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of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Internal Review
Bangladesh
Population Movement Operation 2017

FINAL REPORT

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Disclaimer

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Executive Summary

Background

The Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) has assisted people fleeing Myanmar's Rakhine State since the 1990s. In 2017 following repeated upsurges of violence, a massive influx of people from Rakhine triggered a major 'Category Red' emergency response operation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). 1.2 million people are considered to be in need in the south-eastern Bangladesh districts of Cox's Bazar (CXB) and Bandarban. More than 650,000 of these people have arrived since 25 August 2017.

IFRC's Population Movement Operation (PMO) assists 200,000 people with emergency relief and longer-term support. The PMO is currently transitioning from the surge phase to a longer-term structure. The PMO team intends to apply a 'One Window Approach' (OWA), allowing for the integration of various bilateral and multilateral contributions through a common plan of action for Movement partners, led by BDRCS.

Given the protracted nature and political complexities of the operational context, it is likely that humanitarian needs will remain high. The path to recovery for people from Rakhine looks uncertain. All future scenarios require multi-year humanitarian assistance.

Purpose and Scope of the internal review

This internal review is commissioned by the Under Secretary General Programmes and Operations, IFRC Geneva, and the Regional Director, IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office. It reviews activities from the period from 25 August 2017 to 20 December 2017.

It is focussing on four areas of interest: the Movement support processes of (a) human resource management, (b) finance, (c) logistics and (d) volunteering in the emergency context. The team has identified broader operational, managerial and strategic aspects that are influencing the operation and needed to be taken into account, captured here in the general findings and recommendations chapter.

The review aims to strengthen the response to the crisis and to provide evidence of good practice and lessons learned for future response operations. The Terms of Reference (Annex 4) define the core questions to be addressed:

1) What is working well?
2) What requires improvement?
3) In what ways is the response effective and efficient?
4) How has IFRC, BDRCS and Movement capacity been harnessed?
5) What needs to be in place to help sustain a successful operation?

Methods

This review was carried in one month (03 December 2017 – 05 January 2018), with a desk based document review, key informant interviews and group interviews, an online questionnaire, field visits and observation. Initial findings have been shared via stakeholder feedback and validation sessions in order to strengthen recommendations and build ownership for their implementation.

Key recommendations

The review provides recommendations targeted at two levels:

- the PMO level, to be implemented by BDRCS, IFRC and/or Movement stakeholders involved in the operation, and
- the 'system-wide' Federation response system

General

G1. Review roles and responsibilities for the leadership level of the PMO, and communicate broadly alongside with information on the decision-making process.

G2. Fully implement the 'One Window Approach' when transitioning from surge to a longer-term setup.

Human Resource Management

H1. IFRC improves surge and longer-term HR processes with a view to timeliness of staffing and competencies of personnel. Increase procedural knowledge of key personnel.

H2. BDRCS immediately adopts fast-tracked recruitment procedures for the operation.

H3. BDRCS takes a long-term approach to increasing staff capacity in Disaster Response.

Finance

F1. BDRCS and IFRC strengthen their finance capability by recruiting more staff and training them on standard procedures, policies and good practices to improve timely reporting.

F2. Improve coordination and provide financial services between BDRCS / IFRC and Movement partners to ensure smooth cash flow.

F3. BDRCS mitigate fraud and corruption concerns by strengthening internal control systems and training.

Logistics

L1. In major operations, strong logistics management is required from the onset to longer-term implementation.

L2. Enable comprehensive and cost-effective logistics planning.

Volunteering

V1. Strengthen the pool of experienced, skilled and senior volunteers (via NDRT, stronger program teams, engaging senior volunteers).

V2. Stronger focus on the welfare of volunteers, including health and safety, psychosocial support and timely payment of allowances.

V3. Integrate and equalise the conditions of volunteers from the host community and Rakhine State in the BDRCS structure.

The **'recommendations at-a-glance' table (Annex 9)** presents key recommendations and respective enabling steps towards an improved PMO and an improved RCRC-response system.
An analysis of relevant **PMO risks** is displayed in **Annex 8**.

Background

The Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS), supported by Movement partners, has assisted people fleeing from Myanmar's Rakhine State since the initial displacement in the 1990s. Since January 2017, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has again been supporting BDRCS in responding to the needs of an increasing number of People from Rakhine (PfR) after an upsurge of violence from October 2016 onwards. This initially happened through a Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) allocation in January 2017, followed by an Emergency Appeal, which was revised several times[1]. Parallel flood and cyclone response operations are ongoing in other regions of Bangladesh.

From 25 August 2017, new violence in the state of Rakhine prompted a new influx of people into South East Bangladesh. Since then, more than 655,000 persons have arrived, most of them in dire humanitarian need - with more arriving daily. This influx has increased the total number of Persons from Rakhine (PfR) in the area to 867,481 (female: 52% / male: 48%)[2]. The vast majority of them are concentrated in Cox's Bazar (CXB) and Bandarban Districts, and spread across registered refugee camps, makeshift settlements, spontaneous settlements and host communities. Inclusive of at-risk host communities, 1.166m persons are in need[3].

The IFRC operation set a target to address the humanitarian needs of 200,000 persons through timely and effective emergency relief (access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene services, shelter, medical care, food, protection and psychosocial support), alongside medium and longer-term interventions to support the safety, dignity and resilience of People from Rakhine. The majority of targeted settlements are hard to reach and heavily congested. The Population Movement Operation (PMO) also addresses the humanitarian impact on host communities, and contingency planning for the risks of cyclones and the outbreak of communicable diseases.

IFRC surge tools are playing a crucial role in delivering assistance. The transition process to a longer-term structure has begun, including the recruitment of personnel and ensuring sustained operational support to BDRCS in the post-surge phase.

The PMO promotes a 'One Window Approach' (OWA), designed with flexibility to accommodate more partners' contributions to the response through a common agreed plan, which - under the lead of BDRCS - allows for the integration of various bilateral and multilateral contributions to the PMO, including IFRC, ICRC and a number of Partner National Societies working bilaterally.

In addition, about 50 actors including government agencies and Bangladesh military, international and local NGOs, and UN agencies are providing services to People from Rakhine.[4]

Given the protracted nature and political complexities of the operational context, it is likely that humanitarian needs will remain high, and the path to 'recovery' for people from Rakhine looks

[1] The current revision of the Emergency Appeal (23 October 2017) is asking for CHF 33.5 million.
[2] Situation Update: Rohingya Refugee Crisis (ISCG), 19 December 2017; Need and Populations Monitoring 7 Report (IOM), 19 December 2017
3 Including 300,000 people of Bangladeshi host communities (Humanitarian Response Plan [IOM], September 2017-February 2018, 04 October 2017
[4] Many of the NGO and UN actors are organised in the 'Inter Sector Coordination Group' (ISCG).

uncertain. Humanitarian agencies are currently restricted to the provision of life-saving humanitarian assistance, with no scope to build infrastructure or build livelihoods - thus cementing their dependence on aid. There are several options proposed for the future of people from Rakhine, including repatriation to Myanmar, resettlement to a new location in Bangladesh[5], and establishing a 'mega-camp' in the current area of operation. All future scenarios will require multi-year humanitarian assistance.

Purpose and Scope

Purpose

The Terms of Reference defines the following purpose of the internal review:

> *'This review will ascertain the effect of four areas of support services coordinated by the IFRC on the intended results of the IFRC's scale-up response to the influx of Persons from Rakhine in Bangladesh since late August 2017. The four areas are finance, human resource (HR), logistics, and volunteering in emergency response context. The outcome will contribute to organizational learning for the IFRC, the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society and the Movement partners, and inform concise recommendations and strategies to improve the coordination and management of the four areas in the immediate and medium terms, to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected communities.'*

The review aims to strengthen the response to the crisis in the short to medium term, as well as providing good practice and lessons learned for future response operations.

Review Questions

The review Terms of Reference (see Annex 4) provide a core of high-level questions:

1. What is working well?
2. What requires improvement?
3. In what ways is the response effective and efficient?
4. How has IFRC, BDRCS and Movement capacity been harnessed?
5. What needs to be in place to help sustain a successful operation?

In addition to the high-level questions, the Terms of Reference provide a series of specific sub-questions related to the four areas of interest (human resources, finance, logistics and volunteering).

Scope

The review focusses on results and lessons from the IFRC Emergency Appeal for the Bangladesh PMO (MDRBD018). It covers the period 25 August to 20 December 2017: the beginning of the most recent influx until the end of the review data collection and analysis phase. The review will take into account earlier existing planning, coordination and issues that have influenced the current response.

[5] Amongst others, there has been discussion of relocating PfR to an uninhabited island.

Despite the review's focus on internal Movement support processes, the team has considered broader operational, managerial and strategic aspects, which are influencing the operation and its support processes. An additional chapter sums up the respective 'general' findings and recommendations.

Timing

The table below shows the schedule for the internal review.

Phase	03-09 Dec	10-18 Dec	19-24 Dec	25 Dec – 12Jan	13-22 Jan
Desk review, inception interviews, inception report					
Field visit to Bangladesh (10-18 Dec)					
Visit AP Regional Office (KL, 19-20 Dec) Submit draft report by 24 December					
Review and feedback on draft report (IFRC, BDRCS), by 12 January					
Finalize report, submit by 22 January					

Schedule for the PMO internal review.

Review management

This review was commissioned by the Under Secretary General, Programmes and Operations, IFRC Geneva, and the Regional Director, IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office. An evaluation focal point oversaw the review and provided organizational support.

Method

The review team conducted a validation workshop with BDRCS, IFRC and PNS in Dhaka, to strengthen findings and recommendations. Photo: Jess Letch / Australian Red Cross

The review applied a range of methods allowing for adequate information collection, information analysis and triangulation. All information collected has been documented and coded. Informants have been ensured discretion, thus de-identified information is stored as an 'information-trail' and can be provided, if required.

Inception phase

To prepare themselves for the field, the review team conducted a series of semi-structured inception interviews with 20 key informants, including current and former operations and leadership personnel from IFRC and BDRCS (see Annex 1). The team held a meeting with the Evaluation focal point. The inception report was submitted on 09 December 2017.

Desk based document review

The review team undertook a comprehensive review of background documentation. Annex 2 provides a list of documents consulted. The Evaluation Management Team provided support and assistance in locating and compiling these documents.

Key Informant Interviews / Group Interviews

The team interviewed key informants face-to-face in Bangladesh, in Kuala Lumpur and via Skype and telephone. Informants included BDRCS, PNS, IFRC and ICRC resource persons (Annex 1 and figure below). One group interview was held with eight BDRCS volunteers involved in the PMO. All interviews were semi-structured nature and held in safe spaces, assuring a confidential dialogue to all interviewees.

Field visits and observation

The review team undertook field visits as follows (see Annex 3 for details):

10 – 13 December: Bangladesh, Cox's Bazar
14 - 18 December: Bangladesh, Dhaka
19 – 20 December: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Online questionnaire

The team sent a short questionnaire to the IFRC surge contacts mailing list[6]. It asked for input from PNS and surge personnel on the four areas of interest, with an open option for general feedback (see Annex 4). Thirteen responses were received from PNS stakeholders and IFRC personnel involved in the operation.

Stakeholder feedback / validation sessions

The team presented preliminary findings and recommendations at a validation and action building session on 17 December in Dhaka and team brief on 19 December in Kuala Lumpur (with IFRC APRO personnel and dial-in participants from Bangladesh and Geneva). The purpose of these sessions was to share initial findings, gain further information to strengthen findings, generate, test and fine-tune recommendations, and build ownership for future implementation. Annex 7 provides a summary of the Dhaka Validation Workshop.

Following the validation sessions, the team held several discussions with BDRCS and IFRC personnel. This final report was shared for an initial round of stakeholder feedback on 24 December 2017 before final submission.

Statistical analysis:

The team undertook 108 informant consultations (female: 37% [n=40] / male: 63% [n=68]) in Bangladesh, in Kuala Lumpur, via skype and through the survey. See tables below for more details:

Consultation modality	Female	Male	Total
Group Interview	4	4	8
Interview (face to face)	14	31	45
Interview (Skype / phone)	9	13	22
Survey response	8	5	13
Validation Workshop	5	15	20
Total	**40**	**68**	**108**

Resource person consulted by consultation modality and gender.

Note: The above total differs from the total number of persons interviewed (95), with several persons consulted in differing modalities (e.g. being interviewed and participating in the validation workshop) modality (see Annex 1).

[6] This mailing list reaches approximately 250 recipients within IFRC and PNS involved in surge operations around the globe.

Consulted	Number	Female	Male
BDRCS	24	5	20
IFRC	60	15	25
ICRC / PNS / ERU / RDRT / FACT	11	18	12
Total	**95**	**38**	**57**

Review consultations by entity (see Annex 1)

Limitations

The review did not cover sectoral interventions and bilateral activities of Participating National Societies (PNS), unless relevant to the four areas of interest.[7] The review team was not asked to review the performance of the ICRC.

Despite the substantial history of the operation, the review focuses on the period 25 August to 20 December 2017. The absence of dedicated subject matter experts in human resource and volunteer management may have limited the level of technical detail for the respective review responses.

The rapid nature of the review (for desk research and field visit phase) did not allow for in-depth follow up on some issues that would require collection of additional data or forensic evidence.

The PMO is operating in a highly politicized environment (as with similar population movements). There remain a range of sensitivities regarding the Rakhine crisis in Bangladesh and Myanmar, and its humanitarian response on governmental level (with elections coming up in 2018), in the population and within the Movement. The rapid nature and limited scope of this review did not allow for a complete contextual embedding of the findings and recommendations. Recommendations are likely to touch sensitive areas, which may affect the possibility of full implementation.

[7] The review teams recommends evaluating sectoral approaches and utilization of respective surge capacities in detail (RTE or specific evaluation). Special focus should be given to sectors being considered 'successful' (Health, Relief) or 'less effective' (WASH) by stakeholders.

General findings and recommendations

The operation has reached 200,000 people - close to one-third of the newly arrived population.
Photo: Jess Letch / Australian Red Cross

General Findings - in brief

1. **Successes**

- Strong health and relief programming, good integration of PGI and PSS and development of contingency plans (for cyclones and communicable diseases).
- Integration of non-traditional PNS.
- BDRCS with the support of IFRC has brokered independent humanitarian access based on its principles and auxiliary role with the Government of Bangladesh.

2. **Challenges**

- Lack of clear Movement strategy and detailed activity plan.
- IFRC leadership roles, responsibilities and decision-making structure is unclear on all levels.
- WASH programming has been facing major challenges.

3. Effectiveness and efficiency

- PMO has reached the target of supporting 40,000 families (200,000 people) with relief items.

4. Harnessing the capacity of the Movement

- Strong engagement and integration of non-traditional PNS capabilities.
- BDRCS capacities are currently overstretched and limited in terms of quantity and quality.
- Movement partners describe an absence of Movement coordination on strategic (Dhaka) level, resulting in under-utilization of resources, especially the capabilities of long-term in-country partners.

5. Sustainability of the operation

- The protracted character of the crisis will require long-term engagement.
- The PMO will largely have to rely on the support of international / internationally managed capacities, with BDRCS as the operation's face.
- With the given low implementation ratio vs appeal budget of the PMO, substantial bilateral and ongoing ERU contributions (beyond the initially planned surge phase), even limited appeal funding can sustain programming for the complete appeal period.

Lessons for the Movement

- The strength of institutions and individuals have a big impact on results on the ground. An operation is as good as its leadership.
- The 'One Window Approach' is well suited to small- and medium-scale crises. In a 'Red' emergency, Movement partners need to take a stronger role to ensure leadership and timely planning.

Major recommendations

G1.Review roles and responsibilities for the leadership level of the PMO, and communicate broadly alongside with information on the decision-making process.

G2. Fully implement the 'One Window Approach' when transitioning from surge to a longer-term setup.

Rationale for G1 (roles and responsibilities):

The surge phase was hampered by divergent understandings of the allocation of tasks, responsibilities and accountabilities between two IFRC leadership functions in Cox's Bazar, the Head of country office, the Asia Pacific Regional Office and Geneva headquarters. The Surge phase organogram of the PMO reflects multiple (managerial, technical and dotted) reporting lines. Informants reported a lack of clarity on the delegation of authority, especially regarding the roles and responsibilities of appeal manager, project managers or budget holders, resulting in protracted discussions and confusion amongst actors involved. Technical decision making has at times been escalated up the hierarchy, with decisions taken at higher hierarchical levels than necessary (such as the deployment of single FACT-functions, procurement of relief goods, hospital site selection, fleet importation and longer-term recruitments), resulting in a perception of 'centralized' decision-making and micro-management. 'Who reports to whom' and 'how and by whom are which decisions taken' have been frequent and consistent questions from PMO stakeholders.

Several factors have contributed to this situation: (1) The operation scaled up repeatedly, with IFRC in-country capacities responding and setting up operational structure initially; later on international surge capacities were called in, who had to integrate leaders in an existing response structure. (2) Unlike in other major operations, where operational practice often is a Country Office acting in the

background rather than in the centre of the operation, the HoCO (backed by procedures) took a strong role the in the PMO. (3) Especially for the period of the HEOps deployment, the PMO lacked a cooperative, solution-oriented approach, with decision-making delayed by frequent and protracted discussions between CXB and Dhaka level of decision makers. (4) With the IFRC 'Emergency Response Framework only coming into force in 2017, there is doubt all involved actors acted with the same understanding of the procedures recently put into effect.[8] (5) APRO could have played a stronger strategic lead role, i.e. through an 'Emergency Coordinator'[9].

The longer-term set-up of the PMO (i.e. roles of Operations Manager and Head of Sub-Office) has been raising questions with stakeholders and will benefit from broader explanation of tasks and responsibilities of the two lead functions on field level (operational programming respectively overall management including support processes and coordination / liaison.

Enabling steps

- *IFRC review and document roles and responsibilities of longer-term PMO leadership functions (Operations Manager / Support Service Manager upwards, including APRO) and their respective (direct / technical) reporting lines. Disseminate to all Movement stakeholders involved (by the upcoming Partnership Meeting).*
- *BDRCS and IFRC take timely decisions on the right tactical, operational and strategic level. For both partners, this requires delegation of authority and transparent information on the decision-making process.*
- *IFRC consider the soft-skills required of aspirants during the recruitment phase for key personnel.*
- *Broad dissemination and training on the ERF and the finalisation of the envisaged 'Red level' disaster / crisis guideline are recommended.*

Rationale for G2 (One Window Approach):

The PMO intends to apply a 'One Window Approach' (see figure below). Up to now, the approach has not been properly implemented due to a lack of available human resources on BDRCS- and IFRC-side, the absence of longer-term strategic priorities (given the volatility of the situation, this may require planning with several scenarios) and a perceived lack of urgency for full implementation of the approach. Stakeholders have an inconsistent understanding of the OWA, indicating the need for clearer definition and dissemination of the concept (a work in progress). The approach needs to be aligned to the operational reality and embedded in the SMCC process / similar initiatives taken in earlier response operations.

Enabling steps:

- *BDRCS, supported by IFRC, explain the One Window Approach in more detail to PMO stakeholders, in the run-up of the February Partnership Meeting.*
- *BDRCS lead the development of a PMO master plan ('National Society Emergency Plan'), with the support of Movement partners by mid-January, in preparation for the February 2018 partnership*

8 The Framework provides guidance, inter alia a RACI (Responsibility, Accountability, Consultation and Information) table, and further guidance on roles and responsibilities on country, regional and global level.

9 With a '*separate guideline on responding to a Red level disaster or crisis [to be] developed'*, the ERF also foresees '*technical and management support* [to be] *coordinated by the RO, but provided by both RO and HQ* [,] *when relevant under the direction of the "Emergency Coordinator"* […appointed] *at the level of a Regional Director or above to direct and manage the IFRC response.*' (Emergency Response Framework, IFRC; p7 (2017)

meeting. In parallel, BDRCS and IFRC develop and finalize of supporting plans such as a comprehensive BDRCS human resources plan and one BDRCS reporting system.

- *Through revitalized Movement Coordination at the country level, IFRC, ICRC and in-country PNS contribute to the design of this master plan, support its implementation and sustainability. The Implementation shall promote 'shared leadership' amongst Movement partners, taking care of components of the master plan.*
- *With BDRCS in the lead role, IFRC CO facilitate the planning platform integration of Movement partners into the operation (utilizing the additional Country Office-capacity allocated for the preparation of the partnership meeting mid-February).*
- *Partners contribute to Movement-wide (or at least, Federation-wide) reporting for the PMO.*



Proposed OWA setup. The 'One-Window Approach' has been designed with flexibility to accommodate more partners' contributions to the response through a common agreed framework and is regarded as the most acceptable, effective and efficient approach for this response' (Revised Emergency Appeal °3, 23/10/17)

For a risk analysis for the PMO, resulting from the review's areas of interest and general findings, see Annex 8.

Area-specific findings and recommendations

Human Resource Management

In Cox's Bazar, an RDRT delegate (pictured left, from Philippines Red Cross) returns from the field with BDRCS youth volunteers. Photo: Jess Letch / Australian Red Cross

Human Resource Management - In Brief

1. **Successes**

- BDRCS is actively responding to three parallel emergencies.
- The response rate to regional / global surge requests was close to 100%, despite competing global surge response operations.
- IFRC showed strength in its duty of care for personnel.

2. **Challenges**

- Slow progress in the recruitment of longer-term staff, by IFRC as well as BDRCS; resulting in prolonged utilization of surge capacities.
- The long-term success of the operation is highly dependent on the quality of key staff, with given limitations under the current national HR framework.

3. **Effectiveness and efficiency**

- Time-consuming decision-making on the longer-term operational structure and lengthy recruitment processes within BDRCS and IFRC have hampered operational efficiency.
- BDRCS' human resource capacities - staff and volunteers - have been limited, due to parallel operations, the absence of processes allowing scaling up quickly and internal political sensitivities.

4. Harnessing the capacity of the Movement

- IFRC Surge requests have used multiple channels, with uncoordinated parallel recruitments from the same pools. This created confusion among PNS stakeholders.

5. Sustainability of the operation

- The success of the PMO rests on the quality of national and international staff recruited. Senior experts will be required in leadership roles and other key functions to ensure that PNS fund the emergency appeal into the future.
- Capacities of the long-term PNS in country can contribute to the sustainability of the operation. IFRC and BDRCS can harness them through revitalized Movement Coordination

Lessons for the Movement

- Category Red emergencies in their initial stages require surge delegates with leadership and planning skills, able to unlock local capacities. Surge personnel in the first rotation had differing levels of skills and experience. Despite positive appraisals with few exceptions, senior managers consulted attributed operational deficiencies for some sectors to inadequate performance of first rotation personnel.
- Human Resource planning for the post-surge phase did not start at the early stage of the operation and took significant time, resulting in avoidable delays for recruitments.

Major recommendations

H1. IFRC improve surge and longer-term HR processes with a view to timeliness of staffing and competencies of personnel. Increase procedural knowledge of key personnel.

H2. BDRCS immediately adopt fast-tracked recruitment procedures for the operation.

H3. BDRCS take a long-term approach to increasing staff capacity in Disaster Response.

Responses to key review questions

Deployments

The response rate for requested global and regional surge roles was close to 100% within the standard timeframe. However, IFRC did not request logistics and HR functions in the initial stage of the operation. Deployments included 'non-standard' IFRC functions such as security, RFL and protection, gender and inclusion. Staff from 'Non-traditional'[10] PNS fulfilled several functions with good appraisals. There was also positive feedback for the competencies and the integration of RDRT personnel. The IFRC CO's support service capacities in the PMO did not scale up early. IFRC or PNS could have offered remote HR support similar to information management remote support.

During the time of the review team's visit, deployments of some PNS were significantly delayed due to missing 'Letters of Invitation' (issued by the IFRC country office) necessary for visa processing. There

[10] RCRC-jargon speaks of 'traditional PNS' as National Societies with a rather long history of participating in / contributing to multi-national RCRC response operations, many of them holding ERUs and extensive FACT pools. Most of these are western NS. 'Non-traditional' (aka 'emerging') PNS are National Societies that have started participating in / contributing to international response operations in more recent years, regularly not holding ERUs. Many of them are non-western NS. While integration of 'non-traditional' PNS in multi-lateral operations has repeatedly caused challenges in the past, 'non-traditional' PNS (such as Iranian RC, Qatar RC, or Turkish RC) integrated well in the PMO.

has been ongoing discussion, whether prolonged processing time in the CO, delayed requests by the PNS or a combination of both have caused the delay, which has triggered negative effects on the performance (especially of the field hospital, which temporarily lost its EMT2-status due to delays to visa approvals).

Partners reported that surge personnel were requested by individuals working within a range of IFRC functions (sectoral experts, technical departments, surge focal points on regional and global level, HR department). Rather informal requests from technical experts and departments are known from other operations. There was criticism in particular on a recruitment modality for mid-term delegates introduced by IFRC HR at RO level, which was channelled through PNS surge focal points: Some surge delegate contracts have been extended through 'regular' HR channels respectively delegates have been recruited as mid-term personnel. These practices caused some confusion among partners, and difficulty obtaining an overview of surge needs and the status of requests. The utilization of surge pools to recruit longer-term personnel may be beneficial for sourcing HR, yet requires coordination between surge and HR departments involved.

On the quality of information accompanying surge requests - such as more detail about context and the profiles required for RDRT roles: Whilst the initial level of information for global surge profiles was good (with tasks and required competencies), information become less detailed later in the operation. Regional alerts could generally benefit from more information.

Terminology used in surge contexts varies and needs clear definition when introduced to stakeholders. Some terms used in the operation, such as 'surge support function' were not clear to stakeholders. Stakeholders also considered 'ERU – HR only' an inadequate term: When a request is for surge personnel only, it shall be described as such. The aforementioned recruitment of longer-term personnel has reportedly been termed 'surge' recruitment, blurring the lines between regular and surge recruitment procedures.

BDRCS and the IFRC CO were stretched by concurrent flood and cyclone responses and were challenged to mobilize additional staff. For the PMO to scale up effectively, additional BDRCS headquarters people were deployed to field, further decreasing the regular headquarter capacities. BDRCS applied different procedures for the deployment and compensation of BDRCS HQ personnel to Cox's Bazar, creating feelings of inequality.

BDRCS personnel had limited understanding of global and regional procedures and the handling of incoming surge capacities, despite some BDRCS staff being trained earlier as RDRT or FACT members.

Enabling steps

- *Channel IFRC Surge requests through one focal point rather than using multiple channels. Avoid uncoordinated parallel recruitments for the same operation, from the same pools.*
- *IFRC establish and deploy a core set of surge profiles required for a 'Red' emergency and provide more detailed information on the competencies required (both on regional and global level), stressing the level of experience for 'Red' disasters.*
- *Clarify surge terminology in line with the on-going surge optimisation process. Explain new terminology to stakeholders to prevent misunderstandings.*
- *Seek surge personnel for an extended duration (8-12 week missions), especially from second rotations onwards. Take into account the challenging conditions of individual operations and innovative employment models (on PNS-side).*

- *BDRCS headquarters scale up Disaster Response HR capacities and build a backup structure to ensure business continuity during emergencies.*
- *Introduce learning opportunities for Host National Society personnel to increase the understanding for global and regional procedures and better manage incoming surge capacities.*
- *IFRC CO and PNS immediately rectify workflows to ensure the timely completion of visa arrangements for delegates (with timely delegate information and minimum time issuance of Letters of Invitation).*
- *IFRC review the utilization of surge capacities and sectoral approaches in the PMO in more detail (RTE or specific evaluation).*

HR Planning

Some respondents called for longer surge deployments in order to reduce the number of rotations. Some handovers left little or no time to transfer relevant information, resulting in impaired relationships, a loss of continuity of knowledge and reduced operational performance. The extension of missions needs to balance against staff welfare concerns, particularly with hardship given as the PMO in August - September 2017.

The long-term operation will need the support of a backbone of international staff. The quality of key post-surge personnel is crucial for operational success. Some PNS have set this as a key criterion for future funding of the EA: international leadership and other key staff need to bring senior expertise, paralleled by quality recruitments of national personnel.

IFRC's post-surge HR planning started in October, with a release of a pre-final organisational chart. IFRC is currently recruiting longer-term personnel, with several re-openings of jobs (such as the Field Coordinator, now re-advertised as 'Operations Manager'). The average time for standard recruitments is three months, from the beginning of the recruitment process to arrival in the field. The standard duration of the surge phase is four months. Thus, when longer-term planning begins two or three months into the operation, there is systematic delay and an extended surge phase. As in other operations, surge personnel will most probably be utilized beyond the standard surge phase.

Existing IFRC fast-tracking options for longer-term recruitments in emergencies have not been applied. Not all involved actors had the same level of knowledge on procedures, creating some misunderstandings between country and regional level, and further slowing down recruitment processes. The ongoing 'Surge Optimisation' process tackles the issues of HR-support in emergencies, more timely HR procedures and a revised tool-kit, with results expected for 2019.

In a 'Code Red' emergency, the need for longer-term backbone personnel - such as Operations Manager, Health, WASH, Logs, Admin/Finance, and alike - is highly predictable. Recruitment should commence in the first week of a major operation in order to have personnel in place on time. Although it is difficult to know the final size and revenue for each emergency appeal, more information will emerge as recruitment takes place, minimizing the risk of signing employment contracts for unfunded positions.

BDRCS is currently in a consolidation phase, with a 'no new staff' verbal governance order, which became effective before the PMO. However, the PMO requires significant and timely scaling up of human resources. It took the BDRCS board long time to grant permission to hire 37 additional staff for the operation. Operational staff report that a much larger number of national staff is required to sustain the operation: up to 100 to staff the field hospital, and a further 100 to provide operational support and service delivery in all sectors (noting that no detailed BDRCS HR plan has been produced

to justify this position). At present, more international than national personnel are involved in the operation. With the end of the surge phase, there will be a significant shortage of local and international personnel, which will have a critical effect on the PMO.

The fast tracking of BDRCS recruitment of national staff is urgently required. New BDRCS recruitments currently take several months, with several stages to be completed including a written exam in advance of being granted an interview. In the current PMO-inspired competitive job-market, the HR framework of BDRCS in place (salaries, compensation, per diem, R&R, duration of contracts) will make recruitments of skilled quality staff difficult (for example experienced health staff for the field hospital); many national and international agencies are hiring with better offers. It may even cause brain drain for BDRCS. To mitigate this effect without causing a long-term burden to BDRCS, a streamlined approach should include rapid recruitment with fixed-term contracts, as well as an allowance scheme for the short-term supplementation of salaries. Earlier projects, in cooperation with PNS, successfully hired personnel on fixed-term contracts with special conditions tailored to the emergency context. This approach shall be considered for the PMO.

For BDRCS, recruitment of national staff is a headquarters task. BDRCS would improve the process if they delegate recruitment to the operational level BDRCS level in CXB, with remote support from the headquarters HR department.[11] In the staff selection process, IFRC technical experts and HR in the field could help to support the process.

IFRC has established adequate duty of care in the PMO. There are gaps in BDRCS' duty of care for volunteer (see Volunteering chapter). There is no medical clearance foreseen for BDRCS staff entering the operation.

Enabling steps

- *IFRC shall begin recruitment of longer-term roles for key international positions within a week of commencing surge to a major emergency - noting that recruitment takes significant time.*
- *Prioritize ongoing (surge optimisation) initiatives to revise emergency recruitment processes and the dissemination of respective information.*
- *Increase the number of qualified national staff in the PMO according to the operational needs to sustain the PMO. This requires senior management approval within BDRCS. Alternatively, agree with BDRCS for IFRC contracting local staff.*
- *Install a BDRCS fast-track recruitment procedure, applying a fixed-contract model, considering the competitive job market situation*
- *Delegate the recruitment of BDRCS field personnel to the CXB level.*
- *Consider aspects of 'duty of care' for BDRCS staff and volunteers in the PMO.*
- *Conduct a 'Disaster Response Capacity Evaluation' (DRCE) to support broader disaster response capacity building*
- *Utilize the capacities of Movement partners to build capacities*

Competencies

All stakeholders stressed the importance of senior expertise and planning skills, especially in the first round of surge; the early phases of such a crisis requires skills in operational analysis, planning and scaling up an operation ('brains rather than hands'), yet as well clear understanding of standard IFRC

[11] Not changing the geographical area of HR sourced, yet the PMO-proximity and thus recruitment priority. BDRCS HR (recruited / deployed by HQ) and IFRC HR at the XXB level could thereby intensify their cooperation.

finance and administration procedures. The highly politicized and sensitive PMO environment requires additional negotiation and advocacy skills. Some IFRC PMO key personnel in the Surge phase lacked procedural knowledge.

Surge personnel in the first rotation had differing levels of skills and experience. Although appraisals were OK with few exceptions, senior managers attributed operational deficiencies for some sectors to inadequate performance of first rotation personnel. A gap in supply and demand for experienced surge personnel has become evident once again. The finding relates to the professionalization of the humanitarian industry: PNS need to focus on providing more regular missions for a smaller pool of delegates, rather than sending numerous first-mission staff and volunteers to highly complex environments. In addition, the validity of performance reviews need to be increased, considering the appraisals a relevant tool in HR recruitment and development – the IFRC's Surge Optimisation process is tackling this aspect.

The level of competence of national staff in the PMO varies greatly, with room for improvement among many staff deployed from BDRCS headquarters. This correlates to existing HR policies, salaries and compensation (see above). Thus, there is a substantial need for learning and training in the onboarding phase for new national staff. The IFRC checklist for incoming personnel to Cox's Bazar is a great first step in this direction.

Enabling steps

- *IFRC increase the required leadership and management competencies for first-rotation delegates to 'Category Red' disasters ('brains rather than hands').*
- *PNS increase the supply of experienced personnel by providing more missions for a smaller pool of highly skilled delegates.*
- *Provide training opportunities during the on-boarding phase for new national staff, ensuring Red Cross and Red Crescent and sectoral learning.*

Legal

There is concern in relation to the management of staff seconded from IFRC to BDRCS, especially for performance management. Some BDRCS' approaches may not comply with Bangladesh labour laws and IFRC procedures (issuing of cautions, dismissal of personnel and alike). IFRC, BDRCS and seconded staff require greater clarity on duties and responsibilities for each party.

The hiring of daily labour has not presented problems at this stage, but may be subject to future governmental regulations (due to competition on the labour market) and shall be monitored closely. Accident and health insurance for daily labour is a topic from a humanitarian point of view. The engagement of community volunteers is discussed at more length in the volunteering section.

Enabling steps

- *Clarify the roles and responsibilities for staff seconded to the national society (i.e. for disciplinary actions) on the seconder and the recipient side.*
- *Monitor labour-market regulations and consider insurance for daily labour.*

Finance

ERUs including the Norwegian Red Cross field hospital (pictured) channel parts of their funds via BDRCS. Photo: Jess Letch / Australian Red Cross

Finance - In Brief

1. Successes

- Strong finance expertise among staff of the PMO to provide the financial services.
- Effective internal communication and coordination between IFRC and BDRCS.
- IFRC approved Project Expenditure Approval Request with funding gap exposures, in order to assure timely cash flow to the PMO.

2. Challenges

- Insufficient number of BDRCS and IFRC personnel to manage finance.
- High risk of integrity concerns, primarily at field level. Want of confidence of partners (those arrived with the PMO, some long-term present PNS) leading to slow progress for acquittals.
- Concerns about the capacity of the PMO to absorb funds.
- Unclear reporting lines and structures within BDRCS.
- The need for a larger number of integration agreements between IFRC and partners, in order to supply financial services to them and reduce bottlenecks.

3. Effectiveness and efficiency

- Inadequate staff capability within BDRCS has slowed down financial processes.
- For BDRCS and IFRC, insufficient financial information sharing among finance personnel hampering progress. Knowledge of arrangements has not flowed well between field and headquarters.
- Lack of clarity on the delegation of financial authority by IFRC leadership on CXB level, linked to some delayed decisions.
- Lengthy financial procedures have not been adapted to the emergency operation context.
- BDRCS' use of government banks causes substantial delays (up to three weeks) for banking transactions and finance reaching the field.
- IFRC and PNS experience long waits for the settlement of acquittals by BDRCS.
- Non-availability of the concise standard global policies and procedures package for the Financial Management in an emergency.

4. Harnessing the capacity of the Movement

- IFRC and PNS were unable to cooperate to their highest potential due to a lack of integration / global service packages for the PNS, caused by a shortage of subject specialists at Cox's Bazar, and limited Movement coordination at Dhaka level.
- Initiatives on fraud and corruption prevention still have to spread through the ranks of BDRCS and IFRC PMO.

5. Sustainability of the operation

- BDRCS requires stronger financial expertise before it is able to provide comprehensive financial services for their own projects and partner activities.
- Without ownership and leadership from senior management, BDRCS will fail to build trust among partners.
- The current BDRCS structure of finance staff reporting to program staff exposes financial personnel to potential pressures of fraud and corruption, eroding partner confidence in the BDRCS system.

Lessons for the Movement

- All Movement partners need protocols and a standardised package of global policies and procedures to ensure a pragmatic approach to managing finance in emergencies.
- The hiring of finance personnel in the initial stage of the operation is crucial to success.

Major recommendations

F1. BDRCS and IFRC strengthen their finance capability by recruiting more staff and training them on standard procedures, policies and good practices to improve timely reporting.

F2. Improve coordination and provide financial services between BDRCS / IFRC and PNS partners to ensure smooth cash flow.

F3. BDRCS mitigate fraud and corruption concerns by strengthening internal control systems and training.

Responses to key evaluation questions

Policies and procedures

Suitability of policies and procedures

In the early stage of the operation, IFRC PMO personnel lacked clarity on standard policies and procedures, roles and responsibilities - particularly on the roles of appeal manager, project manager or budget holder (this appeared both for persons trusted with respective functions and those working with them). The management of PMO-associated projects has been divided into two positions, i.e. Head of Sub-Office and Head of Operation. This caused further confusion, because the Project Manager - as a budget holder of the project - can take all decisions as per the approved budget, with no additional approval required for project expenditures from the Head of Office (until and unless they cross the standard project expenditure ceiling limit of the Project Manager). The lack of clear understanding also delayed the authorization of some PMO decisions[12]. Delays also resulted from poor information sharing between BDRCS and IFRC in terms of financial resources.

During the non-emergency period, IFRC Bangladesh CO created a procurement ceiling of 500 CHF, which is half of the standard 1,000 CHF procurement ceiling. This happened to ensure better internal controls in the normal context of the country. Yet, this policy affected the PMO sub-office, as it was not adjusted to the global standard threshold for the emergency context at early stage, but in October, creating avoidable friction between the finance team and service receivers before.

BDRCS lacks trained personnel capable of providing financial services to partners within the operation. In the field office of BDRCS, the financial management and accounting relies upon manual processes. The lack of software-based accounting and financial systems has affected the speed of transactions and reporting. Precious time could have been saved by minimizing the long approval process: BDRCS requires six approvals and a further two signatures before a cheque can be issued. The inflexible application of protocols such as these caused substantial frustration and delays for partners, personnel and suppliers.

BDRCS financial policy does have certain control mechanisms, but various fraud and corruption prevention steps are not clearly highlighted. BDRCS needs to apply new fraud and corruption prevention processes in pragmatic ways that empower staff and do not add unnecessary delays.

IFRC Bangladesh Country Office is exempted from Value Added Tax (VAT), but needs further communication / certification from the relevant Government authorities.

Cash flow

There are four different cash flow trajectories for the operation:

1. IFRC Geneva → IFRC Country Office (London Forex Bank Account) → IFRC Country Office (BDT bank account in Dhaka) → IFRC Sub-Office bank account in CXB (in some cases direct transfer from IFRC Country Office [London bank account] to IFRC Sub-Office Bank account)

[12] E.g., in October, the signing-off a Request for Proposal for a borehole was delayed about a week due to procedural unclarity on CXB leadership level, involving both HoSO and HEOps.

2. IFRC Country Office's Bangladeshi Taka currency bank account → BDRCS HQ Bank account → BDRCS CXB Office's Bank Account
3. Partner National Societies (PNSs) HQs → BDRCS HQ bank account → BDRCS CXB Office's Bank Account
4. ERU / FACT self-management of funds

The cash flow between IFRC functions is working well. However, IFRC has been capped at 5 million Bangladeshi Taka to be advanced to the field office bank account (approximately 60,000 CHF) [13]. When cash transfer programming commences, this cap will be insufficient to meet daily cash needs.

The cash flow between IFRC and BDRCS is subject to substantial delays due to the slow settlement of acquittals. Nevertheless, the operation has been slow to scale up and thus far has not experienced a scarcity of funds. However, this is likely to become an issue as activities increase.

PNS experienced delays of up to two months between PNS HQs, BDRCS HQ and BDRCS CXB. This has caused serious delays in the payment of volunteers and field hospital employees contracted by BDRCS.

Due to the strict policy of Central bank on incoming and outgoing funds from Bangladesh and long intra-banks validation process within the country, it takes approx. two working weeks to complete a transaction.

Working Advance

Advance acquittals and recording of expenditure are subject to lengthy delays. Reasons for delays include:

1. Getting documentation back from BDRCS against the working advance on time
2. Inadequate supporting documents
3. The lengthy process required before receiving replies to queries

Bank account

At the beginning of the PMO, the opening of a bank account at CXB was delayed. This was primarily due to the contradictory situation between IFRC Dhaka's suggested bank (Sonali Bank) and the bank recommended by the IFRC Security assessment (BRAC Bank). The Geneva-based finance survey also recommended Sonali Bank, reporting that BRAC did not have a good reputation. In the past, IFRC had used Sonali Bank in CXB and had a good experience working with them. Following two months of discussion between IFRC Dhaka, Geneva and the Security team, an account was opened at BRAC Bank.

The delayed process of opening a bank account for the IFRC Sub-Office in CXB did not affect BDRCS' project implementation; the respective money was flowing from BDRCS HQ to the CXB office without difficulty. However, the handling of higher amounts of cash resulting from the absence of a bank account brings staff security issues with it (with actually no incidents reported). IFRC's main task was to transfer funds from IFRC Dhaka (from a London forex account) to the BDRCS headquarters bank account in Dhaka. BDRCS' use of a government bank meant that each transfer would take several weeks to be approved.

[13] The cap was set by the IFRC CO, which is a good practice to avoid forex losses, at the same time such ceilings may limit implementation plans due to insufficient cash flows.

Cash Transfer Programming

Due to a government decision, Cash Transfer Programming is on hold and was not examined as part of this review (see risks chapter).

Enabling steps

- *BDRCS and IFRC finance teams and program colleagues engage in a results-focussed discussion and action to increase the understanding of gaps in policies and procedures, and expenditure authorization ceilings.*
- *BDRCS settle acquittals more quickly to ensure adequate cash flow for programs implemented by BDRCS.*
- *BDRCS establish a fraud and corruption prevention policy that is suited to emergency operations and does not disrupt the workflow.*
- *BDRCS upgrade accounting software (e.g. of Navision) and install at sub-office / PMO project level.*
- *IFRC share clear roles and responsibilities, including the delegation of financial authority of senior management team to the staff, so they can approach the right person for support.*
- *IFRC increase the cap on cash in field, in order to meet future Cash Transfer Programming needs.*
- *IFRC communicate with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to resolve the issue of VAT exemption.*
- *At global level, IFRC Finance conduct a financial management and budget holder training / refresher for Operations Managers / FACT / Head of Emergency Operations and Head of Country / Cluster Offices to familiarise the target group with the latest changes in policies and procedures.*
- *At global level, replace irrelevant, old financial policies and procedures by most updated policies and procedures on Fednet, DMIS and other commonly used information sharing platforms.*

Risks

Risk of fraud and corruption

Due to lack of sufficient human resources in BDRCS finance in CXB, finance management is currently a 'one-man-show': one person is responsible for vendor selection process, receiving invoices, reviewing invoices, preparing vouchers, presenting documents for approval, validating and approving vouchers on behalf of finance, preparing cheques and signing cheques as part of bank signatories. This exposes the PMO to integrity risks.

Funding Gaps

As per 15 December, there was a current gap of 58% between the emergency appeal budget and 'hard pledge' income. Given that core commitments for the operation are high, there will be a high overhead vs. programming-ratio. Slow implementation of program activities will exacerbate this.

Timely implementation against the various earmarked contribution

Prioritis-ation of funds utilization	Closing balance at 19 Dec 2017	Funds utilization timeline of earmarked pledges									
		Year 2018									2019
	Amount in CHF	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Jun
High Risk	523,035	31 Jan									
	358,609		28 Feb								
	936,012			31 Mar							
	58,676				30 Apr						
	201,299						30 Jun				
Medium Risk	1,308,029								31 Aug		
	2,851,656									30 Sep	
Low risk	100,000										30 Jun
	3,143,772	*									30 Jun
	9,481,090	**Total available funding as of 19 Dec 2017, reference MoF-MDRBD018**									

* Netherland Red Cross contribution of CHF 853,868.69 (EURO 750,000) through PMN# M1704053 and M1710071 is hidden under the appeal code MDRBD018. As per the MoU, approx. CHF 2,432,346 expenses has to be within the NLRC pledge timeframe i.e. within first 12 months.

Funds utilization timeline of earmarked pledges

Budget vs implementation

The PMO is already behind expectations for implementation; the peak period of spending generally falls within the first six months. As per 15 December, the rate of expenditure for implementation is 62% of the approved total budget for the respective period.

The limited number of professional suppliers in CXB has increased the cost of implementation.

Credibility with donors

There are risks to the Movement's organization reputation and legal status. These stem from land rental, staff contract, hiring of security guards, vehicle rental company, visa related concerns, carrying more than the government standard ceiling cash in country by the FACT and ERU-personnel and other factors.

If reinstated, Cash Transfer Programming will also carry risks: Beneficiaries do not have IDs. The Movement can cut these risks by collaborating with agencies, who are leading the process of digital registration supported by biometric data collection. IFRC is working on the operational setup of CTP in coordination with external stakeholders.

Enabling steps

- *IFRC or BDRCS increase their fraud and corruption prevention activities (such as workshops).*
- *Partners hold a monthly meeting with the senior management team to analyse risks, track pledge management, monitor budget vs funding vs implementation and share challenges in finance management.*
- *Clarify roles and responsibilities for project managers, budget holders, operation managers, Head of Country Office and BDRCS.*
- *IFRC advise donors of any delays in implementation that affect the utilisation of their funds within given timeframes; manage reputational risk by gaining donors' trust through transparency.*

For a broader risk analysis for the PMO, see Annex 8.

Constraints

The review team found various difficulties in the PMO. This operation is probably one of the biggest managed by BDRCS in recent history. The lack of sufficient human resources is apparent in all sectors and this has affected the finance functions for the entire PMO. Several new Movement partners have become active in Bangladesh in the PMO, and are to a high extent reliant on BDRCS finance. There is limited ownership and leadership from BDRCS Headquarters, district branch and field office. A small number of personnel in the HQ finance team is supporting the PMO, no specific finance focal point has been established in BDRCS HQ, and processing of a large number of vouchers and documents is highly delayed at the BDRCS finance office.

Lengthy document review process

The document review process is as follows:
CXB BDRCS Finance → BDRCS HQ Finance → BDRCS HQ Audit → IFRC Dhaka Audit → BDRCS HQ Audit → BDRCS HQ Finance → IFRC Dhaka Finance

Availability of funds in the field

Due to the slow acquittals settlements, in between BDRCS, IFRC and PNSs, funds liquidation has affected timely payment of volunteers and daily labours. This may continue in the future with given personnel resources. As mentioned before, the ceiling of the IFRC Sub-Office bank account may not be sufficient to run future Cash Transfer Programmer activities.

Global Tools

ERUs must be fully financially self-sufficient for the period of deployment. This means an ERU shall have sufficient in-country resources to cover all running costs, be operational, and work without drawing on the resources of the existing IFRC CO or the Host National Society.

Due to the strict policy of Government of Bangladesh and Central bank of Bangladesh, cash flow was not sufficient for managing ERU running costs in all cases. For theses exceptional cases, the IFRC CO may provide service in terms of using its bank account to facilitate the transfer from an ERU NS HQ to

its deploying ERU in the field (subject to the IFRC head of finance approval). This was neither coordinated nor communicated by PNS nor by IFRC.

It takes five working days for every bank transfer to travel from IFRC CO to IFRC CBX. Funds from BDRCS headquarters to BDRCS CXB take even longer, because BDRCS uses a Government bank account.

The overall rate of spending in the PMO is low. Still, there are no monitoring tools such as 'activity plan vs. budget' to follow up on the (financial) implementation progress.

Donors have placed demanding and specific earmarking on some pledges, which are at risk of remaining unfulfilled within the specified sectors, geographic area and/or timeframes.

The efficiency of the operation would have benefited massively with sufficient finance staff from the very beginning of the PMO, with clear roles and responsibilities, delegation of authority, bank account, close coordination at field office and HQ level, leadership and ownership.

Enabling steps

- *IFRC / BDRCS take immediate action to fill the human resources gaps in finance*
- *Initiate dialogue with partners to bring them under the integration agreement, so IFRC can help resolve problems with the flow of funds.*
- *Establish Field Office level authorities for BDRCS and IFR to resolve efficiently finance problems - including the settlement of acquittals - at CXB level.*

Support ratio

IFRC has communicated the operation vs. support budget from the beginning, through the integrated approach, with all in-country PNS were involved in preparing the PMO emergency appeal document. This was also shared at the weekly Movement coordination meetings in CXB. Broader information sharing shall take place at the upcoming Partnership Meeting.

The allocation of Operation budget vs. Support budget fits well within the standard ratio ceiling[14]. Imbalance is most likely to occur when the appeal timeframe is extended, but the total budget remains same.

Partner engagement

For a majority of countries, the standard platform for partners engaged is the Movement Coordination Meeting (generally organized and led by the HNS). In Bangladesh, there is no current practice of regular Movement Coordination meetings at national level (with some meetings held by IFRC CO, yet without regular contributions of BDRCS).

At present, BDRCS is running three emergency appeal operations (floods, cyclone, PMO). Financial resources are stretched at partner's level and partners are closely monitoring the situation of the operations. PNS are reporting on a lack of confidence in their ranks on the IFRC management

[14] as outlined in the 'IFRC Costing Principles' (v1.0, 22/07/11), specifically on personnel costs

capacities and implementation capabilities, calling for intensified information sharing and integration, and more proactive IFCR leadership (i.e. with regard to influencing BDRCS).

PNS thinking is diverse on the merits of the One-Window Approach and the joint management of financial resources. Some partners are willing to contribute through IFRC, some are looking for bilateral intervention, and few others are taking a quasi-unilateral approach responding to the PMO.

It is possible that the appeal budget will increase to 50 million Swiss francs. In the last few weeks, fundraising activities were slow (explained by the upcoming Christmas festive season), yet PNS are sharing optimistic views on the availability of funds from mid-January onwards. By that time, IFRC is hopeful to have an Operations Manager and other key functions in place, who will build up confidence of PNS. There is a clear need to involve partners in a more organized way: by systematically organizing the Movement Coordination Meetings at country level and sharing information on activities, projects and sector-level funding gaps for partners' intervention in different sectors to fill the gaps in a joint way of working.

Enabling steps

- *Organise regular Movement coordination meetings to share the information on activities, projects and sector-level funding gaps with partners.*
- *Release Federation-wide reports summarizing the RCRC involvement on PMO in terms of finding gaps and available resources including in-kind, personnel and financial support.*

Logistics

Local worker carrying relief goods in the CXB warehouse in preparation of an upcoming distribution. Photo: Jess Letch / Australian Red Cross

Logistics - In Brief

1. Successes

- Logistics has been able to deliver all requested materials - within funding limitations - with only minimal delays.
- Programmes have been generally pleased about the quality of logistics service, if service / logistics HR were in place ('when there was IFRC logistics personnel in place, logistics service was good and co-operative, but when there were HR gaps, there was no service')
- Coordination and cooperation within IFRC Logistics structure between CXB, Dhaka, and the KL RLU has been good and supportive.

2. Challenges

- Due to HR-gaps, there have been periods of insufficient logistics management capacity and procurement expertise in CBX. Hiring of local staff has been very slow.
- There has been very little involvement from BDRCS logistics; an excellent learning opportunity about emergency logistics response has been lost.
- Planning and requests from programmes was ad-hoc, subsequently planning of the IFRC supply chain was challenging.

3. Effectiveness and efficiency

- Ad-hoc requests from programme personnel made it impossible to coordinate the long-term supply chain.
- Locally rented fleet has not been cost-effective. The re-tender of local vehicle rental services and process to import VRP vehicles should have started earlier. Fleet was one of the areas in Logistics, which was insufficiently staffed.

4. Harnessing the capacity of the Movement

- A FACT Logistics Coordinator should have been deployed with the first FACT rotation. Not calling down the function resulted in a lack of logistics management capacity at crucial periods of the operation.
- There was low response towards the Mobilization Table by PNS, with no subsequent response from IFRC to rectify the problem.

5. Sustainability of the operation

- Long-term positions should have been opened early for the IFRC PMO Logistics team. A Logistics Coordinator and a Procurement Delegate are long-term requirements. Filling these long-term positions shall be a priority for IFRC HR.

Lessons for the Movement

- In 'Category Red' emergencies, IFRC logistics management capacity should be in place from the start of the operation.
- The IFRC Logistics HR structure shall not only serve the IFRC operation, but also requests from PNS. Capacity is needed especially at procurement.

Major recommendations

L1. In major operations, strong logistics management is required from the onset to longer-term implementation.

L2. Enable comprehensive and cost-effective logistics planning.

Responses to key evaluation questions

Constraints

There were HR gaps in IFRC logistics team especially in logistics management and procurement. Hiring of local staff has been slow.

IFRC fleet management for the PMO is not yet at a sustainable level. Systems are very well in place, but not the personnel needed to run these systems effectively. The current Fleet Delegate is ending his mission at the beginning of January, and no Local Fleet Officer has been recruited, despite plenty of changes and activities in fleet taking place these days: Local rental contracts are going to be changed/renewed, IFRC vehicles imported, IFRC drivers hired and trained. At the time of writing the report RDRT Fleet Delegate is been requested and national staff recruitment process is ongoing.

There is very little involvement from BDRCS logistics in CXB. A BDRCS logistician should be working jointly with IFRC logistics team in CXB. Joint Logistics operation shall enable smooth handover of logistics activities in the future, and provide opportunities to build the capacity of BDRCS logistics.

Enabling steps

- *For 'Category Red' emergencies, a FACT Logistics Coordinator shall always be included into the first FACT rotation and the logistics management capacity shall be safeguarded without gaps.*
- *Long-term positions in logistics shall be identified and opened at the latest two months after the start of a 'red' operation. For the PMO, these would be Logistics Coordinator and Procurement Delegate. Other long-term logistics roles can be hired locally.*
- *An IFRC Fleet Delegate is required for an additional month to set the fleet operation at a sustainable level.*
- *IFRC Logistics Coordinator, BDRCS Director of Logistics, and BDRCS PMO Project Director need to work together to plan logistics activities in coordinated way.*
- *BDRCS needs to appoint a counterpart for IFRC Logistics Coordinator as soon as possible. Once cooperation is established, further BDRCS logistics capacity enhancement shall be the next step.*

Supply chain management

All logisticians claimed that there was no long-term distribution plan available. Materials needed for distributions were known only one week in advance. There were also many changes in overall material plans, such as: food / no food, family tents / no family tents. The ad-hoc nature of requests made long term supply chain planning and coordination difficult and decreased the cost-effectiveness. Some charter flights could have been replaced with cheaper sea transport, if longer-term planning and commitment would have been in place. This could also improve the environmental effectiveness of the operation.

Enabling steps

- *IFRC programme managers need to provide clear and prioritized material need; especially FACT Delegates are required to have skills to make material planning and material request with priorities and against a timetable, thereby enabling logistics to provide cost-effective and timely support.*

Procurement

A PMO procurement delegate was deployed 22nd November 2017. Since the delegate's arrival, procurement has been at sufficient level. When planning logistics HR structure, IFRC shall consider whether logistics should to be ready to also provide logistics services for PNS bilateral programs. Procurement is generally the service in greatest demand from PNS. When programmes know their long-term plans and material needs are confirmed, local framework agreements might be suitable option.

Enabling steps

- *IFRC recruit a long-term Procurement Delegate to ensure continuity and quality of the procurement services at CXB.*

Mobilization table

Response by the PNS towards the PMO Mobilization table was considered slow and low. One reason for this was donor PNS' simultaneous engagement in hurricane operations in the Americas. IFRC acknowledged the low response, but it did not result in any further action. KL RLU did send the updated Mobilization table to PNS using the MobTable distribution list (normal procedures; eight updates sent in September and October). Urgent material requirements should also be communicated and highlighted to PNS using partnership calls and further information channels.

Enabling steps

- *On top of the normal Mobilization Table distribution by the RLU, material needs (as defined in the MobTable) should be highlighted at partnership calls to get the attention of PNS for material gaps.*

Bilateral contributions

In the PMO, bilateral donations of food and non-food items were taken into the BDRCS supply chain at CBX with logistics support provided by IFRC. Most of these materials were distributed by BDRCS together with the Relief ERU. Some of the materials, such as family tents, are still using space at the warehouse, as they are not priority items

Specifications of bilateral donations did not equate with IFRC/ICRC standards, yet were considered acceptable by BDRCS and IFRC for the PMO. As there was slow response towards the MobTable, some faster delivered bilateral donations replaced multilateral in-kind donations and in this way served the operation in a timely way. Risks linked to accepting and distributing non-standard items with potentially varying quality were accepted.

Enabling steps

- *IFRC should continue to discourage unsolicited bilateral donations. For a cost-effective supply chain, all potential in-kind donations should be coordinated through the IFRC Regional Logistics Unit. At the same time, IFRC must have capable logistics team on the ground to implement Logistics activities including local procurement.*

External factors in Logistics

Customs clearance generally worked well. Due to a heavy increase of cargo, there was congestion at Chittagong seaport that caused 10 – 15 days of delays for the sea shipments.

Environmental Impact

There were no specific Green Response decisions in this operation. The only discussion where environmental impact was considered, was regarding the specification of stoves. The stove procurement has not taken place. If there had been a clear plan for material needs, some charter flights could have been replaced with sea transport, which would have been a more environmentally friendly transportation option.

A consultant for 'Green response' (with support of Swedish RC) has been deployed to identify concerns and opportunities on how to address minimizing adverse impact on the environment resulting from the response operation (report not submitted at the time of writing).

Enabling steps

- *Environmentally friendly options might not always be available or feasible in the emergency operation, nevertheless guidelines and training on 'Green Response' in humanitarian emergency response is still widely lacking, and should especially be considered for future procurement and distributions.*

Volunteering

Engaged directly by PNS, community volunteers (left) do not share the same training, insurance protection, per diems or personal equipment as BDRCS Youth volunteers (pictured right). Photo: Jess Letch / Australian RC

Volunteering - In Brief

1. **Successes**

- BDRCS has mobilized 234 Youth Red Cross volunteers in Cox's Bazar, and issued a guideline for the engagement of community volunteers.
- Red Crescent volunteers are enthusiastic and dedicated; they enjoy their work and are proud to be part of the Movement.

2. **Challenges**

- Volunteer per diem payments have been delayed, sometimes for months.
- Community volunteers are not well integrated into BDRCS and lack insurance, visibility and equal payment.
- Current interim guidelines for BDRCS and 'community' volunteering require further improvement.

3. **Effectiveness and efficiency**

- A shortage of volunteers slowed the scaling up of programs in the first phase. This has been rectified.
- A territorial- rather than needs-based-approach to volunteer deployment reduced BDRCS ability to scale up in a timely manner
- The frequent rotation of volunteers is hampering the effectiveness and efficiency of their work.

4. Harnessing the capacity of the Movement

- BDRCS have engaged community volunteers. Headquarters and Cox' Bazar branch have been strongly engaged in supplying Youth Red Crescent to Movement partners.
- PNS directly to fill gaps and meet local needs

5. Sustainability of the operation

- Further expansion of the Bangladeshi and community volunteer base may be required as program activities scale up.

Lessons for the Movement

- Branch and sub-branch engagement is essential for the sustainable management of community-based programming.

Major recommendations

V1. Strengthen the pool of experienced, skilled and senior volunteers (via NDRT, stronger program teams, engaging senior volunteers).

V2. Stronger focus on the welfare of volunteers, including health and safety, psychosocial support and timely payment of allowances.

V3. Integrate and equalise the conditions of (host and PfR) Community volunteers in the BDRCS structure.

Responses to key evaluation questions

BDRCS involvement

Branch and headquarters

BDRCS activities at Cox's Bazar level are strongly led by headquarters in Dhaka. Following concerns about 'integrity' at the CXB branch, all funding from HQ to the branch has been stopped. CXB branch employs two staff - an office assistant and a night guard. The other two staff working at CXB branch are deployed from BDRCS headquarters. A senior volunteer primarily manages volunteers, organizing rosters, per diems, and moves between PMO office and CXB office. The Cox's Bazar branch has the capacity to be influential in the future trajectory of the PMO. It is essential that branch leaders are engaged and motivated to sustain this operation in the medium and long-term.

Inter-branch cooperation

There has been very little cooperation between Cox's Bazar and neighbouring branches. Political considerations hampered the sharing of volunteers; Cox's Bazar resisted the encroachment of a larger and wealthier Chittagong branch. However, there is much greater acceptance of NDRT deployments. BDRCS could have made better use of NDRT (staff and volunteers) to meet shortages in personnel. BDRCS trains 30 NDRT per year. Now that most staff have been trained, most future NDRT recruitments will be sourced from the volunteer pool.

Language barriers

Communication barriers were often cited as a reason for bringing volunteers from neighbouring districts. The review found less problems with language than often reported; CXB volunteers and

people from Rakhine able to understand each other, BDRCS regularly asserted that Cox's Bazar volunteers speak the same language as people from Rakhine. Research from Translators without Borders has found that there is a 70% overlap between Chittagonian (also spoken in Cox's Bazar area) and Rohingya Zuban[15]. Whilst mutually intelligible, there are some keywords that might have different meanings, which can lead to miscommunication. There is much less similarity between Rohingya Zuban and the languages spoken by staff from Dhaka and other regions of Bangladesh.

Enabling steps

- *Stronger leadership of the Cox's Bazar branch and sub-branch structure in the recruitment and management of volunteers, with support from BDRCS Youth and Volunteer department, NHQ.*

Protection, gender and inclusion

Confidentiality

PSS volunteers have the most sensitive roles, and have strong guidance on confidentiality. Registration volunteers also have access to information of a personal nature. All volunteers need to attend a briefing session on the code of conduct and sign it before commencing work. However, there is no specific guidance on data protection, and it was not clear whether privacy and confidentiality are included in the volunteers' code of conduct and induction processes. Many volunteers have received training in protection gender and inclusion, including child protection.

Gender balance

BDRCS volunteers are 70% male and 30% female. Gender balance among volunteers is easily achieved when volunteer numbers are specified by the receiving PNS. Norwegian RC field hospital achieves gender balance in its team every day, with four BDRCS and eight community volunteers engaged each day.

Health and safety

The health and safety of volunteers is a concern: Youth Red Crescent volunteers (but not community volunteers) are covered by IFRC insurance. This insures medical expenses, death and disability resulting from accidents but not illness. When questioned, the volunteers were not aware of the IFRC insurance. Two out of eight reported diarrhoea since going to the camps, and many expressed fear of getting sick or being injured on the steep hills in the camp. Government immunizations (including diphtheria and measles, mumps and rubella) are provided free of charge. However, no extra protection is given to volunteers - such as cholera immunisations - to protect from potential health hazards. One volunteer reported visiting the Red Cross hospital for treatment but being turned away. Volunteers expressed simple requests: boots, umbrellas, well-functioning vehicle transport, to work in pairs for safety, health insurance and hand sanitiser.

Psychosocial care is an area of concern for volunteers, who are witnessing traumatised people living in difficult circumstances. There may be a tendency to dehumanise the people from Rakhine - particularly at the highly charged distribution points. There were examples cited of volunteers taking photographs of people in difficult circumstances, shouting at them, and - in one case - slapping a person. With the strong presence of psychosocial expertise in the PMO, there is the opportunity to provide comprehensive psychoeducation and peer support to all volunteers, not only those trained or PSS.

[15] Translators Without Borders, Rohingya Zuban, 11 December 2017 [accessed 22 December 2017]

Insurance for community volunteers

Community volunteers are not covered under the same BDRCS volunteer structure as Red Cross Youth, and receive no accident and life insurance. BDRCS advised this should be rectified: community volunteers will be brought into the system and will be eligible for insurance. This must be expedited. It may require further examination of legal status and eligibility under BDRCS policy. If necessary, the PMO can cover additional insurance costs.

Enabling steps

- *Stronger peer support between PSS teams (delegates and volunteers) and volunteers working on other operations.*
- *Register community volunteers for IFRC insurance.*
- *Compensate volunteers for health-related costs incurred during the course of their work in the camps.*

Volunteer profiles and capacity

Supply and demand

After initial shortages of volunteers for the PMO, BDRCS is now meeting demand. There are now 144 volunteers from Cox's Bazar and 90 from sub-districts Teknaf and Ukhia, which are closer to the camps. BDRCS is receiving requests for 65 volunteers per day, which is easily accommodated. According to sector leaders, there may be greater demand for volunteers when programs are able to go to scale; programs are currently hampered by HR shortages. However the current trend toward community volunteers means that this scaling up may happen using camp residents, rather than among Red Crescent Youth. However, the political situation for People from Rakhine remains volatile; Movement partners must be prepared for a possible prohibition on the payment of allowances to community volunteers.

Reliance upon Red Crescent Youth

Volunteers are universally young, which limits the roles they can play. BDRCS needs to increase its use of senior volunteers. The PMO volunteer workforce is built upon the Red Crescent Youth system, drawn from local colleges. These volunteers are young, educated and see volunteering as an opportunity to gain training and work experience, with a view to future employment. Red Crescent youth are described as highly dedicated and enthusiastic. However, they lack seniority and experience for leadership roles. The volunteers themselves are happy with a three-day-per week roster, but there is concern expressed from many quarters that their parents may not tolerate such a heavy work schedule when university returns, and that the allure of per diems is diverting them from their studies. BDRCS guidelines stipulate that community volunteers must also be under 30 years of age. The PMO requires greater use of its 'senior volunteers' to increase continuity and leadership within programs.
National Disaster Management Teams can supply a cohort of mature and experienced volunteers. BDRCS has deployed 15 NDRTs to the PMO. It was difficult to deploy more, as many were already busy working on other responses (half of the 64 districts were affected by floods in 2017). BDRCS reports that there are plans to establish a cadre of senior volunteers over 30 years of age.

Community volunteers

'Community volunteers' is the term currently used by BDRCS to refer to the engagement of People from Rakhine. Many PNS began engaging community volunteers due to a shortage of BDRCS

volunteers. Operations people report great satisfaction with the community volunteers - they work more regular shifts without rotation, speak the same language as the displaced population, arrive on time, it contributes to their livelihoods and helps to build local leadership. The review team received reports of Myanmar Red Cross volunteers displaced to Kutapalong Camp, who are still carrying their Photo ID cards from their work in Rakhine state.

As a result, demand for BDRCS volunteers is dwindling. This is causing resentment among Red Cross youth. However, the political situation for People from Rakhine remains volatile; Movement partners must be prepared for a possible prohibition on the payment of allowances to community volunteers, and must retain a diverse volunteer base. The best way to do this is for BDRCS to have an integrated system that gives equal treatment and management of all volunteers working for the Movement. The IFRC HR advisor should work with BDRCS counterparts to examine the legal risks, restrictions and possibilities to ensure that community volunteers are engaged according to local law.

BDRCS has issued a guideline for the use of community volunteers. It stipulates that they should receive a half-day orientation from BDRCS, and are entitled to an ID card, Red Crescent cap and T-shirt. However, community volunteers are managed on a two-track system, reporting directly to PNS. Cox' Bazar demonstrates no willingness to integrate them into the branch structure.

According to the PNS interpretation of interim BDRCS guidelines, community volunteers must receive less per diem for the same work than their Youth Red Cross counterparts. Because they sit outside the regular recruitment and deployment system, they are working without Red Crescent-branded clothing, and without insurance (see point above). Senior representatives at BDRCS Dhaka indicate that these volunteers should be considered BDRCS personnel, and the per diems equalised. However, it is not yet clear how they would fit with the current system of recruitment, training, rostering. This process of equalization needs to take into account the political sensitivities related to the engagement and payment of People from Rakhine.

The rotation of BDRCS volunteers

Red Cross Youth are currently working three shifts per week and being rotated between programs. Whilst it increases the exposure of volunteers to different kinds of work, the rotation system is inhibiting their ability to build teams and build skills. One sector leader reported training a large number of volunteers, then having them rotated out and replaced with untrained personnel. Volunteers expressed a wish to be allocated to a single program for a longer period. Now that the operation has stabilized, it would not be difficult to establish work teams to remain on a program for a minimum of three months – including rest periods between volunteer shifts. Greater use of senior volunteers can also increase the continuity and availability of volunteers.

Enabling steps

- *BCRCS establish regular volunteer workforce for each program area, on minimum three-month rotations.*
- *Greater use of NDRT and senior volunteers to increase experience, leadership and continuity within programs.*
- *BDRCS establish a systematic approach to volunteer recruitment, retention and recognition beyond the Youth Red Cross structure.*
- *IFRC NSD and BDRCS Youth and Volunteers invest in CXB branch leadership, to ensure ownership and sustainability.*

- *Equalise and integrate community volunteers within the BDRCS volunteer structure - so that they receive equal per diems, volunteer insurance and per diems. PMO HR advisor work with BDRCS counterparts to examine legal matters and ensure that community volunteers are adequately protected.*

Other constraints

Non-payment of per diems

The greatest concern among volunteers in the non-payment of per diems. They report that many per diems take 15 days to be received, and that work for certain PNS and programs - such as Italian Red Cross, Qatar Red Crescent, Norwegian Red Cross field hospital and the Epidemic Control Team - have not been received after several months. In the case of the field hospital, the blockage was due to delayed financial transactions from Oslo to Dhaka to CXB, and funds were finally received in CXB the week of the review team's visit. It is unacceptable that youth volunteers should absorb the consequences of internal delays, a lack of trust and coordination between partners. BDRCS should accept the risk, safe in the knowledge that in the rare case of non-payment from a PNS the PMO could cover the relatively small cost of volunteers.

Enabling steps

- *BDRCS pay volunteers in full within 48 hours, in lieu of reimbursement from partners.*
- *BDRCS and IFRC take rapid action to ensure full payment of per diems to volunteers for past work undertaken. If the cash flow issue cannot be resolved, use emergency appeal funds to absorb the cost.*

Annexes

Annex 1: List of persons consulted:

No	Name, Position, Organization	Gender
1	Abdul Bari Parvas, Unit Level Officer, BDRCS CXB branch	M
2	Achala Navaratne, Country Representative Bangladesh, American Red Cross	M
3	Afroza Khandker, Sr. Manager OD, IFRC APRO	F
4	Afroza Sultana, PMER Officer, BDRCS HQ	F
5	Afsar Uddin, Director Logistics, BDRCS HQ	M
6	Ahmad Obaidus Sami Sana, NS Development Coordinator, IFRC APRO	M
7	Ahmed Salem, TL bilateral QRCS team, 1st rotation (2months), Qatar Red Crescent Society	M
8	Alberto Monguzzi, HEOPS Bangladesh, IFRC Secretariat	M
9	Alka Kapoor Sharma, Head of RLU Kuala Lumpur, IFRC APRO	F
10	Amitabh Sharma, Country Representative, Swiss Red Cross	M
11	Amy McLachlan, Surge Roster Management, Australian Red Cross	F
12	Andrea Wissinger, International HR officer, Austrian Red Cross	F
13	Andreas Waser, ERU officer, Austrian Red Cross	M
14	Anette Andresen, Finance coordinator HQ, Norwegian Red Cross	F
15	Anne-Katherine Moore, Surge Deployment, Swiss Red Cross	F
16	Antu Dhar, volunteer, BDRCS CXB branch	M
17	Arifur Rahman, Logistics Manager, IFRC Bangladesh	M
18	Asfaque Ahmed, Senior Supply Chain Manager, IFRC PMO	M
19	Auslaug Braende, PSS delegate, field hospital, Norwegian Red Cross	F
20	Azmat Ulla, Head of Country Office, IFRC Bangladesh	M
21	Dagne Hordvei, ERU Team Leader, field hospital, Norwegian Red Cross	F
22	Daniel Bolanos, Head of Surge, IFRC HQ	M
23	Dave Luddington, FACT Logistics (2), British Red Cross	M
24	Dharmin Thacker, Procurement Delegate, IFRC Bangladesh	M
25	Diksha Khadka, FACT Information Management, American Red Cross	F
26	Ea Suzanne Akasha, PSS support and recruitment support, IFRC PS Centre	F
27	Eelko Brouwer, TL Benelux Relief ERU, Netherlands Red Cross	M
28	Ekram Elahi Choudhary, BDRCS Project Director, BDRCS CXB	M

No	Name, Position, Organization	Gender
29	Ezekiel Simperingham, Migration Coordinator, IFRC APRO	M
30	Georg Ecker, FACT WASH (3rd rotation), Austrian Red Cross	M
31	Gerhard Tauscher, IFRC Ops Manager PMO, IFRC Sri Lanka	M
32	Grace Turner, Surge HR PMO, British Red Cross	F
33	Hasibul Bari Razib, Manager Response and Shelter, IFRC Bangladesh	M
34	Huq Mozharul, Secretary General, BDRCS HQ	M
35	Jahir Uddin, Director of Finance, BDRCS HQ	M
36	Joanna Hill, Surge Delegate, British Red Cross	F
37	Kym Blechynden, Regional Emergency Health Coordinator, IFRC APRO	F
38	Kira Suleimanyan, Coordination Delegate, ICRC Bangladesh	F
39	Laily Khan Majlish, Senior HR & Admin Manager, IFRC Bangladesh	F
40	Lidwina Dox, FACT WASH (1st rotation), Austrian Red Cross	F
41	M Nurun Nabi, Project Manager PMO, BDRCS CXB	M
42	Maheron Jannath Nisa, volunteer, BDRCS CXB branch	F
43	Mainul Islam, Director of Internal Audit, BDRCS HQ	M
44	Malte Schuemmelfeder, Delegate (bilateral), German Red Cross	M
45	Marie Munoz-Bertrand, TL ERU health (1st rotation), Canadian Red Cross	F
46	Mark Handby, WASH delegate (1st rotation), Australian Red Cross	M
47	Martin Faller, Deputy Head of Region, IFRC APRO	M
48	Mausam Bohara, Surge Health, IFRC PMO	F
49	May Maloney, Gender and Diversity Advisor, IFRC APRO	F
50	Md Sohel, volunteer, BDRCS CXB branch	M
51	Md Belal Hossain, Director DRM, BDRCS HQ	M
52	Mehedi Hasan Shishir, Livelihood officer and Cash Focal, IFRC Bangladesh	M
53	Merete Miehle, PSS delegate, field hospital, Norwegian Red Cross	F
54	Mohammad Kamrul Hasan, Sr. PMER Officer, BDRCS HQ	M
55	Mohammedreza Fakoor, FACT Relief (2nd rotation), Iranian Red Crescent Society	M
56	Monskes Khan, volunteer, BDRCS CXB branch	M
57	Motiar Rahman, Senior Finance Manager, IFRC Bangladesh	M
58	Murad Hossain, Assistant Finance Officer PMO, IFRC PMO	M
59	Muhiuddin N, volunteer, BDRCS CXB branch	M

No	Name, Position, Organization	Gender
60	Nazmul Azam Khan, Director of Disaster Response, International Relations & Communication, BDRCS HQ	M
61	Necephor Mghendi, Operations Manager PMO (Nov), Operations Coordinator, IFRC APRO	M
62	Nelson Castano, Head of DCPRR, IFRC APRO	M
63	Iqbal [phon], Community Volunteer, BDRCS (Benelux Relief Centre)	M
64	Papeya Mollik, volunteer, BDRCS CXB branch	F
65	Pascal Morf, Surge Desk, Swiss Red Cross	M
66	Peder Damm, Interim Country Coordinator / Ops manager, Danish Red Cross	M
67	Praxedes Merchan, Surge Partnership Coordinator, IFRC Bangladesh	M
68	Rabea Begum, volunteer, BDRCS CXB branch	F
69	Raqibul Alam, Sr. Manager PMER with Comms, IFRC Bangladesh	M
70	Renae Davies, Bangladesh Country Program Manager, Australian Red Cross	F
71	Riku Assamaki, Regional Logistics Coordinator, IFRC APRO	M
72	Rita Marie Petralba, Country Representative, Swedish Red Cross	F
73	Riyadh Hasan Khan, (former) Admin/Finance, BDRCS CXB	M
74	Rosemarie North, Regional Communications Manager, IFRC APRO	F
75	Ruben Romero, FACT Team Leader (2nd rotation), IFRC ERO	M
76	Sajid Hasan, Intern (admin support), IFRC Bangladesh	M
77	Sanjeev Kafley, Head of Sub-Office CXB, IFRC PMO	M
78	Senjuti Khisa, Sr. PMER Officer (embedded BDRCS), IFRC Bangladesh	F
79	Sera Coelho, Surge Logistics Mobilization Delegate, IFRC APRO	F
80	Serah Naiti Muiah, Surge Finance, IFRC PMO	F
81	Shakhawat Hossain, RSO, BDRCS HQ	M
82	Shyam Kumar Ganaesvaran, Senior Finance Analyst, IFRC APRO	M
83	Sikder Mokaddes Ahmed, BDRCS Director Youth and Volunteers, BDRCS HQ	M
84	Sirajul Islam Molla, Director HR and Health, BDRCS HQ	M
85	Siri Meinich, Admin and Finance Manager field hospital ERU, Norwegian Red Cross	F
86	Soheli Aketer Moni, volunteer, BDRCS CXB branch	F
87	Sophia Keri, Resource Mobilisation in Emergencies Coordinator, IFRC APRO	F
88	Shahab Uddin, Volunteer focal point, BDRCS CXB branch	M
89	Tracey Cumin, Delegate Programme Manager, New Zealand Red Cross	F
90	Umadevi Selvarajah, Head of Finance & Administration, IFRC APRO	F

No	Name, Position, Organization	Gender
91	Walter Jeanty, deputy Head of Delegation, ICRC Bangladesh	M
92	Winnie Maganda, Regional Manager Human Resources, IFRC APRO	F
93	Yvonne Affolter, PMO delegate (Oct/Nov 2017), Swiss Red Cross	F
94	Xavier Castellanos, Regional Director, IFRC APRO	M
95	Zahra Bolouri, Partnerships and External Relations Coordinator, IFRC APRO	F

Annex 2: List of documents consulted

No	Document name / content
1	ALNAP RTE Guide
2	BDRCS annual reports (2014 / 2015 / 2016)
3	BDRCS Constitution
4	BDRCS documents on volunteer management (NDRT SOP, interim guidance for RC Youth volunteers, interim guidance for community volunteers)
5	BDRCS Finance and Procurement manual p27-28, 60-83
6	BDRCS Finance and Procurement Procedures
7	BDRCS Management of response supplies (Authority for dispatchment from HQ) p59
8	BDRCS Recruitment manual p29-31
9	BDRCS response manual
10	contingency plans for cyclones / floods
11	Disaster Response Capacity Evaluation (DRCE) Evaluator Assessment Guide
12	earlier review / evaluations of emergency operations / developmental programmes in Bangladesh (6)
13	EoM reports (FACT, ERU-TLs, other surge functions)
14	FACT / HEOPs Reports (weekly)
15	ICRC EA / BEA / EA 2018 Bangladesh, Myanmar
16	IFRC – Procurement manual
17	IFRC - volunteering in emergencies (2011)
18	'IFRC Costing Principles', v1.0 (22/07/11)
19	IFRC Country Office Development Operational Reports (bi-annual) 2014, 1205, 2016
20	IFRC Emergency Appeal documents (DREF, EA, rEA, EPoA, rEPoA, Ops Updates, Mobilization Tables, related finance documents)
21	IFRC Emergency response framework
22	IFRC Framework for evaluation
23	IFRC HR in Emergencies - Staffing Modalities

No	Document name / content
24	IFRC IM products (4Ws, dashboards, maps)
25	IFRC Legal framework for volunteering in emergencies
26	IFRC PMO Logistics Strategic Development & PoA
27	IFRC PMO Situation reports / updates and infographics
28	IFRC Principles & rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent humanitarian assistance
29	IFRC Recruitment Process Workflow
30	IFRC RTE guide working draft
31	IFRC Staff Regulations
32	IOM - Needs and Population Monitoring, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh #5, #6, #7
33	ISCG Situation reports and snapshots
34	Job postings (Bangladesh) in the period 01Dec - 20Dec (IFRC homepage) / JDs of IFRC PMO staff
35	One Window Approach - documentation
36	Organogram BDRCS HQ
37	Organogram IFRC BD delegation
38	Organogram IFRC PM Operation (Surge phase)
39	Organogram IFRC PMO (post-surge phase)
40	PMO contingency Plan plans for cyclones / floods (draft as of 30 Oct 2017)
41	PMO WASH strategy
42	Prior RTE reports, Meta-analysis 2016
43	Prior RTEs & surge meta-analysis 2016
44	ToR PMO volunteer focal person BDRCS CXB branch
45	UN Humanitarian Response Plan (09-2017 - 02-2018)
46	Working advance expense reports
47	Translators Without Borders, Rohingya Zuban, 11 December 2017

Annex 3: Summary of daily field movements

Day	Activity
10 December	Arrive Dhaka
11 December	Fly Dhaka to Cox's Bazar. First interviews Cox's Bazar.
12 December	Interviews Cox's Bazar
13 December	Visit to field: PMO Warehouse, Relief registration, Field hospital
14 December	Interviews CXB, travel Cox's Bazar to Dhaka
15 December	Work on report, additional interviews (Weekend)
16 December	Work on report, additional interviews (National Holiday)
17 December	Action-building workshop BDRCS, additional interviews
18 December	Travel Dhaka to Kuala Lumpur, work on report
19 December	Presentation APRO and Geneva, additional interviews
20 December	Work on report, depart KL
21 December	Arrive home

Annex 4: Internal Review Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference

Internal review of Bangladesh Population Movement Operation (PMO)

1. Summary

1.1. Purpose: This review will ascertain the effect of four areas of support services coordinated by the IFRC on the intended results of the IFRC's scale-up response to the influx of Persons from Rakhine in Bangladesh since late August 2017. The four areas are finance, human resource (HR), logistics, and volunteering in emergency response context. The outcome will contribute to organisational learning for the IFRC, the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society and the Movement partners, and inform concise recommendations and strategies to improve the coordination and management of the four areas in the immediate and medium terms, to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected communities.

1.2. Commissioner: Under Secretary General, Programmes and Operations, IFRC Geneva and Regional Director, IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO)

1.3. Audience: Findings of this review will be used by the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS), the IFRC country office in Bangladesh, the regional office in Kuala Lumpur, the IFRC headquarters in Geneva, the National Societies participating in the response operation and the ICRC.

1.4. Review team: A team leader supported by two/three evaluation practitioners drawn from the IFRC membership or the IFRC RTE trained roster from National Societies that are not directly involved in this operation.

1.5. Duration: up to 20 days (including 10 days in the Bangladesh and Kuala Lumpur)

1.6. Estimated dates: 3 December 2017 - 5 January 2018

1.7. Location: Bangladesh and Kuala Lumpur

2. Background

Since January 2017, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has been supporting the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) in responding to the needs of people fleeing from Myanmar's Rakhine State into Bangladesh. The initial response – mounted through a CHF 273,151 Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) allocation on 17 January followed by the launch of Emergency Appeal for CHF 3.2 million in March – started after an upsurge of violence in the northern areas of Rakhine during October 2016 prompted local Muslim populations to cross the border into Bangladesh in large numbers. As the initial Population Movement Emergency Appeal operation took shape, on 25 August 2017, a new influx started as thousands fled a new wave violence in northern areas of Rakhine. Since 25 August, more than 604,000 persons have arrived, most of them women and children. According to the Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG), the latest influx has resulted in an increase of Persons from Rakhine (PfR) to a total of 816,000. There are four categories of PfR: 1) registered individuals with refugee status living in camps managed by UNHCR since 1992; 2) older undocumented PfR since 1993; 3) new undocumented PfR since October 2016; and 4) newer PfR who started crossing into Bangladesh on 25 August 2017. Most of them are concentrated in Cox's Bazar District and are spread across a variety of settlements: registered refugee camps, makeshift settlements, spontaneous settlements and with the host community. Thousands continue to cross every day, making the crisis one of the largest and most complex in the region in decades.

In response to the massive upsurge in humanitarian needs, IFRC issued a Revised Emergency Appeal for CHF 12.76 million on 14 September and deployed various components of its Global Response Tools[16] (GRTs), with specialists and units covering a wide range of sectors. The scale of needs has since increased exponentially and on 10 October IFRC categorized the situation as 'Red' level crisis according to the IFRC Emergency Response Framework, making it an organization-wide priority for the IFRC Secretariat at all levels. Linked to this, a further scale-up of the IFRC response was done on 23 October with issuance of another Emergency Appeal Revision which increased the ask to CHF 33.5 million. The operation aims to meet the humanitarian needs of 200,000 persons through timely and effective emergency relief alongside medium and longer-term interventions to support the safety, dignity and resilience of PfR and host communities.

IFRC and BDRCS have identified four target geographic locations for inter-sectorial focus and interventions: Hakimpara, Mainnerghona, Burma Para and Kutupalong Extension. All are makeshift settlements, mostly populated by newly-displaced persons from Rakhine, with smaller numbers of previously displaced persons and members of host communities. The four sites have been identified as having critical humanitarian needs, with few actors providing services. The operation aims to address the humanitarian impacts on the host communities, and contingency planning or measures for the forthcoming cyclone seasons as well as the potential outbreak of disease, including cholera.

The GRTs are playing a crucial role in delivering assistance in Cox's Bazar, with current focus on providing assistance to the newly-displaced PfR arriving since 25 August 2017. Looking ahead, and to ensure a swift transition from surge to longer-term roles, IFRC has initiated the process of recruiting management, technical and support personnel who will support BDRCS in the response after GRTs demobilize.

For the revised appeals and latest operations update, please go to the appeal section on www.ifrc.org.

3. Evaluation purpose and scope

This review will ascertain the effect of four areas of support services coordinated by the IFRC on the intended results of the IFRC's scale-up response to the influx of PfR in Bangladesh since late August 2017. **The four areas are finance, human resource (HR), logistics, and volunteering in emergency response context.**

The review will draw on current best practice in the four areas (what is working well) as well as identify what requires improvements, taking into consideration the context and capacities of the IFRC, BDRCS and Movement partners. The review will examine the extent to which the four areas of support services are contributing to an effective and efficient response; how the capacities of BDRCS to provide appropriate staff and volunteer support to the operation have been considered, and; what needs to be in place to ensure a sustained operation.

Considering that the operation has a substantial history, the review will cover the period when the latest influx started, i.e. late August 2017 until the time the evaluators collect the data. Nevertheless, it shall take into account how earlier existing contingency planning and coordination for the ongoing operation may have influenced the current response.

4. Evaluation objectives and key questions

The specific objectives and possible key questions to be addressed in this review are listed below. The review, based on its findings, is also required to propose possible operational options and directions for the ongoing operation.

[16] Emergency Response Units (ERUs), Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT), Head of Emergency Operations (HEOps), Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT), and Non-Nominal Surge.

4.1. Overall objective

1. **Contribute to organisational learning** for the IFRC, BDRCS the Movement partners, and **inform concise recommendations and strategies to improve the coordination and management of the four areas** in the immediate and medium terms, to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected communities.

4.2. Evaluation questions

The questions below provide an initial guidance and are expected to be further elaborated by the Review team in the inception report. It is framed based on the five evaluation criteria.

No.	Key questions	Evaluation criteria
	HUMAN RESOURCE	
1.	How coordinated and timely was the selection of deployed members, either as part of the global or regional tools? How can the barriers in optimising surge deployments be resolved? What are the main constraint faced to ensure regular support from staff (national and international)?	Efficiency
2.	To what extent have the BDRCS's volunteer management procedures been applied in the mobilisation of trained volunteers (including NDRT and BDRT)?	Efficiency
3.	How has the process of HR planning – for medium-term solutions (6-12 months) – been undertaken, i.e. including development of job descriptions and classification, recruitment, contracting, medical clearance, and deployment (including induction briefing/training, and duty of care)?	Effectiveness
4.	Are the current staffing (and volunteering) levels and competencies/skill sets appropriate for delivering the immediate- and medium-term objectives of the operation?	Effectiveness
5.	What are the possible legal concerns around HR and logistics that may impact on sustaining the operation?	Sustainability
	FINANCE	
6.	To what extent have the IFRC and BDRCS's finance policies and procedures affected implementation of the operation (looking at the practices, barriers and risks related to cash flow, working advance liquidation, thresholds, opening of bank accounts, and cash disbursement as part of CTP modality)? What are the major financial risks?	Efficiency
7.	What are the major constraints that the teams have had to deal with related to financial resources? What could have increased the efficiency?	Efficiency
8.	How has the ratio between operational and support budgets been communicated within the Movement partners? To what extent have Movement partners been engaged in ensuring adequate resources are made available?	Connected-ness

	LOGISTICS	
9.	Has the operations supply chain management been informed by a clear distribution plan or have requests been ad hoc? If it has been ad hoc, how has this influenced the procurement and supply chain management in meeting the intended outcomes? Has operational supply chain management and related support functions such as importation restrictions hampered the attainment of intended outcomes? What are the major constraints faced in logistics?	Efficiency
10.	What are the main issues on procurement?	Efficiency
11.	Why has there been low response to the mobilization table, considering the scale and visibility of the crisis?	Efficiency
12.	To what extent have bilateral contributions adhered to the IFRC logistics standards. Have bilateral contributions impacted on the cost-effectiveness of the operation?	Effectiveness
13.	To what extent have external factors related to logistics (transit time, customs clearance, warehousing spaces, and fleet management) impacted on the timeliness of humanitarian assistance? How can the bottlenecks, if any, be resolved?	Effectiveness
14.	To what extent has the design and implementation of the operation considered aspects of Green Response?	Sustainability
	VOLUNTEERING	
15.	To what extent has the BDRCS Branch in Cox's Bazar been engaged in the volunteering management of the operation? Is there a shared understanding between BDRCS HQ and Branch on the ownership of this responsibility? What is the level of communication and coordination between the volunteering departments in BDRCS HQ, Branch in Cox's Bazar and Branches in neighbouring districts?	Appropriate-ness
16.	How has Branch-to-Branch peer support been facilitated for the operation; and to what extent has the PMO considered collaborating with the Chittagong Branch which has many volunteers who speak the same language as the target population?	Appropriate-ness
17.	With volunteers being at the forefront of engaging target population for distribution and services delivery, how has the PMO considered data privacy and protection of people reached?	Appropriate-ness
18.	To what extent has BDRCS considered the well-being and safety, gender and diversity, profiles and capacities of its volunteers mobilised for the PMO? What key factors have supported or hindered meeting these needs, and why? What are specific recommendations to strengthen in this area?	Efficiency
19.	What are the major constraints identified on the support and work with the volunteers?	Efficiency

5. Evaluation methodology & process

The methodology will adhere to the IFRC Framework for Evaluations, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

An **IFRC evaluation management team (EMT)** will manage and oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The EMT will consist of three people not directly involved with the operation. The EMT will support the review team prior to and during the review, provide the interface with the IFRC offices in Bangladesh and Kuala Lumpur, and guide the evaluation and approval of the deliverables, with particular attention to sufficient stakeholder involvement for ownership and use of the findings and recommendations.

The **review team** will consist of at least three people: one team leader and two or three evaluation practitioners from the IFRC membership (National Societies) that have no direct participation in this operation. The IFRC country office in Bangladesh will help to clarify internal processes and approaches for the team as well as support the in-country arrangement for the evaluation team. The team will be gender balanced. Ideally, one of the NS representatives should have knowledge of the IFRC systems (particularly in HR, finance and logistics). Ideally all candidates will have some experience with evaluation practices and the IFRC disaster response systems.

- The **team leader** will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations. The team leader will report on progress or challenges to the management group and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he will not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated. Ideally, s/he should have knowledge of IFRC systems. Appointment of the team leader will be based on professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation. S/he can be from IFRC offices from other regions or Geneva.

- The **team members** will work with the team leader in the evaluation process, and will be able to provide perspectives on the RCRC actors and interactions in the operation. It is expected that the team will be able to conduct a reliable and informed evaluation of the emergency operation that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders. Other evaluation team members can also be sourced from the IFRC RTE trained roster.

The specific **evaluation methodology** will be detailed in close consultation between the review team, EMT, Commissioner and relevant key stakeholders, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

1. **Desktop review** of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, including IFRC as well as BDRCS and National policies and SOPs relevant to the four areas of support services, prior IFRC reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data, such exist surveys from IFRC participants in the operation.
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites and to the country and regional offices.
3. **Key informant interviews** (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate).
4. **Focus group discussions** (institutional and beneficiaries) as time and capacity allow.

The review team will meet with and interview key Red Cross Red Crescent stakeholders in person or via telephone/skype. The team will also consult with other partners and organizations such as governments, the UN, INGOs / NGOs as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives, including beneficiaries.

Secondary data will be provided to the review team early in the exercise, and initial briefing and selected key informant interviews will be used for the review team to draft an inception report. Upon review and approval of the inception report, data collection and analysis will follow the detailed plan as outlined in the inception report. The review team will receive security briefings for all field visits as required.

Initial findings will be shared with the IFRC, BDRCS and the partner operational response teams in Bangladesh. Recommendations will be developed based on the initial findings and consultation with relevant key stakeholders.

6. Evaluation deliverables

Inception Report – The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the review and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team.

Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels: The team will report its preliminary findings to the IFRC country office, BDRCS and operational partners, and the IFRC APRO.

Draft report: A draft report identifying key findings based on facts and will separate from the report opinions or rumours, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within one weeks of the evaluation team's return from the field.

Final report: The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his/her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

The draft and final reports will be submitted through the EMT, who will ensure the quality of the report providing input if necessary. The EMT will submit the report to the key stakeholders interviewed for review and clarifications. The Commissioner will oversee a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up.

7. Timeframe

Activities	Due dates	Days	Deliverables
Desk review, initial KII and develop inception report	3-9 December	7	Inception report
In-country data collection and analysis Presentation of initial findings	10-16 December (including travel days) in Bangladesh	7	Preliminary findings
Debriefing/presentation in the IFRC regional office Kuala Lumpur	19 December	1	Preliminary findings

Prepare and submit draft report with annexes	17-20 December (including travel days) in Kuala Lumpur	3	Draft report
IFRC submits any requests for clarifications, corrections, changes on the draft report	22-29 December		
Finalize and submit final report with annexes	4-5 January	2	Final report
	Total	**20**	

7. Evaluation quality and ethical standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility**: Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility**: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality**: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence**; Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency**: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy**: Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation**: Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration**: Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

8. Qualifications

Selection of the **team leader and team members** will be based on the qualifications outlined below:

1. Demonstrable experience in leading or conducting evaluations of humanitarian programs responding to major disasters, with specific experience in operational review or evaluation preferred.
2. Knowledge of the IFRC systems and policies (in HR, finance, logistics, and volunteering).
3. Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders.
4. Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner.
5. Experience in qualitative data collection and data analysis techniques, especially in emergency operations.

6. Knowledge and experience working with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and knowledge of the IFRC's disaster management systems.
7. Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a team.
8. Fluent in English – communication and presentation skills, and written skills with relevant writing samples of similar evaluation reports.
9. Knowledge of Bangladesh and relevant migration issues would be an advantage.
10. Immediate availability for the period indicated.
11. Completed IFRC online security training (which can be done upon recruitment is needed).

9. Application procedures

Interested candidates for should submit their application material by 13 November 2017 to the PMER Manager, IFRC APRO at clarence.sim@ifrc.org. Application material is non-returnable, and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process.

Application materials should include:

1. **Curriculum Vitae** (CV)
2. **Expression of Interest** clearly summarizing your interest and experience as it pertains to this TOR
3. At least one example of an evaluation report most similar to that described in this TOR

Annex 5: Survey Questions

The online-survey as seen below was sent via the Surge team in Geneva on 07 Dec 2017, using a mailing list including operational PNS contacts (total of 250 recipients)

Dear colleagues,

Please find below a short series of questions related to the effectiveness of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Bangladesh Population Movement Operation. This survey is primarily intended for personnel working within surge roles within Partner National Societies.

This survey focuses on HR, finance and logistics, which are the primary areas of interest for the current internal review. There is also a general comments section for feedback that fits outside of these three subject areas.

All questions are optional - you only need to answer the questions where you have experience or an opinion to share. By providing information about your name and role, you help us to understand the context of your comments. All comments will be de-identified by the review team in order to protect your confidentiality.

For more information, please refer to Juergen Hoegl (Austrian Red Cross; juergen.hoegl@redcross.at), team-leader for the review team.

Many thanks for your time – your feedback by 15 December 2017 is appreciated!

Juergen, Jess, Yadav and Ari (review team)

1) Your name: [text]
2) National Society or agency: [text]
3) Your role - in relation to the Bangladesh Response: [text]
4) Email (Please include your email address in case we have any further questions for you): [text]

HR and surge personnel

5) For the Red Cross and Red Crescent Bangladesh response, how coordinated and timely was the selection of deployed members? [tick-box]
    a. Not at all coordinated or timely
    b. Somewhat coordinated and timely
    c. Sufficiently coordinated and timely
    d. Extremely well coordinated and timely
6) What are the main constraints faced to ensure regular support from national and international staff? [text]
7) How can the barriers in optimising surge deployments be resolved? [text]
8) Please add any further feedback about HR and surge personnel (Consider what is working well, what needs to be improved, what should be in place to sustain a successful operation): [text]
9) Please add any observations or feedback about volunteer management in the Bangladesh response (Consider what is working well, what needs to be improved, what should be in place to sustain a successful operation): [text]

Finance and Logistics

10) To what extent have Movement partners been engaged in ensuring adequate resources are made available? [tickbox]
    a) Not at all engaged
    b) Somewhat engaged

c) Sufficiently engaged
d) Extremely well engaged

11) How could Movement partners be better engaged to ensure adequate resources for the Bangladesh response? [text]
12) How has the ratio between operational and support budgets been communicated with Movement partners? [text]
13) Given the scale and visibility of the crisis, why has there been a low response from PNS to the mobilization table? [text]
14) How have bilateral contributions impacted on the cost-effectiveness of the operation? Have they adhered to IFRC logistics standards? [text]
15) Please add any further comments about logistics and/or finance (Consider what is working well, what needs to be improved, what should be in place to sustain a successful operation): [text]

General comments

16) What has been working well in the Bangladesh response? [text]
17) What requires improvement in the Bangladesh response? [text]
18) In what ways has the Bangladesh response been effective and efficient? [text]
19) How have IFRC, BDRCS and Movement partners' capacity been harnessed? [text]
20) What needs to be in place to help sustain the success of this operation? [text]

Annex 6: Income and Expenditure Comparison

As of 19 December 2017, the IFRC has received a total of CHF 12.23 million against the appeal budget CHF 29.94 million (excluding the ERU components) in support of its PMO in Bangladesh. A total of CHF 2.79 million, or 9 % of the total budget has been spent. Comparing income vs. expenditure, 23 % of total income has been spent.

The first three to six months of an operation is the key time of having high-value expenses. Due to the different (man-made, non-sudden and protracted) nature of this operation, the spending ratio has gradually increased from August 2017, but has not able to gain appropriate speed.



PMO Bangladesh: Financial Health of IFRC Emergency Appeal in CHF (as of 19 December 2017)



PMO Bangladesh: Financial Health of IFRC Emergency Appeal in percent (as of 19 December 2017)

Annex 7: Summary of Dhaka Validation Workshop

Date & Time: 17 December 2017, 11am - 1:30pm
Location: BDRCS Office, Dhaka

Attendance:

No	Name	Designation	Organization
1	Mr. Azmat Ulla	Head of Country Office	IFRC, Bangladesh
2	Ms. Joanna Hill	Surge Delegate	British RC
3	Mr. Ahmad Sami	Regional National Society Development	IFRC, APRO
4	Mr. Motiar Rahman	Senior Finance Manager	IFRC, Bangladesh
5	Mr. Sirajul Islam Molla	Director, Health and HR	BDRCS
6	Mr. Amitabh Sharma	Country Rep	Swiss Red Cross
7	Mr. Praxedes Merchan	Surge Partnership Coordinator	IFRC, Bangladesh
8	Mr. Raqibul Alam	Sr. Manager, PMER with Comms	IFRC, Bangladesh
9	Ms. Senjuti Khisa	Sr. PMER Officer (embedded BDRCS)	IFRC, Bangladesh
10	Mr. Hasibul Bari Razib	Manager, Response and Shelter	IFRC, Bangladesh
11	Mr. Mehedi Hasan Shishir	Livelihood officer and Cash Focal	IFRC, Bangladesh
12	Ms. Afroza Sultana	PMER Officer	BDRCS
13	Mr. Mohammad Kamrul Hasan	Sr. PMER Officer	BDRCS
14	Mr. Shakhawat Hossain	RSO	BDRCS
15	Mr. Nazmul Azam Khan	Director, DR	BDRCS
16	Ms. Rita Marie Petralba	Country Rep	Swedish RC
17	Mr. Md. Belal Hossain	Director, DRM	BDRCS
18	Ms. Afroza Khandker	Sr. Manager, OD	IFRC
19	Mr. Md. Afsar Uddin	Director, Logistics	BDRCS
20	Mr. Sajid Hasan	Intern (admin support)	IFRC
21	Mr. Martin Faller	Deputy Head of Region	IFRC, APRO
22	Mr. Huq Mozharul	Secretary General	BDRCS

Outline

- The review team leader introduced the review scope, timeline and approach.
- Each member of the review team presented their initial findings and a high-level summary of successes, challenges, lessons and findings.
- Participants worked in five groups, roughly organised by subject matter: finance, logistics, HR, volunteering and general findings. The latter group comprised senior leaders from IFRC and BDRCS.

- Participants received a copy of the draft major recommendations and enabling steps. Participants worked on this document - to

Feedback from Working Groups

General findings and recommendations

The working group widely agrees to draft recommendations with some suggested add-on to successes and challenges:

Successes:

- The BDRCS has brokered Independent Humanitarian Access based on its principles and auxiliary role with the GoB - this applies to all Movement Partners.
- Daily Federation-wide reports, later transformed into weekly Sitreps, with measured deliverables were highly relevant and appreciated by Federation-wide partners. Fortnightly Movement Infographics including ICRC/IFRC/BDRCS.

Challenges:

- 'Out of the 6 ERUs, 4 are working well. The M40 and MSM ERUs have unfortunately produced very little results in terms of clean drinking water and latrines respectively over the last 3 months, despite investment. This is [in the commenter's opinion] a result of less qualified HR. It seems that other organisations including some bilateral Movement partners have managed better.'
- There is a need for Emergency HR-, Emergency Finance- and Emergency Procurement processes in place, where speed and quality are mutually inclusive - in the PMO and for crisis/disaster response in general.
- Clarity on roles and responsibilities for Geneva, KL, country level.

The IFRC Head of Country Office made the following additional comments:

- 'There was a clear organogram [of the PMO] very early on, so there are no problems with reporting lines. It is important to recognise that the IFRC works as one and not in 'layers' - for example, the ultimate responsible body for the IFRC in Bangladesh as defined by its legal status is the HoCO - not the person, but the position.'
- 'The One Window: Approach, Framework and ultimately Plan will serve the Movement well in terms of Principles, Coordination and Quality. There could be different types, which are being developed for the [February 2018] Partnership Meeting and not necessarily to have one plan or one channel of funds, BUT at least a single approach and framework which will also give higher assurance towards our Principle of Unity.'
- 'Focus must be towards service delivery and one should not see Coordination as a means to an end, if this does not result in qualitative, quantitative and timely support to vulnerable populations.'

Logistics

In addition to the recommendations, the team suggested to add:

- Hiring of local staff in Cox's Bazar has been slow.
- BDRCS counterpart for IFRC Logs still missing
- This operation would be opportunity for BDRCS to build their capacity

    - PNS who have been in country for long might be able to support
- Procurement, Local FA needed
- Is there insurance coverage for daily labour working at the warehouses -> HR issue

Finance

In addition to the recommendations, the team suggested to add:

- Timely reporting from National Society to the donor/IFRC
- Emphasis to complete the online course on fraud and corruption prevention for all staff.

Human Resources

The working group widely agrees to major recommendations with the following comment on Deployments:

- HR requests to BDRCS to support surge tools [with local personnel] should be coordinated through one specific channel.

Additional comments:

- HR planning is the key to success of the PMO, and the priority for efficient programme implementation.
- Existing, skilled Movement key personnel should be deployed to lead the programme in combination with additional new hiring of national experts.
- Set a BDRCS standard HR procedure and guideline for quicker requesting, processing and onboarding new HR.
- BDRCS could have exposure visits to Movement partners to learn from their experience on managing of surge interventions, and related capacity development for the Host National Society.

Volunteering

The working group widely agrees to these major recommendations with some observations:

- Tone down the term of payment so that the spirit of volunteerism should prevail.
- The term of 'community and Youth Red Cross volunteers' could be harmonized with BDRCS volunteer management system.

Under the Enabling steps:

- Registration of volunteers for insurance need to be under the ownership of branch and sub-branch structure following BDRCS volunteer management system.
- A systematic approach for volunteer recruitment, retention and recognition to be put in place for longer time sustainability of volunteer programme.
- Develop a strong linkage and support strategy for branch and sub-branch structure improvement with technical support from BDRCS Youth & Volunteer department, NHQ.

Annex 8: PMO Risk Analysis

The Annex lists relevant risks for the future PMO identified by the review team. Listed risks are resulting from the review's areas of interest and general findings. Risk is defined as the product of probability (likelihood) and impact (effects) [R = L x I]. The analysis uses a standard risk matrix with each five levels of likelihood and impact. The review team has defined likelihood and impact levels / thresholds used for risk scoring (using standard risk indices). Note that risks are interdependent and may aggravate each other[17].

The review team did the actual scoring of likelihood and impact, based on findings and conclusions from the PMO. It was not an exercise involving key informants.

#	Risk	Risk	Risk description	Likelihood	Impact
A	Ill-defined or ill-communicated roles & responsibilities and delegation of authority	**12**	Unclarity (overlaps/gaps; poor communication) on roles & responsibilities, especially for project managers, budget holders, appeal manager and regional office (on IFRC side), project director and project managers (on BDRCS-side), and unclarity on delegation of authority, contributing to prolonged decision making, operational delays and lack of accountability.	4	3
B	Insufficient long-term planning	**16**	Lack of longer-term strategy, operational planning and prioritization of interventions (National Society Emergency Plan) and comprehensive support planning (BDRCS human resources plan and one BDRCS reporting system) affecting the quality of programming. BDRCS may not be able to take advantage of capacity building opportunities linked to PMO.	4	4
C	Absence of strategic Movement coordination	**12**	Challenges in Movement partners' coordination and cooperation on country level. Impact on efficiency, coherence and quality of interventions and services provided (including bilateral activities). Movement (Federation) wide reporting not yet in place.	4	3
D	Political influence on humanitarian programming	**9**	Politicized environment of the PMO influencing decision-making and needs-based programming for the affected persons (including both host communities and PfR).	3	3
E	Lack of qualified human resources	**20**	Lack of technical and managerial expertise due to untimely recruitment a/o non-availability of qualified and accountable staff (national, international) and volunteers. Potential for missed opportunities for increased utilization of branch volunteers (CXB and beyond) as well as (CBX) branch development.	5	4
F	Inadequate duty of care	**12**	Health, safety and security of staff and volunteers compromised by a lack of preventive, mitigative or reactive procedures a/o unequal procedures for different BDRCS groups of staff / volunteers. Lack of coherent volunteering policies (age restrictions, reimbursements, insurance, inequality of community volunteers…). Breaches of Code of Conduct may cause reputational damage.	3	4
G	Lack of accountability	**16**	Gaps in compliance with donor requirements (earmarked contributions), minimum finance and reporting standards and internal control systems (fraud & corruption prevention). Impact on efficiency and reputation, potential repayment of funds to donors, not meeting funding requirements.	4	4
H	Significant funding gaps	**16**	Funding gaps affect PMO (quality and extent of implementation of planned interventions). To an extent, funding gaps may be compensated by low spending rates.	4	4
I	Logistics deficiencies	**12**	Improper setup of logistics workflows and processes (procurement standards, procurement planning, warehousing, fleet management, staffing) resulting in operational delays a/o non-compliance with procedures.	3	4

Major risks of the Bangladesh PMO (resulting from the internal review's areas of interest and general findings).
Note that risks are interdependent and may aggravate effects each other.

[17] E.g., not enough experts available to implement plans will lead to delayed implementation, which in turn may scare of potential donors and increase the risk for funding gaps. These gaps may result in revisions of operational priorities, posing in increased risk of non-utilization of earmarked funds or the need for negotiations with back donors and reputational issues...

impact / probability	irrelevant	small	relevant	severe	disastrous
very likely				E	
likely			A C F I	B H G	
seldom			D	J	
unlikely					
very unlikely					

Likelihood (throughout PMO)		
1	very unlikely	< 1%
2	Unlikely	1-5%
3	Seldom	5-20%
4	Likely	20-49%
5	very likely	> 50%

Impact (adverse reputational, sectoral implementation a/o financial effects)		
1	irrelevant	no reputational, implementation a/o financial effects
2	small	minor reputational effects, implementation delayed <1 month, minor financial effects (<5 % of budget)
3	relevant	some reputational effects, implementation delayed 2-3 months a/o some minor objectives not reached, relevant financial effects (<6-15 % of budget)
4	severe	relevant reputational effects, implementation delayed >3 months a/o major objectives not reached, significant financial effects (16-30% of budget)
5	disastrous	major reputational damage, implementation cancelled a/o majority of objectives not reached, major financial effects (>30% of budget)

Left: Risk matrix of the Bangladesh PMO (5x5; resulting from the intern review's areas of interest and general findings);
Right: probability and impact levels used for risk scoring

Annex 9: Recommendations and enabling steps at-a-glance

Area of interest	Recommendation	Enabling steps	IFRC-wide	PMO
General	G1. Review roles and responsibilities for the leadership level of the PMO, and communicate broadly alongside with information on the decision-making process.	G1.1 IFRC review and document roles and responsibilities of longer-term PMO leadership functions (Operations Manager / Support Service Manager upwards, including APRO) and their respective (direct / technical) reporting lines. Disseminate to all Movement stakeholders involved (by the upcoming Partnership Meeting).		✓
		G.1.2 BDRCS and IFRC take timely decisions on the right tactical, operational and strategic level. For both partners, this requires delegation of authority and transparent information on the decision-making process		✓
		G1.3 IFRC consider the soft-skills required of aspirants during the recruitment phase for key personnel.	✓	✓
		G1.4 Broad dissemination and training on the ERF and the finalisation of the envisaged 'Red level' disaster / crisis guideline are recommended.	✓	
	G2. Fully implement the 'One Window Approach' when transitioning from surge to a longer-term setup	G2.1 BDRCS, supported by IFRC, explain the One Window Approach in more detail to PMO stakeholders, in the run-up of the February Partnership Meeting.		✓
		G2.2 BDRCS lead the development of a PMO master plan ('National Society Emergency Plan'), with the support of Movement partners by mid-January, in preparation for the February 2018 partnership meeting. In parallel, BDRCS and IFRC develop and finalize of supporting plans such as a comprehensive BDRCS human resources plan and one BDRCS reporting system.		✓
		G2.3 Through revitalized Movement Coordination at the country level, IFRC, ICRC and in-country PNS contribute to the design of the master plan, support its implementation and sustainability. The Implementation shall promote 'shared leadership' amongst Movement partners, taking care of components of the master plan.		✓
		G2.4 With BDRCS in the lead role, IFRC CO facilitate the planning platform integration of Movement partners into the operation (utilizing the additional Country Office-capacity allocated for the preparation of the partnership meeting mid-February).		✓
		G2.5 Partners contribute to Movement-wide (or at least, Federation-wide) reporting for the PMO.		✓
Human Resource Management	H1. IFRC improves surge and longer-term HR processes with a view to timeliness of staffing and competencies of personnel. Increase procedural knowledge of key personnel.	H1.1 IFRC establish and deploy a core set of surge profiles required for a 'Category Red' emergency, increase the required leadership and management competencies for first-rotation delegates to 'Red' disasters ('brains rather than hands') and provide more detailed information on the competencies required (both on regional and global level). PNS increase the supply of experienced personnel by providing more missions for a smaller pool of highly skilled delegates.	✓	
		H1.2 IFRC shall begin recruitment of longer-term roles for key international positions within a week of commencing surge to a major emergency. Prioritize ongoing (surge optimisation) initiatives to revise emergency recruitment processes and the dissemination of respective information.	✓	
		H1.3. Channel IFRC Surge requests through one focal point rather than using multiple channels. Avoid uncoordinated parallel recruitments for the same operation, from the same pools.	✓	

Human Resource Management		H1.4 Seek surge personnel for an extended duration (8-12 week missions), especially from 2nd rotations onwards. Take into account the challenging conditions of individual operations and innovative employment models (on PNS-side).	✓	✓
		H1.5 IFRC CO and PNS immediately rectify workflows to ensure the timely completion of visa arrangements for delegates (with timely delegate information and minimum time issuance of Letters of Invitation).	✓	✓
		H1.6 IFRC review the utilization of surge capacities and sectoral approaches in the PMO in more detail (RTE or specific evaluation).	✓	
	H2. BDRCS immediately adopts fast-tracked recruitment procedures for the emergency operation.	H2.1 Install a BDRCS fast-track recruitment procedure, applying a fixed-contract model, considering the competitive job market situation		✓
		H2.2 Increase the number of qualified national staff in the PMO according to the operational needs to sustain the PMO. This requires senior management approval within BDRCS. Alternatively, agree with BDRCS for IFRC contracting local staff.		✓
		H2.3 Delegate the recruitment of BDRCS field personnel to the CXB level		✓
		H2.4 Consider aspects of 'duty of care' also for BDRCS staff and volunteers in the PMO. Provide training opportunities during the on-boarding phase for new national staff, ensuring Red Cross and Red Crescent and sectoral learning		✓
		H2.5 Clarify the roles and responsibilities for staff seconded to the national society (i.e. for disciplinary actions) on IFCR and BDRCS side.	✓	✓
		H2.6 Monitor labour-market regulations and consider insurance for daily labour.		✓
	H3. BDRCS takes a long-term approach to increasing staff capacity in Disaster Response.	H3.1 BDRCS headquarters scale up Disaster Response HR capacities and build a backup structure to ensure business continuity during emergencies.		✓
		H3.2 Introduce learning opportunities for Host National Society personnel to increase the understanding for global and regional procedures and better manage incoming surge capacities.		✓
		H3.3 Conduct a 'Disaster Response Capacity Evaluation' (DRCE) to support broader disaster response capacity building.		✓
		H3.4 Utilize the capacities of Movement partners in country to build capacities.		✓
Finance	F1. BDRCS and IFRC strengthen their finance capability by recruiting more staff and training them on standard procedures, policies and good practices to improve timely reporting	F1.1 BDRCS and IFRC finance teams and programme colleagues engage in results-focussed discussion and action to increase the understanding of gaps in policies and procedures, and expenditure authorization ceilings.		✓
		F1.2 IFRC shares clear roles and responsibilities, including the delegation of financial authority of senior management team to the staff, so they can approach the right person for the support.	✓	✓
		F1.3 BDRCS settle acquittals more quickly to ensure adequate cash flow for programmes implemented by BDRCS.		✓
		F1.4 IFRC increase the cap on cash in field, in order to meet future Cash Transfer Programming needs.		✓
		F1.5 BDRCS establish a fraud and corruption prevention policy that is suited to emergency operations and does not disrupt the workflow.		✓
		F1.6 IFRC communicate with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to resolve the matter of VAT exemption.		✓
		F1.7 BDRCS upgrade accounting software (e.g. of Navision) and install at sub-office / PMO project level.		✓
Finance	F2. Improve coordination and provide financial services between BDRCS / IFRC and PNS partners to ensure smooth cash flow.	F2.1 Initiate dialogue with partners to bring them under the integration agreement, so IFRC can help resolve problems with the flow of funds.		✓
		F2.2 Establish Field Office level authorities for BDRCS and IFR to resolve efficiently finance problems - including the settlement of acquittals - at CXB level.		✓
		F2.3 IFRC / BDRCS take immediate action to fill the human resources gaps in finance.		✓

	F3. BDRCS mitigate fraud and corruption concerns by strengthening internal control systems and training.	F3.1 IFRC or BDRCS increase their fraud and corruption prevention activities (such as workshops). F3.2 Monthly meeting of SMT of RCRC Movement Partners to analyse the risks and sharing the challenges. F3.3 Clarify roles and responsibilities for project managers, budget holders, operation managers, Head of Country Office and BDRCS. F3.4 Inform in advance / regularly communicate on pledge management and its risks to the SMT and implementing partners. F3.5 Update donors on delays in implementation affecting the utilisation of their funds within given timeframe. Manage the reputational risk by gaining trust being transparent and honest. F3.6 Closely monitor the Budget vs. Funding vs. Implementation ratios, highlights risk and concerns to SMT well in advance.	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Logistics	L1. In major operations, strong logistics management is required from the onset to longer-term implementation.	L1.1 For 'Category Red' emergencies, a FACT Logistics Coordinator shall always be included into the first FACT rotation and the logistics management capacity shall be safeguarded without gaps. L1.2 Long-term positions in logistics shall be identified and opened at the latest two months after the start of a 'red' operation. For the PMO, these would be Logistics Coordinator and Procurement Delegate to ensure continuity and quality of the procurement services at CXB. An IFRC Fleet Delegate is required for an additional month to set the fleet operation at a sustainable level. Other long-term logistics roles can be hired locally. L1.3 IFRC Logistics Coordinator, BDRCS Director of Logistics, and BDRCS PMO Project Director need to work together to plan logistics activities in coordinated way. BDRCS needs to appoint a counterpart for IFRC Logistics Coordinator as soon as possible. L1.4 Once cooperation is established, further BDRCS logistics capacity enhancement shall be the next step	✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
	L2. Enable comprehensive and cost-effective logistics planning.	L2.1 IFRC programme managers need to provide clear and prioritized material need; especially FACT Delegates are required to have skills to make material planning and material request with priorities and against a timetable, thereby enabling logistics to provide cost-effective and timely support. L2.2. On top of the normal Mobilization Table distribution by the RLU, material needs (as defined in the MobTable) should be highlighted at partnership calls to get the attention of PNS for material gaps. L2.3 IFRC should continue to discourage unsolicited bilateral donations. For a cost-effective supply chain, all potential in-kind donations should be coordinated through the IFRC Regional Logistics Unit. At the same time, IFRC must have capable logistics team on the ground to implement Logistics activities including local procurement. L2.4 Environmentally friendly options might not always be available or feasible in the emergency operation, nevertheless guidelines and training on 'Green Response' in humanitarian emergency response is still widely lacking, and should especially be considered for future procurement and distributions.	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	 ✓
Volunteering	V1. Strengthen the pool of experienced, skilled and senior volunteers (via NDRT, stronger program teams, engaging senior volunteers).	V1.1 IFRC NSD and BDRCS Youth and Volunteers invest in CXB branch leadership, to ensure ownership and sustainability. V1.2 Stronger leadership of the CXB branch and sub-branch structure in the recruitment and management of volunteers, with support from BDRCS Youth and Volunteer department, NHQ. V1.3 BCRCS establish regular volunteer workforce for each program area, on minimum three-month rotations. V1.4 BDRCS establish a systematic approach to volunteer recruitment, retention and recognition beyond the Youth Red Cross structure, including greater use of NDRT and senior volunteers to increase experience, leadership and continuity within programs.		✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

	V2. Stronger focus on the welfare of volunteers, including health and safety, psychosocial support and timely payment of allowances.	V2.1 Stronger peer support between PSS teams (delegates and volunteers) and volunteers working on other operations. V2.2 BDRCS pay volunteers in full within 48 hours, in lieu of reimbursement from partners. Compensate volunteers for health-related costs incurred during the course of their work in the camps. V2.3 BDRCS and IFRC take rapid action to ensure full payment of per diems to volunteers for past work undertaken. If the cash flow issue cannot be resolved, use emergency appeal funds to absorb the cost		✓ ✓ ✓
	V3. Integrate and equalise the conditions of volunteers from the host community and Rakhine State in the BDRCS structure.	V3.1 BDRCS equalise and integrate community volunteers within the BDRCS volunteer structure - so that they receive equal visibility, training, and per diems. PMO HR advisor work with BDRCS counterparts to examine legal matters and ensure that community volunteers are adequately protected. V3.2 BDRCS registers community volunteers for IFRC insurance.		✓ ✓