

Final Evaluation of Tropical Cyclone Mora and the Landslides Operation

MDRBD019



Children using repaired well in Naikhongchari

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List of acronyms

APRO	Asia Pacific Regional Office
BDRCS	Bangladesh Red Crescent Society
BMD	Bangladesh Meteorological Department
CBHFA	Community Based Health and First Aid
CEA	Community engagement and accountability
CFW	Cash for work
CGI	Corrugated iron sheeting
CHAST	Children’s Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
CIE	Cash in an envelope
CO	Country Office
CPP	Cyclone Preparedness Programme
CTP	Cash transfer programming
DBM	Dead body management
DPHE	Department of Public Health Engineering
DR	Disaster response
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EA	Emergency Appeal
EPoA	Emergency plan of action
FBF	Forecast based financing
FSP	Financial service provider
HoCO	Head of Country Office
HR	Human resources
HP	Hygiene promotion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEC	Information, education and communication
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ISCG	Inter-Sector Coordination Group
KII	Key informant interview
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NAWG	Needs Assessment Working Group
NHQ	National headquarters
NDRCC	National Disaster Response Coordination Centre at Dhaka level
NDRT	National disaster response team (member)
ODK	Open data kit
O&M	Operation and maintenance
PASSA	Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter and Settlements Awareness
PHAST	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
PMER	Planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting
PMO	Population Movement Operation
PNS	Partner National Society
RCY	Red Cross Youth (BDRCS youth volunteer)
RDRT	Regional disaster response team (member)
SAR	Search and rescue
SoP	Standard operating procedure
STK	Shelter tool kit
ToT	Training of trainers
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene

Table of content

Executive Summary.....	4
Background.....	7
Evaluation Purpose, Methodology and Team.....	7
Scope and Challenges.....	7
Key Issues.....	8
1. Timeliness of the Operational Response and Recovery.....	9
2. BDRCS capacity to scale up.....	10
3. IFRC capacity to scale up.....	12
4. Assessment and Beneficiary Selection.....	13
5. Targeting and Integration of the Recovery.....	15
6. Cash Approaches and Methodologies.....	17
7. Community Engagement & Accountability	18
8. Quality Programming and Accountability.....	19
9. Technical Programme areas.....	21
Shelter.....	21
WASH.....	23
Livelihoods.....	26
Health.....	28
Forecast based financing.....	28
10. Exit Strategy.....	29
Annexes	
Annex 1 – List of Key Informant Interviewees.....	30
Annex 2 – Operational Overview in Numbers.....	31
Annex 3 – List of content of hygiene parcels.....	32
Annex 4 - Terms of Reference.....	33
Annex 5 – Evaluation Questions.....	37

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Tropical Cyclone (TC) Mora struck the coastal belt of Bangladesh on 30th May 2017. The TC was originally forecast as signal strength seven, but finally hit at signal strength ten, having changed course at the last moment. Over 3.3 million people were affected across 15 coastal districts, with six of these districts severely affected. 50,000 homes were damaged and the cyclone had a serious impact on the lives and livelihoods of many poor communities in these vulnerable areas. On 13th June, the situation worsened, when the inland areas around Bandarban and Rangamati were struck by the deadliest landslide to hit Bangladesh, killing 160 people and damaging 11,000 homes.

Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) is experienced in preparing for and responding to such crises, and after the initial work to alert people to the incoming cyclone and evacuate them to safe areas, BDRCS moved into action with its standard response practice as auxiliary to the public authorities, providing search and rescue (SAR), food (dry and cooked), shelter kits and unconditional cash grants to those affected by both disasters. However, after the initial response, the impact of two further crises – the floods response in the north of the country and the scale-up of the population movement operation (PMO) - disrupted focus on the TC Mora operation from July onwards, and fully absorbed the capacities of both BDRCS and the International Federation's Country Office (IFRC CO).

The National Society and IFRC's CO was only able to refocus on the recovery operation for TC Mora in October 2017, following the resolution of some internal challenges and a lull in other activities. The recovery programming focused on shelter, WASH, livelihoods, with some health and disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities and comprised support in terms of material assistance, cash grants and training. The recovery programme ran from October and until the end of May, when there was a rush to finish activities before closing the programme.

The evaluation team is conscious that this is the first evaluation supported by BDRCS since the Cyclone Sidr evaluation in 2010. The evaluation is being accompanied by a lesson learning workshop, held on 25th May, before the finalisation of the operation. The team hope that the evaluation findings will be viewed as part of that lesson learning process.

The findings and recommendations are grouped according to the per following areas:-

- **Timeliness of the response and recovery** - As auxiliary to the public authorities, BDRCS delivered a timely response in the four targeted, coastal districts, reaching around 50,000 people according to IFRC reports. However, the three concurrent, operations overwhelmed both BDRCS and IFRC capacities and delayed recovery programming for TC Mora from July until October. Although the recovery activities were well targeted in terms of location and needs, the recovery work clearly happened well after the response and in some different areas. The lateness of the recovery activities de-linked them from the Mora response, and they appeared a separate "recovery phase" more focused on general needs and vulnerabilities.
- **Capacity of BDRCS to scale up** - The volume of emergency operations, understandably, overwhelmed the capacity of BDRCS and distracted attention from the TC Mora operation. Staff, particularly those within the National Disaster Response (DR) and other teams at NHQ, ended up carrying out multiple functions and were unable to fulfil their roles in respect to the Mora operation until much later. Key informant interviews (KIIs) stressed the need to strengthen capacity, particularly technical capacity, such as shelter, in the NHQ DR team. At a local level, the volunteers were seen to do good work, but were organised differently in each sub-district visited. The Red Cross Youth (RCY) volunteers brought more training and experience to the response and the recovery distributions, however, the community volunteers we met brought a strong sense of community engagement, in their regular contact with community members, and supported continuity of engagement, as they remained in

the community. The team would encourage BDRCS to reinforce its support to this level of community volunteers, to build and sustain local community capacity. The team would also recommend strengthening engagement between NHQ and the District Units / project level to better support local capacity and engagement and consider decentralising some decisions from NHQ.

- **Capacity of IFRC to scale up** - Similarly, IFRC capacity was also overwhelmed by the multiple operations and time for the TC Mora response was understandably limited as other responsibilities took priority. The team felt that the IFRC CO team needs reinforcement and should work with Partner National Societies (PNS) to build on opportunities to increase capacity for current and future operations in the new monsoon season. The evaluation also notes the urgent need for the IFRC to speed up its procedures for support services (e.g. HR, finance etc.) for emergency response, to unlock delays in the systems and facilitate the reinforcement of the CO's capacity.
- **Assessment and beneficiary selection** - Much of the feedback was linked to the area of assessment and beneficiary selection. For the emergency response, this was done by BDRCS (District Units) working in cooperation with the authorities at a local level. For the recovery planning, BDRCS and IFRC used a relatively general Kobo survey, carried out door-to-door by volunteers, to collect community level data. This was analysed at NHQ and the beneficiary lists then shared from NHQ to the local level for sign off. Interviews with volunteers, project teams and district unit staff showed that they did not feel able to adapt this list to local or changing circumstances, once received. Local feedback was that they felt that beneficiary selection was done in Dhaka and there was a lack of local participation in or ownership of the beneficiary targeting or the follow up / exit planning.
- **Integration of recovery programming** - While the assistance provided during the recovery phase was appropriate and needed at community level, the delivery of the programme seemed to be uncoordinated and random (some assistance was given in October, then some in December, April and May). Timings were not linked, nor always logical (e.g. the timing of the training, distributions and cash grants were out of sequence). The team saw no overall plan or schedule for the activities and it was not clear how they were integrated with each other, nor the rationale for the specific targeting of each type of assistance. This could be improved in future through the development of a clear recovery plan and timeframe, to better define the targeting of the assistance towards the most vulnerable, improve the integration of the recovery activities, and coordinate the scheduling of activities to improve results.
- **Cash approaches and modalities** - Cash has been extensively used across this operation and has been well received by the beneficiaries we met, both as cash in an envelope and bank cheques. Multiple cash grants were given covering different sectors, but the team was not able to find clear justifications for the specific targeting of beneficiaries for the each one (particularly for conditional versus unconditional cash), nor for the amounts agreed upon, based on market assessments. It would be important for BDRCS to further develop its SOPs and methodology for conditional cash, to ensure there are clear records of the justification for specific grants and appropriate follow up on the conditionality and support provided to beneficiaries after the distributions. BDRCS should also consider updating its cash methodology with Movement partners, to ensure full transparency and efficiency in its processes. This should include discussions around working with other Financial Service Providers (FSPs), such as mobile cash mechanisms, especially for recovery programming.
- **Community engagement and accountability (CEA)** - BDRCS has made big improvements in its CEA, through setting up complaints boxes and a hotline for the recipients of recovery assistance in this operation. However, more work can be done to build on this good start, by improving the technical set-up of and access to community engagement mechanisms, ensuring a two-way communication process with beneficiaries (responding to complaints), extending community engagement beyond the distribution process to include the whole programme cycle and bringing the engagement to a more local level at District Unit and project levels.

- **Quality programming and accountability** – The initial Emergency Plan of Action (EPOA) for the TC Mora/landslides operation was well done and clear, although the indicators were mainly quantitative and missed the qualitative element that would give balance to the planning. BDRCS had also made a strong statement in hosting this final evaluation and the lesson learning workshop that followed our visit. A strong message that came from both the field and NHQ, was the lack of strong M&E capacity to support programming teams to improve the quality of their work. While monitoring was done, it was through limited follow up on a one-page beneficiary plan or through unplanned / unrecorded field visits. It would be good for BDRCS to set up a M&E plan for each operation, with clear monitoring targets and timings and for written records to be kept. Both BDRCS and the IFRC could improve systems and levels of written records and reporting (e.g. situation reports, monitoring reports, operations updates etc.) in future operations.
- **Exit strategy** - Finally, regarding the exit strategy for this operation, not enough had been done to prepare for the end of the programme and there were too many activities still to be done in the last few days when we visited (e.g. school latrines, tube wells and cash for work). BDRCS and IFRC could do more planning in advance to be ready for the finalisation of the operation (completion of the activities, financial reporting etc.) and to inform the beneficiaries. This would be strongly recommended for future operations to ensure clear communication with programme staff and communities on the end of the operation, and to ensure the necessary actions are taken place to support a good closure and all necessary follow up. This should be planned with the District Unit offices who will do it.

The team is very grateful to the BDRCS and IFRC teams for their support for this evaluation and to the evaluation management team for their help in organising and supporting the team during the process. We are aware that this is the first evaluation of its kind for a while and hope that the teams will see it as an opportunity to support learning and the exchange of ideas. Finally, thank you to the members of the evaluation team, who took time out from other work to support this exercise.

BACKGROUND

On the morning of 29 May 2017, the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) declared Tropical Cyclone “Mora” a danger signal seven storm for six coastal districts and a signal five for nine others. This was upgraded to levels 10 and seven respectively nearer the event. The cyclone made landfall on 30th May 2017, killing seven people and wreaking havoc in the districts of Chittagong (Chattogram), Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar. Many people had been mobilised by Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) and Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) volunteers and were evacuated to shelters or safer areas. The heavy rain and strong winds damaged 50,000 houses and affected around 3.3 million people and the severe flooding affected people’s livelihoods.

Shortly afterwards on 13 June, the worst landslides in Bangladesh’s recent history hit the Bandarban, Rangamati, Chattogram, Khagrachari and Cox’s Bazar districts, killing around 160 people and injuring 187, while damaging 11,000 houses, as well as 1,200 latrines and 1,000 water points. The landslides affected around 80,000 people, bringing further desolation to the region.

BDRCS immediately launched their emergency response capacity and working alongside the authorities to assist up to 6,500 families with dry or cooked food and an additional 700 families with shelter tool kits and multi-purpose or unconditional cash grants. With support from the International Federation (IFRC), the BDRCS received a DREF of CHF 110,111 and launched an initial emergency appeal on 12 June 2017 for CHF 1,296,519 to assist 50,000 people with shelter, WASH and livelihoods support. This appeal was subsequently revised upwards on to CHF 1,674, 188 on 7 August, to include those affected by the landslides and target 80,000 people. Finally, the appeal was revised down CHF 1,149,014 on 22 December to meet the remaining needs and reflect funding levels and this remained in place through to the end of the operation on 31 May 2018, when the programmes were completed or exited. The appeal was 78% covered by partner National Societies and government and will have expended around 93 – 95% of the funding.

EVALUATION PURPOSE, METHODOLOGY AND TEAM

This evaluation, as per the TOR, is an internal evaluation with the scope to evaluate the **effectiveness, efficiency, relevance (appropriateness) and sustainability** of the assistance provided under the TC Mora and Landslides operation. There was also a specific request to look at delivery against planned outcomes in the three focal areas of the recovery - **shelter, WASH and livelihoods**.

The team worked towards this goal through the collection of data from primary sources (key informant interviews at NHQ and the field, group interviews with volunteers and beneficiaries, and through direct observation and questions during the field visits to the two target communities - Banskhali Sub-district of Chattogram District and Naikhongchari Sub-district of Bandarban District), and from secondary sources. The initial findings from the KIIs, group interviews and document review at NHQ and the field were shared with the operational management team of BDRCS and IFRC for validation and their feedback considered.

The team was an internal team, comprising team leader from the IFRC PMER team, Geneva (Christine South), an emergency WASH officer from the IFRC Regional Office, Kuala Lumpur (Wendy Neoh), a Livelihoods consultant from the PMO (Monica Luz Cardenas), and a PMER staff from BDRCS (MD Kamrul Hasan).

SCOPE and CHALLENGES

The scope of this evaluation was to look at the response and recovery operation for TC Mora and the landslides, which started in late May after the cyclone made landfall and was expanded to include the

response to the landslides in mid-June. The response efforts for the cyclone took place in four districts – Chattogram, Cox’s Bazar, Bandarban and Noakhali, while the later recovery assistance was targeted in the two communities of Naikhongchari (Bandarban District) and Banshkhali (Chattogram District). The landslides response was mainly in Bandarban and Rangamati districts and there was no recovery programme for that operation. The final evaluation’s scope was therefore guided towards the recovery programming for the cyclone affected areas and the two field visits focused on these two communities.

The evaluation team was tasked to come up with practical recommendations to guide BDRCS in finalising the TC Mora operation and to inform future operations and wider IFRC learning. The team has aimed to make the recommendations as concrete as possible for the BDRCS and the IFRC, in the time available.

It should be noted, there were several limitations involved in delivering this evaluation.

1. While the focus of the evaluation was on TC Mora and the landslides, the impact of the floods operation in northern Bangladesh and the scale up in the PMO (July/August), affected the attention given to the TC Mora / landslides response. The latter was a relatively small operation and TC Mora was overwhelmed by the other two, however, the learning from this response is still relevant, as it is a typical level of response for a Society like BDRCS and is relevant for other work.
2. In discussions with KIIs, it proved difficult to separate out information on TC Mora and most wanted to link feedback on Mora / landslides with practices or experience in the floods / PMO. Apart from the information from the teams and communities in the two districts visited, there was limited specific information on the Mora operation and there was inevitable cross-over. Therefore, the team has presented their findings from the TC Mora operation, to have thematic or technical relevance for the wider operations currently being carried out by BDRCS.
3. The evaluation timeframe was short (10 days in practice, with only five of those with the whole team). There was also limited time for the field visits. In addition, the team was unable to access Bandarban District for the planned visit to the Unit office and government authorities, due to missing security permissions and was therefore unable to verify findings around the Naikhongchari community visit.
4. In terms of field visits, the team met with the project teams, volunteers and communities in both areas, but only had space for discussions with the community in one of the two areas (Banshkhali). This limited the level of community feedback or validation with beneficiaries and BDRCS staff and volunteers. In addition, the team were also unable to meet Government Authorities, due to time / travel constraints and closures due to Ramadan, which started when we went to the field, and the field visit was over the weekend – both of which limited the inputs.
5. There was no technical shelter person available for the evaluation, so the shelter element was covered by the Team Leader and the PMER team member from BDRCS, thus limiting the level of technical input.
6. Given the limited time and access to beneficiaries and limited amount of written reports and documentation, the team focused primarily on qualitative information and it was difficult to triangulate this with any baseline or existing quantitative data. This limited the validation of some findings.

The team is aware this is the first operational evaluation commissioned by BDRCS since the Cyclone Sidr evaluation in 2009 / 10, so this is a relatively new practice for the current BDRCS and IFRC teams. We hope that the report will be viewed as learning opportunity and that the findings may help identify areas for development in ongoing operations.

KEY ISSUES

As mentioned above, the TC Mora response has been “morphed” with the other responses currently underway. As a result, the team is presenting its key findings through nine thematic lines and one technical

area of feedback on shelter, WASH and livelihoods. We have tried to link the findings to the TC Mora response, but have also tried to ensure they are potentially relevant for the other operations.

1. Timeliness of the response and recovery

Findings

The timeframe of this operation is quite special, due to the impact of the two other major operations that started from July/August 2017. Immediately after both TC Mora and the landslides, BDRCS responded immediately, following its established protocols, as auxiliary to the Government. It provided alerts, evacuation and search and rescue (SAR) throughout the coastal districts, and in the area of the landslide. In the cyclone affected areas, the NS provided dry food to around 6,500 families in Cox's Bazar, Chattogram and Noakhali in the first weeks and distributed shelter tool kits (STKs) and multi-purpose cash grants to 700 families in Chattogram and Bandarban. After the landslides, BDRCS worked alongside the army and the ICRC in Bandarban to provide cooked food, first aid, medical evacuation and dead body management (DBM). Partners noted there were coordination meetings and information on work being carried out as this stage.

However, after the immediate response, the TC Mora response was knocked off course by the other two operations from July/August until October and there was limited time or energy for the Mora operation. This led to a long gap before "early" recovery started in October. Ultimately, this recovery work feels de-linked from the TC Mora response, as it is now long after the event and the programming feels more connected to wider needs in cyclone vulnerable communities. The information on the response also stopped.

Recovery planning and programming started again in October, following visits from Geneva and Kuala Lumpur (KL), changes to the financial management system (working advances were increased to CHF 300,000), and an increase in staff capacity (BDRCS hired two project officers for each location and IFRC one project officer). BDRCS identified Naikhongchari and Banskhali as the two most affected sub-districts (based on cluster information) and proceeded to set up two temporary project offices reporting to the District Units. BDRCS volunteers carried out door-to-door surveys of needs in both communities via ODK/Kobo and the data was fed to Dhaka for analysis and beneficiary selection. The recovery activities were then delivered between October and May, through cash grants, in-kind distributions, and training, and were completed or ended by 31 May 2018, a year after the original cyclone. There were no recovery activities in Bandarban for the landslides, as discussions with ICRC did not lead to support in this area.



Repaired house in Naikhongchari

This was a late start for "early" recovery activities, and although unavoidable, meant those affected by the cyclone had to wait for assistance. In addition, the recovery planning appeared ad hoc, with some programming further delayed – e.g. some cash grants and goods were given in December / January, some in April and some activities were still being completed in late May. In both districts, there has been a last-minute rush to deliver the remaining assistance before the end of May, when the project ends, project offices are closed and the project staff leave and the team did not see any plans for monitoring or follow up.

Overall the team found the objectives for a six-month recovery timeframe were ambitious (six months in the original planning and six to eight months remaining after the late start in October), as the scope covered multiple programme areas – shelter, WASH, livelihoods, CFW/DRR etc – and the BDRCS ran out of time to deliver across all areas. It would be more useful to either allow for a more generous timeframe at the outset or to consider focusing on a smaller number of programmatic areas, prioritising the most urgent, post-cyclone needs first (e.g. shelter and WASH). This would have been more achievable. This was reflected in comments from some KIIs, who said they understood the need for a longer-time frame for recovery and therefore the extensions to the appeal, but would welcome a clear and open discussion of the needs, priorities and timings of the recovery programme at the outset of future operations.

There were also timing issues around the delivery of the recovery assistance. Based on meetings with project teams in both locations, we did not see any evidence of a plan or timeframe for the recovery programming. This meant that delivery of different recovery elements (cash grants, materials and trainings for shelter, WASH and livelihoods etc.), were not coordinated and sometimes of sequence with the logic of the programme. For example, in Naikhongchari, the cash grant for shelter was given out a few weeks before the CGI sheeting was distributed and from the monitoring sheets seen in the Project Office files during our visits, some beneficiaries spent the money on other things (but we cannot quantify how many). The livelihoods training was also given after the distribution of the cash, and some of the WASH assistance was late in both communities, with latrines and the installation of new tube wells being finalised in the last ten days, well after the distribution of cash grants for latrine repair and the repair of ring wells, which was completed by the first week of April. Finally, there was still much to complete before the project closes.

Recommendations

- **Start recovery work as early as possible, to give time to complete it in a thorough and participatory way and to allow for completion of/follow up on activities. (Timeliness)**
- **Choose realistic objectives for more focused and targeted recovery support for the most vulnerable in the communities (Effectiveness)**
- **Balance the current wide reach of recovery activities across the community, with a more detailed focus on one or two priority areas, to enable them to be more thoroughly completed e.g. holistic shelter solutions for the most vulnerable HHs and linked WASH support. (Effectiveness).**
- **Set out a clear and realistic plan for the recovery, with support from the IFRC and partners as needed. This should include a timeframe/schedule for the resourcing and delivery of the different elements of the recovery programme and an overview of how they interact (Efficiency and Effectiveness)**

2. BDRCS capacity to scale up

Findings –

The team is conscious that many of the BDRCS staff and volunteers we met were also extensively involved in the floods response and PMO. The staff and volunteers we met were generally committed and hard-working.

Community level

In visiting the target communities, the team experienced two very different approaches to volunteering.

- In Banskhali, experienced Red Cross Youth (RCY) volunteers from Chattogram had been involved during the emergency distributions and the Kobo assessment. For the recovery period, a group of 13 – 14 local community volunteers had been engaged. These volunteers were newer to the BDRCS, having just started with the initiation of the project in October. They had received training, but did not have the same background or capacity as the RCY. However, they were very committed and provided strong links to the local community and continuity to the project support.

- In Naikhongchari, the team only met the Head of Volunteers, who was also RCY. Here the RCY volunteers appeared to have multiple trainings and experience (the RCY in Chattogram were also more thoroughly trained), but they did not appear to have the same connection and involvement with the community. This could also be linked to absence of other volunteers during the community visit.

The team had a positive experience of the grass-roots volunteers, who work with the communities in a very enthusiastic and engaged way. While we realise that the BDRCS structure is complex, we would stress the importance of active, grass-roots volunteering within the local community and encourage that balance, alongside the highly trained RCY volunteers, who can be from further away.

Project level and District Unit

The team also visited Project Offices in the two locations. In both places, temporary project offices had been set up in October to support recovery programming through until the end of May. Both offices were supported by two project staff, one covering shelter and livelihoods and one for WASH. These project staff will also finish on 31 May 2018.

- As both recovery project teams/offices were temporary, there was limited continuity in their engagement with the communities and no space for follow up. For Chattogram, this is less of a problem, as it is relatively near the community and can have more regular contact, but for Bandarban, there is a much greater distance and regular contact or direct engagement with the community is less feasible. While the team realises it is challenging for BDRCS to maintain local structures, it was clear that the temporary nature of the engagement in both communities raised issues around the sustainability of the project support and building of grass-roots engagement.
- Although branch volunteers carried out the Kobo survey, both staff and volunteers at project and District Unit level expressed a lack of ownership of / responsibility for beneficiary targeting and could not answer questions on beneficiary selection, which they felt had mainly been done at NHQ level. BDRCS NHQ explained in turn that, as per their procedures, the input from the Kobo survey was assessed at NHQ against criteria for each programme, with support from a surge IM delegate. A beneficiary list was then shared with the District Units for endorsement (signed off by Unit Secretary) and a final list agreed. However, it seemed that the community, project and district unit levels did not comment on nor adjust the selection information to reflect local conditions or changes in situation. This raised questions around the effectiveness of the consultation processes around BDRCS's procedures for beneficiary selection in this instance and around the levels of local engagement and ownership of the project.
- There were also comments from project/district staff, that there were not enough technical facilitators for the programme and the trainings (PHAST/CHAST etc). They would like to see more technically qualified people providing support from the District Unit or the national Disaster Response (DR) team.
- There also seemed to be few female BDRCS staff or volunteers at the local levels, even though the percentages of female beneficiaries engaged in the recovery programmes were high.



BDRCS Community volunteers in Banskhali

Headquarters

It was clearly noted that BDRCS NHQ, particularly the DR team, had been working full out in response to the multiple operations experienced in 2017 – 18, there were certain observations made to the team.

- It was positive that BDRCS NHQ, with support from German Red Cross and funds from the TC Mora Appeal, had held a National Disaster Response Team (NDRT) training under the framework of the TC

Mora operation. This was the first such training for a time and was targeted at building capacity amongst volunteers from various district units.

- During interviews in Dhaka, some KIIs reiterated the issue of the lack of technical capacity to support the TC Mora recovery programme and said they would have appreciated further support in shelter / WASH from the DR team to deliver more effective assistance (there is one cash focal point in the DR team). A similar comment was made about the need for more support from the BDRCS PMER team. The team questioned whether this support could have been provided by the NDRT pool, particularly given the recent training. Two NDRTs had been deployed to support emergency distributions and two NDWRTs had been deployed towards the end of the recovery operation, to support the delayed WASH implementation. However, given the stated need for more technical support, BDRCS could have considered using NDRTs' skills and experience at other points of the operation.
- Regarding the feedback on decisions being "made by NHQ in Dhaka", KIIs discussed the option that the local levels might play more of a role in the beneficiary selection and project design, and that it might be more appropriate for NHQ to play more of a support role and provide monitoring/quality assurance role.

Recommendations –

- **Strengthen BDRCS's volunteer presence through the building of community volunteer capacity in the two communities to ensure a strong grass roots outreach prior to cyclone season (BDRCS could use community volunteers in Banshkhali as a local model). And follow this up, with the setting-up of a RCY structure, training and support (equipment) in Banshkhali upazilla, as requested by the community. (Sustainability)**
- **While appreciating BDRCS's existing structure, NHQ should build engagement with District Units and Project Offices, to ensure beneficiary selection and project decisions are locally appropriate and owned (NHQ could strengthen its monitoring and quality control roles). (Appropriateness)**
- **NHQ should ensure that their procedures around the implementation of beneficiary survey using the ODK/Kobo tool are well understood and have in place clear steps in the system to allow for input from local staff, volunteers, and communities in the final selection of beneficiaries and that this is adhered to in future operations. (Effectiveness)**
- **BDRCS should use the capacity and experience of its pool of trained NDRTs beyond initial distributions, to support other parts of the response / recovery roll out, including training. This might require more technical training for this NDRT pool. (Efficiency)**
- **Many interviewees at Project and District level recommended that BDRCS strengthen the technical capacity of its DR team in Dhaka, to include focal persons for shelter, WASH etc. If not immediately possible, the DR team should use available technical support from local or external partners when delivering similar operations. (Effectiveness)**

3. IFRC capacity to scale up

Findings –

In the IFRC Country Office in Dhaka, there are 31 staff employed in programme and support roles. Over the 2017 and 2018, the staff in the office have worked hard to keep up with the overwhelming number of operations, but have been stretched beyond capacity. This was exacerbated by the turnover of key staff (Manager, Response and Organisational Development) at the beginning of the TC Mora operation.

As a result, many staff have multiple functions (up to three or four different roles) and find it challenging to perform their key roles as fully as required or to provide the necessary technical support for the operations and the ongoing work of the IFRC in Bangladesh. A specific example was given around the lack of time that could be given by the IFRC or BDRCS PMER teams, to hands-on support for operational monitoring and

objective feedback on quality programming. There are also challenges in the operational environment to support planning in advance for such PMER support, and the requests are often last minute. As the floods operation and PMO are ongoing and the new monsoon season is starting again, it is likely that this pressure will continue, and both BDRCS and the IFRC need to plan for meaningful use of the PMER capacity. At the same time, KIIs reported that despite the workload, the IFRC Country Office seemed reluctant or slow to scale up capacity. Partner National Societies (PNS) reported offering support (e.g. for CTP) or to fund additional positions (e.g. CEA position), but the latter has moved slowly and is not in place after nine months.

From the IFRC perspective, the CO stressed the slowness and inflexibility of the IFRC's procedures to scale up support services required during major response operations. While aware of accountability requirements, the Office emphasised that IFRC urgently needed to set up more flexible procedures for "emergency support services", in Human Resources, Finance and Logistics, to be able to respond more quickly. An example was given that related to the three operations – the ceiling in the level of working advance, which had affected the BDRCS / IFRC's ability to run CTP at scale. The limit on the working advance level was raised from CHF 100,000 to CHF 300,000 for the three operations, but only following a visit from Geneva and KL management. In feedback from the APRO, it was clarified that it is possible to get an exemption to logistics procedures at the beginning of an emergency operation, if planned and justified with the logistics team in KL. The IFRC team also noted that, as BDRCS has had an embargo on hiring new staff over the past year or more, they believed it to be important to keep a balance in the levels of IFRC staff in line with those in the host NS.

Linked to the point raised for BDRCS around the need for more technical support for the recovery programme, the team noted that there had been limited or late deployment of RDRTs for this operation. One RDRT had been deployed at the outset to support logistics and a WASH RDRT had been requested in March, but was deployed in May to finalise the late WASH recovery activities. While the TC Mora response was relatively small, RDRTs have been used for other operations and provided strong technical support, yet this option was not used to deliver technical support and quality for Mora recovery activities.

Recommendations

- IFRC should work with PNS to optimise opportunities for surge support, technical capacity building and deployment of qualified staff to support response / recovery operations at this busy time and for future operations. **(Efficiency)**
- IFRC staff need to be able to focus on their key functions and deliver against these roles – for example, IFRC should identify a PMER focal person who can work closely with operations, to more fully utilise existing PMER capacity to plan support to improve programme quality. **(Effectiveness)**
- IFRC should look at ways to use qualified RDRT technical capacity in an earlier, planned way, to support response / recovery technical delivery - RDRTs should have a reporting line to their technical line management **(Efficiency)**

4. Assessment and Beneficiary Selection

Findings - This section has been separated into response and recovery, which were two distinct and separate phases in this operation (ideally recovery would be planned alongside response and would build on response activities).

Response

- Four districts were selected for the response to TC Mora - Cox's Bazar, Chattogram, Bandarban and Noakhali. All were coastal districts identified by the government. It was not clear to the team from the documentation or interviews, why Noakhali was selected for emergency assistance, as the cyclone

changed direction and this area was not so badly affected (it is the area of the German RC Forecast Based Finance (FBF) project). It was later not selected for any further assistance for the recovery programme.

- The selection of beneficiaries for emergency distributions followed standard BDRCS protocol, as auxiliary to the public authorities and targeted the areas identified by the authorities as most affected and in need of assistance. This was not changed or modified by BDRCS for TC Mora.
- It is less clear why the landslides response was included in this appeal in June. While the landslides response was in Bandarban district, it was in a separate area (inland in the mountains). Also, while the immediate response was similar to the TC Mora response, with BDRCS providing food (cooked food provided alongside the army) and delivering STKs and unconditional cash grants (BDT 4,000), the Bandarban District Unit did not deliver any recovery assistance to the affected population and the response was never fully integrated into the Mora operation or appeal. The also provided first aid and DBM support during the response, with support from the ICRC, but potential support from the ICRC for recovery activities were not finally agreed and there was no other provision for recovery in the appeal.
- There was reference in the appeal / EPOA to a Movement Assessment, but this did not take place. This was not deemed a priority and Movement partners played an active role supporting the Joint Needs Assessment of the humanitarian cluster, which demonstrated positive engagement with partners.

Recovery

- As the recovery was focused on the priority need of shelter, BDRCS engaged with the Bangladesh Shelter Cluster (led by the Swedish Red Cross Representative and the IFRC Disaster Manager), to identify their areas of intervention. The areas selected matched the two sub-districts where the shelter needs were assessed as the most severe, based on the 4Ws matrix and gap analysis (Banshkhali and Naikhongchari). BDRCS then consulted with the two District Units and the relevant authorities to agree the specific communities. The other areas of assistance were then identified through the Kobo survey in these areas agreed as a priority for shelter assistance, and were linked to wider needs picked up in these two communities. Of the two areas, one (Banshkhali) had also received emergency assistance, while the other, Naikhongchari, only received recovery assistance. However, it was clear from observing the communities, that both were generally vulnerable and in need of assistance (particularly low-lying Banshkhali), even if it was not clear how this related to specific damage from TC Mora.



Female beneficiaries of shelter assistance in Naikhongchari

- During the field visits and in the beneficiary lists for the shelter, livelihoods and WASH programming, the team saw a good spread of gender and diversity amongst beneficiaries - Banshkhali demonstrated an equal number of male and female recipients in its beneficiary lists. During our interviews and group discussions, female beneficiaries were the most vocal and well-represented. It was also clear, from the levels of need in both communities (particularly Banshkhali), that assistance had been given to vulnerable members of the communities. Beneficiaries confirmed BDRCS had helped those in need and did not raise any issues of inappropriateness or gaps in support.

- In both communities, BDRCS used Kobo to support one assessment survey for the whole recovery operation. This had been designed by a surge IM delegate for the floods response and the same delegate assisted with the selection process. The

survey listed a set of standard questions, including beneficiary profiles and one or two questions on the impact in each technical area. The team felt that this “one size fits all” approach to beneficiary selection

for recovery did not allow for more contextual or specific assessments in each location or for each area of need (shelter, WASH, or livelihoods). Nor did it clearly show any rationale for the parallel use of unconditional cash as a modality for recovery that the team could see, other than to ensure a level of assistance across a wide group in both communities. It would have been useful to support volunteers or local project staff to add comments/observations to contextualise or verify the survey and better inform the selection process and targeting of assistance.

- Volunteers received limited training in the Kobo tool (approx. 30 mins), but said it was relatively easy to use. There was no input from them on the need to verify or triangulate beneficiary information through observation or other questions, to ensure its accuracy and relevance, but this seemed to have been left out of the mobile data gathering process.
- Finally, the team was informed that the beneficiary analysis and selection for each sector was done in Dhaka – the input was ranked and assessed by the response team with support from the IM surge delegate. The list of selected beneficiaries was then sent back to the two District Units for endorsement and sign off. However, the field informed the team that they did not feel that they were able to input further into the beneficiary selection process and beneficiary lists sent by NHQ. The team in NHQ also then did not benefit from additional information from the field relating to the sectors or the changing vulnerabilities on the ground. We understand from BDRCS NHQ, that this is not in line with standard procedures and may have been linked to the system set up around the analysis of the Kobo survey in Dhaka. As a result, the volunteers, project staff and district unit representatives did not feel ownership of the final selection and felt that they were implementing what they were told from Dhaka.

Recommendations

- **BDRCS should establish greater coherence and connection between the response and recovery elements of an emergency appeal, so that assistance can consistently targeted at the areas of greatest need and support can be as sustainable as possible. (Appropriateness/Relevance)**
- **While NHQ currently has technical capacity for the relatively new mobile data collection tool (Kobo), we would recommend that in future there is better communication with the field around the analysis of the assessment survey and the decisions on beneficiary selection, to include relevant local feedback (Appropriateness/Relevance)**
- **BDRCS should provide additional training for volunteers and project staff on the use of mobile based assessment (ODK/Kobo) and recommend setting up a pool of trained volunteers to help set up the specific survey questions for each context, support local volunteers in the targeted use of the tool, and help analyse the findings (Effectiveness)**
- **Linked to this, it would also be useful to hold training for NHQ and IFRC teams on the options to tailor the ODK/Kobo tool for context or technically specific assessments or to include feedback/observations from the field. (Effectiveness)**
- **In future, once the mobile data system is more established, BDRCS NHQ could consider moving from direct operation of the beneficiary selection to monitoring the process and a quality assurance role to support beneficiary selection to be carried out nearer to the project. (Appropriateness)**

5. Targeting and integration of the recovery approach

Findings –

Recovery activities for TC Mora started in October – delayed due to pressure from the other operations. The activities covered shelter, WASH, livelihoods, CFW and unconditional cash (see technical overview, section 7). There was good work done in each sector targeting vulnerable households and it was well appreciated by the communities we met. Due to the delay, it did however, seemed a bit dis-associated from the TC Mora aftermath and response and more a response to wider vulnerabilities.

The team found the range and number of activities planned for the recovery period to be ambitious for a six-month timeframe (as per the original plan or from the restart date). The human and material resources of the BDRCS and IFRC were spread thinly and could have been focused on delivering fewer activities, but in more depth. Many activities were committed to, but some seemed incomplete e.g. provision latrines, but no buckets, soap or hygiene promotion (HP) and there was a challenge to finish all activities on time.

The timing of the activities seemed inconsistent, with some carried out immediately between late October and December, while other work, particularly the WASH activities, were being completed in April and in the last days of the operation in May. There were separate beneficiary groups for each technical area - shelter, WASH, livelihoods and for unconditional cash - and limited overlap or integration between these groups. Each received a cash grant of different amounts at different times and these distributions were not coordinated. Even within each technical sector the cash, in-kind goods or training could be delivered at different times. In Naikhongchari for example, the cash for shelter was given a few weeks before the CGI sheets arrived and some people on the beneficiary lists we saw, spent the money on other things, while livelihoods cash became de-linked from the training.

Overall, it would have been useful to have set up a recovery implementation plan, with clear objectives and timelines, for delivery of the whole recovery operation in both locations. This would have improved the coordination and timing of the different inputs, ensuring that cash, goods and training facilitators were delivered when needed. And it would have assisted the efficiency and integration of the recovery delivery, leading with shelter (the priority need), and linking this to support for household WASH and other prioritised areas under the overall goal. This could also have factored in further monitoring and follow up support around the conditional use of the cash grants.

There were also a high number of trainings provided to the communities over the period. Although each was targeted at different beneficiaries under each sector, and may have led to some knowledge sharing between community members, this could not be ascertained in our limited field time. The team questioned the level of knowledge volunteers had been able to absorb in the short ToTs, and how much they had been able to pass this on to communities across such a wide range of sectors. The team also had questions around the amount of materials and support the volunteers had been given to carry out the community level training. It would be useful to do the ToT trainings more thoroughly to ensure volunteers have a better understanding of the key messages they need to pass on, and that the community trainings are prioritised according to need and timed to reinforce the key messages in support of the technical assistance being given. The community in Banskhali said the CBHFA training had been most useful, although it was outside the main programme.

Although BDRCS did include elements of DRR in the recovery programme, there was surprisingly little DRR given that it was a cyclone response. They provided fruit tree saplings to families targeted for livelihoods assistance at the end of the recovery period – this was more livelihoods assistance but the trees might provide some level of mitigation. They also used CFW to rebuild roads identified by the government, to improve access to cyclone shelters or as key access routes in time of cyclone or another emergency. These actions seemed rather random and the DRR element could have been more strongly emphasised and better integrated into the wider recovery approach. DRR activities could have been linked to the shelter / WASH priorities e.g. CFW to build small ditches / embankments to protect improved houses, tree planting, drills and simulations or HP for communities. This might have helped build sustainability. There was also no DRR in the training package. BDRCS did however, commit to a new initiative supporting six schools with latrines, hygiene parcels and training (CHAST), which builds their future sanitation and health capacity.

Recommendations

- **Set up an integrated plan (objectives/indicators) for the recovery, outlining links between programmes and schedules, to improve timeliness and coherence. (Efficiency and Effectiveness)**

- **Balance the support to multiple areas of work and a wide range of beneficiaries, with a stronger focus on one or two priority areas based on need e.g. a focus on shelter needs with linked support to WASH or livelihoods activities for the most vulnerable households. (Effectiveness)**
- **Revisit the rationale for providing broad based unconditional cash at the recovery stage and use those for funds for more targeting assistance, in line with the key objectives of the recovery operation. (Effectiveness)**
- **Consider a DRR lens in all recovery programming, including opportunities to add DRR elements within existing recovery work, such as digging ditches, planting trees or building small embankments alongside repaired housing, or providing HP alongside latrine provision. (Sustainability)**
- **Prioritise from amongst the many trainings, to focus on the training that is needed for each specific activity/timing, providing the key messages in support of the distribution, so the whole works together to best support the community (e.g. hold the training before the distributions and provide time for volunteers to understand messages to be conveyed). (Appropriateness and Effectiveness)**

6. Cash Approaches and Methodologies

Findings

BDRCS have a long experience of using cash, particularly for emergencies, where they provide small amounts of cash (BDT 4,000 / CHF 50) in an envelope (CIE) to a wide group of recipients. This was done in response to TC Mora, where 700 families received unconditional cash in the two to three weeks after the cyclone struck (although the team did not see any distribution lists). BDRCS deliver this through an established set of SOPs, whereby an envelope is left open and handed over to the beneficiary with the funds visible. This is perceived as a quick and established process for emergency response, which has a limited level of risk, given the small amounts distributed. However, cash specialists noted that there is a level of risk for the staff and volunteers who transport the funds to the site and store it prior to distribution and a risk of misappropriation of funds during this process. This has been an issue following the floods response, and, although the recent audit report was not available to the evaluation team, informal feedback suggests no major issues were identified and steps have been suggested to improve procedures e.g. around beneficiary list validation.

For the recovery element of the operation, a high percentage of programming was delivered through conditional and unconditional cash grants, covering a diverse range of technical sectors. Each grant was set at a different amount agreed between by the Cash / DR team. These cash grants were delivered through bank cheques, which beneficiaries cashed in at a local bank on production of their cash registration form/ID (many do not have an ID card). This modality was well received by the beneficiaries we talked to, with only a few mentioning the distance and cost (BDT 150) to access the bank (they would have preferred CIE). All beneficiaries the team talked to had received the full grant for their area of support, and only the shelter recipients said that the money was not enough (they received BDT 8,000, the amount agreed by the cluster, but needed to add their own funds, as they needed nearer BDT 20,000 for repairs). It would be useful to see the price analysis and market assessments used for gauging the cash amounts and this might be an area for BDRCS to examine and strengthen in its cash working practices.

The team raised questions around the targeting of conditional cash in both communities, to clarify how the specific targeting of beneficiaries for shelter, WASH, livelihoods and cash for work (CFW) had been decided (through the Kobo survey), and how it has been followed up at the community level. It was not clear how many beneficiaries had benefited from more than one area of assistance – it seemed that most had received assistance in only one area. It was also unclear how BDRCS had followed up on these grants to support the recipients and ensure that the required conditionality was met. Also, the team could not clarify the rationale for giving unconditional cash grants during the recovery period. These had been given in both communities

(709 people in Naikhongchari and 599 in Banshkhali), alongside the conditional cash grants, but it was unclear why unconditional cash had been given on such scale during the recovery period and alongside the conditional grants - other than to ensure the widest possible level of equity and distribution to families in need. The funds dispersed in unconditional cash could have also been validly used to increase the value of or numbers in receipt of conditional cash for key needs, such as shelter and WASH - this raised some questions around the range and effective targeting of the recovery cash transfer programming.

Finally, there is a clear pressure from PNS partners and IFRC cash specialists for BDRCS to consider moving from CIE / bank cheques towards using Financial Service Providers (FSPs), such as mobile cash providers like B-kash. BDRCS has used B-kash in the past, but felt the system was too cumbersome and slow. However, for partners, the FSPs provide a more efficient and trustworthy way to transfer cash quickly, have a wide presence near the communities and have more secure systems. Given recent questions raised around the floods response, this issue will come up again and BDRCS should engage in discussions with PNS and IFRC to find workable solutions. Linked to this, IFRC must also work on its financial processes to deliver cash in emergencies. It has changed its working advance procedures in Bangladesh to accommodate a higher working advance limit for CTP in multiple operations, following the challenges of managing the three concurrent operations in 2017/18, but there is more to be done to ensure smooth support in emergencies.

Recommendations –

- **Clarify the targeting of conditional cash and improve integration between the different grants, their purpose, timing and allocation level, to support integrated recovery programming. (Effectiveness)**
- **Ensure follow up on the conditionality of cash grants and provide targeted support. (Effectiveness)**
- **Clarify the use and targeting of unconditional cash in the recovery phase and establish the clear function of such grants outside an emergency response, alongside conditional cash. (Effectiveness)**
- **BDRCS should examine cash transfer options, including via a FSPs, and use the technical support of the IFRC and PNS to further develop its CTP - update its cash SOPs accordingly. (Effectiveness)**
- **Both IFRC and BDRCS should follow up on recommendations from the IFRC audit regarding CTP procedures and share information on their actions with partners. (Efficiency)**

7. Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA)

Findings –

Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA)

During the TC Mora response, BDRCS made positive attempts to extend their work in CEA. This included setting up a new hotline for community members to call (we saw the advert at the Project Office in Naikhongchari) and providing complaints boxes in both areas. The complaints box at the project office in Naikhongchari received four complaints (e.g. when would the CGI arrive, why someone did not receive assistance, and that there was insufficient cash for shelter). However, in Banshkhali, the complaints box received no complaints, in part because the hotline information was only put up for a few days around the distributions. In Chattogram District Unit, they held a meeting with the community in Banshkhali to explain the beneficiary selection process and to discuss who was or was not selected and why.

- While communities did have access to the list of selected beneficiaries (these were published in the community or outside the project office), they told us they saw the selection list as final. They were generally accepting of it and had few comments, but there was also limited space to comment.

- While the hotline is viewed as positive, it is still new and needs further work. It has not been widely used yet and has not been set up as a two-way system (we did not see any response to calls). There are also practical issues around language – the hotline is run by a team of 10 trained volunteers in Dhaka, but the local language is not Bangla. Also, access to phones and the cost of calls, knowledge of the hotline (it did not seem to be advertised in Banshkhali), and cultural issues around calling someone rather than having face-to-face contact, are all issues that need to be managed. We were also unsure how comfortable the community were with “complaining” or whether they felt the information was confidential.
- The complaints box in Naikhongchari was set up on the front gate of the office and was clearly visible to the community. This is important, as the complaints box in Banshkhali was only available for a few days around the distributions and not accessible at other times. The Project Office was also a long distance away in the nearby town and had no signage.
- It is a challenge to manage CEA, including feedback to beneficiaries, from Dhaka and to ensure a two-way communication with beneficiaries from such a distance. It could be an option for BDRCS to extend the line and have local contact points in the District Units, through the RCY network.



Complaints box and hotline advert in Naikhongchari

CEA was very much focused around the beneficiary selection process and “who got what”. However, it would be interesting in future to extend that engagement to explain elements around the different programming, targeting, amounts and to have a discussion around the quantity, quality and timing of assistance, as well as the completion of the project. This ongoing dialogue with communities is an area for development.

Recommendations

- **BDRCS should look to further develop its activities in CEA:- (Appropriateness and Effectiveness)**
 - Set up practices for holding discussions with communities to explain the planned programme, selection process, programme choices, timings, progress on implementation and exit strategy
 - Work on improving the hotline system, with toll-free access or local options for calls. The RCY team suggested using their numbers for more accessible local contact in the same dialect.
 - Ensure complaints boxes and other channels are well explained during and after distributions and that their locations are accessible to communities
 - Develop two-way communication processes to ensure complaints/feedback are followed up, including ensuring there are trained staff to follow up on the resolution of complaints

8. Quality programming and accountability (including monitoring & communications)

Findings –

According to the review of documents, the EPoA contained clear measures to address quality programming and accountability to beneficiaries and donors. These and delivery against them are outlined below:

Planned Activity	Implementation status
Initial Assessment	A quick assessment was done by BDRCS with support from IFRC. The assessment informed the EPoA. Information was also collected from the ISCG multi-sector rapid assessment and the Joint Needs Assessment.
Staff orientation on assessment and beneficiary selection	The volunteers received a brief orientation on beneficiary selection using Kobo
Post distribution monitoring	There was no systematic PDM conducted for the overall recovery operation and against the distribution of items planned in the EPoA. There was some post distribution monitoring for shelter and livelihoods activities. A beneficiary satisfaction survey was not planned or conducted
Monitoring visits of joint teams from NHQ	Monitoring visits were made by BDRCS and IFRC teams during the operation, but there are no written records of these
Lessons learned workshop	This was done in the last week of May
Final evaluation	This was done as planned

- The various versions of the EPoA were well done and met minimum results-based requirements, with indicators for each component. However, the indicators were all quantitative and at output level – there were no qualitative indicators to measure outcomes or change at community level, which would have given more balanced information. This was also true for the qualitative data provided by both field offices. A logframe and corresponding M&E plan for the operation would have been useful for teams to work from and a baseline analysis at outset would have supported any M&E of programme quality.
- There were no people in the programme management or PMER teams, in Dhaka or the field, designated to work on M&E or reporting for this operation. Although, both BDRCS and IFRC have PMER staff, both had little time for working on the Mora response. Many KIIs mentioned the need for stronger PMER in operations, to ensure quality programming, but recognised that both BDRCS and IFRC PMER teams were covering many other activities. BDRCS PMER is trying to capacitate a pool of focal persons from other departments to cover ongoing monitoring and reporting needs. Assigning M&E focal persons for operations would be a useful way to support progress tracking, prior to the final evaluation.
- According to the KIIs interviewed in Dhaka and the field, monitoring visits were carried out from Dhaka and the District Units, to follow up on the progress of implementation at the community level. However, these were not done systematically and these were not reported in any standard or written way. There were also no clear plans for monitoring visits, including who was being monitored, for what, when and how. As a result, most of the visits were ad-hoc or linked to the distribution of items to beneficiaries.
- The shelter and livelihoods activities had some system for monitoring the individual recipients of their activities. A one-page monitoring form was used to ensure two rounds of monitoring, which was carried out door-to-door by RCY / community volunteers to show what the cash grants had been spent on. This was a light system, but did provide some follow up on the use of the cash. This process could be enhanced by revising the form to include more detailed information/options for follow up, especially if the work has not been completed. The selection and training of volunteers to do this monitoring is crucial.
- Overall, there was limited evidence of written reports (e.g. sitreps, or field monitoring reports). There had been some initial written information and analysis on damage and the first response, but this diminished after the first weeks. There was clearly a lot of information exchanged by phone or email between the project teams, the district units and NHQ, but the team saw few written reports, except for a couple of training reports. There was also a difference in the level and structure of information between the two project offices and it would be useful for the field teams to have more structured formats/systems for monitoring and reporting. From the IFRC side, there was only one Operations Update done for this operation (with some errors on the completion of activities). There is therefore a need for more structured written reporting for both BDRCS and IFRC.
- This final evaluation is the first commissioned by BDRCS since the final evaluation of Cyclone Sidr in 2010 – none of their emergency or recovery operations in between have been evaluated, though the IFRC has commissioned some evaluative work. The commitment of BDRCS and IFRC teams to carry out this evaluation is extremely positive, as is the lesson learning workshop on 25 May.

Communications

There were limited communications (both internal and external) around this operation. At the outset, there were situation reports and media communication on the cyclone path/damage and on the assistance provided in the immediate aftermath. However, after the first couple of weeks and throughout the recovery period, there was limited written information, either in the form of internal reports and situation reports (except for the training reports), communications within or outside the Movement, and there was only one IFRC Operations Updates (18 March 2018), in which there were some errors around the completion of activities. There was virtually no public or media communications materials issued after the first weeks.

There was a clear difference in the structure and availability of information between the two project offices (the Banskhali office had a more structured set of files and written information). It would be useful for BDRCS to establish more structured written reporting formats, and systems to help field offices keep records and structure reporting and communications. There was clearly a lot of information exchanged by phone or email between the field and the District Units / NHQ, but the team saw limited written records of these discussions or of monitoring visits etc.

Recommendations

- Prepare a logframe for each operation as a guide for monitoring and quality programming, and balance both quantitative and qualitative indicators in a M&E plan **(Efficiency)**
- Establish written baseline information for planning indicators and conduct final evaluations/lesson learning exercises to do against this baseline for future programming. **(Effectiveness)**
- Plan and conduct systematic Post Distribution Monitoring and Beneficiary Satisfaction surveys for distributions and at key points in programme delivery. **(Effectiveness)**
- In response to the strong call for this, ensure there is a designated person to do M&E and reporting for each operation and ensure that person has the support of both operational and PMER staff in BDRCS and IFRC for the necessary technical guidance and engagement. **(Efficiency)**
- Ensure there are written records of any monitoring visits from BDRCS NHQ or IFRC **(Efficiency)**
- Capacitate local District Units to carry out beneficiary selection so that NHQ can move towards taking on a monitoring and quality assurance role in operations, particularly recovery. **(Effectiveness)**
- Provide capacity building training to volunteers and staff on monitoring and reporting. **(Effectiveness)**
- Improve and increase the level of written reporting and communications, setting out a plan, schedule and formats for periodic monitoring reports/written sitreps. IFRC should ensure there are written field sitreps from coordinators and produce the required Operations Updates for partners **(Efficiency)**
- BDRCS and IFRC should ensure there is a system for written sitreps to be submitted on a regular basis (weekly to start and then monthly). This can be used for ongoing BDRCS and IFRC reporting and communications and provide a written record of the programme. **(Efficiency)**

9. Technical programme areas – shelter, WASH and livelihoods

The TOR asked the team to look at the three technical areas of the recovery programme. We have done this as far as possible given the time and resource constraints. The team comprised two specialists – one for WASH and one for Livelihoods, who have compiled the relevant sections. However, there was no shelter specialist and this section has been drafted by the other two team members, which limits its technical depth.

a) Shelter –

The needs assessments carried out by the Needs Assessment Working Group (NAWG) and ISCG highlighted shelter as the priority need and identified Naigkongchari and Banskhali as the two communities most in need of shelter assistance. It was therefore appropriate for BDRCS to select these two communities and to put a priority on shelter recovery. Although the original appeal target was 2,000 families, this had to be scaled

down due to coverage and capacity - 700 families received STKs during the emergency phase, and for recovery, a further 700 households (finally 716) were targeted. BDRCS used a Kobo survey to identify the 716 households most in need of shelter assistance for house repair (the NS did not cover rebuilding and we did not hear about houses requiring complete rebuilding). The survey questionnaire included generic questions on the household status and one or two specific questions on the level of damage, but no further observations or input from the volunteers. The package of assistance was based on that suggested by the Bangladesh Shelter Cluster – a cash grant of BDT 8,000, 18 sheets of CGI sheeting, and PASSA training for 240 people in the two communities. We do not have information on what this was based on.

Activities	Naikhongchari		Banskhali	
	Targeted #	Status/progress	Targeted #	Status/progress
Cash grants for shelter repair	409	Completed	307	Completed
CGI sheets (18)		Completed		Completed
PASSA ToT training for vols	1	Completed (13 pple) ¹	1	Completed (13 pple)
PASSA training for communities	4	Completed (120 pple)	4	Completed (120 pple)

BDRCS opted for a high standard of CGI for this response. The sheeting was painted and had an additional coating that made it thicker and particularly hard-wearing – above the previous standard used in country. The PASSA training provided information on how to use and secure the sheeting and ensure effective support for the roofing, through pillars, wooden joists/struts, bindings etc. Community members saw this as a positive contribution and most interviewees felt it had led to an improved shelter that would be more weather-resistant and last longer, hopefully through future cyclones. The increased technical specifications for the CGI led to delays in procurement linked to quality control, but the benefits outweigh the delays.

The cash grant was appreciated by beneficiaries, however, the level set by the NDRCC, ISCG and via the shelter cluster to contribute towards repair, was felt to be too small for the purpose (BDT 8,000, as opposed to BDT 20,000 required). We did not get a full explanation as to how this amount was decided. Beneficiaries said they had to find other funds or borrow money to complete repairs and many borrowed from family or lenders. While clearly BDRCS can only give part of the money for shelter repair, this left vulnerable community members to find other resources to complete repairs and raised questions around the completeness of the shelter support for the most vulnerable. The team felt that, as part of the focusing of resources mentioned above, BDRCS could consider focusing more resources on the priority need of shelter, rather than dispersing funds across a range of support.



Repaired roof in Banskhali village

There was also a problem in Naikhongchari, when the cash grant was given out a couple of weeks before the CGI sheeting arrived and some people used the conditional cash for other purposes. It would be important in future to coordinate the training, cash grants and distributions to happen in order and to have more of a system in place to follow up on the conditionality of the cash grant.

From the houses we saw, the roofs had been well constructed, however, there was limited investment in the foundations or walls, unless the family had been able to access additional funds themselves. The team heard that the NS and IFRC would have valued more technical support to analyse shelter needs and identify the best action. This would be an important priority for BDRCS in future to seek shelter technical support (within Bangladesh or from the

¹ All participants were trained in one ToT training in Naikhongchari

IFRC/PNS) to look at a more “holistic” approach to shelter, to ensure they are supporting the best house repair model for cyclone resilience and to include wider awareness of “building back safer” techniques, better construction methods and advocacy with the authorities, through the PASSA training and other engagement. This could also include ensuring adequate support for the most vulnerable households to ensure they are able to carry out shelter repairs properly. It could also link to small mitigation measures (e.g. ditches or embankments) to support future sustainability.

Regarding the Shelter Cluster, the evaluation was not asked to look at this, however, we did speak to Swedish RC and the IFRC Shelter Coordinator, both of whom worked on this cluster coordination. The cluster functioned reasonably well for TC Mora, however, it was noted that the two persons engaged on it, were not specialists in the cluster role and were doing this alongside their other work. The additional support that had been sent from Geneva (a technical specialist and an IM person) were much appreciated, but it was agreed that the IFRC role in this needed to be enhanced, both during a response and peacetime, to build shelter capacity. It was noted that BDRCS had not participated in the Shelter Cluster during this response.

Recommendations

- Continue the provision of quality CGI sheeting and resolve the quality control procedures with suppliers in cooperation with the RLU. **(Appropriateness and Efficiency)**
- As shelter was identified as the most urgent need, BDRCS should consider focusing more resources on ensuring the thoroughness and quality of this element of the operation, particularly for the most vulnerable households, rather than spreading resources over too many areas. **(Effectiveness)**
- The Shelter Cluster should discuss the level of the shelter repair cash grant and the package with its membership to ensure that it is being set at the appropriate level. **(Appropriateness and Relevance)**
- BDRCS should seek additional shelter technical support for future operations, to help identify the optimal assistance for a holistic shelter response (e.g. technical support and awareness of safe building techniques), to ensure future sustainability in cyclone affected areas. **(Sustainability)**
- BDRCS could also set up a shelter quality assurance and monitoring mechanism to follow up on PASSA training, materials distribution and technical assistance on the ground. **(Effectiveness)**

b) WASH

The implementation of the “software” activities have generally progressed well and most have been completed at field level (i.e. the PHAST and CHAST training and CBHFA ToT and dissemination to target communities). However, delays have been experienced in rolling out of the “hardware” activities, particularly the distribution of cash grants for latrine repair, installation of new deep tube wells, distribution of hygiene parcels to schools and distribution of jerry cans to communities. It is important in a response like this to ensure a balanced integration of water, sanitation and hygiene promotion activities and beneficiary numbers for optimal results, however, the team did not see beneficiary lists for each area, so cannot comment on the balance or overlap between the three areas of support.

Water - Findings

In the affected areas the main drinking water source is underground water i.e. ring and tube wells. Communities usually do not treat (boil) their water before consumption, except during disasters. In some instances, during normal times, a small fee is charged to well users for access to water (between BDT 100 to 200 per month), to cover upkeep. The needs in WASH, particularly in Banshkhali, were clear and the response found to be appropriate in its focus.

Activities	Naikhongchari		Banshkhali	
	Targeted #	Status/progress	Targeted #	Status/progress
Repair of damaged wells	20	Completed	20	Completed
Installation of new wells	5	2 in-progress	5	4 in-progress

Under the TC Mora operation, all 40 targeted wells have been repaired, through contractors, and handed over to the appointed caretakers, who are often the nearest households to the wells. Their main responsibility is to ensure the day-to-day operation of the wells and carry out minor repairs when needed. Repaired wells have raised platforms (about 6 inches), are sealed and have some form of drainage. Water is available throughout the year and each well benefits 150 - 250 households (including schools/madrasahs).



Deep tube well digging in Banshkhali

The construction of the six deep tube wells was still in-progress when we visited. This is below the 10 wells targeted in the plan - the number was revised down due to under-budgeting of installation costs (BDT 100,000 - 110,000 each). Contracts were signed between BDRCS District Units in Bandarban and Chattogram and selected contractors, who are believed to be contractors for the Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE). The District Units will only pay for the wells upon assurance by DPHE, as the national lead agency for water and waste management, of the quantity and quality of the water supply, through testing. Similarly, these new tube wells will be handed over to caretakers upon completion. As part of the hand-over, it is important to ensure that caretakers are appointed, trained, and provided with basic repair tools, to continue maintenance for the new wells after the programme is finalised.

Recommendations

- Provide orientation/training for the appointed caretakers on the basic operation and maintenance of wells during future operations and provide necessary tools and contact details for further technical support (including post project). **(Sustainability)**
- BDRCS should include a higher budget of around BDT 150,000 (USD 1,800) in future for the installation of deep tube wells, to avoid under-budgeting and reduced well provision. **(Efficiency and Effectiveness)**

Sanitation – Findings

From the field visits, it is evident that open defecation is still commonly practiced in the communities and there was a need for sanitation assistance, particularly in Banshkhali.

Activities	Naikhongchari		Banshkhali	
	Targeted #	Status/progress	Targeted #	Status/progress
Supporting schools for latrine repairs	3 schools; 11 units	Completed	2 schools; 6 units	In-progress
Cash grant for latrine repairs	200 HHS	25 HHS received BDT 5,000	150 HHS	93 units installed

Cash grant recipients for latrine repair exchange their cash grant of BDT 5,000 (about USD 60) for five rings, one latrine slab and four pillars from a local vendor. Local vendors were identified and linked to the cash grant recipients, to facilitate the process of getting the materials for latrine repair. A second cash grant of BDT 2,000 (USD 24) is given upon completion of the latrine repairs to cover the cost of the work.

The total amount of the cash grant was reported as sufficient to cover latrine repair, including the purchase of materials for the structure and roofing. In Naikhongchari, transportation was included as part of the package, however, in Banshkhali, communities needed to pay an additional BDT 5 - 700 to hire a “rickshaw van” to transport the materials from the vendor to their houses. The latrine slabs used were reinforced with steel bars and were thicker/larger than the usual ones in the market.



No training was provided to cash grant recipients on latrine building/repair, but the identified local vendors were given key messages and some guidelines on the model latrine design and a list of required latrine materials, including the reinforced structure. Community members could seek technical support from the vendors for a small fee, or alternatively, latrine workers could be hired to assist in the digging of the pit.

Concerning the repair of school latrines (for both primary and secondary schools²), all units in Naikhongchari were completed, but those in Banskhali were still underway. School management committees have been formed to monitor progress and maintain the latrines, which have been equipped with sanitary disposal, where this can be done privately and safely.

Recommendations

- Train cash grant recipients on latrine location, to minimise risk of contaminating nearby water supply and ensuring appropriate excreta disposal. This would include support on siting the latrine, slab installation, pit digging, handwashing and safe disposal of excreta and links to HP. This could include IEC in pictures/local language to provide information on operation and maintenance. **(Sustainability)**
- Identify more local latrine vendors, with the capacity to provide large quantities of quality materials in a short timeframe and collate this information into a vendor database, which can be used for quicker emergency response in future. **(Efficiency and Effectiveness)**

Hygiene - Findings

Activities	Naikhongchari		Banskhali	
	Targeted #	Status/progress	Targeted #	Status/progress
PHAST ToT for volunteers	-	13	-	
PHAST for communities	-	120	-	
CHAST ToT for teachers	-	12	-	
CHAST for students	-	2,496	-	1,004
Distribution of hygiene parcels to communities	609 HHs	Completed	408 HHs	0
Distribution of hygiene parcels to students	3,600 parcels; 3 schools	0	2,067 parcels; 3 schools	0
Distribution of jerry cans	700 JCs; 500 HHs	0	300 JCs; 150 HHs	0

There was general appreciation of the training provided to communities by BDRCS volunteers, particularly those relating to health and sanitation. These trainings were targeted at schools and villages, where teachers and community members received ToT and then disseminated further training to students and community members. BDRCS was still to distribute hygiene parcels to students and jerry cans to communities before the end of the project. Schools were also still to be provided with cleaning kits (for latrines). The list of hygiene items has been adapted to the needs of the target groups, particularly by gender e.g. the inclusion of sanitary napkins for female secondary students, but not for primary students (see annex 3 for content of HPs).

Recommendations

- BDRCS should distribute relief items, such as jerry cans and hygiene parcels, during the emergency response, as timely distribution contributes to safer water transportation and storage at the household level. **(Efficiency and Effectiveness)**
- Although the PHAST and CHAST provided some awareness on health, hygiene and sanitation issues, we recommend that BDRCS carry out hygiene promotion (HP) activities at the same time as distributing

² Primary and secondary schools would cover children aged between 7 and 17 years old

hygiene parcels (just after the disaster), to ensure the promotion of key hygiene messages at this critical timing. This should be followed by more in-depth training to address risky behaviour and have a more profound impact. It could be a good idea to set up a record of existing IEC materials for future responses. **(Timeliness and Sustainability)**

c) Livelihoods

Component	Activities	Targeted no.		Achieved	
		Naikhongchori	Banskhali	Naikhongchori	Banskhali
Livelihood & FS	Unconditional multipurpose cash grant for one month (CHF 50 per family)			709 HHs	599 HHs
	Conditional cash grant for restoring livelihoods (CHF 187.50 per family)			212 HHs	98 HHs
	Livelihood ToT for volunteers			1 ToT	1 ToT
	Conduct livelihood training in communities			1	1

1. Unconditional multipurpose cash grant for one month (CHF 50 per family)

Findings

- BDRCS successfully distributed small amounts of unconditional cash during the emergency response. This is an established modality for the NS in first phase emergency response, when BDT 4000 is distributed as cash in an envelope (CIE).
- BDRCS also distributed the same amount as unconditional cash grants, as part of recovery activities to a greater number of beneficiaries (1,308 people across the two communities). The NS felt it was a useful way to provide a small level of support to a wide range of people, although the distribution was delayed until April. It was not clear to the team how this unconditional cash given to a larger target group, was linked to the conditional cash grants under the recovery programme, as many people seemed to use the money for similar items.
- The delivery mechanism of CIE is very common and accepted by beneficiaries and BDRCS staff at all levels, however, there are risks in terms of the transportation and storage of cash, which puts volunteers at risk.
- Due to a lack of dis-aggregated data per upazilla, we were not able to compare targets against delivery in quantitative, nor confirm if it reached the most vulnerable or made a difference to their livelihoods.



Beneficiary of livelihoods programme in Banskhali


Recommendations

- Unconditional multipurpose cash distribution should be done in a timely manner and are best used for emergency response purposes. **(Efficiency)**
- Recovery and livelihoods assessments should include dis-aggregated baseline data per gender for each upazilla, as done in Banskhali, to support targeting, monitoring, reporting and evaluation. **(Effectiveness)**
- BDRCS should research available technology to provide cash grants with high transparency and zero risk for staff and volunteers and use bank cheques or preferably a FSP for recovery CTP. **(Efficiency)**

2. Conditional cash grant support for restoring livelihood (CHF 187.5 per family)

Findings

- The needs analysis for livelihoods was done through the overall Kobo assessment survey, without considering the fuller information on the two different communities (i.e. one is hilly, the other is in a low lying coastal area), or looking to verify the information through observation or further questioning. The community had limited involvement in the selection process and in ensuring the most vulnerable received assistance, but seemed accepting of the decisions and we saw limited evidence of market / price assessment or analysis to inform this. Numbers selected for livelihoods assistance in Banskhali, where needs were greater. There is a need for more documentation and more specific criteria for such interventions, to ensure the cash grants sustain livelihoods.



Criteria for livelihoods selection

- The amount identified for the livelihoods conditional cash grant (BDT 15,000) was appropriate. The delivery mechanism was through a bank cheque, which seems to have worked reasonably well for beneficiaries, although a few did not like having to travel so far to the bank

- The criteria to select conditional cash beneficiaries for livelihoods was quite general – questions were limited and missed a deeper level of detail (i.e. data showed the majority were daily workers, but people took the opportunity to buy livestock to sell during Eid). Most beneficiaries used the money to buy livestock. It is hard to say if this was an income generating/ livelihoods activity, or a short-term coping strategy. While beneficiaries submitted a “proposal” of one or two lines to say how they would use the cash, they did not make longer-term commitments or plans for livelihoods support, nor did the project teams follow up on changes to these plans or the sustainability of

the planned activities. The conditional cash was also provided in a single tranche, which meant the team had limited control over how the money was used and if it was within any clear conditions.

- It is not so easy to see results for livelihoods support and there is a need to ensure evidence of the outcome, through setting up good baseline information/analysis at the outset and tracking it after the cash distribution. It is important to have the right monitoring system in place and, if necessary, seek technical support to set up standard templates to track progress and manage data analysis. Seeds and saplings were also provided on a small scale to the beneficiaries and could help build some sustainability, but this will not be monitored as it is outside the programme timeframe now.
- It was unclear how the support for livelihoods was linked to the other sectors - all used the same modality, but it was not clear how the sectors were integrated or explained to the community.

Recommendations

- Conditional cash support for livelihoods needs to be carefully prepared. If resources and capacities are not available, BDRCS should seek technical support from partners/experts and seek to establish further guidance on market / price assessment and analysis. (Effectiveness)
- BDRCS should research options to transfer conditional cash grants through other means, such as mobile technology (B-kash) for speed, transparency and beneficiary access. (Efficiency)
- It is useful to ensure that any livelihoods approach is integrated with the other components/objectives to ensure it reaches the most vulnerable. (Effectiveness)
- BDRCS needs to set up strong baseline information and track progress through a clear monitoring system and templates. (Appropriateness and Efficiency)

3. Livelihoods training (TOTs for volunteers and for communities)

Findings

- The livelihoods ToT training was conducted after the conditional cash distribution was made in February. The ToT training was conducted in Naikhongchari for volunteers from both communities (nine community volunteers from Banskhali and seven RCY from Naikhongchari). From the curriculum, it seems the focus was less on livelihoods and more on safe water, sanitation, healthy behaviour, environment issues, etc.
- We did not see examples of IEC materials used during the livelihoods training to support these targets
- The ToT trainings were replicated at community level in April 2018, but we did not receive any reports or information on the dissemination nor had specific follow up about the participants.
- Although purpose and linkages around this were not clearly outlined in the plan, BDRCS conducted a CTP training for 30 participants (staff and volunteers) during the operation. This training seems relevant to the operation, given the number of cash grants made, but we were unable to find any written information on its content or how it linked processes for delivering the multiple cash grants.
- Both upazillas invited the government Livestock Officer to give technical orientation to the beneficiaries.

Recommendations

- Prepare livelihoods training and ToT in line with the objectives of the project and ensure that it supports targeted livelihoods areas being supported (livestock, micro-enterprise, agriculture, etc). **(Effectiveness)**
- Provide participants with the relevant (visual) IEC materials to support the training and ensure follow up support for the sharing of key message to the community members. **(Effectiveness)**
- Provision of training in a timely manner according to the calendar of the livelihoods activities. **(Efficiency)**
- Establish baseline data/qualitative indicators to measure changes of behaviour, knowledge and capacity and include livelihoods training in the monitoring report to collect information on participation, challenges, follow up actions etc. **(Efficiency and Effectiveness)**
- Engage public/private partners in our actions to improve local engagement. **(Sustainability)**

The Cash for Work (CFW) support was provided as a livelihoods/DRR option and focused on paying people to construct or reinforce roads that could be used for escape or access during cyclone season or to reach banks and markets. This provided workers with a relatively low amount of money compared with the local market and was not so popular with community members, but was seen by BDRCS as a contribution to DRR.

d) Health - although the evaluation was not asked to look at this specifically, however, there are a couple of points that we would like to highlight in this area-

- There were clear health needs in both communities, however, this was beyond the scope of the BDRCS plan
- We received one recommendation from the field to include Reproductive Health activities in future in these responses, as it is a key need in both communities
- The CBHFA training was most appreciated from a community perspective and seen as useful

e) Forecast Based Financing (FBF) – The FBF mechanism was activated as TC Mora was approaching. The interview with the German RC delegate noted that the trigger was seen to have worked, however, learning from the experience has shown that cash assistance in a TC is not appropriate, as it is not possible to mobilise cash to the communities in the two days between the trigger and the cyclone hitting. GRC are rethinking their approach for TCs and will look to provide in-kind (food, water, First Aid kits and possibly blankets) as support and incentives to use shelters. They will trial this during the upcoming monsoon season, then re-assess how viable the procurement and transport of goods is in the limited time between trigger and cyclone.

10.Exit strategy

Findings

The TC Mora recovery programme ended on 31st May 2018 and at that point the temporary project offices shut down and IFRC / BDRCS project staff finished their work. From that point, any follow up has had to be done by staff from the BDRCS District Unit offices in Chattogram and Bandarban and there have been no funds to support any remaining work. As some of the recovery activities were left until late in operation (e.g. WASH cash grants, latrines, wells, distribution of hygiene parcels for students, jerry cans for communities, CFW in Banskhali, and training etc.), there was clearly a risk that they were not completed and funds might have to be returned. This is challenging for BDRCS and the IFRC to manage and both need to discuss the options to complete and close the operation, including how to deal with the activities that are outstanding. It would be advisable in this and future operations, to have a clear plan and budget to ensure proper completion of the activities and to support a clear exit plan.

There is also a need for a plan and budget for any necessary follow up activities to ensure the sustainability of the work done e.g. maintenance and management of the wells, management of local volunteer support, in accordance with any national policies/guidelines. All wells will be handed over to caretakers, but these people are not paid and if problems occur, will need to contact the District Units. It will be hard to maintain support from Chattogram and Bandarban and wells risk being left unmanaged and unused. There is a need for NHQ to engage with the two District Units to discuss and commit to realistic follow up actions, and to make timely financial planning to manage the financial closure of the project and a sustainable exit process.

There has been a limited amount of communication with beneficiaries around the end of the project. When we visited the communities, it was 10 days before the end of the project, yet this had not been communicated to beneficiaries and we were not told of the plans to do so before the last day(s). All responsibilities relating to the programme will be handed over to the two District Units, but we could find no clear plans to complete the activities/provide follow up or to explain their lack of completion to the two communities. The District Unit's lack of ownership of the operation (outlined above), does not help them engage in follow up actions or steps to exit the project responsibly and inform beneficiaries.

A positive action has been the links established with local government offices, including the Livestock Officer through the livelihoods training and with DPHE to support the safe construction of deep tube wells – both providing links to help the technical continuity of the work for the future.

Recommendations

- Prepare an exit strategy when planning the operation/recovery and revisit it in the last month, to finalise all programming, including steps to inform stakeholders, close the project office/finance etc., complete/handover unfinished work and follow up. **(Efficiency and Effectiveness)**
- Give clear messaging to the communities about the status of the activities and the end of the project, including what will happen to unfinished activities and what follow up there will or will not be. **(Appropriateness and Sustainability)**
- Engage with the District Units to discuss and commit to realistic exit planning, as they need to “own” the exit and any follow up actions. **(Sustainability)**
- In order finish activities well, look into budget options at NHQ or District Unit level to continue small activities, such as well maintenance and management and volunteer support, that are vital for the sustainability of the work done. **(Effectiveness and Sustainability)**
- Support Chattogram District Unit's suggestion to set up a committee of RCY volunteers in Banskhali to continue contact and follow up with these communities. **(Sustainability)**
- Continue the inclusion of Government and other partners in activities, training and exit planning to look for wider options to sustain the achievements made. **(Sustainability)**

ANNEX 1

List of Key Informant Interviews (KII)

	Name	Position	Organisation	Date
1	Mr. Hasibul Bari Razib	Manager, Humanitarian Response and Shelter	IFRC	14 May
2	Mr. Md Feroz Salah Uddin	Secretary General	BDRCS	14 May
3	Mr. Raymond Zingg	FBF Delegate	German RC	14 May
4	Ms. Gen de Jesus	Country Rep	British RC	14 May
5	Mr. Nazmul Azam Khan	Director, Disaster Response and Internat. Relations / Comms Dept	BDRCS	15 May
6	Mr. AHM Mainul Islam	Director In-charge, Finance Dept	BDRCS	15 May
7	Mr. Sirajul Islam Molla	Director, HR, Admin and Health Dept.	BDRCS	15 May
8	Aleksandre Mikadze Yirgalem Hirpa Negeri	Operations Manager/ Floods Risk Management Delegate	IFRC	15 May
9	Mr. Hasibul Bari Razib	Manager, Humanitarian Response and Shelter	IFRC	15 May
10	Mr. Walter Jeanty Ms. Yun Kyeong Han	Deputy Head of Delegation Cooperation Delegate	ICRC	16 May
11	Mr. Achala Navaratne	Country Rep	American RC	16 May
12	Mr. Md Mehedi Hasan (Shishir)	Snr Officer, Livelihoods & Cash	IFRC	16 May
13	Mr. Tanoy Dewan	Senior WASH Officer	IFRC	16 May
14	Mr. Md. Mizanur Rahman	Project Manager	BDRCS	16 May
15	Mr. Md Afsar Uddin	Director, Logistics Dept	BDRCS	16 May
16	Mr. Md. Mahbub Ali	Logistics Officer	IFRC	17 May
17	Mr. Motiar Rahman	Snr Finance Manager	IFRC	17 May
18	Ms. Rita Maria Petralba	Country Rep	Swedish RC	17 May
19	Mr. Taufik Jeremias	RDRT WASH	IFRC	17 May
20	Mr. Mathieu Leonard Ms. Alice Ho	Operations Coordinators, DMU	IFRC (KL)	17 May
21	Mr. Ram Chandra Raha	Shelter and Livelihood Officer, Naikhongchari	BDRCS	18 May
22	Mr. Emon	Youth Chief, Naikhongchari, Bandarban Unit	BDRCS	18 May
23	Members of the community	Naikhongchari (approx. 12)		18 May
24	Mr. AKM Jahangir	Secretary, Bandarban Unit	BDRCS	18 May
25	Mr. Mosharef Hossain	ULO, Bandarban Unit	BDRCS	18 May
26	Mr. BZM Shafi Ullah	WASH Officer, Bashkhali	BDRCS	19 May
27	Members of the community	Banshkhal (approx. 50)		19 May
28	Three community volunteers	Banshkhal	BDRCS	19 May
29	Mr. Nurul Anwar Chowdhury Bahan	Secretary, Chattogram Dist Unit	BDRCS	21 May
30	Mr. Rashid Khan	ULO, Chattogram Dist Unit	BDRCS	21 May
31	Mr. Zahirul Alam	Program Officer, MORA Operation	IFRC	21 May
32	Mr. Azmat Ulla	Head of Country Office	IFRC	22 May
33	Mr. Isidro Navarro	Cash Delegate	IFRC (Bangkok)	23 May

ANNEX 2

Activities and people reach - Early Recovery Operation, Tropical Cyclone Mora

Component	Activities	Targeted no.		Achieved	
		Naikhongchori	Banskhali	Naikhongchori	Banskhali
Emergency relief	Dry food distribution		2000 HH		2000 HH
	Distribution of MPCG + shelter toolkit		350 HH		350 HH
Water	Installation of new wells (tube/ring)	5	5	2 tube wells in-progress	4 tube wells in progress
	Repair of damaged wells	20	20	All 20 tube wells completed	All 20 tube wells completed
Sanitation	Cash grant for latrine repairs for HHs	200 HHs	150 HHs	25 HHs received BDT 5,000	93 units installed
	Supporting schools to repair latrines	3 schools; 11 units	2 schools; 6 units	All completed	In-progress
Hygiene	PHAST ToT for volunteers	-	-	13	12
	PHAST for communities	-	-	120	90
	CHAST ToT	-	-	12	12
	CHAST for students	-	-	2,496	1,004
	Distribution of hygiene parcels (communities)	609 HHs	408 HHs	609 HHs	408 HHs
	Distribution of hygiene parcels (students)	3,600 parcels; 3 schools	2,067 parcels; 3 schools	0	0
	Distribution of cleaning kits (schools)	3 sets	3 sets	0	0
	Distribution of jerry cans	700 JCs to 500 HHs	300 JCs to 150 HHs	0	0
Health	CBHFA training for communities	-	-	4 trainings; 120 pax	2 trainings; 60 pax
	First aid boxes to communities	-	-	30	20
	First aid training for school	-	-	1 training; 30 pax (fr 3 schools)	1 training; 30 pax (fr 3 schools)
Livelihood & FS	Distribution of multipurpose cash grant			709 HHs	599 HHs
	Distribution of livelihood cash grant			212 HHs	98 HHs
Shelter	PASSA ToT for volunteers and staff	1		1 training at N.chari with 26 participants (13 each from 2 places)	
	PASSA training for communities	4	4	4 course (120 pax)	4 course (120 pax)
	Distribution of conditional cash grant for shelter repairing			409 HHs	307 HHs
CTP	CTP training			12	2
DRR	Distribution of seeds			1300	1,004
	Sapling distribution	1300	1000	1300	1000
	Cash for work	4	4	4 (160 people)	2 (148 people)

	Completed
	In-progress
	Not started yet

ANNEX 3

Hygiene parcel content for communities

No.	Items	Quantity
1	Body soap	12 pcs
2	Laundry soap	5 pcs
3	Sanitary napkin	40 pads
4	Bath towel (small)	3 pcs
5	Bath towel (large)	2 pcs
6	Toilet paper	6 rolls
7	Tooth paste	2 pcs
8	Tooth brush	2 pcs
9	Shaving razor (disposable)	4 pcs

Hygiene parcel content for primary school students

No.	Items	Quantity
1	Body soap	2 pcs
2	Laundry soap	2 pcs
3	Toilet paper	1 roll
4	Tooth paste	1 pc
5	Tooth brush	1 pc
6	Comb	1 pc
7	Nail cutter	1 pc

Hygiene parcel content for high school female students

No.	Items	Quantity
1	Body soap	2 pcs
2	Laundry soap	2 pcs
3	Sanitary pad	1 packet
4	Toilet paper	1 packet
5	Tooth brush	1 packet
6	Tooth paste	1 packet
7	Comb	1 packet
8	Nail cutter	1 pc

Hygiene materials for schools

No.	Items	Quantity
1	Liquid hand wash soap	5 pcs
2	Refill of hand wash	15 pcs
3	Towel	6 pcs
4	Toilet paper	20 rolls
5	Toilet cleaning materials	2 pcs
6	Toilet brush	5 pcs

ANNEX 4

TERMS OF REFERENCE INTERNAL EVALUATION BANGLADESH CYCLONE MORA OPERATION (MDRBD019)

1. SUMMARY

Purpose: To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian assistance with regards to Tropical Cyclone Mora, focusing on shelter, WASH and livelihood. It is expected that findings and recommendations from this evaluation will guide the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) in ongoing as well as future operations and contribute to broader Red Cross Red Crescent learning, particularly to better address needs in emergency, relief and recovery, considering long-term impact and sustainability
Audience: BDRCS, IFRC, Partner National Societies (PNSs) and donors
Commissioners: Head of country office, IFRC Bangladesh country office
Reporting to: The evaluators will report to the Head of Country Office, IFRC Bangladesh
Duration: Total 11 days including 4 days field visits
Timeframe: 13-24 May 2018
Methodology summary: The evaluation will be conducted internally method(s) suitable to the local context. Data can be sourced from a desk review, extraction of information from the household surveys, observation, key informant interviews, field visits and participatory workshops and surveys
Location: Chittagong and Bandarban districts of Bangladesh

2. BACKGROUND

Due to heavy monsoon rains, the south-eastern part of Bangladesh experienced two disasters within a short interval – Tropical Cyclone Mora (TC Mora) made land fall on 30 May 2017, followed by landslides on 13 June. According to the situation report (31 May) from Bangladesh's Department of Disaster Management (DDM), seven people were reported dead in Cox's Bazar, Rangamati and Bhola and more than 50,000 houses were damaged, following the cyclone. As of 3 June, an estimated 3.3 million people were recorded as affected in Cox's Bazar, Chittagong, Bandarban and Rangamati.

Around the same time, the districts of Bandarban, Chittagong, Rangamati, Khagrachari and Cox's Bazaar experienced the worst landslides in the history due to heavy rainfall starting 13 June 2017. 160 people lost their lives and 187 people were injured. Approximately 2,124 people took shelters at 19 shelter centres in Rangamati, 388 people at five centres in Bandarban. More than 80,000 people affected were from five districts; out of which 34,000 were severely impacted as they have lost their houses altogether and belongings, necessities, livelihoods and food stocks. Approximately 46 per cent of the most affected people were from Rangamati, 25 per cent from Bandarban, 25 per cent from Chittagong, 2 per cent from Cox's Bazar and, 1 per cent from Khagrachari. Due to the landslides, around 11,000 houses were reported either fully destroyed or partially damaged; more than 1,200 sanitary latrines were damaged and around 1,000 water points such as tube-well and ring-well were damaged.

BDRCS, with the support from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched an emergency appeal on 13 June 2017, and later on revised the amount to CHF1.6 million on 7 August 2017, to assist 10,000 families in five most affected districts of Cox's bazar, Chittagong, Bandarban and Noakhali through the provision of emergency food, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), livelihood and health support including strengthening resilience at local level.

3. EVALUATION PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Purpose

To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian assistance with regards to TC Mora operations focusing on three key areas namely shelter, WASH and livelihood.

It is expected that the findings and recommendations will guide the BDRCS in ongoing as well as future operations and contribute to broader Red Cross Red Crescent learning, particularly to better address needs in emergency, relief and recovery, considering long-term impact and sustainability.

Scope

This evaluation will assess relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of TC Mora operation based on the planned outcomes in the three key areas.

The internal evaluation shall include data from relevant stakeholders and communities that received the humanitarian assistance under the said operation. Targeted communities for the internal evaluation should those in Banskhali (sub-district of Chittagong district), and Naikhongchari (sub-district of Bandarban district).

Relevant stakeholders should include BDRCS staff, volunteers, IFRC programme team, PNSs, Bangladesh Government, local authorities (district relief & rehabilitation officers(DRRO) and upazilla (sub-district) nirbhahi officers (UNO) of relevant departments and other relevant stakeholders deem necessary by the evaluation team.

4. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA

Objectives

The evaluation aims to:

- Assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of cyclone Mora operational activities against the planned outcomes in three key areas; shelter, WASH and livelihood.
- To capture the current best practices and improvements with regards to the key target areas.
- Assess the sustainability of the programme intervention.

The evaluation should highlight good practices, lessons learned and areas of improvement to inform future response operations, together with recommendations.

Criteria

This evaluation focus on the following criteria:

- Relevance and appropriateness
- Coverage
- Efficiency/ effectiveness
- Connectedness and sustainability

Evaluation Questions

Specific interview questions can be established by the evaluation team. Sample questions which meet the requirements of the criteria and desired evaluation objectives can be obtained in the Annex.

5. METHODOLOGY

The methodology will adhere to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluations](#), with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted and utilized. The method applied should take into consideration the local cultural and language to ensure concepts and techniques common in English language are adapted and well understood by local communities and its stakeholders.

The evaluation will be conducted internally method(s) suitable to the local context. The evaluation can include qualitative and/or quantitative data collection from identified stakeholders and communities in two targeted districts. These may be in the form of surveys, key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGDs) or other methods, at the discretion of the evaluation team.

The evaluation is planned to be completed within 11 days including preparation of the final report.

The methodology will be further detailed by the Team Leader and the team through the Detailed Work Plan. The detailed work plan should clearly outline realistic plan of work for the evaluation, sampling method, data collection methods and tools, proposed data analysis, and timeframe with firm dates for delivery of outputs, travel and logistical arrangements for the evaluation.

The detailed evaluation design is to be created by the internal evaluation team; however, the following should be taken into account:

- Sampling method is to be decided by the evaluation Team Leader, as long the final sample to be evaluated on includes all Movement partners involved in the cyclone operation interventions, within the targeted sectors and districts of the intervention and the 'most vulnerable' beneficiaries ensuring gender balance.
- Data collection methods will be decided by the Team Leader, in consultation with the EMT.
- The evaluation team should visit a representative number of communities in Chittagong and Bandarban districts assisted in the cyclone Mora response. The total evaluation work is estimated at 11 days including travel time.
- Appropriate briefing, if required, should be organized for the volunteers and facilitated by the evaluation team to provide volunteers with the knowledge and practice to conduct interviews/fill questionnaires in the evaluation process as required.

The evaluation team will be responsible to clearly outline the support needs in-country in their Detailed Work Plan. This will be agreed with BDRCS and IFRC based on resources available.

6. OUTPUTS / DELIVERABLES

1. Detailed Work Plan for the evaluation.
2. Draft report of the evaluation.
3. A presentation of key preliminary evaluation findings to BDRCS and IFRC in Dhaka, including an opportunity for key stakeholders to clarify any immediate points.
4. Final evaluation report of no more than 15 pages (excluding executive summary and annexes) which highlights key conclusions and recommendations.

7. SCHEDULE

The evaluation is expected to complete from 13 to 24 May 2018 and it is expected that within 11 working days³ the evaluation will be completed following schedule.

Activity	Location	Days	Dates	Outputs	Responsibility
Desktop review	Home country				
Submission of Detailed Work Plan		1	13 May 2018	Detailed Work Plan	Team Leader
Briefing in Dhaka and KII	Dhaka	1	14 May 2018		Team Leader
Data collection	2 districts: Chittagong & Bandarban	4	15-18 May 2018	Data collection	Evaluation Team
Consolidation of data, analysis and report writing	Dhaka	2	19-20 May 2018		Evaluation Team
Debriefing and presentation on preliminary findings to BDRCS and IFRC	Dhaka	1	21 May 2018	Presentation	Team Leader
Draft report submission	Dhaka	1	22 May 2018	Draft report	Team Leader
Report Review by BDRCS and IFRC		0	23 May 2018		BDRCS and IFRC
Final report and approval		1	24 May 2018	Final Report	Team Leader
Total		11			

³ Friday and Saturdays are weekend in Bangladesh.

8. EVALUATION QUALITY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS

The consultants should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the review team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#). IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost-effective manner.
3. **Ethics and Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with regards for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality and Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that considers the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technically accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected the evaluation will respect the seven [Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross Red Crescent](#): Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.

9. EVALUATION MANAGEMENT TEAM

An evaluation management team will manage and oversee the evaluation, and ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of three (3) PMER members from Asia Pacific regional office, IFRC Bangladesh Country Office and BDRCS.

10. EVALUATION TEAM AND QUALIFICATIONS

This evaluation will be conducted by internally by the Red Cross Movement, consisting of a Team Leader and at least three evaluation team members with relevant knowledge and experience in Shelter, WASH and livelihood.

11. APPLICATION PROCEDURES (INCLUDED AS SEPARATE SECTION)

Interested candidates should submit their expression of interest and curricular vitae (CV) to Raqibul Alam raqibul.alam@ifrc.org and pmer.apzo@ifrc.org by 28 April 2018. In the subject line, please state the position you are applying for, your surname and first name. (SUBJECT: Bangladesh Cyclone Mora Operation Final Evaluation – Last Name, First Name).

The expenses for this internal evaluation are fully funded by the appeal, all related costs including flights to Bangladesh from evaluators' home countries, per-diem and in-country costs are fully covered.

12. APPENDICES – (to be handed over prior evaluation)

1. Proposed evaluation questions
2. Package of reference documents for MDRBD019
3. Updates and reports, including movement updates
4. Disaster response operations manual and other available guidelines

ANNEX 5

Questions by evaluation criteria

In each section, and as this is a light evaluation, the team will keep an overarching focus on the simple issues of

- What good practices can be identified from this response across the levels and amongst the different actors?
- What challenges or constraints were faced during the implementation and how did the BDRCS and partners adapt to changes that arose (in need, capacities and context)?
- What lessons have been identified that can improve provision of similar interventions in future?

Relevance and appropriateness
<p>How were the needs of the affected population assessed, identified and responded to? Was the assistance well judged, targeted and relevant to the needs and expectations of communities and partners.</p> <p>Red Cross and Movement partners</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. How did the BDRCS target the most vulnerable people / groups among the affected population? And how did they decide the appropriate assistance to respond to those needs?2. How far did past experience of such responses inform this individual response?3. What steps did BDRCS take to improve a) the targeting and b) quality of the assistance provided? How far did they involve the communities in that process?4. What strategies were used to ensure appropriate quality of goods and services were delivered? <p>Authorities and external partners (we did not meet these in the end)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Was the response operation and the assistance provided in line with the priorities of the government authorities and did it meet their expectations? If yes how? If not how not?2. How was this coordinated with other actors and the authorities to ensure the effective targeting of assistance?3. How was coordination and communication managed between the BDRCS and the authorities? How well other key humanitarian actors? <p>Communities</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Was the assistance provided appropriate to meet the needs of the communities and the different groups within them (technical needs/per group) and to address their situation?2. Was there any assistance that was provided that was not relevant or appropriate to the emergency needs? Or to the longer-term recovery needs? How was that dealt with between the communities and BDRCS?3. How far were the communities involved in the assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring of the assistance? Was the response sensitive to local customs?4. Was the beneficiary selection process fair and appropriate and well managed and explained to the communities? Was a complaints/feedback mechanism available and how did it work?
Coverage
<p>Did the interventions reach all relevant populations and population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance?</p> <p>Red Cross and Movement partners</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. How did the BDRCS ensure that it covered the most vulnerable communities and people within them? Could they see any ways in which that process should be changed or improved?2. Did all communities receive the same assistance relevant to their needs, or were there differences in the assistance provided? If so why did that happen and how could it be remedied in future?3. Did BDRCS take into account the PGI concerns, needs and capacities of the most vulnerable people in these communities? And if so how? <p>Authorities and external partners (we did not meet these in the end)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. How did the authorities work with BDRCS to ensure appropriate coverage of the assistance across the affected population? How well did that work and could anything be improved?2. How did this work with other partners to ensure a good coverage of needs, without gaps or overlaps?3. Could the coverage and distribution methods of the BDRCS be improved in any way, including in relation to the coordination with them? <p>Communities</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Were the gaps in the coverage of assistance within the communities? How was that handled by the communities and how could it be addressed in future? Was the selection process fairly done and well communicated?

2. Were there any gaps or overlaps in the assistance provided that caused problems in the communities? Did the BDRCS deliver assistance according to their commitments and community expectations?
3. Again, how far were the communities involved in the process and did they feel that their input was taken into account during the implementation of the response?

Efficiency

How efficiently was the operation carried out and how well did it adhere to BDRCS / IFRC systems, procedures, and quality control mechanisms, to support the smooth delivery of the response and recovery plans?

Red Cross and Movement partners

1. Were all the necessary systems, procedures and quality control mechanisms in place and adequate for the response and recovery operations – both in BDRCS and IFRC?
2. Were there strong processes in place to ensure accountability to both communities and donors?
3. How efficient and accountable were the support services for this response and were they able to support delivery of the objectives, efficiently and in the time-frame?
 - logistics (was there an adequate tracking system for goods/services)
 - human resources (was there adequate and appropriately skilled HR to support the operation across the levels / locations)
 - resource mobilization (were there adequate resources to deliver the planned response)
 - PMER (were there efficient processes for planning, monitoring and reporting on this response and efficient use of internal data from such processes to inform the response)
 - financial (systems to ensure efficient transfer and monitoring of funds and to minimize potential losses/risks faced by BDRCS and IFRC?)
4. Was there adequate time and resourcing available to support and inform efficient and timely decision-making, across the chain from community / branch level through to NHQ?

Authorities and external partners (we did not meet these in the end)

1. How efficiently did communication and information sharing work between BDRCS, IFRC and the authorities? How far did this support or hinder the delivery of the response? And what could be done in future, if anything, to improve it?
2. How efficiently did BDRCS and IFRC engage with and coordinate with partners? Were there regular channels (meeting, information etc) for this coordination and how well did it work?
3. Do partners have any input around the efficiency and timeliness of the response? Did this have any impact on their work?
4. Do authorities / partners feel that the operation presented good value for money?

Communities

1. Did the communities feel that they received the assistance in good time to respond to their needs? Were there any delays in the provision and what sort of impact did this have? How could this be improved in future?
2. How efficiently were the various distribution systems (or other services) managed and communicated to communities? Was it clear what was being provided, when and to whom? Were there any gaps or overlaps in that delivery and in the systems for supporting and communicating it?
3. Did BDRCS provide any follow up to ensure that the goods / services had been efficiently provided and check if there was a need for any adaptations in that support? If so how did that work and were community members aware of this follow up and have access to it?

Effectiveness

How well did the response interventions deliver against their original objectives and intended results?

Red Cross and Movement partners

1. Did the response operation deliver against the original plan? What challenges were there and how did the BDRCS adjust the programme to accommodate those?
2. Was there adequate time and effort invested in improving integration across the different sectors? To what degree was integration achieved and how could this be further strengthened, if necessary?
3. How did this response build on the investment in preparedness measures and how have those preparedness actions resulted in a more effective intervention? What steps could be taken to improve that preparedness investment and its links to the response?
4. What key learning did BDRCS and IFRC take from the experience of planning and delivering the recovery element of the operation? What worked and what didn't? How could this experience inform future recovery planning and resourcing?

Authorities and external partners (we did not meet these in the end)

1. How were programme activities managed and coordinated, particularly between BDRCS, IFRC, other Movement partners, clusters, and local authorities to optimise the effectiveness of the operation?
2. What were the authorities' opinion of the effectiveness of the response and subsequently, of the recovery element of the operation? What over-arching areas did they believe went well in this response (based on previous experience) and where do they feel that there could have been improvements?
3. How have partners experienced the engagement with the BDRCS and IFRC around this operation? Has coordination and communication been effective and led to problem solving / a more effective operation? What areas would they look to improve in future? This could include feedback on the Emergency Shelter Cluster coordination.

Communities

1. To what extent did the communities affected by the TC, especially those in more vulnerable circumstances, receive the assistance as planned and at the right time?
2. To what extent were the same communities engaged in the planning for and to what extent did they receive support for their recovery as needed and at the right time?
3. To what extent were the communities, specifically women, children, the elderly etc., satisfied with the delivery of the response and the recovery assistance? Did it meet their overall expectations?
4. How well did communities feel that they were engaged and communicated with throughout the whole response? Did they have timely access to clear information about the programme across the board⁴ and did they have the mechanism to get that information, provide feedback or engage / complain?

Connectedness and sustainability

1. Have the programme activities, particularly in shelter and WASH, been sustained in any way following completion of the interventions?
2. Did the response result in enhanced institutional capacity of the BDRCS in any way or did it have any unsuspected results for the NS (e.g. around preparedness or recovery programming)?
3. Given Bangladesh's ongoing work and experience around preparedness for such weather events, what lessons have been learned from this response that can inform the preparedness cycle?
4. Was a lesson learned workshop held and did it result in BDRCS changing the response/recovery in any way or capturing changes to be applied in future responses?
5. Has the response and recovery enhanced capacities in the target communities in any way or improved their links with local authorities / organizations? How inclusive and participatory has the response been? What approaches have been used or are being considered for the future?
6. Did the support of the IFRC in this response complement the BDRCS response and the engagement with the communities in any way?

⁴ Selection criteria, planned activities, community-level budgets, expenditure and results etc