



International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

&

DPRK Red Cross Society (DPRK RCS)

2016 North Hamgyong Flood Operation

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

FINAL EVALUATION

**A qualitative learning evaluation of Emergency and Recovery interventions undertaken
by the DPRK RCS supported by IFRC, from September 2016 to December 2017.**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
List of Acronyms, Terms and Abbreviations	7
1. INTRODUCTION	8
1.1 Rapid Background of the 2016 North Hamgyong Flood.....	8
1.2 Description of the Flood Operation.....	8
2. METHODOLOGY OF THE FINAL EVALUATION	10
2.1 Purpose of the Final Evaluation.....	10
2.2 Used Methodology	10
2.3 Implemented Activities	10
2.4 Limitations	11
3. KEY COMPARATIVE FINDINGS	12
3.1 Relevance & Appropriateness (& Coherence).....	12
3.2 Coverage.....	14
3.3 Effectiveness (& Accountability).....	16
3.4 Efficiency & Monitoring.....	17
3.5 Impact.....	20
3.6 Sustainability (& Connectiveness)	22
4. GENERAL CONCLUSION	24
5. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON LESSONS LEARNT	25
APPENDIXES	27

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I would like to take the opportunity here to express my deep consideration of the impressive involvement of individuals during the implementation of this unprecedented massive emergency response, in very challenging working and living conditions.

Lastly, may the Final Evaluation contribute to enhance *DPRK RCS* and *IFRC* humanitarian response capacity and assist the Red Cross Movement in reducing the burden of natural disasters through solid prevention, preparedness and response in the future.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Six northern counties of North Hamgyong Province, along the Chinese border, were seriously hit by an unprecedented massive flood, in the night of 31 August 2016. The Government estimated that 600,000 persons were affected by the flood, including 140,000 severely affected persons; about 30,000 houses were totally or partly destroyed. Characterized by steep hills, deep and narrow valleys, the area is relatively isolated from the rest of DPRK. To respond to the largest disaster ever experienced in the North Hamgyong Province, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* jointly implemented the *MDRKPO08* Flood Operation, starting in September 2016 and to be completed by December 2017. With a large reduction in funding *DPRK RCS & IFRC* Flood Operation (33% of requested fund obtained), the total number of targeted beneficiaries decreased from 330,000 to 110,000.

The Final Evaluation '*...determines to what degree the humanitarian objectives of the relief and recovery interventions have been achieved and how the methodologies utilized have facilitated and contributed to the results attained...*'. Key lessons and recommendations from this evaluation process will guide *DPRK RCS & IFRC* in future operations and contribute to broader *Red Cross Red Crescent* learning. The Evaluation Report documents the findings based on a visit in DPRK (Pyongyang, Chongjin and the 3 main affected Counties: Yonsa; Musan and Hoeryong City). The field visit occurred from December 05th to December 22nd, 2017.

Key Findings

(1) Relevance/Appropriateness and Coherence

Beneficiaries' selection criteria were appropriately designed, focusing on families who suffered most from flooding. The nature of special attention to the most vulnerable persons could have been better clarified from the programming phase, for clearer guidance, systematic inclusion and ease of monitoring. Overall, the Flood Operation activities were adapted to the needs which vary depending on phases (Emergency or Recovery approaches).

Selected approaches and technical solutions of the Flood Operation are relevant, with satisfactory quality materials and equipment, as well as a suitable range of associated training/workshops and messages dissemination. From a programming perspective, the Flood Operation worked out satisfactory planning to deliver goods and services related to emergency needs.

The Final Evaluation interviews gather very high regards expressed by the affected population towards *DPRK RCS* support. Emergency Response and Recovery activities were in line with Government policies and *DPRK RCS & IFRC* strategies. *IFRC* and *DPRK RCS* are considered as a major Disaster Risk Management actor by the international community based in Pyongyang.

The Flood Operation implemented some suitable Emergency interventions with respect to gender-based considerations. The absence of related indicators makes difficult any in-depth analysis of how this was applied.

(2) Coverage

The Flood Operation was a large-scale intervention to respond to a massive natural disaster. While selection criteria are clear and special attention to provide to the most vulnerable groups of population was acted, there is little related disaggregated information in donor reports. Reported data about beneficiaries bring some confusions regarding calculation of total beneficiaries and associated analysis. A thorough analysis approach, based on collected disaggregated data, would be useful in the development of sources of information related to knowledge management for next operations. It also gives valuable potential for more contextualized (i.e. referring to specific location and timing) evidence-based decision-making (rather than standard assessment).

(3) Effectiveness (and Accountability)

The Flood Operation reached a good level of outcomes' achievement. The absence of a detailed logical framework, with SMART indicators of performance and associated sources of verification, is detrimental to performance measurement of the Flood Operation.

Considering the significant scale of interventions in a short period of time and with limited initial local capacity, this is quite a remarkable achievement.

The Flood Operation is defined by 2 different implementation phases (with different perspectives and approaches): 1- Emergency Phase, starting right after the flood and lasted approximately 3-4 months; 2- Recovery Phase, looking more at disaster preparedness and long-lasting benefits for the affected population.

(4) Efficiency (and Monitoring)

The Flood Operation was a large-scale intervention, with significant resources. Some aspects or activities of the Flood Operation (data analysis, knowledge management) could have benefited for greater allocation of resources, using part of remaining budget for it. 95% of total budget has been spent during the Flood Operation.

In terms of logistics, *DPRK RCS* prepositioning stocks in other provinces was a clear asset for rapid response despite huge logistics constraints to access affected areas. All levels of *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC* played active roles in the Flood Operation implementation. There have been significant efforts on *RCS* capacity building.

The Flood Operation implemented in a same program Shelter, WASH and Health, as well as related capacity building. The WASH approach used during the Flood Operation mainly focused on Water and Hygiene. The Flood Operation integrated Disaster Preparedness activities after the first phase of responding to emergency needs. *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC* had very good collaboration, with both appreciation of respective cooperation and management support.

(5) Impact

The Flood Operation has been a grasped opportunity to largely strengthen the Provincial & County *RCS* capacity. The outcomes assisted the affected populations in maintaining and resuming basic dignity; they also assisted them in resuming life in normal conditions with safe housing and basic facilities. The Flood Operation is considered by all stakeholders as a successful Disaster Response and Recovery operation. However, it remains difficult to measure produced evidence-based effects, with detailed indicators of performance.

(6) Sustainability.

The Provincial Branch long-term capacity seems to be very linked to regular support from the national level (with or without *IFRC* support).

Rapid conclusion

All stakeholders have expressed great satisfaction about *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC* contribution, from the Government of DPRK to the International Organizations in DPRK, as well as the affected communities. With a large-scale intervention design and associated resources to be implemented in relatively short period, achieved outcomes level is satisfactory. The Flood Operation could rely on dedicated and committed staff from all levels of *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC*, which played proactive roles in its successful design and implementation.

Previous *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC* Disaster Response experience, as well as existing prepositioned stocks in country, were well utilized. As an undeniable asset, *DPRK RCS* has an extensive network of *RCS* volunteers on the ground. Those characteristics allowed rapid emergency interventions, despite limited *DPRK RCS* capacity at field level (Province & Counties/City) at that time. In addition, *IFRC* support has been judged effective in many aspects (project management; *DPRK RCS* capacity building; technical expertise; HR surge team; administrative and logistics support).

Despite minor issues, the Flood Operation implemented quality interventions, in line with Government policies and *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC* strategies. *DPRK RCS* has close cooperation with the Government, especially with SCDEM. *IFRC* is well positioned as a major humanitarian actor within the International Community in Pyongyang, with proactive participation and leading roles in humanitarian coordination. Those are favorable factors for active advocacy roles *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC* both played and can pursue at their respective levels.

With a large number of targeted beneficiaries, there are some identified areas for improvement to increase quality services, especially towards the most vulnerable groups. This particularly concerns increased clarity of what specific attention should mean in practice. Reports to donors would be improved with more detailed disaggregated information about beneficiaries. Likewise, more monitoring clarification about CGI sheets distribution are expected into the Final Report (due by March 2018). This also highlights the need for appropriate Human Resources capacity for data analysis, to be adapted to the Operation scale (monitoring of distribution activities and related accountability requirements).

Knowledge management process is important for such a large-scale (and non-regular) operation. Documenting practices (field reports, learning notes, etc.) should have been further produced.

Through a WASH approach mainly focusing on Water and Hygiene during the Emergency period (displaced population), there is the need for further attention on Emergency Sanitation risks, with respect to outbreak prevention and control. Also, in close relation with behaviour change and how to adapt local interventions on a more contextualized basis, there should be more evidence-based decision-making process for local adaptation (rather than from a standardized assessment approach) for priority messages dissemination and related emergency activities.

The Flood Operation targeted a large number of beneficiaries, with massive deployment of means (budget, logistics and human resources). Considering the exceptional scale of interventions for *DPRK RCS & IFRC*, many lessons learnt can emerge from this large-scale Flood Operation, to be integrated in future *DPRK RCS & IFRC* Disaster Risk Management.

10 Main recommendations...

1- Building up based on sharing of experiences: develop a plan to transfer lessons learnt on Disaster Preparedness & Response Capacity to other provinces

- Exchange workshop between North Hamgyong Province and the 2 other provinces where DPRK RCS/IFRC programs (both Disaster Response and Development): sharing of experiences with previous interventions
- Planning deployment of Early Warning & Evacuation mechanisms in other counties and provinces, including more field-based Disaster Preparedness simulation exercises
- Support of *IFRC* to *DPRK RCS* Contingency Plan revision

2- Reporting and documenting

- Provide detailed monitoring information about actual use of CGI sheets (80% from 2016 supply)
- Share lessons learnt to HCT and Sector Working Groups (workshop if possible) for increased advocacy on enhanced Disaster Response and Preparedness capacity in country

3- Increase evidence-based decision-making process

- More technical advocacy about the high importance of flies control (Emergency Sanitation) during emergency phases, for further Outbreak Prevention & Control interventions when needed

4- Strengthen some activities programming

- Develop clear objectives for increased gender considerations and specific attention to the most vulnerable groups
- More Disaster Preparedness simulation exercises in the field (and specific focus on mitigation measures against flash floods)
- Strengthen DPRK RCS/IFRC strategy for long-lasting Behaviour Change, with priority focus on identification of determining factors

5- Linking Disaster Preparedness and Response with Disaster Risk Reduction efforts

- Priority focus on integrated DRR activities, linked with DPRK RCS areas of expertise: tree planting near water sources, pumping stations location in non-flooded areas, extreme cold temperature protection in bathrooms and valves chambers, etc.

List of Acronyms, Terms and Abbreviations

CAS	Cooperation Agreement Strategy
CGI	Corrugated Galvanized Iron
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DPRK RCS	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Red Cross Society
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EUPS	European Union Program Support (<i>official name of resident international NGOs</i>)
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HQ	Headquarters
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
NFI	Non-Food Items
O&M	Operation and maintenance
PMER	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
PNS	Partner National (Red Cross/Red Crescent) Society
RCS	Red Cross Society
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
SCEDM	State Committee for Emergency and Disaster Management
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
VCA	Vulnerability Capacity Assessment

1. INTRODUCTION

This next 2 pages briefly give a quick introduction of the Flood operation context.

1.1 Rapid Background of the 2016 North Hamgyong Flood

As a result of Typhoon *Lionrock*, 6 northern counties¹ of North Hamgyong Province, along the Chinese border, were seriously hit by an unprecedented massive flood in the province, in the night of 31 August 2016.

Official Government figures indicate the followings:

- 538 persons² lost their lives
- An estimation of 600,000 persons affected by the flood, including 140,000 severely affected persons
- About 30,000 houses were totally or partly destroyed: by end of November 2016, 11,928 households living in new houses or building units and 17,698 households living in rehabilitated houses
- 70,000 persons³ were displaced and lived under emergency tents during the first 2-3 months
- Also 18 Ri hospitals/clinics and 57 child institutions (nurseries, kindergartens and schools).

Characterized by steep hills, deep and narrow valleys, the area is relatively isolated from the rest of DPRK (3-hour to 5-hour drive from Chongjin⁴, the provincial capital of North Hamgyong Province, despite the presence of large mining factories and a railway network. Winter conditions are extreme (minus 20 to 25 degrees Celsius during the Final Evaluation visit, beginning of December), with frozen roads during several months (from mid-November to mid-March).

The Government of DPRK and the Humanitarian Country Team held 2 missions⁵ to assess, plan, monitor and coordinate the Flood Response. As per its mandate, SCEDM coordinated the overall emergency support. The international community organized regular inter-sectoral and sectoral (Shelter & NFI, WASH, Health, DRR Sector Groups) meetings for coordination and monitoring.

1.2 Description of the Flood Operation

Program Objectives

To respond to one of the largest disaster in the history of DPRK (the largest one for North Hamgyong Province), *DPRK RCS & IFRC* jointly implemented the *MDRKP008* Flood Operation, starting in September 2016 and to be completed by December 2017. It led to significant efforts to address emergency relief and recovery needs within a large scale.

The overall objective of the Flood Operation was to ensure that:

1. Immediate humanitarian needs of 11,928 displaced and relocated families (approximately 47,712 people), who were severely affected by the floods in the 6 counties/city are addressed
2. All flood-affected people in the 6 flood-affected counties (27,500 families = 110,000 people) receive assistance in their WASH, Health and Disaster Risk Reduction needs.

¹ Yonsa, Musan & Hoeryong City were the most severely affected places. Onsong, Kyongwon and Kyonghung Counties were also affected but to a lesser extent.

² 138 dead bodies, plus 400 bodies not found.

³ Using the standard DPRK rate for rural area of 4 persons per household, it indicates that not the entire population living in damaged houses were accommodated to emergency shelters.

⁴ Chongjin can be reached from Pyongyang by 2 flights per week or by road, but it takes almost 2-days' drive. Materials can be supplied by train or by boat.

⁵ Assessment Mission from 6 to 9 September; Review Mission from 18 to 23 November

List of Priority Activities

- Distribution of family Emergency Kits
- Health/Hygiene promotion dissemination in communities
- Provision of CGI sheets for permanent houses
- Provision of household First Aid kits and support to *DPRK RCS* First Aid posts
- Basic medical kits and midwife kits, plus solar heating systems to health institutions and hot water solar systems to nurseries and kindergartens
- Various training of *DPRK RCS* volunteers and Youth Groups (*DPRK RCS* capacity building)
- Improved Early Warning and Evacuation systems
- Rehabilitation of piped water supply systems
- Renovation of the North Hamgyong *RCS* Provincial warehouse

Targeted Program Population

With a large reduction in funding *DPRK RCS & IFRC* Flood Operation (33% of requested fund obtained), the total number of targeted beneficiaries decreased from 330,000 to 110,000.

From extrapolated information from donor reports, it seems that detailed numbers of beneficiaries per activities or outcomes were as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| - Emergency kits | 47,712 beneficiaries |
| - Shelter CGI sheets | 9,688 beneficiaries |
| - Water supply systems | 47,840 beneficiaries |

Main Stakeholders

DPRK RCS & IFRC; *RCS* Provincial Branches; *RCS* County/City branches;

SCEDM; County People's Committees; Provincial City Management Authority; Health Facilities; Kindergartens and nurseries

PNS; the International Community in Pyongyang: UNICEF; UNDP and other aid agencies involved in Sector Working Groups.

Financial Framework

- Initial Emergency Appeal request: CHF 15,199,723
- Available Budget: CHF 5,037,707 (*following second revision of the Emergency Appeal in November 2017*)

2. METHODOLOGY OF THE FINAL EVALUATION

This Chapter briefly presents the overall approach used for the Final Evaluation, as well as applied methodologies (& tools) and identified limitations.

2.1 Purpose of the Final Evaluation

As described in the Terms of References (See Annex 1), the Final Evaluation ‘... will determine to what degree the humanitarian objectives of the relief and recovery interventions have been achieved and how the methodologies utilized have facilitated and contributed to the results attained...’. Key lessons and recommendations from this evaluation process will guide DPRK RCS & IFRC in future operations and contribute to broader Red Cross Red Crescent learning, particularly to better address needs in emergency, relief and recovery, taking into account long-term impact and sustainability.

Therefore, the Final Evaluation is an additional quality tool, used to:

- (i) Give a clear overview of what and how the Flood Operation has been achieved (for Accountability purpose), and
- (ii) Identify main best practices and areas for improvement for future actions (for Knowledge Management purpose).

Notably, the Final Evaluation is intended to:

- Assess the extent to which interventions under the operation have achieved its objectives.
- Assess the capacity of the DPRK RCS to deliver relief and recovery assistance efficiently and make recommendations on how this capacity can be further strengthened.
- Examine the coordination and communication between national and international stakeholders (GoDPRK, SCEDM, UN Agencies, EUPS Units, Embassies)
- Assess the coordination and communication among DPRK CAS and Movement partners.

2.2 Used Methodology

The Inception report (See Annex 2) outlines the description of validated methodology applied for the Final Evaluation.

Focusing on both quantitative and qualitative aspects, the Final Evaluation assesses the current achievements against expected project outcomes. It identifies project progress and it also looks at challenges and potential gaps encountered throughout the project.

Using standard design for a Final Evaluation, it has been divided in 5 main categories:

- Desk Review
- Field Investigations (including Beneficiaries Interviews and Key Informants)
- Secondary Data Collection (including specific meetings & discussions with key persons)
- Data Analysis (& debriefing with DPRK RCS & IFRC)
- Draft and Final Evaluation Report

A list of Evaluations Questions, added to Key Aspects / Issues to Consider and associated Data Collection Methods provides a comprehensive overview of what the Final Evaluation should foresee. The Evaluation Questions are addressed in the *Key Comparative Findings* Chapter.

The workplan of the Final Evaluation is presented on Annex 3. Limited to 18 working days in total, the Final Evaluation focused on interventions implemented in affected areas of Musan County, Yonsa County and Hoeryong City.

2.3 Implemented Activities

The Evaluation Report documents the findings based on a visit in DPRK (Pyongyang, Chongjin and the 3 main affected Counties: Yonsa; Musan and Hoeryong City). The field visit occurred from December 05th to December 22nd, 2017. The Annex 3 describes the daily activities during the country visit; the Annex 4 is the list of Key Informants and Stakeholders interviewed and the Annex 5 is the list of questions during interviews (beneficiaries and RCS Volunteers Focus-Group Discussions).

Achieved activities - North Hamgyong Province

- Visit of 8 Ri / Dong / Up⁶
 - Yonsa County: Kwangyang Ri, Palso Ri
 - Hoeryong City: Songhak Ri, Yuson District, Kangan Dong
 - Musan County: Musan Up, Sambong Ri, Phungsan Ri
- 3 clinics/hospitals + 4 children institutions + 3 water supply sources: 1 river catchment and 2 pumping stations
- 16 Key Informants Interviews (DPRK RCS Branches, Clinics/Ri Hospital and Child Institution Managers, Pumping Station Managers)
- 12 interviews of beneficiaries
- 2 Focus-Group Discussions with *DPRK RCS* volunteers
- Visit of the Provincial warehouse

Achieved activities - Pyongyang

- 1 Meeting with *SCEDM*
- 1 Meeting with *DPRK RCS* Department Directors
- 5 Meetings with *IFRC* Regional Office and DPRK offices staff (including 2 former key DPRK office staff: former Head of Delegation and former Disaster Risk Management Delegate)
- 4 Meetings with International Organizations: *Office of the UN Resident Coordinator, UNICEF, UNDP, EUPS #3*
- Brief questionnaire to PNS concerned
- Debriefing with Secretary General, *DPRK RCS* and *IFRC* Program Coordinator⁷ – [*The PowerPoint support used for debriefing with DPRK RCS & IFRC is presented on Annex 6*].

2.4 Limitations

- **Limitations related to field access:** the *DPRK RCS & IFRC* Flood Operation was implemented in remote areas, far from the place of accommodation of the Evaluation Team (3h and up to 4h30 drive). Most of the time, an additional 30 mins was added to reach the targeted sites. Very harsh winter weather conditions (snow storms, up to minus 25 degrees during daytime) delayed access. As dusk starts at 4:30pm in winter season, time onsite was very limited for detailed investigations.
 - ⇒ **Mitigation measures:** the final Evaluation relied on cross-checking interviews of former staff, to read in details project documentations.
- **Limitations related to the context of DPR of Korea for random investigations:** as mentioned in the Terms of References, evaluation methodology should be adapted to the context.
 - ⇒ **Mitigation measures:** the final Evaluation had priority focus on Key Informant Interviews and One-to-One Interviews.
- **Limitations related to linear replies to questions:** while information from beneficiaries and Key Informant Interviews tends to be similar, participatory process cannot be largely used within the Final Evaluation. Open questions and suggestions can provide with some details and give valuable inputs.
 - ⇒ **Mitigation measures:** the final Evaluation looked for collection of details during discussions to deepen understanding of issues and achievements.
- **Limitations related to limited knowledge management:** many *IFRC* staff were involved during the Flood Operation, but the key persons are not present anymore.
 - ⇒ **Mitigation measures:** the final Evaluation had rapid Skype call with 2 key former staff (Head of Delegation and DRM Delegate) and collected a larger range of reports for detailed review, when they were available.

⁶ Ri, Dong and Up are different titles for administrative units in DPRK. Ri can be the equivalent of a community or a village, with many work units. Dong and Up are most related to units in Township; Dong is not about agriculture matters.

⁷ The *DPRK RCS* Secretary General had no negative critic to mention about the Final Evaluation. He agreed on the proposed recommendations.

3. KEY COMPARATIVE FINDINGS

The Final Evaluation Report presents the main findings based on standard DAC criteria for evaluation: (1) *Relevance/Appropriateness and Coherence* (2) *Coverage* (3) *Effectiveness (and Accountability)* (4) *Efficiency (and Monitoring)* (5) *Impact and* (6) *Sustainability*.

Analysis of each evaluation criteria is developed through some specific questions, that were developed in the Terms of References. The Inception Report added additional inputs: (a) 'Key Aspects / Issues to Consider', to ensure all aspects will be assessed during the Final Evaluation and (b) 'Data Collection Methods', associated to each Evaluation Question.

3.1 Relevance & Appropriateness (& Coherence)

Q1. How effective were the interventions in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and responding appropriately to their particular circumstances?

Beneficiaries' selection criteria were appropriately designed, focusing on families who suffered most from flooding, according to total/partial loss of housing and basic furniture's, with associated rehousing in temporary shelters. Recovery interventions enlarged the targeted population in 3 communities where water supply systems were destroyed; actions focused also on affected Ri hospitals/clinics and nurseries and kindergartens.

The Flood Operation also characterized the most vulnerable groups of population. It makes sense that people with disability, elderly persons, families with a young child, family with many children and women-headed families were identified as the most vulnerable groups, and as such being of priority focus. The most vulnerable persons could have received further special attention to address any specific need (especially for physically-dependent persons, such as people with disability, elderly and pregnant women). While it seems *DPRK RCS* volunteers gave them higher care than for others during the emergency phase, the nature of related special attention could have been better clarified from the programming phase, for clearer guidance (based on specific population group vulnerability), systematic inclusion (ensuring minimum level of attention for all concerned priority beneficiaries) and ease of monitoring (measure of performance).

Overall, the Flood Operation activities were adapted to the needs which varies depending on phases (Emergency or Recovery approaches). During the first emergency phase (affected families living under temporary tents), provision of emergency family kits (emergency shelter; hygiene kits; kitchen set; water purification tablets) was timely appropriate and coherent with needs assessment.

Following the Government priority decision to rehouse all affected population (including the most vulnerable beneficiaries) in new places (apartment blocks or 2- or 4-family dwellings) before the winter season, priority need for shelter (CGI sheets provision in large quantity – 52,200 pieces for *DPRK RCS / IFRC* operation) became predominant, while securing in the meantime living conditions of affected population (support to 11,928 families, i.e. 47,712 beneficiaries among the 70,000 displaced persons living in emergency shelters).

Activities about First Aid kits⁸ (to 8,675 families and *RCS* First Aid Posts, plus training of trainers and related equipment) are part of the Recovery Phase, as they were implemented after the Emergency period. They were not intended for emergency response, but within a preparedness perspective. As such, relevance of selection criteria for families is more questionable.

During the Recovery phase, one main intervention focused on damaged water supply systems reconstruction/rehabilitation. It aimed to provide the entire targeted community, included the most vulnerable persons, with safer water access at home. Provision of midwife kits at Ri hospitals & clinics can improve maternal and child health conditions. Apart from midwife kits and basic medical kits supply, recovery activities in health and child institutions were designed to supplement newly built or rehabilitated flood-affected facilities, installing equipment against extreme cold weather conditions in winter season⁹. At Ri hospitals & clinics (18), solar heating systems should benefit in particular to women in labour and delivering, but also to all patients (sick persons can

⁸ 6,200 families were benefited with Household First Aid kits in June 2017; 2,475 other families received one in December 2017. Selection criterions for families were some families affected by flood and some families who did not receive family and hygiene kits.

⁹ About minus 20 degrees Celsius during the Final Evaluation, beginning of December

be considered as most vulnerable). At nurseries and kindergartens, hot water solar devices make handwashing for young children more comfortable. Given harsh weather conditions, those heating services not only bring valuable comfort, but also allow proper and decent health care service for sick persons and encourage children to handwashing practices.

Disaster preparedness activities, more specifically Early Warning & Evacuation, should benefit to the entire concerned in the event of new flood. They are also designed within the perspective of assisting the most vulnerable groups, in particular the ones with mobility limitations. Again, more documenting guidance might have better embedded this priority action.

o What are the strategies used to ensure appropriate quality and timeliness were maintained in delivering the goods and services to target beneficiaries including mechanisms to capture beneficiary complaints/feedback?

Overall, selected approaches and technical solutions of the Flood Operation are relevant, with satisfactory quality materials and equipment, as well as a suitable range of associated training/workshops and messages dissemination for proper ownership and self-sufficient usage from beneficiaries and local persons in charge. As mentioned in the *Sustainability Paragraph*, there are some minor concerns regarding actual maintenance/repair capacity of some devices with sophisticated technologies and regarding usual water supply systems O&M issues.

During programming, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* teams faced with high challenges to deliver emergency response in time. In one hand, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* Flood Operation was very quick regarding emergency kits but, on the other hand, it was challenged by very tight deadlines for CGI sheets supply. Nevertheless, the Flood Operation used some suitable strategies to potentially maximize the use of existing capacities (requesting prepositioning stocks from other provinces, CGI sheets stock from the Philippines). From a programming perspective, despite some delays in delivering CGI sheets (see *Effectiveness Paragraph*), the Flood Operation worked out satisfactory planning to deliver goods and services related to emergency needs, with a great balance of quality and acceptable timing for emergency support, especially in regards with (highly demanding) priority requests from the authorities.

Like in other countries, the Red Cross Movement has the unique asset of massive presence of RCS volunteers, deployed in the field and being very close to the population. Within the specific context of DPRK and related restriction for an international organization to have participatory project approach directly with beneficiaries, *IFRC* can rely on *DPRK RCS* to enhance beneficiaries' participation at all implementation stages of the Flood Operation (included claiming feedback). However, diverting from formal top-down approach, the principle of asking for more beneficiaries' participation might have some limitations. Such as for every international humanitarian agency working in the country, limited relevance of monitoring mechanisms to capture beneficiary complaints and feedback is therefore acknowledged. Nevertheless, through close cooperation with the *DPRK RCS*, *IFRC* seems to have greater capacity for it rather than other international aid agencies working in the country; hence the asset of existing close cooperation between *DPRK RCS* and *IFRC*.

The Final Evaluation interviews gather very high regards expressed by the affected population towards *DPRK RCS* support (100% of the 12 beneficiaries interviewed are very satisfied with *DPRK RCS* support). Sampled beneficiaries interviewed claimed some comparable suggestions for improvement, which are more about quantities of distributed items. Request of having hand knife and scissors in hygiene kits has been acknowledged by *DPRK RCS & IFRC* for future interventions (although not yet included in replenished kits at the provincial warehouse).

Q2. Were intervention strategies and priorities in line with local customs and practices of the affected population, the priorities of the Government authorities and other key humanitarian actors?

Final Evaluation interviews all indicate high users' satisfaction of distributed kits. Being a new product for the affected families, use of water purification tablets might not come to a clear consensus from beneficiaries, as some might be reluctant to chlorine smell and/or taste. However, most of the people drink boiled water and there was apparently¹⁰ no severe increase of water-borne disease during the emergency period. Designed before the Flood Operation, based on previous disasters lessons learnt, emergency kits respect population habits (considering the assumption that local needs in the northern part of North Hamgyong Province are the same ones as in other

¹⁰ Disease surveillance data not available to *IFRC*.

places/contexts of DPRK). Moreover, the Flood Operation could count on the extensive use of community-based *DPRK RCS* volunteers for emergency support and direct discussions with beneficiaries, if any adjustment needed.

Emergency Response and Recovery activities were in line with Government policies and *DPRK RCS & IFRC* strategies. The Government (and all levels of authority involved) expressed excellent appreciation of *DPRK RCS & IFRC* contribution to the Flood Response effort. While not measurable by the Final Evaluation, Korean stakeholders all highlighted that the general opinion of DPRK has great appreciation and recognition of *DPRK RCS* involvement in regards with the Flood Response.

Interviewed stakeholders consider that the coordination process between the Government and *DPRK RCS & IFRC* was excellent. Similar feedback has been expressed by interviewed international organizations involved in the Flood Response. From all, this great level of cooperation between *DPRK RCS & IFRC* prevented from risks of activities duplication and overlapping, as well as enhanced opportunities for complementary actions during emergency response.

IFRC and *DPRK RCS* are considered as a major Disaster Risk Management¹¹ actor by the international community based in Pyongyang (UN agencies and EUPS Units). The Flood Operation was in line with Sector Groups (Shelter, WASH, etc.) strategies and recommendations.

Q3. Were the interventions in line with the DPRK RCS and IFRC strategies, policies, standard operating procedures and guidelines, including the Minimum Commitments to gender and diversity?

The Final Evaluation did not gather any significant negative observation that would relate to potential non-respect of strategies, policies and protocols in place. Supported by a specific Contingency Plan, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* have gained significant experiences on flood-related disaster response and preparedness in recent years. This helped for implementing such a large-scale operation, even in remote areas and without former provincial/local preparedness and response actions in the past.

The Flood Operation being now completed, there is a consensus within *IFRC* and *DPRK RCS* to revise the *DPRK RCS* Contingency Plan. Given that gathering lessons learnt is a very productive exercise not to be skipped over, especially when an Operation is coming to an end, this is therefore appropriate and a key learning priority for the upcoming months. Overall, considering the 16-month during of the Flood Operation, more knowledge management activities could have been included and used with the existing budget. As mentioned in *Efficiency & Monitoring Paragraph*, this is closely related to the related lack of documented reports and internal notes, that can capture all implementation details (a required basis for learning analysis).

The Flood Operation implemented some suitable Emergency interventions with respect to gender-based considerations. For instance, distributed emergency items (hygiene & kitchen kits) were adjusted based on discussions with local women and included menstrual pads. However, referring to *IFRC* Minimum Commitments to Gender and Diversity Guidelines, the absence of related indicators makes difficult any in-depth analysis of how this was applied. There are no disaggregated data in the Flood Operation reports reflecting support given to girls, boys, women and men.

3.2 Coverage

Q4. To what extent did the interventions reach all population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance?

The Flood Operation was a large-scale intervention to respond to a massive natural disaster (30,000 houses destroyed; 70,000 persons displaced; 140,000 persons severely affected). While initial Red Cross Emergency Appeal targeted 330,000 beneficiaries based on a rapid assessment, fundraising being diminished by 3 led to a beneficiary reduction divided by 3 (110,000 concerned by the Flood Operation eventually). As this is still a substantial support to the identified needs, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* played a major actor in the Flood Response effort.

While selection criteria are clear and special attention to provide to the most vulnerable groups of population was acted, there is little related disaggregated information in donor reports. The Flood Operation registration lists (for every activity) seem to be detailed and comprehensive, but extracted data is lower than expected. Data analysis

¹¹ Disaster Risk Management gathers Disaster Preparedness, Disaster Response and Disaster Risk Reduction areas.

requires time-consuming efforts for such a large-scale operation. This project management aspect is in close relation with the identified need for increased data collection capacity and monitoring human resource within *DPRK RCS & IFRC* (See *Efficiency Paragraph*). As a potential area of technical improvement, it would be relevant to explore innovative tools to facilitate data collection and analysis, such as Mobile Data Collection tools using specific software on tablets.

Reaching remote areas is one of the goals of the Flood Operation, in close link with *DPRK RCS* mandate. Some remote areas, which were difficult to access after the flood (damaged roads, but also frozen conditions in winter season), have been targeted. Having all requested funding would certainly allow doing more in that sense. However, whatever fundraised budget, one lesson learnt of this large-scale operation is that a detailed mapping exercise of beneficiary targets, based on remote status of affected areas and Vulnerability Capacity Assessment, would have brought increased clarity to what extent all remote areas were effectively targeted and how planning actions were based on related identified challenges.

Q5. How could the coverage and distribution methods be improved?

Considering that initial funding request was not obtained, the actual scale of the Flood Operation was much dependent on available budget capacity to reach a certain level of beneficiaries. At least, the Flood Operation remained very large, contributing significantly to the overall Flood Response. At the same time, having greater funding capacity would have brought additional critical constraints (with potential decreased quality outcomes), especially within the context of no historical collaboration on *DPRK RCS & IFRC* annual programs, limited local capacity and difficulty of access. Consequently, the actual coverage of the Flood Operation can be considered as satisfactory.

DPRK RCS & IFRC had great level of coordination with the Government and other agencies, especially *UNICEF* and *UNDP*, for adequate framework of shared responsibilities and absence of duplicated interventions in the field. No specific overlapping issue have been noticed from the Final Evaluation investigations (field visits, interviews, meetings and desk review).

Reported data about beneficiaries bring some confusions regarding calculation of total beneficiaries and associated analysis. Below are described the main issues related to that lack of clarity. As a key lesson learnt, it would be worthwhile for next operations to extract those information from detailed registration lists so that it could give clear analysis of the operation scale compared to the overall population in need.

- i. Data collected in reports about beneficiaries for each activity are often unclear, with potentially mixing figures when calculating actual targeted beneficiaries: adding figures based on family or beneficiary numbers with systematic estimation of 4 persons per household (supposed to only be an average for estimation); using houses or household for similar calculations (some houses can have 1 or 2 or 4 families); etc.
- ii. Calculation of total beneficiaries is based on cumulating beneficiaries of every activity, which means that one person who received different kinds of support might be counted several times as a beneficiary. The total number of persons supported is therefore less than the total number of beneficiaries. Actual number of persons that benefited from the Flood Operation is not informed into reports. While 140,000 persons were severely affected by the flood, it is thus not possible to estimate a ratio of how much severely affected persons were covered by the Flood Operation (110,000 beneficiaries).
- iii. Water supply systems rehabilitation concern entire communities with safer access to water through taps at home. As an example, most of the 32,000 beneficiaries of Musan Township were not part of the severely affected population. They were affected as the piped water access collapsed because of the flood, but certainly not among the most vulnerable population as per the Flood operation selection criteria. In that sense, comparative figures between severely affected beneficiaries and other would have given greater mapping of the Flood Operation
- iv. The Flood Operation reports indicate 100% of beneficiaries were targeted with hygiene promotion activities. While one person can be a beneficiary of several activities, this figure can be questioned. In addition to more detailed reporting, it would have been useful to include an estimation of indirect beneficiaries, notably taking into account the audience of *RCS Youth Groups Hygiene Promotion* performance, plus potential benefits of *Early Warning and Evacuation* activities (as well as other disaster preparedness capacity building) for a large amount of population.

Although beneficiaries' selection criteria were, as a whole, appropriate (*see Relevance Paragraph*), decision-making process could have been better documented, especially in regards with the rationale about emergency kits distribution frequency within the selected families. Indeed, the following addressed (i.e. documented) key questions, critical for decision-making process in distribution activities, would bring increased clarity in beneficiaries' selection mechanisms:

- Which conditions led to the distribution of hygiene kits 2 or 3 times for one family? Is it linked with the status of 'most vulnerable person'?
- Why are water purification tablets (and hygiene kits) distributed after the Emergency phase? Was it related to disease outbreak risks? Or was it due to unsafe drinking water conditions in new dwelling locations? How was it linked with boiling water practices (which appeared to be very common)?

Those examples clearly indicate that such a thorough analysis approach, based on collected disaggregated data, would be useful in the development of sources of information related to knowledge management for next operations. It also gives valuable potential for more contextualized (i.e. referring to specific location and timing) evidence-based decision-making (rather than standard assessment). This is especially the case for which priority messages dissemination to focus and which emergency activities to prioritize based on actual practices.

3.3 Effectiveness (& Accountability)

Q6. Did the interventions meet their immediate and intended results? How effective the interventions address issues and constraints faced during implementation?

The Flood operation reached a good level of outcomes' achievement. As mentioned in Question 14 (*See Impact Paragraph*), the absence of a detailed logical framework, with SMART indicators of performance and associated sources of verification, is detrimental to performance measurement of the Flood Operation. However, looking at how the Flood Operation logic of intervention was constructed, the proposed outputs allowed to reach the expected outcomes, that contributed to the overall objectives.

Initially planned for 12 months, the Flood Operation action plan was revised in due course for an appropriate extension of 4 more months (till 31 December 2017). This decision allowed both the effective use of allocated resources (*see Efficiency Paragraph*) and the effective implementation of planned activities, leading to the Flood Operation completion in time. Considering the significant scale of interventions (110,000 beneficiaries; CHF 5-million budget; remote areas; emergency plus recovery and preparedness activities) in a short period of time (16 months) and with limited initial local capacity, this is quite a remarkable achievement.

Notably, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* existing capacity, responsiveness and commitments (rapid needs assessment and field coordination; fast deployment of existing stocks in country; massive assignment of RCS volunteers) allowed substantial emergency interventions within the first 2-3 months. With respect to Government support, it is worthwhile to note that the Government had impressive capacity to rapidly deploy resources in the field, helping a lot for logistical support (rehabilitated roads, etc.). Besides, none of *IFRC* field access requests was rejected by the public authorities, ensuring good monitoring presence.

The Flood Operation is defined by 2 different implementation phases (with different perspectives and approaches):

1. One Emergency Phase, starting right after the flood and lasted approximately 3-4 months (up to the beginning of winter season). This is characterized by rapid interventions and an impressive workload within a short period.
2. One Recovery Phase, looking more at disaster preparedness and long-lasting benefits for the affected population. The Recovery Phase started a few months after the flood occurred. Completion of emergency kits distribution activities sometimes overlapped with the Recovery Phase but without major negative effects.

The quick shift between the 2 phases was mainly caused by tight deadlines required by the Government. It put high pressure on *DPRK RCS & IFRC* teams, but it also led to anticipated early recovery approach which benefited to the affected population.

In view of the challenging context of intervention, exacerbated by the key prerequisite of completing emergency response after the first 3 months, many issues occurred during the Flood Operation (most higher ones within the first 3 months). Achieving the overall Operation in time and without large gaps eventually proves great capacity of *DPRK RCS & IFRC* to readjust and mitigate encountered issues.

The major difficulty was related to shelter activities (52,200 CGI sheets delivery in a few weeks). Looking back at it, it seems not possible to respect such tight deadlines with granted quality and respect of *IFRC* procedures. *IFRC & DPRK RCS* did not managed to supply in time: only 20% of CGI sheets were used before the winter. However, the selected approach, focusing on items quality and respect of internal procurement procedures, was relevant. Eventually, 100% CGI sheets have been installed by the Flood Operation completion (more details in final report expected – See 3.4 Efficiency & monitoring Paragraph). As an important lesson learnt, this issue appears to be crucial for next large-scale disasters: it highlights the need for clear making-decision process during programming phase in regards with potential risks if Government expectations exceed realistic *IFRC & DPRK RCS* capacities.

Additional external constraints that *DPRK RCS & IFRC* had to encounter during the Flood Operation implementation, are related to:

- (i) UN sanctions, and associated delivery delays for imported materials and equipment (prepositioned stock and in-country purchases can mitigate but not fully address it)
- (ii) Chinese National Holidays that occurred just one month after the flood, interfering timely delivery of imported materials and equipment.

Also, but somehow indirectly related to *DPRK RCS & IFRC* capacity, if there was technical characteristics for CGI sheets quickly available, this would allow faster procurement process. It also reinforces the need for prepositioned stock shelter materials (CGI sheets) somewhere in the region.

3.4 Efficiency & Monitoring

Q7. Were there adequate resources available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?

As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the Flood Operation was a large-scale intervention, with significant resources. Although initial Emergency Appeal target was not reached (one third of initial budget demand), the Flood Operation scale was suitably readjusted to available resources. Within learning purpose, some aspects or activities of the Flood Operation (data analysis, knowledge management) could have benefited for greater allocation of resources, using part of remaining budget for it.

The *Annex 7 – IFRC Budget Monitoring File* indicates that 95% of total budget has been spent during the Flood Operation: CHF 269,990 remaining out of CHF 5,037,707 of total budget. The ‘Relief Items, Constructions, supplies’ budget category, which represents 64% of total budget, has a satisfactory 4% forecast/spent variation. Budget for allocated resources to implement the Flood Operation was used up to 92% (about CHF 67,000 remained).

In terms of logistics, *DPRK RCS* prepositioning stocks in other provinces was a clear asset for rapid response despite huge logistics constraints to access affected areas. The creation of a new provincial stock in North Hamgyong Province is relevant; the warehouse is well renovated, protected from potential flooding and proper stock management is in place. Clear technical characteristics for CGI sheets available at *IFRC* region/global level would helped for rapid tendering, especially within such tight delivery deadlines. It was also relevantly suggested that *IFRC* Regional Office should keep a prepositioned stock of CGI sheets at regional level for rapid deployment, if cost feasibility is not an overwhelming issue. While such a prepositioned stock might not cover all needs in the event of a large-scale disaster occurs, it would however speed up supply time as well as saving significant coordination time if set up in an initial preparedness phase (Shelter Specialist to focus more on other crucial aspects, such as decision-making data, monitoring plan, local participation and ownership, etc.).

o Was the capacity of the human resource system adequate to execute the interventions? Were personnel skills utilized in an efficient and effective manner?

Generally speaking, all levels of *DPRK RCS & IFRC* (*DPRK RCS* HQ; Provincial Branch, City/County Branches; *RCS* Volunteers and *IFRC* in country and regional level) played active roles in the Flood Operation implementation.

As a whole, *IFRC* support was much appreciated. The team in place (Head of Delegation; DRM and Finance & Administrative Delegates) received additional support for shelter activities (during the Emergency Phase) and for WASH activities (during the Recovery Phase). One additional national staff from *DPRK RCS* was assigned for the whole year of 2017. Also, it was the first time a RDRT deployment (Surge Team from regional level) occurred in the country. *IFRC* President, Regional Office staff and some PNS made monitoring visits too.

DPRK RCS Secretary General has intervened from the very beginning, leading the Flood Operation with the support of related Departments Directors. That active leadership commitment has been particularly appreciated by *IFRC*, consolidating the close cooperation between *DPRK RCS* and *IFRC*.

In terms of need for extra-resource, additional staff for Data Collection Monitoring should be considered in the future for increased data collection capacity and monitoring human resource within *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC*. Likewise, additional resource for communication would be of great value (See Coverage Paragraph).

Closely to the facts that there was no major disaster response in the area in the past, neither was there any regular *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC* programs, *DPRK RCS* local capacity (Provincial Branch; County/City branches; RCS Volunteers) was limited at field level. As mentioned in the *Impact Paragraph*, there have been significant efforts on RCS capacity building, with a large range of training and workshops for *DPRK RCS* staff, especially from provincial and city/branches levels but also for RCS volunteers for field interventions.

Q8. Were systems, procedures and control mechanisms adequate to ensure smooth delivery of assistance and minimize potential losses/risks faced by DPRK RCS and IFRC?

As mentioned in Question 3 (see *Relevance Paragraph*), there was no particular issue reported during the Final Evaluation. There are a large variety of strategic and planning tools in place, which frame the collaborative work between *DPRK RCS* and *IFRC* during an intervention. *DPRK RCS* contingency plan should be revised after the Flood Operation, in a coordinated timing based on expected updates related to the Disaster Law (possibly, shortly in beginning of 2018).

Some of *IFRC* administrative requirements (such as procurement from HQ for medical kits, including basic First Aid kits) somehow scaled down the implementation plan. It would be appreciated if such constraints might be avoided, but this requires further discussions at regional and global levels for modifying standards procedures.

Despite improved reporting format from mid-2017, reports available from *IFRC* Delegates, short-term experts and monitoring visits remain little. The Final Evaluation had indeed limited information about background information, detailed decision-making processes and other internal perspectives. While gathering relevant and useful information, reports to donors cannot be as much detailed as a learning document. Knowledge management should be enhanced for such a scale of operation (characterized by both Emergency & Recovery interventions, integrating different sectors/areas of expertise and with an unprecedented effort in country from *DPRK RCS* & *IFRC*). Combined with regular delegates turn-over and short-term assignments, risk of losing information flow (with associated consequences on knowledge management and experience sharing) is quite high; hence the need for higher documenting practices from *IFRC* Delegates and short-term visits.

Besides, as part of the learning process, it would have been relevant to include a more detailed specific learning workshop¹², resulting in a learning note to be shared with relevant partners. If scheduled within the Flood Operation timeline, it could enlarge quality outcomes in a timelier way and within the Flood Operation budget.

Alternatively, if designed on a larger scale (18 days being limited for such a large-scale operation), the Final Evaluation could have been used for further learning purpose, capturing more in details some lessons learnt. This could include more in-depth analysis of internal work frame and related monitoring commitments (in regards with existing strategies and Standard Operating Procedures, etc.) for instance.

Q9. Were adequate tracking systems for delivery of goods and services in place to ensure transparency and accountability?

The question related to accountability closely refers to findings of both *Relevance and Coverage paragraphs*.

The Final Evaluation did not notice any evidence or any particular concern of misuse of the Flood Operation resources.

¹² Within or in addition to the one that occurred in December in Chongjin with local stakeholders.

Further details about CGI sheets use in the 2nd semester of 2017 is expected in the Final Report (due in March 2018).

Q10. Were complaints/feedback mechanisms put in place for community questions and concerns to be answered? What were the concerns raised by communities during the intervention?

Refer to Question 1 of the Relevance Paragraph.

Q11. Was there adequate time and effort invested for the integration of interventions across the different operation sectors? To what degree was integration achieved and how could this be further strengthened?

With extensive hardware and distribution activities, Shelter and WASH condensed a large part of the Flood Operation budget (78% of implemented activities). Health activities remained within the frame of DPRK RCS & IFRC core mandate, mainly focusing on First Aid and Health Promotion. Shelter, WASH and Health needs are predominant following a large-scale disaster causing massive displacement of population and associated disruption of essential services. Implemented together, such as the Flood Operation did, the 3 sectors provide with better effects to the affected population covering basic needs and mitigating potential risks of further issues (survival & access to essential needs, disease outbreak, etc.).

WASH and Health are particularly linked together under the purpose of Environmental Health, especially through joint health and hygiene promotion activities, which are about appropriate individual practices. No outbreak apparently started during the Emergency phase¹³ (see Impact Paragraph).

The WASH approach¹⁴ used during the Flood Operation mainly focused on Water and Hygiene. While no sanitation activities during the Recovery phase is justified (pour-flush toilets were installed in new built houses built by the Government), emergency sanitation needs were however not sufficiently considered. As a key component of an integrated and comprehensive outbreak prevention & control strategy during emergencies (a sudden and massive displacement of population brings serious public health if sanitation risks are not contained), effective management of emergency public toilets used in shelter areas should have got more specific attention, especially in terms of actual usage rate and effective flies control (at least in terms of field assessment and simple corrective measures to be applied). With little documented information, it is nevertheless not possible to extrapolate actual risk level of no emergency sanitation integration; hence the actual quality of implemented preventive environmental health measures.

Through a relevant and comprehensive approach, the Flood Operation integrated Disaster Preparedness activities after the first phase of responding to emergency needs. This was a main component of the Recovery Phase (2017). Integration of local Disaster Risk Reduction activities was promoted in many occasions. Such interventions did not aim to prevent future floods, but only towards further mitigation benefits. Even if Disaster Risk Reduction activities were implemented within a limited scale, all aspects of Disaster Risk Management were thus integrated in the Flood Operation. The Final Evaluation field investigations observed (or extrapolated) some consequences (or high risks) of extreme weather conditions, that might affect the durability of services in the short/medium run: frozen pipes in bathrooms equipped with hot water solar systems; frozen valves chambers at water tanks; Musan Township pumping station location at risk if similar (exceptional) flood.

Q12. How were program activities managed and coordinated, particularly between DPRK RCS, IFRC, DPRK CAS and Movement partners, inter-agency coordination mechanisms, and local authorities?

As mentioned in Relevance paragraph, DPRK RCS & IFRC had very good collaboration, with both appreciation of respective cooperation and management support.

Despite some timing issues and other coordination confusions that sometimes happened in the field, the Flood Operation maintained a productive collaboration with SCEDM. This is due to the special (and successful) efforts done by the DPRK RCS during, but also prior to the Flood operation. Partly due to the fact that North Hamgyong local authorities were not experienced for such a large-scale disaster response in the first weeks after the flood (very consequent work to coordinate), encountered challenges are also probably due to the recent creation of this

¹³ Disease surveillance data not made available to IFRC. From HCT Review Mission held in November 2016: ‘... a declining trend in diarrhea cases in all three counties as compared to September 2016. At Ri level, an average of 40-50 cases of diarrhea were reported every day in September/October, which had dropped to between five and seven cases by November 2016...’

¹⁴ WASH is literally Water Sanitation and Hygiene.

specific governmental body regarding the application of the new Disaster Law. Interestingly, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* have been quite involved in SCEDM capacity building since it has been created.

In terms of proactive participation and leading roles in humanitarian coordination, *IFRC* contribution has been significant (as shown by leading involvement during the 2 HCT assessment and review missions) and in line with the Flood Operation scale. *IFRC* played a very proactive role in participating and leading (co-chairing) humanitarian coordination mechanisms within the international community.

- Operational on a temporary basis (upon emergency needs), with relatively little number of involved aid agencies, *IFRC* leadership role in the Shelter & NFI Sector Group is therefore prominent; *IFRC* critical involvement was very much appreciated.
- Regarding the WASH Sector Group, coordinated approach with UNICEF in the field during the emergency phase facilitated information-sharing through regular meetings and joint situation analysis to ensure complementary programming and avoid overlaps. Proactive contribution for WASH preparedness and recovery efforts (*IFRC* being - with UNICEF - one of the only 2 WASH actors with large recovery programs in the flood-affected area) are very much appreciated too.
- The DRR Sector Group, also co-chaired by *IFRC*, have less regular meetings, notably due to priority Flood Response implementation. While Disaster Preparedness activities started quite rapidly after a few months, it would have been valuable to further reactivate it, with direct impact on advocacy purposes towards the international community and due roles and responsibilities of SCEDM.

IFRC effective external communication towards global media is acknowledged. Likewise, through *RCS* volunteers network in the field, plus authorized access to the field within a few days after the flood, local visual communications produced was good and assisted in raising funding from PNS.

3.5 Impact

Q13. What evidence is available that greater investment in preparedness measures prior to the floods have resulted in more efficient response and recovery interventions?

At national level, preparedness capacity as well as previous disaster response experiences helped in coordinating and leading *DPRK RCS* interventions. However, the situation was much different at local level: preparedness activities prior to the 2016 Flood was almost inexistent in the 6 targeted counties and the *DPRK RCS* Provincial branch of North Hamgyong Province was not much familiar with flood response. The Flood Operation has been a grasped opportunity to largely strengthen the Provincial & County *RCS* capacity. Through proper assessment of limited initial *RCS* capacity in the field, identified weaknesses were effectively translated into a large range of capacity building activities

DPRK RCS contribution towards preparedness measures in affected communities is well integrated and complimentary with overall preventing measures implemented by the Government. There is now more solid capacity in terms of preparedness, which will result in much organized rapid response. A new prepositioned stock in Chongjin warehouse as well as enhanced capacity building at provincial level should also benefit to other counties in the province. Many trainings and workshop focused on preparedness activities, especially for the broad network of *RCS* volunteers at community and county level.

Prior to the 2016 Flood, counties & communities had inefficient Early Warning and Evacuation systems. As it is well acknowledged by all stakeholders, Early Warning and Evacuation systems can save many lives. In that sense, a lot has been done during the Recovery Phase, orienting many preparedness activities towards more effective rapid local alert systems and evacuation mechanisms, which should result in less human losses for future flooding events in the affected area. As mentioned below in Question 15, actual capacity to respond in due time in case of an unfortunate event should be more performed through local/field simulation exercises.

Q14. What evidence (both direct and indirect) is available that the interventions contributed to the reduction of suffering and that the affected populations were assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and enhancing disaster preparedness?

During the Emergency Phase, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* actions helped a lot the affected communities. As described in *Coverage Paragraph*, *DPRK RCS & IFRC* have been a major actor of the Flood Response and the most rapid aid organization to be active in the field. Overall, emergency activities were suitably designed and rapidly implemented. The Flood Operation outcomes assisted the affected populations in maintaining and resuming basic dignity; they also assisted them in resuming life in normal conditions with safe housing and basic facilities (as per usual standards in rural areas of DPRK).

The Flood Operation is considered by all stakeholders as a successful Disaster Response and Recovery operation. The Final Evaluation also concluded of the overall positive effects of the Flood Operation, bringing great support to the affected population and being a solid prerequisite for future disaster prevention, preparedness and response in the targeted area. However, it remains difficult to measure produced evidence-based effects, with detailed indicators of performance. Even if the specific context of DPRK is somehow challenging to obtain usual humanitarian indicators, especially for the reason of limited access to sources of verification, it should be possible to adapt and work out a list of predefined indicators that would help in properly measuring the actual performance of the operation. Notably, *DPRK RCS* humanitarian objectives are based on the respect of SPHERE Humanitarian Minimum Standards. It is therefore important to translate them into - at least - a few (realistic) country-specific indicators, to be collected during future emergency interventions.

DPRK RCS & IFRC shelter activities were limited to the provision of CGI sheets. Scale of interventions was designed in a cooperative and coordinated way with the DPRK Government, ensuring the construction of operational dwellings eventually. The Flood Operation contribution was massive in terms of quantity (52,200 CGI sheets); however, it remains difficult to measure the exact importance of *DPRK RCS & IFRC* within the entire shelter needs, plus how many families this can represent. The Government did not inform how they covered all the needs and if other international actors (through embassies) collaborated. In other words, as per a major CGI sheet contributor, what would happen if *RCS DPRK & IFRC* did not implement those shelter activities, i.e. what would be the exact impact on rehousing the entire displaced population? While only 20% of CGI sheets were used in 2016 (during the Emergency Phase), how was the non-reached population (i.e. the remaining 80%) supported during that period? Was it through the Government resources? How far did the Embassies in Pyongyang contribute to Shelter activities? The actual use of *DPRK RCS & IFRC* CGI sheets is not questioned here, but those unanswered questions just illustrate how difficult it is to measure the real impact of some actions (especially for the Shelter activities), within the overall needs response. The lack of detailed information might pose a challenge of accountability for *DPRK RCS & IFRC* in future Emergency Appeals; therefore, increased clear communication from the government should be required for further disaster response.

From interviews and reports, there was no critical increase of diarrhoea during the period when the affected population lived under emergency shelters. This tends to indicate that implemented measures through the Flood operation for drinking water and hygiene practices were effective in preventing diarrhoea outbreaks. While there was daily surveillance routine in place, transmitting data from local to national levels, no detailed disease data surveillance was provided to *IFRC*. This is unfortunate as it limits conclusion on how far *DPRK RCS & IFRC* interventions in emergency shelters assisted in preventing or controlling diarrhoeal outbreak. Alternatively, detailed environment health assessment can usually bring reliable sources of information regarding outbreak risks, but this was not documented for the Flood Operation.

As mention in the *Efficiency Paragraph*, flies were probably not controlled in emergency public toilets (with narrow pit and uncovered hole). At least *RCS* volunteers worked closely in the field with *Ri Doctors*, extrapolating potential mechanisms to be operational for rapid environmental health interventions in case of disease surveillance signal. As a key lesson learnt for next disaster response, increased attention on emergency sanitation will be critical to ensure proper outbreak prevention and control.

Q15. What impact did the interventions have on how the communities might cope with subsequent disasters?

It seems that the communities have greater awareness of *DPRK RCS* roles after they realized which support they could provide for disaster response. This is particularly the case for alert and evacuation mechanisms, with potential lifesaving benefits. Data collected during the final evaluation indicates an increase of 25 to 50% of new *RCS* volunteers in the 3 visited counties¹⁵. At present, one year after the disaster, associated flooding risk is logically

¹⁵ How new volunteers were recruited was not investigated during the Final Evaluation.

still in the mind of the population. Plus, visual scale on river banks and bridge and visible alert sirens should remind of the potential risk, whenever needed. Evacuation maps are also available at community levels.

One aspect that remains uncertain at this stage is how the Early Warning and Evacuation system would be effective in case of flash floods (an enabling zone for landslides and for rapid floods, with deforested hills, steep slopes and narrow valleys). This highlights the need for field simulation exercises integrating scenario of flash floods, plus the importance of raising that specific issue during Sector Group meetings and other technical/coordination Disaster Preparedness events in country.

The Government implemented a large variety of protection measures against flooding in the area. During the Emergency Phase, disaster-related disease outbreak (especially diarrhoea) was prevented, probably due to adapted safe hygiene practices of the affected population.

Hazards related to climate change (intense weather events) have major likelihood. Looking at other disaster risks, in the event of an earthquake buildings would not be protected and it may cause significant damages, especially in urban zones. At least, *DPRK RCS* response capacity enhanced through the Flood Operation, would be utilized; the Government has proved to successfully deploy massive response capacity in the event of a large-scale disaster.

3.6 Sustainability (& Connectiveness)

Q16. In what way did the interventions result in enhanced institutional capacity of the DPRK RCS in terms of: a) ability to implement recovery programmes, b) ability to prepare for and respond to disasters in a timely, efficient, and coordinated manner; and c) ability to mobilize communities at risk to cope with future disasters?

As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, *DPRK RCS* capacity at Provincial, County/City and community levels have been much strengthened during the Flood operation. It is well recognized that any gained capacity might decrease after a certain period; hence the question of how to duplicate regular refreshing training and other activities in the future. The Provincial Branch long-term capacity seems to be very linked to regular support from the national level (with or without *IFRC* support). At county and community levels, similar challenges are higher due to widespread access to remote areas. Ideally, the Provincial Branch should enhance County/City capacity that will then replicate for community capacity building; but at present, it seems to be too early stage for self-sufficient capacity building.

At the time of the Final Evaluation, there is no specific concern about sustainability of the renovated provincial warehouse and its operational capacity (prepositioned stock with no consumables; proper stock management). It is expected that any used emergency stock would be replenished accordingly through the related Emergency Operation.

In terms of disaster preparedness, performing simulation exercises in the field is of the utmost importance. Therefore, it is recommended to continue to proceed to preparedness scenario at field level. Also, as an indirect consequence, if there is no unfortunate event for a few years, the local population and *RCS* volunteers might somehow lose attention; hence the need for regular refreshing training from time to time in the future.

CGI sheets provided are of good quality, with longer lifespan prospect (about 10 years).

The solar devices are basic but using sophisticated technologies that might require periodic maintenance, including repairs and/or replacement of electronic components. *DPRK RCS & IFRC* can have feedback of 1 to maximum 3 years of usage from recent programs in other provinces: at this stage, there has been no specific concern about durability. Nevertheless O&M challenges can realistically occur within a few years. Considering the remote location of the flood-affected counties, there are therefore some minor concerns regarding the actual maintenance/repair capacity of electronic devices, especially how would electronic equipment be realistically replaced in the long run. Would they be accessible in *DPRK* through any *DPRK RCS* channel or would health and child institutions be able to import from near China border by their own (or through local authority's support)? As of today (i.e. completed Flood Operation), it appears uncertain how to extrapolate about actual sustainability perspectives for solar devices, as this will much depend on actual capacity to supply spare parts and make technical repairs, when maintenance will be needed.

On similar matters, frequent piped water supply systems O&M issues, especially in rural areas of DPRK, are related to leaking taps, lack of regular O&M at river catchments and other watertightness issues on distribution lines and valves. Those technical issues would lead to disrupting proper operation of water supply systems (regular dysfunctions of pressured water flow; water contamination).

For pumping systems, electricity availability could be challenging, even if the affected area has got mining/industrial activities that require good electricity supply. Surface pumps were provided from a Korean factory, which is of good value for maintenance and access to spare parts. How isolated (i.e. issue of receiving supplies in due time in case of pumps - and electrical boxes – breakdown) might the remote flood-affected areas be in practice (if need arises): this is hard to assess within the Final Evaluation. As a mitigation measure recommended in Water Supply guidelines, the Flood Operation adequately provided each pumping station with 2 pumps and electronic boxes: spare one to be used if any technical problem.

Lastly, as mentioned in Question 11 (*see Efficiency Paragraph*), the Final Evaluation observations highlight some potential issues in the middle/long run: disaster-prone activities not optimized: pumping station location, frozen pipes. Sustainability concerns that can be now observed in the field were not documented into *IFRC* reports, as some of the activities were completed by the 2nd semester of 2017 (*IFRC* field monitoring activities tented to be lower during that period, as human resources capacity decreased).

Q17. To what extent did the *IFRC* support strengthen and complement the response of *DPRK* *RCS*?

In addition to active support to the emergency response, *IFRC* brought a lot of support in terms of disaster preparedness, with great focus on developing local capacity. Enhanced institutional and individual capacity would be used in future disaster (extrapolated increase of climate change disasters in the next years). But as mentioned in previous Question 16, this would have to be followed by continuous strengthened Disaster Preparedness support (*DPRK* *RCS* committed to support local branches). The 6 affected counties would not be included in the new *DPRK* *RCS* & *IFRC* pilot program (within regular annual programming) in North Hamgyong. But being left aside might jeopardize the capacity built during the Flood Operation.

Through proactive external communication during the Flood Operation and a solid cooperation between *DPRK* *RCS* & *IFRC*, Red Cross Movement activities in the country have been highlighted and promoted. The Flood Operation has brought more PNS on board. All these should be productive for future collaboration.

Climate change will cause more and more extreme weather events that lead to natural disaster. *DPRK* *RCS* & *IFRC* have solid experience and great recognition of all involved stakeholders in all 3 aspects of Disaster Risk Management (Disaster Response; Disaster Preparedness; Disaster Risk Reduction). It is therefore important *DPRK* *RCS* & *IFRC* remains considered as a major humanitarian actor, by being very active in the field, but also in advocating (through workshops and learning notes to be shared) for further considerations on Disaster Preparedness, as well as more Disaster Risk Reduction programming in the country (focusing on Climate Change Adaptation).

4. GENERAL CONCLUSION

The Flood Operation was a large-scale program in remote zones of DPRK, affecting many small valleys connected to the Tumen River. Considered as one of the largest disasters in country over the past 70 years, 2016 North Hamgyong Flood occurred in a province which is not familiar with natural disasters of such extent. The Flood Operation is therefore the biggest Emergency Response and Recovery program for *DPRK RCS & IFRC* in DPRK. It targeted a large number of beneficiaries, with massive deployment of means (budget, logistics and human resources).

Phasing of the Flood Operation was specific with 2 distinct periods:

- (i) a massive Emergency Response but in a very limited 2-to-3-month period;
- (ii) Recovery interventions were put in place quite rapidly. It relevantly included a large variety of Disaster Preparedness activities.

Considering the exceptional scale of interventions for *DPRK RCS & IFRC*, many lessons learnt can emerge from this large-scale Flood Operation, to be integrated in future *DPRK RCS & IFRC* Disaster Risk Management (Disaster Response, Disaster Preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction).

Main strengths of the Flood operation

All stakeholders have expressed great satisfaction about *DPRK RCS & IFRC* contribution, from the Government of DPRK to the International Organizations in DPRK, as well as the affected communities.

With a large-scale intervention design and associated resources to be implemented in relatively short period, achieved outcomes level is satisfactory. The Flood Operation could rely on dedicated and committed staff from all levels of *DPRK RCS & IFRC*, which played proactive roles in its successful design and implementation.

Previous *DPRK RCS & IFRC* Disaster Response experience, as well as existing prepositioned stocks in country, were well utilized. As an undeniable asset, *DPRK RCS* has an extensive network of RCS volunteers on the ground. Those characteristics allowed rapid emergency interventions, despite limited *DPRK RCS* capacity at field level (Province & Counties/City) at that time. In addition, *IFRC* support has been judged effective in many aspects (project management; *DPRK RCS* capacity building; technical expertise; HR surge team; administrative and logistics support). The flood Operation was also a grasped opportunity to largely strengthen the Provincial & County RCS capacity.

Despite minor issues, the Flood Operation implemented quality interventions, in line with Government policies and *DPRK RCS & IFRC* strategies. Emergency Response and Recovery services provided to the beneficiaries are suitable to local and gender-based considerations. Main purchased items (CGI sheets, water pipes) are of good quality, with satisfactory durability perspectives within the context of DPRK. The Flood Operation brought appropriate mitigation measures during the Recovery phase (Early Warning & Evacuation mechanisms, disaster preparedness activities, RCS capacity building, etc.).

DPRK RCS has close cooperation with the Government, especially with SCDEM. *IFRC* is well positioned as a major humanitarian actor within the International Community in Pyongyang, with proactive participation & leading roles in humanitarian coordination. Those are favorable factors for active advocacy roles *DPRK RCS & IFRC* both played and can pursue at their respective levels.

Identified areas for further improvements

With a large number of targeted beneficiaries, there are some identified areas for improvement to increase quality services, especially towards the most vulnerable groups. This particularly concerns increased clarity of what specific attention should mean in practice. Reports to donors would be improved with more detailed disaggregated information about beneficiaries. Likewise, more monitoring clarification about CGI sheets distribution are expected into the Final Report (due by March 2018). This also highlights the need for appropriate Human Resources capacity for data analysis, to be adapted to the Operation scale (monitoring of distribution activities and related accountability requirements).

Knowledge management process is important for such a large-scale (and non-regular) operation. Documenting practices (field reports, learning notes, etc.) should have been further produced.

Through a WASH approach mainly focusing on Water and Hygiene during the Emergency period (displaced population), there is the need for further attention on Emergency Sanitation risks, with respect to outbreak prevention & control. Also, in close relation with behaviour change and how to adapt local interventions on a more contextualized basis, there should be more evidence-based decision-making process for local adaptation (rather than from a standardized assessment approach) for priority messages dissemination and related emergency activities.

The next chapter are the proposed recommendations of the Final Evaluation, which have been developed based on Key Findings analysis and the General Conclusions listed above.

5. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON LESSONS LEARNT

Below in this chapter are presented 5 categories of recommendations, based on identified strengths and best practices to be replicated, as well as some areas for improvement for next Disaster response, Disaster Preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction interventions.

*The 10 most important recommendations - also presented in the Executive Summary - are highlighted in **bold**.*

As a general comment, after the Final Evaluation being completed (findings, conclusions and recommendations jointly finalized and accepted), it is of the utmost importance that DPRK RCS & IFRC teams should work out a dedicated Plan of Action [*Who does What, When and How*] to ensure the effective application, in the upcoming months, of the following recommendations.

1- Building up based on sharing of experiences: develop a plan to transfer lessons learnt on Disaster Preparedness & Response Capacity to other provinces

- a. Exchange workshop between North Hamgyong Province & the 2 other provinces where DPRK RCS/IFRC programs (both Disaster Response and Development): sharing of experiences with previous interventions**
- b. Develop a learning note (summarizing best practices and other lessons learnt from learning workshops) that can be shared to all provincial DPRK RCS branches
- c. Ensure application of validated Final Evaluation's recommendations into next year annual program (including DPRK RCS Capacity Building in North Hamgyong Province)
- d. Planning deployment of Early Warning & Evacuation mechanisms in other counties and provinces, including more field-based Disaster Preparedness simulation exercises**
- e. Support of IFRC to DPRK RCS Contingency Plan revision**

2- Reporting and documenting

-
- a. The ones below to be included in the Final Flood Operation Report (by end of March 2018)*
 - i. Provide detailed and gender-specific disaggregated data for beneficiaries, especially for the most vulnerable groups of populations (people with disability, elderly people, women with young children, etc.)
 - ii. Support DPRK RCS County Branches to collect related data, if any difficulty to do so.
 - iii. Ensure sufficient HR in first quarterly for data processing/analysis
 - iv. Provide detailed monitoring information about actual use of CGI sheets (80% from 2016 supply)**
-
- b. Share lessons learnt to HCT and Sector Working Groups (workshop if possible) for increased advocacy on enhanced Disaster Response and Preparedness capacity in country**

- c. For Shelter, WASH and Health activities, establish priority SPHERE Standards indicators to be realistically collected in future emergency response (including related sources of verification)
- d. Improve Beneficiaries Monitoring data collection:
 - i. provide with detailed data per activity, with disaggregated information throughout the project implementation;
 - ii. explore the feasibility of innovative tools to facilitate data collection & analysis, such as Mobile Data Collection tools using specific software on tablets
 - iii. for next operations, improve quality of reports to donors, with more detailed disaggregated information about beneficiaries
- e. Keep improving collection of disaggregated data collection, in accordance with IFRC requirements - and explore possibilities for increased HR capacity (additional part-time or full-time staff if large-scale program for instance)

3- Increase evidence-based decision-making process

- a. Explore the possibility of using rapid VCA tool to further identify special attention to most vulnerable persons
- b. Document analysis process based on health data surveillance and rapid hygiene practices survey for more adapted and contextualized emergency WASH response
 - o especially about priority decisions between water purification tablets distribution Versus dissemination messages for boiling water
- c. **More technical advocacy about the high importance of flies control (Emergency Sanitation) during emergency phases**
 - o for further Outbreak Prevention & Control interventions when needed

4- Strengthen some activities programming

- a. **Develop clear objectives for increased gender considerations and specific attention to the most vulnerable groups**
- b. **More Disaster Preparedness simulation exercises in the field (and specific focus on mitigation measures against flash floods)**
- c. Advocate realistic programming (CGI sheets target) based on maximum supply capacity for emergency response - and adjust target between emergency and recovery priority needs.
- d. Integrate energy conservation issues (windows, walls isolation) when programming solar heating systems in health facilities
- e. Explore the relevance of further *DPRK RCS* activities in post-trauma disorders after large-scale disasters – and adjust capacity building plan accordingly
- f. **Strengthen *DPRK RCS/IFRC* strategy for long-lasting Behaviour Change, with priority focus on identification of determining factors**
- g. Insert *DPRK RCS* volunteers' roles in messages dissemination within broader Health & Hygiene Promotion capacity onsite - And use newly developed hygiene posters (WASH Sector Group)

5- Linking Disaster Preparedness and Response with Disaster Risk Reduction efforts

- a. **Priority focus on integrated DRR activities, linked with *DPRK RCS* areas of expertise: tree planting near water sources, pumping stations location in non-flooded areas, extreme cold temperature protection in bathrooms & valves chambers, etc.**
- h. *IFRC* to be proactive in leading Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group, with more frequent - monthly basis if possible - meetings for sharing of experiences and innovative actions.

APPENDIXES

ANNEX 1 - Terms of References

ANNEX 2 – Inception Report

ANNEX 3 – Work Plan of the Final Evaluation

ANNEX 4 – List of Key Informants and Stakeholders interviewed

ANNEX 5 – List of Questions, Interviews & Focus-Group Discussions

ANNEX 6 – Preliminary Findings & Recommendations PowerPoint Presentation, DPRK RCS & IFRC Debriefing

ANNEX 7 – IFRC Budget Monitoring File



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TERMS OF REFERENCE

Final Evaluation - Democratic People's Republic of Korea – Flood Operation

1. SUMMARY

Purpose: To review the impact of emergency relief and recovery interventions undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Red Cross Society (DPRK RCS) as part of the Flood Appeal Operation supported by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and to analyse key areas for improvement. The evaluation will specifically look at the design, implementation and sustainability elements of the programmes. It is expected that key lessons and recommendations from this evaluation will guide the DPRK RCS in ongoing as well as future operations and contribute to broader Red Cross Red Crescent learning, particularly to better address needs in emergency, relief and recovery, taking into account long-term impact and sustainability.

Audience: DPRK RCS, IFRC and Movement partners

Commissioners: Deputy Director, IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO)

Reporting to: Evaluation Management Team

Duration: 18 days

Timeframe: 5th – 28th December 2017

Location: Pyongyang, Musan County, Yonsa County and Hoeryong City in North Hamgyong Province, DPRK

2. BACKGROUND

In late August 2016, heavy rainfall occurred in North Hamgyong Province of DPRK, causing massive flooding in Tumen River and its offshoots around the Chinese-DPRK border and other areas across the province. The flooding in North Hamgyong was described as the largest natural disaster in northern DPRK since 1945 and was declared a national emergency of highest priority.

One pulse of water flowed down the Tumen flood plain, creating a violent torrent of water that washed away people, buildings, gardens and crops. This situation was further aggravated due to Typhoon Lionrock which simultaneously hit the coast of North Hamgyong Province. The winds and increased sea levels caused by the typhoon prevented the flood waters pouring down the Tumen River from discharging into the East Sea. The water was effectively blocked in the riverbed, resulting in widespread flash-flooding and inundation of surrounding cities, and towns across the North Hamgyong Province.

Since natural disasters are not common in this region of DPRK, despite the activation of early warning system, people were not prepared against for floods. According to the government official figures, 138 deaths were reported with 400 people missing and at least 667,715 people affected across all six counties in the province of North Hamgyong. Over 30,000 houses were damaged, submerged or completely destroyed resulting nearly 70,000 people displaced. Statistics on flood damages from the government on 6 February 2017 reports that around 3,187 buildings were completely destroyed.



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Emergency shelter and non-food items were identified as immediate needs of flood affected communities of North Hamgyong Province. Construction or rehabilitation of houses was also at priority keeping in view the extreme cold (-37) in winter.

The Government of DPRK (GoDPRK) requested the international community for their immediate support to provide emergency shelter, non-food items, rehabilitation of water supply system and support to provide CGI sheets for rehabilitation or reconstruction of new houses. As a result, a well-coordinated operation was initiated, mobilizing the available stock instantly.

The overall objective of the DPRK RCS response operation ([MDRKP008](#)) was to ensure that 330,000 affected people receive appropriate assistance in a timely, effective, and efficient manner and.

3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

3.1 Purpose

This evaluation will determine to what degree the humanitarian objectives of the relief and recovery interventions have been achieved and how the methodologies utilized have facilitated and contributed to the results attained. Further it should provide recommendations on how the capacity can be further strengthened at both DPRK RCS Headquarters and Provincial Branch levels.

The desired result of the evaluation is to provide best practices, lessons learned, and recommendations that may inform DPRK RCS, IFRC and other DPRK CAS and Movement partners in establishing better guidelines, priorities, plans and implementing ongoing or future operations.

3.2 Scope

The focus is on the interventions in the affected areas in Musan County, Yonsa County and Hoeryong City in North Hamgyong Province, DPRK

4. OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA

4.1 Objectives

The evaluation aims to:

- (i) Assess the extent to which interventions under the operation have achieved its objectives.
- (ii) Assess the capacity of the DPRK RCS to deliver relief and recovery assistance efficiently and make recommendations on how this capacity can be further strengthened.
- (iii) Examine the coordination and communication between national and international stakeholders (GoDPRK, SCEDM, UN Agencies, EUPS Units, Embassies)
- (iv) Assess the coordination and communication among DPRK CAS and Movement partners.

The evaluation should highlight following points:

1. Good practice in programme design and implementation, highlighting if community engagement and accountability (CEA) practices have been applied.
2. Coordination mechanism – in terms of duplication or complimentary interventions from other stakeholders, and the interventions provided to targeted communities.
3. Lesson learned – what can be done better in future operations particularly in the area of planning and implementation? what are the strengths and capacities of IFRC and DPRK RCS for future disaster response that can be further built on?



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4.2 Criteria

The following criteria will be used to guide the evaluation recommendations:

a. Relevance and appropriateness

1. How effective were the interventions in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and responding appropriately to their particular circumstances?
 - o What are the strategies used to ensure appropriate quality and timeliness were maintained in delivering the goods and services to target beneficiaries including mechanisms to capture beneficiary complaints/feedback?
2. Were intervention strategies and priorities in line with local customs and practices of the affected population, the priorities of the Government authorities and other key humanitarian actors?
3. Were the interventions in line with the DPRK RCS and IFRC strategies, policies, standard operating procedures and guidelines, including the Minimum Commitments to gender and diversity?

b. Coverage

4. To what extent did the interventions reach all population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance?
5. How could the coverage and distribution methods be improved?

c. Efficiency/effectiveness/accountability

6. Did the interventions meet their immediate and intended results? How effective the interventions address issues and constraints faced during implementation?
7. Were there adequate resources available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?
 - o Was the capacity of the human resource system adequate to execute the interventions? Were personnel skills utilized in an efficient and effective manner?
 - o Did the previous lesson learned workshop result in DPRK RCS addressing the identified capacity and operational gaps for the recovery phase?
8. Were systems, procedures and control mechanisms adequate to ensure smooth delivery of assistance and minimize potential losses/risks faced by DPRK RCS and IFRC?
9. Were adequate tracking systems for delivery of goods and services in place to ensure transparency and accountability?
10. Were complaints/feedback mechanisms put in place for community questions and concerns to be answered? What were the concerns raised by communities during the intervention?
11. Was there adequate time and effort invested for the integration of interventions across the different operation sectors? To what degree was integration achieved and how could this be further strengthened?
12. How were programme activities managed and coordinated, particularly between DPRK RCS, IFRC, DPRK CAS and Movement partners, inter-agency coordination mechanisms, and local authorities?

d. Impact

13. What evidence is available that greater investment in preparedness measures prior to the floods have resulted in more efficient response and recovery interventions?
14. What evidence (both direct and indirect) is available that the interventions contributed to the reduction of suffering and that the affected populations were assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and enhancing disaster preparedness?
15. What impact did the interventions have on how the communities might cope with subsequent disasters?

e. Connectedness and Sustainability

16. In what way did the interventions result in enhanced institutional capacity of the DPRK RCS in terms of: a) ability to implement recovery programmes, b) ability to prepare for and respond to disasters in a timely, efficient, and coordinated manner; and c) ability to mobilize communities at risk to cope with future disasters?
17. To what extent did the IFRC support strengthen and complement the response of DPRK RCS?

5. METHODOLOGY

The methodology will adhere to the IFRC Framework for Evaluations, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

Interviewees will include DPRK RCS and IFRC (e.g. managers, field officers, direct implementers and volunteers) and beneficiaries ('most vulnerable' beneficiaries including children, women, the elderly, people with disabilities).

These may be in the form of key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs) or other methods, at the discretion of the evaluation team. Interviews will also take place at the Pyongyang level to include perspectives from high-level management of DPRK RCS and IFRC. The evaluation is expected to be no longer than 20 days in duration, including preparation of the report.

Secondary data will be collected from UN, EUPSs, and GoDRPK.

The detailed evaluation design is to be created by the evaluation team; however, the following should be taken into account: Data collection methods and pace are to be decided by the evaluator, in consultation with the DPRK RCS and IFRC country office focal person(s), but should take into account the reality of the DPRK country context. One-on-one interviews, discussion groups and key informant interviews are encouraged.

6. OUTPUTS/DELIVERABLES

- a. Inception report and detailed work plan for the evaluation
- b. Presentation of initial findings prior to departure from Pyongyang
- c. Draft report to be submitted one week after the conclusion of the evaluation
- d. Final evaluation report of no more than 20 pages (excluding executive summary and annexes) which highlights key conclusions and recommendations

Suggested report outline

No.	Content	Description
01.	Executive Summary	Summarize the overall findings of the evaluation with key conclusions and not more than 10 key recommendations. Executive Summary must be specific to the Evaluation and clearly outline the specific context of the interventions
02.	1. Background	A general section that will outline the overall objectives, aims, intervention strategy, policy frameworks, targets, main stakeholders, financial frameworks, institutional arrangements
03	2. Methodology	Outlines the overall approach used, the tools applied and the key assumptions. It will focus on consideration for efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability, in function of the internal and external issues
04.	3. Comparative findings	Outlines the findings of the evaluation

05.	4. Conclusions	Outlines the main conclusions that have emerged from the findings
06.	5. Lessons learned and recommendations	General overall recommendations, including on cross-cutting issues that affect not only the specific intervention

7. SCHEDULE

The evaluation is expected to no more than 18 days, including submission of the final evaluation report. It is proposed to start on 5 December 2017 with the following schedule:

Activity	Location	Days	Tentative dates
Arrives in DPRK	Pyongyang	3 (including travel day)	5-7 Dec
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preparation, desk review • Submit inception report • Interview stakeholders in Pyongyang 			
Travel to the field for key informant interviews and focus group discussions			
Analyze results and submit draft report	North Hamgyong, Musan/ Yonsa/ Hoeryong	8	8-15 Dec
Present initial findings to DPRK RCS, IFRC and partners	Pyongyang	1	20 Dec
Departs from DPRK	Pyongyang	1	21 Dec
Stakeholders feedback on the draft report			19-27 Dec
Prepare and submit final report	Consultant's home base	1	28 Dec
Total days		18	

8. EVALUATION QUALITY and ETHICAL STANDARDS

The consultants should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the review team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#)

The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

- a. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
- b. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost-effective manner.
- c. **Ethics and Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
- d. **Impartiality and Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.



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- e. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
- f. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technically accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
- g. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
- h. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the [seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross Red Crescent](#): Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.

The following ethical considerations will be observed throughout planning and execution of the evaluation and during documentation and presentation of the findings:

1. The process at any point will ensure 'Do No Harm' principle. This will not only relate to physical consideration but also emotional and contextual considerations that might affect the well-being or social position of the participating individuals.
2. Information at all levels will be confidential in nature and the analysis will be done based on blinding of the characters and context; as much as possible.
3. Any photograph and contextual information (name, household information, history, locality name, Barangay name etc.) will only be published if all the participating members endorse the process and allow publication of the same in totality.
4. In case the author wishes to use the unpublished datasets or information's, from this evaluation; (s)he/ they must seek principle approval from IFRC.
5. The evaluator(s) is not authorized to promise a service or provide solution for any expressed problems. Though (s)he may document the same and make it available to the DPRK RCS and IFRC.
6. Complete orientation of the government laws and policies will be pivotal and at any point the evaluation team must respect and adhere to the local laws and policies.

9. EVALUATION TEAM AND QUALIFICATIONS

The evaluator must have experience or significant knowledge of the humanitarian response mechanisms, specifically relief and recovery interventions, and have previous experience in conducting evaluations for medium-to-large scale programmes. The Team Leader will be supported by an evaluation team (2 to 3 persons) from IFRC and DPRK RCS. The Team Leader will coordinate directly with the IFRC AP Regional Office and IFRC DPRK Country Office.

The following characteristics are highly desirable for the evaluation team:

- **(For Team Leader)** Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programmes responding to major disasters and at best working experience in DPRK.
- Understanding of DPRK country context and cultural sensibility
- Knowledge of activities generally conducted by humanitarian organizations in the sectors of relief, shelter, water and sanitation, health and DRR.
- Field experience in the evaluation of humanitarian or development programmes, with prior experience of evaluating Red Cross programmes desirable.
- Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner (examples of previous work may be requested)



International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

- Previous experience in coordination, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian programmes.
- Ability to work within tight deadlines and manage with available resources.
- Excellent written and spoken English skills required.

10. APPLICATION PROCEDURES

Interested candidates for Team Leader role should submit their expression of interest to pmer.apzo@ifrc.org by **18 October 2017**. In the subject line, please state the evaluation you are applying for, your surname and first name. (SUBJECT: DPRK Floods Final Evaluation - Last Name, First Name).

The application should include:

1. Cover letter clearly summarizing experience as it pertains to this assignment, daily rate, and contact details of three professional referees
2. Curriculum Vitae (CV)
3. Provide samples of previous work (reports of previous evaluations and reviews completed)

Application materials are non-returnable and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted. Shortlisted candidates will be contacted via email for Skype interview on the week of 23-25 October 2017.

11. APPENDICES – will be made available in country

- Package of Reference Documents for [MDRKP008](#)
- Updates and reports, including Movement updates
- Disaster Response Operations Manual and other available guidelines
- Other relevant DPRK RCS and IFRC policies, standard operating procedures and guidelines

Draft Inception Report

Final Evaluation, Flood Operation, DPR of Korea – IFRC

Yvan GRAYEL, 20 December 2017

Section One (1): Objectives of the Final Evaluation

The present Inception Report is about the Final Evaluation of the Flood Operation implemented by the *DPRK Red Cross National Societies* (DPRK RCS) and the *International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies* (IFRC).

After the largest flood in history of DPR of Korea, that occurred in 6 counties of North Hamgyong province on September 1st, 2016, MDRKP008 Flood Operation started in September 2016 and it will be completed by December 2017. Due to its unprecedented scale and declared as a National Emergency of Highest Priority, the Flood Response has led to significant efforts to address emergency relief and recovery needs. There is therefore the need for reviewing such an exceptional program, with the overall objective of learning from this experience and increasing in-country capacity for future interventions.

Looking at the impact of emergency relief and recovery interventions, the Final Evaluation provides an overview from outside the project about the operational context. It will document project achievements, highlight best practices and identify key areas for improvement in future disaster preparedness and response.

As described in the Terms of References, the objectives of the Final Evaluation are as follow:

- (i) Assess the extent to which interventions under the operation have achieved its objectives,
- (ii) Assess the capacity of the *DPRK RCS* to deliver relief and recovery assistance efficiently and make recommendations on how this capacity can be further strengthened,
- (iii) Examine the coordination and communication between national and international stakeholders, (GoDPRK, SCEDM, UN Agencies, EUPS Units, Embassies), and
- (iv) Assess the coordination and communication among DPRK CAS and Movement partners.

The Final Evaluation Report will present the main findings based on DAC criteria for evaluation (OECD): *Relevance/Appropriateness and Coherence; Coverage; Efficiency (and Monitoring); Effectiveness (and Accountability); Impact; Connectedness & Sustainability*.

The Final Evaluation concerns interventions implemented in affected areas of Musan County, Yonsa County and Hoeryong City.

The following *Sections* of the Inception Report are:

- Evaluation Matrix
- Limitations
- Description of the methodology used (including data collection processes and different phases foreseen)
- Reporting requirements, and
- Validated work plan.

Section Two (2): Evaluation Questions

It is acknowledged that the list of Evaluations Questions proposed in the *Terms of References* provides a comprehensive overview of what the Final Evaluation should foresee. Therefore, the table below presents the listed questions with additional inputs:

- 'Key Aspects/Issues to Consider', to ensure all aspects will be assessed during the Final Evaluation
- 'Data Collection Methods', associated to each Evaluation Question.

Evaluation Criteria	Evaluation Questions (from the Term of References)	Key aspects / issues to consider	Data Collection Methods					
			Interviews with IFRC & RCS	1-to-1 Interviews with beneficiaries	Key Informant Interviews	Desk Review	Field Observation	Interviews with other stakeholders
Relevance & Appropriateness & Coherence	<p>1. How effective were the interventions in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and responding appropriately to their particular circumstances?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o What are the strategies used to ensure appropriate quality and timeliness were maintained in delivering the goods and services to target beneficiaries including mechanisms to capture beneficiary complaints/feedback? <p>2. Were intervention strategies and priorities in line with local customs and practices of the affected population, the priorities of the Government authorities and other key humanitarian actors?</p> <p>3. Were the interventions in line with the DPRK RCS and IFRC strategies, policies, standard operating procedures and guidelines, including the Minimum Commitments to gender and diversity?</p>	<p>o Vulnerability assessment</p> <p>o Local needs considerations</p> <p>o Population's participation</p> <p>o Suitability of technical solutions</p> <p>o Adaptation to changes</p> <p>o GoDPRK policies and requirements</p> <p>o Red Cross strategy and mandate</p>	✓	✓	✓	✓		
			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coverage	<p>4. To what extent did the interventions reach all population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance?</p> <p>5. How could the coverage and distribution methods be improved?</p>	<p>o Needs assessment quality</p> <p>o Actual project coverage</p> <p>o Coordination with other Flood Response actors</p> <p>o Inclusion of population groups</p> <p>o Actions at Health & Education institutions</p> <p>o Cross-cutting issues consideration</p> <p>o Monitoring quality</p>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Effectiveness & Accountability	6. Did the interventions meet their immediate and intended results? How effective the interventions address issues and constraints faced during implementation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Project achievements o Project timeline o Level of changes with initial plans 	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Efficiency & Monitoring	<p>7. Were there adequate resources available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Was the capacity of the human resource system adequate to execute the interventions? Were personnel skills utilized in an efficient and effective manner? o Did the previous lesson learned workshop result in DPRK RCS addressing the identified capacity and operational gaps for the recovery phase? <p>8. Were systems, procedures and control mechanisms adequate to ensure smooth delivery of assistance and minimize potential losses/risks faced by DPRK RCS and IFRC?</p> <p>9. Were adequate tracking systems for delivery of goods and services in place to ensure transparency and accountability?</p> <p>10. Were complaints/feedback mechanisms put in place for community questions and concerns to be answered? What were the concerns raised by communities during the intervention?</p> <p>11. Was there adequate time and effort invested for the integration of interventions across the different operation sectors? To what degree was integration achieved and how could this be further strengthened?</p> <p>12. How were programme activities managed and coordinated, particularly between DPRK RCS, IFRC, DPRK CAS and Movement partners, inter-agency coordination mechanisms, and local authorities?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Project feasibility o Sufficient allocation of HR capacity o Sufficient allocation of resources o Sufficient allocation of funds o Cost-effectiveness o Multi-Actors Coordination o Monitoring capacity o Knowledge management o Visibility & Communication 	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Impact	<p>13. What evidence is available that greater investment in preparedness measures prior to the floods have resulted in more efficient response and recovery interventions?</p> <p>14. What evidence (both direct and indirect) is available that the interventions contributed to the reduction of suffering and that the affected populations were assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and enhancing disaster preparedness?</p> <p>15. What impact did the interventions have on how the communities might cope with subsequent disasters?</p>	<p>o Direct and indirect evidences on populations' conditions</p> <p>o Indicators measurement</p> <p>o Relations between achieved results and expected outcomes</p> <p>o DPRK RCS capacity assessment (<i>short-term</i>)</p> <p>o Unexpected and negative effects</p> <p>o Added values from previous programs</p>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Sustainability	<p>16. In what way did the interventions result in enhanced institutional capacity of the DPRK RCS in terms of: a) ability to implement recovery programmes, b) ability to prepare for and respond to disasters in a timely, efficient, and coordinated manner; and c) ability to mobilize communities at risk to cope with future disasters?</p> <p>17. To what extent did the IFRC support strengthen and complement the response of DPRK RCS?</p>	<p>o Integration of post-emergency needs</p> <p>o Challenging factors & mitigation measures</p> <p>o DPRK RCS capacity assessment (<i>medium- to long-term</i>)</p> <p>o GoDPRK commitment and capacities to support</p> <p>o Disaster Risk Reduction strategy</p>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Section Three (3): Limitations

- ❖ **Limitations related to field access:** *IFRC / DPRK RCS Flood Operation* has been implemented in remote areas, far from the place of accommodation of the evaluation team (minimum 3h and up to 4h30 drive). Most of the time, an additional 30 mins should be added to reach the Ris. Besides, winter weather conditions in the area are very harsh (snow storms, up to minus 25 degrees during daytime), delaying access to project sites. During winter season, dusk starts at 4:30pm. Consequently, time onsite is very limited for detailed investigations, even with a representative sample of projects sites and activities implemented.
 - *Mitigation measures:* rely on cross-checking interviews of former staff, read in detail project documentations.
- ❖ **Limitations to the context of DPR of Korea for random investigations:** as mentioned in the Terms of References, evaluation methodology should be adapted to the context.
 - *Mitigation measures:* priority focus on Key Informant Interviews (KII) and one-to-one interviews.
- ❖ **Limitations to linear replies to questions:** while the final Evaluation cannot be fully independent considering the and information from beneficiaries tends to be similar, participatory process cannot be largely used. But interviews and open questions for individual experience and recommendations, utilized at limited scale, remains nevertheless productive and provide valuable inputs for the Final Evaluation
 - *Mitigation measures:* look for collection of details in discussions to enhance understanding of issues and achievements.
- ❖ **Limitations to risk of limited knowledge management of the project:** there have been many IFRC staff involved during the Flood Operation. Especially the ones in charge during the first part of the project implementation are not present anymore. Moreover, some potential learnings might be documented in donor reports.
 - *Mitigation measures:* rapid Skype call with key former staff, collection of a large range of reports for detailed review.

Section Four (4): Methodology

In addition to all the processes outlined in this report, the proposed methodology respects the requirements of the related *Terms of References*.

The Final Evaluation will be implemented with high quality and ethical standards, ensuring that all mandatory engagements described in *Chapter 8 of the Terms of References* are fully respected.

Focusing on both quantitative and qualitative aspects, the Final Evaluation assesses the current achievements against expected project outcomes. It identifies project progress and it also looks at challenges and potential gaps encountered throughout the project.

1. Evaluation Preparation and Briefing – 2 days

The starting phase of the final evaluation will last 2 days. It includes international transportation to DPR of Korea (total of 28 hours). In addition to contract signature and travel preparation, some preliminary emails were exchanged with the Evaluation Team before starting date, regarding work plan development and donor reports collection.

An Inception Meeting was held on arrival in the country at *DPRK RCS* office with the Evaluation Team. It was the occasion to:

- (i) Briefing on security and validate Security Information document
- (ii) Introduce each member of Evaluation Team
- (iii) Agree on objectives of the Final Evaluation and express expectations from all parties, and
- (iv) Review the proposed work plan and make necessary adjustments and arrangements.

The field Evaluation Team discussed various expected outcomes of field investigations and the best methodologies and organization on how to proceed.

2. Desk Review – 2 days

Reports and other documentations available on the Dropbox folder specific to the Final Evaluation are collected and read during the Desk Review activities. Additional documents will be sent by USB card read by next flight to Chongjin on Tuesday 12th.

To ensure comprehensive overview of available information and data, it is requested that the Evaluation Team should provide the Consultant with all existing/available documents (Secondary Data) listed below:

- From *IFRC* and *DPRK RCS*
 - o Donor Reports - *obtained*
 - o *IFRC* Framework for Evaluation - *obtained*
 - o Relevant *IFRC* Regional learning documents related to other Flood Operations in the region
 - o *DPRK RCS* 2016-2020 Strategy
 - o *IFRC* Country Strategic (Positioning) Note, plus policies, SOP and specific guidelines
 - o Previous DRM Projects reports or learning workshop reports in country
 - o *DPRK RCS* Contingency Plan (national and provincial)
 - o Contingency stock report
 - o *IFRC* and *DPRK RCS* field reports
 - o Workshop & Training reports
 - o Workshops PPT presentations & Training modules
 - o Technical or learning notes about the Flood Operation
 - o BoQ for purchased Materials & Equipment
 - o Budget monitoring
- From *IFRC* and Int. Organizations
 - o Need Assessment Data Reports (from GoDPRK) - *obtained*
 - o HCT Joint Assessment Team – September 2016 - *obtained*
 - o Joint Review Mission (November 2016) – *obtained*
 - o Others reports, including learning and strategic/operational sectorial notes

To be integrated in the evaluation process, listed documents should be sent by Sunday 17th Dec, at the latest. If some documents cannot be made available to the consultant, they will be considered as non-existent or not been used during the Flood Operation.

List of Stakeholders

- *IFRC* / *DPRK RCS* (National, Provincial and County Branches)
- County People's Committee
- Provincial City Management Authority
- Health Facilities and schools, Kindergartens and nurseries
- RCRC Movement and CAS Partners
- International organizations: UNDP, UNICEF, EUPS #3, ICRC

3. Field Investigations – 7 days

North Hamgyong Province must be reached by airplane. The place of stay is in Chongjin, the Provincial Capital. Flood Operation sites being located near the Chinese border, it takes 3-4 hours to reach the field (pending on road accessibility during winter time).

It has been agreed on arrival in Pyongyang that one day during the stay in Chongjin will be dedicated to Desk Review activities. This was suggested in the draft itinerary developed by IFRC and DPRK RCNS to adjust postponed travel on 06 Dec as Korean visa had to be collected in Paris the day before. Nevertheless, as the Field Team must stay in Chongjin for a full week (2 flights per week), this does not modify the total amount of working days (18) allocated for the Final Evaluation.

It was agreed during the briefing meeting that the Inception Report will be sent after the last day of Desk Review activities; i.e. Sunday 9th morning the latest.

The field Team is composed of:

- **Yvan Grayel**, International Consultant – Team Leader
- **Ju Song Nam**, PMR Officer, IFRC Pyongyang
- **O Il Hyok**, Senior Officer, DPRK RCNS – Also acting as a Translator

The 2 Korean Evaluation Members (DPRK RCS and IFRC) have not been involved in regular work for the Flood Operation; each of them have only been in project sites once since last September. The Final Evaluation being a learning exercise through stepping back and bringing a different ‘eye’ than regular staff involved in project design and implementation, this will bring valuable additional external views from the Flood Operation team.

The 3 members of the Evaluation Team will conduct interviews and focus-group discussions. For time constraints, RCS volunteers cannot be associated to data collection. Some of them are part of the Key Informant Interview persons.

Considering both the large-scale nature of the Flood Operation and the limited presence in the field, the Final Evaluation will attempt the best representative overview of project context, achievements and outcomes. Depending on road accessibility (winter weather), onsite investigations will allow the visit of maximum 11 Ri / Up / Dong (maximum 1-2 hours of stay per site) among a total of XXX project sites: this corresponds to XX% of project locations. Sites to be visited were pre-selected by DPRK RCNS and IFRC.

➤ Field Investigations

- **Key Informant Interviews** in every visited site: local Chairman of People’s Committee (Ri and Unit levels), health facilities and school managers, DPRK RCS local managers, and any other Governmental counterpart if relevant
 - *Targeted objective*: at least 16 interviews (based on a minimum of KII interviews per visited site)
- **Visual observations**, with systematic walk in the targeted communities and visit of health and child institutions
 - *Targeted objective*: 8 sites, 3 health institutions and 3 schools, kindergartens and nurseries
- **One-to-one interview** of beneficiaries in new or rehabilitated houses, with representative sample of Head of family and women, as well as elder people and disabled people when possible.
 - *Targeted objective*: at least 16 interviews of beneficiaries
- *[If possible... Time constraints]* - **Focus-group discussions** with DPRK RCS volunteers and Youth members

- *Targeted objective*: 2 focus groups
- **Contingency stock inspection** at the Provincial warehouse, and local prepositioning stock
 - **Targeted objective**: 1 Provincial warehouse, 4 Ri-level prepositioning stock

The Consultant will develop Structured Interview guides to lead the discussion during interviews and group discussions.

To reflect gender diversity and inclusion, the Evaluation Team will attempt to reach as much as it can be (pending on local rural context) gender-balanced data collection. Also, data aggregated by sex will be requested when available.

4. Individual Stakeholders Meetings – 2 days

The following IFRC and DPRK RCS key persons, involved in a significant way in the Flood response will be interviewed during the Final Evaluation. Some being away now, it is proposed to arrange rapid Skype discussions during the 2nd week, between the Evaluation Team Leader and the proposed persons. This will be particularly productive as it will bring additional feedback and sharing of experiences of the first stages of the Flood Operation (*IFRC staff turnover*)

- *Within IFRC DPRK Country Office*
 - **Gwendolyn Pang**, Interim Head of Country Office
 - **Joseph Muyambo**, Project Coordinator
 - **Farid Ahmed**, Finance and Administration Delegate
 - **Pak Un Suk**, Operation Officer
 - **Marlene Fiedler**, former DRM Delegate
 - **Chris Staines**, former HoCO
- *Within IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office*
 - **Alice Ho**, Operations Coordinator, DCPRR
 - **Riku Assamaki**, Regional Logistics Coordinator
 - **Sarah M Davies**, Regional WASH Coordinator
- *Within DPRK RCS, national level*
 - **M. the Secretary General**
 - **Kim Jonh Ho**, DM Department Director
- *RCRC Movement and CAS Partners*
- *Other organizations involved (for coordination purpose)*
 - State Committee on Disaster Emergency Management
 - UNDP/OCHA
 - UNICEF
 - EUPS #3
 - ICRC

5. Draft Report and Debriefing – 3 days

- Additional data collection (reporting, technical review, detailed aspects, etc.)
- Data analysis, draft findings and recommendations
- Debriefing with the Evaluation Team in DPR of Korea: senior staffs (plus any other relevant staff) are expected to attend the learning workshop/debriefing which will be aiming at presenting the draft results of the evaluation process, to gather feedback on the findings and to build consensus on proposed recommendations.
- The debriefing note / PPT presentation will describe the first findings of the evaluation for exchanges and adjustments of recommendations.

6. International Travel – 1 day

In practice, this will take 2 days. But the Consultant will use travel time to complete the Draft Report. Indeed, available time is too limited to submit a comprehensive Draft Report before debriefing meeting, as suggested in the *Terms of References*.

Therefore, as travelling finishing on late evening on 22 December, European Time Zone, the Evaluation team will receive the **Draft Report on Saturday 23 December** (end of day considering time difference between DPR of Korea and the place of residence of the consultant).

7. Final Report – 1 day

The last day will happen after receiving feedback from stakeholders on the Draft Evaluation Report. The consultant will compile all remarks and provide additional information, wherever needed.

The Final Version of the Evaluation Report will be produced in both Word and PDF format.

It will include reporting requirements as highlighted in the *Terms of References* and in the next *Section*.

Section Five (5): Reporting Requirements

The Evaluation Team Leader (International Consultant) will report to his direct supervisors (*IFRC* Regional PMER & *IFRC* Program Coordinator) and works in very close collaboration with the rest of the Evaluation Team.

Deliverables include the present Inception report; a Draft Evaluation Report and a Final Evaluation Report. Before leaving the country, the Consultant will present preliminary key findings and recommendations.

Evaluation Report format will follow usual format for such a type of report, as well as respecting *Terms of References* requirements. Not more than 20 pages, it will be organized as the following description:

- Table of Contents – [*included in the Final Version*]
- Abbreviations and Acronyms– [*included in the Final Version*]
- Executive Summary – [*included in the Final Version*]
- Project Background and activities implemented
- Methodology used (including limitations, bias and data analysis methods)
- Key Comparative Findings
- Main Conclusions
- Recommendations based on Lessons Learnt
- Appendixes

Section Six (6): Work Plan

#	DATE	LOCATION	ACTIVITY
1	Tue 05 Dec	Paris	Desk Review Travel Lyon – Paris & Visa collection in Paris

2	Wed 06 Dec	<i>International Travel</i>	Travel to Beijing
3	Thu 07 Dec	<i>Pyongyang</i>	Travel to Pyongyang Briefing meeting with Country Evaluation Team Collection of documentations
4	Fri 08 Dec	<i>Chongjin</i>	Travel to Chongjin Meeting with Secretary of the Provincial Branch of DPRK RCS
5	Sat 09 Dec	<i>Chongjin</i>	Desk review Submission of Inception Report
6	Sun 10 Dec	<i>Field Visits</i>	Yonsa County: Kwangyang Ri; Palso Ri
7	Mo 11 Dec	<i>Field Visits</i>	Hoeryong City: Songhak Ri;
8	Tue 12 Dec	<i>Field Visits</i>	Hoeryong City: Yuson District; Kangan Dong
9	Wed 13 Dec	<i>Field Visits</i>	Musan County: Phungsan Ri; Kangson District
10	Thu 14 Dec	<i>Chongjin</i>	Warehouse Inspection Further discussion with <i>DPRK RCS</i>
11	Fri 15 Dec	<i>Chongjin</i>	Travel to Pyongyang Data Analysis
12	Sat 16 Dec	<i>Pyongyang</i>	Meeting with Joseph Muyambo, Project Coordinator Meeting with EUPS #3 Data Analysis
-	Sun 17 Dec	<i>Pyongyang</i>	- Day off – [<i>DPRK RCNS Invitation to visit Juche Tower & Wolhyang Expo.</i>] Data Analysis
13	Mo 18 Dec	<i>Pyongyang</i>	Meeting with DPRK RCS Meeting with State Committee on Disaster Emergency Management
14	Tues 19 Dec	<i>Pyongyang</i>	Meeting with UNDP/OCHA Meeting with UNICEF Skype with IFRC staff (Interim HoCO; former HoCO; former DRM Delegate, APRO) <i>Dinner Invitation, by DPRK RCNS</i>
15	Wed 20 Dec	<i>Pyongyang</i>	Debriefing with IFRC and DPRK RCNS Draft Report
16	Thu 21 Dec	<i>Pyongyang</i>	Travel to Beijing
17	Fri 22 Dec	<i>International Travel</i>	From Beijing to Lyon, France
	Sat 23 Dec	<i>Home-based</i>	Submission of Draft Report
-	23-27 Dec		<i>Feedback on Draft Report</i>
18	Thu 28 Dec	<i>Home-based</i>	Final Version – Evaluation Report

Workplan, Country Visit

Final Evaluation, Flood Operation, DPR of Korea – IFRC

Yvan GRAYEL, December 2017

Calendar of Activities

DATE	ACTIVITIES
05-06-07 Dec	International Travel (Lyon/Paris for Korean visa collection & Paris/Beijing/Pyongyang)
07 Dec	Briefing with <i>RCS DPRK & IFRC</i>
08 Dec	Travel to Chongjin; Meeting RCS Provincial Branch
09 Dec	Desk review
10 Dec	<i>Field Visit</i> : Yonsa County (Yonsa up; Kwangyang Ri; Palso Ri)
11 Dec	<i>Field Visit</i> : Hoeryong City (Songhak Ri)
12 Dec	<i>Field Visit</i> : Hoeryong City (Yusan Ri; Kangan Dong)
13 Dec	<i>Field Visit</i> : Musan County (Sambong Ri; Kangson Dong; Phungsan Ri)
14 Dec	<i>Field visit</i> : Provincial Warehouse; Data Analysis
15 Dec	Meeting with <i>DPRK RCS</i> ; Travel back to Pyongyang
16 Dec	Meeting with <i>IFRC</i> ; Meeting with EUPS #3
17 Dec	Data Analysis
18 Dec	Meeting with <i>DPRK RCS</i> ; Meeting with SCEDM; Skype calls
19 Dec	Meeting with Office of the UN Resident Coordinator; Meeting with UNICEF; Skype Calls
20 Dec	Debriefing with <i>DPRK RCS & IFRC</i>
21 Dec	Travel to Beijing; Draft Report
22 Dec	Travel back home

Annex 4 – List of Key Informants & Stakeholders Interviewed

Final Evaluation, Flood Operation, DPRK RCS & IFRC

Yvan GRAYEL, December 2017

In addition to 12 interviews of beneficiaries and 16 Key Informants Interviews in the field (DPRK RCS Branches, Clinics/Ri Hospital and Child Institution Managers, Pumping Station Managers), here below is the list of the Key Informants & Stakeholders interviewed during the Final Evaluation.

INTERVIEWED...				
ORGANIZATION	NAME	POSITION	EMAIL	DATE OF MEETING
IFRC Regional Office	Alice HO	Operations Coordinator	alice.ho@ifrc.org	19 December
IFRC Country Office	Joseph MUYAMBO	NSD & Programme Coordinator	joseph.muyambo@ifrc.org	07 & 16 & 19 December
	Farid AHMED	Finance and Administrative Delegate	farid.ahmed@ifrc.org	15 December
	PAK Un Suk	Disaster Risk Management Officer	unsuk.pak@ifrc.org	15 & 19 December
	Chris STAINES	Former Head of Delegation	chris.staines@ifrc.org	20 December
	Marlene FIEDLER	Former DRM Delegate	fiedler.marlene@gmail.com	18 December
DPRK RCS	RI Ho Rim	Secretary General	dprk-rc@star-co.net.kp	20 December
	KIM Jong Ho	Director, DM Department		07 & 15 & 18 December
SCEDM	Mr HO & Mr KIM	Deputy Director and External Cooperation	-	18 December
UNDP	Stephen KINLOCH-PICHAT	Deputy Resident Representative	stephen.kinloch-pichat@undp.org	23 December
Office of the UN Resident Coordinator	Marina THRONE-HOLST	Coordination Officer	throne-holst@un.org	19 December
UNICEF	Anil POKHREL	WASH Specialist	apokhrel@unicef.org	19 December
EUPS #3	May SANTIAGO	WASH & DRR Programme Manager	dprk.washpm@concern.net	16 December
Swedish Red Cross - by emails	ASA SANDBERG	Head of Desk/Project Coordinator, DPRK	asa.sandberg@redcross.se	-

List of Key Informants / Stakeholders not interviewed (or no feedback)

ORGANIZATION	NAME	POSITION	EMAIL
IFRC Regional Office	Riku ASSAMAKI	Regional Logistics Coordinator	riku.assamaki@ifrc.org
	Wendy NEOH	Emergency WASH Officer, Health unit	wendy.neoh@ifrc.org
IFRC Country Office	Gwendolyn PANG	Interim Head of Delegation	Gwendolyn.PANG@ifrc.org
Italian Red Cross <i>Not involved in the Flood Operation</i>	Marino CALVINO	Head of International Cooperation	marina.calvino@cri.it
Danish Red Cross	Susanne THORSBOLL	-	sutho@rodekors.dk
Korean Red Cross	SUNG Mi	-	sungmi@redcross.or.kr
Norwegian Red Cross	Torben HENRIKSEN	-	torben.henriksen@redcross.no
British Red Cross	-	-	MYeo@redcross.org.uk
Canadian Red Cross	-	-	Yunhong.Zhang@redcross.ca
Finish Red Cross	-	-	Niina.Kylliainen@redcross.fi
German Red Cross	-	-	GiebelH@drk.de
Irish Red Cross	-	-	intdep@rcs.ir

Specific Questions, Interviews and Focus-Group Discussions

Final Evaluation, Flood Operation, DPR of Korea – *IFRC*

Yvan GRAYEL, December 2017

Beneficiaries Interviews (12)

9 females and 3 men – Average age: between 25 to 65-year-old

- What happened to you and your family during the flood? How was the Early Warning and Evacuation system? What should be different now for future disasters?
- When did you receive emergency shelter support? Can you describe on it was? When was your family relocated in permanent dwellings?
- What did you receive from RCS Volunteers? When? How often? What is your opinion about it?
- Have you received First Aid Kit from *DPRK RCS*? If yes, for what? What is your opinion about it?
- What kind of disease your children got after the flood? Was it more than before? What are the main practices to avoid diarrhea to children?
- How did you and your family's members) participate in the Flood Operation?
- How often did you use the water purification tablets? How often do you boil water? How was the access to water before the flood? What about now (if the project site is targeted with water supply system activities)? What are the main problems you have noticed on the new system?
- Would you have any recommendations for the Final Evaluation?

Focus-Group Discussions with RCS Volunteers (2)

2 groups of 4 females – Average age: not asked – Estimated age of participants between 20 to 40-year-old

- From when are you a RCS Volunteer? What motivates you? What are the main differences of *DPRK RCS* in your County and communities, with before the flood?
- What and when did you receive training from *DPRK RCS*?
- What can prevent diarrhea? What would be the more likely types of diseases that might occur during an emergency period?
- How often and how do you spread the messages to the communities?
- Would you have any recommendations about *DPRK RCS* capacity building for the Final Evaluation?

DPRK Red Cross Society



International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies



Final Evaluation of Flood Operation, 2016 North Hamgyong Province

Preliminary Findings

**DPRK RCS Office - Presentation
December 20, 2017**

Yvan Grayel – Team Leader, Evaluation Team

Objectives of the Final Evaluation



To what degree
the humanitarian objectives of the **relief and recovery interventions**
have been achieved
and
how the methodologies utilized
have facilitated and contributed to the **results attained**.

Key lessons and recommendations from this evaluation will:

- ❑ Guide the *DPRK RCS* in ongoing as well as future operations and
- ❑ Contribute to broader Red Cross / Red Crescent learning, particularly to better address needs in emergency, relief and recovery, taking into account long-term impact and sustainability.

Used methodology of the Final Evaluation

Using standard design for a Final Evaluation

- **Desk Review**
- **Field Investigations** (including Beneficiaries Interviews and Key Informants)
- **Secondary Data Collection** (including specific meetings & discussions with key persons)
- **Data Analysis** (& debriefing with *DPRK RCS*)
- **Draft and Final Evaluation Report**

Achieved activities

North Hamgyong Province

- Visit of 8 Ri / Dong / Up
 - **Yonsa C:** Kwangyang Ri, Palso Ri
 - **Hoeryong C:** Songhak Ri (WSS), Yuson District (WSS), Kangan Dong
 - **Musan C:** Musan Up (WSS), Sambong Ri, Phungsan Ri
- 3 clinics / hospitals + 4 children institutions + 3 Water Supply System sources (WSS): river catchment or pumping stations
- 12 interviews of beneficiaries
- 16 Key Informants Interviews (*DPRK RCS* Branches, Clinics/Ri Hospital and Child Institution Managers, Pumping Station Managers)
- 2 Focus-Group Discussions with *DPRK RCS* volunteers
- 1 visit of Provincial warehouse

Achieved activities

Pyongyang

- Meeting with SCDEM
 - Meeting with *DPRK RCS* Department Directors
 - 5 Meetings with *IFRC* Regional Office and DPRK offices staff – including former key staff in DPRK
 - Meetings with International Organizations - Office of the UN Resident Coordinator, UNICEF, UNDP, EUPS #3
 - Brief questionnaire to PNS concerned
-
- Debriefing with Secretary General, *DPRK RCS* and *IFRC*

General Conclusions



- **A large-scale Flood Operation (about 5 million CHF in 16 months – in 6 counties) to respond to one of the largest natural disasters in DPRK in the past 70 years – [the largest one in North Hamgyong Province]**
- **2 main phases:**
 - [before 2016 winter season] Emergency Response
 - [2017] Recovery: provision of long-term services; Disaster Preparedness; *DPRK RCS* capacity building
- **A series of lessons learnt** from this large Flood Operation, to be integrated in **future *DPRK RCS/IFRC* Disaster Risk Management actions**

General Conclusions



- **Stakeholders satisfaction**

- High appreciation from the Government of DPRK (and all authority levels)
- High regards from the affected population about *DPRK RCS* support at County & Ri levels
- Great perception from the general opinion in DPRK – [*not measurable within the Final Evaluation*]
- *DPRK RCS/IFRC* considered as a major Disaster Risk Management actor by the International Organizations
- Positive PNS feedback (**pending more replies**), while expecting more monitoring details on use of CGI sheets

Preliminary Findings

Main strengths of the Flood operation



Satisfactory Project Outcomes

1. Good level of outcomes' achievement
2. Valuable commitments and significant efforts from all Red Cross levels: *DPRK RCS HQ; IFRC; DPRK RCS Provincial Branch, City/County Branches and Volunteers*
3. Allocated resources have been utilized and overall implementation plan was on track: very good for such a large-scale response in a limited period
 - Flood Operation implemented in time,
 - 98-99% use of budget use
 - 98%-99% reach of targeted beneficiaries - **To be cross-checked**

Preliminary Findings

Main strengths of the Flood operation



Enhanced Red Cross Capacity

1. Extensive *DPRK RCS* network on the ground, allowing first emergency interventions very rapidly, despite limited *DPRK RCS* capacity at field level (Province & Counties / City) at that time
2. Effective use of previous *DPRK RCS* Disaster Response experience, added to regular *DPRK RCS/IFRC* annual programs for activities replication
3. Effective *IFRC* support (project management; *DPRK RCS* capacity building; technical expertise; HR surge team; admin and log).

Preliminary Findings

Main strengths of the Flood operation



Quality Interventions *(slide 1)*

1. Emergency response activities are in line with Government policies and RC strategies, and (mostly) adapted to needs situation
2. Interventions suitable to local and gender-based considerations regarding distributed emergency items (hygiene & kitchen kits), plus extensive use of community-based RCS volunteers for emergency support and communication to beneficiaries
3. Solid quality of items (CGI sheets, water pipes), renovated provincial warehouse and prepositioning stock

Preliminary Findings

Main strengths of the Flood operation



Quality interventions *(slide 2)*

4. Asset of existing prepositioning stocks in country (despite huge logistics constraints to access affected areas)
5. Proper assessment of limited initial RCS capacity, translated into a large range of capacity building activities: a grasped opportunity to largely strengthen the Provincial & County RCS capacity
6. Design and implementation of appropriate mitigation measures during the Recovery phase: Early Warning & Evacuation mechanisms, disaster preparedness activities

Preliminary Findings

Main strengths of the Flood operation



Coordination and Advocacy

1. Tight collaboration with the Government (in Pyongyang and in the field)
2. Proactive participation & leading roles in humanitarian coordination for IFRC: actively involved in the 2 HCT assessment/review missions; co-chairing Shelter & NFI Working Group; active role in the WASH Working Group; co-chairing the DRR
3. Proactive *IFRC* external communication
4. Adapted visibility of *DPRK RCS* presence onsite

Preliminary Findings

Identified areas for further improvements



In terms of Coverage, Monitoring & Reporting

1. Potential for higher focus on specific attention to most vulnerable groups
2. Little disaggregated information about characteristics of beneficiaries in donor reports - In close relation with the need for increased Data Collection capacity and Monitoring Resource within *DPRK RCS & IFRC*
3. *Need for better clarity on how all remote areas are targeted, and planning actions based on identified challenges*
4. *Need for higher documenting practices from IFRC Delegate and Experts*

Preliminary Findings

Identified areas for further improvements



Produced effects lower than expected for some interventions *(slide 1)*

1. Limited timeliness of CGI sheets distribution for emergency needs (20%) - Relevance & Efficiency *Versus* Extreme Pressure
2. Timeliness of First Aid kits distribution (with respect to emergency needs)
3. WASH approach mainly focusing on Water and Hygiene: appropriate for recovery phase, but need for further attention on emergency Sanitation risks (outbreak prevention & control)
4. Potential for more contextualized (i.e. referring to specific location and timing) evidence-based decision-making (rather than standard assessment) for priority messages dissemination and emergency activities: for instance, what is priority? Hygiene kits and WPT targets *Versus* hygiene practices as an example)

Preliminary Findings

Identified areas for further improvements



Produced effects lower than expected for some interventions *(slide 2)*

4. Issue of low energy conservation for solar heating systems
5. Damages risk due to extreme cold weather (bathrooms, water tanks and valves chambers), Musan Township pumping station location if (exceptional) flood
6. Limited sustainability of *DPRK RCS* County Branches capacity (need for more than 1-year capacity building), requiring special attention/support

-
- External constraints:
 - Very short deadline required for Shelter activities (mixing Recovery Needs with Emergency Timeline)
 - Limited coordination capacity in the field, bringing confusion and restricting timeline of emergency interventions.

Preliminary Recommendations

Based on best practices & areas for improvement



Building up based on sharing of experiences: develop a plan to transfer lessons learnt on Disaster Preparedness & Response Capacity to other provinces

- ✓ Exchange workshop between North Hamgyong Province & the 2 other provinces where *DPRK RCS/IFRC* programs (both Disaster Response and Development): sharing of experiences with previous interventions
- ✓ Develop a learning note (summarizing best practices and other lessons learnt from learning workshops) that can be shared to all provincial *DPRK RCS* branches
- ✓ Ensure application of validated Final Evaluation's recommendations into next year annual program (including *DPRK RCS* Capacity Building in North Hamgyong Province)
- ✓ Planning deployment of Early Warning & Evacuation mechanisms in other counties and provinces, including more field-based Disaster Preparedness simulation exercises
- ✓ Support of *IFRC* to *DPRK RCS* Contingency Plan revision

Preliminary Recommendations

Based on best practices & areas for improvement



Reporting and documenting

The ones below to be included in the Final Flood Operation Report
(by end of March 2018)

- ✓ Provide detailed and gender-specific disaggregated data for beneficiaries, especially for the most vulnerable groups of populations (people with disability, elderly people, women with young children, etc.)
- ✓ Support DPRK RCS County Branches to collect related data, if any difficulty to do so.
- ✓ Ensure sufficient HR in first quarterly for data processing/analysis
- ✓ Provide detailed monitoring information about actual use of CGI sheets (80% from 2016 supply)

Preliminary Recommendations

Based on best practices & areas for improvement



Reporting and documenting

- ✓ Share lessons learnt to HCT and Sector Working Groups (workshop if possible) for increased advocacy on enhanced Disaster Response and Preparedness capacity in country
- ✓ For Shelter, WASH and Health activities, establish priority Sphere Standards indicators to be realistically collected in future emergency response (including related sources of verification)
- ✓ Improve Beneficiaries Monitoring data collection: provide information per activity, with disaggregated and throughout the project implementation
- ✓ Keep improving collection of disaggregated data collection, in accordance with *IFRC* requirements - and explore possibilities for increased HR capacity (additional part-time or full-time staff if large-scale program for instance)

Preliminary Recommendations

Based on best practices & areas for improvement



Increase evidence-based decision-making process

- ✓ Use health data surveillance and rapid hygiene practices survey for more adapted and contextualized emergency WASH response,
 - ✓ especially about priority decisions between water purification tablets distribution *Versus* dissemination messages for boiling water
- ✓ More technical advocacy about the high importance of flies control (Emergency Sanitation) during emergency phases,
 - ✓ for further Outbreak Prevention & Control interventions when needed

Preliminary Recommendations

Based on best practices & areas for improvement



Strengthen some activities programming *(slide 1)*

- ✓ Develop clear objectives for increased gender considerations and specific attention to the most vulnerable groups
- ✓ More Disaster Preparedness simulation exercises in the field (and specific focus on mitigation measures against flash floods)
- ✓ Advocate realistic programming (CGI sheets target) based on maximum supply capacity for emergency response - and adjust target between emergency and recovery priority needs.
- ✓ Integrate energy conservation issues (windows, walls isolation) when programming solar heating systems in health facilities

Preliminary Recommendations

Based on best practices & areas for improvement



Strengthen some activities programming (*slide 2*)

- ✓ Explore the relevance of further *DPRK RCS* activities in post-trauma disorders after large-scale disasters – and adjust capacity building plan accordingly
- ✓ Strengthen *DPRK RCS/IFRC* strategy for long-lasting Behaviour Change, with priority focus on identification of determining factors
- ✓ Insert *DPRK RCS* volunteers' roles in messages dissemination within broader Health & Hygiene Promotion capacity onsite - And use newly developed hygiene posters (WASH Sector Group)

Preliminary Recommendations

Based on best practices & areas for improvement



Linking Disaster Preparedness and Response with Disaster Risk Reduction efforts

- ✓ Priority focus on integrated DRR activities, linked with *DPRK RCS* areas of expertise: tree planting near water sources, pumping stations location in non-flooded areas, extreme cold temperature protection in bathrooms & valves chambers, etc.
- ✓ **IFRC to be proactive in DRR Working Group reactivation?**

Next...



- **Next step:** production of an Evaluation Report, arranged according to usual DAC evaluation criteria:
 - One draft version, to be reviewed
 - Final version
- Afterwards, it is strongly suggested to work out a **Plan of Action (Who does What, When and How)** to ensure effective application of validated recommendations.

Thank you very much for your attention!

Expenditure (till 31 Dec 2017 excluding the PSSR & other fees)

Account Groups	Budget	Expenditure	Variance
	A	B	A - B
BUDGET (C)		5,037,707	
Relief items, Construction, Supplies			
Shelter - Relief	1,201,773	1,201,773	0
Construction - Facilities	11,898	48,115	-36,217
Construction Materials	36,000		36,000
Clothing & Textiles	331,175	331,175	0
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	814,487	707,748	106,738
Medical & First Aid	477,986	406,035	71,952
Teaching Materials	107,199	107,199	0
Utensils & Tools	122,040	122,040	0
Other Supplies & Services	62,779	114,840	-52,061
Total Relief items, Construction, Supplies	3,165,338	3,038,926	126,412
Vehicles	169,250	96,088	73,162
Computers & Telecom	827	10,765	-9,937
Office & Household Equipment	11,000		11,000
Total Land, vehicles & equipment	181,077	106,853	74,224
Logistics, Transport & Storage			
Storage	16,109	31,671	-15,563
Distribution & Monitoring	67,384	81,467	-14,083
Transport & Vehicles Costs	76,165	51,553	24,612
Logistics Services	119,058	124,445	-5,387
Total Logistics, Transport & Storage	278,716	289,137	-10,421
Personnel			
International Staff	206,236	224,782	-18,545
National Staff	37,075	39,087	-2,012
National Society Staff	53,063	33,581	19,482
Volunteers	47,829		47,829
Other Staff Benefits		47,829	-47,829
Total Personnel	344,204	345,279	-1,075
Consultants & Professional Fees			
Consultants	15,000	10,455	4,545
Total Consultants & Professional Fees	15,000	10,455	4,545
Workshops & Training			
Workshops & Training	280,046	234,971	45,075
Total Workshops & Training	280,046	234,971	45,075
General Expenditure			
Travel	67,077	58,292	8,785
Information & Public Relations	164,809	148,399	16,410
Office Costs	17,977	33,017	-15,039
Communications	10,037	9,250	787
Financial Charges	65,638	78,310	-12,673
Other General Expenses		0	0

Shared Office and Services Costs	120,051	109,624	10,427
Total General Expenditure	445,590	436,893	8,697
Indirect Costs			
Programme & Services Support Recover	306,148	275,114	31,034
Total Indirect Costs	306,148	275,114	31,034
Pledge Specific Costs			
Pledge Earmarking Fee	20,188	22,290	-2,102
Pledge Reporting Fees	1,400	7,800	-6,400
Total Pledge Specific Costs	21,588	30,090	-8,502
TOTAL EXPENDITURE (D)	5,037,707	4,767,717	269,990
VARIANCE (C - D)		269,990	