



International Federation  
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

## Final Evaluation of Sri Lanka Floods Operations 2016-2017

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## Acknowledgements

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# Final Evaluation of Sri Lanka Floods Operations 2016-2017

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## Executive Summary

### Background

In 2016, Sri Lanka was hit by a severe Tropical Cyclone *Roanu*, which affected 22 out of 25 districts in the country. In 2017, the South-West Monsoon caused heavy rainfalls which triggered a major flood and landslide situation affecting 15 districts.

Under *Flood and Landslide Operations 2016 – MDRLK005*, the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society (SLRCS) assisted 140,000 affected people in the relief phase. SLRCS activated its various disaster response teams, which mobilized more than 400 volunteers. The recovery phase included livelihoods support for 690 affected families and SLRCS capacity enhancement on Cash Based Interventions (CBI).

Under *Flood Operations 2017 – MDRLK006*, SLRCS assisted approximately 100,000 affected people in the relief phase. SLRCS again activated its response teams, mobilizing more than 480 volunteers. During the early recovery phase, unconditional cash transfers were given to 800 beneficiaries, and livelihood cash grants to 400 families. Trainings were also done for volunteers and staff to enhance SLRCS preparedness.

### Objectives and Methodology

The evaluation objectives are to:

1. assess the mobilization of volunteers (BDRT and NDRT) and staff for emergency operations; and
2. identify the effectiveness of the Cash Based Interventions (CBI) conducted and indicate areas for further improvement as the SLRCS has moved towards better CBI.

Methods included desk reviews of SLRCS documents and guidelines and documents from other relevant stakeholders, as well as key informant interviews with 42 governance volunteers, staff and stakeholders, and focus group discussions with 91 field volunteers and beneficiaries. The 10-day visit covered SLRCS HQ and five affected districts identified in the evaluation [Terms of Reference \(ToR\)](#).

### Summary of Findings

#### Objective 1: Mobilization of volunteers & staff for emergencies

SLRCS is generally able to rapidly mobilize trained volunteers though much depends on the local capacity of branches. While SLRCS rightly emphasizes volunteer leadership of the organization and responses, funding for core operational capacity to support preparedness and response is a challenge. Fundraising overall is weak.

Coordination with government is strong, though not all stakeholders understand the SLRCS mandate and role. Emergency response systems exist at national level but are not consistently known or used elsewhere. National mechanisms to deploy volunteers and staff are not used very much and are a missed opportunity.

All volunteers could benefit from more training, including psychosocial support, but a big challenge is retention, though there are opportunities to broaden the range of volunteers and engage them all more.

#### Objective 2: Effectiveness of Cash Based Interventions

CBI was a relevant and appropriate response, and SLRCS' Cash Based Interventions (CBI) were considered successful but there are opportunities to improve. Transfers were considered enough though justification for the livelihoods amount is not clear and staff did not always understand or fully follow guidelines in all places.

Livelihood responses took considerable time, and there were delays in payments for unconditional cash as well. Beneficiary selection risks exclusion errors and post-distribution feedback mechanisms are lacking. Data privacy and protection of SLRCS-collected information also needs to be strengthened.

## Summary of Recommendations

### Recommendation 1: Strengthen funding for core operations in support of volunteer capacity

- Increase overall fundraising capacity and performance at national and branch levels
- Invest in core operational capacity to support disaster preparedness and response

### Recommendation 2: Harmonize and strengthen disaster response systems

- Clarify the legally-mandated role and independence of SLRCS with local authorities and communities
- Strengthen and rollout a set of strategic guidance, procedures and tools applicable to each response
- Ensure clear and consistent designated roles during disasters to coordinate operational response

### Recommendation 3: Use NDRT system more effectively

- Promote role of NDRT as a support system for a stronger branch response
- Consider automatic deployment of NDRT members if national project or support funds are provided
- Use NDRT members to support rollout and disaster preparedness - helps harmonization and uptake of systems, and provides needed opportunities to keep NDRT members both engaged and up to date

### Recommendation 4: Strengthen volunteer recruitment, training and retention

- Recruit adults/retirees with skills in disaster preparedness, operations/office support, and fee-for-service
- Train volunteers in psychosocial support, and consider response teams for child-friendly spaces
- Ensure regular volunteer communication and engagement to boost retention rates

### Recommendation 5: Strengthen CBI capacity

- Conduct more CBI training on needs, market, response options, and delivery mechanisms analysis
- Strengthen CBI guidelines and tools and ensure they are rolled out and implemented consistently

### Recommendation 6: Streamline CBI implementation to improve speed of response

- Respond sooner for livelihood recovery, by organizing assessments and partnerships in advance
- Avoid delay in selection/payment by reducing certification needs and use delegated staff authority

### Recommendation 7: Strengthen data privacy and protection

- Increase data management capacity, and ensure that data protection is in place, so that records are securely transmitted, with limited access for use, and are destroyed when no longer needed

### Recommendation 8: Strengthen monitoring processes

- Conduct well baseline and end-line assessments to capture short-term impacts and lessons learned
- Ensure ODK data collection systems are functional off-line for areas lacking network coverage

### Recommendation 9: Strengthen CBI beneficiary selection & feedback mechanisms

- Ensure independent assessment to avoid exclusion risk of government-provided lists
- Establish confidential complaint and feedback mechanisms for the entire duration of project

### Recommendation 10: Continue to expand and strengthen CBI livelihood programme

- Establish ongoing partnerships with agricultural and economic development support services
- Define appropriate transfer amounts, individual contributions, and tailor transfers to type of livelihood

## Background

In 2016, Sri Lanka was hit by a severe Tropical Cyclone *Roanu*, which affected 22 out of 25 districts in the country. Flood and landslide affected 428,000 people, at least 104 people reported dead, 99 remain missing, 4,000 houses were damaged, and 600 houses were destroyed. In 2017, the activation of South-West Monsoon caused heavy rainfalls in the South-Eastern parts of the island. This triggered a major flood and landslide situation in the country affecting 15 districts.



A member of Sri Lanka Red Cross Society branch disaster response team (BDRT) assesses Aranayaka landslide area. **(Photo credit: SLRCS Kegalle branch)**

Under *Flood and Landslide Operations 2016 – MDRLK005*, the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society (SLRCS) assisted 140,000 affected people in the relief phase. SLRCS branches activated their community-based disaster response teams (CBDRT) or Village Disaster Management Committees (VDMC) and their branch disaster response teams (BDRTs), which mobilized more than 400 volunteers. National Disaster Response Team (NDRT) members also deployed. The recovery phase included livelihoods support for 690 affected families and SLRCS capacity enhancement on Cash Based Interventions.

Under *Flood Operations 2017 – MDRLK006*, SLRCS assisted approximately 100,000 affected people in the relief phase. SLRCS branches again activated their CBDRT/VDMC and BDRT, mobilizing more than 480 volunteers. During the early recovery phase, unconditional cash grants were given to 800 beneficiaries, and livelihood cash grants to 400 families. Trainings was done for volunteers and staff to enhance SLRCS preparedness.

## Evaluation Objectives and Scope

The purpose of evaluation was to assess SLRCS disaster preparedness and response capacities during the 2016 & 2017 operations, to enhance future capacity and response. Specific objectives are to:

1. assess the mobilization of volunteers (BDRT and NDRT) and staff for emergency operations; and
2. identify the effectiveness of the Cash Based Interventions (CBI) conducted and indicate areas for further improvement as the SLRCS has moved towards better CBI.

The evaluation is based on the IFRC ToR criteria<sup>1</sup>, each of which was separately assessed, though there is also some overlap:

- Relevance and Appropriateness
- Coverage
- Efficiency / Effectiveness / Accountability
- Impact
- Connectedness and Sustainability

As per IFRC's evaluation ToR and due to limited time available, the evaluation focused on operational areas in Colombo, Gampaha, Kalurata, Kegalle and Matara districts.

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<sup>1</sup> Similar to those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee evaluation guidance

## Methodology

### Desktop Review

A total of 18 documents were reviewed, which included SLRCS disaster response documents, livelihood development programme guiding documents and associated supporting templates, emergency operation appeal documents for both MDRLK005 and MDRLK006 as well as reports on Post-Disaster Needs Assessment conducted by the Sri Lankan government. All documents have been archived and are available for review from IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office.

### Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD)



Focus group discussion with a group of beneficiaries of livelihood grant (Photo credit: Evaluation team)

Most of the KII data were obtained through semi-structured interviews and discussions with key informants through face to face meetings during a 10-day visit spanning SLRCS HQ and five districts (Matara, Kalutara, Colombo, Kegalle and Gampaha). Other interviews were done through Skype or Viber calls with past SLRCS staff, Federation staff and delegates. Discussions were also conducted in focus groups of beneficiaries and volunteers in the five districts.

The interviews and discussions were conducted in English whenever possible, and in Sinhala or Tamil through consecutive interpretation when required.

Before each interview and discussion, the team ensured that the informants were aware of the confidential and voluntary nature of the information being provided. The following is a summary of interviews and discussions completed:

Informant	M	F	Total	Organization/Region
SLRCS HQ Staff	2	2	4	
SLRCS National Governance <sup>2</sup>	1		1	
SLRCS Branch Staff	6	3	9	Matara, Kalutara, Colombo, Kegalle and Gampaha
SLRCS Branch Governance	6	2	8	Matara, Kalutara, Colombo, Kegalle and Gampaha
IFRC Staff	4	2	6	IFRC Sri Lanka and Asia Pacific Regional Office
National Government Officials	1		1	Disaster Management Centre
Community Government Officials	10	2	12	Disaster Management Centre, District Secretaries, Division Secretaries, Grama Niladharis, Livelihood/Development Officers
Peer Agency Officer	1		1	Oxfam
Beneficiaries	20	42	62	Matara, Kalutara, Colombo, Kegalle and Gampaha
Volunteers <sup>3</sup>	13	16	29	NHQ, Kalutara, Colombo, Kegalle and Gampaha
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>133</b>	

### Field Visits/Observations

After each FGD with beneficiaries, the evaluation team also visited a few livelihoods of beneficiaries, and in one case the FGD participants brought their livelihood products (such as clothing, fruits, crafts and sweets) to show to the evaluation team.

<sup>2</sup> Where there is overlap with branch governance, informant is categorized under branch governance.

<sup>3</sup> Includes NDRT, BDRT and other volunteers. Where there is overlap with staff, informant is categorized

### Sampling

The areas selected for data collection were according to the scope of the ToR. For selection of FGD beneficiary participants, each district branch office was informed in advance to announce to the beneficiaries through the local government representative of the evaluation team’s visit.

### Presentation of Preliminary Findings and Discussion

At the end of the 10-day visit, the evaluation team presented preliminary findings to the IFRC and SLRCS team at Colombo followed by a Q&A session. This was done to obtain initial feedback and to emphasize the importance of sharing the findings with stakeholders and implementing the recommendations that would be included in the final report.



Evaluation team members with interpreter (from left to right: C. Mike Daniels, Ranjith Liyanage, Wai Siong (Audrey) See Tho, Ruthraj Senadhirajah *(Photo credit: Evaluation team)*

### Team Composition

The evaluation was conducted by a three-person team including one international consultant team leader; one IFRC regional evaluation specialist nominated by IFRC; and one SLRCS staff member (from a district not being visited) nominated by SLRCS.

Team Member	Role	Responsibilities
<b>C. Mike Daniels</b>	Int’l Team Leader	Leadership, evaluation design, liaison with EMT, data collection & analysis, and lead writing of reports
<b>Wai Siong (Audrey) See Tho</b>	Int’l Team Member	IFRC systems, support design, data collection & analysis, participate in debrief and draft report writing
<b>Ranjith Liyanage</b>	National Member	SLRCS systems, liaison with branches/logistics, and support data collection, analysis, debrief and draft report writing

### Constraints

Due to the limited time available and lack of understanding of the local context, the evaluation team depended upon SLRCS staff to recruit participants for the FGDs, which did not allow for sample randomisation. Invitations were apparently made through an announcement by the local authorities, so some additional participants showed up to the FGD without selection by SLRCS staff, giving at least some degree of random self-selection.

The timing of the FGDs during weekdays also proved a challenge for male beneficiaries (who are the main household income earners) and volunteers with full-time jobs to participate. There were two days where the team conducted discussions during the weekend.

The overlap between the 2016 (MDRLK005) and 2017 (MDRLK006) operations sometimes can cause compounding answers to the questions asked. To address this, the team made sure to clarify and ask comparative questions between 2016 and 2017 operations.

Sri Lankan culture also adds to the difficulty in receiving constructive criticism, which the team addressed by explaining before each interview and discussion that the feedback the team receives are meant to improve future programmes and will not directly impact the accessibility of assistance for specific individuals.

## Findings

### Objective 1: Assess the mobilization of volunteers and staff for emergency operations

#### *Relevance and Appropriateness*

- SLRCS well structured (HQ, District Branches, Divisions & Units), but more Units may be needed
- Emergency response systems exist at national level, but are not consistently known or used elsewhere
- Volunteers are dedicated but recruitment, training, recognition & retention could be more systematic
- Youth development strong & essential, but retirees may be a mostly untapped resource
- Training useful but need more, including practice, drills/simulations and psychosocial support

The Sri Lanka Red Cross Society (SLRCS) is a membership-based organization that recruits, trains and mobilizes large numbers of community volunteers to respond to disasters, as well as conduct ongoing health- and safety-related activities such as community and commercial First Aid (FA) services or training, hygiene promotion and Dengue eradication programmes. The organizational structure matches the administrative levels of the Sri Lankan government – i.e. national HQ, district branches, divisions and finally local units (with units matching one or more of Sri Lanka’s local *Grama Niladhari* (GN) administrative units.

This organizational structure is considered appropriate as it fosters ongoing community engagement and local government coordination and allows for rapid response to disasters, as well as the ability in principle to shift human and other resources to disasters around the country as needed. There were calls from both SLRCS and stakeholders to open more local units, but securing volunteers and funding is often a challenge.

SLRCS is led by member-elected governance boards and their chairs who serve in a voluntary capacity, while a small professional staff Head Quarters (HQ) in Colombo and the 25 branches across the country provide executive and operational support and funding to activities and programmes.

Members and volunteers conduct both regular and emergency operations under the planning and supervision of the respective national, branch or division governance boards and their chairs. Branch Executive Officers (BEO) are responsible to manage implementation in their district and can seek assistance from HQ executive and technical staff as needed.

Though there is a national constitution outlining the specific roles and responsibilities, the branches manage the relationships and functions between governance and staff in a variety of different ways – reportedly depending to some degree on the branch history and personalities involved. More clarity could help ensure national strategy and policies are consistently implemented.

SLRCS has developed a set of emergency response documents, including the SLRCS Strategic Plan, a National Contingency Plan for Floods, a Disaster Response Framework, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Flood Response. Knowledge about and use of these documents also varied, with response systems in some locations not very structured while others developed detailed systems to guide, implement and document their responses.

In addition to the volunteers engaged in regular activities that can be re-purposed, the main rapid-response mechanisms for mobilizing volunteers are the Division Disaster Response Teams (DDRT), Branch Disaster Response Teams (BDRT), and the National Disaster Response Team (NDRT). These mechanisms are all considered an appropriate way to boost capacity, and all members were reportedly appropriately trained.

Response team and other volunteers we spoke to and reportedly others are all very dedicated to the work of SLRCS, but recruitment, training, recognition & retention are challenges that reportedly could be done in a more systematic manner. Most volunteers are youth and young adults attracted through the strong school programmes conducted by SLRCS or through the opportunity to help their communities while building useful connections and skills, but many of these volunteers then leave to seek work or begin families leading to high rates of turnover and the constant need for recruitment and training. There are reportedly fewer adult volunteers that might be more likely to stay longer and bring useful professional or social skills. Retired persons

especially seem to be an untapped resource for volunteers that could fill community support or technical advisory roles and would potentially be willing to be involved without the payments that are often given to project volunteers.

Most informants suggested that all volunteers needed more training, including specialised technical topics such as water rescue, assessment and camp management, and ask for practical sessions that could include simulation exercises and even community evacuation or rescue drills. Many informants also mentioned training on soft-skills such as psychosocial support because volunteers often deal with and support affected persons traumatised by disaster, even if only by listening. Children especially need 'safe-spaces' to play and learn, and all psychosocial support should take a 'do no harm' approach so appropriate training is important.

Many informants, including some volunteers themselves say that some volunteers can feel under-appreciated if not regularly engaged or recognised. While some volunteers do get and appreciate official recognition in the form of certificates or ceremonies and enjoy the visibility of public service events such as first aid trainings at festivals, others asked for more basic acknowledgement. The BDRT members we met all proudly wore their team shirts, but other volunteers reportedly did not receive t-shirts or identification even during responses.

Regular engagement and acknowledgement is an essential part of volunteer retention, especially for those only used during emergencies. While more regular training is a good way, there were other suggestions as well including social events, inter-division/district visits, and joint training across districts to foster a sense of belonging to the 'Red Cross family.'

### Coverage

- More trained volunteers & more resources are needed
- Branches can send & receive support between them, but logistics are a challenge
- Few staff & support-role volunteers and lack of funds & fundraising to meet operational needs
- DDRT – BDRT – NDRT – RDRT good idea but teams need more opportunity to engage & progress
- Under-used NDRT a missed opportunity to learn, share & harmonize disaster response approaches

The turnover in volunteers means that new volunteers are always needed, and they then need to be given orientation in SLRCS principles and practice and trained in the various aspects of disaster response. Nearly all internal informants said that resources to do this are limited, mostly due to a lack of funds. Funds are also lacking to purchase equipment and supplies needed for disaster response. Items often mentioned included boats, communications and relief items.

Some branches do have enough volunteers or equipment that they are willing to provide to other branches during disasters, but often the receiving branch can then struggle to accommodate and absorb the support. A few cases of branches sharing funds with others were noted as very helpful, though it did not seem to be coordinated through HQ. The national office has very limited funds to provide support to branches, other than project funds secured as part of emergency appeals or other donations.

Across almost all branches visited, and reportedly at most others there is a very small staff and limited budget to meet the core operational costs of running the branch or preparing for disasters. Few seem to use volunteers in day-to-day support functions not related to direct programme activities. Most staff at both HQ and branch levels report sometimes feeling overloaded with work.

Several offices have tried or are trying a variety of fundraising activities, including collection of donations at festivals and public events, fee-for-service First Aid training, renting of SLRCS-owned building spaces to unrelated business, and allowing billboard advertising on external walls. SLRCS has also negotiated an innovative deal with the private sector to fund construction of a new HQ on SLRCS land that will provide a stream of rental income.

Most offices however report the leadership being too busy for, not sufficiently knowledgeable about, or even not very interested in developing better fund-raising strategies. Given the oft-repeated complaint regarding lack of funding, this seems self-defeating. Only one branch was reportedly very successful in fund-raising, for

example developing corporate sponsorships and private donation campaigns, and offering professional disaster preparedness services for businesses, resorts and other corporate clients.

The Sri Lanka volunteer mobilization mechanisms of DDRT, BDRT and NDRT (and the IFRC Regional Disaster Response Team – RDRT) are reportedly able to cover most response capacity needs, and there is a process for progression through the levels as experience and training allows. Training has been infrequent for the NDRT, but the mechanism has not been used very often or at any scale so there is not seen to be much need for new members, leading to further cutbacks in the training schedule and budget. Though NDRT training is now a prerequisite for RDRT applications, this reduction in NDRT training has reportedly created a ‘blockage in the pipeline’ for volunteers keen and able to progress to NDRT and eventually the RDRT – not helping retention rates. The lack of refresher trainings or practical field experience for NDRT members has likely limited their readiness to respond if, and when they are called upon.

Opinions varied on why the NDRT has not been used much. Some felt there was a reluctance of branches to acknowledge the need to call or accept help from HQ, others that it would be another burden during an already stressed time, and others simply that enough local capacity already existed (including some NDRT members able to respond at their own branch as part of the BDRT). Many saw NDRT members as individuals sent to do useful tasks that locals don’t have the time for, rather than as a support system that brings ideas, resources and tools for a stronger branch response. It is however not clear that enough capacity exists at most branches visited. HQ leadership does reportedly try to coordinate the identification of capacity gaps and placement of NDRT members to fill them, but there are no checklists or other tools used.

Under-use of the NDRT is also a missed opportunity to drive learning, sharing and harmonizing of SLRCS disaster response approaches using the HQ-level contingency plans, frameworks, SOPs and other guidance. NDRT members could be more than just someone to ‘fill a seat’ or do an assigned task during disasters. As trained ‘representatives’ of the national level systems, NDRT members could learn from, train and help the branches to adopt good practices. This could also be done between disasters when people have more time.

#### *Efficiency / Effectiveness / Accountability*

- Good coordination with govt. & partners, but not all stakeholders understand SLRCS’s legal ‘auxiliary’ role
- Strong leadership, but not always clear/effective use of governance/executive & volunteers/staff roles
- Response systems not always consistent for mobilization of volunteers and the response itself
- Mostly timely & effective volunteer mobilization – new technologies help & could be expanded
- Need more pre-positioning of equipment & stocks with infrastructure, systems & training to manage it
- SLRCS is well-appreciated & trusted by communities

During disaster response, SLRCS reportedly coordinates well with and is appreciated by government authorities at all levels, from national Disaster Management Committee to local committees set up with or by GN representatives, as well as partner organizations. Such coordination helps determine the locations and activities for SLRCS to cover to avoid gaps and duplication with others. Some authorities and volunteers however, especially at field level seemed to lack of understanding of SLRCS’s unique status as auxiliary to government<sup>4</sup> as distinct from other humanitarian organizations. Though this legally-mandated role appears in national legislation under the ‘Red Cross Act’, but this information has not reached all relevant stakeholders at local levels. It seems that more education and discussion could be done to ensure SLRCS’s principles including independence of action are safeguarded and applied.


SLRCS leadership of and internal coordination between field volunteers, staff and governance is reportedly generally effective, though some cases were reported where roles were not clear and led to confusion and frustrations in decision-making and mobilization. The national governance system developed for parallel volunteer-management and staffing structures was not always implemented in the branches and may anyway

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<sup>4</sup> See <https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/document/guide-auxiliary-role-red-cross-red-crescent-national-societies-asia-pacific-2/>

not be the most effective method during disasters. At least one branch independently developed an ‘emergency commander’ role delegated directly responsible for coordinating all aspects of the response – a mechanism widely used in most other disaster management agencies globally. As reported earlier, the inconsistent awareness or use of SLRCS emergency response documents also meant the effectiveness of mobilization of volunteers and the response itself was dependent on local relationships and capacities.

Despite the above challenges, most informants considered the 2016 and 2017 volunteer mobilizations and relief responses to be timely & effective. The few cases where NDRT members were deployed were also considered successful, appreciated mostly after they demonstrated their value. In some cases, new technologies such as drones helped and could usefully be expanded, along with better communications.



SLRCS volunteers were appreciated and recognised for their quick deployment and response, and sometimes to remote areas (Photo credit: Evaluation team)

Most respondents also mentioned the need for more and more-local pre-positioning of response equipment & relief stocks along with the infrastructure, systems and training to manage it. More motorised rescue boats were purchased in 2017 and can now be seen hanging ready inside some branches, whereas in 2016 one groups of volunteers had to make rafts from banana tree trunks and barrels – showing resourcefulness, but probably not the most secure or speedy means of transport during floods.

All local informants and beneficiaries stressed how much they appreciate and trust SLRCS for its disaster response and other activities, including the fact that it can be faster to respond than the government. The close coordination, use of local volunteers, and capacity of the BDRT are all clearly factors in that success.

### Impact

- Dedicated volunteers & staff are the foundation of the SLRCS response
- Impact improves each time – relationships built then enable faster & better responses
- Knowledge, attitudes & practices must be the best, so leverage local, national & global talent
- IFRC should also continue local & RDRT support

This evaluation has not looked at the impact of relief supplies distributed or activities conducted, but project reports show that SLRCS has provided considerable amounts of both to disaster-affected populations. Volunteers and staff are clearly dedicated to the disaster response and programmes of SLRCS, from senior leadership to local field workers. The positive impacts SLRCS has on disaster-affected communities is to a large extent because of that dedication and effort, likely as much as the relief itself.

Many informants consider the responses to have had more impact each time and believe they will continue to do so. Certainly, the coordination mechanisms, relationships and community trust established will enable faster and more effective responses next time leading to greater short-term impact, as well as laying the foundation for longer-term impact.

All volunteers and staff would benefit from more training to increase impact, but SLRCS has a large pool of talent to draw on, including from local, national and global offices. The DDRT & BDRT are reportedly well trained to respond, as is the NDRT but its team members could also be used to build capacity to increase their impact on both the organization and the responses.

IFRC already provides welcome support directly in country, from regional offices, and via deployment of RDRT members and other experts. It can further increase its impact by building more capacity of SLRCS systems and staff for mobilization and response, including volunteer recruitment, retention and recognition.

### *Connectedness and Sustainability*

- SLRCS is well connected to government, but possibly could do more to ensure its sustainability
- Volunteers & members are key to access, success & long-term impact – a major comparative advantage
- Expand community DRR, preparedness & early warning to engage teams & improve sustainability
- Use increased profile to raise recruitment & core funding with coordinated national & branch campaigns

SLRCS's auxiliary role to government enables it to partner with and receive support from the government for organizational capacity development – provision of government land for facilities being one example. There should also be opportunities for joint training and shared resources that don't seem to be explored as much. While care must be taken to maintain independence and neutrality, it could be explored whether to use military assets to speed and scale up deployment of personnel and supplies without incurring significant costs that SLRCS currently struggles to meet.

SLRCS's volunteers and members also offer a major comparative advantage over other humanitarian organizations because they are key to community and stakeholder access including both government and private sectors, and they can successfully deliver relief and services at scale with minimal cost. Where they can be retained and developed, community-based volunteers and members are able to deliver long-term impact. SLRCS seems to recognise this and is apparently increasingly seeking longer-term impact such as with public health and livelihood programmes.

More seemingly could be done using trained volunteers to lead or support community-based Disaster-Risk Reduction (DRR), emergency preparedness, and support to early warning systems through dissemination of information. Many national societies are leaders in this in their own countries. In Sri Lanka this could help communities become more resilient and increase sustainability of impacts. Moreover, it would engage disaster response team volunteers more regularly in a wider range of rewarding activities. Volunteer retention and skills would both improve, and the increased visibility for SLRCS would help recruitment and fundraising.

While this evaluation did not set out to review fundraising capacity, most informants suggested that a lack of funding is one of the main constraints for SLRCS success and sustainability, so there is a need for coordinated national and branch level fundraising campaigns, in which volunteers and their mobilization systems can both contribute and benefit.

### **Objective 2: Assess the effectiveness of the Cash Based Interventions (CBI) conducted**

#### *Relevance and Appropriateness*

- Functional markets were generally known to be safely accessible after disasters
- CBI widely accepted by govt. & community, and basic needs amount was harmonized with stakeholders
- Livelihood grant (LHG) amount considered appropriate, though not based on market assessment
- Bank appropriate, though documents a challenge – are other mechanisms too costly or lack coverage?
- Voucher pilot reported as success but was overly complex & likely not justified by perceived risk of UCT

Cash Based Interventions (CBI) is widely considered relevant and appropriate to disaster response in Sri Lanka. Though little specific feasibility assessment was done for the 2016 or 2017 projects, the market economy is strong, and SLRCS and other had already been using CBI for some time so knew that affected populations generally have safe access to functional markets after disasters.

CBI is widely accepted by communities and most government stakeholders with little concern about creating dependency or other negative impacts. The concerns expressed, and resistance reported mostly relate to the small number of beneficiaries receiving such desirable assistance rather than CBI itself.

CBI was mainly given in one of two ways – as a one-time 'unconditional cash transfer' (UCT) for basic needs, or as a 'livelihood grant' (LHG) in two instalments to help restart small business or skilled trades. The LHG was conditional in that beneficiaries needed to attend training and/or begin activity before receiving each

instalment. It is unclear whether PDM done by SLRCS asked specifically about appropriateness of CBI, but Both modalities were considered by the evaluation informants and FGD participants, and found by this review, to be appropriate for their intended purpose.

The UCT amount of 10,000 Sri Lanka Rupees (LKR) was in-line with both a government disaster grant scheme and the agreement by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) based on typical family (5 persons) needs for a 'Minimum Expenditure Basket' (MEB) of essential items. Though this review did not look at the research on the MEB itself, the deliberate harmonization of transfer amounts with others is anyway appropriate.

The reasoning for the LHG amounts of 56,000 LKR (CHF 400) in 2016 was not clearly defined or understood by most informants and reportedly was based on a combination of a 'fair amount' and available budget rather than detailed market assessment of the likely items needed (or harmonization with other comparable projects of which there appear to be very few). A national govt-published Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA)<sup>5</sup> report published before the 2016 LHG project started suggested that 50,000 LKR would be appropriate for livelihood recovery for those self-employed in agriculture, but that those in non-agricultural livelihoods would need up to 100,000 LKR, and all would need at least that for a resilient recovery. It is therefore not clear how the final amount used was defined and whether it was justified. Given the availability and use of credit, the transfer amounts could also have considered debt repayment needs but that was reportedly considered not acceptable to stakeholders. Some amount could have also been allocated to other basic needs, but funds were already limited.

A lesser amount of 50,000 LKR in 2017 was reportedly due to 'rounding down' while taking advantage of local exchange rate changes to allocate a smaller donor funding budget per recipient (i.e. 345 CHF). It is not clear that any assessment was done for change in market prices, though presumably exchange rate changes do impact local prices given to Sri Lanka's dependence on imports for many items.

CBI guidelines developed in 2017 suggest the assistance given should be based on an assessment of what a business/tradesperson needed to restart rather than a flat amount. If some needed less that could allow limited project funds to cover more beneficiaries.

Regardless of the amount given, most beneficiaries and other informants thought it was generally appropriate, though most said that more money for more people would have been better. Some felt that smaller amounts could have been enough, at least for some if that allowed more beneficiaries to be helped.

The transfer mechanism chosen was bank deposits directly from SLRCS's bank to beneficiaries' accounts in their own banks. This was considered by all beneficiaries and other informants as acceptable and low cost, and is seen by this review as appropriate, though there is a recognised problem of some beneficiaries having lost or lacking bank books or national identification (ID) cards.

Other mechanisms were reportedly considered, but available e-card and mobile-banking systems were thought to have too expensive service fees and not enough coverage in rural areas. Mobile money for basic purchases is not widely available or used so like regular banking is reliant on the presence of bank agents.

A small pilot basic needs CBI project was designed in 2017 as a practical exercise following a CBI training. Community consultation apparently raised concerns of misuse of unconditional cash. Market assessment found vendors willing in principle to redeem vouchers presented by beneficiaries, but most declined due to concerns about the cost of stock needed and the process of voucher reconciliation and reimbursement. SLRCS went ahead with a basic needs voucher programme with one larger urban supermarket (likely not often used by beneficiaries), to which they made a large advance deposit. Selected beneficiaries were distributed paper vouchers and allotted specific times to come to the shop, where staff and volunteers would closely monitor the process of redemption.

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<sup>5</sup> Sri Lanka Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, Sri Lanka Ministry of Disaster Management, May 2016, ISBN 978-955-9417-57-6

The voucher programme was reported by SLRCS informants as a success, though it was not then repeated when CBI was again done in 2018. While useful as a training exercise, this review however finds it the voucher programme was probably not as appropriate as UCT would have been given the complexity, limited and possibly not suitable choice of vendors, and amount of staff and volunteers involved. Later discussion with beneficiaries did not raise concerns of misuse, and most would have preferred UCT.

### Coverage

- Geographic targeting based mostly on govt. information/direction with less SLRCS strategic control
- Small number of beneficiaries due to limited funds sometimes created initial resistance but no conflict
- 2016 beneficiaries mostly selected by govt., but 2017 beneficiary selection was more independent while still done in appropriate collaboration with local authorities
- Validation of local govt. beneficiary list – inclusion errors avoided but not sure about exclusion errors
- Appropriate vulnerability criteria known & used, including intent & experience for livelihood grants

As described above under objective 1 (specifically effectiveness), SLRCS coordinates with partners and government to define locations for SLRCS to mobilize volunteers and respond to avoid gaps and duplication. Geographic coverage of UCT and LHG CBI programmes are similarly coordinated, but also seem to be overly directed by the government rather than according to SLRCS contingency plan and other strategic guidance to operate in sectors where it has experience, expertise and the necessary resources, and including to try to work in contiguous areas rather than in widely dispersed interventions.

Some district authorities did assign SLRCS to the most affected divisions, while others directed SLRCS to assist the most vulnerable in every affected district making it difficult to implement. Being slow to ‘come to the table with resources’ was also reportedly sometimes a problem that left SLRCS ‘getting what was left’ rather than being strategic in its choice of locations for effective coverage.

The small number of beneficiaries that SLRCS was able to offer to help reportedly sometimes led to initial resistance from local authorities to accepting any CBI assistance due to fear of community complaints. Usually these were resolved after explanations of the selection process and criteria. No inter-community or intra-community conflicts were reported because of CBI, to the credit of both SLRCS and local authorities.

Beneficiaries for the 2016 CBI were reportedly mostly chosen by local authorities (the GN) with little independent verification by SLRCS staff or volunteers in some places. Reasons cited for this included not having internal selection processes, a lack of knowledge/experience, or simple reliance/trust in the government. The evaluation team considers this over-reliance a concern. The process was recognised as significantly improved in 2017 when SLRCS introduced community meetings to explain the process and criteria, and then consistent procedures to verify and validate eligibility of those on the lists provided. Appropriate verification included house visits and interviews with all nominated beneficiaries, then public posting of selected beneficiary lists for community comment. Any complaints raised through this public feedback process were discussed and changes done in partnership with local authorities, and the final lists then endorsed by local and divisional representatives (typically the Divisional Secretary). For the 2017 livelihood project there were reportedly additional community committees appropriately involved in the selection process.

The verification process was likely effective in reducing ‘inclusion error’ – i.e. beneficiaries not properly eligible, but because it is based on the original list provided by the GN there is still a risk of ‘exclusion error’ whereby marginalised populations or otherwise non-favoured households could be missed. Staff, volunteers and beneficiaries spoken to said this was not a problem as they place a lot of trust in local authorities and believe that anyone missed would find out and complain to SLRCS. Indeed, no cases were reported to us.

Because of the system of land registration, the GN reportedly knows all households in their area, but we believe it only applies to home/land owners. Families renting property or otherwise not registered could still be missed, especially in urban environments where there are apparently a lot of migrant workers or poorer households. When questioned, staff and volunteers said that such people would “return home after a disaster

and so not need assistance” but that seems a simplistic response – surely those without property, assets or legal resident status might be among the most vulnerable or affected.

The vulnerability criteria used for verification of beneficiary eligibility were well known, used in line with project guidelines, and appropriate. They included impact of disaster, income/assets, disability or illness, family size, and female-headed households (assuming there are few single male heads of family). The LHG CBI projects appropriately included additional criteria of experience and interest in business or skilled trade.

### *Efficiency / Effectiveness / Accountability*

- CBI reportedly met targets & objectives, found via baseline & end-line assessments not yet seen
- UCT relatively rapid, but some delays for govt. endorsement of final beneficiary lists
- LHG took too long to begin, but beneficiaries also said if too soon would be spent on other priorities
- 2016 CBI had no formal guidelines & some 2017 CBI guidelines were not often understood or followed
- Beneficiaries overall satisfied with process and support, and most were successful
- LH grant most successful for existing LH in existing locations, less for new settlement or new business
- Market support needed, and partnerships with govt. but staff are limited & volunteers not used much
- Complaint mechanisms used only for selection, though all selection complaints reportedly well-resolved
- Monitoring & evaluation/lessons learned - need end-line assessments in addition to ODK data collected
- Beneficiary data privacy & protection practices need to be strengthened

### *Efficiency*

SLRCS CBI projects reportedly met their objectives and beneficiary number targets, and in 2016 increased its original target from 600 families to 690 families. Some baseline assessments were reportedly conducted, though the evaluation team did not see any data, and it is not clear if end-line assessments were consistently done. Request for assessments were not met as of the time of this writing.

Distribution of unconditional cash transfers (UCT) were relatively rapid considering the post-disaster context, but it seems there were some delays in processing payments. Local and divisional authorities complained to evaluators that they were of course too busy during the response, and yet they still expected organizations to submit beneficiary lists for review and approval, which SLRCS dutifully did. Some branches were able to get approval quickly, others apparently not. HQ finance also required such government endorsement before agreeing to process payments but is not clear if this was a government policy or simply SLRCS internal controls. Either way it would have helped to have a more streamlined process.

One further specific delay reported was when SLRCS held payments until an official ceremony could be organized with government representatives and beneficiaries (and presumably the media). While this likely provided useful visibility otherwise lacking with bank transfers, it might have better been organized as an appreciation event after the fact, as was done with some livelihood CBI.

Implementation of (conditional) livelihood grants (LHG) was very slow to begin – often more than six months after the disaster, but in some cases, it was almost a year before the grants were given. Once started, the process seemed reasonably quick, with orientation and training followed by beneficiary submission of plans, payment of first instalment, inspection of progress (and in some cases more training), and then payment of the final (second) instalment.

While beneficiaries met did not (or were not willing to) complain about the timing, they did say it would have been better if done sooner. One group said that during the delay the market prices for supplies had gone up, so the grant was less helpful than it could have been. Market price monitoring would have identified if this was a significant problem but does not appear to have been done.

When asked, beneficiaries also said that if they had received the LHG too soon they (or others) would likely have spent it on other priority needs. A more effective project timing balancing immediate impact and mid-term needs would have been preferable. Another option not explored, or at least not described, was to

provide both UCT and LHG to the same beneficiaries at the same or near-same time so that one complements the other and reduces the risk of unintended use of the LHG (including debt repayment).

### Effectiveness

The 2016 CBI was done without specific CBI guidelines, though some staff say they had prior CBI experience from the tsunami-response and other programmes. Each branch seemed to implement the LHG activities in slightly different ways in terms of the use of volunteers and staff, the number and content of trainings, the use of government or private-sector trainers, and whether single full-amount payments were ever allowed for purchase of larger assets. According to beneficiaries and other informants however, all projects seemed reasonably effective.

By 2017 there were some CBI guidelines prepared with IFRC support which seemed to formalise the approaches used in 2016 as well as bring good practice from elsewhere. The guidelines were not always well understood or followed, possibly because they may have been developed ‘from the top-down’ without enough input from the field. For example, the guidelines outlined the need of branches to keep an Excel sheet of beneficiary details – a simple process which some did not follow. Another suggestion not often followed was that beneficiaries be given different amounts based on need up to a maximum amount and be asked to invest some of their own income, savings or credit into the business. While that would have required more work, it might have possibly been more effective in that more beneficiaries could be helped, and beneficiaries would have more personal stake in the business. There is very little evidence that it was ever done, but again business success rates were mostly good for the beneficiaries that did receive support.

The main reason where LHG was not very effective was when beneficiaries were encouraged to start new or diversified businesses, or to restart in new locations. For example, a group of landslide-affected farmers and others moved by the government into new housing settlements and given CBI support to start businesses then faced the dual challenge of learning a new business and identifying suppliers and customers in unfamiliar markets not in the settlement. This was foreseen in the previously mentioned 2016 PDA report which states that “the 733 families affected by landslides needs to relocate their agriculture livelihoods. It is expected that this would happen in medium term at an estimated cost of LKR 500,000 per affected family and would need another LKR 100,000 per person in the long run.”



Some affected population in Kegalle were relocated to new locations as landslides rendered their original homes uninhabitable (**Photo credit: Evaluation team**)

New or dislocated business such as those described above would also require far more support, including ‘market interventions’ such as trader fairs to connect buyers and sellers and/or subsidies for transportation. Such trader fairs were sometimes done for other beneficiaries, to reported success and appreciation. Market support such as these however require a lot of staff time and effort as well as liaison with local agricultural or economic development officers. Local government officers spoken to were keen on such partnerships, but also stressed their lack of time and resources, particularly in the short- to mid-term after disasters.

For both 2016 and 2017 CBI projects some field staff also complained there was too much work – again related to lack of staff budget, but it seems trained volunteers could also have been used better to support and leverage the efforts of staff. As described in objective 1, a larger cohort of trained CBI and market support volunteer field workers would also boost livelihood sustainability.

## Accountability

Though CBI beneficiary selection allowed for some community input, there were no specific beneficiary or community complaint and feedback mechanisms used during implementation of the project (the earlier complaint boxes were removed). In some cases, office phone numbers were published but apparently no processes were in place to confidentially and efficiently receive, document or respond to feedback. Informants said there were rarely if any complaints, but that could of course be a result of the lack of confidential mechanisms.

Monitoring and evaluation of projects also seemed ad hoc. Some Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) was reportedly done and data collected using 'Open Data Kit' (ODK) systems, but we did not see much evidence of systematic end-line assessments or after-action reviews or other learning approaches. At least one informant also said that ODK while useful, can be difficult to use with network difficulties. Given that CBI is still relatively new for many staff of SLRCS and global good practice has been changing so rapidly, a thorough lessons learned process would ensure effectiveness was maximised. Hopefully this evaluation will help. SLRCS and IFRC has also started a joint cash working group that will incorporate all the lessons learned to draft out strategic guidelines for future use of CBI.

As it typical of CBI, SLRCS collected a lot of information on beneficiaries including IDs and banking details as used for payments. Photocopies are taken by field staff and sent to HQ for processing, however these and other branch beneficiary files were not always secure. Such personal information and documents should be kept private, secured, only seen by those with an official need, and then destroyed after use. It is not apparent that any system was in place for this, so this review found that data privacy and protection within SLRCS needs strengthening.

## Impact

- Short-term impacts were positive for most beneficiaries; some also able to grow or diversify incomes
- No reported negative impact on communities or markets, and very few reports of misuse of cash

Beneficiaries of unconditional cash transfers (UCT) reported positive short-term impact in that it covered their basic needs for a short period and enabled them to begin to recover. Purchases reported include food, medicines, school supplies and transport. One beneficiary was even reported to have used the entire amount to purchase a coffin for her husband killed in the disaster. Since the grant was one-time only, some may struggle to continue meeting basic needs, but government social welfare systems are also available.

Beneficiaries of livelihood grants (LHG) also reported positive impacts including recovered and sometimes increased income, and sometimes a more diversified income allowing for more resilience to economic shocks. Successful beneficiaries from the 2016 CBI already show a mid-term positive impact, but for 2017 beneficiaries it might still be too soon to assess.

Importantly, no negative impacts were reported – for example no community or household conflict and no increase in prices attributable to CBI, and few cases were reported of 'misuse' for non-intended purposes. These are issues that should be planned for and closely followed during and after implementation, and though it is not clear this was done, our review found no problems.



The livelihood cash grant was generally considered a success as many beneficiaries were able to recover and some were even able to diversify their livelihoods. **(Photo credit: Evaluation team)**

### Connectedness and Sustainability

- IFRC training on CBI was useful but more is needed, especially on response options analysis
- Lessons learned need to be defined by SLRCS to improve future programmes
- Visibility of CBI could be increased to boost the sustainability of SLRCS programmes & operations
- CBI often well connected with govt. – seen as good model picked up by some local govt. LH departments, but more could be done to ensure sustainability and resilience
- Opportunity to connect with govt. social welfare systems

SLRCS is well connected to and supported by IFRC both through the local Colombo office and reportedly from the country cluster and regional offices. CBI training provided by IFRC was useful, but more is needed particularly on response options analysis. This could include market assessment and analysis including use of market interventions, delivery mechanism assessments, service provider negotiations, and risk analysis.

Learning lessons from past programmes could help improve responses rather than repeating the same activities. Livelihood grants especially can be developed for more effect as described above and more long-term sustainability as described below. CBI can be a very powerful tool if complemented with effective support – something increasingly known as ‘cash plus.’

Much of the programmatic and operational improvements possible or needed by SLRCS require more resources for projects, and more ‘core’ funds to develop systems, staff and volunteer capacity. As discussed above in objective 1, fundraising often requires positive ‘visibility’ or a high profile to attract potential partners and donors. The nature of CBI is that it is not typically as visible as in-kind or first-aid, especially when bank transfers are used. Some attempts were made, but SLRCS could have done more. Even the form of e-card

delivery mechanisms where feasible could be used as visibility, with service fees offset by sponsorship for example. Senior management has good ideas that could be supported by governance.

SLRCS livelihood grant (LHG) projects often partnered with local government technical units to provide business training for beneficiaries. Reportedly some governments see it as a good model to replicate, including those spoken with who were not closely involved. Though still only small scale, SLRCS could have been more deliberate in this, and connected more at district and national levels as well.

Even with the training provided, LHG beneficiaries were mostly left to decide which part of their business or income to restart or diversify. While this supports dignity of choice (an important aspect of CBI), results were not necessarily sustainable. Particularly in disaster prone areas there was a recognised need to diversify into new crops or products to ensure livelihoods are more resilient. There could have been more help in making better-informed decisions in partnership with local authorities. Projects could even have prioritised which types of livelihoods to support to maximise the use of CBI to best community advantage.

Finally, Sri Lanka reportedly has a variety of government and civil-society social welfare and insurance schemes. SLRCS could have explored connections with those for its past or future CBI projects. Much work is being done in the global CBI community on strategies for such integration.

## Conclusions

SLRCS is rightfully proud of its recent record of responding to disasters, its dedicated and competent volunteers and staff, and its trust and reputation among communities, government and other stakeholders.

The 2016 and 2017 flood operations were able to rapidly assist affected communities with rescue and first aid services, camp management support, and provision of immediate basic needs including via unconditional cash transfers. Coordination with national and local authorities and partners was strong, though in some cases it seemed the necessary independence of the SLRCS was not clearly understood by local authorities.

SLRCS has worked positively on clarifying and strengthening both its emergency response procedures and its governance and operations structures, though more is still needed on awareness and institutionalisation. A major obstacle remains securing and effectively allocating funding for core operational capacity including staff, equipment and infrastructure. Mechanisms for deploying expert volunteers, in particular the National Disaster Response Team (NDRT) could be strengthened and used more proactively.

Cash Based Interventions (CBI) have been overall successful in meeting the basic needs and/or livelihood recovery need of selected beneficiaries, though not always in a timely manner but with particular delays in livelihood recovery. Beneficiary selection, feedback and data protection processes all need strengthening, and monitoring and evaluation for lesson learned could improve. Livelihood recovery projects need to find ways to scale up while making the most effective use of funds for sustainable outcomes.

SLRCS volunteers and staff seem committed to improving the impact they have on affected populations, so the evaluation team is confident that with enough support they will be able to use the findings from this review to implement the recommendations to great effect.

## Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The following lessons learned and recommendations all draw on and should be read in conjunction with the detailed comments in the *Findings* section above. They are grouped by objective, but otherwise do not use the same order of specific evaluation criteria, in some cases relating to more than one. Within the objective, the recommendations are ranked in the general order of importance as considered by the evaluation team.

### Objective 1: Mobilization of volunteers & staff for emergencies

SLRCS is generally able to rapidly mobilize trained volunteers at branch, division and local level though much seems to depend on the differing local capacity of branch systems, governance/leadership volunteers and

staff. While SLRCS rightly emphasizes volunteer leadership of the organization and responses, recognition of the need and funding for core operational capacity of staff, equipment and infrastructure to support preparedness and response is a challenge at all levels. Fundraising overall is weak though many ideas exist.

Coordination with government is strong, though not all stakeholders understand the SLRCS mandate and role. Emergency response strategies, guidance documents and procedures exist at national level, but do not seem to be consistently known or used elsewhere. National mechanisms to deploy well-trained volunteers and staff are not used very much – also a missed opportunity to harmonize emergency response systems.

Other volunteers could benefit from more training, including psychosocial support, but a big challenge is retention, though there are opportunities to broaden the range of volunteers and engage them all more.

#### Recommendation 1: Strengthen funding for core operations in support of volunteer capacity

- Increase overall fundraising capacity and performance at national and branch levels to secure more unrestricted donations, sponsorships and fee-for-service income in addition to just project grants
- Consider focus on mandate-related campaigns or business to increase and protect the SCLR profile
- Invest in and allocate more budget to core operational capacity such as staff, equipment and infrastructure to support preparedness and response by volunteer leadership and field teams

#### Recommendation 2: Harmonize and strengthen disaster response systems

- Clarify and more consistently implement the legally-mandated role and independence of SLRCS with local authorities and communities as well as staff and volunteers
- Incorporate good practice from branches, HQ and IFRC to agree a common set of strategic guidance, standard operating procedures and tools applicable but adaptable to each response. Distinguish decision-making between normal operations and disaster response, and streamline financial, procurement and other SOPS and approvals during emergency response.
- Implement a consistent and effective disaster management decision-making process across all levels, and differentiate between governance and operational management roles in disaster response (even if the same person fills different roles at different times). An example might be the common approach of delegated ‘incident commander’ roles during disasters that are empowered to coordinate the overall operational response (with governance oversight), as currently done in at least one branch.
- Rollout systems and train all governance, field volunteers and staff in each location, with emphasis on decision-making and communication with volunteers and government by governance and staff

#### Recommendation 3: Use NDRT system more effectively

- Promote role of NDRT more as a support system that brings ideas, resources and tools for a stronger branch response, not just as individuals sent to do useful tasks that locals don’t have the time for
- Consider automatic deployment of NDRT members whenever national project or support funds are provided – might avoid perceived stigma of ‘having a capacity gap,’ and could help to oversee usage
- Proactively use NDRT members (and BDRT/RDRT) to support branch/unit/SLRCS disaster response system rollout and preparedness actions prior to disasters – would help harmonization and uptake of systems, and provide needed opportunities to keep NDRT members both engaged and up to date

#### Recommendation 4: Strengthen volunteer recruitment, training and retention

- Recruit adults and particularly retirees with community mobilization, social, professional or technical skills to help in preparedness, operations/office support, fee-for-service activities, and responses
- Train all volunteers in psychosocial needs awareness and support for affected populations (and themselves); Consider response teams trained to work on child-friendly spaces and other support
- Encourage, support and promote regular volunteer communication and engagement including social events, skills sharing and informal recognition to foster a sense of belonging and boost retention

## Objective 2: Effectiveness of Cash Based Interventions

SLRCS' Cash Based Interventions (CBI) were considered generally successful but there are opportunities to improve particularly for livelihood recovery. CBI was a relevant and appropriate response to meeting both basic needs and livelihood recovery objectives. Transfers were considered enough though the livelihoods amount was not based on needs assessment and staff did not always understand or follow guidelines.

Livelihood responses took considerable time to start and implement, and there were some delays in the payment process for emergency unconditional cash transfers (UCT) as well. Beneficiary selection seems overly driven by local authorities, risking exclusion errors and there are insufficient post-distribution complaint or feedback mechanisms. Data privacy and protection also needs to be strengthened.

### Recommendation 5: Strengthen CBI capacity

- Provide all SLRCS staff and project volunteers more CBI training, particularly on needs assessment and market analysis, as well as response options analysis, and delivery mechanisms analysis
- Finalise and operationalise the draft CBI guidelines and tools and ensure they are rolled out to all branches, volunteers and staff, and are implemented consistently and effectively

### Recommendation 6: Streamline CBI implementation to improve speed of response

- Respond sooner for future livelihood recovery needs, by for example organizing market assessments and partnerships in advance, streamlining design and funding approval processes, and beginning community engagement earlier in order to set realistic timelines for implementation
- Avoid unnecessary delays in beneficiary selection and payment by for example reducing the number and/or government seniority levels of certifications required and use delegated staff authorisation

### Recommendation 7: Strengthen data privacy and protection

- Strengthen the IT and data management policies, systems and capacity at all levels
- Ensure that beneficiaries give informed consent to collection of personal and banking details, and that data privacy and protection procedures are in place and staff trained, for example records are securely transmitted, use password-protected access, and are destroyed when no longer needed

### Recommendation 8: Strengthen monitoring processes

- Conduct ongoing project monitoring beyond initial Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM), as well as baseline and end-line assessments to capture short-term impacts and lessons learned
- Ensure ODK data collection systems are functional off-line for areas lacking network coverage

### Recommendation 9: Strengthen CBI beneficiary selection & feedback mechanisms

- Ensure enough independently-conducted assessment and community consultation to avoid exclusion risk of government-provided lists, in addition to verification of eligibility for inclusion
- Establish confidential complaint and feedback mechanisms for duration of project, not just during initial beneficiary selection, for example a dedicated toll-free phone line answered by trained staff

### Recommendation 10: Continue to expand and strengthen CBI livelihood programme

- Establish ongoing partnerships with government and private agricultural and economic development support services, to both prepare for future programmes and continue support to past beneficiaries
- Ensure livelihood recovery needs and costs are assessed and used to define appropriate transfer amounts, promote individual contributions, and consider tailoring transfers to the type of livelihood

## Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

### Final Evaluation of Sri Lanka Floods Operation 2016-2017

#### 1. SUMMARY

**Purpose:** The purpose of the evaluation is to assess SLRCS disaster preparedness and response capacities during the 2016 & 2017 flood operations; MDRLK005 and MDRLK006. Furthermore, effectiveness, timeliness, and impact of the cash transfer programmes implemented is also to be assessed.

**Audience:** SLRCS, IFRC, Other actual and future partners (e.g. Oxfam, John Keels Holdings, UNDP, Ministry of Disaster Management)

**Commissioner:** Head of Country Cluster Support Team (CCST) - Delhi

**Reporting to:** Operations Manager – IFRC Country Office Sri Lanka

**Duration:** 20 days

**Timeframe:** 16 September to 19 October 2018

**Location: DPRK:** Colombo, Sri Lanka; with field work in a representative number of flood/landslide affected districts based on agreement with SLRCS and IFRC. Districts to visit; Colombo, Gampaha, Kalurata, Kegalle and Matara.

#### 2. BACKGROUND

Sri Lanka is mostly affected by weather-related hazards. Floods mostly due to monsoonal rain or effects of low pressure systems and dry spells / droughts are the most common hazards experienced in Sri Lanka. The country is prone to hazards such as floods, landslides, lightning strikes, coastal erosion, epidemics and effects of environmental pollution. The large extent of the flooding in 2016 and 2017 was partially linked to the El Niño- Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which has affected the Asia and the Pacific region. In 2016, Sri Lanka was hit by a severe Tropical Cyclone Roanu, which affected 22 out of 25 districts in the country. Flood and landslide affected 428,000 people, at least 104 people reported dead, 99 remain missing, 4,000 houses were damaged and 600 houses were totally destroyed. In 2017, the activation of South-West Monsoon caused heavy rainfalls in the South-Eastern parts of the island. This triggered a major flood and landslide situation in the country affecting 15 districts. At least 658, 490 people were affected: 206 people died, 92 people remain missing, 1,713 houses fully destroyed and 9,284 houses were partially damaged. IFRC launched emergency appeals to assist people affected.

##### Flood and Landslide Operations 2016 – MDRLK005

The budget of the project is CHF 1,604,185 and aimed to assist: 40,000 people (8,000 families), which was extended to 27,500 people (5,500 families) with the revised appeal on 24 November 2017. The operation timeframe was from 20 May 2016 to 31 March 2018 was implemented in the worst affected districts: Colombo, Gampaha, Kegalle, Kurunegala and Puttlam.

Sri Lanka Red Cross Society (SLRCS) assisted approximately 140,000 flood-affected people in the initial relief phase. As the situation unfolded, SLRCS branches activated their community-based

disaster response teams (CBDRT or Village Disaster Management Committees) and branch disaster response teams (BDRTs), which supported the operations with more than 400 volunteers. Two National Disaster Response Team (NDRT) members deployed to Kegalle to support Kegalle branch with its response.

Along the first phase of relief distributions, the focus of the branches was on health and WASH with its medical camps (mobile clinics), well cleaning as well as RFL activities. SLRCS held First Aid Camps throughout the districts to inundated victims. In medical camps patients were treated for cuts, bruises and other injuries sustained with the severe flood condition. SLRCS also provided additional relief efforts such as food distribution and addition Non-Food Items (NFI) with bilateral support from International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), Partner National Societies (PNS) and external partnerships outside the scope of this emergency appeal. The government assigned four camps to the SLRCS to manage in Kegalle – namely Pallepamunuwa and Narangammana in Aranayake DS division and Thunbage and Kalupahanawatta in Bulathkohupitiya DS division. SLRCS provided first aid services at the camps through mobile clinics and water and sanitation support together with other partners. Well cleaning programme, medical camps and the house cleaning and disinfection activities were conducted in all the affected districts.

The recovery phase had a focus on livelihoods support. Implementation of the recovery shelter component was removed from the appeal, which was put on hold due to the lack of funds and that whereby affected families could apply for conditional grants for purchasing land and constructing houses provided by the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). A Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programme was implemented in three communities. Risk identified together with the community through Vulnerability Capacity Assessment (VCA). SLRCS revised its initial health and WASH plan de-prioritising construction of latrines. The programme focused on Community-Based Health and First Aid (CBHFA) and Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation (PHAST), which was implemented in three districts.

To enhance the institutional disaster response capacity, the appeal supported five BDRT trainings and three specialized trainings: assessment training, boat riding and camp management. Furthermore, ferry boats and rubber dingy boats were procured and prepositioned in disaster prone areas.

The appeal was extended for four months with the focus on SLRCS capacity enhancement on Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) and Health Disaster Risk Reduction programme with a focus on dengue prevention.

### **Flood Operations 2017 – MDRLK006**

The Operations budget of the project is CHF 1,793,739 and aims to assist 40,000 (8,000 families) in Matara, Kalutara, Galle, Ratnapura, Gampaha and Colombo from 25 May 2017 to 31 July 2018.

SLRCS assisted approximately 100,000 flood-affected people in the initial relief phase. As the situation unfolded, SLRCS branches activated their CBDRT or Village Disaster Management Committees and branch disaster response teams (BDRTs) which supported the operation with more than 400 volunteers.

The following activities were conducted in the initial relief phase; first aid services, medical camps, well cleaning, hygiene promotion, house cleaning, distribution of NFRI, and Restoring Family Links (RFL).

After the initial relief phase, the focus of activities moved to early recovery/recovery phase, in the four most affected districts (Kalutara, Ratnapura, Galle and Matara).

Under the early recovery/recovery following activities were conducted: unconditional cash grant of LKR 10,000 (CHF 69) for 800 beneficiaries, NFRI procurement, livelihood cash grant programme to assist 400 families with LKR 50,000 (CHF 345), and to enhance National Societies (NS) preparedness for response by conducting trainings for volunteers and staff.

A Shelter Coordination team of three staff (Coordinator, Information Management-IM and national staff IM coordinator) was deployed from 2 June to 30 November 2017. They provided coordination services in support of the Sri Lanka government for the shelter sector and assessed the local context for defining an adequate sectoral response.

Upon successful completion of the planned activities, and with the savings due to exchange fluctuations (rupee depreciation) an extension of the timeframe was requested until 31 July 2018. The main focus during the period will be on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) aspect.

### **SLRCS disaster response mechanism**

During disasters SLRCS is in the forefront providing assistance to affected people. The strength of SLRCS is its branch network spread across 25 districts of the country and the strong volunteer base. SLRCS volunteers are multi skilled; they are trained on First Aid, Disaster Management, Health etc. Most of them are members of the Branch Disaster Response Teams (BDRT) and some are members of the National Disaster Response Team (NDRT), who will be deployed during disasters.

The following documents provide guidance to SLRCS governance, volunteers and staff:

- National Contingency Plan
- SLRCS Disaster Response Framework
- Standard Operation Procedure (SoP) for flood response

## **3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

### **3.1 Purpose**

This evaluation will assess SLRCS disaster preparedness and response capacities during the 2016 & 2017 flood operations, with special focus on mobilizing trained volunteers (BDRT and NDRT) and staff for emergency operations. Particular focus will be given to cash interventions; CTP, as well as the other areas of focus providing recommendations on how this capacity can be further strengthened at both SLRCS headquarters and district levels.

### **3.2 Scope**

The evaluation will be conducted focusing on the 2016 and 2017 flood operations focusing at operations area in Colombo, Gampaha, Kalurata, Kegalle and Matara. SLRCS, IFRC, other partners; Oxfam and John Keels Holdings, Government Authorities, community leaders, beneficiaries will be the target group.

## **4. OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA**

### **4.1 Objectives**

The evaluation will be conducted to assess the SLRCS disaster preparedness and response capacities during the 2016 & 2017 flood operations at the national headquarters and branch levels.

The main objectives of the evaluation:

- mobilizing trained volunteers (BDRT and NDRT) and staff for emergency operations.
- Identify the effectiveness of the cash transfer programmes conducted (emergency cash grant, livelihood cash grant, and pilot project), indicate areas for further improvement as the SLRCS has moved towards a better CTP.
- The evaluation should highlight good practice, lessons learnt and areas of improvement to inform future response operations, together with recommendations on how to proceed.

## 4.2 Criteria

The following criteria will be used to guide the evaluation recommendations:

- Relevance and appropriateness
- Coverage
- Efficiency / effectiveness / accountability
- Impact
- Connectedness and sustainability

## 4.3 Evaluation questions

The consultant and evaluation team will create specific questions linked to the above objectives. Recommendation of questions based on the criteria above are outlined in the Annex. Please note that sample questions need to be adjusted based on the situation /operation, in agreement with the evaluation management team (EMT), and outlined in the inception report.

## 5. METHODOLOGY

The methodology will adhere to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluations](#), with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted and utilized.

Interviewees will include SLRCS and IFRC personnel (e.g. managers, field officers, direct implementers, volunteers and community mobilizers), beneficiaries and potentially, other bi-lateral donors (Oxfam, John Keels Holdings), people who did not receive assistance.

The specific evaluation methodology will be detailed in close consultation between the review team, EMT, Commissioner and relevant key stakeholders, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

- **Desktop review** of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, including IFRC as well as SLRCS and National policies and SOPs, prior IFRC reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data, such exit surveys from IFRC participants in the operation.
- **Field visits/observations** to selected sites in the country.
- **Key informant interviews** (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate).
- **Focus group discussions** (institutional and beneficiaries) as time and capacity allow.

The detailed evaluation design is to be created by the external evaluation team; however, the following should be taken into account:

- **Sampling method** is to be decided by the evaluator, as long the final sample to be evaluated on includes both SLRCS and IFRC involved in the floods operation interventions, branches, sectors of the intervention and the 'most vulnerable' beneficiaries.
- **Data collection methods** and pace are to be decided by the evaluator, in consultation with the SLRCS and IFRC country office focal person(s), but should take into account the reality of difficult-to-reach districts.
- **The evaluation team should visit** a representative number of communities in the districts where the operations implemented; Colombo, Gampaha, Kalurata, Kegalle and Matara. The evaluation team will be responsible to clearly outline the support needs in-country. This will be agreed with SLRCS and IFRC based on resources available.

The team leader; external evaluator will need to work together with evaluation team member of IFRC/SLRCS.

## 6. OUTPUTS/DELIVERABLES

The review team will deliver the following outputs:

- a. **Inception Report:** The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the review and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team.
- b. **Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels:** The team will report its preliminary findings to the SLRCS and IFRC country office prior to leaving the country.
- c. **Draft report:** A draft report identifying key findings based on facts and will separate from the report opinions or rumours, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within three days after presenting the initial findings.
- d. **Final report:** The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned and clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final report will be submitted two days after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC. Details of the final report are outlined in the table below.

### Suggested final report outline

No.	Content	Description
01.	Executive Summary	Summarizes the overall findings of the evaluation with key conclusions and not more than 10 key recommendations. Executive Summary must be specific to the evaluation and clearly outline the specific context of the interventions.
02.	Background	Outlines the overall objectives, aims, intervention strategy, policy frameworks, targets, main stakeholders, financial frameworks, institutional arrangements.
03	Methodology	Outlines the overall approach used and the rationale why the approach used, the tools applied and the key assumptions. It will focus on consideration for relevance and sustainability, coverage, efficiency / effectiveness / accountability, impact and connectedness and sustainability in function of the internal and external issues.
04.	Findings	Outlines the findings of the evaluation.
05.	Conclusions	Outlines the main conclusions that have emerged from the findings
06.	Lessons learned and recommendations	Provides general overall recommendations, including on cross-cutting issues that affect not only the specific intervention.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his/her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

The draft and final reports will be submitted through the EMT, who will ensure the quality of the report providing input if necessary. The EMT will submit the report to the key stakeholders interviewed for review and clarifications. The Commissioner will oversee a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up

## 7. SCHEDULE

The evaluation is expected to be completed no more than 20 days, including submission of the final report. It is proposed to commence the evaluation on 16 September 2018 with the following schedule and deliverables:

Activity	Location	Days	Deliverables	Dates
Desk review, and develop and submit inception report	Home country	3	Inception report	16-18 Sep
Review and the Commissioner to approve the inception report				19-20 Sep
Briefing: Evaluation team with IFRC and SLRCS	Colombo	1		25 Sep
Key Informant Interviews (KII) with stakeholders	Colombo	2		26-27 Sep
In-country data collection and analysis	Colombo, Gampaha, Kalurata, Kegalle and Matara	7	Preliminary findings	28 Sep-4 Oct
Presentation of initial findings	Colombo	1		5 Oct
Prepare and submit draft report with annexes	Colombo	3	Draft report	6-8 Oct
Review of the draft report: SLRCS and IFRC submits any requests for clarifications, corrections, changes on the draft report				10-16 Oct
Finalize and submit final report with annexes	Home country	3	Final report	17-19 Oct
Final report approval by the Commissioner				
<b>Total days</b>		<b>20</b>		

## 8. EVALUATION MANAGEMENT TEAM

An evaluation management team will be appointed to manage and oversee the review, and ensure that it upholds the IFRC Framework for Evaluation. The management team will consist of two to three people from the IFRC, IFRC Sri Lanka country office and SLRCS.

## 9. EVALUATION QUALITY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable process outlined in the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#). The IFRC Evaluation standards are:

The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at: [www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp)

## 10. EVALUATION TEAM AND QUALIFICATIONS

The external evaluator (Team Leader) must have experience or significant knowledge of humanitarian response mechanisms, deployment of staff and volunteers, cash transfer programming, and previous experience in conducting external evaluations for medium-to-large scale programmes. The Team Leader will be supported by an evaluation team (2 to 3 persons) from SLRCS and IFRC who are not directly involved in the operation. The Team Leader will coordinate directly with the IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office and IFRC Sri Lanka Country Office. The Team Leader will coordinate directly with the EMT and IFRC Sri Lanka Country Office.

The consultant and the evaluation team should have the following characteristics:

- (For Team Leader) Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programmes responding to major disasters and preferably previous experience of conducting evaluation in Sri Lanka or South Asia.
- Knowledge of activities generally conducted by humanitarian organizations in the sectors of response, relief and cash transfer.
- Field experience in the evaluation of humanitarian or development programmes, with prior experience of evaluating Red Cross programmes desirable.

- Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner (examples of previous work).
- Previous experience in coordination, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian programmes.
- Ability to work within tight deadlines and manage with available resources.
- Fluent in spoken and written English.
- Strong interpersonal skills.
- All individuals of the evaluation team should have relevant degrees or equivalent experience.
- Availability for the time period indicated.

## 11. APPLICATION PROCEDURES

Interested candidates/teams should submit their expression of interest to [radhika.fernando@ifrc.org](mailto:radhika.fernando@ifrc.org) and [pmer.apzo@ifrc.org](mailto:pmer.apzo@ifrc.org) by **25 June 2018**. In the subject line, please state the position you are applying for, your surname and first name. (SUBJECT: Final Evaluation of Sri Lanka Floods 2016-2017 - Last Name, First Name).

The application should include:

1. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing experience of the consultant team leader as it pertains to this assignment, daily rate, and contact details for three professional referees
2. **Curricula Vitae**
3. At least one and up to **two samples of previous written work** similar to that described in this Term of Reference (previous evaluations and reviews completed).

Application materials are non-returnable. We thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted.

## 12. APPENDICES (TO BE PRESENTED AFTER APPOINTMENT)

1. Package of Reference Documents for MDRLK005 & MDRLK006
2. Following SLRCS documents; National Contingency Plan, SLRCS Disaster Response Framework, and Standard Operation Procedure for flood response (SoP)
3. Stakeholders list.

### 13. ANNEX 1

The following criteria will be used to guide the evaluation recommendations:

**Note: below mentioned are standard questions that will need to be adjusted, in agreement with the EMT, at the stage of the inception report.**

#### a. Relevance and appropriateness

- How effective were the interventions in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and responding appropriately to their particular circumstances?
  - Was the beneficiary selection process fair, appropriate and effective?
  - What strategies were used to ensure quality, timely and relevant delivery to target beneficiaries including mechanisms to capture beneficiary complaints/feedback?
- Was the assistance provided appropriate and sufficient to meet intended needs?
- To what extent were the beneficiaries involved in the assessment, planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of the interventions?
- Were intervention strategies and priorities in line with local customs and practices of the affected population, the priorities of the Government authorities and other key humanitarian actors?
- Were the interventions in line with SLRCS and IFRC strategies, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and guidelines?
- What problems and constraints were faced during implementation and how did the interventions manage these?
- What important lessons have been identified that can improve future interventions in the Sri Lanka and be shared more widely?

#### b. Coverage

- Did the interventions reach all population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance?
- Were there exclusions or differential impact between groups based on their location?
- How could the coverage and distribution methods be improved?

#### c. Efficiency/effectiveness/accountability

- Did the interventions meet their immediate and intended results?
- Were there adequate resources (financial, human, physical and informational) available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?
- Were adequate tracking systems in place to ensure transparency and accountability?
- Were complaints/feedback mechanisms put in place for community questions and concerns to be answered? What were the concerns raised by communities during the intervention?
- Would greater investment in preparedness measures have resulted in more efficient, effective and less costly interventions?
- How were programme activities managed and coordinated, particularly between SLRCS, IFRC, other partners, clusters, and local authorities?
- Was the capacity of the human resource system enough to fulfil the needs of the interventions and beneficiaries? Were personnel skills utilized in an efficient and effective manner?
- Was there adequate and relevant staffing including: a) decisions concerning the number of staff members needed, where, when, with what competences, at what levels, and at required availability and b) decision-making chain regarding staffing?

#### d. Impact

- What evidence (both direct and indirect) is available that the interventions contributed to the reduction of suffering and that the affected populations were assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and enhancing disaster preparedness?
- What impact did the interventions have on how the communities coped with subsequent disasters?

#### e. Connectedness and Sustainability

- Did the interventions result in enhanced institutional capacity of the SLRCS, in terms of: a) ability to implement recovery programmes, b) ability to prepare for and respond to disasters in a timely,

efficient, and coordinated manner; and c) ability to mobilize communities at risk to cope with future disasters?

- Did the support of the IFRC strengthen and complement the response of SLRCS branches and coping mechanisms, or hinder them?
- How will the support to enhance the capacities of NS will enable SLRCS to better face future disasters?
- How the links between the local government, officials, community groups enable communities to sustain their livelihood activities in the future.

## Annex 2 – Bibliography

1. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2015) *Guide to the auxiliary role of red cross and red crescent national societies – Asia Pacific*. [Online]. Available from: [https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/12/1294600-Guide\\_Asia-Pacific\\_En\\_LR-1.pdf](https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/12/1294600-Guide_Asia-Pacific_En_LR-1.pdf)
2. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2016a) *Emergency plan of action: Sri Lanka floods and landslides (MDRLK005)*.
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25. Sri Lanka Red Cross Society, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2017) *Draft SOP for ELRP CCG of Sri Lankan Red Cross – August 2017*. Colombo

## Annex 3 – List of Key Informants

No.	Name	Organisation	Title
1	Abyewickrama	Ministry of Home Affairs	former District Secretary
2	Alica Ho	IFRC	Operations Coordinator, South Asia
3	Ananda Uyanwatta	SLRCS	BEO
4	Anton Victoria	SLRCS	District Chairperson & Central Gov Board Member
5	Anura Saman	Ministry of Home Affairs	Division Secretary & former Kegalle Assistant District Secretary
6	B,A Jayasili	SLRCS	Kotapola Division Chairperson & Matara Committee Member
7	Bhagya Liyanarachchi	SLRCS	Finance Manager
8	Budhika Manawasinghe	SLRCS	Project Officer
9	Chalani Gunawardana	SLRCS	former Livelihoods Officer & BDRT member
10	Chathura Liyanarachchi	DMC	Assistant Director, Preparedness
11	Col. S.B. Madugalle	SLRCS	Deputy Director General
12	D.A.M Amarathilake	SLRCS	Field Officer
13	Damitha Chanaka	SLRCS	Assistant Manager, Disaster Management
14	Dinusha Karunathilaka	SLRCS	Bookkeeper & acting BEO
15	G.S. Fernando	Oxfam	Project Coordinator, EFSVL
16	Ganesha Amarasinghe	Ministry of Home Affairs	Division Secretary
17	Gerhard Tauscher	IFRC	Operations Manager
18	Hemal Waravita	SLRCS	NDRT member & Internal Auditor
19	Isidro Navarro	IFRC	Coordinator, Livelihoods & Cash Preparedness
20	Jagath Abeysinghe	SLRCS	National Chairperson
21	K.A. S.P. Kodikara / D.I.Nayana dayangani / Indika Wijesighe	Ministry of Home Affairs	GN / Agriculture research production assistant / Economic development officer
22	K.W. Kaveen Chanaka	SLRCS	BEO
23	Kolitha Pathirana	SLRCS	NDRT member & former Galle BEO
24	L.J.M.G. Chandrasiri Bandara	Ministry of Home Affairs	District Secretary
25	Lakshman Perera	SLRCS	Division Chairperson
26	M.K. D. Chandrasiri	SLRCS	District Chairperson & Central Gov Board Member
27	Maj Lahiru Pinnadoowage	DMC	Assistant Director
28	Manoj Dilshan	Ministry of Home Affairs	Grama Niladhari (GN)
29	Mathieu Leonard	IFRC	Operations Coordinator, Pacific (formerly South Asia)
30	Nimali Amarakoon	SLRCS	Assistant Accountant & acting BEO in 2016
31	Radhika Fernando	IFRC	Senior Programme Manager, DCPRR & Operations

32	Rohan	Ministry of Home Affairs	Livelihoods Officer
33	Rukshan Peris / Dr. Amila Kankanamge / Nimali Nanayakkara	SLRCS	Chairperson / Secretary & Central Gov Board Member / Treasurer
34	Ruwan Abeywardana	SLRCS	BEO
35	Samadhee Attanayaka	SLRCS	Livelihoods Officer
36	Sanhatha Dananjaya	SLRCS	BEO
37	Selvarajasingham Umakanthan	IFRC	PMER Officer
38	Swarna	Ministry of Home Affairs	Development Officer
39	Tharaka Samarasinghe	SLRCS	NDRT member & MIS Officer
40	Wimalasena	SLRCS	Vice Chairperson
41	Z.A.M. Faizal	Ministry of Home Affairs	Division Secretary

## Annex 4 – Evaluation Matrix

### Objective:

The evaluation objective is to assess SLRCS disaster preparedness & response capacity during the 2016 & 2017 flood operations at national HQ and branch levels, with emphasis on:

1. Mobilization of trained volunteers and staff for emergency operations, and;
2. Effectiveness of Cash Transfer Programmes (CTP) conducted.

Criteria	Key Lines of Enquiry/Questions	Methods	Sources
Mobilization of trained volunteers and staff for emergency operations			
Relevance & appropriateness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the staff/volunteers/operations align with SLRCS governance guiding documents (NCP, Disaster Response Framework, SoPs for flood response)?</li> <li>• Was the SLRCS HQ &amp; branch structure appropriate to responding in at-risk locations?</li> <li>• Were SLRCS HQ &amp; branch volunteer &amp; staff recruitment, training &amp; mobilization systems appropriate to expected emergencies?</li> <li>• How were local/branch volunteer/staffing needs, capacities and gaps identified?</li> <li>• Were the available volunteer/staff functions &amp; skills relevant to the needed/chosen response?</li> <li>• Was effective and relevant training given to prepare them for mobilization/deployment?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Key Informant (KI) interviews with internal stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SLRCS National Contingency Plan</li> <li>• SLRCS Disaster Response Framework</li> <li>• Standard Operation Procedures (SoP) for Floods</li> <li>• Org charts/descriptions</li> <li>• Mobilization strategies, policies &amp; procedures</li> <li>• Management reports</li> <li>• HQ &amp; branch managers &amp; teams</li> <li>• Recruitment, training &amp; mobilization units</li> <li>• BDRT &amp; NDRT members</li> </ul>
Coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were there enough trained &amp; experienced local or branch volunteers/staff able to respond in their designated service areas?</li> <li>• Were enough national level volunteers/staff able to reach all areas needing staffing help?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• KI interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management reports</li> <li>• HQ, branch &amp; team staff &amp; volunteers as above</li> </ul>

<p>Efficiency / effectiveness / accountability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did SLRCS HQ and branches meet their volunteer/staff mobilization targets?</li> <li>• How timely &amp; effective was decision-making regarding: a) the number of people needed, where, when, with what competences, at what levels, and at required availability?</li> <li>• How timely &amp; efficient was mobilization and/or deployment of trained volunteers/staff?</li> <li>• Were the people &amp; skills used in an efficient &amp; effective manner once mobilized/deployed?</li> <li>• How was HQ, local/branch and volunteer/staff feedback collected, reviewed and addressed?</li> <li>• How high are retention rates? What does SLRCS do to retain trained volunteers &amp; staff?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• KI interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management reports</li> <li>• HQ, branch &amp; team staff &amp; volunteers as above</li> <li>• Past BDRT &amp; NDRT members that chose to leave or not renew</li> <li>• IFRC management &amp; capacity building staff</li> </ul>
<p>Impact</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did mobilization of volunteers/staff help SLRCS HQ and branches to meet their objectives for emergency responses?</li> <li>• What evidence shows that mobilization helped ensure positive impacts of those responses?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• KI interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme reports</li> <li>• IFRC, HQ, branch &amp; team staff &amp; volunteers</li> <li>• Local authorities &amp; community leaders</li> </ul>
<p>Connectedness &amp; sustainability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did/could SLRCS connect with other local &amp; national emergency mobilization systems?</li> <li>• How did/could mobilization of SLRCS national teams help improve disaster preparedness of branches and their ability to help communities cope with future disasters?</li> <li>• How did/could mobilization of IFRC personnel help improve disaster preparedness of SLRCS?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• KI interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme reports</li> <li>• IFRC, HQ, branch staff &amp; volunteers</li> <li>• Local authorities &amp; community leaders</li> </ul>
<p>Effectiveness of Cash Transfer Programmes (CTP) conducted</p>			
<p>Relevance &amp; appropriateness</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the most vulnerable targeted &amp; selected?</li> <li>• Were markets accessible and able to sufficiently &amp; safely provide for needs?</li> <li>• Was CTP in-line with local customs &amp; with govt. &amp; other actors' priorities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Key Informant (KI) interviews with internal &amp;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SLRCS National Contingency Plan</li> <li>• SLRCS Disaster Response Framework; Standard Operation Procedures (SoP) for Floods</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In-line with SLRCS &amp; IFRC strategies, SOP, guidelines?</li> <li>• How were modalities, mechanisms &amp; service providers chosen?</li> <li>• What strategies ensured quality &amp; timely delivery and beneficiary feedback?</li> <li>• How was the transfer amount defined &amp; was it enough to meet needs?</li> <li>• How were beneficiaries, market vendors &amp; other stakeholders involved?</li> <li>• How were challenges identified &amp; managed &amp; what lessons were learned?</li> </ul>	<p>external stakeholders</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with representative members of affected communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessments, funding proposals &amp; reports</li> <li>• IFRC, HQ &amp; branch staff &amp; volunteers</li> <li>• National and local authorities</li> <li>• UN &amp; NGO actors</li> <li>• Community leaders</li> <li>• Beneficiaries (female &amp; male, especially vulnerable, etc.)</li> <li>• Other community members</li> </ul>
Coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did CTP reach all target population groups in need, including those in remote areas?</li> <li>• Were there exclusions or different coverage by location, type of beneficiary or type of CTP?</li> <li>• How could coverage &amp; distribution methods be improved?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• KI interviews</li> <li>• FGD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme reports; Response coordination &amp; coverage reports</li> <li>• IFRC, HQ, branch &amp; team staff &amp; volunteers</li> <li>• National &amp; local actors</li> <li>• Beneficiaries &amp; community</li> </ul>
Efficiency / effectiveness / accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the CTP meet its objectives/results?</li> <li>• Were enough resources (financial, HR, physical &amp; info) available? Were they used effectively &amp; efficiently?</li> <li>• Did tracking systems ensure transparency &amp; accountability?</li> <li>• Were community feedback mechanisms in place and responded to? What were the concerns raised by communities?</li> <li>• What preparedness was done (CTP feasibility/market assessments, service provider agreements, staff training &amp; systems)? Could more have been done for more efficient &amp; effective interventions?</li> <li>• How was CTP managed &amp; coordinated, particularly between SLRCS, IFRC, other partners, sectors/clusters, and local authorities?</li> <li>• Was capacity of the HR system enough to meet needs? Were people &amp; skills used in an efficient &amp; effective manner?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review reports</li> <li>• KI interviews</li> <li>• Some FGD regarding concerns &amp; feedback mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management and programme reports</li> <li>• IFRC, HQ, branch &amp; team staff &amp; volunteers</li> <li>• National &amp; local actors</li> <li>• Beneficiaries &amp; other community members</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was there adequate &amp; relevant staffing including: a) number, level, skills, location &amp; timing of staff, and b) effective decision-making chain on staffing?</li> </ul>		
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What evidence shows CTP helped reduce suffering &amp; maintain or resume basic dignity among affected populations (e.g. better access to basic needs, better choice/welfare, less negative coping, new skills/opportunity or income, lower debt, more empowerment)?</li> <li>• Were there any perceived negative impacts on beneficiaries, communities or markets (e.g. on anti-social behaviours, household/community relations, prices, supply, number of vendors)?</li> <li>• What evidence shows CTP helped disaster preparedness (e.g. resilient housing &amp; markets, community planning, access to savings/credit)?</li> <li>• What impact did/will CTP have on how communities cope with future disasters?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review reports</li> <li>• KI interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme and M&amp;E reports &amp; indicators</li> <li>• Sector/cluster &amp; other coordination reports</li> <li>• IFRC, HQ, branch &amp; team staff &amp; volunteers</li> <li>• National &amp; local actors</li> <li>• Beneficiaries &amp; other community members</li> </ul>
Connectedness & sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did/could CTP connect to government, UN and community development programmes, including social protection systems?</li> <li>• Did the CTP response build capacity of SLRCS to a) implement (CTP) recovery programmes, b) prepare for/respond to disasters in a timely, efficient and coordinated manner; and c) mobilize communities at risk to cope with future disasters?</li> <li>• Did the support of IFRC strengthen and complement the response of SLRCS branches and coping mechanisms, or hinder them?</li> <li>• How will IFRC support enable SLRCS to better face future disasters?</li> <li>• How do links made by CTP between local government, officials &amp; community groups enable communities to sustain their livelihood activities in the future?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review reports</li> <li>• KI interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mgmt, programme &amp; coordination reports</li> <li>• IFRC, HQ, branch &amp; team staff &amp; volunteers</li> <li>• National &amp; local actors</li> </ul>

## Annex 5 – Questionnaires

### KI Interview Questionnaire – Staff

**Guidance:** Thank informant & introduce yourself. Explain evaluation is independent of SLRCS, answers are voluntary and confidential, and quotes will not be attributed, so encourage candour. Confirm availability for 60-90 minutes and ask for consent to begin. Confirm informant name, title and organisation. Use a semi-structured format - begin with the key question, asking further probing questions as needed and suggested.

#### *Introduction & Roles*

- 1) Describe your current role/purpose?
- 2) Are you familiar with SLRCS's 2016 &/or 2017 flood operations? What was your role during that time?

#### *Emergency Response Systems*

- 3) Describe SLRCS's emergency response process. What would you consider key strengths? The main gaps?
  - a) Which emergency response documents are you know, or know of? (e.g. National Contingency Plan, Disaster Response Framework, Standard Operating Procedures for Flood Response.)
  - b) Are there other similar documents you are familiar with &/or know of? How would I find them?
  - c) How well did they help deliver/support the flood responses? How could they be strengthened?

Mobilisation of trained volunteers and staff to support operations

#### Relevance & Appropriateness

- 4) Describe how SLRCS recruits, trains and mobilises volunteers & staff for emergency response. What would you consider key strengths during the 2016/17 flood responses? The main gaps?
  - a) How were branch volunteer/staff needs, capacities and gaps identified?
  - b) How relevant were the available volunteer & staff functions/skills to the planned response?
  - c) How relevant was the training given to prepare them for mobilization? How effective was it?

#### *Coverage*

- 5) Does SLRCS have enough volunteers and staff able to mobilise as needed? What are the challenges?
  - a) Were enough BDRT volunteers & staff available for 2016/17 responses? What more was needed?
  - b) Were enough NDRT members available to support branches in 2016/17? What more was needed?
  - c) Were enough IFRC staff/delegates available to support SLRCS in 2016/17? What more was needed?

#### *Effectiveness / Efficiency / Accountability*

- 6) How effective and efficient is the process for mobilising volunteers & staff? What would you consider key strengths during the 2016/17 flood responses? The main gaps?
  - a) How fast was decision-making regarding the number of people needed where, when, and with what competences? How effective was it (i.e. were appropriate decisions made)?
  - b) How fast was mobilization of trained volunteers/staff? How efficient (i.e. effort & cost needed)?
  - c) How were mobilised volunteers & staff used? Was it for the intended purpose of mobilisation?
- 7) How satisfied are HQ, branches, volunteers and staff with the mobilisation process?
  - a) How was HQ, branch and volunteer & staff feedback collected, reviewed and addressed?
  - b) Did mobilised volunteers stay for the time expected? If not, why?
  - c) Did volunteers want to be available next time?
  - d) What does SLRCS do to retain trained volunteers and staff?

### *Impact*

- 8) What impact did mobilisation of volunteers & staff have on response? What was positive? Any negative?
  - a) How did mobilization of IFRC staff help SLRCS meet its emergency response objectives?
  - b) How did mobilization of NDRT/BDRT volunteers & staff help branches meet response objectives?
  - c) How did mobilization help deliver positive results of those responses? Can you give examples?

### *Connectedness & Sustainability*

- 9) How does IFRC & SLRCS volunteer & staff mobilisation processes connect with national systems?
  - a) What other local or national emergency personnel mobilization systems exist?
  - b) How did IFRC & SLRCS coordinate or collaborate with those? What could they do better in future?
- 10) How did the mobilisation system support disaster preparedness for sustainable impacts?
  - a) How did mobilization help improve future disaster preparedness of branches?
  - b) How could mobilization of IFRC personnel help improve disaster preparedness of SLRCS?
  - c) How did it improve branches' ability to help communities cope with future disasters?
  - d) How could HQ do in future to help branches prepare and help communities cope?

### *Cash Transfer Programmes (CTP)*

#### *Relevance and Appropriateness*

- 1) How did SLRCS decide if CTP was feasible for 2016/17 flood responses? What was done well? Gaps?
  - a) How were needs assessments done? What needs were CTP intended to meet?
  - b) Which types of market or supply chains were assessed to see if CTP was feasible? What criteria were used for market assessment? Who was involved?
  - c) How did you know if CTP was acceptable to community customs? Was it in line with national/local government policy/priorities on CTP? Was it aligned with other organisations' approaches?
  - d) How was CTP in-line with SLRCS & IFRC strategies, SOP, guidelines?
- 2) Describe how the CTP response in 2016/17 was designed? What was done well? Gaps?
  - a) How and why were the modalities chosen (i.e. unrestricted/cash Vs. restricted/voucher)?
  - b) How and why were delivery mechanisms & service providers chosen?
  - c) How was the transfer amount defined & was it enough to meet needs?
  - d) How were beneficiaries, market vendors & other stakeholders involved?

#### *Coverage*

- 3) Describe how beneficiary targeting and selection was done? What was done well? Gaps?
  - a) How were districts, sub-districts and communities targeted for CTP assistance?
  - b) Did CTP reach all target population groups in need, including those in remote areas?
  - c) How did programme coverage vary by location, type of beneficiary or type of CTP?
  - d) How were beneficiaries targeted? How were the most vulnerable selected?
  - e) Were any group or type of beneficiaries excluded or missed? Why?

#### *Effectiveness / Efficiency / Accountability*

- 4) How effective and efficient was the implementation of CTP in 2016/17? What was done well? Gaps?
  - a) Were enough resources available (financial, HR, physical & info)? Were they used well?
  - b) Did the CTP meet its objectives? What were the results? How do you know?

- c) How was CTP managed & coordinated, particularly between SLRCS, IFRC, other partners, sectors/clusters, and local authorities?
- d) What preparedness was done for CTP? Could more have been done?
- 5) How did SLRCS ensure accountability to donors and beneficiaries? Strengths? Gaps?
  - a) How did selection & distribution tracking systems ensure transparency & accountability?
  - b) How were community feedback mechanisms used? What concerns were raised? How were they addressed? What was the result?

#### *Impact*

- 6) Describe the impact of CTP during the 2016/17 response.
  - a) What positive impact did CTP have on beneficiaries and affected populations? How do you know?
  - b) Were there any negative impacts on beneficiaries, communities or markets? How do you know?

#### *Connectedness & Sustainability*

- 7) How did or could humanitarian CTP connect to or fit within the broader development community?
  - a) How did/could CTP align with government, UN and community development agendas?
  - b) How did/could CTP work with government or other social protection systems?
- 8) How did or could CTP help build sustainable capacity for future disaster response?
  - a) How did/could CTP build SLRCS capacity for future response?
  - b) How did/could CTP help build community disaster preparedness?
  - c) How did/could CTP build sustainable beneficiary & community livelihoods?

## KI Interview Questionnaire – External

**Guidance:** Thank informant & introduce yourself. Explain evaluation is independent of SLRCS, answers are voluntary and confidential, and quotes will not be attributed, so encourage candour. Confirm availability for 60 minutes and ask for consent to begin. Confirm informant name, title and organisation. Use a semi-structured format - begin with the key question, asking further probing questions as needed and suggested.

### *Introduction & Roles*

- 1) Describe your current role/purpose?
- 2) Are you familiar with SLRCS's 2016 &/or 2017 flood operations?
- 3) What was your role during that time?

### *Emergency Response Systems*

- 4) Describe what you know of SLRCS's emergency response processes? What are key strengths? Gaps?

### *Mobilisation of trained volunteers and staff to support operations*

### *Relevance & Appropriateness*

- 5) Describe your impression of how SLRCS volunteers & staff were recruited and mobilised for the 2016 & 2017 flood responses. What seemed to work well? What not so well?

### *Coverage*

- 6) Did it seem there were enough volunteers and staff for the response? What more was needed?

### *Effectiveness / Efficiency / Accountability*

- 7) How effective and efficient was SLRCS's mobilisation of volunteers & staff? Strengths? Gaps?
  - a) How fast were volunteers & staff able to begin work? What could have been better?
  - b) Did it seem they were used for the right things? What could have been better?
- 8) Were you asked by SLRCS for input or feedback? What was their response? What was the result?

### *Impact*

- 9) How did SLRCS volunteers help deliver positive results for communities? Can you give examples?

### *Connectedness*

- 10) What other local or national emergency personnel mobilization systems exist?
  - a) How did IFRC & SLRCS coordinate or collaborate with those?
  - b) What could they do better in future?
- 11) How did SLRCS help communities better cope with future disasters? What could be better?

### *Effectiveness of Cash Transfer Programmes (CTP)*

### *Relevance and Appropriateness*

- 12) Do you think CTP was a feasible response option for the 2016/17 flood responses?
  - a) What were needs of communities & beneficiaries that CTP could meet?
  - b) After the floods, were people able to find their needs in the market? Could they earn an income?
  - c) Was CTP acceptable to community customs?
  - d) Was CTP acceptable to national/local government or others?

13) What do you think about the CTP given by SLRCS?

- a) The type (i.e. cash Vs. vouchers)? The way it was distributed? What about the companies used? What could have been more appropriate?
- b) How were beneficiaries and others involved in deciding what amounts to give? Was the amount given enough for beneficiaries to buy what they needed? What could have been more appropriate?

*Coverage*

9) Describe how beneficiary targeting and selection was done? What was done well? Gaps?

- c) How were places & beneficiaries targeted for CTP assistance? Were they the most vulnerable?
- d) Did CTP reach all target population groups in need, including those in remote areas? Were any group or type of beneficiaries excluded or missed?

*Efficiency / Effectiveness / Accountability*

14) How effective and efficient was the implementation of CTP in 2016/17? What was done well? Gaps?

- a) How & how well did IFRC & SLRCS coordinate with partners, sectors, and govt. authorities?
- b) Did they have enough resources (financial, HR, physical & info)? Were they used well?
- c) How were community and other feedback mechanisms used? How were SLRCS' responses?

*Impact*

10) Describe the impact of CTP during the 2016/17 response.

- d) What impact did CTP have on beneficiaries and the affected populations? How do you know?
- e) Were there any negative impacts on beneficiaries, communities or markets? How do you know?

*Connectedness & Sustainability*

11) How did or could humanitarian CTP connect to or fit within the broader development community?

- a) How did/could CTP align with government, UN and community development agendas?
- b) How did/could CTP work with government or other social protection systems?

12) How did or could CTP help build sustainable capacity for future disaster response?

- a) How did/could CTP build SLRCS capacity for future response?
- b) How did/could CTP help build community disaster preparedness?
- c) How did/could CTP build sustainable beneficiary & community livelihoods?

## Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire

Guidance: Explain evaluation is independent of SLRCS, answers are voluntary and confidential, and quotes will not be attributed, so encourage candour. Explain that everyone might have a different opinion, and there are no right or wrong answers. Please speak one at a time and respect what other people are saying. Confirm availability and ask for consent to begin. Confirm names, community and beneficiary status. Use a semi-structured format - begin with the key question, asking further probing questions as needed and suggested.

### *Effectiveness of Cash Transfer Programmes (CTP)*

#### *Relevance and Appropriateness*

- 1) Do you remember the 2016/2017 floods? Describe what happened to your community.
- 2) How did SLRCS find out what your community needed after the floods?
  - a) Were you asked about you or your family's needs? In so, when, how and by whom?
  - b) Were you asked about access to the market?
- 3) What happened to the markets after the floods?
  - a) Were you able to find your needs in the market? Basic needs? Livelihood needs?
  - b) Could you earn an income? Why or why not?
- 4) Were you or your community asked if giving CTP was acceptable to your customs?
  - a) Was it acceptable? Why or why not? Has there been any change?
- 5) Are you satisfied with the way the CTP was given?
  - a) What do you think about the type of CTP given (i.e. cash Vs. vouchers)?
  - b) What do you think about the way it was distributed?
  - c) What about the companies used?
  - d) Was the amount given enough to buy what you needed? What would have been better?

#### *Coverage*

- 1) How did SLRCS choose which beneficiaries to give CTP assistance? What is your opinion of the process?
  - a) Were the most vulnerable selected?
  - b) Were any group or type of beneficiaries excluded or missed?
  - c) Were any communities missed?
  - d) Did the process cause any conflicts in the community?
  - e) Did you or others have to pay anything to anyone before or after receiving assistance?

#### *Efficiency / Effectiveness / Accountability*

- 1) Did SLRCS tell you or your community how to give feedback on CTP?
  - a) If so, how could people give feedback? Was it easy?
  - b) Did you or others you know give any feedback? If so, what was done about it?

#### *Impact*

- 1) Are you satisfied with the result of the CTP assistance?
  - a) How has CTP helped you, your community or the marketplace? Can you give examples?
  - b) Has it caused problems in your family, community or the marketplace? Can you give examples?
  - c) Will it help you or your community to better cope with future disaster? Can you give examples?