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September 27, 2016

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THRU : THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL *[Signature]* 10/14/16  
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 THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, INTERNATIONAL RELATION AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS OFFICE *[Signature]*

From: : THE ACTING MANAGER, TYPHOON HAIYAN OPERATIONS

Subject : ENDORSEMENT OF THE META-EVALUATION OF THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RECOVERY OPERATION FINAL REPORT

Haiyan Memo No. 2016-09-0125

In lieu to the on-going Haiyan Recovery Operations, the undersigned would like to endorse the submission of the Meta-Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Operation Final Report presented by Corin Chater, Evaluation and Learning Consultant of the Anvita initiated by the Philippine Red Cross together with the American Red Cross that was conducted in June 2016 in Legend Villas in Mandaluyong City.

The Haiyan Operations has commenced its emergency operations after the onslaught of the Typhoon Haiyan last December 2013, and various recovery operations funded by the Partner National Societies will conclude this year.

This Final Meta-Evaluation Report is part of our commitment to Partner National Societies. Further, this evaluation will confirm that the project was successfully done with quality, challenges and learning were discussed and addressed by the management and that recommendations will be taken into consideration for the Movement's future undertakings.

The Meta-Evaluation Report includes the introduction, background and the purpose of the evaluation, the methodology, findings, Haiyan Operations success stories and the conclusions.

For your reference, please see attached Meta-Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Operation Final Evaluation Report.

For your approval.

*[Signature]*  
BRIAN KAE ENRIQUEZ

Philippine Red Cross  
ASG, Program Dev't & Services

OCT 03 2016

Together for humanity



Always First, Always Ready, Always There.

Received By: *[Signature]* 11:44 am

**META-EVALUATION  
OF THE  
TYPHOON HAIYAN RECOVERY OPERATION  
FINAL REPORT**

Presented by:



**Corin Chater  
Evaluation and Learning Consultant**

Submitted to:  
**Philippine Red Cross**



**Manila, Philippines  
July 10, 2016**

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## **PART I: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND PURPOSE OF THE FINAL REPORT**

This Final Report presents the main concluding findings, as well as lessons learned and recommendations, emanating from the Typhoon Haiyan Meta-Evaluation, conducted in May/June 2016. It is the final deliverable of the review process, and builds upon the common key findings and recommendations presented in the seven Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement Partner evaluations through an authentication process consisting of a validation field mission to Haiyan-affected areas, informant interviews and discussions with Philippine Red Cross (PRC) and other National Society staff at headquarters in Manila undertaken by the Consultant, and conclusions emanating from the Typhoon Haiyan Learning Conference held on June 1, 2016. This methodology will be described in greater detail below.

As noted above, the Final Report comments on whether the main findings from the RCRC evaluations were justified, as well as an overview of the methodology employed in the validation process. Additionally and where appropriate, it will also add some commentary on the various findings and validation process.

It will also provide the following Annexes:

- Annex A: Typhoon Haiyan Meta-Evaluation Terms of Reference
- Annex B: List of Evaluations Reviewed
- Annex C: Evaluation Score Card Assessment Results
- Annex D: The Evaluation Matrix/Interview Protocol employed for the validation exercise
- Annex E: Outline of all Evaluation Recommendations
- Annex F: Typhoon Haiyan Learning Conference Outcomes

It should be noted that this is a review document and not an evaluation exercise. The findings presented are taken from evaluations commissioned by various Movement Partners and have been available to the PRC and other Movement Partners since their submission. The purpose of the Meta-Evaluation was to document and compile the most frequent findings over the evaluations, and as such, findings presented here are not the Consultant's, but findings from the evaluations themselves which have been organized and compiled in a more coherent manner.

All work undertaken over the course of this consultancy adhered to the highest ethical standards and professional practice and in conformity with internationally accepted standards, most notably the IFRC Framework for Evaluation, which contains Movement-wide best practices and standards for both data collection and evaluation.<sup>1</sup> The collection of primary data as part of the validation activity was conducted with appropriate sensitivity to both the needs of beneficiary groups as well as the RCRC Movement itself.

This document is meant to act as a learning tool for the PRC and other Movement Partners.

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<sup>1</sup> Please see: <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>


## BACKGROUND TO THE FINAL REPORT

In November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known locally in the Philippines as Typhoon Yolanda) struck the Central Philippines with a combination of cyclonic winds (of more than 275 kph), heavy rains and tsunami-like storm surges. Described as one of the most powerful tropical cyclones ever, Haiyan caused colossal devastation. In its aftermath, more than 6,300 people had lost their lives while there was extensive destruction and damage to housing, livelihoods and infrastructure, leading to a drastic reduction in living conditions, income, and access to basic services. In all, more than 16 million people (some 3.4 million households) were affected, with more than 1 million houses destroyed or damaged.

Immediately following the typhoon, the RCRC Movement began relief activities largely consisting of interventions focused on the provision of food; emergency shelters; health care and medical services; water; essential household items; and improved sanitation. Four months after the disaster, the RCRC Movement transitioned activities towards longer-term recovery, initiating its Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Operation with interventions focused on improvements to shelter; livelihoods; water and sanitation (WASH); health services; education; and to community capacities related to disaster risk reduction (DRR).

The map below illustrates the geographical scale and locations of the Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Operation in the Philippines, as well as which National Society/RCRC Movement Partners were involved, where they were/are, and what recovery sectors were in evidence.

**Figure 1: Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Operation Sector Coverage by Chapter**



Presently, almost two and a half years after the disaster, the Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Operation is well underway and approaching its conclusion. Numerous evaluations and learning exercises have

been undertaken by PRC and individual National Society and Movement partners, however overall recommendations and key learnings had not as yet been collected, compiled, and validated in a systematic fashion. The purpose of the consultancy was to complete this process.

## **PURPOSE OF FINAL REPORT**

The RCRC Movement is committed to quality assurance, standards and a culture of learning in its disaster response, recovery and preparedness. As such, the aim of this document is to provide support towards the compilation and reflection on lessons learned during implementation of the Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Operation focusing on the twenty-six month period from March 2014 to June 2016 so as to act as a learning tool in the event of any future disasters that necessitate both PRC and Movement Partner involvement.

## **ORGANIZATION OF THE DOCUMENT**

Part I provides an introduction to the meta-evaluation exercise, including the background and purpose of the assignment. Part II provides an overview of the meta-review methodology and the various activities undertaken by the consultant and the PRC to move the process forward. Part III provides an overview of the recommendations and findings that were validated, including their status. Part IV comments on several successes seen in the Typhon Haiyan recovery effort. Finally, Part V concludes with some overarching commentary on the findings and recommendations (and their status) from the various evaluations, as well as some additional points to consider moving forward in the Haiyan recovery, and indeed for potential future disasters both in the Philippines and globally.

## PART II: METHODOLOGY

As noted above, this document is the end result of the Typhoon Haiyan Meta-Evaluation process, and builds upon the previous phases of the consultancy. Broadly, the methodology to arrive at this document consisted of the following phases:

- a) **Work Planning and Meta-Evaluation**
  - Document Review and Process Development
  - Development of Inception Report
  - Development of Evaluation Scorecard
  - Meta-Evaluation of Evaluation Quality
  - Draft Report of Evaluation Quality
  
- b) **Synthesis and Validation of Findings and Recommendations**
  - Synthesis Report of Meta Evaluation Findings and Recommendations
  - Validation Mission with Key Stakeholders in Haiyan Affected Areas
  - Validation Mission with Key Stakeholders in PRC Headquarters
  
- c) **Learning Conference and Production of Final Report**
  - Development of Learning Conference Concept Note
  - Facilitation of Learning Conference
  - Final Report Production

Phase A of the consultancy was desk-based both in Canada (residence of the consultant) and Philippines, while phases B and C were undertaken onsite in the Philippines. Each will be briefly described hereafter.

### PHASE A: WORK PLANNING AND META-EVALUATION – APRIL/MAY 2016

The first stage of the consultancy consisted, broadly speaking, of the development of the Meta-Evaluation Inception Report and Evaluation Scorecard, as well as finalizing the timetable for completion of the various consultancy deliverables. Prior to commencement of the Meta-Evaluation exercise, the PRC requested movement partners and various National Societies taking part in the Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Operation to submit their learning documents to date (i.e. evaluations, baseline surveys, workshop reports, thematic reports.) A total of **sixteen (16)** documents were submitted. Of the sixteen submitted, however, only **seven (7)** were classified as “true” evaluations, that is to say, exercises conducted by an external consultant(s) that utilized, in whole or in part, internationally accepted evaluation criteria. The remainder (9) were not considered evaluations per se, as they were not independently conducted but were essentially internal learning exercises (i.e. workshop reports, baseline surveys, etc.) with some providing recommendations and others not. As such, this exercise exclusively reviewed the seven “true” evaluations only, which was agreed upon by PRC and the consultant. That said, some of the remaining nine documents also possessed recommendations, but most often these were specifically related to particular themes, geographical areas, or the internal management practices of the Movement Partner in question. Consequently, while these nine other documents were not included in the Meta-Evaluation, in certain cases their recommendations mirrored those of the “true” evaluations. The complete list of documents submitted to PRC and reviewed by the consultant may be found in Annex B, with the “true” evaluations highlighted.

In terms of the meta-evaluation process itself, the consultant, following preliminary analysis of previous evaluations, constructed an evaluation scorecard (see below) where the quality of the seven evaluations was judged. The score card itself was divided into two aspects relating to the evaluations themselves: Structure Considerations and Content Considerations. Each of these were then divided into three sub-categories, which received a number grade (against a maximum numerical figure).

**Figure 2: Evaluation Scorecard Criteria and Sub-Criteria**

<b>Structure Considerations (35 points)</b>
<p><b>Structure of the Report (10 points)</b> How was the evaluation formulated? Was the approach logical for the delivery of relevant information? Are sections logically broken down by subject area? Is the evaluation easily readable? Is the subject matter appropriate to the purpose of the review?</p>
<p><b>Executive Summary (10 points)</b> Was the executive summary effective in providing a brief but effective overview of the evaluation? Does it touch on all the important elements (project overview, methodology, key findings, lessons learned, and recommendations)?</p>
<p><b>Lessons Learned and Recommendations (15 points)</b> Were these provided? Were they realistic and appropriate (i.e. could they be realistically addressed) given the realities of the implementing partners as well as the situation of beneficiaries on the ground? Is there evidence of follow-up activities to address lessons learned and recommendations identified?</p>
<b>Content Considerations (65 points)</b>
<p><b>Evaluation Design and Methodological Appropriateness (20 points)</b> Were the Terms of Reference appropriate? Did the evaluator design the evaluation questions and field mission appropriately to receive the maximum information from participants? Was the sample and types of interviewees appropriate? Did the evaluation receive the appropriate support from the implementing partners? What were the challenges faced in the conduct of the review? Was the evaluation team or individual appropriately qualified?</p>
<p><b>Content of the Report (25 points)</b> Were international standards and values for IFRC Evaluations utilized and effectively presented in the evaluation, adhering to OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respect for Red Cross and Red Crescent Fundamental Principles, Organizational Values, Code of Conduct and IFRC 2020 Strategy</li> <li>• Relevance and Appropriateness</li> <li>• Efficiency</li> <li>• Effectiveness</li> <li>• Coverage</li> <li>• Impact</li> <li>• Coherence</li> <li>• Sustainability and Connectedness</li> </ul> <p>Was there enough information under each? Has the evaluation effectively utilized any graphs, tables, charts, or photographs? Were beneficiaries involved in the process of project design, delivery, and monitoring? Did the project allowed the targeted population to provide feedback/complaints? Is there a description of the key organizational as well as programme related learning from the project? How effective has been the coordination with other RC Movement and non-Movement actors? How does the project fit with other projects/programmes implemented in by the PRC?</p>
<p><b>Soundness of the Analysis (20 points)</b> Are the findings, observations, lessons learned, and recommendations clearly stated and based upon sound empirical analysis and examples? Has the evaluation used effective and holistic participatory techniques to come to its conclusions? Were the correct stakeholders (and number of stakeholders) interviewed to justify findings? Was the duration and location of field visits appropriate?</p>

As the focus of the assessment was more on the appropriateness of evaluation content rather than structure, scoring in the content section was weighted higher than structure considerations (65/35). Each evaluation was thus given a numerical score out of one hundred (100). The criteria informing review of the sub-categories is further elaborated on in the score cards themselves. Note: This Scorecard was employed only for those documents that were clear evaluations as opposed to progress reports, reviews, and workshops that do not, by their very nature, adhere to elements of the Evaluation Scorecard.

Of the seven evaluation reviewed, they were of many different types, geographical foci, and intent. Two were focused solely on specific sectors, one was centered on integration, three were sector-wide, and one was essentially an internal policy document for a particular Red Cross actor. The scorecard employed best practices and standards in meta-evaluation and judged the reviews against best practices in the field, as outlined in IFRC's Framework for Evaluation, which itself is based on OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria for evaluation of development assistance initiatives.<sup>2</sup> Completed evaluation score cards contained in Annex C.

## PHASE B: SYNTHESIS AND VALIDATION OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS – MAY 2016

The next step of the consultancy may be broadly defined as the reporting and stakeholder interview stage. Once in Manila, the consultant completed the Assessment Report as well as the Synthesis Report of Key Learnings from the various evaluations under review, which were broken down by theme and sector. In sum, there were a total of 120 recommendations that were present across the seven evaluations under review. Learnings were categorized according to the four key technical sectors inherent in the Typhoon Haiyan recovery effort, and five key themes that relate more to less-tangible elements of the programmes, such as management, coordination, and integration during the response. The following chart illustrates the subject areas that recommendations were grouped into, followed by groupings by theme, with associated numbers of recommendations for each across all seven evaluations, bearing in mind that some of the recommendations themselves occur across one or more reviews. The total roll-up of the 120 recommendations found in the seven evaluations may be found in Annex E.

**Figure 3: Number of Recommendations by Sector/Subject Area<sup>3</sup>**

Sector /Subject Area	Number of Recommendations Across All Evaluations
Shelter and Repair Assistance	21
Livelihoods	13
WASH/Health	7
DRR/Education	9
Support Services	29
Cross-Cutting	6

<sup>2</sup> IFRC Framework for Evaluation may be found at:

<http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>

OECD-DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance may be found at:

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

<sup>3</sup> These subject areas were identified following consultations with PRC

Coordination and Cooperation	14
Internal RC Specific	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>

**Figure 4: Number of Recommendations by Theme**

Themes	Number of Recommendations Across All Evaluations
Technical	14
Cross-Cutting (Gender, Climate Change, etc.)	6
Project Operations, Policy, and Management	48
PMER	23
Training	7
Coordination	16
Integration	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>

Of the 120 recommendations found across the seven evaluations, there were a total of twenty-one (21) that were common to two or more evaluations. This, incidentally, was the criteria for selection of the recommendations to be validated. The twenty-one common recommendations will be elaborated on in Part III, below.

Once the twenty-one recommendations were established, the next step in the review process was to validate them. The consultant developed an evaluation matrix/interview protocol (Annex D) that were utilized to obtain input from a variety of stakeholders involved in the Typhoon Haiyan recovery effort, which included RC managers at both headquarters and chapter/field level, direct beneficiaries, RC143 volunteers, and representatives of Barangay Recovery Committees (BARECOMS). Data collection itself was undertaken employing a traditional mixed-method approach utilizing both individual informant interviews as well as focus group discussions. This validation phase was conducted over a six-day field mission. The geographical reach of the validation exercise focused on those areas that were significantly affected by Haiyan, including Tacloban (Leyte), Western Samar, Cebu (Bantayan Island and Northern Cebu), and Iloilo (Iloilo City and Central Iloilo Province). In each location, the consultant visited various barangays and RC chapter/field office locations. In terms of who was interviewed, the following stakeholder groups were in evidence:

- Leyte: (RC Haiyan Staff, American Red Cross staff, BARECOM (2), Shelter and Livelihood Beneficiaries, 143 Volunteers
- Samar (Western): RC Haiyan Staff, German Red Cross staff, BARECOM (2), Shelter and Beneficiaries, 143 Volunteers
- Cebu: RC Haiyan Staff, German Red Cross staff, BARECOM (3), Shelter and Livelihood Beneficiaries, 143 Volunteers
- Iloilo: Chapter Head, RC Haiyan staff, British Red Cross staff, BARECOM (1), Shelter and Livelihood Beneficiaries, 143 Volunteers

These field interviews were then supplemented by interviews in Manila with PRC and PNS/Movement Partner representatives, which included:

- British Red Cross

- Spanish Red Cross
- Switzerland Red Cross
- Finland Red Cross
- American Red Cross
- IFRC
- PRC Managers and Haiyan Task Force representatives in the following areas: Procurement, Finance and Administration, Human Resources, and Volunteer/Youth.

The total breakdown of interviewees who participated in validation interviews is provided in the table below:

**Figure 5: Breakdown of Interviewees by Stakeholder Type**

Stakeholder Type	F	M	Total
PRC/Haiyan Task Force (HQ, Chapter, Field Offices)	12	11	23
RC 143 Volunteers	19	13	32
BARECOM	18	6	24
Beneficiaries (Shelter and Livelihood)	22	1	23
RC Movement Partners (Operations Heads and Country Representatives at HQ/Field)	7	4	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>113</b>

The purpose of these interviews was to determine their perspectives on the recovery effort as well as to validate the twenty-one recommendations and other key findings from the meta-evaluation. Subsequently, the results and findings from the interview process and content from these interviews were included in the Typhoon Haiyan Mid-Term Learning Conference for further validation.

### **PHASE C: LEARNING CONFERENCE AND PRODUCTION OF FINAL REPORT – JUNE 2016**

Once the field mission and interviews at headquarters concluded, the final phase in the validation exercise was to hold a one-day Typhoon Haiyan Learning and Validation conference, which took place on June 1 at the Legend Villas Hotel and Conference Center in Mandaluyong (Metro Manila). The conference itself was internal to the RCRC, that is to say, only Red Cross representatives (both those who had directly participated in the recovery effort as well as those who did not) attended. The purpose of the conference, which was entirely participatory, was to build upon the meta-evaluation of findings and recommendations from the various evaluations and the consultant’s field work validation mission by further assessing the validity of the findings to date, as well as brainstorming on efficient and effective ways to further build on the recommendations for current and future operations. The stated objectives of the conference were to:

- Validate the findings/recommendations from the meta-review exercise
- Reflect on the current status of findings/recommendations made in the evaluations
- Compile lessons learned and best practices in the various sectors and themes that were effective
- Formulate an action plan for addressing the recommendations made
- Share experiences from the recovery operation with and amongst RCRC movement partners

It is anticipated that the subject matter of the learning conference will be used to inform future RCRC recovery operations (for both Haiyan and future disasters) both in the Philippines and elsewhere.

The conference itself may be considered very successful. Over one hundred and ten (110) individuals attended from a variety of diverse RCRC stakeholder groups, including senior representatives from:

- Haiyan Task Force (Managers and Sector Heads)
- PRC (Senior Managers and Chapter Representatives/Heads)
- PNSs
- Other Movement Partners

The consultant was very encouraged with the level of discussion and debate at the Learning Conference, as well as the openness displayed by the participants. Some of the recommendations (elaborated on in the Part 3 below) were controversial, but this did not serve to hinder a frank and open discussion. Once the findings and recommendations were presented, participants broke into sector/theme groups to discuss the validity of the recommendations. Every participant at the conference was given the opportunity, either within the sector/theme groups or otherwise in plenary, to comment and add their input into the deliberations. Participants were then tasked with outlining what, in their opinion, worked well in the recovery effort and what did not. Thereafter, lessons learned and best practices were outlined by sector/theme, and the day culminated with each sector/theme group providing their own recommendations and action plans for moving forward on specific issues: sometimes related to the meta-evaluation findings and sometimes in other areas. While this validation report is only concerned with the findings and recommendations from the seven evaluations themselves, an overview of the learning conference activity (including the above outputs) may be found in Annex F.

Upon conclusion of the conference, the consultant was tasked with the production of this Validation Report, which acts as an overview, roll-up, and validation of the evaluation meta-review process.

## **METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES**

While there were certain limitations (outlined below) that served to potentially impact upon the meta-evaluation validation process, the consultant nonetheless is of the opinion that these limitations and challenges did not serve to adversely impact the overall validation results, and were in fact a fair, though not perfect, representation of stakeholder opinions and views.

Prior to outlining the limitations, however, it is necessary to clarify one point regarding the meta-evaluation assignment and process, as there appeared to be some confusion on the part of some stakeholders as to the *raison d'être* of the exercise. This confusion stemmed from the fact that some believed that this exercise was actually an evaluation exercise. However, a meta-evaluation process does not make individual judgements on findings and/or recommendations. Instead, it reviews already existing evaluation documents (in this case, undertaken by seven PNSs and Movement Partners) and provides a roll-up of the common recommendations that occurred across these documents. In other words, none of the twenty-one findings and recommendations presented as part of the validation exercise were the opinion of the consultant, rather, they were the opinion of the independent consultants who were hired by the various PNSs and Movement Partners to review various aspects of the recovery effort. As such, while some of the findings may be somewhat

uncomfortable for certain stakeholders, the consultant himself is not responsible for them, but is simply relaying what already exists within the evaluation documents.

It should also be noted that this meta-review process only involved the recovery effort for Haiyan, and **not** the initial emergency phase.

Over the course of the consultancy and data collection field mission, the following challenges and limitations were encountered which potentially may have had an impact on the validity of the field validation process. However, while the points below are noted, the consultant does not believe that these limitations had a significant deleterious effect on the integrity of the validation process, as the majority of findings were, for the most part, common across all regions visited.

- Geographical Reach: The field validation mission was allotted six days. Over that time span, the consultant was able to visit multiple locations in four Philippine provinces (Western Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Iloilo) where Haiyan struck with great force (and where the recovery effort was in place). Unfortunately, there were Haiyan affected areas where, due to time and resource restraints, the consultant was unable to visit (for example: Eastern Samar, Palawan, and Antique provinces). As such, direct data collection was unable to take place in these areas, with the consultant having to rely mainly on secondary data sources (i.e. evaluations, reports) rather than face-to-face interviews. While this was not optimal, the consultant does believe that in the context of the meta-review process, the locations and individuals visited did provide an acceptable and sound sample of opinion on the Haiyan recovery effort across the various geographical areas.
- Location-specific Findings and Recommendations: While the majority of evaluation findings, especially those that concerned management and coordination aspects, cross-cut multiple evaluations, there were examples of multiple findings, for example those relating to shelter, that may have been more location-specific than others, and therefore not as relevant for shelter interventions in other locations where different PNSs or movement partners may have taken a different approach. This being said, as the criteria for inclusion on the twenty-one findings/recommendations list was their occurrence over more than one evaluation, the location of the intervention is less important than the message, even if it may not have been relevant in certain geographical locations or for specific movement partners.
- Possibility of Specific Selection: Primary responsibility for selection of locations and individuals that the evaluator visited/interviewed was with the various Haiyan Task Force personnel at headquarters and in the field, as well as the various participating PNSs and movement partners operating within the geographical areas the consultant travelled to. This, in theory, raises the potential for selection of locations/individuals where only “positive” outcomes/opinions were in evidence, that is to say, locations where the recovery interventions were broadly successful with little negative issues. The reason this potential limitation has been raised by the consultant was that fact that on one occasion, a particular barangay (and its BARECOM) was visited unannounced and unplanned. Indeed, this visit resulted in perhaps the most negative assessment of the Haiyan recovery effort by any stakeholder group over the entire field mission, which in turn raises the possibility that the consultant was steered towards those locations/stakeholders that would only put a positive spin on the Red Cross intervention. This being said, the consultant does not necessarily believe that the choice/location of field visits and stakeholders to be

interviewed was inappropriate, but this is something that could be taken into account to a larger degree for future meta-evaluation.

- Availability of Beneficiary/Stakeholder Groups and Lack of Notification: The validation field mission was undertaken with little lead time in terms of organizing specific site visits and interviews with specific stakeholders, especially those at the BARECOM and beneficiary levels. This fact, however, was not an issue with the Haiyan Task Force (responsible for organizing the meetings), as they themselves had very little lead time before the validation mission was finalized. The consequences, however, were evident in a few cases, where interviewees had little or no notification that they were to be interviewed, and were not prepared for such an activity. In one case, where the BARECOM and barangay beneficiaries were to be interviewed, only one individual was present, as the remainder of the barangay was away at another village for fiesta. It is suggested that for future meta-analyses, a larger amount of planning go into ensuring that stakeholder groups are available to be interviewed by the consultant upon arrival in the area.
- Questions Regarding Sampling: At the validation conference, an issue was raised regarding an appropriate sample of stakeholders that were interviewed to validate (or invalidate) the various evaluation findings. Some RCRC staff were of the opinion that the validation process did not possess a large enough number or diversity of respondents to be acceptable, especially in the context of a scientific evaluation process. There are two points to consider regarding this limitation. First, as noted previously, the meta-evaluation process was not an evaluation, but rather a compilation of other previously undertaken reviews. As such, there was less scientific rigour attached to the stakeholder interview process as this was not a scientific exercise, per se. Second, while a larger sample in terms of interviewees and geographical locations is always optimal, the field mission was but one aspect of the meta-evaluation process, and as such, was constrained by both time and resource factors. Indeed, the consultant did the best he could in terms of undertaking appropriate interviews with available stakeholders in the field and at headquarters in Manila, and while additional interviews would have doubtless made the validation process more holistic, he is confident that the opinions expressed by stakeholders was both sound and relevant to the evaluation findings themselves.
- Evaluation vs. Review: Throughout the consultancy, there was some confusion over the terminology of this exercise, leading to questions regarding the appropriateness of sampling as noted above, and thus the findings presented in this document. Essentially, this confusion revolves around semantics. The consultant was tasked with undertaking a “meta-evaluation”, which is a technical term used within the M&E sector ([http://betterevaluation.org/plan/manage/review\\_evaluation](http://betterevaluation.org/plan/manage/review_evaluation)) that refers to the process of reviewing the quality of existing evaluations and consolidating findings/recommendations. As such, this exercise employed the common term “meta-evaluation”, but in essence, this exercise could also be considered a “review”, which generally refers to a re-assessment of existing information and is generally not held to the same degree of statistical rigor. On the other hand, the consultant acknowledges that the term “meta-evaluation” may be somewhat confusing as “evaluation” refers to some sort of measurement of value/success against established standards (e.g. IFRC Evaluation Criteria). The term also generally implies a high degree of statistical rigor. Reviews are often much more qualitative in nature (key informant interviews, focus group discussions, observations, etc.) and do not focus as heavily on assessing value/success as opposed to providing recommendations for action. While the official title for this document is “meta-evaluation” the consultant has chosen to use the terms “meta-evaluation” and “review”

interchangeably to underscore the fact that the findings/recommendations were drawn from existing information as opposed to the collection of new data. The only “new data” collected for the meta-evaluation was used for validation of existing information. While it is noted that the number and composition of the validation respondents could be reassessed to ensure proper validation, it should also be noted that the original evaluations that fed into the meta-evaluation findings/recommendations included their own methodologies which included household-level surveys, key informants, focus group discussions, etc. In essence, the meta-evaluation findings/recommendations draw from the collective opinion of thousands of beneficiaries, volunteers, and staff. As such, technically, and in adherence to international evaluation standards, this document is indeed a “meta-evaluation”, but in spirit, and certainly content and methodological rigor, it does present more as a “review”.

- The consultant acknowledges that there were some areas of disagreement between certain findings presented in this document (based upon review of the evaluations) and the outcomes of the field mission and validation conference. This maybe due to the thin line between the relief and recovery periods of the Typhoon Haiyan operations. The consultant again notes that the various evaluations covered the recovery phase exclusively, whereas at the validation conference, it appears that some individuals believed that the meta-analysis covered both stages.
- Finally, it is also acknowledged that certain findings contained in this document may have been relevant during the time of writing but are no longer relevant as remedial measures have already taken place to address them.

## PART III: FINDINGS

This section of the document outlines the various findings and recommendations from the various evaluations that were to be validated. As noted above, criteria for selection was the appearance of a specific finding/recommendation that occurred over at least two of the seven evaluations reviewed as part of the meta-evaluation. As has been shown above, there were 120 recommendations made across all evaluations reviewed. Of this number, twenty-one (21) occurred over multiple evaluations. The twenty-one findings/recommendations were then divided by the consultant (in concert with PRC PMER) into eight relevant separate sectors and themes which could be more easily addressed in the validation conference. The following table illustrates the breakdown of mutual recommendations by sector and theme:

**Figure 6: Frequency of Mutual Recommendations (21) by Sector/Theme**

Sector/Theme	Frequency of Recommendations Occurring Over 2 or More Evaluations
Shelter	3
HR and Volunteer Management	3
DRR/Education	3
Livelihoods	1
Health/WASH	1
Finance/Logistics and Procurement	1
Operations (PMER, Field Level)	4
Coordination (Haiyan/PRC/Chapter/Sector/PNS/External)	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>

Main findings/recommendations are presented in the table below. For each separate element, there are three categories: Recommendation (paraphrased from the evaluations), Findings from the evaluations (used to justify the associated recommendations) are listed next, followed by Findings from the validation mission (to determine whether the evaluation findings were valid). The final stage in the validation process occurred at the Validation conference where, however, findings were validated by sector/theme as opposed to each individual finding/recommendation. In other words, while there were twenty-one mutual recommendations (with associated findings), these were not validated individually but instead by sector/theme. Consequently, this document will outline validation findings from the conference also by sector/theme (for a total of eight). **These will be outlined in the table below employing a traffic-light system. Green indicates the findings were valid, yellow indicates that there was some disagreement on their validity, and red indicates that the findings were not validated by individuals at the Learning Conference.**

It is important to note that although the twenty-one findings have been separated by sector/theme, there is a fair degree of overlap and cross-cutting between and amongst them. For example, the first shelter finding concerns the compensation/pay out structure that shelter beneficiaries received, but while this may be within the shelter mandate, the decision to alter such a structure could also have been placed within the rubric of finance, logistics, and procurement. This potential cross-pollination is important to bear in mind when reviewing the findings and recommendations.

Finally, the consultant will, where appropriate, provide some additional commentary on specific findings/recommendations.

**Figure 7: Meta-Evaluation Recommendations and Findings by Sector/Theme**

Sector / Theme	Recommendation	Findings from Evaluation	Findings from Validation Mission
Shelter	For shelter interventions, dependent on context and markets, a combination of cash and materials should be considered rather than cash only. Further, If local market conditions permit, cash grants should be increased to enable beneficiaries to purchase NFIs directly from local suppliers. This will likely enable the local economy to recover more quickly, the benefits of which should spin-off to affected communities. The rapid purchase of NFIs, based on 'speed of procurement' judgments, future Operations should consider distributing products with cash grants. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cash grants were appropriate to cover shelter rehabilitation, but not to cover total rehabilitation costs</li> <li>• Mixture of cash grants and CGI sheets was found to be a good strategy, as the cash allowed beneficiaries to buy other roofing and structural materials to support the CGI, and also to employ carpenters to make necessary repairs.</li> <li>• Better to assist the overall local economy rather than rely on external sources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shelter beneficiaries (across all locations) were of unanimous agreement that a better strategy would be to lower the total cash payout and instead pay for the materials. Cash payouts would be used to pay for labour, which typically cost around P3000.</li> <li>• Instances of P10,000 not going to where it was intended, but rather on other things (necessities and non-necessities)</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> Wide agreement on the part of shelter beneficiaries and BARECOMS that their preference would be, in future disasters, for the RCRC to wholly cover the cost of building materials and lower the total amount of cash payout.</p>			
Shelter	Safe shelter training should focus on beneficiaries who are in a better position to understand and incorporate safe shelter messages - including carpenters. Core shelter construction provides a good opportunity for practically demonstrating safety features to a wider group. An advanced carpentry skills training module may need to be developed with a ToT component. Also, ensure training is practical with demonstration or non-classroom element. Provide simple materials / incentives to help SSA champions to spread messages to others in their community. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PASSA training does not appear to have been effective: beneficiaries are generally unaware of the 8 safe shelter messages and strategies have not been consistently adopted.</li> <li>• Information on safe shelters not widely distributed to beneficiaries.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The main issue here was that the appropriate individuals (carpenters) within the community were trained, but that the actual training occurred long <i>after</i> (in some cases two months) following reconstruction. This resulted in traditional practices being employed which were not up to standard.</li> <li>• Unanimous agreement that PASSA training should occur prior to reconstruction, for obvious reasons.</li> <li>• The training itself appeared to have a hands-on element</li> <li>• No incentives were in evidence</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> PASSA and build back safe training should occur <b>PRIOR</b> to reconstruction, and not afterward</p>			

<p><b>Shelter</b></p>	<p>The shelter programme should undertake a follow-up review of the repairs made by beneficiaries based on the SRA (by trained staff) and encourage beneficiaries to rectify unsafe features. Further, the programme should randomly select a number of barangays, review the SRA houses across the Barangay, and use this to make a decision on level of risk posed by the repairs. A small budget could be allocated to make immediate changes. (2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No specific finding to justify this recommendation is in evidence, but is rather based on the fact that many beneficiaries are still, as noted above, unaware of safe shelter practices.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring of safe shelter building practices has been done by volunteers in the interim. More aware of safe shelter practices now, but still</li> <li>Issue was that often shelters were rebuilt <i>before</i> PASSA training was held for carpenters within the community.</li> <li>Having an SRA-specific evaluation, either as part of a general Movement-wide evaluation, or as a stand-alone exercise, would be beneficial.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> Self-evident</p>			
<p><b>Validation Status from Learning Conference:</b> Stakeholders at the validation conference found the three shelter findings to be valid for the most part though there were concerns with the split of cash and materials suggested by the beneficiaries. It was also pointed out that the issues raised in the two shelter training findings/recommendations were already being addressed and implemented.</p>			
<p><b>HR and Volunteer Management</b></p>	<p>The programme should take steps to improve staff retention – given the problems of attracting and retaining quality staff; quicker issuance of contracts and enhancing opportunities for staff development are possible options. (4)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unanimous observation that difficulties have been experienced in ensuring adequate staffing</li> <li>Recruitment is difficult due to low salaries</li> <li>Long delays in issuing contracts (job insecurity)</li> <li>Relocation an issue</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All of the above were confirmed in discussions with field staff in all locations</li> <li>However, there were also difficulties in recruiting locally due to lack of qualifications</li> <li>Also, delays in contracting had much to do with the issue of absorptive capacity of HR to deal with the huge increase in activity as a result of the emergency/recovery effort</li> <li>Lack of Chapter and Field Haiyan compliance with HQ requests.</li> <li>Contracting process would often take 1-3 months for approval</li> <li>Many qualified individuals chose to work for INGOs as the package is better, however, now that INGOs are leaving, more people available</li> <li>Red Cross, is, however, primarily a volunteer organization, and as such cannot be expected to match salaries of others</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> It was acknowledged by management at PRC HQ that there had been difficulties in terms of staffing and contracting, but that new systems would be put in place to ensure greater efficiency</p>			

<p><b>HR and Volunteer Management</b></p>	<p>NSs should support technical working groups to develop guidelines for PRC volunteer management and building skills in community facilitation and communication. (2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same findings as noted below in next finding</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a need for stronger guidelines to support PRC volunteers, especially in orienting and preparing them</li> <li>• There is a code of conduct for volunteer management but no official manual or guidelines</li> <li>• Involvement of the TWGs should be greater as there are different types of volunteers (by sector)</li> <li>• Very little communication between Haiyan volunteers and HQ volunteer management</li> <li>• Also, it is apparently not written in the guidelines that volunteers should receive P300 a day: this figure comes from Chapters</li> <li>• One RC office developed their own guidelines for volunteers by sector which they shared with Chapter.</li> <li>• Organizing a specific TWG for RC143 comprised of Programme and Chapters</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> The issue of lack of appropriate or incomplete guidelines for recovery management (across many sectors) emerged as the largest issue faced by the PRC according to those individuals participating in the Validation Conference. Ensuring new and efficient guidelines for management was at the top of the action plan agenda for almost every sector/theme</p>			
<p><b>HR and Volunteer Management</b></p>	<p>Develop a strategy and plan of action for how to maintain and support the volunteers recruited and trained in the barangays and incorporate them into the RC 143 network and link to Red Cross Action Teams. (2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The 143 programme may be considered a standout success which is key to community preparedness and risk reduction and represents a highly effective mechanism for building community resilience in a sustainable way. As such, the incorporation of volunteers, who were often very effective, would be beneficial, especially in the context of future disasters.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unanimous agreement that the 143 Volunteer Programme has been very successful, with committed individuals on the ground acting as effective bridges between the RC and the community: they know the context, making communications much easier</li> <li>• No current strategy on how to integrate volunteers once the operation ends, but some NSs and Chapters have taken steps to assist volunteers, such as endorsing them in specific sector areas, and possibly providing training additional training</li> <li>• Need to train more volunteers on ground for sustainability (Basics of 143, community organizing)</li> <li>• Volunteer vs. Beneficiary question: danger that volunteers will end up relying</li> </ul>

			<p>(benefiting) on their volunteer stipends from the RC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In one case, volunteers will be turned over to Chapter, which is in the process of potentially involving them in Red Cross Action Team (RCAT)</li> <li>Resource question is paramount: do Chapters possess appropriate resources to absorb 143 volunteers?</li> </ul>
<b>Commentary:</b> Self-Evident			
<p><b>Validation Status from Learning Conference:</b> Validation findings from the Conference were critical of the methodology employed to arrive at the above recommendations/findings, even though there was wide agreement across all stakeholder groups (both in the field and indeed with individual interviews at HQ. It was felt that the data gathering methodology was not scientific and that the number of respondents was not well represented, which perhaps stems from PRC management confusion as to the purpose of the meta-review, discussed above. In short, the validation conference found these three findings to not be valid, which, curiously, is the direct opposite of what interviewees told the consultant privately. Additionally, that fact that the issue of inappropriate guidelines was raised by all stakeholders and that developing more appropriate guidelines was at the top of action plans would appear to suggest that these findings may in fact be more valid than noted at the conference.</p>			
<b>DRR/Education</b>	<p>Consider whether the Recovery Committee mechanism may still be used as an entry-point to the communities for DRR activities, perhaps by renaming, re-training and planning for medium to long-term engagement with them beyond the life of the household-level recovery activities. (2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disconnect between the use of Recovery Committees by location: in some they are active, while in others barangay officials are responsible</li> <li>Confusion in mandate and modus operandi of Recovery Committees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wide variance in role, makeup, and selection process of BARECOMs by region/barangay</li> <li>Most very progressive, one not really involved</li> <li>No real evidence of confusion in their mandate</li> </ul>
<b>Commentary:</b> This is an example of a finding from evaluations that was, upon further investigation through the field mission, found to not valid, as there was little evidence (with one exception) of the BARECOMs not being aware of their mandate and function. That said, the discrepancy in terms of make-up of BARECOMs is something that could be addressed in the future.			
<b>DRR/Education</b>	<p>Ensure that action for DRR is community-owned and community-led with skilled staff conducting training, analysis and action planning with communities. Community facilitation training should be provided to PRC volunteers. (2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As a great share of community interaction is handled by PRC volunteers, it makes most sense that they should deliver the training, as they will be familiar to beneficiaries. At the same time, as many are young, they may not have the appropriate skills to do so. This is why community facilitation training makes sense.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Common agreement amongst barangays and RC that volunteers were effective and acted as very good ambassadors to the community.</li> <li>Validation mission did not receive any specific indication that PRC volunteers were not effective as trainers, or that they required specific training in community facilitation.</li> <li>Communities did feel ownership over DRR</li> </ul>

<b>Commentary:</b> As above, another example of an evaluation finding that was not validated during the field mission as well as the Conference			
<b>DRR/Education</b>	In order to sustain the initiatives and gains of the PRC and NSs, there should be a need to further capacitate and expand the roles of Barangay Recovery Committees and PRC chapters to include community organizing and social mobilization; specifically community resource mobilization, partnership building, assessment and monitoring, and resource management. User-friendly TORs should be established for the Recovery Committees. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Barangay Recovery Committees are excellent vehicles for implementation, in particular to link the programme with the wider community: the “transition belt”. They represent an “integrated” bridge to the community.</li> <li>BRCs are worth retaining in future operations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Generally, the BRC mechanism was found to be very effective in terms of information dissemination and decision-making for the community as part of the recovery effort (except in cases where there was political interference/bias)</li> <li>BRCs are certainly worth retaining, but could be further capacitated to undertake their roles (training in DRR, for example).</li> </ul>
<b>Commentary:</b> Self-evident			
<b>Validation Status from Learning Conference:</b> Findings were found to be valid. However, as the findings from the field mission were almost the opposite from those of the evaluations, it was actually the field mission findings that were found to be valid, not what was contained within the evaluations.			
<b>Livelihoods</b>	Consider introducing insurance linked to micro-enterprise activities such as livestock, crops, health, etc. Furthermore, the PRC should seek to establish links with micro-finance institutions for insurance, learning from experience outside the Philippines to see if innovations in insurance can be incorporated into future recovery, as insurance is a critical resilience building tool. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Incorporation of insurance is likely to protect micro-enterprise individuals and small-scale farmers etc. from future disasters, as it would provide them with additional funds for recovery.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stakeholders believed that this would be a good idea, but worried about the additional costs this may incur for very low income beneficiaries.</li> <li>Indeed, this scheme has already been piloted in one region, where the RC has connected with an insurance provider to provide free insurance coverage for those to sign up for it. High rate of sign-up.</li> </ul>
<b>Commentary:</b> It is quite interesting to note that the existence of crop insurance, which has been successfully piloted by one PNS in Iloilo province with the collaboration of a Philippine insurance provider, was not known to the majority of PNSs and indeed the PRC itself. Sharing this knowledge with others may be considered a positive (and intended) outcome of the Meta-Evaluation process.			
<b>Validation Status from Learning Conference:</b> For the crop insurance aspect, the findings were validated at the Learning conference. However, it was pointed out that there are no unified livelihood strategies as many of the livelihood interventions are at different phases of completion.			
	WASH needs to be better integrated with the health sector, particularly in relation to the software components. There is no	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Issues of health, water, and sanitation are clearly linked. Separating them as sectors in the context of a recovery effort is not</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Almost unanimous agreement that these two sectors should be integrated. In fact, some field offices have already integrated them in</li> </ul>

Health/WASH	reason why health and WASH cannot be a combined sector programme even if population sets are different.	logical	terms of delivery (but not reporting) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• However, from an HR perspective, it could be too much of a burden to place on one officer if the sectors were merged</li> <li>• Lots of interaction between those responsible for health and WASH at the field level</li> <li>• Health issues at Barangay level have more to do with WASH than health</li> <li>• Having them separate causes duplication of both programmes and volunteers</li> <li>• Two sides of the same coin: Example: hygiene promotion is part of WASH, but there are health benefits of this as well</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> This finding and associated recommendation are straightforward. However, it was noted by Learning conference participants that separating Health and WASH <b>does</b> make sense in the initial phases of a recovery operation, where the two are more separate. Once programming in these areas becomes more mature, however, then there is greater overlap between them, and thus the impetus for combining them makes more sense.</p>			
<p><b>Validation Status from Learning Conference:</b> Finding Validated at Learning conference</p>			
Finance/Logistics and Procurement	For future emergencies, management and support systems should be re-organized to function as close as possible to where the impact of that decision would be felt or gained. This would include transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness. Logistics systems and record keeping require further enhancement. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support systems and centralization of decision-making, as well as delays in receiving authorization from Manila, resulted in significant delays in procurement, contracts, and payment</li> <li>• Too many bureaucratic procedures, especially within the PRC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Considerable delays generally due to lengthiness of approval process: amount of signatories required is too many, as are the approval steps (in almost every case)</li> <li>• Absorptive capacity a key challenge</li> <li>• Issues with financial management and HR management at HQ</li> <li>• Alterations mid-stream of contracts and payment delays. Also due to lack of compliance on behalf of field staff</li> <li>• High staff turnover within Finance Dept.</li> <li>• Finance staff need to be better capacitated (at both HQ and field)</li> <li>• Field-level needs to be better informed about finance and procurement processes</li> <li>• Quality vs. cost issue</li> <li>• But it is challenging and a learning curve for PRC to spend the considerable amount of funds that came flowing into the country following Haiyan, and organize the appropriate support systems to deal with this.</li> </ul>

**Commentary:** Delays in procurement was highlighted as one of the major challenges of the recovery effort. Much of the responsibility was placed on the overly bureaucratic nature of the approval process as well as the amount of signatories required. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the ability of the PRC (in terms of HR and policy) to absorb the large amount of funds flowing into the country following Haiyan was an issue. That said, progress has been made in updating and simplifying systems to make procurement, finance, and logistics realities less complex

**Validation Status from Learning Conference:** The above findings were found to be partially correct by Learning conference participants. It was acknowledged that there were often delays in procurement, but the responsibility should be shared by those at HQ and those in the field

<p><b>Operations (PMER and Field Level)</b></p>	<p>Weekly PRC reports should be abandoned, as they put a huge reporting burden on local staff. That time should be rather used for implementation. (2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Too much of a reporting burden is placed on local RC chapters.</li> <li>• There is far too much bureaucracy and reporting on behalf of the PRC.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Almost unanimous agreement that weekly reporting is not required and too much time is used that could better be spent on implementation</li> <li>• However, it was suggested that the recovery timeline should be taken into account. In the initial stages of a recovery effort, more reporting is required as the situation is fluid, but once activities become more entrenched and begin to wind down, the need is lessened.</li> <li>• Issues with reporting templates (for all sectors weekly report is the same: no templates by sector)</li> <li>• Confusion as to who to send the reports to. Always changing</li> <li>• Very little to no feedback from HQ. Field staff are unsure as to whether the reports are actually being read and by whom</li> </ul>
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**Commentary:** Self-Evident.

<p><b>Operations (PMER and Field Level)</b></p>	<p>Conduct a Meta-Evaluation of learning and develop a process for institutionalizing learning at national/chapter level, as there are several reviews undertaken by PRC in cooperation with its Movement partners. It is important that a meta- analysis of all learning is undertaken to consolidate findings and recommendations. Multiple reviews by multiple partners places pressure on the NS to engage in parallel learning processes. PRC should consider</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Findings and recommendations need to be consolidated to ensure appropriate learnings regarding the recovery operations are shared with all movement partners.</li> <li>• A Meta-Evaluation would prevent the need, in the future, for parallel exercises and thus reduce resources that could otherwise be spent elsewhere.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreement on the need to consolidate key findings and recommendations across RC movement partners</li> <li>• No management responses in evidence</li> <li>• This conference and Meta-Evaluation consultancy is the end result</li> </ul>
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	implementing more collaborative reviews with a group of partners so as to create synergy in learning and reduce the resources engaged in parallel processes. (3)		
<b>Commentary:</b> This finding (and recommendation) has been addressed by this Meta-Evaluation/review exercise			
<b>Operations (PMER and Field Level)</b>	PRC should engage with programme staff as soon as possible to decide on the exit strategy for sector programming. Are there aspects of the programme which it would like to maintain – or should discussions begin with other organisations with a view to providing continuing support. (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainability will be an issue once the program ends, thus it is important to ensure that initiatives and beneficiaries are not abandoned</li> <li>• Lack of clarity on behalf of both stakeholders and RC staff as to what will occur once support ends.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generally, depending on time remaining, exit strategies have been formulated, but not all communicated to PRC</li> <li>• Differing models: RC Movement partner transferring to country NGO, creation of permanent unit in BARECOMs/LGUs in communities</li> <li>• Process has started to hand over to Chapters</li> <li>• Plans are to continue where possible: many requests from Barangays</li> <li>• Plans to continue monitoring impacts (training of locals and volunteers)</li> <li>• Priority sectors: Livelihoods, Health/WASH and DRR</li> <li>• Challenges: Lack of Capacity and uncertainty (both in terms of HR, hardware, and financial resources)</li> </ul>
<b>Commentary:</b> Self-evident. Additionally, issues of exit strategy and potential sustainability of programming following the conclusion of the recovery effort have not been in any way uniform across PNSs and other movement partners. That said, as the RCRC effort has essentially taken place within geographical and RC partner silos, it is little surprise that efforts at developing effective exit strategies have been varied, which is understandable.			
<b>Operations (PMER and Field Level)</b>	Work more closely with Technical Working Groups (TWG) in pushing for necessary modifications to programming guidelines, focusing on timely resolution. Tailor flexible approaches of activities within the guidelines that meet individual needs of beneficiaries. Operations should be flexible in accommodating change and diverse conditions. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some criteria within PRC guidelines are unsuitable to specific operating contexts. There is a perception amongst PRC staff that guidelines must be followed as rigid rules: there is not a common understanding about how to make changes</li> <li>• Strictly following the guidelines did not meet the needs to vulnerable groups (i.e. persons with disabilities)</li> <li>• Protracted delays in TWG approval from Manila</li> <li>• TWGs are an excellent innovation as a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flexibility was found to be in evidence, usually simply out of necessity</li> <li>• However, some instances of PRC staff nervous to make alterations if not fully compliant with guidelines</li> <li>• TWGs were generally quite flexible when the situation was explained to them, but often delays in communicating approval</li> <li>• Need for a more integrated TWG rather than only by sector</li> <li>• Remember that “guidelines are not rules but guidelines”</li> </ul>

		means of unifying representation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TWGs one of the major successes of the intervention</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> There was considerable agreement that the creation and presence of the TWGs in formulating sector policy was a very effective mechanism. Moreover, it was stated that, as a group, they were flexible in making alterations to programming where necessary, even if this often took longer than hoped for. The suggestion for an integrated TWG (i.e. an “overarching” body, not just by sector) is an excellent one.</p>			
<p><b>Validation Status from Learning Conference:</b> The findings and recommendations regarding weekly reporting were found to be not valid, although there was dissent. The findings and recommendations regarding the Meta-Evaluation, exit strategy/sustainability, and technical working groups were valid.</p>			
<p><b>Coordination (Haiyan/PRC/Chapter/Sector/PNS/External)</b></p>	<p>Joint planning amongst various National Societies is recommended in order to produce an integrated or consolidated operational plan, and which can better systemize project operations and enhance control mechanisms. (2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The decision that the PRC would directly provide support services to all its Haiyan partners was an indication of strong leadership, but the PRC has struggled to meet the demands arising from this decision, and missed an opportunity to utilize capacities of other movement partners.</li> <li>• Parallel systems have been established on HR, finance, and logistics issues that is unnecessary.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination meetings do occur on a monthly basis at the National level, but nothing particularly substantive is discussed, rather, it is simply a forum to present updates</li> <li>• Sometimes concerns with sharing information with others based on “territorialism”</li> <li>• At Chapter/local levels, monthly meetings as well in theory, but these are often not attended by PRC.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> This finding was challenged by the Validation conference participants, on the grounds that coordination meetings, when they occur, do discuss substantive issues. However, PNS respondents disputed this.</p>			
<p><b>Coordination (Haiyan/PRC/Chapter/Sector/PNS/External)</b></p>	<p>PRC and National Societies should begin a discussion about the extension of the programme: an early “in principle” agreement to extend would remove pressure from the programme team and allow more realistic operational and manpower planning for the project. (2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of clarity as to whether PRC is interested in continuing to support livelihoods programming.</li> <li>• Few practical connections between the PRC and the NS at the local level to develop capacity in developing sustainability and approaches to future disasters.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PRC Chapters lack human resources for continuing and sustaining programmes and services</li> <li>• Local level communications between PRC and the NS are not frequent at all</li> <li>• Each PNS works differently, which also has impacts not only on extension, but also on other issues</li> </ul>
<p><b>Commentary:</b> Self-evident</p>			
<p><b>Coordination (Haiyan/PRC/Chapter/Sector/PNS/External)</b></p>	<p>Review how assessment criteria between programmes are harmonized to produce the most holistic view of community needs and priorities. The VCA tool should be used not only for risk assessments, but also</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Additional data could be incorporated into the VCA tool to achieve better mapping.</li> <li>• Need to better link emergency health/recovery with long-term health programmes, and secure better integration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generally, RC staff were of the opinion that the VCA tool was effective in providing the information they required for community interventions</li> <li>• The comment was, made, however, that it</li> </ul>

	as an effective tool for community-based planning. (2)	between CBHFA and WASH.	would be a good idea for VCA to be conducted by a generalist rather than a sector specialist, as the latter will be more apt to “have an eye” for their own sector as opposed to others <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Also, in terms of better integrating CBHFA an WASH, this has already been a priority, as community institutions such as schools are a primary focus for both</li> </ul>
<b>Commentary:</b> Self-evident			
<b>Coordination (Haiyan/PRC/Chapter/Sector/PNS/External)</b>	Communications with communities and beneficiaries should be better planned, formalized, and coordinated, which will make for a more consistent approach in future PRC operations. It should be possible to inform community representatives of significant programme activities across all sectors on a monthly basis. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Accountability to and communication with communities has been problematic, often affected by individual sector targets and visits by different sector teams in rapid succession.</li> <li>Under-communication with communities</li> <li>Recovery Committees did not have a sense of what planned activities were to take place in coming months.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In general, the validation mission found that the above findings were not in evidence</li> <li>Communities (BARECOMs and beneficiaries) were generally well-informed of timelines and communications were found to be effective and timely</li> <li>That said, there were instances where it was commented that too many sector representatives would appear which would sometimes cause confusion</li> </ul>
<b>Commentary:</b> This is another example of a finding from the evaluations that was not validated by the field mission as well as at the Learning conference.			
<b>Coordination (Haiyan/PRC/Chapter/Sector/PNS/External)</b>	Aim for more systemic integration of government stakeholders and other groups in recovery efforts, program design, and decision-making. This would give local government units more ownership over outcomes and facilitate their stronger involvement and links. (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality of relationships with external bodies varies significantly, ranging from courtesy visits to meaningful engagement.</li> <li>Communities are better connected with LGUs, and the PRC played a part in this.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For the most part, the validation mission found that LGUs were quite involved, and very positively, in coordinating the recovery effort (i.e. field offices and barangays would closely contact and work with LGUs, as their approval is needed)</li> <li>Level of LGU involvement varies by program/sector. For example , quite involved in livelihoods and health, less so in shelter</li> <li>In some cases, LGUs provided hardware, security, and access to assist in the operations</li> <li>At national level, less enthusiasm for working with outside non-RC stakeholders</li> <li>Small issue now after election, as there are many new officials to meet with/orient.</li> </ul>

**Commentary:** Self-evident

**Validation Status from Learning Conference:** The question of validating issues of coordination is a complex one. The official response from the Learning Conference was that these findings were not valid, however, the consultant points out that amongst all PNS representatives interviewed, there were of a different opinion in terms of coordination and working with non-RC stakeholders. Granted, the consultant did not have the opportunity to discuss these findings with upper PRC leadership.

Overall, of the eight sector/theme areas, three findings from the evaluations (DRR/Education, Livelihoods, and Health/WASH) were validated, three more (Shelter, Finance/Logistics and Procurement, Operations) were partially validated, and two (HR and Volunteer Management, Coordination) were not validated. The table below provides a traffic-light illustration.

**Figure 8. Status of Evaluation Findings following the PRC Learning Conference**

Sector/Theme	Status of Validity of Findings
Shelter	Yellow
HR and Volunteer Management	Red
DRR/Education	Green
Livelihoods	Green
Health/WASH	Green
Finance/Logistics and Procurement	Yellow
Operations (PMER, Field Level)	Yellow
Coordination (Haiyan/PRC/Chapter/Sector/PNS/External)	Red

## PART IV: TYPHOON HAIYAN RECOVERY SUCCESS STORIES

The nature of recommendations in any given evaluation is to generally address perceived challenges in the design, implementation, and management of programming initiatives. More often than not, recommendations are based upon findings that serve to enhance the effectiveness and/or efficiency of an intervention. What are often perceived as negative findings are usually not intended as such at all, but only strategies that could be implemented to make the initiative run smoother. In a learning organization, this information should be viewed as constructive, which is, in fact, why independent evaluations are commissioned in the first place.

It was pointed out to the consultant that the certain findings presented as part of the meta-review process were perceived as negative towards the PRC, and that not enough successes were highlighted. Two comments are called for here. First, and to again reiterate, the findings presented in the Meta-Evaluation were contained in the evaluations, and not the opinion of the Meta-Evaluation consultant. As such, the lack of “positive” findings is not based on any bias, but on the actual evaluation documentation that has been readily available to the RCRC. Second, and as noted in the above paragraph, findings and recommendations contained in the various evaluations should be viewed in any way as negative, but as an opportunity for improvement, and not as shortcomings within an organization. No intervention carried out by any implementing organization, whether it be a government donor, an NGO, a corporate foundation, or an international organization such as the RCRC movement, is ever perfect in their programming and management, especially in the context of a major disaster, where planning is severely limited by responding to the immediate needs on the ground.

Typhoon Haiyan was an unprecedented event, both in terms of the scale of destruction as well as the scale of the response. The coming together of so many RC partners to provide relief and recovery, under the rubric of the PRC, illustrates that a common response can be very effective. Indeed, there have been multiple successes and best practices that have emerged from the recovery effort, many of which will serve both the PRC and other Movement Partners well in future calamities. *These successes were duly highlighted in the evaluations reviewed as well as in the other non-evaluation documents*, but as there was no associated recommendations specifically around them, they did not appear as part of the main Meta-Evaluation findings.

The Typhoon Haiyan response has resulted in the following success stories:

- **RC143 Program and Volunteers:** Perhaps the most highlighted success story of the recovery operation (and indeed, the emergency phase), has been the formation and emergence of the RC143 Program. The decision by PRC senior management to organize a system of volunteers to support the recovery effort was continually noted in many of the documents as a major factor in the ability of the RCRC movement to reach and interact with typhoon-affected areas, barangays, and individuals. The strength of the RC143 Program lies in the fact that the volunteers themselves are members of the communities that were impacted by Haiyan, and thus the organization was able to gain an immediate and trusted entry-point into these communities. While the evaluations did have some concerns regarding the future of the RC143 once the recovery effort concludes, the PRC has done very well to create a critical mass of trained, enthusiastic, and contextually knowledgeable individuals who will be able to be quickly mobilized for any future disasters that may occur. In short, the creation and development of the RC143 should be viewed as an extremely positive outcome of the Haiyan response, and is indeed a

model that the RCRC could consider replicating in other countries that experience major natural disasters.

- **Barangay Recovery Committees (BARECOMs)** were, much like the RC143, a very innovative mechanism that was developed by the PRC soon after Haiyan struck. The purpose of the BARECOMs was chiefly to, at the barangay level, act as a liaison body with the RCRC to assist with coordinating the recovery effort as well as assisting in determining beneficiary selection (specifically for shelter and livelihood interventions). Although the BARECOMs were not constituted uniformly (as noted in the validation field mission), interviews with both local RC staff as well as barangay members and beneficiaries found that the Committees, for the most part, worked very well and were an effective cog in the recovery effort. Indeed, a positive unintended result of the creation of the BARECOMs has been that in some cases the bodies have been retained to act as an advisory and planning group for barangay development unrelated to the typhoon recovery effort. The BARECOMs thus played a significant advisory and coordination role in the recovery and have, in some cases, morphed that role into community development imperatives. Once again, the decision on behalf of the PRC to create such local bodies has been highly effective.
- **Technical Working Groups (TWGs)** were formed at the beginning of the recovery effort to act as high-level advisory bodies that could advise on macro-level programming at the sector level. As the evaluations have shown, the TWGs were a positive creation, as they brought together sector experts from both the PRC and other RCRC partners to discuss and set sector programming strategies, develop timelines, and act as a consultative body for any issues that arise. Indeed, the TWGs were so well received by Movement partners that it was recommended, as above, that the TWGs expand their role by not only focusing on sector matters, but also on more management-related aspects of recovery effort, for example volunteers, procurement, and finance.

The above successes may be characterized as **tangible** positive outcomes from the Typhoon Haiyan recovery intervention, but aside from their progressive reputations, perhaps a more significant aspect of their development will be seen in any future disaster, as they have **ensured that effective systems will be in place at the management, operational, and community level** to mobilize rapidly, which in turn will serve to more quickly alleviate hardship and ensure more rapid intervention. Effective recovery response systems, such as the RC143 Program, BARECOMs, and TWGs should be applauded as great successes of the Haiyan RCRC and PRC intervention, and, depending on context, could be replicated to great effect in other locations where future disasters may occur.

While the above successes are tangible and direct, it could be argued that an even greater success of the Typhoon Haiyan recovery effort lies in the **intangible** aspects of the intervention. Foremost of these aspects has been the **creation of much goodwill towards the RCRC movement as a whole, and the PRC in particular**, on behalf of communities, beneficiaries, and even local and regional governments. The importance of this should not be underscored. As the main organization leading the recovery effort, and the fact that the intervention succeeded in reaching and assisting the most vulnerable individuals and communities, **the reputation of the PRC and RCRC in general has been greatly enhanced**, and the movement is now viewed, even more than the government (at least in those areas affected by Haiyan), as a trusted partner in recovery. In turn, this has created a **groundswell of grassroots support** for the RC, which may be seen by the great appreciation displayed on behalf of community members interviewed during the validation mission, as well as the

large numbers of RC143 volunteers that stepped up to contribute their time and efforts to the recovery effort.

In conclusion, the Haiyan intervention on behalf of the RCRC has resulted in several tangible and intangible success stories, all of which will serve the Movement well if and when future disasters occur.

## PART V: CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, the Typhoon Haiyan Meta-Evaluation was, in the opinion of the consultant, a very worthwhile exercise, and indeed, it would be beneficial if all disaster recovery interventions undertook a similar review. The main purpose of this document has been to highlight common recommendations inherent in the seven evaluations that were commissioned by RC movement Partners, as well as to validate whether the findings that drove those recommendations were valid. The Meta-Evaluation found that, of the findings in eight separate sectors and thematic areas under review, three were completely validated, three were partially validated, and two were not validated. While this was the outcome of the process, the consultant would like to add one point regarding the validation process itself.

To wit, there was something of a discrepancy sometimes between the findings contained in the evaluations and confirmed in the validation mission (including interviews at HQ) to those of the actual Validation conference, which poses something of a conundrum for the reviewer: which findings should have more precedence or legitimacy? Granted, some of the findings contained in the seven evaluations had been addressed in the time period between the time of their release and the validation field mission conference. On the other hand, for several there were marked differences between findings during the validation mission and at the Learning conference, a period of ten days. The reasons for this are unclear, but the consultant did note that many of the same individuals interviewed as part of the validation process did not always confirm their opinions at the conference itself. There were also instances of a validation decision being codified (i.e. findings not validated) for certain sectors/themes where there was dissenting opinion. In short, although the findings at the Learning Conference are of course valid, there nonetheless may be additional opinions that could also be considered.

Finally, although it was not specifically in the mandate of this assignment to comment or provide suggestions based on the overall Meta-Evaluation findings, the consultant would like to offer some suggestions as to how evaluations of disaster response programmes could be made to be more effective in the future. These are only suggestions, and are meant to be taken under advisement by the RCRC from an evaluative perspective:

- Of the seven evaluations reviewed, only one actually employed the **IFRC Framework for Evaluation** criteria (itself based on OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, viewed as the standard in the review of development interventions) in its totality, both in the evaluation itself and even in the ToRs, though all were commissioned by Red Cross organizations themselves. This would appear to point to a lack of awareness on the part of RC staff and managers as to what the actual official RC evaluation policies and standards actually are. It is highly recommended that RC staff, especially those in PMER units and those responsible for drawing up ToRs for evaluations, re-familiarize themselves with the actual IFRC document, entitled IFRC Framework for Evaluation, which may be found at: <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>

At the same time, it is understandable that the subject matter of ALL evaluations commissioned by RCRC partners may not be relevant to all IFRC evaluation criteria. For example, an evaluation focusing on a specific sector (i.e. Livelihoods) may not involve questions of coherence, which is one of the IFRC evaluation criteria. If this is the case, then the lack of relevance of a section on coherence (or any other criteria) within the evaluation document should be noted directly, for it will provide an explanation as to why coherence was not included in the evaluation criteria. In

this way, the evaluation acknowledges that while it reflects the IFRC evaluation criteria, not all criteria are relevant for specific reviews.

- Another area that requires additional attention in the production of evaluations, and the ToRs themselves, is **greater consideration given to cross-cutting themes such as inclusion of gender and youth perspectives, environmental factors/climate change, and governance**. Analysis related to these was mostly omitted in the evaluations that were reviewed. Especially in recovery efforts such as Haiyan, it is very important to obtain qualitative data on women's and youth perspectives regarding shelter assistance and livelihood training especially, as their perspectives will often differ from men. Special attention should be paid to ensuring that there is some sort of gender analysis in the evaluations that goes beyond simple counting of numbers, as their perspectives would likely be of great benefit to inform future programming.
- A core aspect of the evaluation process is the writing of a **management response** that comments on the quality and content of an evaluation following its submission. The purpose of the management response is both to assess the evaluation and provide management feedback and clarification on any points, findings, processes, and recommendations within the document that may be unclear or incomplete. In the context of the seven Haiyan evaluations, no management response exists, thus little mutual learning actually took place. The management response, as with the evaluation, is an important learning tool. In the future, it is highly recommended that the PRC commit to ensuring that a proper management response is written for any external independent evaluation that is submitted. This will ensure the reviewer, management, and partners are all on the same page.
- The seven evaluations reviewed as part of the Meta-Evaluation process were all commissioned by different PNSs and Movement Partners. However, as noted, the scope and geographical focus of the evaluations was as varied as the locations where the various RCRC partners were operating. While the evaluations themselves were generally effective in addressing the subject matter and focal points contained within their TORs, the focus was only on the activities of the particular PNS or Movement Partner. Indeed, it would be of great benefit, in the opinion of the consultant, to undertake a more holistic evaluation once the recovery effort concludes that assesses the Haiyan recovery response as a whole, including the work of all participating RCRC partners. This would provide a good overview of the different strategies and approaches to disaster response and recovery employed by the many RC stakeholders, as well as outlining innovative practices and common challenges. Granted, this meta-review may be viewed as a first step in outlining these, but an end-of-line program evaluation would be additionally beneficial. It is therefore suggested that the PRC undertake a system/intervention/partner-wide evaluation near the conclusion of the recovery phase. This will likely be a costly undertaking, as the consultants will have to travel to many locations and interview a wide variety of stakeholders. As such, it is further suggested that each RCRC partner who was involved in the Haiyan recovery contribute a portion of resources (both monetary and otherwise) to this final review, as all will benefit. With so many participating RCRC partners, this need not be overly cumbersome.