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INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES

AN EVALUATION OF THE CAPACITIES AND METHODOLOGY TO PREPARE FOR AND  
RESPOND TO  
SLOW ONSET DISASTERS IN AFRICA



FINAL REPORT  
PREPARED BY THE GLOBAL EMERGENCY GROUP LLC



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## ACRONYMS

ACP-EU	Africa Caribbean Pacific - European Union
AU	African Union
AWD	Acute Water Diarrhoea
AWG	Africa Working Group on Disaster Risk Reduction
BDRT	Branch Regional Response Team
BRC	British Red Cross
CARO	Central Africa Regional Office
CBDRR	Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CRCS	Cameroun Red Cross Society
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DM	Disaster Management
DMC	Disaster Management Coordinator
DMU	Disaster Management Unit
DR	Disaster Response
DRC	Danish Red Cross
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRMFSS	Disaster Management and Food Security Sector
DR/DP	Disaster Response/Disaster Preparedness
EAC	East African Community
EAIO	East Africa Indian Ocean Regional Office
EARO	East African Regional Office
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department
EP&R	Emergency Preparedness and Response
EWEA	Early Warning Early Action
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
EU	European Union
EU NDP	European Union Natural Disaster Facility
EWS	Early Warning Systems
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GA	General Assembly
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GEG	Global Emergency Group
GFDRR	Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction
GLS	Global Logistics Service
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HOA	Horn of Africa

HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
ICHP	Integrated Resilience and Contingency Planning
ID	Identification
IDA	International Disaster Assistance
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHCP	Integrated Health Care Program
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IPPC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KI	Key Informants
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOH	Ministry of Health
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDMA	National Disaster Management Agency
NDMC	National Disaster Management Council
NEPAD	NPCA the New Partnership for Africa's Development Planning and Coordinating Agency
NDRT	National Disaster Response Teams
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMHS	National Meteorological and Hydrological Services
NS	National Societies
PNS	Partner National Societies
OD	Organizational Development
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
RC/RC	Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
RC	Resident Coordinator
REC	Regional Economic Commissions
RFL	Restoring Family Links
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
RO	Regional Office
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SARO	South Africa Regional Office
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SG	Secretary General
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SoS	Slow Onset Scenarios
SRO	Sahel Regional Office
SRCS	Somali Red Crescent Society
SRCS	Senegalese Red Crescent Society
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
DDC	Dry lands Developments Centre
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
US	United States Agency for International Development
USAID	United States of America
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WB GFDRR	World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
WDR	World Disasters Report
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
ZRCS	Zimbabwe Red Crescent Society

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objectives of this evaluation as described in the Terms of Reference and as further agreed within the Inception Report (November 17<sup>th</sup> 2014) provided to GEG and approved by the IFRC Africa Zone DMU, are to:

- Assess the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) approach, capacities and methodologies (including the uses and appropriateness of the DRM Global Tools and Systems) of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and selected National Societies (NSs) in Africa, in close collaboration with other external partners to address various aspects of **Slow Onset Scenarios (SoS)**
- **N.B. Definitions:** For the purposes of this evaluation<sup>1</sup>, the term **Slow Onset Scenarios (SoS)** as opposed to **Slow Onset Disasters or Emergencies** is recommended. SoS is used in this evaluation to try to avoid the already too common perception that, by definition, such situations are already being addressed and managed with the Emergency Preparedness & Response Planning (EP&R) methodologies of most humanitarian agencies. In addition, many NS SoS activities are a component of longer –term DRR programming but there is also an important, and as will be seen, neglected need for early action and pre-emptive Emergency Response. The former DRR is covered by NS to a greater or lesser degree. The latter “pre-emergency” activities less so.
- Evaluate their capacity to monitor, predict and provide indicators from early warning system information in order to prepare for and respond to slow onset disasters.
- Assess their ability to take into account PNS and back-donor opportunities and challenges to providing bilateral or multilateral support to such disasters.
- The findings from the review are expected to form recommendations to improve the capacities of the IFRC and African NSs to manage and mobilize resources for responding to slow onset disasters.

- With this strengthened capacity, it is expected that there will be opportunity to reduce loss of life, property and suffering during times of disaster.

## METHODOLOGY

This review used a mix methods approach that combined a secondary data review based on both IFRC, PNS and external agency academic and professional documents deemed relevant to an evaluation of SoS; key informant interviews (both in the field and over the telephone), and one participatory workshop with IFRC/PNS staff during meetings in Nairobi in mid-December 2014. More than 80 individual stakeholders participated in this evaluation (approximately 70 through key informant interviews and others in the participatory workshop). A questionnaire in English and French was provided but there were no responses to this questionnaire prior to the start of the field data collection. In order to gain a continental overview, the Africa Zone HQ and the Regional Offices of the NS, IFRC, ICRC, PNS as well as the IFRC Secretariat HQ in Geneva. External partner stakeholders were visited in East Africa (EARO) Central (CARO) South (SARO) and the Sahel (SRO) were also visited. In support of interview standard M&E approaches on criteria were also applied in the review of the subject matter these were the following:

- Relevance & Appropriateness
- Effectiveness, Efficiency and Performance
- Connectedness & Sustainability
- Gender Approach
- Future Strategy

**FINDINGS** The Findings in this evaluation are directly linked to the key questions outlined in the ToR and the Inception Report. However, it is interesting but not surprising to note, that many of the findings and recommendations in this evaluation are not new. They often mirror and reflect attention to guidelines and content within the existing Policy, Strategy and Guidelines and Standard Operation Procedures of the IFRC and

the Zone and in other review documents that were part of the desk review for this evaluation.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENT TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE AREAS OF INTERVENTION FOR THE RED CROSS/RED CRESCENT

**At the Africa Continental Level:** Africa is the global focal point and nexus for Slow Onset Scenarios (SoS)<sup>2</sup> By far the largest numbers of SoS interventions are on this continent. In these SoS, food security, epidemics and drought play a major role often to climate related disasters which have an inherent SoS profile and are on the increase. The concerns and challenges regarding Food Security in particular were deemed so important that Food Security was highlighted in the Plan of Action from the Ouagadougou Declaration from the 2000 Pan Africa Conference (see Appendix 5 attached). Given the predominance of this sector, a recommendation from the findings is that extra effort be given to identifying, but more importantly, retaining a wider representation of FS experts in the NS structures and in the RDRT. This can be reinforced with enhanced general awareness in the branch and volunteer groups. The NS is supported through the robust IFRC initiatives in the zone to highlight the importance of this sector. The second trend is population movements; they are most commonly still linked to food security and drought and all too often aggravated by insecurity and conflict. In discussing this overarching challenge the collective opinion as perhaps best expressed from the OCHA interview meetings and summarised in their Slow Onset position paper *“Slowly unfolding emergencies can be mitigated by early response. If preparedness, early warning and early response systems are fully functioning, coordinated and integrated, the longer lead time means the humanitarian community can step in early enough to reduce human suffering and help prevent the*

<sup>1</sup> E.g.: Findings and recommendations in this review were already noted and embedded within the Africa Zone Disaster Management Framework 2013-2017, IFRC Disaster Resilience Key Messages African National Societies Food Security Strategic Framework 2013-2017

<sup>2</sup> Provention and ALNAP: Slow onset disasters: Drought and Food Security: Learning from previous relief & recovery responses.

*downward spiral of increased vulnerability future hazards.”*<sup>3</sup> The challenge is that to date the response for most humanitarian agencies remains embedded most often in the emergency response model. What is clear from all interviews is that at this time there is a overall tendency to see Slow onset and Sudden onset as simply a continuum of a disaster and to be addressed as such by the emergency tools and systems that are in place in the absence of others designed to support and produce more effective early or preemptive action<sup>4</sup>. In addition the OCHA World Humanitarian Data & Trends 2014<sup>5</sup> support the recommendation from this evaluation that: “Strengthening the level of participation by RC/RC NS in national and regional coordination engagements applies equally to the international components of the Movement”.

#### **At the Country/NS Level:**

At the country and NS level, in the NS interviewed with the exception of Kenya, the perception of SoS early pre-emptive preparedness and response activities as a core part of NS DRR/ DRM business was uniformly the same.

1. Most NS do not have any additional capacity in DRM/DRR beyond that currently in place.
2. What excess capacity they may have to address NS core SoS activities is commonly split with obligations and demands to provide these resources to support PNS funded DRR and Resilience projects
3. Consequently, in 3 out of the 5 NS interviewed SOS early preparedness and response activities as a focus was not considered a priority activity.

<sup>3</sup> OCHA Occasional Policy Briefing Series Brief No. 6: *OCHA and slow-onset emergencies*

<sup>4</sup> To some extent, the distinction between slow- and rapid-onset disasters is artificial..... it could be argued that all disasters are slow-onset.....however there is a case for a long-term, holistic approach towards managing risk that also breaks down the distinction between slow- and rapid-onset disasters. PAHO “Slow Onset Disasters”

<sup>5</sup> *“The case studies show the increasing need for the international humanitarian community to strengthen its partnerships with local, national and regional actors to overcome operational challenges...”* OCHA World Humanitarian Data & Trends 2014



4. Most NS have some modest capacity within ongoing programs to address some aspects of Food Security and Health from a SoS standpoint.
5. The NS are guided by various directives and recommendations such as the Ouagadougou Declaration, Strategy 2020 and the Africa DM Strategy. PAC commitments and PNSs projects are expected to complement the NSs efforts. However, in the majority of NS interviewed, they felt that what spare capacity, if any, that might be directed to new SoS activities is very much linked to and dictated by the type, content and demand for NS staffing contributions to PNS funded DRR/Resilience projects and programmes.
6. DRR/Resilience approaches carried out in most of the NS in Africa are primarily delivered (in the NS visited) by integrated PNS funded projects that draw staffing from the NS. It is in these projects that much of the technical expertise the NS may have in the sectors to be addressed, food security, health, shelter, WatSan.
7. It was claimed by interviewees that the excess capacity required addressing SoS emergency preparedness and pre-emptive response is lacking. Discussions with NS, PNS and others indicated there may be potential to strengthen this aspect of SoS capacity through enhanced awareness training for existing DM staff (NDRT, BDRT, RDRT and volunteers). This would be a polyvalent approach and provide a wider exposure to NS DM staff of SoS characteristics. It would enhance inclusion in risk assessments and other general DRM activities carried out in projects and programs and in normal daily community work (See the Somalia Red Crescent case study)

#### **At the IFRC Level:**

There is no widely accepted definition within the IFRC for a Slow Onset Scenario. A number of other agencies have developed definitions often linking them to their own specific mandate. OCHA has a close approximation to what it may be for the RC

/RC Movement.<sup>6</sup> Within the IFRC systems, as with most humanitarian agencies, SoS strategic and tactical thinking is often blurred between a silo approach of separate development and humanitarian areas of responsibility. The focus driven by the experiences and lessons in the mid-90s to 2000 from a series of major events like Rwanda, the Balkans, Hurricane Mitch stimulated by the UN Humanitarian Review resulted in a much needed attention to improved DRM coordination systems and tools.

#### **DISASTER RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS LEVELS AT THE LEVELS OF THE SELECTED NS WITH SPECIFIC FOCUS ON SoS.**

All of the NS interviews aspire and in some cases have made progress in moving to a more integrated and linked up approach to general Emergency Preparedness & Response Planning and Contingency Planning. However the findings identified a lack of tools in place to react as effectively to specific SoS type of events where early warnings and local community inputs confirm a situation evolving.

#### **WORKING WITH THE GLOBAL DRM SYSTEM & TOOLS**

IFRC global tools are well recognized by the RC/RC NS but in the case of SoS, for the wrong reason or more correctly because of the absence of a viable alternative option. By default action on SoS scenarios is often delayed and, in the absence of specific tools to address these different needs, has become dependent making a case to mobilize the emergency systems such as DREF, RDRT, ERU, FACT in the IFRC and CERF and UNDAC in the UN system to respond. This involves the same deployment of resources for emergency relief that is both ineffective and inefficient. Responses to DREF for SoS start-up funding and Appeals, with only a few exceptions, are not well covered<sup>7</sup>. This is a situation not unique to the RC/RC but also reflected in UN responses<sup>8</sup>. The consensus of

<sup>6</sup> OCHA: "a slow-onset emergency is defined as one that does not emerge from a single, distinct event but one that emerges gradually over time, often based on a confluence of different events"

<sup>7</sup> Drawn from the desk review analysis of IFRC appeal documents provided for this review.

<sup>8</sup> Feedback from UN KI interviews (UNOCHA, UNDP & WFP)

stakeholders interviewed stated that DREF is widely regarded by both NS and PNS as possibly the mostly and the most effective of the IFRC emergency response tools. However, given the accepted limitations of existing SoS funding sources many interviewees suggested DREF would have additional utility by dedicating a percentage of its funding exclusively to SoS scenarios. The recommendation is that consideration be given to following the General Assembly directive to earmark 10% of all appeals to DRR and that this same percentage of DREF be similarly allocated. RDRT are used extensively in Africa and are seen as critically important in emergency support deployments. However the RDRT roster could be accessed and used in more creative secondments to NS where they could have a specific role in increasing SoS effectiveness in Africa. Contingency Planning, Food security training, surge capacity and technical support positions are one-off short term deployments outside of an emergency mobilisation.

#### ISSUES OF EFFICIENCY & EFFECTIVENESS

A significant aspect to consider in an evaluation of the RC/RC capacity to address DRM in general, and Slow Onset Scenarios specifically is an understanding of the relative effectiveness and efficiency of IFRC and NS management and operational structures to deliver services. The question of the status of the current IFRC decentralised structure is being addressed separately at the IFRC Secretariat Geneva HQ level and is part of a "Review of the Decentralisation of the IFRC Secretariat". No specific findings or recommendations on this review are yet available but anecdotal evidence as well as information drawn from the desk review of this evaluation and based on materials from other regional and zonal DRM reviews, suggests the decentralised zone structure is not without challenges relevant to this evaluation. These observations are mostly directed at concerns as to the structural and organisational inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the Secretariat's<sup>9</sup> DRM coordination and decision

making. There are questions surrounding the allocation and implementation of roles and responsibilities of DRM staff within what is frequently noted to be a structure with too many levels of management and operational complexity. The key informant interviews raised the interesting observation; that in their opinion the majority of NS are credited with being "quite effective" (in the sense they have good representation, presence access and often credibility with their governments and are held in generally high regard by the citizens of their countries. Moreover, they are seen mostly as having a degree of independence, and trust and, in all cases, are the most effective (or indeed only) domestic relief agency. This perception is commonly linked to the community and branch level presence and access of the NS where volunteers and branch staff are inevitably closely linked to and identified with the community and its needs. District and community RC/RC staff have a level of training and awareness that is seen as added value by those communities and, in many countries, may have a greater level of acceptance and value to the community than even government agencies. The case of the critical and admirable role RC volunteers and staff currently have played during the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea is a good example of this. It is also reflected in the Kenya RC, specifically, its proactive, well coordinated, trained National Emergency Response Teams and systems and also includes its proactive engagement in SoS in longer term DRR programming and in early action component of SoS activities through its community programming. Other good examples such as Somalia and Zimbabwe, two other NS interviewed will be reflected in the report.

Conversely there was an equally broad consensus that this grass roots effectiveness is too often diluted or even blocked by weak internal management design, too frequent top-down micro-management that hinders or even discourages middle-management decision making and implementation of its organizational objectives. National coordination, of which the

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<sup>9</sup> The IFRC "Secretariat" includes the Geneva HQ and the Zone offices (including their regional and country offices)

RC/RC is a part of and early warning information, flows too slowly to the local level. This is in part due to the other finding in this review regarding the sometimes low level engagement and strategic participation by the RC/RC with the forecasting agencies such as FAO, WFP, meteorological and agriculture agencies.

This can result in inefficient mobilization of management and operational service delivery. In the case of pre-emptive SoS this particularly can impede the flow and utilization and mobilization of information and operational data from the district and community into actionable national activities. This effect is not unique to the RC/RC but afflicts government and other agencies<sup>10</sup> None the less to qualify these findings, given the limited feedback available to the evaluation on this subject from only 5 NS; this does not imply that there are not many useful initiatives in EWS that NS engage in if they have the capacity. In the case of Kenya RC, the NS has an active engagement in EWS with various government and technical bodies.

#### SUSTAINABILITY OF RC/RC SoS APPROACH

As is noted among government and humanitarian agencies, the IFRC approach to SoS is still largely incorporated within longer term DRR and Resilience projects through some level of inclusion into donor/PNS funded Community Integrated DRR and Resilience programmes. However, Emergency appeals researched by the evaluation that include the GA 10% DRR directive do not attract significant funding (see DRR section, pg 15).

Alternatively, the RC/RC, like most other agencies interviewed including donor agencies, such as

ECHO, (see section in SRAF case study box)<sup>11</sup> have been highly dependent on the models based on emergency funding methodologies for response through DREF or Emergency Appeals. Most of the “Emergency Appeals” researched, regardless of how well they were covered, had an important and successful component of start-up DREF funding included in them. However, this reinforces the perception that there remains a dependency on “emergency funding” tools to address so called “Slow Onset Disasters (i.e. EMERGENCIES) implying any earlier preemptive funding was unavailable. Neither development nor humanitarian funding sources (See graphic in the report) provides a solid platform for a sustainable strategy to address more effective and efficient SoS preparedness and response. Feedback from the IFRC indicates that a Multi - year funding initiative that could address a wide range of SoS activities, particularly those not addressed in long term DRR & Resilience, has not received a buy- in by partners. Management Efforts have also been made to mobilize long-term funding under the Africa Food Security Framework. The lack of dedicated funding and the ability to generate more effective SOS preemptive early response remains a key obstacle to more pre-emptive and appropriate early action by the RC/RC. In particular, this includes the need to meet and take earlier action such as prepositioned stock, Livelihoods projects or preventative WASH or health interventions. If such early action is not undertaken then the developing event will deteriorate to a full blown emergency at which point the conventional response mechanisms that are funded and resourced kick in but are by definition too late.

#### FUTURE RC/RC SoS STRATEGY

If IFRC and supporting partners continue the current funding-constrained, management and human resource limited approach to SoS based on

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<sup>10</sup> One challenge, which calls for improvement of the existing early warning systems in the Horn of Africa, is the slow dissemination of warnings which do not reach the local level in some cases. If they do, sometimes they are not understood by end users, and if understood, capacity to actually act on them is weak. UN ISDR “Africa INFORMS” 2012.

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<sup>11</sup> The ERC Situation and Response Analysis Framework Reinforcing *Institutional Capacity for Timely Food Security Emergency Response to Slow Onset Crises at Scale (SRAF)*

existing systems it is likely that for the majority of NS their priority and inclination to redirect more of their already limited resources and time into coordination and early warning integration in to existing programmes will remain no greater than at present and may in fact decrease.

### **SUGGESTED PRIORITIES FOR THE SOS IN THE AFRICA ZONE**

Despite the constraints noted in the review and specifically, those due to the limited number of NS visited, the timing and the workload experienced by the Movement attributable to the Ebola crisis, multiple reviews and other priorities; a wide ranging number of conclusion, findings and recommendations are provided that can inform ongoing Zone initiatives in the area of Slow Onset Scenarios.

The review suggests the following would be considered to be paramount areas for consideration by the Zone for attention.

**General:** There is an agreement at all levels of stakeholders reviewed that SoS activities fall into two areas of funding and expertise and capacity requirements:

- DRR and Resilience: The longer-term, integrated and cross-cutting activities in livelihoods, food security, health, WASH etc that fall primarily into the development funding basket.
- Early Response to SoS events: These are more tilted to the Humanitarian funding basket but are not accepted as being "Emergency interventions as covered by CERF, DREF or Emergency Appeals but are none the less frequently featured in them.

The RC/RC NS, following various guidelines and directives detailed in the review, have made progress in addressing SoS activities projects and programming in the first area of DRR and Resilience. However, like most agencies, as featured in the SRAF case study below, there remains a need *"to improve timely, relevant response to slow onset or predictable crises"*.

To this end, the following are important areas for attention:

**Funding:** Many of the findings and recommendations were met with differing views and seen through differing lenses by various Key Informants. However the issues around SoS funding were unanimously agreed to be the biggest challenge and solutions to this of the greatest importance. Earmarked SoS funding is scarce. SoS funding can be accessed but with difficulty through bilateral DRR funding for major donors such as EU, World Bank GFDRR INDP etc. The RC/RC must strengthen its expertise knowledge and marketing as a preferred national agency to gain access to these funds. The importance of DREF as a SoS finding mechanism needs to be reviewed or an alternative SoS fund considered to encourage donors of the value of what would be quite modest funding to initiate pre-emptive action.

**Technical capacity development:** To inform and provide a credible evidence-based lobby and advocacy to donors to take this aspect of SoS support seriously, the RC/RC needs to enhance its current technical capacity. It must either engage in or build strategic alliances with the agencies that have them, a competence in the areas of forecasting, triggering and surveillance, the use of livelihood and climate and other market analysis.

**Contingency and Emergency Response Planning:** To take full advantage of the above attention must remain focused on good DRM/DRR planning. Efforts are progressing but need to be maintained across the Movement in harmonising and developing a more context-appropriate framework for contingency planning as a pre-event exercise with Emergency Preparedness and Response planning for the specific event.

**The Inclusion of Response Analysis Criteria:** The planning process will be enhanced with additional focus on improving the RC/RC approach to SoS risk assessments through training and best practice peer-supported community-based integrated resilience programming that contributes to the analysis process. Contingency planning needs to be a live interactive and detailed activity that supports and aids decision making.

**Capacity Building:** The selection of more “expert” NS and RDRT staff in key areas of SoS Food security, WASH and health for example should be complimented with an elevated inclusion of general SoS awareness in branch NDRT and community DM committees and volunteers. Training, Coaching and Mentoring in aspects of SoS methodology should be applied at all three levels of the RC/RC NS structure National, Regional and Continental.

**Coordination and partnerships:** A more focused and strategic engagement with key partner SoS mandated agencies, government departments and technical institutions, supported by improved joint assessments and risk analysis would in turn enhance planning that could lead to more effective funding mobilisation, that would in turn open up greater opportunities for NS to initiate early pre-emptive actions to fill the existing gap.

### KEY CONCLUSIONS SUMMARY

A caveat to the conclusion section is that, as noted earlier, with only five NS interviewed, though covering all regions, it cannot be assumed that these conclusions are over arching across all NS in Africa.

The consensuses of opinion from the stakeholder interview, which are supported by the reviewer, are that IFRC strategy for SoS in Africa should focus on:

1. Ongoing enhancement of the modest areas of SoS capacity within current NS structures, planning and programming (specifically PNS funded DRR and integrated resilience programmes).
2. All stakeholders confirm the major challenge raised by non-existent or limited financial mechanisms to fund the relatively modest needs to pro-actively engage in SoS activities.
3. Enhanced training for key DRM managers on how to be more effectively engaged in meaningful participation in key forums where SoS may be addressed such as clusters government and UN coordination sectoral meetings and forums where SoS data gathering analysis and operational approaches can benefit existing RC/RC initiatives fund raising and contingency planning
4. Reinforce RDRT surge roster with increased Food Security capacity.
5. Enhance through a polyvalent approach where all members and new roster staff of existing BRT, NDRT and RDRT receive basic awareness training in SoS characteristics and approach.
6. Enhance risk assessment skill in team training that includes a SoS component.
7. Increased, but appropriate continuation within the Africa Zone DMU of initiatives to enhance Food Security awareness, communications, knowledge management and information flow.

### ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS SUMMARY

1. Addressing additional SOS activities, outside of the existing programming through PNS funded projects and specifically the early action aspects of SoS was not a priority for most NS. However all acknowledged that food security and SoS situations predominate in Africa but that aside from already funded programmes, usually longer term DRR programmes, funding for new activities that may allow the NS take on is notoriously hard to come by. An analysis of the Emergency Appeals with a SoS component would confirm this. Food and Drought is followed by flooding, epidemics (Ebola, Meningitis, Malaria, Polio and Cholera), Population Movements, that are not a trigger in themselves but often initiated by food insecurity and access due to conflict or the consequences

of epidemics. The possibility of election and major event demands on NS are also important elements to be considered, and where at all possible incorporated, in the planning and implementation of their ongoing DRR and Resilience programmes.

2. Few NS interviewed (and others not visited were confirmed in discussion with the zone) have any additional or specialised SoS skills or capacity to add this further into their planning than already done.
3. Most NS interviewed endeavor to address the guidelines in RC/RC policy include some element of early action SoS activities, awareness and basic knowledge in their strategic and operational planning. However, their ability to deliver on this appears heavily influenced by a lack of funding for this aspect of SoS and by the predominance of PNS longer –term DRR and Resilience support and projects.
4. ALL stakeholders, RC and external interviewed, noted the limited DRR capacity to take on more SoS activities unless very well funded to increase that capacity. In particular, the PNS interviewed in all the regions visited strongly advised against adding an addition layer of specific technical SoS activities or responsibilities to existing NS capacity.
5. Almost all stakeholders and the NS themselves believe the best route to enhanced capacity in the SoS area is to avoid any suggestions that NS take on additional obligations (to which government may make excessive demands) in the areas of forecasting and data analysis. It was stated by NS and PNS that the societies are frequently approached by government agencies or ministries to take on community level activities to either support or, as has been noted in this report, “to lead” in areas of DRM/SDRR. They truly do not have the capacity or competence (this is not to say that within existing funded activities the RC /RC could not make a contribution). Rather, they all believe stronger and more pro-active and focused engagement with agencies better resourced with the technical skills for data gathering and analysis and for RC/RC to use the outputs from such sources to enrich and inform the NS existing DRM strategies, planning and resilience and DRR programmes.
6. Almost all NS admit they are dependent on either a relaxation of DREF or are influenced to hold off on an earlier intervention until a case for DREF can be made TOO LATE!! The requirement, inclusion and implementation for 10% DRR appeals is to be reviewed and ascertained in terms of compliance or not and why.
7. The ICRC sees SoS as an area of concern within their own mandate specifically in First Aid, emergency room hospital capacity building and RFL. All expressed an interest to work closer with the ns and ifrc to prepare for and support active NS engagement in election or indeed any mass gathering event hostile or not)
8. Governments having varying levels of capacity in all areas of DRM and often despite a commitment to DRR DRM and climate change integration. There is an uneven perception and assumption between government and NS and the international partners that support them as to what each expects of the other in real terms. This is even more so in the case of SoS.



## KEY RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY

The recommendations that follow are derived, in part, from the GEG evaluation data collection process and results from the workshop conducted in Nairobi with IFRC and some PNS staff.

An IFRC management response should eventually be attached to this report specifying how and who within IFRC, PNS and NS may address these specific recommendations.

### STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

- S1. Focus on improving RC/RC approach to SoS risk assessments through training and best practice peer supported community based integrated resilience programming
- S2. Contribute to establishing a cross-agency agreement on enhanced key triggers for the major SoS risks in Africa, by region (food security, drought, epidemics, population movements)
- S3. Empower and provide specific training for NS to become more strategic, proactive and engaged in their approach to interagency SoS related coordination, resource mobilization, technical and contingency planning forums.
- S4. Address, through organisational development and peer engagement, ENHANCED NS middle management responsibility and authority to ensure community based resilience programming quality, outputs, DATA AND information FLOW THAT lead to improved decision making.
- S5. Address the acknowledged funding gap for SOS through reviewing in close collaboration with IFRC and PNS, possibilities of an amended DREF for a component for SOS alternate DRR funding through GFDRR, UNDP, AU and African Regional Economic Commissions etc.
- S6. Support NS develop competitive, evidence based funding proposals leveraging the RC relative advantages and backed by relevant data analysis

### TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

- T1. Develop a technical program that will enhance NS HQ technical department staff, NDRT, RDRT, and branch level volunteer polyvalent awareness of SoS.
- T2. Design a technical program quality framework and policy (including triggers, processes and SOPs) related to the use of the SoS technical sectors with specific focus on food security/drought.
- T3. Further develop RDRT roster capacity, support by ERU staffing (relief) skills, in some technical food security expertise.
- T4. Agree to ensure a more focused and committed application of the GA directive for a 10% DRR including in all appeals. This recommendation reflects and notes the feelings expressed from a wide range of interviewees that in principal the reviewer has sympathy with. A 10% allocation of DREF funding OR some alternative mechanism at the time of DREF request could provide modest funds for certain SoS initiatives that are generally less expensive to initiate that emergency response . The recommendation notes to opinion of the IFRC DM officers who feel that to include a 10% allocation should weaken the DREF.
- T5. Seek an approach to map the outputs from T4 and promote their inclusion elsewhere. I.e. what can we do better to promote this?
- T6 Base humanitarian slow onset preparedness and response on robust multi-sector multi-agency risk and needs assessments with quality technical data analysis, forecasting and surveillance input from appropriate agencies (FAO/WFP/UNICEF/OCHA/Ministry of Agriculture, Health, Meteorological departments)

### CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS TO THE EVALUATION:

This evaluation was influenced by a number of constraints and issues that had a direct impact on the final evaluation report content and delivery. Some of these were noted during the Inception Report Phase.

1. There were a very limited number of National Societies interviewed, less than 10% of the African total number of NS. The original intent was to try and meet with seven in the various regions visited, the final number was five. Consequently one might conclude the findings recommendations and opinions do not reflect the continental NS view. On the other hand it could be exactly the opposite and could be the same since with perhaps the exception of only one, the Kenya RC, the responses to questions, opinions and recommendations were remarkably consistent.
2. GEG has undertaken this review at a time of great challenges facing the Zone and Region that have had an impact, on the ability of the evaluation to fully engage as many stakeholders as planned. These include the massive distractions and call on Zone DRM resources and HR for the Ebola Crisis in West Africa with a number of high profile visits to the Regional Offices (RO); priority end of year reporting and training obligations in many National Societies (NS); the physical move of delegation offices and the concurrent deployment in the region of up to six other reviews and evaluations at both global and Africa Zone level all with the common focus on DRM/DRR.
3. Whilst the number of stakeholders interviewed appears significant, constraints noted later resulted in what may best be described as a very "thin" information and data input. That is almost all stakeholders responded with the very same observations on SoS core issues that produced the findings and recommendations namely: Priority, Capacity constraints, Lack of Funding, level of expertise, and weak advocacy and engagement in appropriate forums.
4. The timing of the evaluation and the delivery of it was geared to meet the donor reporting framework that was incompatible with the time of year (December holiday period), the duration of the evaluation and the final "team" composition.
5. The original ToR on whom the consultancy bid was based was for a three-person team. It subsequently proved that the budget was sufficient for only one consultant in the field who then had to sub-contract two home-based support staff for a very limited input to the final report. The inability to have the three persons in the field supporting the field data gathering and analysis phase significantly and negatively impacted the scope and depth of this data collection phase.
6. The Slow Onset Evaluation was run concurrently with up to six other reviews and evaluations in the Africa Zone (3 Africa DRR reviews, an RDRT review a Food Security review Slow Onset and Globally (Global tools and DREF reviews). All evaluations focused on essentially the same DRR /DRM sectors. This resulted in a certain "review fatigue" among stakeholders and had an impact on their focus, interest and attention and resulted in less detailed and quality information
7. Delays at country level on the logistics, administration and scheduling of interviews impacted the number of days available for interviews. In every field visit, the arrangements to meet agencies and stakeholders began the day of the consultant's arrival in country. This resulted in approximately three out of five days of work time being reduced or lost.



8. Logistics and administration challenges resulted in the often limited participation of the ideal key informants. . In many cases, only one person was available for interview and frequently it was not the best person for the subject matter of the review. This resulted a in a very mixed level of information quality and quantity. In several cases, the interviewee either cancelled or did not turn up which reflected the mixed priority and importance of this subject by stakeholders.
9. In a number of NS's, end of year reporting, training workshops and other conferences and meetings occurred drawing away KI from the consultant interviews.
10. In two cases, the delegations were in the process of moving. In one case, the delegation was half way through the move with limited or no access to the KI.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 BACKGROUND FROM INCEPTION REPORT

This report presents findings from a review commissioned by IFRC Africa Zone Disaster Management Unit (DMU) to evaluate the capacities and methodology of the IFRC and National Societies to prepare for and respond to slow onset scenarios (SoS) in Africa.

In the 20th century, it is estimated that more than 70 million people died from famines, with most cases identified in Africa<sup>12</sup>. In many places, this kind of scenario is cyclical, occurring on a yearly or seasonal basis, or the cause of the situation is chronic. However, there has been limited consolidated analysis of the most effective ways to respond to slow onset disasters in Africa, despite this type of disaster being more predictable thus allowing more time to plan and implement appropriate responses. However, every year, African National Societies continue to request resources for SoS interventions from the IFRC. Based on the large number of slow onset disasters in Africa, and the response and funding gaps of these operations. There is a clear need to respond to the slow onset disasters sooner and with more appropriate resources.

The IFRC's Strategy 2020 outlines the obligations of Red Cross/Red Crescent (RCRC) NSs to be well prepared and to use all effective means to help disaster and crisis-affected populations. As the predominate first responders across Africa, the NSs are best positioned among humanitarian organizations to save lives, as well as reduce suffering, damage and losses in disaster and crisis events. In order to be well-prepared to meet the immediate needs of those affected by disasters and other crises, NSs need to improve their preparedness and response capacities as part of the RCRC network, as well as seeking synergies between emergency response and DRR and livelihoods mitigation strategies.

**The Ouagadougou Declaration: Plan of Action 2000 (Appendix 4):** The PoA specifically addresses Food Security, the most predominant and systemic type of SoS challenge in Africa. Food Security is a primary concern to be addressed by Africa National Societies in their preparedness and response planning. In this evaluation the Food Security PoA objectives were considered. Whilst it is not possible to assume all progress and engagement of 52 NS are reflected by the inputs from the interviews of the 5 NS interviewed in this evaluation, some general assumption can reasonable be made and many of the objectives have been directly addressed in this evaluation.

The declaration states among others that NS *"to the extent of their capacities"..."National Societies make food security a strategic priority for this decade, recognizing that food insecurity is directly linked to a number of root causes, including poverty, the HIV/AIDS pandemic etc"..."Complementing services by working in partnership with communities, Ministries of Health, UN agencies, and other national and international organizations": ..."Asking donors to allocate 10 per cent of their emergency relief budgets to African National Societies to meet their overhead costs"*. In all cases interviewed NS had instituted some degree of progress on the Food Security objectives. Training and capacity development, core NS Food Security activities, PNS funded DRR and Resilience projects included aspects of these PoA objectives. The degree, size and scope of these initiatives varied considerably and where they were instituted also contributed to absorbing much of the NS DRR staffing capacity. When it came to the specific area of SoS preparedness and response there was as a consequence an overall admission that few NS had the excess capacity to address specific SoS activities as a priority. This in turn was significantly hampered by a shortage of funding to fuel such activities. Hence most stated SoS was not

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<sup>12</sup> Famine in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: Steven Devereaux ids working paper and Wikipedia

necessarily a priority but that some elements were addressed in Integrated DRR Resilience projects, Food Security, Health and Community-based DM programming they were undertaking.

Rising to this challenge, African NSs have committed to implementing the first strategic direction outlined in the Africa Disaster Management Framework 2013 – 2017, which states that a NS must strive ‘to be a high calibre “First Responder” agency, with an accessible capacity able to manage and mobilise resources to react to small, medium, or large scale sudden and slow onset disasters throughout the sub-Saharan Zone’. In this regard much has been achieved in recent years through the development of NS staff and volunteer capacities and response equipment, supported by improved contingency planning. In addition, NSs have accessed complementary resources, such as funding from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF), Emergency Appeals and human and physical resources through Regional Disaster Response Teams (RDRT), Emergency Response Units (ERU) and Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT) drawn from the global RC/RC disaster response system. However, the IFRC renders it necessary to determine how current tools and methodologies utilized in disaster contexts can be adapted and applied to the increased number of slow onset disasters occurring in Africa.

The IFRC external review will consider the current impact of RC/RC disaster preparedness measures at country and regional levels in Africa. At the country level, five NSs (one per region) and countries have been surveyed. These countries have been selected based on factors, such as the level of disaster likelihood in the country, the number of IFRC Emergency Appeals launched in the last five years, the country’s UNDP Humanitarian Development Index rankings, in addition to other criteria. The selection criteria will also take into account those countries where NSs, the IFRC and/or PNSs have invested significant resources over the last five years to strengthen RC/RC disaster response capacity.

## 1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW

According to the Terms of Reference (See *Annex 1*), the objectives and purpose of this review are to:

- The external review will assess the disaster response (DR) capacities and methodologies of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and selected National Societies (NSs) in Africa to respond to slow onset disasters, taking into account PNS and back-donor opportunities and challenges to providing bilateral or multilateral support to such disasters.
- The findings from the review are expected to form recommendations to improve the capacities of the IFRC and African NSs to manage and mobilize resources for responding to slow onset disasters.
- With this strengthened capacity, it is expected that there will be less loss of life and property, and reduced suffering during times of disaster.

## 2. FINDINGS

### 2.1 HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENT

This section presents findings from the review against the Key Questions provided by the IFRC Africa Zone DMU and further presented in the inception report and agreed with the IFRC.

KEY QUESTION  
2.1.1

THE HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENT, OUTLINING THE TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE AREAS OF SLOW ONSET SCENARIOS (SOS) INTERVENTIONS FOR THE RED CROSS/RED CRESCENT

There is an increasing acceptance and engagement among African Governments to incorporate a more integrated approach to DRR/DRM. This is guided and supported by a more robust position on DRR/DRM within the African Union although its implementation, through the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) and unions, varies between regions<sup>13</sup>. Many government disaster management agencies interviewed not only in this evaluation but other recent reviews in Africa<sup>14</sup> admit that whilst government DM policies, strategies and planning are in place, there are also internal structural and political as well as human capacity constraints. Operationally that can lead to a dependency on their RC society to take a leadership role in humanitarian action. This may be through the allocation of certain “cluster” lead functions or specific relief responsibilities such as camp management. The challenge with taking on such a role in SoS activities is if, with the support of the Movement partners, the society is able to meet those commitments.

The line between slow and rapid onset disasters is often blurred and this tends to result in an artificial definition of a chronic versus and emergency status. This in turn results in a similar response to a rapid emergency and calling on the tools designed to facilitate that emergency response. Within the NS reviewed but according to the Zone DMU reflected in others, National Societies there is simply a limited capacity, technical skills and, like governments, structures that cannot fully deliver outputs and decisions in the most efficient and effective way. The actual transition within government planning to move from a response based platform to that of a DRM/DRR/Climate Change/SoS focus has been stated but its implementation is varied.<sup>15</sup> There remains, to quite a wide extent under this situation, that government at least still retain the view that the core business for their RC/RC society is to that ensure Disaster Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) remain the priority. This may seem contradictory when many African countries face food insecurity every few years and in one or two case, like Ethiopia, it has become an infrastructure reality. Part of the answer to this is funding, or more correctly, the lack thereof, as noted within this review to react. In researching documents provided by the zone and others, the review found wide evidence of the rapid change of vulnerability in Africa from the historic rural environment to one of urban risk. Whilst reasonably, the current thinking on African SoS is still based on issues of rural climate change, food security, and drought, it is clear that already and increasingly in the in the coming years , as the shift in Africa moves from rural to an increasingly urban economy urban SoS will become predominant<sup>16</sup>. Urbanisation as a DRR and slow onset scenario are recognised and are being given more focus at both government and agency levels<sup>17</sup>. Whilst not immediately seen as SoS many stakeholders, the ICRC being a particular proponent, note the engagement of a NS presence during election and other major events through First Aid, RFL and other social support services<sup>18</sup>. Insecurity is both an ongoing problem in many regains. Once much focus in the Horn of Africa, it has now emerged as an increasing threat and, in many countries, spared until recently. Increased slow onset scenarios are

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<sup>13</sup> ACP-EU National Disaster Facility Final Evaluation: Borlini & Logan 2013.

<sup>14</sup> Southern Africa Region: Review of Red Cross National Society & IFRC Disaster Management (Preparedness & Response) Capacity: Nov 2013

<sup>15</sup> ACP-EU National Disaster Facility Final Evaluation: Borlini & Logan 2013.

<sup>16</sup> Urbanization and its implications for food and farming David Satterthwaite , Gordon McGranahan , Cecilia Tacoli

DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0136 Published 16 August 2010 / A report by ActionAid October 2006 Climate change, urban flooding and the rights of the urban poor in Africa Key findings from six African cities Et Al.

<sup>17</sup> 'Disaster Risk Reduction Must Keep Pace with Rapid Urbanization, Say Urban Planners'<http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/iha1323.doc.htm> , consulted Feb 9th.

<sup>18</sup> *“Disasters and responses in this region are currently framed around outdated rural livelihoods..... Recovery actions seek to restore a pre-crisis, status quo of tradition and subsistence. ... DM efforts to enable or maintain a traditional status quo may prove to be counter-productive and risk retarding safer, more progressive transformation. Disasters shift from a rural phenomenon to an urban one. Climate, traditionally, the single greatest disaster hazard in this region, will be overtaken by economic factors. Disasters amongst urbanising populations are different in who is affected how than rural disasters of the past.....DM responses will need to evolve to provide early action or pre-emptive assistance.”* No Regrets SomRep & Early Action v2, Stephen McDowell October 2014.

focused around Food Security (Drought, Livelihoods), Epidemics, Population Movements and some hydrological events due to slow increase of rains. Additional areas of focus are election and other civil events scenarios where the RC/RC can play a role. None the less, these elements will still remain as important and will not exclude the food security agenda, which has been and will be jeopardized by climate change and drought.

The West African Ebola crisis has had a huge impact and reflection across the continent and, indeed, globally on the need to maintain active and skilled surveillance mechanisms and coordination for epidemics. Moreover, there is a need to identify and agree among humanitarian actors in Government, Early warning agencies, The RC/RC Movement, the UN agencies, INGOs and donors, the early triggers of SoS so that more pre-emptive actions can be funded and mobilised. Humanitarian communication, education and awareness including addressing livelihoods, coping mechanisms, cultural mores and habits of a community have, yet again, emphasized the critical importance of engagement by government and agencies at the household level in assessing the effects and possible interventions in SoS.

Civil Unrest/Election risks or major human gatherings are acknowledged to be a form of slow onset events that require both monitoring, preparedness and pre-emptive and attention and action by both government and their auxiliaries such as the RC/RC.

Population Movements, both IDP and Refugees, continue to feature as a major humanitarian focus although the trigger for many of these scenarios in Africa is still often underlying food insecurity, climatic changes and aggravated by conflict and insecurity.

Regarding Slow onset scenarios, Inter-governmental Initiatives need to be improved. This is underway in many countries through changes and enhancement of and harmonization in Laws/policies. A competitive environment and fast growing economies can add additional stressors > these can be manifested in areas such as urban immigration, food production and access, building standards. The single greatest SoS challenge across Africa is Food Security and Drought<sup>19</sup> which dominates the request for funding support from the traditional emergency funding sources such as the IFRC DREF, the UN CERF and Emergency Appeals<sup>20</sup>. Some recent examples are the Southern Africa Food crisis of 2002/03, The East Africa/ Horn of Africa famines in 2010/11<sup>21</sup>. As an ODI for 2013 reports, 'the financing in drought-affected countries is very weak. Niger, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Malawi have seen 105 million people affected by drought but their combined DRR financing has been \$116.5 million, the same as Honduras alone<sup>22</sup>. Other risks revolve around Population, movements, both internal and cross border, epidemics and some hydrological events. Insecurity, conflict and terrorism impact increasingly on both SoS and EP&R planning preparation and response. Countries spared the extremes of this are now having to address the problem and countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Nigeria are examples of this spreading challenge are more frequently than ever a complication and driver in humanitarian action.

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<sup>19</sup> Some 36 countries around the world were affected by food emergencies, including 23 in Africa (64 percent), 7 in Asia (19.4 percent), 4 in Latin America (11.1 percent) and 2 in Europe (5.5 percent). In Africa, the dominant cause is civil war which affects 14 of the 23 countries or 61 percent, followed by drought (11 countries or 48 percent).

<sup>20</sup> Wikipedia: 10 of the last 14 worst famine/ drought since 1970 were in Africa most of them in The Horn of Africa.

<sup>21</sup> A FAO: The State of Food and Agriculture: Food Aid for Food Security. International Food Policy Research Institute: Déjà Vu in the Horn of Africa.


<sup>22</sup> Jan Ellet and Alice Caravan, ODI. September 2013. *Financing Disaster Risk Reduction: a 20 year story of international aid*:Pg vi.

Emerging from the data are clear indications that strengthened engagements in addressing Government, Regional and UN bodies such as surveillance and data gathering and forecasting agencies such as Ministries of Agriculture, Environment, Meteorological departments, the NDMO, UN agencies such as FAO, WFP UNICEF and the IASC clusters; Regional RECs like IGAD/SADC etc are needed. Participation, beyond mere attendance, to a full active participation and to direct, pro-active, engagement and advocacy is critical to ensure advocacy space and positioning the RC. Most governments have or are in the process of drafting/approving DRM legislation. There is both time and value for the RC/RC to lobby to assure inputs and interest among governments in NS/IFRC advice and help in understanding the best practices and learning from other national DM systems. There is a demand for practical data gathering and analysis and advice on evaluating and validating SOS or response based on changing risk factors (climate driven) and vulnerability in densely populated areas.

There are opportunities to further enhance the RC/RC role in this area in a more focused approach to SoS interventions. There is a more focused attention on the part of the Africa Zone to seeking opportunities to launch appeals that are specifically directed toward SoS pre-emptive response activities. The recent Gambia and Senegal Food Security appeals are examples of this and this review and contribute to informing those appeals (See Case Study 1, pg 15).

There remains a major gap in dedicated funding, HR and quality data analysis sources for SoS. All stakeholders pointed to these as the most critical hurdles to more effective early action to address SoS<sup>23</sup>.

Figure 1: Graphic on SoS v Sudden onset scenarios



Correctly, or otherwise the review detected from many interviews, that there is a tendency to see slow onset and sudden onset scenarios as a continuum rather than different scenarios. Even the language as noted reinforces this. The reviewer notes that not one single KI, including RC/RC, used any other phrase than emergencies or disasters to describe SoS and to distinguish these elements. In the absence of dedicated tools for early action, by default emergency methodologies and resources dominate and

<sup>23</sup> The management of slow onset risks will require strong and reliable institutional arrangements and governance structures; countries need to develop a forward looking climate change policy with specific goals and priorities, that takes into account slow onset climate change and its impacts. Integration of the management of slow onset risks into national development planning, poverty reduction strategies and other relevant policy frameworks will help to coordinate actions across sectors. Slow Onset Technical Paper: UN Framework for Climate Change 2012.

meetings with the various UN OCHA staff indicated the same with their system. This tends to contribute to a delay in pre-emptive action for that emergency where all resources are currently available. In order to change this dynamic, evidence indicates that overarching SoS triggers need to be more effectively agreed by upon stakeholders for a specific region, which in turn will allow the justification on evidence-based data analysis to lobby for and obtain the funding and human resources currently difficult or unavailable for effective and efficient pre-emptive early action.

*Figure 1* demonstrates the tendency to see slow onset and sudden onset as two components of a single disaster; it is just matter of timing. However, even if a slow onset is a longer drawn out scenario, in the absence and difficulty to fund and then resource this activity there's limited motivation among NS to differentiate between the two.

## 2.2 KEY QUESTIONS/ISSUES – COUNTRY AND NATIONAL SOCIETY LEVEL

### KEY QUESTION 2.2.1

WHAT ARE THE TRENDS, THREATS AND POSSIBLE AREAS OF INTERVENTION FOR THE RC/RC DURING SLOW ONSET DISASTERS?

At the country and NS level, the SoS threats remain largely the same as those described in the above 2.1.1, with Food security within DRR programming topping the list of concerns for most NS. Universally in interviews with NS, it was clear that any additional activities beyond what they are currently able to manage in SoS and, in particular, with the early action and response constraints note within this review are not a priority for most NS. Yet at the same time all acknowledged that Food Security, flooding, epidemics (Ebola, Meningitis, Malaria, Polio and Cholera) as well as the possibility of election demands on their societies are important factors to be included in their planning. It is important to note that there are activities that are being done successfully in a number of NS (see Somalia Case study box) that could be disseminated to sister societies. This would have an added value where, as is recommended elsewhere in this report, some NS staff or RDRT team members could engage in cross deployments to facilitate this process. Suggested activities could include leading an integrated Contingency Planning process for SOS, or develop EWS for SoS; collect primary data and analyse secondary data and bring evidence based information and inputs of the SOS to appropriate surveillance bodies and government.

The majority of stakeholders questioned on the effectiveness and efficiency of the RC/RC indicated the main threat to RC/RC strategic and tactical planning for SoS is based around the common challenge of limited capacity in mid-management leadership, decision-making and operational authority at both HQ and Branch level. The general opinion among most stakeholders is that the RC/RC societies have good community (district) level presence and access. In fact, in the Sahel and Central Africa regions, external interviewees (OCHA, WFP, ECHO) observations indicate that the RC /RC is the only significant domestic “go-to” agency for their respective governments. Such a mindset is a two bladed sword as the information gathered indicated that while this may be so, the perceptions and interpretations between government and NS as to the respective capacity and obligations between the two partners are not always the same. In other words, the government frequently assumes, over-estimates and expects a greater DM capacity and service delivery from their NS, (also assuming the international component will have the wherewithal, including funding, to compensate) than is commensurate with the actual NS resources. The NS interviewed, including Kenya, underestimates the demands the government assumes they will accept. Such a situation emphasised the primary reason to enhance regular and meaningful coordination at all possible levels of government as well as with external agencies. This will ensure the maximum exchange of information to planning and operational capacity.



The intervention capacity at the RC /RC Branch Level and community level for small to medium events is also generally good. However this capacity is limited and it can quickly become overwhelmed. It then falls to the NS HQ to provide surge capacity from its DM resources to maintain and strengthen the operational management. This systemic surge demand pressure was another reason given against adding an addition layer of NS SoS activities. In particular, these could include forecasting data gathering and analysis and in mobilising early short –term preparedness and response for evolving events. HR attrition, particularly in the areas of trained staff, is also a continuing concern. Retention of these key staff is critical to RC/RC project and programme sustainability and structural integrity. There is a need for a more linked up approach to harmonising EP&R planning and Contingency Planning. Each has a separate and important role in over all DM strategy that addresses the objectives of each but permits maximum effective and efficient use of limited assets especially at branch and community levels. This must be reflected in a more engaged and empowered middle management decision-making approach to both strategic and tactical planning.

**KEY QUESTION**  
**2.2.2**

**WHAT ARE THE EXISTING RC/RC (INCLUDES IFRC, NSs AND PNSs)  
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE CAPACITIES FOR SLOW ONSET  
DISASTERS AT THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRY OF ANALYSIS**

**General DP/DR capacity in the selected countries:**

In reviewing all stakeholders' interviews and data, a number of common threads appear regarding the overarching DR/DP capacities in the respective NS of the countries of analysis (Kenya, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Senegal and Cameroun). They are as follows:

**PNS Project Dependency and Coordination:**

Both the benefits and challenges that accrue to any NS from significant PNS/Donor funded projects and programmes are recognized and well documented. The NS activities, staff capacity, human resources and above all funding for DDR/DRM, including the limited contribution to SOS situations, come primarily from a number of major donor funded PNS's. In the case of the regions visited this included the Danish, British, Finnish, Norwegian, German, American and Canadian RC. In the West Central & Sahel countries it is predominantly the French RC. This dependence puts many NS in a difficult position where they need to provide human resources to these projects and programmes. This often leaves little spare capacity for additional core NS activities beyond those found within such projects. In addition, some of the PNS stakeholders interviewed admitted their back donor reporting and accountability requirements were onerous. They discussed how the DRM Reporting capacity constraints in the NS departments add to the strain. It was accepted also that in some circumstances there was not always the best of inter-PNS coordination, resulting in additional internal NS management stress.

**SOS skills:**

Generally the NS, Kenya RC being the exception, have limited DM breadth both at HQ and in the field. Most of their resources are quite heavily dedicated to support the PNS funded DRR and Integrated Resilience Programmes where, as noted earlier, there is often some basic SoS capacity but very little scope to expand. The consensus of most NS feedback was that the capacity they did have (see Zimbabwe) was primarily in the areas of Relief management, WASH, Health and some Food Security skills. However, these skill sets did not necessarily include specific training and awareness of the SOS



sector. The exceptions were where some elements of livelihoods and Food Security were included in the PNS funded projects. Most NS that have some SoS capacity feel constantly pressured and find it difficult to retain staff that have these skills. This is partly due to the funding constraints but also “head hunting” of such qualified personnel by other agencies. In most NS, they endeavor to include some element of SoS awareness and basic knowledge in strategic and operational planning; however, this is heavily influenced by PNS support and projects. Overall, most NS interviewed do not consider, short of significantly more and dedicated funding availability, a greater focus on SoS beyond what they are currently capable to be within their capacity and hence it is not a priority.

### **SoS and DRR funding options:**


All stakeholders confirmed the very weak financial mechanisms that are specifically dedicated to fund the relatively modest needs to deliver proactive SoS activities. Some agencies such as UNDP and the GDRFF do have ear-marked funding for DRR but, with some exceptions, the NS appear not to be as well engaged with these sources of funding as they require further training to be able to deliver a robust proposal design and presentation. This is an area of capacity building the Africa Zone is seeking to support.

Anecdotal evidence indicates that there is an inherent resistance to RC/RC NS applications to access DRM/DRR funding when made to the government ministries and agencies that are the recipients and managers for such earmarked donor funds. This includes government-to-government though donors such as WB, GDRR, EU, even when those funds are earmarked for implementation by local partners<sup>24</sup>. These difficulties are at least partially linked, as noted elsewhere, to the lack of meaningful and strategic engagement and networking of RC/RC in DRR forums and development initiatives. If the NS only appear to approach donors when asking for funding (and governments already believe NS to have an abundance of funds through the international RC/RC partners funds), then their request for funds in DRR activities are likely to be denied. Increasing the relationship and engagement by the NS in these multilateral and multi-actor forums could improve the opportunities for them to access funds and programme DRR activities.

### ***Figure 2: Graphic on Emergency versus Development Funding***

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<sup>24</sup> The ACP-EU Natural Disaster Fund has provided such tranches of DRM/DRR funding to the African countries with specific intent that local partners working in these sector are the preferred implementing agencies.



Discretionary SoS funds possible, but often difficult and slow to access

### IFRC Appeal funding and DRR:

The requirement, inclusion and implementation for 10% DRR in appeals is to be considered in this review and ascertained in terms of compliance or not and why:

In September 2011, in reviewing lessons learned from major operations such as the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods, over the last two years, the IFRC Governing Board at the 24<sup>th</sup> Session, decided that every 'appeal for international disaster response should include, as far as possible, a provision of at least 10 percent for longer term disaster preparedness and risk reduction work'<sup>25</sup> in NS.

In line with the findings, the predominance of climate related drought and food security dominates the African SoS profile, aggravated by insecurity and conflict and epidemics, all resulting in population movements both internal and refugees. When examining the IFRC's history of appeals (from 2011 onwards) for DRR in Africa (drought, food security, population movement, and epidemics), it is clear that incorporating the mandatory 10% for DRR funding has been attempted. In 58% (39 out of 67) of the appeals since 2010 in the above noted emergencies, DRR capacities have been incorporated into the appeal in some capacity (see Annex 3 for full data analysis table). This includes both Emergency Appeals and DREF. If broken down further, DREF appeals have a success rate of 46% (18 out of 39) of include DRR activities and Emergency appeals have a much higher success rate of 66% (22 out of 30). Some appeals have been very diligent in including DRR activities within their programming; however, this seems to vary on the type of emergency. For example, in drought appeals from 2010-2014, 84% (5 out of 6) have included DRR activities within their appeal. Meanwhile, other appeals, such as food security, have even gone so far as including a specific DRR outcome within their appeals (85% of food security appeals between 2010-2014 had initial DRR outcome specific goals earmarked within the appeal), which demonstrates cognizant steps forward in including DRR programming and forecasting. In population

<sup>25</sup> International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies: 28-30 September 2011 Decisions 24th Session of the Governing Board, Geneva, Switzerland, Pg.4.

movement crises, the success rate of including DRR activities was the lowest with a success rate of merely 16% (4 out of 25). While it could be argued that population movements are difficult to incorporate into DRR specific programming, a few appeals in this category (Chad's Population Movement in 2013 (Emergency appeal n° MDRTD011) include as specific DRR outline in their appeal. For example, this appeal had outcome #4 as an 'Increased awareness on disaster risk reduction in the 3 regions of Sila, Ouaddai and Wadi Fira where population movement is prevalent'. The activities in this outcome included:

- Train 100 volunteers in DRR, early warning system, population movement and environmental protection.
- Establish a disaster preparedness team in each of the three regions.
- Develop an annual contingency plan on cross-border population movement in eastern Chad and test it with simulation exercises.
- Distribute 6,000 improved stoves to 3,000 households in the camp of Abgadam to reduce the consumption of firewood and;
- Organize sensitization activities on environmental protection in the camp of Abgadam<sup>26</sup>.

However, whilst the recommended contribution to DRR is 10% of appeals, for analysis purposes, it is still difficult to define exactly if this amount was earmarked for DRR activities within these appeals as the budgeting lines did not indicate the amount allocated to DRR activities. If appeals are to follow the recommended 10% of funds towards DRR activities, it could be useful to have DRR funding included within the budgeting break down in appeals to make the activities more noticeable. In some appeals, DRR outcome-specific objectives were included to clearly demonstrate the activities in their programming.

When examining the implementation of these outcomes in the same food security programmes, the final reports indicates that the DRR activities decrease to an implementation rate of 64% (9 out of 14 appeals for food security). According to the final reports of the appeals, the drop of DRR activities can be largely attributed lack of funding of the appeal as a whole. For example, in the case of the above mentioned Chad Population Movement Emergency appeal in 2013, the DRR activities listed above where ultimately dropped shortly within the appeal process as the first operations update of July 2013 noted that 'based on the current funding levels, implementation of disaster risk reduction activities will be delayed and other emergency activities prioritized.'<sup>27</sup> In most cases, especially in low coverage appeals, DRR activities are dropped if the targeted funding amount for the appeal is not met. If the coverage is low then it is doubtful that any significant impact can be made in either emergency or DRR. An argument could be made that a DRR activity could be more beneficial in terms of long term impact and should therefore not be dropped from the appeal budget. All NS interviewed, including the Kenya RC whose own internal funding is the most robust of all of the African NS, admitted that they most are dependent on either a relaxation of the DREF or are influenced to hold off on earlier intervention activities until a case for DREF can be made. However, by the time a DREF is approved, especially for a SoS application, the emergency situation already exists and any pre-emptive action is too late.

As discussed in an interview with the evaluation team leader of the DREF review that was underway at the same time, the DREF, by and large, is agreed to be perhaps the most flexible and useful of the global DR tool and "does

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<sup>26</sup> IFRC Emergency appeal, Chad: Population Movement, Emergency appeal n° MDRTD011 GLIDE No. OT-2013-000049-TCD 26 June, 2013, pg 7

<sup>27</sup> IFRC Emergency appeal, Chad: Population Movement 'Emergency appeal n° MDRTD011 GLIDE No. OT-2013-000049-TCD Operation update n°1' 31 July, 2013, pg 5

the job". It is deemed, simple, appropriate and good for assessments and validation. There are gaps, however, in its evidence-based applications. It could also be used in a more creative way. In the absence of any SOS funding, a portion of DREF (say equivalent to that of DRR in appeals, 10%) could be dedicated to DRR in every DREF response. It is noted earlier that the DREF department are not supportive of this but accept that there is already a lot being done to improve DM capacity within NS through DREF operations, i.e. incorporation of lessons learned into contingency plans – as above. There is a possibility to incorporate the component of DRR within these next steps/plans etc. In addition an interesting suggestion is provided worth consideration DREF operations could be a launching pad into longer term DRR activities that can help address SoS – e.g. consider as an output of the DREF operation a proposal/plan of action for resource mobilization / advocacy purposes. At the moment, DREF is inadvertently contributing to the tendency to delay making a request of pre-emptive action in SoS in order to meet the emergency criteria of DREF. By definition, this is too late. This was also reported during OCHA interviews to be a challenge with the UN CERF fund. The criteria of DREF, however, is not currently applicable to true SoS's and it could be applied to non-emergency activities of RDRT Technical and contingency planning, M&E and risk assessment and technical (nutrition) or an assessment mission such as the Cameroon Global Humanitarian Assessment which while not a DRR per se is a useful model to be promoted in many if not all Africa NS in December 2014. Regardless, to quote a Secretariat interviewee, *"We agree that there is a need to consider how we can use the tool more strategically, e.g. more consistently identify recurrent/protracted crises that are being responded to through DREF, develop mechanisms to use this information to inform advocacy around need for DRR, including to those supporters of the DREF"*.

## CASE STUDY I: Recent Appeals

### **A brief review and recommendation of the opportunities and challenges facing the inclusion, funding and implementation of DRR and SoS in selected recent IFRC Appeals.**

#### CAMEROON

While examining the current Cameroon appeal for Population Movement, MDRCM015, initially requested in September 5th, 2013, it seems the 10% DRR component under the GS directive was not included in the first Emergency Appeal. The DRR specific outcomes were included in the revised emergency appeal. As the first Emergency Appeal is often the one that gets the most attention, this opportunity may have been lost. Although, this was addressed in the revision of the appeal often that revision needs to be more aggressively marketed so donors are aware of changes. In the revised appeal, the DRR component was appropriate given the overall objectives of the Emergency Appeal, however, since it did not appear in the original appeal, it may be that a more focused marketing approach to donors emphasizing the DRR component is now needed. This emphasizes the importance of including the DRR within the first appeals of DREF applications.

Once the DRR specific outcomes were incorporated into the revised appeal, it appears the implementation was effected. Although DRR was included in the revised version of the appeal and progress was made with the early implementation, it seems that no further progress was made after the first six months. Why did it stagnate? Does this come down to marketing again? Should they explain more thoroughly in the appeal why the DRR portion is important?

If this is the case, this needs to be disseminated to donors to attract any additional funding that's needed.

Evidence from interviews with RC/RC, government and UN and other external agencies constantly emphasize the importance of evidence of good forecasting and triggering mechanisms in funding applications. It has been stated that this would give credibility to SoS/DRR appeals and help convince donors of the added value and improve the opportunity of funding SoS pre-emptive activities. However, in the case of the Cameroon 2014/15 appeal there still are challenges. This was a Population Movement Appeal drafted firmly in the findings from a well conceived, multi-sectoral NS/IFRC/ICRC/REF RDRT Team I risk assessment. The needs assessment was carried out using IFRC DM tools such as RDRT DMIS, DREF and, using forecasting and triggering tools to gather the data. Despite that pre-

emptive assessment was carried out based upon forecasts and triggering criteria, this has not guaranteed a significantly improvement in the funding level for the appeal. It is therefore difficult to understand why, given these are criteria requested by donors there appears still to be a continued resistance among those same donors to earmark specific SoS funding.

## **KENYA DROUGHT**

In reviewing the data, it seems clear that there remains an enormous challenge to get the public and the donors motivated for SoS pre-emptive, pre-emergency action. The majority of international aid funding falls into two clearly marked and quite vigorously ring-fenced baskets. The Humanitarian emergency type (ECHO, DREF, and CERF etc) and the Developmental/Longer term DRR (EuroAid, GFDRR, World Bank etc) there is a tiny overlap where some dedicated funds may be found in some regionally funded programmes. Both the funding baskets may have limited discretionary SoS funding but which require applications that are quite onerous and slow in approval. The model is shown in a graphic the evaluation.

Accessing either of these for SoS is a challenge that has to be addressed. For example in 2010-2011 in one country alone, the Kenya RC, a very strong and capable RC NS, presented a detailed but unsuccessful appeal for a SoS drought situation. Despite compelling evidence-base information presented for these pre-emergency SoS appeals, on both occasions very low interest was shown. However, as predicted in both occasions a severe food/famine emergency developed a year later at which point emergency funding was generously provided. The failure to fund the SoS appeals may not have stopped the emergency but would certainly have positioned the NS to carry out short-term, pre-emptive, and meaningful and lifesaving interventions. Interestingly in 2014 a similar situation arose, this time no SoS appeal was raised by it was nearly 8 months from the initial indications of an oncoming emergency before the IFRC was able to launch an appeal that was funded.

From the review of the appeals, they appear to be well structured. In each case some of the appeals have DRR component, which is positive. Where DRR is not included in the appeal, it would be difficult to then justify DRR activities. In other words, if you don't have at DRR outcome in the appeal, you can't take 10% out for DRR. If you don't have it highlighted, marketing will be difficult. Conversely, if there is a DRR objective, not only can they allocate money, it becomes a more compelling document in lobbying for increased support.

KI including the UN interviewees confirm that earmarked funding for DRR, of which SoS is a legitimate part, is available in these appeal countries. This is commonly through UNDP, ACP-EU, GFDRR/World Bank and other donor development and some humanitarian funding. The managers of the appeal may have to come up with a specific tactic to have access to and advocate for those funds.

The review has noted the feedback from KI that there is a resistance from governments department who are the recipients of bilateral DDR funding to positively consider providing this funding to RC/RC appeals. The perception voiced on a number of occasions by officials from these departments, being that the RC/RC has access to "its own funding".

## **GAMBIA AND OTHER NEW APPEALS**

This appeal is a good example of an emergency plan of action appeal and the content in is appropriate to the objectives of the appeal. However, conventional wisdom would dictate that this appeal would have been based on an existing Gambian RC pre-event Contingency Plan. . This would potentially have allowed more pre-emptive action if a SoS early action tool was available. It is not known if the GRCS has a Contingency Plan that addresses SoS, if not, then one of the objectives of this appeal should be the development such a plan from the future using lessons learned from this appeal.

Capacity building and training of NS staff in broad early-action activities might have been included in the appeal. If a Contingency Plan was in place, it would have provided in the appeal for refresher training to staff and volunteers

in baseline SoS characteristics and methodology (FS, logistics beneficiary engagement etc). Since there is considerably demands on the GRCS in the appeal to coordinate with multiple agencies and to lead community level activities strengthening the awareness and skill to be active participatory and engaged in these meetings and to take a predominate role where they can influence and advocate would be valuable. This training should still be considered as part of this appeal but would be on the job training rather than pre-emptive preparedness training.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION OF APPEALS WITH SOS COMPONENTS:**

1. Noting the comments from the Secretariat but given the wide level of input in this the recommendation remains for consideration. Alternatively to review or to adopt some of the recommendations for the DREF desk for alternatives to DREF as a source of SoS support. Where the 10% DRR allocation is presented in the appeal, that the IFRC crafts an overarching and inclusive DRR/SoS statement for the DRR section in Appeals and DREF. The statement should capture both the importance of NS/IFRC being able to seize their relative advantage to initiate early action as well as opportunities and challenges and therefore importance of global earmarked funding for SOS early short-term interventions.
2. Since it is critical that the NS/IFRC demonstrate competence and capacity in SoS approach methodology as well as presence and access in addressing the tasks, a component of on-the-job practicum's and mentoring as well as technical refresher training NS HQ technical department staff, NDRT, RDRT, and branch level volunteer polyvalent awareness of SoS should be a key component in the appeal/DREF objectives and PoA.
3. Include section on details of methodology triggers, forecasting processes and processes and SOPs related to the use of the SoS technical sectors with specific focus on food security/drought.
4. Indicate in resources section the skills enhancement of RDRT roster capacity, support by ERU staffing (relief skills, in some technical food security expertise.
5. Indicate steps RC/RC NS have taken reinforce their auxiliary role with government that should attract a preferred response not a discriminated one.
6. Develop a more assertive engagement by NS, supported by the IFRC/Humanitarian Diplomacy, targeted at the agencies that provide these funds and the government or other institutions that manage and disperse them
7. It may require more proactive and assertive lobbying with these funding departments to persuade them of the benefits of allocating funding to the appeal.
8. Include cross-sectoral SoS awareness training in Contingency and Emergency Planning and reinforce as an objective of Emergency Appeals and DREF.

#### **Logistics Capacity:**

There is a need for further development of the capacity building in logistics in all NS. Often the logistics sits in the finance and admin departments and is assigned to staff with not necessarily the adequate skills for the requirements of this sector. Moreover, the GLS cost recovery system is not conducive to funding Logistics DP, especially for SoS, where there is limited funding even without the additional cost of cost recovery. There has been a noted consensus among most humanitarian agencies that clearer agreements and acceptance of regionally specific triggers for activation of a SoS preparedness or response are desirable. These would allow more strategic decision making, encourage confidence among donors to address the need for more robust SoS type funding and allow for a more tactical approach to procurement and preposition of materials and stock.

#### **EAST AFRICA REGIONAL OFFICE (EARO):**

##### **Case study II: Somali Red Crescent Society IHCP & ICRP**

**SRCS Project and Programme management approach:** The Somali Red Crescent Integrated Resilience and Contingency Planning (ICRP) and its longer running parallel health programme the Integrated Health Care Programme (IHCP) are good examples of an approach to DRR programming. They positively demonstrate features

and incorporate a number of the findings and recommendations in this evaluation that directly address in a manageable but effective way, aspects of SoS as well as resilience and disaster response<sup>28</sup> These projects have been selected as a peer agency case study for good practice that may inform or provide a template for some other NS in Africa. These two programmes complement each other to give a broad based DRR approach to the SRCS activities in a country that is hugely challenging. SRCS has achieved a successful holistic methodological approach to implementing and building its capacity in both DRR & DRM through an integrated approach to resilience and health programming. The foundation of this, as stated in the SRCS strategy documents, is based on a fundamentally “scaled approach to humanitarian assistance” and reinforced by the adherence to a number of criteria they adopt from the start of any planning and implementation process. Planning and programming are firmly based on a realistic and continuous assessment of the SRCS “real” capacity and on **WHAT** they can do. **HOW** they can effectively do and **WHO** they can do it with.

**Self Assessment and Impact analysis:** SRCS has completed a baseline study on core programs for a DRR strategy 2013-2017. This rigorous self assessment and check-and-balance approach to project and programme relevance/impact demonstrated in The recent SRCS IHCP Baseline survey was carried out where the foundation of the programming was thoroughly reviewed with partners. This programme, along with the Integrated Community Resilience Programme, both have SoS components. A disciplined and inclusive approach to internal monitoring and evaluation results in a credible, viable and, consequently, a well funded appeal with strong PNS and donor support. The approach has focused on a combination of platforms that play to the strengths and experience of the SRCS and allow for objective adjustments in planning and design that respond to both success and challenges. This has allowed them to fine tune their model for DRR/resilience project and programmes to include modest, but viable, additional capacity to address the baseline programme aspects of SoS elements.

**Linking Emergency Preparedness and Response and Contingency Planning:** The planning approach in the SRCS results from their experience in emergency response and the society is quite well versed in VCA that links implementation to their core capacity. Contingency planning is developed using the same planning approach for unforeseen but potentially serious events, such as the Contingency Plan put in place recently for Ebola.

**SoS: Identifying Triggers:** The Baseline study has included indicators for nutrition triggers. With support from the IFRC, SRCS produced concept notes linking donors to a long term safety net strategy for the introduction of mobile clinics to strengthen DR/DP. Programs support livelihoods, water, and well rehabilitation. With support from the ICRC and the FAO there is a component for livestock production, and health; gardens and seeds and tools for animal fodder combined with livestock water sharing.

**SOS and Preparedness and Response capacity:** SRCS’s approach to surge capacity to address, modestly but effectively and efficiently, both elements of SoS and sudden onset scenarios is based on a polyvalent mobilisation of existing funded human resources embedded in their core programmes noted above. Within these activities are dedicated and trained personnel who are on call to be released from their project or programme responsibilities. These personnel are able to mobilise into teams to deploy out to investigate, assess and set up activities where the information deems a situation is evolving. Since these assets are already within an existing programme, they are continually building capacity both within the programme, but at the same time being pre-funded from the programme, they can be quickly and effectively deployed to unexpected incidents without a need to await appeal or DREF funding. Only where the event clearly exceeds the capacity of the SRCS internally are external IFRC assistance assets required.

**Programme design approach:**

1. Take a robust “integrated” approach to DRR and Resilience programming.
2. Make objectives based firmly on the SMART model.

<sup>28</sup> SRCS S Puntland Integrated Community Resilience Project: 2014-2016 The projects aimed at strengthening the DRR capacities of the implementing NS branches and that of the participating communities on their knowledge of prevalent disaster risks, Early Warning, Preparedness and Response. Other underlying risk factors such as environmental concerns, climate change were addressed including promotion of small scale livelihood intervention



3. Maintain close coordination with IFRC and ICRC partners in planning and implementation and reporting on operational progress.
4. Keep ambitions within known, understood and acknowledged constraints of the over arching capacity of the SRCS and that of the country context itself. Project budgets are typically under CHF 1,000, 000)
5. Cultivate, through active engagement and “ownership”, a core of longer-term committed and supportive PNS/donors who have a stake in the success of the project or programme. Programmes are supported for at least 2 years.
6. Maintain an active and inclusive dialogue with RC/RC and external partners in terms of quality control and impact.
7. Include programme elements Contribute to addressing SoS risk areas such a food security, livelihoods, livestock agriculture and forestry and other environmental activities

### Kenya RC:

Kenya RC has emerged over the past few years as the best example in Africa of a RC/RC that has successfully built its capacity competencies and scope of service delivery to cover a wide range of Red Cross humanitarian and development. It has garnered considerable influence and profile within the national DM system and engages in pro active advocacy and leadership initiatives in many facets of the activities covered in this review. It is not the intention to draw comparisons in this review between NS however, in interviewing the KRCS on their approach to SoS, it is clear there are openings and prospects to take advantage of their experiences in this sector. There is also a good opportunity to leverage peer influence, share best practices and experiences from the directions KRCS has taken and like the Somalia case example benefit from initiatives that could be disseminated with the wider Africa NS network to their benefit.

Kenya RC has significantly increased its focus on the linkage between DRM flowing into DRR, both of which incorporate elements of SoS. In the former, attention is paid to where the NS has built up its strategic relationships with other agencies and government to enhance the forecasting and triggering criteria that will allows them to demonstrate improved effectiveness in timely short-term response to evolving events. In the latter, DRR, their focus both independently, as core NS funded activities, and partners with PNS in their integrated DRR and Resilience programming. They have sought to improve linkages with IFRC DRR frameworks in developing expertise in urban DRR, creative uses of DREF, (particularly in Food security) and in the use of the global DM tools. It would then be valuable use of DREF for innovative responses and uses should be encouraged –To this end, and importantly, in coordination with Government of Kenya, they have reviewed their structure to reflect this in the 2011-2015 planning. To ensure attention to the various differing aspects of SRM/DRR, Kenya RC has points of contact in 47 of the new counties and DRR is reflected from the HQ down to the district levels. Kenya RC subscribes to the frequently reported concerns regarding the harmonization and agreement of SoS triggers with government and other agencies. Agreeing on triggers can be a sensitive issue, particularly where it is influence by political or regional sensitivities, and most especially, in areas of conflict and land issues. The RC approach is based on the promotion of peace in addressing these issues. Kenya RC have a close working relationship with IGAD and have engaged closely with them on gathering EWS, DRR and other lessons learned from the 07/08 election process (election prepared for and responding to election challenges is considered an SoS activity by the Kenya RC and ICRC in Kenya).

Kenya RC have reached a stage of DRR competence that is now leading them into areas of environmental risk and vulnerability and have programs addressing the rejuvenation and propagation of resources. KRCS plays an active role with Government, the UN and other agencies on forums addressing



climate change adaptation, and food security. The society has a sub-committee dedicated to cross fertilization between the RC and key agencies, departments and para-statal agencies with whom they are partnerships and, on occasions, will engage in joint applications and ventures.

#### **SOUTH AFRICA REGIONAL OFFICE (SARO):**

In discussion with all stakeholders on the Zimbabwe visit but this also includes others with a regional perspective. Some observations are also cross cutting across NS in the region:

#### **NS/ Partnerships**

In the context of partnerships, the Movement Partner coordination is generally rather weak as partners are not always working in a coordinated manner and partners are not always aware of each other's plans. As such, there is a risk of duplication and giving NCS conflicting advice.

The Movement Coordination Meetings are held in most countries with the SG and 'heads of delegations' but are often at the strategic level only rather than at an operational or technical level/coordination. There is a need to have tactical/technical meetings with the participations of technical staff such as programme, finance, administration, etc.

Usually, the PNS priorities, rather than the NS priorities are driving the programming. For example, Malawi and Zimbabwe are getting popular with the PNS. When this occurs, there is a risk of overloading the NS.

In terms of external partnerships, they could be strengthened. The overall feedback in all regions was that NS needed to increase their engagement and participation in coordination forums. They do not regularly engage, influence and advocate. The NS are often attending these external meetings but not necessarily participating in coordinating forums (such as HCT, clusters, etc.), acting more as 'observers'. They are also participating in an ad hoc manner, which leads the risk of being irrelevant and not present at the crucial meetings where decisions are being made. To correct this, the IFRC and ICRC can improve the methodology of engagement in these meetings by improving the NS confidence and knowledge that will allow them to advocate more strongly.

#### **Zimbabwe:**

In Zimbabwe, the PNS support to the NS is a more customised approach at the country level. The lessons learned from Mozambique are proving useful and valuable in the context of Zimbabwe. There is a specific focus on CBDRR integrated resilience approaches with enhanced branch capacity building in Zimbabwe and some programmes geared to the development side. The initiatives around the Zambezi River and rural Kariba projects provide a good platform for enhanced SoS awareness. Moreover, election preparedness, with ICRC/IFRC support, provided a good additional opportunity to enhance First Aid capacity as well as building the NS profile. In Zimbabwe, the PNS are better coordinated but agree there is always room to improve to minimise the NS absorption capacity. For example, American RC focuses on enhanced VCA to support CBDRR, including improved and mobile DP/SR and emergency response.

Throughout the review, the consensus from all the PNS interviewed, was that there was no added-value to be gained - (and they would even discourage) from any additional initiatives to create a Slow Onset focus within most of the NS. As reflected in most interviews across the evaluation, their current HR pool of DRR staff and volunteers capacity are fully engaged. This position was reinforced by the DM departments themselves. In the case of ZRCS they considered that what they could realistically do in

regards to additional SoS activities was very limited unless additional SoS funding and staff could be made available. Their intention for the immediate future was that, for the meantime, to maintain the level of focus on Food Security issues that is within their existing programming. At the time of the review, although they had two officers with varying degrees of responsibilities in the food security sector, one was being deployed into wider DM programming and the second was about to be released, yet again capacity constraints.

Most NS often lack a knowledgeable and trained logistics PoC, and this was the case at the time in Zimbabwe. The main weaknesses are found in the areas of procurement, storage, and distribution effectiveness. In some countries like Zimbabwe, local procurement procedures have been strengthened and the capacity to deliver has been confirmed. Moves to a cash transfer process have been adapted as a preferred route to food assistance in the essential rations of Maize beans and oil. In Zimbabwe, as in most African NS capacity building training for in the use of cash-based solutions needs to be reinforced to allow this to be a chosen solution. Cash solutions cannot be implemented without prior training with national level agreements for implementation, and the capacity to do credible market assessments etc.

#### **SAHEL REGIONAL OFFICE (SRO):**

**Senegal RC:** The SRCS has had a food security PoC engaged mostly in DRR and resilience longer term programme work that, according to the PNS, is well delivered. However, there is no specific focus on other short –term early action and preparedness functions. They address such issues as forecasting data analysis and EWS on a more ad hoc basis invariably within partnership activities with agencies that have more of a focus on this sector such as WFP, with whom the NS has an agreement. However, as noted in other interviews, with the demands on staff support to the partner and contracting conditions as well as the ongoing programs, there is little spare capacity available in the society to take on any additional DM tasks. For example at the time of the review, the SG was the only person available for this interview in the HQ as all other DM staff were engaged and, had been and would be for some time, in either field work, training or support to the Ebola operation.

The profile of the SRCS fits that of the other NS. Competition to access government DRR funding adds to the lack of incentive as the competition is strong. Once again, the SRCS is seen by donors and more particularly by the government departments holding the funds to be self-sufficient and tends not to have positioned itself aggressively enough to leverage its relative advantage as an auxiliary to the government and where they could present a viable project worthy of special consideration. DRM strength in the SRCS is solidly founded on a volunteer base. It is in the long term enhancement of their capacity that the SG sees a possibility of contributing more to a SoS programming in the future. Internal and external coordination with partners was a critical area of enhancement potential. These were key to NS capacity building but it was admitted there was a need to more actively lobby on this front and for key staff to better understand the opportunities and leverage by engaging key partners at a more strategic level. Increased attention to training and mentoring were needed to achieve this.

#### **Some common responses from all NS to Key Interview Questions:**

**What is the current disaster preparedness and DR capacity of the respective Government and what is the interaction between the government and the RC/RC?** Government DRM capacity and organisational structure development come in varying degrees of basic systematic capacities. Generally, the government position is that they lack the capacity, particularly at the district level, and suffer from staffing attrition having limited funding. There is an uneven perception and assumption between the

government, NS and the international partners that support them as to what each expects of the other in actual service and delivery of activities. In the case of SoS, this is even more the case. Governments positively view their RC; however, frequently engagement with their RC is often limited at the highest-levels of political governance. This means there can be a potential gap in meaningful, proactive dialogue between the two. This is due to the often limited presence of the RC, voice or empowerment for upper/middle managers to fruitfully interact with their government ministry counterparts.

**What is the role of the NS as an auxiliary to the Government? What is the Government's level of contingency planning, general emergency preparedness and DRR policies and programming?**

It became clear throughout the review, that there is often an uneven understanding of the actual leverage a NS has relative to the potential advantage it gains through its role as an auxiliary to the government. Though all NS claimed to have a "seat" at the government DRM table, further investigation into this demonstrated that the actual engagement, advocacy, information exchange and real participation is often less than robust. The NS is the only domestic agency with such access and it is mobilised in an ad hoc way in many places. NS government engagement ranges from extremely high level VIP (NS President to National President one-on-one relationship) that do not significantly benefit down-stream operational initiatives, to mere attendance rather than participation or advocacy by the NS at coordination meetings. Occasionally, particularly in Kenya & Zimbabwe, the NS are found playing a major role of active engagement and influence. There is a real opportunity to gain from peer experience and approach from such NS that could strengthen the whole approach of DM departments to increase their activity, and play a more meaningful role in such forums.

In reviewing documents it seems that there is a lack of attention in many NS to strategic planning addressing domestic resource mobilisation. Most NS now have relatively well defined mandates and good (or improving) relationships with government, yet very few (Kenya and Namibia are two that come to mind) actually receive any national budget funding allocations.

**What do you feel is the best opportunity to enhance the NS approach to Slow Onset Scenarios challenges?**

Almost all stakeholders interviewed and the NS themselves believe the best route to enhanced capacity in the SoS area is to not take on an additional obligation to be an additional forecasting and data analysis agency, to which government may make excessive demands. With Governments having varying levels of capacity in all areas of DRM and, despite a commitment to DRR DRM and climate change integration, they often see their RC/RC as the "Go-To" domestic agency for all things DRM. Despite their view of RC/RC as their 'go to' agency, very few governments will fund their NS. Governments tend to see the NS as "being rich" because they view the "international RC/RC family as carrying the funding responsibilities for the NS<sup>29</sup>". Even more so, this is the case of SoS, despite the fact that there are known EU, GFDRR and UNDP funds that flow to governments for DRR that could be implemented by their NS. Consequently the NS complain that accessing those funds is very difficult. Support from the Zone could be to investigate exactly where such funds are accessible to NS (EU-NDF managed by the GFDRR is just one to consider).

The ICRC offices all see SoS as an area of concern within their own mandate, specifically where the NS can develop capacity to mobilise services delivery in situations such as electoral and other mass crowd gatherings where unrest may generate. The services they support that would come into play in these

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<sup>29</sup> This was an opinion expressed by most of the NS and was confirmed as being correct by the IFRC ROs.

SOS are emergency rooms in hospitals, IHL and RFL. All ICRC stakeholders interviewed expressed an interest to work closer with the NS and IFRC to prepare for, and support, active NS engagement in elections or any mass gathering event regardless of whether it's hostile or not. A recent important application was noted in Zimbabwe where a good example of mobilisation for this activity and using IFRC systems, was the funding for the first time for ZRCS (as has been done with some other NS) activity in elections preparedness through DREF. This was a successful "slow onset" use of DREF, perhaps to be modelled in the future.

**Are there specific triggers and Early Warning Systems that contribute to launching contingency plans or early response? What is the link, if any, between NS's development and emergency programs for slow onset disasters?**

The question of EWS/SoS triggers attracted considerable debate, and in researching recent material (one reference is already referenced that encapsulates this subject is work carried out by OCHA) there seems to be an agreement that further attention needs to be given to harmonising and agreement among agencies donors and government on how they are used. There are various sources of triggers and, as noted, from inputs from the IFRC in Geneva<sup>30</sup> However, despite a very specific series of questions on this subject to RC/RC/UN and other agencies this source was never mentioned as tool bring used!! The importance of NS /IFRC improving their ability to gather and include forecasting and triggering criteria as evidence of competence and capacity in applying for both DREF and Emergency Appeals was emphasised by inputs from the DREF department. As noted not only within the RC/RC but in consultation with external partners, there is a need to consider what indicators can be agreed to monitor, and then use to trigger the use of the DREF, or in the case of the UN CERF, innovatively. The challenge seems to be arriving at a sufficient consensus among the stakeholders what are the common denominators. Every one appears to approach it differently. It may be there is an institutional lack of resources devoted to addressing the need to develop agreed triggers and early action motivators' among all agencies. This may be partially due to institutional cultural and professional views as to where SOS lies within Foreign Aid and Development assistance. The result is a gap between Development and Humanitarian approach to preparedness for response<sup>31</sup>

National Societies may have some capacity to engage in the development of agreed triggering criteria. However this may have complications at a political level that require high-level coordination. Even if triggers and criteria are developed, the NS may not always have the mandate to launch EWS (e.g. in Malawi the NS cannot mobilize based on their own ES information without government approval). Where there is some capacity in NS health departments (usually as a MoH approved auxiliary) to develop triggers and criteria for pre-emptive SoS actions for which IFRC systems specifically DREF, FACT and ERUs can be mobilised. For most recurrent epidemics there are recognized triggers for the need for immediate response: the case fatality rate in cholera outbreaks, for example, and for hemorrhagic diseases such as Ebola, where one confirmed case is considered a trigger. Emergency tools like DREF and ERUs can be used successfully in SoS events when NS recognise the triggers and know how, and are prepared, to deliver the immediate response.

Traditionally, some agencies have relied on nutritional indicators of acute malnutrition to 'prove' a slow-onset emergency exists before responding. Given more than a decade of work on understanding

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<sup>30</sup> IPC manual including all the triggers for early action and response strategies:  
[http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC-Manual-2-Interactive.pdf](http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC-Manual-2-Interactive.pdf)

<sup>31</sup> Drawn from ECHO/UNDP/OCHA interviews

livelihoods and vulnerability, it is possible to define more sophisticated and earlier indicators of an impending crisis. Development, early warning and emergency response actors can all play an important role in further defining and agreeing on the triggers that would indicate a likely crisis for a particular country or region. Nonetheless, as proved to be the case in the IFRC Cameroun assessment, this still may not guarantee greater credibility and funding attraction to an appeal. . The triggers would be different for each country or region and/or sector and would depend entirely on data availability. This is made more difficult and less attractive as the resources and trained staff for timely data analysis is far outweighed by the amount of data gathered. In terms of drought-related food insecurity, food prices and rainfall data are available in nearly every country, with varying levels of geographic coverage and timeliness. With only these two broad indicators, certain triggers could be agreed. In most countries, analysts can create more sophisticated thresholds for triggering a contingency plan. The analysis and definition of triggers should be part of the general preparedness planning process, cluster work plans, or even included as part of the UNDAF process. In some regions, and with RC/RC, there is excellent engagement with partners (Eastern and West Africa Region are examples) and there is an experience to learn from. IFRC has been working with multiple stakeholders including NGOs, UN and IGAD and West African NS engagement with ACMAD AND IRI. Pre-determining precise triggers can have the added advantage of removing any real or perceived political influences from the planning process.

The IFRC Africa Zone has undertaken some work to identify key triggers through the Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) Experience Sharing Questionnaire of the EWEA Working group with some indications that these had been used to inform specific projects. However, it is unclear from interviews how well this initiative has been disseminated outside individual programmes. More specifically, it is unclear if this dissemination has occurred within the coordination forums such as the cluster or technical working groups. Once again, this reinforces the finding and recommendations on enhancing the effectiveness of RC/RC engagement and inputs in these forums. When questioning NS on if and how the NS used or referred to the “IFRC Community early warning systems: guiding principles” manual the response was “rarely”.

**Is there any engagement of the NS with academic institutions and the private sector to take appropriate early response measures for this kind of slow onset disasters?** There was limited feedback from NS on the level of engagement with either the academic or private sector. Some NS have some periodic engagement with technical institutions such as weather offices and climate change institutions. Others such as the Kenya RC (and it seems the Somalia RC due to its HQ location in Nairobi) do have wider academic and technical institution relationships. All NS believe they have to build stronger and more active and focused engagement with agencies that are better resourced with the requisite technical skills and could use their outputs to enrich and inform the NS existing resilience and DRR programmes.

### 2.3 KEY QUESTIONS/ISSUES – IFRC LEVEL

#### KEY QUESTION 2.3.1

**WHAT ARE THE TRENDS, THREATS AND POSSIBLE AREAS OF INTERVENTION FOR THE RC/RC IN SLOW ONSET DISASTERS IN AFRICA?**

The main SoS threats in Africa are invariably climate related resulting in the main driver of chronic and increasing drought and food insecurity challenges. Aggravated by conflict and insecurity in many countries, this in turn triggers population movements (both IDP and Refugees) as well as mixed economic and internal displacement from encroaching security and civil unrest situations. Epidemics

(Ebola was a slow onset with a sudden surge), Malaria, Polio in Cameroon and Cholera/AWD all of which are often addressed, to a limited extent, in existing emergency response plans of reliance programs. The capacity and priority to address climate-related events in most NS is admittedly limited. In most cases the potential to increase awareness and broaden the existing emergency response capacity, most NS have agreed this is firmly rooted in the lack of dedicated funding for this kind of capacity. There was wide support for the IFRC Secretariat to consider an increased inclusion and implementation of the GA requirement for 10% funding for all appeals and DREF requests. Drought and other Food Security appeals dominate interventions. In Cameroon there are a number of SOS type interventions. Security triggers have resulted in Population Movement appeals in Nigeria but there were also underlying SOS indicators involved prior to the Boko Harum conflict intensifying that if the funding and the capacity was there, may have permitted an earlier pre-emptive initiative by the NS. The challenge is to build capacity to move EWS into actionable planning. Financing is a downscale model, aggravated by no pre-financing. This is despite improved science and outputs from climate change centres. There is a gap in available financial resources and response models dominate agency thinking still. Alternative financing models need to be considered and insurance funding on evidence based data is one area for such consideration. Consideration should be given to humanitarian bonds etc which are paid a premium for humanitarian funding. Data gathering and analysis is available to the RC/RC and it needs to re-engage with major data gather /analysis agencies (FAO/WMO/Meteorological etc.). There is a need to increase engagement and quality of information exchange with Government and partners. The RC/RC could adopt a lighter more flexible approach to logistics and resource mobilisation with cash and voucher programs. There is a need to mobilise improved technology for better targeting Cash transfers household ID etc. An approach that can be considered by African NS to address humanitarian slow onset preparedness and response should be RC/RC participation on robust multi-sector, multi-agency risk and needs assessments. This is then enhanced with quality technical data analysis, forecasting and surveillance input from appropriate agencies (FAO/WFP/UNICEF/OCHA/Min of Agriculture, health, meteorological departments).

**Food Security and Drought in Africa:** It seems reasonable, given the evidence of the predominance and the link between Climate (Drought) and Food Security, aggravated by other SoS drivers such as conflict, access, population movement and attendant health issues, that this area of SoS be given some special focus by the RC/RC. In addition, it is a sector that the RC/RC NS have both a presence and some capacity.

### **Case Study III: The Predominance of Food Security & Drought in Slow Onset Scenario**

#### **Introduction and Definition of Food Security/Slow Onset Emergency**

Despite awareness of food security issues in slow onset disasters, persistent weakness in national and international humanitarian response systems have failed to adequately respond to and eradicate food security crises. As recently as 2011, the international response community exhibited poor program design, inadequate response mechanisms and a delayed response effort.

Food security is a complex and multi-layered concept with varying interpretations across geographic location and stakeholder type. The World Health Organization states that food security is achieved: "When all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life"<sup>32</sup>. Food security is built on the three dimensions of access, availability and utilization.

Slow onset disasters emerge from a confluence of multiple related hazards, and impact communities over time. Responses to these interlinked factors of livelihood change, drought, conflict, natural hazards, as well as political and economic factors. The boundaries between slow and sudden onset emergencies are often blurred, with late

<sup>32</sup> World Health Organization: <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/>.

humanitarian action related to slow onset emergencies resembling sudden onset response plans.

The key difference between slow and sudden onset emergencies is that slow onset crises can be addressed, mitigated and even averted by effective early warning and response actions

## **Overview of food security in Africa**

### ***Current context***

Over 70 million people have perished as a direct result of food security in the twentieth century, and there have been many notable slow onset famine crises in recent decades. Drought is a major cause of food security crises, and is often overlaid with the global trends of food and energy price change, migration patterns, environmental degradation, climate change and urbanization.

### ***Vulnerability, coping and livelihoods: the core of an effective response***

The key to effective slow onset response is to understand community and individual vulnerability, which ISDR defines as “the characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard”.<sup>33</sup> Slow onset affected communities are often living with these hazards over generations, and have developed sophisticated coping strategies for surviving these recurring crises. Bolstering livelihoods – or the capabilities, assets and income activities to support life – is the key to an effective response. Slow onset disasters do not always necessitate international humanitarian response. Governments and affected communities can play an active role in reducing the impact of slow onset events with targeted livelihood support packages.

### ***Risk, resilience and the food security challenge***

Resilience thinking challenges the status quo by providing a complex approach to identifying and strengthening resilience assets, or the ability of a society, community, family or individual to absorb, adapt and transform structures to prosper in the face of shock. The resilience approach places food insecurity as one of many interlinked threats facing vulnerability communities, and calls for new ways of working to bridge the conceptual gaps between the humanitarian and development response communities. In this approach, food security can be addressed by completing a shared risk analyses, identifying the absorptive and adaptive capacities to withstand the threats such as drought, price spikes and political instability, and then establishing transformative processes to interrupt the cyclical nature of these multi hazard threats.

### ***Climate change***

Despite rapid urbanization, the majority of Africa’s Sub Sahara population lives in rural areas dependent on rain-fed agricultural systems as a primary livelihood activity. Climate change is already having a direct impact on food security with reduced rainfall across the Sahel decreasing cereal yield for key staple crops like wheat and maize, and increasing drought linked to rising surface temperatures, and the additional likelihood of more frequent natural disasters. Recent projections from the Inter Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlights major impact areas in Africa’s Sahel region and selected pockets of high impact in Southern Africa. Decreasing and shifting crop yields may drive up prices lowering affordability and leading to negative coping strategies such as reduced caloric intake and increasing malnutrition. Although the links are not yet fully understood, climate change is a clear driver of increased vulnerability among already marginalized populations, and is likely to accelerate slow onset crises in the coming decades.

## **Response Trends in Food Security**

### ***Cash Interventions***

Providing slow onset affected communities with cash in lieu of traditional humanitarian relief items and food supplies is gaining momentum in humanitarian response scenarios. Humanitarian partners delivered over 25m in cash assistance in the recent horn of Africa 2011 crisis and it was recognized as an effective intervention.

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology>

Cash can be an effective response mechanism where markets can supply the existing demand and food insecurity is related to purchasing power. Combining cash with food distribution can provide a complete assistance package. Sophisticated and consistent market monitoring mechanisms are essential to an effective cash response, and gender sensitivity and purchasing power analysis (the translation of cash into nutritional content) are crucial components of response planning.

### **Risk transfer**

Catalyzing an innovative approach to food security issues, risk transfer through index insurance allows smallholder and poor farmers and businesses to use labour to participate in an insurance scheme. Insurance is paid by the providers when an agreed index changes – such as rainfall or food prices – triggering a payout to program participants. This early intervention can be a key part of early onset anticipatory intervention, and is automatic by design.

### **The 2011 Horn of Africa Crisis: Slow onset crises and the resilience dialogue**

In mid 2011, the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) for Somalia declared a famine south and central regions of the country. While this was a regional crisis, only Somalia reached famine levels. Literature reviews indicate that the international response was slow to initiate and focused on life saving rather than resilience building livelihood support activities. National early warning systems in Ethiopia were credited with reducing the impact through scaled up social safety net programs.

The concurrent global financial crisis and terrorism related fears in traditional donor nations created space for non-traditional actors to fund and participate in the response. Arab nations, diasporas networks and Turkish agencies participated in the response.

This crisis and response triggered a global discussion on new approaches to Disaster Risk Management. Most African governments have moved; at vary levels, to start to adopt the proposed move in their DM Policy and Strategies to a more integrated approach to DRR/Climate Change Adaptation<sup>34</sup>. This is reflected in a move away from the international assistance led emergency response model in which sudden onset style responses were the reaction to slow onset chronic crises. The resulting resilience discussion has reshaped traditional development/humanitarian dialogue through a focus on absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacity to withstand external shocks such as slow onset disasters. Donors and response agencies are experimenting with various policy frameworks and resilience markers to quantify and measure this complex concept over time.

### **Sources:**

- OCHA Occasional Policy Briefing No 6: OCHA and slow onset emergencies. April 2011
- UNISDR
- WHO
- ProVention Consortium: Slow onset disasters: drought and food and livelihoods insecurity
- OECD resilience material
- Cereal productivity in sub-Saharan Africa under a projected Inter governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenario <http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article152.html>
- <http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Desk-Review-Somalia-GHA-Crisis-2011-2012.pdf>

An approach that can be considered by African NS to address humanitarian slow onset preparedness and response should be RC/RC participation on robust multi-sector multi-agency risk and needs

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<sup>34</sup> ISDR/NEPAD: This provided the impetus for the initiative to develop an Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Management: Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the status of Disaster Risk Management and Disaster Risk Assessments in Africa. 2004./Also African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Management and an African Regional Programme on Disaster Risk Management "The Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction" differs from the conventional approach to disaster management based on the cyclical sequence of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, relief/response and recovery involving hazard events. Disaster risk reduction concentrates on vulnerability and risk considerations - in contrast to focusing on hazards, addresses multiple risks and vulnerability factors,



assessments. This is then enhanced with quality technical data analysis, forecasting and surveillance input from appropriate agencies (FAO/WFP/UNICEF/OCHA/Min of Agriculture, health, meteorological departments).

#### KEY QUESTION

#### 2.3.2

WHAT IS THE CURRENT DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND DR CAPACITY FOR SLOW ONSET DISASTERS OF IFRC AND PNSS IN THE AFRICA ZONE?

What is the current disaster preparedness and DR capacity of the IFRC in each of the five regions? Regional general – varied capacity with program and support functions linked to DRM:

The overall capacity of the Zone and its structures varies from region to region. The Zone DMU has been reinforced with DM DREF but no Food Security or Livelihood delegates until quite recently. EARO and SARO at the present time do not have any Disaster Response assets to support regional NS. SRO has a good capacity meanwhile CARO is the weakest with a relatively small staff who are not fully able to support any expansion of DM generally and SoS particularly. PNS support is focused most widely in the EARO with reduced numbers in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Sahel RO and CARO have only one or two PNS with the French RC being most visible. Given that Food Security and drought are a dominant part of the SoS profile in Africa the focus by the zone on strengthening this sector of the overall DRM capacity seems justified. Epidemics such as Ebola which was in fact a slow onset event with a rapid surge: Meningitis, Malaria, Polio in Cameroon and Cholera/AWD are all important slow onset events. In many cases, Ebola being the most recent and successful example, SOS events can be addressed by NS/IFRC pre-emptive action, IF the funding was quickly made available to allow the intervention. The capacity and priority to address climate related events in most NS is admitted to be limited. However the single most limiting issue is the lack of dedicated and easily and quickly accessed funding. An increased inclusion and implementation of the GA requirement for 10% funding for all appeals and DREF requests would also facilitate pre-emptive action.

#### IFRC SoS Capacity

Regional Offices are generally focused on DRM (DRR/DP/DR/community based DRM). The IFRC and NSs haven't been promoting a standalone engagement since the Africa Initiative launched in 2008. The focus of NS DRR activities and capacity building are firmly based and dependant on the longer- term PNS funded DRR resilience programmes and supported projects. These certainly benefit the NS in many areas of funding, training and capacity development and community engagement, but also make a considerable demand on NS DRM internal core staffing capacity. There are other opportunities to strengthen SOS for the IFRC Zone and ROs to consider these include:

- An enhanced role for Food Security awareness in RDRT system and additional SOS awareness support to NS in NDRT/BDRT development. This includes Strengthening SoS awareness as a cross cutting element in all sectoral assessment skills
- Closer collaboration and planning between IFRC DRR/ SoS initiative with PNS programming objectives
- **Logistics Unit:** Need for further capacity building in logistics within NS. The GLS cost recovery system is not conducive to funding Logistics DP and especially SoS where there is limited funding even without the additional cost of recovery The procurement approval process between the NS-

country/Regional/Zone and GLS is slow, the RC need to start cash transfers or food procurement earlier.

- **WASH:** IFRC has a good coverage of WASH technical support across the Regional and some country offices reinforced with good representation of WASH in the RDRT rosters. The Horn of Africa has particularly good WASH capacity. Ongoing training and Emergency Preparedness and Response capacity in NDRT /RDRT is one of the stronger sectors of IFRC technical support capacity especially in the Horn of Africa
- **Health Unit:** Firstly, due to the fact that slow onset disaster build up gradually, the health effects equally take the same course and thus most often are not captured. Unfortunately, when the health effects begin to manifest they become increasingly challenging for the health systems to deal with and often leave a long lasting negative consequence. Early action based on EWS (WHO/FAO/WMO/MoH etc) improved coordination with these agencies. Thus, it is important to do inquiry on the level of preparedness of most NS/MOH/other agencies in tackling potential or actual health effects in slow onset disasters. Also, there should be an inquiry with governments and the UN system into the effectiveness of the surveillance systems which can identify risks and monitor the evolution of health needs during slow onset disasters (and how effectively these tools are used to predict and inform actions). Even if they exist, are resources aligned and allocated to ensure response when something happens? The RC/RC needs to re-engage with its key sectoral partners and with them establish if there is systematic availability of early warnings on emerging Public health threats during slow onset disaster. Then there is a need to clarify and strengthen what the mechanism are for sharing this information and who takes responsibility to ensure the use of the information at both NS and MOH levels. Most importantly how will IFRC use this information to ensure NS receive the required financial and material support? Linked to preparedness is the need for the RC/RC to enhance their ability to search, gather and query the availability of clear data/mapping of vulnerability patterns and resources that would help guide preparedness and inform appropriate response. Stronger engagement has to be directed by to Government, as it is important to find out what preparedness systems are in place for disease outbreaks in a slow onset disaster and what are the gaps that need to be filled by partners (is this clearly defined for each Country?).

## NS SoS Capacity

As noted, DRR in NS is increasingly PNS project driven due to donor funding trends and recent aid agency decisions. In the short-term this is positive and does include good examples of addressing SoS in integrated resilience projects and programmes (such as Somalia/Zimbabwe/Sahel (ISIS)) however, in the long term dependency on the PNS can carry a risk. SoS in Africa is mainly visible in addressing the long-term effects from drought and floods, induced food security and health care. These are the predominant activities implemented by NSs as part of a Movement wide initiative. In 2009, the IFRC has also launched an historic, long-term and cross-border initiative to support chronically vulnerable people living along the Zambezi river basin in seven countries. The Zambezi River Basin Initiative – a joint programme between the Angolan, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe Red Cross Societies – is targeting more than 600,000 people living in villages and towns along the river basin over at least the next eight years. A similar initiative has been launched in the Senegal River Basin. The Senegal Basin Initiative includes Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and Guinea.<sup>35</sup> However, in the early stages of

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<sup>35</sup> - See more at: <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/preparing-for-disaster/food-security-nutrition-and-livelihoods-website-2/what-do-we-do-in-food-security-nutrition-and-livelihoods-/#sthash.wgGl1S93.dpuf>

a developing event the DM challenges remain the same and, as noted, NS interviewed reported that in the time between emergencies maintaining capacity to address these in a timely manner is difficult.

DRR financial capabilities are growing in some NS but generally need reinforcement throughout. Moreover, the understanding of basic Project Management and M&E quality management targeting is weak. The assessment capacity of each NS varies significantly. The evaluator found that most NS were better at implementing needs assessments for damage and impact than early warning and longer term SoS needs and vulnerability.

Overall, Governments appreciate their NS and depend on their services. At the same time in many instances there seems mixed support for some NS. It is a fact that governments often demand that the RC taking the lead in preparedness and response roles that would be more appropriate to a government agency lead such as the NDMA or a line ministry. This maybe be attractive from a political perspective but carries the risk of over-commitment of NS resources and can be a challenge if or when issues of independent and impartial action are required from the NS.

With regards to African NS DM staffing: With the exception of the Kenya RC, the NS interviewed in this evaluation all stated they faced a shortage of trained DM resources that would permit additional SoS activities. Where there was adequate HQ DM staffing (Zimbabwe and Senegal are examples) the managerial and leadership effectiveness of these officers was regularly depleted by the need for them to be deployed to the field. These absences were to cover both project and emergency response activities where there was a staff shortage at the branch levels. This reviewer has visited multiple Africa NS in the past 24 months and has noted that this situation was clearly a constraint on their structural effectiveness. In Mozambique, Senegal, Lesotho among others there were no DM staff at the HQ and has not been for some time due to field obligations.

DM roles and responsibilities are affirmed in job descriptions but frequently operational initiative and effectiveness varies within these roles. The main reason for this may be due to a too frequent culture of "micro-management "by higher authority, or at least a dependence on getting such approvals that stifles middle-management decision making.

## **PNS**

The PNS have significant presence and project portfolios. They are project focused, with specific geographic areas and branches. Overall, they are appreciated but sometimes "drain" the HQ and Volunteer resources to staff their programmes and, not infrequently, compete for staff from the same pool. With regards to coordination between the PNS/NS, there are differing levels. Secondments and financial support to Regional Office vary. They can and have successfully provided delegates to fill an IFRC Representation role where there is no Federation country office. This is useful in low-key countries with minimal need for IFRC services on the ground but the absence of an IFRC country office in an active operational or program country has communication, representational and coordination drawbacks as was noted in Zimbabwe.

The have different approaches to community based DRR/DP which linked to back donor approach. Regarding SoS, they do some SoS advocacy initiatives to work in better coordinated consortia.

The NS have no capacity to engage in another level of DRM and therefore the absorption capacity, where there are multiple PNS is difficult to keep up with demands. A focus on enhanced development of existing resources added SoS awareness is needed in the NS. Moreover, once staff capacity is built the selection, appointment and retention occurs frequently as staff are poached by other agencies. To help

with this, further focus on the SoS awareness could be implemented into existing integrated resilience projects. The PNS could support the NS to more assertively position themselves with specialised SoS forecast and data analysis agencies with the technical knowhow (FAO/WFP/FEWS/MoAg/Met depts. etc.). By taking the data from these authorities and integrating it into strategies, operation and programme activities.

The PNS could further help by:

1. Supporting the NS in developing, in consultation with the IFRC Regional Office, an evidence-based proposal to lobby government ministries for donor bi-lateral funds to fill the funding gap.
2. Ensure they advocate for earmarked contributions to the GA directive for 10% DRR allocation.
3. That when obtained support the NS to implement these funds in the NS core DRR planning and programming. In under-funded emergency appeals, if there is a 10% DRR allocation, the tendency is to use any allocated DRR funding to address emergency needs. Some questioned why this is. If DRM leads to DRR then this allocation has an emergency component by definition. Some interviewees advocated the position that if there is little money in the appeal there is almost certainly not enough for emergency work and that some DRR type projects could well add as much value in that situation as an emergency one. PHAST training was quoted by one health officer.

### Capacity Development efforts

Regarding capacity development, DP/DR trainings are key but there also needs to a more strategic approach in managing and turning trainings and workshop *outputs* into real *outcomes* (impact) through the activities and influences the trained personal bring to their work. Generally, capacity building activities have only peripherally contributed to any NS SoS strategy or planning for their B/NDRT that could address SoS initiatives. The NS capacity in this area is embedded in PNS DRR and Resilience programmes. These bring great value in funding and technical learning for NS staff assigned to them but carry a potential drain on core NS activities as staff are allocated to the projects. Therefore, the SoS enhancement should initially be focused on educating, mentoring or coaching elements on existing skill base rather than new technologies or activities.

Regarding the NDRT, these are key resources for the NS, but interviewees confirm a common list of challenges in their NDRT systems. There is limited management and maintenance of roster. There are volunteer losses or attrition to recruitment for other agencies both during emergencies and quiet times. Retention as well as new identifying blood is a challenge. There is a need for more NDRT Team and volunteer leadership development in most NS.

Overall, the RDRT and NS staff N/BRT and volunteers could benefit from a modest but focused effort to increase awareness and skills in food security in existing DR/DR and DRR training.

Moreover, contingency Planning (Planning prior to and leading up to and event) needs to be a better linked to Emergency Response Planning (Planning as the event response unfolds). There are some good peer examples noted in the evaluation but CP/EP&R planning needs more structure in NS DRM Plans.

The Quality Standards, Code of Conduct, Sphere, evidence of understanding of other OD and programming best practice initiatives are also needed to increase accountability, particularly in finance and communications.

PMER: Reporting and Appeal production are key tools in fund raising, possibly the biggest challenges facing the RC/RC when it comes to enhanced capacity to address SoS. Accessing, bidding for and winning earmarked bilateral funding for DRR could significantly enhance the majority of NS ability to address SoS. These PMER skills are often in short supply inside the NS structures. Training and mentoring on how to approach prepare and advocate with government departments holding for DRR from donors such as GFDRR, The World Bank EU etc would help. Donor reporting and accountability are also becoming more onerous.

With regards to communications, there is a need to be able to explain why and how a NS approaches SoS a clear component of the NS communications strategy needs to be developed addressing the importance to all stakeholders including affected communities.

### **SOS Funding Challenges and Constraints**

**Not including IFRC's global tools, is there any funding mechanism for mobilizing funds for slow onset disaster responses at the regional level, within and/or outside the RC/RC Movement?**

At the present time, all stakeholders both RC/RC and external (including some donor agencies), frankly admit that one of the biggest challenges in expanding capacity in SoS is the shortage of dedicated funds to address this particular sector. DRR funding from a number of donors generally comes through government-to-government sources or Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) and is highly tied to government planning, even where the donor may be desirous of a local implementing partner. Most NS expressed frustration at an inability to extract some of this funding. It is possible this could be linked to earlier comments about an inconsistent and active engagement with these government sources. A closer and consistent relationship by the NS (supported by the IFRC) to access and prepare evidence-based proposals could well to unlock some specific funding. This access to funding would also allow NS to expand their activities in SoS opportunities and a degree of more effective pre-emptive community based activities to mitigate and address local level resilience. The main sources of DRR/DRM funding still come from the traditional donors USAUD, DFID, SIDA, CU, IDA, and EU. Most of this funding is delivered via PNS or occasional project/programming and usually has SoS applications as a by-product of programme activities rather than being a specific focus. The "free funding" that could be best applied to early action to address SoS remains in short supply. There are limited resources in the overlap between Development and Humanitarian Funding (therefore the DREF/CERF) baskets remain the draw for such funding applications, the constraints of which are addressed elsewhere in the evaluation.

#### **The IFRC Global DM Tools:**

**Are the IFRC tools (DREF, RDRT, ERU, FACT, Emergency Appeals, VCA, etc.) appropriate and adapted for slow onset disasters in Africa? If not appropriate how some of these tools might be better adapted to slow onset contexts, or what alternative response strategies should be considered?**

The response from all stakeholders to this question was generally positive and constructive. Among the observations and suggestions were:

The current IFRC Global tools (FACT, ERU, DREF, DMIS, and RDRT) have served the Movement well over the years despite comments from interviewees regarding delays and disagreements on deployments among all Movement partners. This is due in large part to the recognised complexity of the current Secretariat structure and on DM decision making. The fact that there are still no overarching Global DM Standard Operating procedures that could mitigate these situations complicates matters further.

Zone and regional DM SOP's are in place in Africa, Americas and Asia Pacific, as there are for FACT, ERU and DREF. However, the lack of Global SoP leaves a critical gap and much of the operationalisation of the tools is held at the zone level but ultimately the Secretariat in Geneva still retains a kind of "veto role" that, in the absence of SoPs, appears to be the source of some concern. Opinions, that are supported by the evaluator, indicate SOPs, tools, systems, processes and roles still lack clarification and agreement between Geneva, Zone Offices and Country Representatives and this can negatively impact effective and efficient decision making.

There was overall agreement that the IFRC tools have an application in SoS situations. If supported by enhanced NS/IFRC awareness and competence in forecasting and requests based on agreed triggering criteria they could have many useful applications for pre-emptive SoS preparedness and response.

B/N/RDRTs need to be broadly reinforced with at least an enhanced level of polyvalent (cross sectoral) awareness and understanding of key SoS characteristics. Food Security and Logistics capacity is important in SoS preparedness and response. Most NS agreed there is a need to increase skills in these areas within the N/RDRT surge rosters.

Within most NS there are limited linkages between Contingency Plans to address preparedness and response planning ahead of an event, and Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans. Approaches and understanding of the differences is often ad-hoc and can be improved to allow for more effective pre-planning to identify ahead of any event situations where the tools may be required to be mobilized. This way each tool can better address the specific scenario they are designed for. In addition as part of Contingency Planning, Slow Onset Risk Assessment and short-term response mechanisms methodologies and capabilities need to be strengthened (see section on SRAF model).

### Specific observations on Global Tools

- **NDRT:** Suffered from historical focus on RDRT needs broad enhancement to ensure NS can be Lead First Responders.
- **RDRT:** Is a valued but underutilised tool in which Food Security expertise could be enhanced but not exclusively as a emergency response application but to be used more creatively and athletically in support to NS in a wider range of deployments such as SoS Risk Assessments (Cameroun Dec 2014) contingency planning and other support activities to which the individual skills of RDDTR staff could be used to assist NS in a wider range of support services to enhance their DP/DR in house capacity.
- More Food Security and other SoS awareness capacity is needed within the NS preparedness and response structures. This can be in a broad polyvalent (i.e. Each sector shelter, logistics, health WASH having a common training in SoS awareness) way rather than higher level technical expertise. In this way all volunteers and staff including those engaged in PNS DRR programmes are exposed to a greater level of understanding of over-arching SoS issues.
- **DREF:** DREF is widely regarded by NS, IFRC and PNS as possibly the most useful of IFRC's DM tool as it directly benefits to NS in a tangible, practical and appropriate way. DREF generated the most active discussions in the evaluation on the topic of IFRC DM systems. This was possibly due the fact a DREF review was also underway at the same time. At the risk of duplicating findings from the DREF review the discussion and observations from KI, including the DREF desk in Geneva, specifically viz a viz DREF and SoS situations are worth recording.

**DREF approvals:** *“They take longer than they should”*. KI inputs were consistent on this point. The multilevel structure of the current IFRC DM system, can requires up to 4 sign offs for a DREF approval this despite the fact that DREF criteria and approval SoP and sign off procedures are quite clearly laid out and can be verified at the first (Country or Regional Office level). This raised the question as to why DREF is required to go through county, region, zone to a final sign on in Geneva. The consensus of opinions from inputs from NS, PNS, and IFRC staff was that if the decentralised structure is in place, at the very least, approval should be granted at the zone level. The KI interviews consistently pointed out that the consequences of such a multiple sign off protocol leaves the system open to delays, replication, inefficiency and potential frustrations as each level is naturally inclined to want to justify its role. This leads to a less than efficient utilisation of a very effective tool. The guidelines are clear, so a solution is a continuation and, if necessary, an increase sensitization on the DREF, its guidelines and procedures, which could help speed up this process.

**DRR allocation in DREF SoP:** Feedback through the review was consistent that consideration should be given to the possibilities to increase DRR requests in a DREF application. This could be restricted just for pre-emptive response such as risk assessments and exceptional events (election preparedness has already been noted). Discussions formed around the possibility to apply the GA “10% for DRR” directive for appeals that could include 10% of DRR in a DREF application. There was a fundamental objection to this from the Secretariat on the grounds the DREF was specifically conceived for and has been very effective for just emergency response. None the less, there appears to be an opportunity to address this to some degree. Early action to reduce the effects of an imminent escalation of crisis can be eligible for support from DREF. The criteria for such inclusion must be based on more effective forecasting, by having established and recognized triggers and by defining appropriate emergency assistance to communities at risk since DREF operations should include emergency response. DREF can and has been used to start up SoS activities<sup>36</sup>, but the short-term nature of DREF-funded activities still needs to be respected. The recommendation included within this review is that such an opportunity be considered.

- **SoS Fund:** Alternatively, have a separate fund for short-term and timely early action for slow onset situations as the process of finally being able to submit a DREF is usually far too late for livelihoods protection – which is key to food insecurity. The challenge that was brought up in these areas was how to overcome the reality that, given the poor systemic response to this funding, yet another fund is likely to fall on infertile ground.
- **FACT & ERU:** There is a basic understand of what they are –but there is a limited acceptance of any sense of ownership of the systems as a tool at the disposal of the NS rather is seen as a tool to ensure access of the IFRC Secretariat and the PNS into the disaster arena.
- **Appeals:** Need to review and ensure better implementation of the 10% DRR ruling from the GA. Make the 10% compulsory on the received funding and don’t leave it to when an appeal is more than 90% funded. (See section on DRR. Pg 13).

#### CASE STUDY IV: OTHER HUMANITARIAN AGENCY’S GLOBAL TOOL

The evaluation researched the current approaches of humanitarian agencies to improving emergency and early action responses to SoS. There is much being done to both increase the awareness among the international community, governments donors and the public of the importance to not ignore SoS due to the higher profile and better funded emergency response and recovery phases of the DRM cycle. The review notes and suggests consideration be given to studying the methodology currently being piloted by the ECHO-ERC funded Save the Children/Oxfam/Concern consortium. This group has developed and are field testing the SRAF<sup>37</sup> (an example of the

<sup>36</sup> Zimbabwe: Election preparedness and deployment. West Africa: Ebola Crisis, 2013 Sahel Operations.

<sup>37</sup> Situation and Response Analysis Framework



























































