together movement components would have been more constructive<sup>52</sup>. Such a meeting could have developed the operational framework and guided efforts of national societies and the Movement at large increasing the potential for coordination.

In order for the IFRC to fulfil its coordination function member national societies must fall under existing coordination mechanisms. In the majority of cases the Seville Agreement and the Supplementary Measures have been followed with a respect for the lead agency role. However, both the Algerian and the U.A.E. Red Crescent undertook actions of support in Tunisia which were not initially coordinated with the TRC or the IFRC. However, the Algerian Red Crescent did rapidly fall under the coordination mechanism in place and made positive contributions to the operation by providing meals for TCNs in the Al-Hayet camp through a mobile kitchen.

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<sup>49</sup> Joint Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross, The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The Libyan Red Crescent, The Egyptian Red Crescent and the Tunisian Red Crescent.

<sup>50</sup> For example in Yemen there was a Movement Coordination Platform, a Movement Operations Committee as well as Technical Committees where discussions took place between the IFRC, the YRCS, ICRC and the PNS.

<sup>51</sup> For example the Tripartite "Framework for Agreement for Coordination and Cooperation between the Libyan Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent"

<sup>52</sup> The Coordination of the Movement Response to the Humanitarian Situation in Libya and Affected Neighbouring Countries, 24-25th March 2011.

### 5.3 Preparedness and Contingency Planning

Contingency planning and basic response preparedness are important elements of this evolving and changing crisis across the MENA region and there should be a focus on different levels of preparedness, including country, regional and Zone level.

The strategy adopted in the Zone office of multiple roles per staff member may function in circumstances where the Zone has traditionally had a low turnover of work and hence limited core budget allocations as well as programme funds<sup>53</sup>. However, the crisis exposed the lack of adequate experienced human resources and should have triggered a response to increase the human resource capacity of the Zone office. While staff in the Zone office have learned lessons through this response it is the opinion of the evaluation team that further support will be required should the crisis escalate further.

The Zone office should work to recruit an experienced Operations Coordinator as a full time post as is standard practice in other Zones. The recent recruitment of a Logistics Coordinator should enhance and build capacities in the region for logistics as well as support the stocking of materials within strategic locations throughout the region.

The Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT) mechanism is a relevant and appropriate mechanism to use in this crisis. The cultural and language abilities of RDRT members were used in Tunisia however there was potential to use this mechanism in support of other countries in the region. In addition, the Global tools such as Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT) and the Emergency Response Units (ERUs) proved to be useful preparedness and response measures specifically for the operation in Tunisia. The Regional Representation in Tunisia has increased its capacity through the presence of an experienced Head of Operations for North Africa.

The Zone office has begun to address some of the human resource capacity issues it faced at the beginning of the operation. RDRT deployments to the Zone office in support of the DMC include roles in Preparedness, Emergency Health, and RDRT development. The Zone office is also developing the data base called the Disaster Response Information System (DRIS) a clone of a system originally developed in the Europe Zone. This will enable a more systematic approach to preparedness for response. Currently the Zone has received little support from the IT Department in Geneva despite requests. Consideration of global IT support should be given to this system since two Zones appear to already plan or are using the tool. The tool could prove useful globally.

While the use of RDRTs was appropriate, RDRT members were deployed for too short a period, had difficulties in accessing visas to enter Tunisia and did not necessarily have all the appropriate skill sets. The RDRTs also experienced difficulties when having to work with international teams that did not speak Arabic. In addition the conflict context is rarely trained on and this should now form an important part of training for RDRT members in the region, including training on "Safer Access". ICRC should be used as a resource for future RDRT trainings in order to capture their experience and knowledge of working in such situations.

Difficulties with visas and customs clearance for vehicles and materials suggest that the Zone office should consider opportunities to address and advocate for International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL) which could facilitate issues such as visa and customs clearance in the future.

There is a lack of clarity about the surge capacity available at a global level including the FACT and ERUs. Basic issues such as what these mechanisms provide in terms of support, how to call on them, reporting lines etc. need to be more thoroughly understood. This was a cause of tension between Geneva, the Zone and the Tunisia Secretariat structures. The Zone office working with Geneva Secretariat should consider a dissemination plan amongst both Zone staff and national societies.

Many of the national societies in the region have contingency plans, however these are out of date and do not reflect the current crisis which is a new phenomenon in the region. The Zone had prior to the crisis

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<sup>53</sup> See section 5.1.1 for further details.

intended to develop a contingency plan, however this was never produced. The MENA Emergency Appeal includes funds to support national societies to undertake contingency planning and to allow the Zone to undertake its own contingency planning. Contingency plans have not been done due to the workload related to on-going support for the operation and the lack of capacity at the Zone office. Technical support on contingency planning was provided for one week to the Zone by the Geneva based Senior Officer for Disaster Preparedness. This visit included work on early warning triggers and a regional approach to early warning and contingency planning. However, this was not followed up by actions to update or develop contingency plans in support of national societies. The only exception was the “scenario planning”<sup>54</sup> exercise undertaken in Tunisia by the FACT team.

In addition it would appear that there have been inter-agency contingency<sup>55</sup> planning processes where national societies and the International Federation secretariat have not been adequately represented. Once again the exception has been in Tunisia where the Tunisian Red Crescent is included in the contingency plan as a key local implementing partner.

The Zone has prepared a document, “Contingency Planning and response mechanism”, which while a good theoretical document does not reflect adequate contingency planning as described in the IFRC Guidelines on Contingency Planning and Response Mechanisms. These guidelines highlight the different levels required for contingency planning including at national societies and Zones. It specifies that Zone contingency plans should adopt *“risk-area contingency plans covering a specific hazard with the potential to cause destruction on a scale requiring extensive international humanitarian assistance. National Societies and the International Federation should plan for these events, setting out the necessary requirements, working relationships, and roles and procedures, as well as identifying event triggers.”* The current Zone plan does not provide scenarios describing potential evolutions of the situation, nor an analysis of existing capacities or gaps, which are a key component of contingency planning.

More recently the Zone office has deployed RDRT members to the Zone office to support the development of contingency plans. This is urgently needed in order to ensure that preparedness levels are enhanced in a volatile and unpredictable crisis across the MENA region. The Zone contingency plan should clearly lay out how both Regional and Global resources will be used to respond in case of need.

## 6.0 Recommendations

### 6.1 Operations Management

Some fundamental aspects of operations management were lacking during the operation. These included experienced, skilled human resource capacities in the Zone office, inadequate management response to the evolving situation and lack of clear roles and responsibilities. The following recommendations are made to improve the current and future operations management:

1. Review the current Zone structure and ensure that adequate operational capacity is in place by the recruitment of a full time experienced Operations Coordinator and that appropriate capacity in support services such as Human resources, Finance Management, Resource Mobilization and Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting are in place.
2. Develop an official coaching/mentoring relationship between specific Zone functions in key positions, occupied by new staff and their Geneva counterparts in order to systematize the support provided by Geneva to existing Zone staff. Key positions include, Human Resources, Disaster Management Coordinator, Resource Mobilization and PMER. This should be based on specific identified learning objectives for individuals concerned.

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<sup>54</sup> Tamnam Aloudat, Langdon Greenhalgh et Al. Tunisia civil unrest and population displacement operation FACT Assessment, Analysis and Planning (AAP) Paper. Number 1 (7 march 2011)

<sup>55</sup> Inter Agency Plan Of Action: Measures to reduce the burden of the crisis in Libya on Tunisia: Community-based Assistance, UNHCR, June 2011

3. The Geneva Secretariat should “step in” when a Zone office is unable to fulfil its obligations and refuses or delays offers of support without justification. Clear objective criteria that reflect reputational and operational risk should be set to enable this decision making.
4. The IFRC should ensure that assessments are documented in order to ensure that the analysis behind decisions is transparent and as an opportunity to have a common situational understanding among members.
5. The IFRC should develop a position or policy on camp management ensuring that it considers its added value, the implications for the organization in terms of the required protection and security skills, as well as funding mechanisms for what could be a long term commitment.
6. The Geneva Secretariat should increase dissemination of Global and Regional Tools such as DREF, FACT, RDRT and ERUs to Zone staff, Regional delegations and national societies.
7. Increase surge capacity in financial management and consider the development and implementation of a system to track financial commitments in real time.
8. Increase understanding of the role of the Security Advisor versus that of security managers in the Zone by holding security training for Zone staff, including Country Representatives.
9. Re-negotiate the current policy the IFRC’s insurance provider has of hiring consultants for delegate posts of less than three months in order to reduce reputational risk to the organization and personal risk to the individuals hired.
10. Disseminate an explanatory note to national societies in the region explaining the need to stop unsolicited in-kind donations and the potential harm this does during an operation.
11. Ensure where possible that national or regional purchase of materials is given priority where quality and timeliness of response is not jeopardized.

## 6.2 Coordination

The need to improve internal coordination is evident from the findings of the evaluation. Further the IFRC must increase its contribution to support national societies efforts to meet vulnerable people’s needs. The following recommendations are made to improve the current and future coordination of operations:

12. Continue to use High level missions during the operation to engage with highest levels of national societies and/or authorities. Expand their use to other contexts when needed and consider Joint High Level missions with the ICRC where a Movement approach is required.
13. In future convene, at the earliest possible time and in collaboration with the ICRC, a Movement meeting to agree a strategic framework that underpins the response actions of the Movement in such crises.
14. Expand on work already undertaken in defining roles and responsibilities of the various parts of the secretariat by developing detailed standard operating procedures for operations management.
15. Re-motivate and refresh the working spirit of the Zone office, delegating the appropriate levels of responsibility to individuals ensuring they have adequate technical and managerial support and prioritize cross-departmental work.
16. Re-establish a constructive working relationship between Geneva Departments and relevant Zone departments and functions by undertaking a workshop to reflect on this report and lessons learned from the operation with the explicit aim of improving future collaboration.
17. Communicate with members both through regular operations updates and where information is too sensitive use internal communication methods to disseminate the information.

18. Ensure that the IFRC has an adequate presence to carry out its role and obligations in countries where it currently does not have a regular international presence namely Libya and Yemen.
19. Disseminate throughout the region and at every opportunity the Fundamental Principles and working modalities of the Movement in order to sensitize member national societies and their Governments against unilateral action.
20. The MENA Zone working closely with the Geneva Secretariat and PNS should develop a Resource Mobilization strategy for the operation.
21. The Geneva Secretariat should finalize the ECHO multi-stakeholder procedure currently being developed in order to ensure clarity on the process of application and entitlements to funding.

### 6.3 Preparedness and Contingency Planning

The MENA Zone office continues to need to prepare for potential increased civil unrest throughout the region. The following recommendations are made to improve current and future preparedness and contingency planning:

22. Working with national societies, develop specific scenario based contingency plans ensuring that the Zone has a complementary one that reflects the resources of the wider Federation including the Global tools.
23. Re-train RDRT members with a specific emphasis on civil unrest and conflict situations (through improved training with refreshers and updated technical profiles) recognizing the important role they may play within their national societies and for the Movement. This should be done in close collaboration with the ICRC and using the Safer Access model.
24. Develop with Geneva Information Systems Department and test the Disaster Response Information System (DRIS) as a Zonal disaster preparedness information management tool (including for management of RDRT members) enabling effective and efficient disaster response.
25. Continue to assess national society capacity needs and how best to address these in a systematic way, ensuring that as national societies go through organizational change and development they retain the fundamental principles and that appropriate procedures are followed.
26. Consider opportunities to address and advocate for International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL) which could facilitate issues such as visa and customs clearance.

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MENA Update Number 7, IFRC

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## Annex 1. Terms of Reference for the RTE

### Terms of Reference for a Real Time Evaluation of the IFRC response to the North Africa / Middle East crisis 2011

#### 1. Summary

- 1.1. Purpose:** This real time evaluation (RTE) will assess the ongoing IFRC response to the North Africa / Middle East crisis to inform continued response and preparedness in MENA, as well as future global emergency relief operations. Particular emphasis should be placed on overall management and performance of the response and related preparedness actions, and how effective they were / are in delivering services throughout the ongoing response.
- 1.2. Commissioners:** This RTE has been commissioned by the USG of the Programme Services Division, IFRC, Geneva.
- 1.3. Audience:** This RTE will be used by the IFRC in MENA Zone and IFRC headquarters in Geneva; it will also inform all RC/RC actors contributing to or affected by the operation and the wider International Federation in future disaster response.
- 1.4. Duration of consultancy:** approximately 30 days (with approx 15 days in the field)
- 1.5. Estimated dates of consultancy:** June - July, 2011.
- 1.6. Location of consultancy:** Geneva, Amman, Egypt, Tunisia and other relevant countries in the MENA Zone.

#### 2. Background

The IFRC is committed to ensuring quality assurance, standards and a strong culture of lesson learning in its disaster response and, as such is committed to carrying out RTEs in the wake of all major disasters requiring an international response and meeting certain criteria. Effective RTEs can identify key systems, processes, issues and lessons in a timely manner that directly improves service delivery and are therefore a key mechanism for accountability to intended beneficiaries, donors and other stakeholders supporting IFRC work.

Since January 2011, the MENA region has witnessed weeks of civil unrest in a number of different countries. This has provoked concern related to the insecurity for the population in each specific country and also to ongoing population movement, primarily from Libya into neighbouring countries. The political conditions and rapidly changing events in Libya have caused around 850,000 people to flee Libya, the majority into Tunisia and Egypt, and there is no immediate end in sight to this situation. In addition, other countries, such as Yemen and Syria have experienced political unrest and confrontation with existing governmental systems. The Red Cross Red Crescent Movement is working together to support the National Societies in these countries, to respond to and/or prepare for escalating tensions and humanitarian needs.

- The IFRC has responded in Tunisia by supporting the Tunisia Red Crescent Society (TRCS) to provide medical / first aid assistance, food, non-food items, water & sanitation and some psychosocial support. With support from a 14-person FACT and four ERUs, the RC has set up a transit camp for up to 2,000 persons to provide support to key groups, such as sub-Saharan Africans. There has also been support to build the capacity of the TRCS. A Plan of Action has been developed to outline the strategy and contingency planning for the operation in Tunisia. There is also a strong focus on building the capacity

of the TRCS to be better prepared for future disasters. This plan will focus mainly on: logistics system, volunteer management and disaster management programming.

- In Egypt, the Egyptian Red Crescent Society (ERCS) has been working closely with the Government and other organizations to provide support to those crossing the border from Libya. ERCS volunteers have provided relief assistance (food and non-food items), water and first aid / basic medical care to those in transit or remaining in the border area of Saloum.
- In Libya, meetings have been held with the LRCS and a plan of action has been drawn up to provide key assistance and capacity building / organisational development support to the NS.
- In both Syria and Yemen, the Zone has carried out assessment missions and in Yemen has provided additional human resources (DM and PSP specialists) who have provided training and technical advice. Assistance is being provided to both NSs to support the targeting and delivery of relief items / logistics systems, in first aid and in other emergency health services in coordination with the ICRC.
- At a regional level, the MENA Zone is supporting National Societies in the three sub-regions to build or reinforce contingency planning at a national and regional level to ensure that they can provide effective emergency response in a timely, neutral and impartial manner. This includes the provision of technical support, training and the planning for pre-positioned stocks.

The IFRC launched a Preliminary Emergency Appeal<sup>56</sup> (MDR82001) on 1 March 2011 for CHF 4,438,090 to support up to 100,000 beneficiaries in the affected countries, in particular in support of the population movement from Libya into Tunisia and for contingency planning across the region. In addition, three DREF grants were (CHF 150,000 was allocated directly to Tunisian Red Crescent, CHF 107,672 to Egyptian Red Crescent, and CHF 59,374 to region for the start up of the appeal). A Revised Emergency Appeal<sup>57</sup> was launched on 24 March 2011 for CHF 12,269,102 to extend to operation in Tunisia and support for regional contingency planning in countries where the risk of humanitarian crises is increasing and again 17 May for CHF 14,840,345 to include support to the Yemen and Syrian Arab Red Crescent Societies.

### 3. Evaluation Purpose & Scope

**The primary purpose of this real time evaluation (RTE)** is to assess the ongoing IFRC response to the North Africa and Middle East crisis to inform continued response and preparedness in the MENA region, as well as future global emergency relief operations. Particular emphasis should be placed on the overall management and performance of the response and related preparedness actions, and how effective they were / are in delivering services throughout the ongoing response. This should focus according to the objectives and activities outlined in Emergency Appeal.

The RTE will look at the appropriateness, timeliness and effectiveness of preparedness and response planning and actions carried out for the affected countries in North Africa and subsequently for the wider MENA region. The RTE will consider the “IFRC response” to include the NSs affected by the current crisis, the Red Cross / Red Crescent NSs supporting the operation within the IFRC Secretariat system and the Secretariat at all levels (country, regional, zone, and Geneva). The RTE will look at links to ICRC activities, but will refrain from pronouncing on those activities. In addition to these RCRC stakeholders and the intended beneficiaries of RCRC services, the RTE may consult with any other key stakeholder (partner organizations, governmental, etc) relevant to the evaluation objectives.

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/11/MDR82001PEA%20final.pdf>

<sup>57</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/11/MDR82001REA.pdf>

Geographically, the scope of the evaluation will include the affected countries included in the Emergency Appeal: - the countries of North Africa (particularly Tunisia and Egypt), of the Middle East (particularly Yemen and Syria) and those NSs covered by relevant preparedness actions (including Bahrain). It will take into account the work done on regional contingency planning and the support from the Regional Logistics Unit in Dubai. The evaluation will cover the period from the outset in January until the time the evaluators collect the data.

#### 4. Evaluation Objectives and Key Questions

Specific objectives and key questions to be answered in this RTE are listed below. In addressing these objectives and key questions particular emphasis should be placed on considering the performance and delivery of the IFRC Secretariat and the wider IFRC in both the response to and preparedness for the developing crisis. Please note that these are guiding questions and the RTE team are not limited to those below.

1. **Efficiency & Effectiveness of operational management:** to what extent have internal systems, structures and mechanisms affected the management and timely and cost-effect service delivery?
  - a. Was the Federation' operational structure, internal systems and processes well geared to deliver timely, efficient and effective disaster response in an equitable manner, proportionate to need?
  - b. How effective and efficient were the systems to mobilize resources – financial resources / fundraising (including DREF, PEAR, ECHO etc), human resources (including surge capacity and delegate recruitment), logistics etc.? Was resourcing adequate and what could have been done differently? How effective and relevant were the initial needs assessment? Who was involved, and what methodologies / tools were used? What (if any) should have been done differently?
  - c. How did the assessment(s) link to planning? Were plans / emergency appeal timely and relevant in each situation?
  - d. How effectively were plans turned into relevant and timely programming or assistance and how effectively was this assistance delivered? What constraints were there? How could the delivery of programmes or assistance have been improved and what lessons are to be learnt?
  - e. What levels of beneficiary consultation were used during the assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring stages?
  - f. How effective were the systems to provide programme and management reporting? And how timely, relevant and informative was both management and public reporting?
2. **Coordination:** to what extent the IFRC response was managed in a cohesive and effective manner, including communication, collaboration, and coordination among key stakeholders:
  - a. How timely and effectively has the IFRC internally communicated and coordinated in its response within the Secretariat – including country, region, zone, and Geneva? Coordination and communication covers all stages from initial assessment to planning and service delivery)
  - b. How timely and effectively has the IFRC communicated and coordinated its response with Movement partners? And with external actors?
  - c. Were the resources present to support and ensure effective coordination and communication at the necessary levels?

- d. Was coordination between levels and across programmes effective and transparent?
- 3. Preparedness:** Contingency planning and basic response preparedness is an important element of this slowly evolving and changing crisis across the MENA region and there should be a focus on different levels of preparedness, including country, regional and Zone level. To what extent were contingency planning and basic response preparedness measures planned and carried out in an effective, efficient, relevant and appropriate manner - at country, regional and Zone level.
- a. What contingency plans and early warning systems were in place before the crisis (or were developed in the early stages of the crisis) to prepare NSs and Secretariat teams?
  - b. How was the early warning and monitoring of the ongoing situation carried out? How timely and effective were the steps taken to put in place contingency plans for emerging crises and how effective were these plans?
  - c. What steps were taken to ensure a coherent approach across the MENA Zone towards contingency planning and response preparedness measures? Were global contingency planning guidelines and technical support used and were they effective? What level of contingency planning information was shared with National Societies and other partners?
  - d. What risk management was taken into account?
  - e. What steps or recommendations would be made to improve or reinforce the regional contingency planning process?

## 5. Evaluation Methodology & Process

The methodology will adhere to the draft [IFRC Framework for Evaluations](#)<sup>58</sup>, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

An **IFRC evaluation management team** will oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of three people not directly involved with the MENA operation; one of which is from the Secretariat Planning and Evaluation Department, the other two who have direct experience in emergency operations and assessments – one from the Zone and one from Programme Services Division.

The **evaluation team** will consist of two – three people: one an external evaluator and one-two internal IFRC evaluators (ideally all candidates should have regional experience and Arabic language skills). The external evaluator will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience to the evaluation, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he should not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on his/her professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation.

The internal evaluator(s) should provide sound knowledge, understanding and experience of IFRC disaster response. They will assist the external evaluator in the evaluation process, and to best interact with the various RCRC actors involved in the operation. It is expected that this two-three person team will be able to conduct a reliable and informed evaluation of the emergency operation that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

*The specific evaluation methodology will be detailed in close consultation between the RTE team and IFRC*, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

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<sup>58</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>

1. **Desktop review** of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, including prior IFRC RTE evaluation reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data, such as existing surveys from IFRC participants in the operation.
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites and to the Zone office.
3. **Key informant interviews** (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate).
4. **Focus group discussions**, (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate) as time and capacity allow.

An initial draft report will be prepared for a **review process**. This process should occur within 3 weeks of submitting the draft report to the evaluation management team, and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

- **Week 1 of review:** the evaluation management team to check content is in line with this TOR and IFRC evaluation standards.
- **Week 2-3 of review:** stakeholders who participated in the evaluation for feedback on inaccuracies or clarifications (differences of opinion would not be put forward here but outlined in the management response). Following this, a final draft is prepared
- **Week 4 of review:** an evaluation management response team (to be determined, but consisting of key relevant stakeholders from within the IFRC) will review the report and compile a management response to be included as an appendix to the final RTE report.

The draft IFRC Real-time Evaluation Management Guide will be piloted for this RTE and that the report review process and development of management response will be undertaken as described in the draft guide, to be made available to the evaluation team.

## 6. Evaluation Deliverables

**Inception Report** – The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the RTE and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team.

**Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels** – The team will report its preliminary findings to the IFRC in Tunisia, Amman (Zone Office) and in Geneva, in a timely manner and will adhere to the above mentioned review process.

**Draft report** – A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within two weeks of the evaluation team's return from the field.

**Final report** – The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final RTE report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his / her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

## 7. Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence;** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at: [www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp)

## 9. Qualifications

Selection of the external evaluation consultant will be based on the following qualifications:

1. Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programs responding to major disasters, with specific experience in RTEs preferred;
2. Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
3. Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;

4. Experience in qualitative data collection and data analysis techniques, especially in emergency operations;
5. Knowledge and experience working with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement preferred;
6. Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a team;
7. Excellent English writing and presentation skills in English, with relevant writing samples of similar evaluation reports.
8. Knowledge of the MENA region required
9. Ability to communicate in Arabic preferred.
10. Minimum qualification of a master's degree or equivalent combination of education and relevant work experience.
11. Immediate availability for the period indicated.

## 9. Application Procedures

Interested candidates should submit their application material by 31st May 2011 to the following email: [misgana.ghebreberhan@ifrc.org](mailto:misgana.ghebreberhan@ifrc.org). Application material is non-returnable, and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process.

Application materials should include:

1. **Curriculum Vitae (CV)**
2. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing your experience as it pertains to this RTE, your daily rate, and three professional references.
3. At least one example of an evaluation report most similar to that described in this TOR.

## Annex 2. List of Informants

### List of informants MENA RTE

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organization, location</b>
1	Stephen Wainwright	Senior officer, Planning and Evaluation Department	IFRC, Geneva
2	Pablo Medina	Senior Officer, Operations Quality Assurance, Disaster Services Department	IFRC, Geneva
3	Simon Eccleshall	Head of Disaster Services Department	IFRC, Geneva
4	Pierre de Rochefort	Senior Officer Training and Information Management, Disaster Services Department	IFRC, Geneva
5	Pankaj Mishra	Senior Officer Preparedness, Disaster Services Department	IFRC, Geneva
6	Matthias Schmale	Under Secretary General, Programme Services Division	IFRC, Geneva
7	Dorothy Francis	Senior Officer, FACT, Disaster Services Department	IFRC, Geneva
8	Christine South	Senior Officer, Operations Quality Assurance, Disaster Services Department	IFRC, Geneva
9	Kalle Loovi	Director, International Operations and Programmes	Finnish Red Cross
10	Roger Bracke	Head, Performance and Development Department (PDD)	IFRC, Geneva
11	Mukesh Kapila	Under Secretary General, NS and knowledge Development Division	IFRC, Geneva
12	Bekele Geleta	Secretary General	IFRC, Geneva
13	Humanitarian Diplomacy Team: Goli Ameri, Sylvie Chevalley, Nina De Rochefort, Siddarth Chatterjee, Pierre Kremer	(including resource mobilization and communications and the Under Secretary General)	IFRC, Geneva
14	Dr. Abdel Karim Bensiali	Director of Zone	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
15	Dr. Hosam Faisal	DM Coordinator	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
16	Issam Barahmeh	Logistics Coordinator	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
17	Rund Nazzal	HR coordinator	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
18	Jo Wood	Finance Manager	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
19	Saeb Omari	Resource Mobilisation	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
20	Jamil Zoubi	Performance and Accountability Coordinator	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
21	Gerard Latredou	Regional Representative	IFRC, Regional office Tunis
22	Steven Loyst	Head of Operation North Africa	IFRC, Regional office Tunis
23	Sergo Fernandes	Procurement/logistics Tunis operation	IFRC, Regional office Tunis
24	Selme Bouaziz	Finance officer	IFRC, Regional office Tunis
25	Dr. Tahar Cheniti	Secretary General	Tunisian Red Crescent Society
26	Julien Chalier	Cooperation delegate	ICRC, Tunis regional


			delegation
27	Vincent Toutain	Field Operations Coordinator	IFRC, Zarzis office
28	Cathy Lengyel	Reporting consultant	IFRC, Zarzis office
29	Hafedh Ben Miled	Operations Coordinator	Tunisian Red Crescent Society
30	Yasser Hajji	Health Coordinator	Tunisian Red Crescent Society
31	Khazar Alizade	Finance delegate	IFRC, Zarzis office
32	Laurent Baudat	Relief Coordinator	IFRC, Zarzis office
33	Hovig Etyemezian	Senior Field Coordinator, Sosha Camp	UNHCR
34	Isabelle Bourgeois	Cooperation delegate	ICRC, Sub delegation Zarzis
35	Valeria Gamboni	Head of Sub delegation	ICRC, Sub delegation Zarzis
36	Rene Suter	ECOSEC delegate	ICRC, Sub delegation Zarzis
37	William Najjar	Admin staff on loan	IFRC, Zarzis office
38	Laurent Benisti	Logistic delegate	IFRC, Zarzis office
39	Joyde Tomalin	Security Coordinator	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
40	Dr. Manhal Annaz	Acting Head of Operations and Programme service	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
41	Hadeel Halaseh	PMER Senior officer	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
42	Rana Kabala	Country representative Yemen	The Norwegian Red Cross
43	Paul Emes	Head of Support Services	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
44	Muhammed Yehyeh Tolan	DM Coordinator	Yemen Red Crescent
45	Muhamed Babiker	Federation Representative for the Gulf	IFRC, MENA Zone office, Amman
46	Pieter De Rijke	Senior Officer ERU	IFRC, Geneva
47	Lars Tangen	Head of Security	IFRC, Geneva
48	Barry Armstrong	Disaster Response Manager	British Red Cross
49	Frank Warnier	Former TL for Benelux Relief ERU	Benelux ERU
50	Isabelle Sechaud	Unit Manager Field Logistics	IFRC, Geneva
51	David Horobin	Manager Global Logistics Service Delivery	IFRC, Geneva
52	Carmen Corminboeuf	Officer Zonal Fundraising Support, Resource Mob. Dep.	IFRC, Geneva
53	Colin Chaperon	Former Coordinator in Tunisia	American Red Cross
54	Hakan Karay	Senior Officer Relief, Disaster Services department	IFRC, Geneva
55	Panu Saaristo	Water, Sanitation & Emergency Health Unit	IFRC, Geneva
56	William Carter	Water, Sanitation & Emergency Health Unit	IFRC, Geneva
57	Tammam Eladout	Senior Health Officer/FACT Operations Advisor Tunis	IFRC, Tunisia
58	John Dyer	Senior Security Officer	IFRC, Geneva
59	Muftah Etwilib	Head of Internation Libyan Red Crescent	Libyan Red Crescent
60	Prof. Mamdouh Gabr	Secretary General of Egyptian Red	Egyptian Red Crescent

		Crescent	
61	Marwan Abdullah	Director of Syrian Arab Red Crescent	Syrian Arab Red Crescent
62	Charlotta Relander	Deputy Head of Cooperation and Coordination within the Movement	ICRC, Geneva
63	Sari Nissi	Head of Movement Operations Unit	ICRC, Geneva
64	Eloi Fillion	Deputy Head of Operations Near and Middle East	ICRC, Geneva
65	Patrick Youssef	Deputy Head of Operations Near and Middle East	ICRC, Geneva
66	Boris Michel	Head of Operations North and West Africa	ICRC, Geneva
67	Langdon Greenhalgh	FACT Field Team Leader	IFRC, Tunisia
68	Ibrahim Osman	High Level Mission Representative	IFRC, Geneva
69	Birgitte Bischoff Ebbesen	Head of Disaster Management	Danish Red Cross
70	Olav Aasland		Norwegian Red Cross
71	Greta Juul	Former Acting Country Representative Yemen	IFRC, Yemen
72	Ela Serdaroglu	Senior Shelter Officer	IFRC, Geneva
73	Gina Guinta	Information and Reporting delegate FACT	IFRC, Geneva

### Groups met

Type of group	Location	No of females	No of males
Beneficiaries (refugees)	Former IFRC transit camp	6	4
Staff Islamic Relief	Former IFRC transit camp	1	1
Doctor and nurse, International Medical Corps	Former IFRC transit camp		2
<b>Total</b>		<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>

# Annex 3. Organigram of MENA Zone office





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*Strategy 2020* voices the collective determination of the IFRC to move forward in tackling the major challenges that confront humanity in the next decade. Informed by the needs and vulnerabilities of the diverse communities with whom we work, as well as the basic rights and freedoms to which all are entitled, this strategy seeks to benefit all who look to Red Cross Red Crescent to help to build a more humane, dignified, and peaceful world.

Over the next ten years, the collective focus of the IFRC will be on achieving the following strategic aims:

1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises
2. Enable healthy and safe living
3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace