

Real-Time Evaluation

Indonesia: Earthquakes and Tsunami (Lombok, Sulawesi) 2018



FINAL REPORT

23 January 2019

Evaluation Team

Ghulam Muhammad Awan, team leader

Said Faisal, special advisor

Juergen Hoegl, chief evaluator

Louise McCosker, Australian Red Cross

Siew Hui Liew, IFRC Asia-Pacific Regional Office

Andreane Tampubolon, Palang Merah Indonesia

Cover photo: PMI volunteers and staff, IFRC staff at the Garuda Volunteers Camp. Palu, Central Sulawesi (Photo: PMI)

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Acronyms

AADMER	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
APRO	Asia-Pacific Regional Office
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BNPB	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Disaster Management Authority)
BOCA	Branch Organisational Capacity Assessment
BPBD	Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (Provincial / district disaster management authority)
CBPF	Country-based Pooled Fund
CCST	Country Cluster Support Team
CEA	Community engagement and accountability
CHF	Swiss Frank
DREF	Disaster relief Emergency Fund
EA	Emergency Appeal
EMT	Evaluation Management Team
EPoA	Emergency Plan of Action
EQ	Earthquake
ERAT	Emergency Response and Assessment Teams
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
GoI	Government of Indonesia
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HNS	Host National Society
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
KPKPST	Kelompok Perjuangan Kesetaraan Perempuan Sulawesi Tengah
NDRF	National Disaster Response Framework
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NS	National Society
NSIA	National Society Investment Alliance
OCAC	Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification
PER	Preparedness for Effective Response
PGI	Protection, Gender and Inclusion
PMI	Palang Merah Indonesia (Indonesian Red Cross Society)
PNS	Participating National Society
RCRC	Red Cross Red Crescent
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
ROHAN	Regional Organisations Humanitarian Action network
RTE	Real-Time Evaluation
SMART	Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time bound
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations

Executive Summary

Indonesia was struck by a series of disasters in the latter half of 2018, causing significant damage and loss of life: several strong earthquakes hit Lombok Island in July and August, and then in late September a major earthquake struck the island of Sulawesi triggering a tsunami and liquefaction.¹ In total, more than 2,700 people were killed, 156,000 houses destroyed or damaged, and about 930,000 people affected in in Lombok and Sulawesi.

The Government of Indonesia's (GoI) decision to declare both Lombok and Sulawesi 'provincial disasters' did not come as a surprise to those who had been following the trajectory the GoI had been on since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami to build a disaster management structure and capacity at national, provincial and district levels.

While international assistance was not requested, the GoI welcomed assistance to a limited extent through defined channels (focused on Sulawesi), preferencing Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) Member States in line with ASEAN disaster management commitments and efforts. This led to some confusion amongst international actors about how the GoI had classified the disaster, with some people incorrectly thinking the disasters had different classifications by virtue of the GoI's less restrictive approach to Sulawesi. The GoI's strong stance for a national-led response caught many in the international community (donors, humanitarian organisations, and media) off guard; learned behaviours of decades of humanitarian action - the muscle memory - kicking in with scant regard to the actual reality on the ground. Push back from donors, international humanitarian organisations and some Participating National Societies reflected the disconnect between commitments made at the global level and the operational reality on the ground.

Overall, the operation was a positive example of a national-led response, while acknowledging that (as with most responses worldwide) some aspects of it could have been improved:

**An overview of
[key findings and lessons learned from the
Lombok and Sulawesi operation](#)
is provided in Annex 6.**

- Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), the largest humanitarian organisation in Indonesia, responded at scale from the onset (pursuant to its auxiliary role), quickly mobilising capacity from its strong network. However, challenges persist to sustain the required volunteer resources for the current operations. PMI's centralisation of decision-making at head quarter level also posed challenges; PMI is encouraged to increase its focus on decentralisation, developing leadership at provincial and local branch levels, and delegating responsibilities with necessary decision-making powers.
- PMI responded in coordination with Indonesia's national disaster management authority (BNPb) and other stakeholders, including the Indonesian Armed Forces. Still, PMI faced challenges with internal and external coordination, including those from new roles (e.g. for logistics) attributed by the GoI in the course of the operation.
- PMI successfully worked with the GoI to launch an international appeal through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) for Lombok (later-on widening the appeal to Sulawesi) asking for a total CHF 38.5 million (at the time of writing).

¹ A tsunami following an eruption of Anak Krakatau hit the Sunda Straits region of Java and Sumatra on 22 December, with a DREF being launched on 25 December. The latter disaster is not within the Real-Time Evaluation's (RTE) scope, which finalized its analysis on 20 December 2018.

- PMI's success with domestic fundraising (mainly corporate donors) was evident. With respect to international institutional donors, PMI did not receive direct funding (to the best of the RTE team's knowledge) except from IFRC's pooled Disaster relief Emergency Fund (DREF)². Donors consulted in the RTE expressed their preference to contribute to the IFRC Emergency Appeal (EA)³ or through bilateral programming of well-known PNSs as '*trusted partners*', ensuring accountability. Some donors mentioned that their current funding regulations do not allow direct funding to PMI.
- National / local Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) provided assistance, many of them supported by their international partner organisations. By contrast, United Nations organisations and major international NGOs kept their limited in-country activities low-profile.
- International Red Cross Red Crescent capacities complemented NS capacities at different scale in Lombok and Sulawesi, reflecting that leveraging the 'Red' footprint requires case-by-case decisions. PMI interpreted the Gol's national-led approach quite strictly for Lombok, keeping the numbers of international personnel low. For Sulawesi, an initial lack of clarity on the Gol's disaster classification decision and, subsequently a less restrictive policy on the acceptance of international assistance, resulted in the deployment of significantly higher IFRC surge capacities⁴. This was driven by PMI resources under pressure with its commitments for the Lombok response, the need for specific expertise (ERUs), and the necessity to ensure compliance with IFRC's administrative and accountability processes with specialized surge personnel.
- National capacities for emergency needs assessments, information management, quality assurance, Community Engagement and Accountability, and Protection, Gender and Inclusion lacked operational integration. PMI finance and logistics capacities were not working effectively to meet operational needs. PMI, supported by Movement actors, is encouraged to develop these capacities further.
- The Gol's commendable efforts in reshaping Indonesia's disaster management framework now need to fully transform into operational procedures, the articulation of concrete roles and responsibilities, and the development of (national) humanitarian standards guiding operations. PMI and IFRC are well positioned to undertake humanitarian diplomacy with the Gol on this, given the important role they have already played in helping shape Indonesia's disaster management architecture.
- The integration of bilateral and ICRC capacities into the response worked, despite Movement coordination mechanisms at a strategic level not being fully established in Indonesia.
- IFRC positively managed to focus on support roles and operational coordination with pragmatic solutions taken by staff on the ground and by senior management. Gains on 'Surge Optimisation'⁵ have not fully filtered through to PNS, with some pushing for more international personnel on the ground. In addition, existing international regulations and processes (finance, HR) are complex and not yet coherent with a localised response.

² DREF, as well as the more recent Forecast-based-Financing tool, are considered by IFRC to be good practices in direct funding.

³ IFRC Secretariat and PNS fundraising for the EA is considered successful with 66% (hard and soft pledges) as per 07 December 2018. Thereby, donor interest for Sulawesi is higher than for Lombok.

⁴ Lombok: Less than 10 delegates on the ground since the disaster onset, mainly Bahasa Indonesia-speaking staff. Sulawesi: about 160 delegates (IFRC Secretariat, multilateral and bilateral Participating National Society surge personnel), including a Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT), Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT) personnel, three Emergency Response Units (ERUs), and administrative personnel - 30% of them being Bahasa Indonesia / Bahasa Malaysia speakers.

⁵ 'As local as possible, as global as necessary' is one of the guiding principles of the Surge Optimisation process.

Generally, the ongoing Indonesia operation is a wake-up call for the Movement, the broader humanitarian community and donors, to translate Grand Bargain commitments on localisation into action. Shifting decision making and authority from international to national and local actors will indisputably change the humanitarian ecosystem, yet even more so the humanitarian ‘ego-system’. IFRC, as the ‘champion’ of localisation, is called on to combine internal transformative action and continuous external advocacy on the road to localised action.

Two sets of recommendations are provided: those specific to future PMI and IFRC activities in the Indonesian context that are emerging from the current response; and recommendations at the general level for IFRC Secretariat and National Societies supporting the transformation of localisation commitments into results. The following summarises these recommendations; they are elaborated with enabling steps in Annexes 7 and 8:

<u>Key recommendations on localisation for PMI and IFRC in the Indonesian context</u>
1. Advocate for and contribute to a multi-agency in-depth study
2. Delegate authority and responsibility to provincial and local levels
3. Ensure continued human resource mobilisation for the recovery phase
4. Build and implement additional cross-cutting capacities (CEA, PGI)
5. Strengthen coordination capacities across all levels
6. Strengthen financial and logistics capacities
7. Strengthen humanitarian diplomacy efforts with the GoI

Table 1: Key recommendations on localisation for PMI and IFRC in the Indonesian context

<u>Key general recommendations on localisation for the IFRC Secretariat and National Societies</u>
1. Define a SMART way ahead, tackling benefits and limitations
2. IFRC to enable conditions for greater empowerment of National Societies towards a localised response
3. Shift the narrative from response towards preparedness
4. Optimise IFRC tools, including support processes
5. Build trusted operational partnerships with regional inter-governmental organisations

Table 2: Key general recommendations on localisation for the IFRC Secretariat and National Societies

1. Purpose and Scope

Purpose

The Terms of Reference (ToR, see Annex 5) articulated the purpose of the Real-Time Evaluation (RTE):

‘This RTE will assess the ongoing IFRC [International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies] operation [...] to support [...] Indonesian Red Cross (Palang Merah Indonesia, PMI...) response to the Indonesia Earthquakes and Tsunami, and its context from late July 2018 with a particular focus on how the localisation model has been applied and impacted the operational, cooperation and coordination mechanisms as well as the decision-making process, planning and service delivery both within and outside of the Movement. The outcome of the RTE will inform the continued response as well as IFRC readiness in adapting emergency operations, and coordination efforts [...]including with public authorities], and readiness requirements, to adapt to locally-led operating conditions.’

The RTE aimed to strengthen the ongoing operation in the short to medium terms, as well as providing recommendations for the future.

Evaluation Questions

The ToR (see Annex 5) identified the following high-level questions:

- What is working well?
- What requires improvement?
- In what ways is the response appropriate and relevant, taking into consideration the context and capacities of involved Movement components?
- What measures should IFRC take to ensure that it is best suited for future operations following a similar approach?

Additionally, the ToR sought to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of 1) the IFRC support of the PMI-led response, 2) PMI’s preparedness to respond and coordinate, and 3) IFRC’s existing response tools and the humanitarian diplomacy approach applied.

Scope

The RTE’s focus was on lessons learnt and recommendations from the Indonesia Earthquakes and Tsunami response. It covered the period from the onset of the first Lombok earthquake until the end of the evaluation data collection and analysis phase (29 July to 20 December 2018).

Timing

The table below presents the schedule for the RTE.

Phase	05-09 Dec	10-21 Dec	22-30 Dec	31 Dec –14 Jan	15-23 Jan
Desk review, inception briefing / interviews, inception report					
Field visit to Indonesia (10-21 Dec), Jakarta debriefing					
Submission of draft report (by 30 Dec)					
Review and feedback on draft report (IFRC, PMI), by 14 Jan					
Finalisation of report, submission by 23 January					

Table 3: Schedule of the Indonesia RTE

RTE management

The RTE was commissioned by the Under-Secretary General, Programmes and Operations, IFRC Headquarters (HQ), and the Regional Director, IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO). An Evaluation Management Team (EMT) of four persons⁶ oversaw the RTE and provided organisational support.

An RTE Management Response Team consisting of the commissioners and three external reviewers oversaw the management response and will define subsequent follow up.

For methodology and limitations of the RTE see Annex 1.

⁶ From PMI, IFRC HQ, IFRC APRO, and IFRC Country Cluster Support Team [CCST] Indonesia & Timor Leste

2. Context

Background

Nine significant earthquakes hit Indonesia⁷ during 2018; six of them measured magnitude 6.0 or greater. Java and Sumatra experienced earthquakes in April and July 2018 respectively, but the most damaging quakes of 2018 occurred later on Lombok Island and in Central Sulawesi. Between 29 July and 19 August, four earthquakes and numerous aftershocks affected West, North and East Lombok. 515 people were killed, 88,000 houses were destroyed or damaged, and about people were affected. An initial allocation of 211,569 CHF from the [Disaster Relief Emergency Fund](#) (DREF), launched on 31 July, supported the immediate response of the RCRC Movement, led by PMI. After a second earthquake in Lombok (05 August) the earlier DREF was increase and an [Emergency Appeal \(EA\)](#) for CHF 8.9 million was launched. More major quakes hit Lombok on 09 and 19 August.

On 28 September, a magnitude 7.5 quake struck the island of Sulawesi, triggering a tsunami with waves up to 6m high, and liquefaction. Palu, the provincial capital, and neighbouring areas were severely impacted. More than 2,200 people were killed, almost 68,000 houses destroyed or damaged, and more than 430,000 people affected. The EA was subsequently revised to incorporate the response in Sulawesi. After a second revision, the [current Emergency Appeal](#) is asking for CHF 38.5 million, aiming to assist a total of 160,000 persons (40,000 households) on the affected islands for up to 30 months.⁸ The response is focussing on shelter; livelihoods and basic needs; health; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH); Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGI); migration and displacement; disaster risk reduction; and National Society (NS) and branch capacity enhancement. The EA also covers Shelter Cluster personnel⁹ and funding of areas of intervention supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Restoring Family Links, Management of the Dead, and forensics).




Figure 1: timeline for the Indonesia disasters and IFRC emergency response decisions (see abbreviations for acronyms; modified from Saari, F., 2018 "Debriefing")

⁷ The Republic of Indonesia is the world's 14th largest country (1,9m square kilometres), with more than seventeen thousand islands. With over 261 million people, it is the world's 4th most populous country. Indonesia consists of 34 provinces, each with its own legislature and an elected governor. Provinces are subdivided into regencies and cities, again with their own legislature. These are further subdivided into districts and again into administrative villages. Following the implementation of regional autonomy measures in 2001, regencies and cities have become key administrative units, responsible for providing most government services.

⁸ Recovery assessments in the affected regions were finished by mid-December and will result in recovery-focussed revision of the Emergency Plans of Action (EPoA) for Lombok and Sulawesi (expected to be published in January).

⁹ IFRC provides Shelter Cluster experts for the Shelter Sub-Cluster, which is part of the national 'Displacement and Protection' Cluster (lead by the Ministry of Social Affairs)

In accordance with Indonesian disaster legislation, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) declared both the Lombok and Sulawesi calamities ‘provincial disasters’. No international assistance was requested, however support was welcomed through defined channels, especially for the Sulawesi disaster, where a less restrictive policy on the acceptance of international assistance was applied (see chapter 3)¹⁰, and preferencing ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Member States. ASEAN’s Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) was tasked with facilitating international disaster management cooperation (with a focus on government-to-government assistance) as well as housing joint efforts in assessment and information management.

PMI¹¹, auxiliary to the public authorities in all humanitarian action, as articulated in the recently endorsed Red Cross Law (2017)¹², responded to all disasters in scope, with response efforts being coordinated with Indonesia’s national disaster management authority (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, BNPB). Pursuant to the Red Cross Law, the GoI supported the request of PMI to launch an international appeal through the IFRC. In the immediate response to the Lombok disaster, IFRC deployed national staff of the Country Cluster Support Team (CCST) office in support of PMI, shortly after being complemented by a few international surge personnel (mainly Bahasa-speaking IFRC APRO staff, and staff sourced by Participating National Societies (PNSs) with in-country presence. For Sulawesi, the number of international surge delegates was significantly higher¹³, with a FACT, RDRTs, three support ERUs¹⁴ (IT & Telecom, Logistics, Base Camp), and other surge functions (mainly in supporting roles) deploying through IFRC. Some PNS mobilized a few delegates bilaterally, who were widely included in IFRC teams.

In addition, national and local NGOs provided assistance and services, many of them supported by their international long-term partner organisations. In-country presence of international assets from UN organisations and major international Non-Government Organisations (INGOs) was low and their limited in-country activities were kept low-profile.

Movement context

The overarching purpose of this evaluation is informed by the following:

- The Movement-wide efforts for ‘[Strengthening Movement Cooperation and Coordination](#)’ which aim to revisit existing frameworks, guided by the strong need for a better, more effective overall Movement response in disasters, crises and conflicts.
- IFRC’s ‘[Surge Optimisation](#)’ process aimed at improving performance and accountability in emergency operations.
- IFRC and ICRC commitments to the ‘[Grand Bargain](#)’¹⁵ of 2016, including to ensure that

¹⁰ One stakeholder described Sulawesi as ‘a provincial-level disaster with some national aspects’.

¹¹ PMI’s general fields of activity include: disaster management (preparedness, response, recovery), health (including PSS), WASH, blood services, and IHL-dissemination. At present, three PNS (American, Australian, and Japanese RC), ICRC and IFRC are supporting PMI with country delegations, further PNSs are cooperating with PMI without permanent presence.

¹² The Red Cross Law was approved by Indonesian Parliament on 11 December 2017. It is regulated by Law No. 1, 2018 and reinforces the role of PMI as an auxiliary to the Government of Indonesia.

¹³ In total, less than 10 delegates were deployed to Lombok.

According to the Sulawesi delegate contact database, a total of 161 IFRC Secretariat and multilateral and bilateral PNS surge personnel deployed to Palu (and some to Jakarta to reinforce CCST capacities) between 01 October and 14 December. This figure includes 32 Indonesian nationals and 17 Malaysian nationals (Bahasa Malaysia being a Malay language widely similar to Bahasa Indonesia). Figures are excluding personnel less than 5 days on the ground and senior management visits.

¹⁴ FACT: Field Assessment and Coordination Team; RDRT: Regional Disaster Response Team; ERU: Emergency Response Unit.

¹⁵ World Humanitarian Summit (Istanbul, 2016): ‘The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need’

humanitarian action is *'as local as possible, as international as necessary'*¹⁶. Together with the Swiss Government, IFRC is co-convening the Grand Bargain work stream 2 on localisation, reflecting IFRC's long-lived commitment to local action. The ['IFRC Policy Brief Localization'](#) describes the IFRC commitment on the 'localisation agenda'.

- The significant work over the past decade by the GoI and supported by PMI, IFRC (within the [disaster law programme](#)) and other stakeholders to institute a comprehensive legal system for disaster risk management.
- The Movement's recently established [National Society Investment Alliance](#) (NSIA), a joint investment fund intended to provide additional means for *'capacity strengthening and organizational development, and to provide finance, support, training and coaching'*¹⁷, thus offering an additional funding mechanism for capacity development.

3. Government of Indonesia leading the response

The strong 'national-led' / 'locally-led' nature of the response to both disasters has attracted international interest and analysis with respect to localising humanitarian action. Comparisons are drawn with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that saw an avalanche of international humanitarian assistance with its accompanying architecture¹⁸, and a national and provincial government feeling completely overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the international footprint. The GoI's approach to the Lombok and Sulawesi disasters was of an entirely different character. This time around, it retained control of the response - harnessing local capacity where possible; issuing clear guidelines for foreign aid workers - asking that they conduct activities with local partners and be registered with government agencies; and accepting offers of international assistance that were fit for purpose and informed by the capacities and technical expertise of the entities offering assistance.

Drivers and reactions

That stance was well considered and reinforced the commitments made by Indonesia and other ASEAN Member States in the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and in the ASEAN Declaration on 'One ASEAN One Response'.¹⁹ It spoke truth to the GoI's statement at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit where the Chairman of the Indonesian Delegation, Head of BNPB Willem Rampangilei²⁰, stated Indonesia's Five Key Commitments including implementing the 'Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030'²¹ and increasing local capacity to cope with disasters and humanitarian crises. It reflected the huge experience Indonesia has in dealing with disasters, shaped by the fact that it is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, experiencing an average of 290 significant disasters caused by natural phenomena annually over the last 30 years.²²

¹⁶ The UN Secretary-General's call at the World Humanitarian Summit 2016

¹⁷ RCM, 2018 "National Society Investment Alliance - Overview", October 2018, p3

¹⁸ The tsunami operation being a trigger for the introduction of the Cluster system (in 2005).

¹⁹ The approach can be summed up as: ASEAN responding to disasters as one in the region and outside the region by harnessing the collective strengths of different sectors and stakeholders in ASEAN

²⁰ on 24 May 2016

²¹ UNISDR, 2015, adopted 18 March 2015

²² Taylor, M., 2018 "With warning drums and river clean-ups, Indonesian women head off disasters"

Most importantly, it reflected the significant work of the past decade by the Gol to overhaul the Country's entire disaster management system, including:

- Adopting the *Disaster Management Act Law No. 24 of 2007 (Law 24/2007)* and its ancillary regulations relating to international assistance²³. It is important to note that PMI was strongly engaged in the development process of Law 24/2007 and its implementing regulations.
- Creating the ministerial level National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB).
- Establishing hundreds of provincial and district disaster management authorities in all provinces (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah, BPBD).
- Adapting the cluster system towards more national leadership, with Ministries and the BNPB in charge of localised coordination mechanisms.
- Developing a National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF), informed by Law 24/2007 as well as Gov. Reg. 21/2008, to provide further clarity, understanding, and efficiency to emergency response for Indonesia²⁴.
- At the regional level, playing a key role in establishing ASEAN's AHA Centre²⁵ to develop regional mechanisms to assist in disaster response.

Against this backdrop, it came as a surprise to many people (mainly in Indonesia) that the Gol's stance was portrayed by some (mainly outside Indonesia) as nationalistic, isolationist and playing politics (presidential and regional elections are due in early 2019) - one article accusing the Gol of *'putting political needs above the genuine needs of Indonesians'*²⁶. Most of the criticism was directed at the Gol's decision to restrict international aid workers, reflected in headlines such as *'Indonesia orders foreign aid workers helping with tsunami effort to leave'*²⁷, *'Quake-battered Indonesia accepts foreign aid, reluctantly'*²⁸, *'Foreign aid workers blocked from Indonesian disaster sites following quake'*²⁹, and *'1,600 dead, 70,000 homeless. Why wouldn't Tsunami-hit Indonesia want aid?'*³⁰ There was a real disconnect between the narrative in Indonesia and that elsewhere; it was as though the learned behaviours of decades of humanitarian action – the muscle memory – had automatically kicked in with scant regard to the actual reality on the ground. The critics had failed to read the signals and had not kept pace with the groundwork that the Gol and other stakeholders had done over the past decade to take the reins. In reality, senior Gol representatives were very positive about all the assistance provided (both national and international) and referenced the localisation mantra – 'as local as possible, as international as necessary'. They and many other people canvassed as part of this evaluation, openly acknowledged the shortcomings and challenges of the response (further elaborated in the next section) and demonstrated a strong commitment to reflecting on lessons learned for the next inevitable disaster.

²³ IFRC, 2014 "International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) in Indonesia: an analysis of the impact and implementation of Indonesia's legal framework for international disaster assistance"

²⁴ As at the date of this report, the NDRF has not been adopted: the final version of the NDRF after stakeholder input was handed back to BNPB in August 2018 (when Indonesia was already going through the Lombok response) and still awaits formal enactment through a Presidential decree.

²⁵ situated in Jakarta

²⁶ Cook, E., 2018 "Indonesia's Deadly Disaster Sparks Political Blame Game"

²⁷ Lyons, K., 2018 "Indonesia orders foreign aid workers helping with tsunami effort to leave"

²⁸ AFP, 2018 "Quake-battered Indonesia accepts foreign aid, reluctantly"

²⁹ Ngcobo, Z., 2018 "Foreign aid workers blocked from Indonesian disaster sites following quake"

³⁰ Rose, D.G., 2018 "1,600 dead, 70,000 homeless. Why wouldn't tsunami-hit Indonesia want aid"

Classification of disasters

A key determinant for how disasters are managed (and talked about) is their status and level. This is not so well understood outside of Indonesia and contributed to some of the confusion and ‘push back’ by some donors and international organisations.

There is a documented process for disaster declaration status and level, codified in Article 7 of Law 24/2007. Indicators include number of casualties; asset losses; damaged infrastructure and facilities; geographical coverage of the impact, and; social and economic impact.³¹ While the decision on disaster status was determined quickly (a ‘yes/no’ decision), the disaster level was ‘*largely influenced by expert judgments and the instincts of leaders*’³², with the enactment of a ‘Presidential Regulation concerning Status and Level of Disaster’ still postponed. The Regulation identifies the following categories for the level of disaster:

- *‘[A] local level disaster is declared when it affects a particular district or municipality and the local government remains functioning.*
- *A provincial level disaster is declared when it impacts several districts and/or municipalities.’*³³ Under provincial status, mechanisms, institutional arrangements, rules and regulations are already in place to enable the mobilisation of national assets and capacities to support local governments, provide access to state budget and funding, and provide flexibility of rules and regulations during emergency.
- *‘A key criterion for national level disaster is when the provincial government has either collapsed or its ability to function is significantly compromised.’*³⁴ Currently there is no exact formulation that can be used to determine when a disaster can be considered a national calamity. As a result, the statement of national calamity will be evaluated using a case-by-case approach and a judgment call by the national government with the decision of the President.

The Lombok and Central Sulawesi disasters were classified as provincial disasters – meaning that the provincial government is in charge, the governor takes the lead, and the national government’s role is to support the local government. For both disasters, the local governments were intact and functioning although the capacity to cope with the disaster was limited, and some infrastructure was impacted. It is important to note that the last time the Gol issued a statement declaring a national disaster was for the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Since then, the government has not issued any statement of national calamity to any disaster in Indonesia including the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake that killed more than 5,700 people, and the 2009 Padang earthquake that claimed 1,115 fatalities.

With respect to engaging international and regional partners, Government Regulation No. 21 and 23/2008 on ‘*Participation of International Organisations and Foreign non-government Organisations in Disaster Management*’ states that the Head of the BNPB is authorised to determine the role of international organisations and foreign NGOs in disaster management.³⁵

The Gol has several options when it comes to **accepting** international assistance:

- a. Not welcoming any form of international assistance [...]*
- b. Welcoming assistance for specific relief items and/or expertise [...]*

³¹ HCT Indonesia, 2018 “Draft internal report from Indonesia’s Humanitarian Country Team’s Lessons from Lombok and Sumbawa Earthquake Response West Nusa Tenggara Province”

³² *ibid.*, p4

³³ *ibid.*, p4

³⁴ *ibid.*, p4

³⁵ *ibid.*

c. *Welcoming assistance from international organizations that already have presence in the country*³⁶. IFRC was considered to ‘have presence’ (unlike a number of INGOs, even when they had been already working in the country earlier), with an existing status agreement and its role ‘to coordinate [...] the international response of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in support of PMI’³⁷

‘d. *Widely accepting humanitarian assistance from international organizations. This option is only available when there is a mega-disaster that affects other countries’ interests and results in enormous humanitarian needs that would overwhelm the capacity of any single country.*’³⁸

‘Welcoming assistance’ and ‘requesting assistance’ are important distinctions in this context. At no point did the GoI **request** international assistance, nor was it expected that they would do so. However, international pressure mounted in the days and weeks after the disasters, driven in large part by the powerful (and painful) memories that the word ‘tsunami’ invoked and the highly unusual event of a liquefaction, both arising in the context of the Sulawesi quake. Important also was the role of media, including social media, which generated additional attention and immediacy, and provided a regular stream of distressing footage and sound bites from remote locations. This resulted in a higher level of international assistance accepted for Sulawesi; in Lombok, the GoI stated it was still able to manage the situation and only accepted limited international assistance. It is worth noting that some people drew the link between the GoI’s tighter restrictions in Lombok and the island’s tourism industry, pointing to potential negative media coverage that could undermine its recovery.

Some informants suggested the GoI felt it had no option with considerable pressure being exerted, in combination with cultural mores of not refusing assistance when it is offered. Conversely, some informants linked the GoI not specifically requesting international assistance to national pride and the upcoming elections.

*“You can’t say ‘no’,
when help is offered”*
National stakeholder

The GoI’s reasoning is most probably much simpler; its main ambition was to not complicate the national response already underway. Implicit in this thinking is the understanding that the ‘giving’ country regards its assistance as an asset, but for the government accepting assistance, it can impose additional stresses and burdens at a time that resources are already stretched. No matter how generous an offer, there is an associated ‘headache’ of receiving assistance ranging from clearing immigration, customs and tax; providing support to the incoming teams; resolving issues at the field level associated with the incoming aid; distributing assistances without creating social issues; potentially attracting controversial media coverage; reputational risks; state audit of how the assistance was utilised; and other potential issues that need to be managed and resolved. Thus, the GoI’s acceptance of international assistance was very specific and intended to support and fill the gap for the assets and capacities that the GoI (and affected communities) most needed.³⁹

In conclusion, the GoI has been on a trajectory since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami to build a disaster management architecture and capacity at the national and provincial levels so that it could be firmly

³⁶ *ibid.*, p4

³⁷ BNPB, 2018 “Indonesia National Disaster Response Framework”, p30

³⁸ HCT Indonesia, 2018 “Draft internal report from Indonesia’s Humanitarian Country Team’s Lessons from Lombok and Sumbawa Earthquake Response West Nusa Tenggara Province”

³⁹ ‘Government of Indonesia has decided to receive [...] Air transportations (preferably C-130 or alike), tents (shelter kits), water treatment, electric generators, and financial donation (i.e. from foreign governments and international organisations preferably to BNPB and PMI’ (AHA, 2018 “Situation Update No. 10 M7.4 Earthquake & Tsunami Sulawesi Indonesia”), p2

in control of any disaster response. That its strong stance for a ‘national-led response’ caught many in the international community off guard was a surprise in itself; the signals have been coming for the past 14 years – in Indonesia; at the regional level with ASEAN; and globally with the Sendai Framework and Grand Bargain commitments. The responses to both disasters were an opportunity to test new systems and alliances and to start to bed down new ways of doing business. Ultimately, the test is whether the Gol, with the support of PMI, other national organisations, and regional and global assistance was able to effectively meet the needs of people who were impacted by the disasters.

4. Response Analysis

This section discusses what went well and what can be improved in the current operation. Lessons drawn have short and long term aims: to optimise the operation in scope, and to set out ideas for how Movement components can be better prepared to respond in future ‘localised’ operations – both in Indonesia and more broadly. The initial figure provides a quick snapshot. This is followed by elaboration of findings and lessons learned.




Figure 2: key aspects of ‘What went well’ (left) and ‘What can be improved’ (right) in the Lombok and Sulawesi operation

An overview of [key findings and lessons learned from the Lombok and Sulawesi operation](#) is provided in Annex 6.

Preparedness and readiness

GoI message unheard

As outlined previously, the message on ‘national-led response’ was not heard in the wider humanitarian world and in the international media. International aid actors (including donors) described their HQs’ push for more international activities on the ground. Some PNSs reportedly also exerted pressure on PMI to deploy their assets.

*“Our biggest battle was internal:
fighting off the HQ and its
machinery”*

INGO stakeholder

Finding 1: Global and policy level efforts on localisation have not yet filtered through to the operational level among international aid actors, resulting in a disconnect between the ‘talk’ and the ‘walk’ at the international level.

Lesson Learned 1: Continued efforts are required to highlight the importance of localisation, and to ensure the transition from policy to operations among international aid actors.

Operationalising the Disaster Management Act

As mentioned, significant efforts have been taken over the past decade by GoI, supported by PMI, IFRC and other stakeholders, to institute a comprehensive legal system for disaster risk management. However, there are still gaps in operationalising many of the provisions in the Disaster Management Act, translating them to procedures, and clear demarcation of responsibilities and authorities for involved actors at each stage and at each level (national, provincial, district). There were also frustrations that existing SOPs and procedures are not being implemented and/or have not been shared widely enough. As well, multi-agency emergency response plans in line with the NDRF are yet to be developed.

Government actors demonstrated an appetite to build on their achievements, with a *Lessons Learned* exercise from Lombok already carried out by BNPB and the Humanitarian Country Team⁴⁰ (HCT) and a similar, more formal exercise for the Central Sulawesi response envisaged, which may result in updating the legal framework. BNPB has also prioritised capacity development of staff and an increase in the number of personnel for both BNPB and provincial / district disaster management authorities (BPBD).

For the future, clarity on GoI expectations towards PMI, and clear operational procedures (including not only the delegation of responsibility, but also the delegation of authority to PMI) need to be sought, to allow for adequate PMI capacity development and operational delivery.

Finding 2: GoI’s significant efforts in reshaping Indonesia’s disaster management framework now need to move to the next step and see the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and articulation of roles and responsibilities.

Lesson Learned 2: Continued PMI efforts with GoI to transform disaster management framework into concrete operational procedures.

⁴⁰ comprising United Nations (UN) agencies, international and NGOs, and the IFRC

Delegating authority and responsibilities to PMI provinces and branches

Discussions between the national, provincial and local levels of PMI were similar to the discussions playing out on localisation at the global, regional and national levels: PMI's planning and decision making (as with the authorities) mostly took place on HQ level, with provincial and local branch levels not feeling sufficiently involved. Branches complained about being informed of finalised plans and being asked to implement without having input into the plans or receiving adequate decision-making powers, financial means or human resources. PMI branches spoke of a '*habit of retaining authority at the national level*', not in line with PMI regulations which see the branch level to be in charge⁴¹. At the HQ level, issues on the provincial and local levels were raised - such as capacity gaps in leadership, implementation and accountability. To some extent, this is reflected by the provincial and local branches' call for more capacity and competency development.

Empowering the provincial and local branch levels to have an integral role in planning and decision-making, and to cooperate with their hierarchy on a level playing field requires a change of attitude at the national level, clear SOPs and the demarcation of responsibilities and delegation of authority for all levels to become reality.

Finding 3: PMI tendency to delegate responsibilities without related decision-making power.

Lesson Learned 3: Need to demonstrate HQ commitment in line with PMI decentralisation, and to enhance leadership capacities at provincial and local branch levels.

Humanitarian standards

The GoI, supported by national and international humanitarian actors, has been working on the definition of national humanitarian standards in some sectors⁴², but as yet no full set of national standards is available. Neither has the GoI made a commitment to adhere to international standards (such as the Sphere Humanitarian Standards⁴³). In effect, standards that should have been applied, were at times absent.

In the absence of national standards, national and international stakeholders highlighted a lack of knowledge on international humanitarian standards with Indonesian actors. This may partly be related to a lack of international standards available in Bahasa Indonesia (Sphere standards were translated earlier in 2018).

"This notion that international standards are always better than regional or national standards; we don't always believe that"

Government stakeholder

National and local actors would benefit from an increased understanding of international disaster response mechanisms and standards, as they can inform the development of national or regional standards, if international standards are deemed inappropriate. As well, the international standards represent the current norms for international responders and even more so for international donor accountability regulations.

National stakeholders called for more clarity on which standards are to be applied, subsequent training and country-wide implementation of standards. They highlighted the added value of distinct

⁴¹ reflecting PMI's decentralization approach

⁴² for example Shelter, with PMI supporting the efforts

⁴³ <https://spherestandards.org/handbook-2018/>

international expertise in the current operation, providing assistance and information on international standards⁴⁴.

PMI's standards comply with IFRC- standards. Thus, PMI and IFRC may continue to support the establishment of national / regional standards, if these are required, as they have done for example with elaborating national shelter standards.

Finding 4: Lack of humanitarian standards guiding operations; national actors are not familiar with humanitarian standards.

Lesson Learned 4: Continued PMI / IFRC efforts to establish and implement (national or international) humanitarian standards.

Coordination

Effective coordination saves efforts, resources, time and, more importantly, lives. It demands solid leadership and is one of the most critical components of any disaster response.

Coordination with GoI actors

As outlined previously, BNPB is mandated to coordinate government agencies and non-state actors in a disaster response. The general consensus was that the capacity of BNPB and BPBDs were stretched beyond capacity, and coordination, particularly at the provincial levels, was less than optimal. In addition, provincial / district BPBDs fall under the authority of and report to the provincial level government, limiting direct control and authority of BNPB. Thus, stakeholders also reported challenges with lines of coordination and responsibility.

It took PMI substantial time to obtain permits / approvals from BNPB for imports of relief goods (even after being tasked as the conduit for incoming INGO relief), whereas government-to-government approvals were obtained quickly (in some cases in half an hour).

The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), with their '*operational preparedness and wide-ranging territorial structure across the country*'⁴⁵, was a central implementing actor (and coordinating, given BNPB's limitation⁴⁶), especially in the initial phase of response. Some civilian organisations expressed reservations on TNI's '*military behaviour*' when coordinating on the ground. PMI and TNI coordinated well and without major issues in the current operation. The role of the military as a key responder in disasters is expected to continue, posing the need for sound civil military relations, especially in relation to existing areas of conflict in country. PMI expressed the need for national civil-military standards, based on mutual understanding of working modalities, including the principles of humanitarian response.

Finding 5: PMI coordination with military worked well, despite no defined civil-military standards.

Lesson Learned 5: PMI, with support of IFRC and ICRC, to engage with its national military and define an agreed approach for civil-military relations in peace-time and for future operations.

⁴⁴ For example, the national cluster system benefitted from integrating international expertise in national clusters: IFRC provided shelter expertise in the shelter sub-cluster, UN agencies provided technical assistance to various national clusters. As well, IFRC supported with a logistics ERU. OCHA embedded experts in the AHA Centre.

⁴⁵ Laksana, E.A., 2010 "The Indonesian Defence Forces and Disaster Relief: Potential Pitfalls and Challenges", p1

⁴⁶ As a common practice, the regional army chief is appointed as the incident commander for major incidents.

Coordination with ASEAN structures

In line with ASEAN commitments, the AHA Centre (established in 2011) was tasked with facilitating international disaster management cooperation, supporting BNPB and coordinating information management. While stakeholders highlighted significant growth of capacities over recent years, gaps were also evident such as no framework for needs assessments, poor assessment data collection and analysis, and untimely sharing of information. AHA Centre's logisticians were considered not to be ready to manage incoming international relief, especially for shipment management and documentation. Stakeholders indicated that the AHA Centre will need to grow and expand its capacities further, if other ASEAN Member States decide to go down a fully localised response model. Some informants also expected ASEAN's Emergency Response and Assessment Teams (ERAT) on the ground to take a stronger coordinating role *'beyond verifying assessment data collected earlier'*.

IFRC APRO has established a positive working partnership with ASEAN disaster management bodies, which may contribute to developing AHA Centre capacities further. At the same time, partnerships allow for the promotion of international humanitarian law and disaster law, to maintain the humanitarian space and to protect the relevance and interest of the Red Pillar.

Finding 6: The AHA Centre's experience and capacity have developed significantly in recent years. This growth will need to continue if the AHA Centre is to reach its potential as a regional platform for facilitating cooperation and coordination.

Lesson Learned 6: Continued IFRC partnership with ASEAN's regional disaster management structures, thereby contributing to capacity development and to building stronger synergies between the AHA Centre, IFRC and National Societies of ASEAN Member States.

PMI coordination capacities

PMI is recognised within Indonesia and with international partners as a highly credible organisation, with its committed volunteers, competent staff and long-term experience in delivering its services in disasters. In the current operations, PMI was given additional responsibilities (i.e. in logistics, INGO-coordination and camp management) by the GoI, which necessitated coordination with a range of national and international stakeholders. Besides raising PMI's image as a central response actor, this also raised expectations of international humanitarian stakeholders for effective facilitation. However, PMI was challenged by the level of coordination activities tasked to it.

Provincial and branch level capacities were highly focused on operational responses, and less on participation in or even organisation of inter-agency coordination fora at the respective level. PMI HQ and IFRC stepped in to ensure coordination (participating in inter-agency coordination meetings), thereby allowing the provincial and local branches to focus on their well-versed response roles. For this current operation and for the future, branches need to develop this important coordination capacity.

*"What does localisation look like? –
Eight different Cluster-Meetings in
Bahasa every week"*

IFRC stakeholder

PMI informants also mentioned a lack of coordination at HQ level, not including existing technical expertise in planning and decision-making. Some operational decisions (e.g. for camp management) were perceived to be taken without consultation of PMI's sectoral technical experts and without

assessment of available resources, which poses the risk of either over-burdening or under-utilising existing capacities.

An increased readiness for vertical coordination (across PMI levels) will also support the delegation of authority and responsibly to provincial and local branches, as described previously.

Finding 7: New roles attributed by the GoI posed an uncommonly high level of coordination needs for PMI.

Lesson Learned 7: PMI is required to strengthen its internal and external coordination capacities.

Strategic IFRC analysis and stakeholder communication

PNS and foreign government representatives spoke of a lack of informed background information on the situational context, despite IFRC's activities in disseminating information to embassy representatives in Indonesia and Geneva. Information for high-level target groups (such as PNS senior decision-makers, donor and foreign government representatives), especially in complex and/or politically sensitive operations may benefit from more tailoring, communicating informed analysis and policy level implications rather than technical facts and figures (as successfully demonstrated for the Bangladesh PMO).

Finding 8: Lack of informed analysis and tailor-made communication for high-level PNS decision-makers, donor and foreign government representatives.

Lesson Learned 8: IFRC Secretariat to continue investing in strategic analysis and high-level communication in politically sensitive and/or complex operations.

Movement coordination

PMI, IFRC CCST, ICRC and in-country PNS have effective professional relationships. ICRC capacities were included in the response. As well, in-country PNS integrated their capacities. Some PNS not present in country responded bilaterally (Danish RC, German RC, Japanese RC, Qatar RC, Turkish RC), generally integrating in the IFRC system.

However, no regular Movement coordination meetings at a strategic level were held (PMI as the lead agency could have called for these), and a partnership meeting intended by IFRC has not yet taken place. Stakeholders contested the value of some partnership calls that have been conducted without PMI presence. The envisaged 'One Plan' concept is yet to be developed, as no comprehensive PMI plan including all funding streams and activities was communicated. A Movement Readiness Plan is currently in draft format, and will need to be revisited, informed by the recent operations. The readiness plan should set the basis for future mobilisation of the IFRC system, thereby adding predictability

Finding 9: The integration of bilateral and ICRC capacities into response worked, despite Movement coordination mechanisms at a strategic level not being fully established.

Lesson Learned 9: Further need to strengthen Movement coordination mechanisms and readiness planning in Indonesia – both in the current response and beyond.

Response capacities

PMI volunteer resources

PMI's strong volunteer network, built over decades, its ability to mobilise resources immediately after disaster, and sectoral expertise in health, WASH and relief have proven to be key strengths. PMI applied a '50-30-20' approach for volunteer mobilisation (with 50% of volunteers mobilised locally, 30% regionally and 20% country-wide). Volunteer teams (including community-based teams) were deployed branch-wise, with rotations of two weeks, recently shifting to four-week deployments. For the Sulawesi operation, target numbers for volunteers in action have not been met in recent periods, leaving the base camp '*half empty*'. Recruitment and training of new volunteers at the local level is ongoing and a new volunteer management system is under development. Given the expected duration of the operation, PMI is at risk of falling short on volunteer capacities, both with regard to the quantity of volunteers and the required expertise. In general, the question of '*How much capacity is enough – and how much is sustainable?*' was raised.

PMI will also benefit from increasing its HR pool trained on international level (e.g. RDRT or FACT) and from deploying surge personnel regionally and globally, thereby increasing knowledge of international operational mechanisms and benefitting the NS's readiness to provide international assistance.

Finding 10: PMI was able to quickly mobilise capacity from its strong network. However, challenges persist with sustaining volunteer capacity (both quantity and required competencies) for the current operations.

Lesson Learned 10: PMI is encouraged to explore solutions to sustain the required volunteer resources in the operation.

Operational shortcomings

International stakeholders (both within the Movement and beyond) identified a need for greater focus on (multi-sectoral) needs assessments, information management, quality assurance, and cross-cutting issues such as Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA), and PGI as key components adding value to localised response - and its international acceptance⁴⁷. PMI informants shared this point for cross-cutting capacities, stressing the benefits of participatory approaches. Stakeholders suggested that CEA was working '*much better*' in Sulawesi than in Lombok, with international capacities on hand to support implementation.

All actors stressed the needs to invest in continued development of these capacities at national and local levels, as the same time highlighting increasing challenges to obtain international funding for long-term capacity development programmes.

Finding 11: Despite significant growth in national / local capacities over the last decade, GoI and PMI experienced shortcomings in operational integration of emergency needs assessments, information management, quality assurance, CEA, and PGI.

Lesson Learned 11: Further support to develop these capacities requires continued preparedness investments. Concerted advocacy will support mainstreaming these capacities into national humanitarian standards and Government-contingency planning.

⁴⁷ The mentioned gaps apply for PMI as well as for governmental actors.

PMI finance and logistics capacity

Despite ongoing efforts to develop PMI's financial and logistics management capacities (with support of IFRC), these sectors did not work according to IFRC standards, with a given need to increase capacities and competencies of staff, especially at branch levels.

The Logistics ERU proved to be fit-for-purpose, enabling the operation to minimize the impact of PMI capacity gaps. For the first time, a procurement delegate was embedded in the ERU, helping to kick-start some local procurement processes. The ERU also helped to coordinate and sort the massive pipeline of relief supplies directed to PMI⁴⁸.

PMI and IFRC underlined the need to further develop these sectors with the rider that there may be too much complexity in IFRC finance and logistics procedures. The latter is something which needs to be further investigated, in order to strike a balance between viable procedures, effective and efficient management of resources, and accountability.

Finding 12: PMI finance and logistics capacities were not working according to IFRC standards.

Lesson Learned 12: Need to increase PMI finance and logistics systems / capacities. Revisit respective IFRC support processes.

Resource Mobilisation

With respect to domestic fundraising, PMI has been successful with a focus on corporate donors (especially Indonesian representatives of international organisations). Donations received come with 'light' reporting and accountability standards (compared to international institutional donor standards). While the current focus is on cash-donations, future corporate fundraising may shift towards specific services (e.g. logistics services from logistics companies, financial services from the banking sector and so forth), corporate volunteering and Zakat⁴⁹ funding.

As for international institutional donors, PMI did not receive direct funding (to the best of the RTE team's knowledge) except from IFRC's pooled DREF⁵⁰. Donors consulted in the RTE expressed their preference to contribute to the IFRC EA⁵¹ or through bilateral programming of well-known PNSs as '*trusted partners*', ensuring accountability. Some donors mentioned that their current funding regulations do not allow direct funding to PMI. With the current localisation indicator of '*at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding [going] to local and national responders as directly as possible*'⁵², the question remains open, if all donor contributions to the EA can be considered 'local' contributions.⁵³

Both widening the scope of resource mobilisation and direct funding will call for comprehensive '*after-sales-services*' (monitoring and reporting), necessitating capacity development of PMI.

⁴⁸ As a result of the Gol direction that all items consigned to non-government entities were to be channelled to PMI.

⁴⁹ Zakat, one of the Five Pillars of Islam, is a form of alms-giving as a religious obligation.

⁵⁰ DREF, as well as the more recent Forecast-based-Financing tool, are considered by IFRC to be good practices in direct funding (see general recommendation 2)

⁵¹ IFRC Secretariat and PNS fundraising for the EA is considered successful with 66% (hard and soft pledges) as per 07 December 2018. Thereby, donor interest for Sulawesi is higher than for Lombok.

⁵² World Humanitarian Summit, 2016, "Grand Bargain – final Document", p5.

⁵³ The localisation work stream defines "*as directly as possible*" [...] *for the time being* [...] *funding to pooled funds that are available to local actors and funding that passes through only one intermediary before reaching a local actor*'. EA contributions may pass through more than one intermediary (e.g. PNS and IFRC Secretariat).

Finding 13: Successful domestic PMI resource mobilisation. PMI did not receive direct international funding (except from DREF allocations).

Lesson Learned 13: PMI may widen the focus for domestic fundraising, and develop resource mobilisation capacities. IFRC needs to explore options to enable direct international funding to National Societies.

Surge capacities

The IFRC Secretariat adapted to the national-led operating model, supporting PMI in delivering on its mandate as a key Indonesian responder, and refraining from taking implementation roles (see figure below). IFRC’s staff on the ground and management in Jakarta (CCST) and Kuala Lumpur (APRO) applied a flexible approach, utilising existing surge tools in a pragmatic way.

“We tried to react to a new modality with standard approaches. The goal was reached in the end - having the right persons on the ground!”

IFRC stakeholder

IFRC managed to shift its footprint from implementation to support roles. The delegates spoken to as part of this RTE understood the national-led approach and their own role to complement national capacities and enable the link between national and complex international support processes and procedures, thereby maximising PMI’s foot-print in the operation. Delegates largely demonstrated adequate soft competencies (such as attitude, sensitivity to cultural context, and *‘humility’*) required for the support-focussed setup.

Deployments decisions were taken jointly by PMI and the sending entity (IFRC Secretariat, PNS for bilateral personnel), whereby PMI preferred to have personnel speaking Bahasa Indonesia or coming from similar cultural backgrounds⁵⁴. As well, a preference for bilateral staff of in-country PNSs rather than IFRC delegates was reported, justified by *‘more freedom’* for selecting personnel and *‘easier cooperation’* when working through bilateral staff. Individuals known to PMI were reportedly accepted more smoothly than persons unknown.

Under these premises, the 10-person *‘FACT’* team alerted for Sulawesi⁵⁵ was sourced from RDRT and FACT registers, IFRC CCST / IFRC APRO staff, and bilateral delegates, underlining the IFRC Secretariat’s pragmatic approach, and being in line with the ongoing Surge Optimisation process. However, this caused some surprises with PNSs expecting FACT register members to deploy and would have benefitted from clearer communication from IFRC-side. Bilateral delegates integrated into the *‘FACT’* team were not formally seconded, no financial authority was provided to them (due to IFRC financial regulations), which could have posed legal and duty of care issues.

IFRC APRO’s *‘business continuity’* approach was good practice, allowing for quick deployments of local and regional IFRC Secretariat personnel, and replacing them in their line-function with staff from other IFRC offices or surge personnel.

⁵⁴ Informants tell about PMI’s initial wish for delegates who are *‘like Indonesians’*, translating roughly to ASEAN origin.

⁵⁵ on 01 October 2018, by IFRC HQ Surge

Finding 14: IFRC positively managed the shift from implementation towards support roles (with pragmatic personnel), despite complex international processes.

Lesson Learned 14: Further need to communicate surge optimisation to PNS stakeholders, and to make IFRC support processes (finance, HR) coherent with localised response. IFRC APRO's approach for staff deploying in surge roles commends to broader roll-out in the Secretariat.

Maximising capacity

PMI interpreted the Gol's national-led approach quite strictly to keep the numbers of international personnel low for Lombok. For Sulawesi, PMI changed this approach soon after the disaster onset. Thus, the IFRC footprint in Sulawesi outnumbered Lombok considerably⁵⁶, despite a majority of informants saying that they felt that the scale of the Lombok disaster was larger than Sulawesi. With respect to the number of delegates and international assets on the ground, the IFRC Sulawesi operation was comparable to 'traditional'⁵⁷ response setups.

According to informants, the higher number of IFRC resources in the Sulawesi operation was most likely resulting from a combination of limited PMI resources for the major operation in Sulawesi given its commitments to Lombok, the need for specific complementing expertise (e.g. for the ERUs), ensuring compliance to IFRC's administrative and accountability processes with specialized surge personnel (e.g. finance; planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting), and perceived pressure from PNSs.

For example, the Gol designated PMI as the conduit for incoming INGO relief goods for Sulawesi - a new and unexpected role for PMI, which stretched PMI's logistics coordination beyond capacity, necessitating IFRC support to handle incoming relief with a logistics ERU. With IFRC's support the given tasks could be managed.

The difference in the scale of the IFRC assistance on the ground can be interpreted as a response to different operational needs, changing from one operation to the other even in the same country and with comparable setups⁵⁸. The ultimate intention is to respond at scale to the needs of affected people, thereby maximising the capacities of the Host National Society (HNS) with complementing international assistance. Decisions on international assistance require solid situational assessment, in localised response as well as in 'traditional' operations.

⁵⁶ The number of surge personnel deployed for Sulawesi totals up to about 160, about 30% of these Indonesian citizens or Malaysians understanding Bahasa Indonesia. Standard surge personnel rotation patterns (on average one month deployments) were applied in Sulawesi, while the deployment time for personnel in Lombok was longer.

⁵⁷ 'Traditional' hereby referring to less localised operations, with standardised international processes and procedures in place, strategic and operational decision-making dominated by international expertise and a high presence of international assets and personnel.

⁵⁸ According to a stakeholder, the Sulawesi disaster triggered a 'hybrid' situation, with national authorities actively engaged, while Lombok was purely a provincial-led response.

Maximising capacities




Figure 3: Maximising capacities in different setups and with changing roles
- comparison of 'traditional' response setup to localised response in Sulawesi and Lombok;
indicative diagrams

Finding 15: International capacities complemented NS capacities at different scale in Lombok and Sulawesi.

Lesson Learned 15: Maximising the 'Red' footprint necessitates case-by-case decisions, considering a number of parameters.

Humanitarian diplomacy with the GoI

PMI, in its auxiliary role and as the most influential humanitarian organisation in Indonesia, is in a unique position to use its influence to persuade decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. PMI plays an active role in national disaster management working groups and is well connected with senior decision makers (PMI's chairman is Indonesia's Vice-President, provincial and local PMI-governance often includes politicians or senior public representatives). As previously mentioned PMI's humanitarian diplomacy efforts with influencing the shape of Indonesia's disaster management architecture have been commendable. This work is regarded as a good practice example of bringing the localisation process forward by supporting the development of adequate national frameworks. IFRC's support has been crucial. As it continues to provide guidance and build the capacity of NSs in disaster law, it is encouraged to frame its disaster law activities to align with the localisation agenda.

With respect to the Sulawesi and Lombok disasters, PMI successfully secured GoI understanding and support to launch an international appeal through IFRC for Lombok (and later-on widening this to Sulawesi), despite the GoI not requesting international assistance.

However, some stakeholders described humanitarian diplomacy as the biggest gap and felt that PMI was challenged in navigating the sometimes-difficult road of balancing the auxiliary role with advocating for humanitarian needs. Stakeholders underlined the perceived '*conflict of interest*' in

which the humanitarian diplomacy role was perceived not to be exercised to the required extent, such as the *'limited operational space'* described by PMI stakeholders (e.g. for requesting international RCRC relief goods); PMI being tasked as the conduit for INGO relief goods by the GoI without prior consultation and without adequate decision-making authority.

PMI, with support as appropriate from IFRC and ICRC, is in a powerful position to undertake humanitarian diplomacy with the GoI, ASEAN including the AHA Centre, and the UN to promote the need for clear roles and responsibilities on humanitarian action; for consistent data collection and needs assessments; for clear guidelines to inform civil military relations; for concise SOPs, translating governmental regulations into practical procedures; and to ensure that humanitarian standards are disseminated and adhered to.

IFRC's ambitions to establish a humanitarian diplomacy / policy-dialogue at a strategic level resulted in the deployment of a delegate to provide strategic analysis on the operation. However, some informants commented that this role was quickly absorbed into operations leaving little capacity to undertake higher level analysis.

Within the current response operation, IFRC humanitarian diplomacy efforts were mainly focused on shelter approaches (through the shelter sub-cluster) and to *'unblocking things'* (such as opening slots for relief goods). Movement actors need to continue their diplomacy efforts with GoI to clarify the Movement role, to upholding humanitarian standards, and to maintain the humanitarian space – in general and especially for the 'Red Pillar' (e.g. for a 'Red Corridor' for incoming relief goods). IFRC can bring its influence to bear to advocate for tripartite pre-disaster agreements (GoI - PMI - IFRC) on a national level. As a member of the HTC, IFRC is also in a key role to encourage 'lessons learned' exercises with BNPB and the AHA centre.

Finding 16: Challenges resulting from PMI's auxiliary role as a lead disaster response, and the role of influencing the GoI in the humanitarian sphere.

Lesson Learned 16: Use the PMI network and Movement diplomacy to maintain adequate humanitarian space and to obtain a clear set of roles and responsibilities in the national disaster management system. Build on the commendable humanitarian diplomacy work already undertaken by PMI and IFRC to support the GoI in strengthening its national disaster management system, with a focus on articulating roles and responsibilities of stakeholders and for response efforts to adhere to humanitarian standards.

Were the needs of the affected population met?

Some (sectoral) rapid needs assessments were carried out (by governmental and non-governmental actors), however poor coordination, a lack of procedural knowledge and improper consolidation of data, as well as a perceived *'pressure to respond'* (as opposed to *'assess'*) resulted in contradictory results and subsequently in a lack of evidence-based understanding of the situation, *'leaving everybody working with their own data'*. The reasons for the lack of needs assessment, and the potential impact on strategic and operational planning need further exploration.

The recent Recovery Assessments conducted jointly by PMI and IFRC (finished in December), which will feed into the upcoming EPoA revision, confirmed the *'existence of core needs in Shelter and WASH sectors, but evidenced a less alarming situation in sectors such as Livelihoods, Health and PSS'*⁵⁹, *'with*

⁵⁹ IFRC, 2018 "Report: Earthquake - Joint Recovery Assessment - Lombok", p6

*most of the immediate relief needs of the community being met*⁶⁰ for Lombok. For Sulawesi, again *'most of the immediate relief needs of the community [are] being met'*⁶¹, while *'[t]he assessment confirmed the existence of core needs both at camp and village level, mainly in Shelter, WASH, and Livelihoods sectors'*⁶². While the existence of recovery needs is evident in the ongoing transition from relief to recovery, there is some indication of shortcomings in the relief phase (with 'most' of immediate needs being met). However, with no comprehensive outcome evaluations for the relief operation carried out so far, information on 'how' and 'to what extent' the needs of affected people were met, is still anecdotal and not systematic. This militates against being able to offer an informed view on the impact of the operation for the time being.⁶³

There is a need for PMI and IFRC to answer this question, whereby a joint multi-agency effort, involving both national and international stakeholders, should be sought. An in-depth study to evaluate the Lombok and Sulawesi response as an example of national-led response was suggested by a number of stakeholders. This study could address the question (mainly coming from international actors) of whether needs would have been better met if more international 'assets' were on the ground.

Finding 17: The lack of comprehensive data makes it difficult to assess whether all humanitarian needs were met.

Lesson Learned 17: There is a need for analysis of the national-led operation, at best a multi-agency effort supported by PMI and IFRC.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p4

⁶¹ IFRC, 2018 "Report: Earthquake - Joint Recovery Assessment - Sulawesi", p4

⁶² *ibid.*, p7

⁶³ The purpose of the RTE did not allow for systematic assessment of the situation of beneficiaries.

5. Recommendations

Recommendations are presented in two sections: at a more specific level for future PMI and IFRC activities in the Indonesian context that are emerging from the current response; and at a general level for IFRC⁶⁴ supporting the transformation of localisation commitment into results.

Key recommendations in the Indonesian context

For the current and future operations in Indonesia, PMI and IFRC would benefit from implementing the following recommendations:

**An overview of
[key recommendations and enabling steps on localisation
for PMI and IFRC in the Indonesian context](#)
is provided in Annex 7.**

Recommendation 1: Advocate for and contribute to a multi-agency in-depth study

The national-led response would lend itself to validating the benefits and challenges of localisation. A comprehensive multi-agency in-depth study should be conducted to evaluate the impact of the Lombok and Sulawesi response⁶⁵. The evaluation may benefit from comparison with a ‘traditional’ response setup characterised by significant international assistance. It should seek to answer the key question, if needs would have been better met if more international assets were on the ground.

PMI, IFRC Secretariat, ICRC and PNSs involved in the operation are called to advocate for the delivery of this evaluation (within the next six months) and participate as national (PMI) and international actors (IFRC).

The in-depth study should include, yet not be limited to the following areas of interest:

- Leadership, decision making and coordination
- Sectoral coverage, including cross-cutting issues
- Quality of emergency needs assessments
- Roles and responsibilities of national, regional and international actors
- Capacities of local, national and international actors involved
- Benefits and gaps resulting from limitations for international actors
- Adherence to national / international (such as Sphere) standards
- Benefits and gaps of national-led response versus ‘traditional’ response
- Outreach and impact of the national-led response versus ‘traditional’ response

⁶⁴ Including the IFRC Secretariat and NS. In some cases recommendations also refer to ICRC (specifically indicated), the latter not being in scope of the RTE

⁶⁵ The evaluation may as well include the recent Sunda Straits Tsunami (22 December 2018) response.

Recommendation 2: Delegate authority and responsibility to provincial and local levels

Localisation is not only about shifting powers from international to national level, but also from national to provincial and local levels. Delegation of both authority and responsibility, including financial authority and responsibility, is a key component of success and may require humanitarian diplomacy efforts. The following aspects needs PMI's emphasis:

- Distinct national level commitment to decentralisation and empowerment of local and provincial levels.
- Involve provincial / local leadership in planning and decision making to increase ownership, empower middle management to take timely tactical decisions, thereby assuring the operational flow.
- Encourage bottom-up contingency planning, including thresholds for required capacities, check lists for activities and simulations to test preparedness and readiness.
- Create a pool of team leaders on local / provincial level trained according to RDRTs standards.

Recommendation 3: Ensure continued human resource mobilisation for the recovery phase

The following enabling steps aim to contribute to ensuring mobilisation of human resources in PMI's recovery operation in accordance with the HR needs defined for successful implementation of the recovery phase:

- Design and implement an effective volunteer management system. Consider the creation of a country-wide pool of trained volunteers available for the recovery phase of the operation.
- Ensure comprehensive briefing and proper hand-over (with outgoing personnel) for incoming staff and volunteers.
- Enhance technical capacities of human resources conducting on-the-job training for volunteers and staff.
- Consider setting up a specific operational structure (cell, office) for the recovery phase.
- Consider operational involvement of community-based initiatives and local NGOs under participatory approaches and partnerships with local authorities to increase resources and optimise outcomes (e.g. for shelter, camp management, health and WASH activities).

Recommendation 4: Build and implement additional cross-cutting capacities (CEA, PGI)

The timely implementation of cross-cutting issues have been considered as an area of improvement during the response (with CEA in the Sulawesi response working). CEA and PGI, both essential components in comprehensive response operations, should be mainstreamed in all operations. The following enabling actions are suggested:

- PMI and IFRC should analyse gaps and ways to strengthen PGI and CEA components in the current operation
- CEA and PGI awareness should be included in learning and training of all PMI volunteers.

- Consider integrating CEA and PGI basics in learning and training of community-based teams supporting in response and recovery
- Improve tools, develop and maintain additional specific volunteer / staff capacity for CEA and PGI (with support of IFRC and PNS)
- Revise contingency plans integrating cross-cutting activities

Recommendation 5: Strengthen coordination capacities across all levels

Effective coordination and communication are pivotal for any operation. Coordination between managers at PMI HQ level, and between HQ, provincial and local levels are considered to be key areas of improvement. As well, external stakeholder coordination will benefit from increased PMI capacities across all levels. Last but not least, affected people are a key stakeholder for coordination, benefitting from increased involvement (see CEA-recommendation).

“Our main challenges are internal not external. Communication and coordination between HQ and field needs to be improved”

PMI stakeholder

Coordination mechanisms need to be established and practiced in non-response time. Local and provincial levels of PMI will benefit most from increasing coordination capacities.

- Develop arguments on the advantages of improved coordination and keep communicating it to internal stakeholders.
- Internal coordination mechanisms need to be established involving all stakeholder levels from local branches to Movement partners in country.
- HQ managers and staff are considered to be role-models for coordination. Establishing a coordination culture needs to start at the top level.
- Staff and volunteers can develop coordination skills through training, but more importantly, they need to gain coordination experience through constant practice.
- Linking to other recommendations, coordination can be fostered by clearly defining roles, responsibilities and authorities, both for operational and administrative processes, and an effective system of information sharing.
- Establish regular fora involving all Movement actors in country to strengthen Movement coordination and cooperation.

Recommendation 6: Strengthen financial and logistics capacities

Sound financial procedures and a strong logistics system are required to achieve a cohesive response. Robust and reliable financial systems and procedures need to be developed and put into practice to provide a cornerstone for effective PMI emergency response.⁶⁶ Similarly, PMI’s logistics system would benefit from a review with the aim of increasing capacity and decentralisation. Important facets include:

⁶⁶ PMI may benefit from peer-to-peer reviewing financial rules and regulations, e.g. with Timor-Leste Red Cross Society, who apply a finance system developed from the PMI system.

- Revise financial systems to benefit efficiency and transparency of the organisation. This will also enhance donor confidence in line with their Grand Bargain commitments, and facilitate interoperability with IFRC finance procedures.
- Invest in developing finance human resources with focus on provincial and local level.
- Prioritising high-risk areas, further decentralise warehousing to district level for improved response timing.
- Develop capacities of logistics staff, ensuring compliance with existing guidance and practical training (focus on emergency procurement, warehousing, supplies standards and quality assurance at national, provincial and local level).
- Identify, assess and map local, regional and national suppliers / markets to support logistics preparedness.

Recommendation 7: Strengthen humanitarian diplomacy efforts with the GoI

Understanding its auxiliary role also as a humanitarian diplomacy role, PMI is encouraged to utilise its network to strengthen humanitarian diplomacy efforts with GoI actors, both on governance and operational level. IFRC and ICRC may play a supporting role.

- Continue efforts to communicate principles and rules guiding humanitarian assistance in order to maintain the humanitarian space for the Red Pillar and beyond.
- PMI, with support of IFRC and ICRC, to engage with Indonesia's national military and define an agreed approach for civil-military relations in peace-time and future operations.
- Organise joint trainings, visits, briefings and simulation exercises for increased understanding of roles and responsibilities with TNI, other government and non-governmental actors.
- Increase efforts to integrate emergency needs assessments, information management, logistics, quality assurance, CEA and PGI in government response and recovery planning.
- Strengthen efforts to establish humanitarian standards and disaster management SOPs, translating governmental frameworks into practical procedures coordination mechanisms, and including delegation of authority and adequate financing of roles entrusted by the GoI.
- Consider tripartite pre-disaster agreements (GoI - PMI - IFRC) agreements on national level, defining models of cooperation, rights and responsibilities.
- Consider PMI-agreements with ASEAN and UN actors.
- Continue efforts on disaster management law with the GoI.

Key general recommendations

An overview of
[key general recommendations and enabling steps on localisation](#)
[for the Secretariat and National Societies](#)
is provided in Annex 8.

The work of NSs like PMI is grounded in local humanitarian action, with staff and volunteers of affected communities being the first responders to humanitarian crises. The commitment to local action is an integral component of IFRC's agenda and strategy and as well anchored in the Seville Agreement and its Supplementary Measures. Over decades NSs have invested in developing capacities at community, branch and HQ levels within their own territory, and in bi- and multilateral cooperation with other NSs, the IFRC Secretariat and the ICRC. Recent IFRC engagement on the Localisation Workstream of the Grand Bargain emphasises this understanding and commitment.

However, power dynamics and resource allocation in the Movement and the broader humanitarian community have resulted in a dominance of international actors and the widely standardized policies, processes and procedures of international response systems.

The international humanitarian community is facing challenges in 'walking the talk' of localisation. Key issues raised around localisation include capacity challenges and a potential lack of compliance with international assistance standards and accountability. Shifting powers from international to national and local actors will indisputably change the humanitarian ecosystem, yet even more so the humanitarian 'ego-system'.

For the Movement, localisation holds both opportunities and limitations: the key benefits are presence, being seen as a central player in localised response, and internal complementarity, allowing for maximising the locally-led response with complementing capacities within the system. On the other hand, localisation bears limitations of not meeting regulations and expectations (especially of donors) of current, less localised international systems.

With existing localisation commitments and humanitarian diplomacy priorities⁶⁷, the recommendations below complement the IFRC's localisation action. They inform the engagement of the IFRC Secretariat, the wider IFRC NS-network, and HNSs in relation to specific domestic activities⁶⁸.

Recommendation 1: Define a SMART⁶⁹ way ahead, tackling benefits and limitations

To achieve IFRC's commitments, measurable action will support the transformation towards localisation. Perceived limitations related to localisation require open discussion.

- **Continue sensitisation of Movement actors.** (Secretariat, NS)⁷⁰

The IFRC Secretariat has been communicating localisation commitments on a policy level for

⁶⁷ IFRC, 2018 "IFRC policy advocacy priorities", May 2018

⁶⁸ in some cases recommendations also refer to ICRC (specifically indicated), the latter not being in scope of the RTE

⁶⁹ Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time bound

⁷⁰ Brackets indicate the entities involved in the process: IFRC Secretariat ('Secretariat'), the totality of National Societies ('NS'), and affected Host National Societies ('HNS')

years⁷¹. However, some stakeholders define a ‘disconnect’ between the policy and operational level. Continued advocacy within the IFRC Secretariat and with NSs is needed to highlight the importance of localisation and the implications for all Movement components.

- **Discuss both benefits and limitations of localisation.** (Secretariat, NS)

Limitations related to localisation (e.g. in the context of funding, and the related power shift), might they be perceived or evidenced, are reflected to a lesser extent than its benefits. This potentially limits informed discussion with stakeholders, overcoming existing bias and developing strategies to mitigate risks. For example, the IFRC policy brief on localisation only refers to “*shar[ing] the risk*”⁷² in one paragraph, while widely discussing the benefits. IFRC is called on to discuss both benefits and limitations linked to localisation.

- **IFRC Secretariat to lead the development of a RCRC Localisation Roadmap with SMART indicators for success, and report on the implementation.** (Secretariat, NS)

While a ‘*Localization Work Stream Workplan (2017-2019)*’ exists for the work stream group (comprised of donors, UN, INGOs, Movement representatives and an invited group of local actors), no internal Movement-wide roadmap has been developed at present. As the ‘champion’ of localisation, the IFRC Secretariat should lead the development of an internal roadmap for the next five years to leverage the localisation momentum and to provide guidance and support to NSs. SMART indicators to make internal progress measurable, would benefit the way ahead⁷³. The roadmap should integrate action across Secretariat departments, thereby avoiding ‘*pigeonholed*’ action. Annual progress reporting would allow for monitoring and adjusting planned activities. Some IFRC stakeholders recommend the upcoming IFRC Strategy 2030 to be the document to set the direction, bringing together different aspects of structures and relationships, and having the level of authority to change directions in sensitive areas that have ‘*a lot of entrenched practice*’. The roadmap should follow the strategic directions as an implementing plan. A Movement-wide roadmap could also reference ICRC’s ambitions with localisation.

Recommendation 2: IFRC to enable conditions for greater empowerment of National Societies towards a localised response

As the HNS is central to delivering the localised response, supported by Movement partners as required, it is crucial that NS capacity development receives continued support around preparedness and readiness. Acceptance of the power shift towards the NS and related funding might be supported by a certification process and amended emergency funding tools.

- **IFRC Secretariat to develop holistic tools to analyse internal capacities (based on existing PER, OCAC/BOCA, Readiness Plans) in the wider strategic context of the country-specific situation.** (Secretariat, HNS)

The IFRC has a number of tools intended to take stock of the NS capacity and preparedness status, such as the recently developed ‘Preparedness for Effective Response’ (PER) tool, the

⁷¹ for example in: IFRC, 2015 “World Disasters Report 2015 - Focus on local actors, the key to humanitarian effectiveness”; IFRC, 2018 “IFRC policy advocacy priorities”; IFRC, 2018 “Localization – IFRC policy brief”

⁷² IFRC, 2018 “Localization – IFRC policy brief”, p5

⁷³ In addition to the aforementioned ‘25% direct funding’-indicator, a second indicator on capacity building commitments has been drafted, yet still discussed.

The percentage of funding channelled through PMI in the current operation was not defined at the time of writing, with an estimated general average of 80% of EA-budgets being channelled through the HNS.

‘Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification’ (OCAC) and its ‘Branch Organisational Capacity Assessment’ (BOCA), and Readiness Planning, which provide the baseline for NS preparedness and readiness development. Based on the existing approaches, a more holistic instrument (also integrating strategic analysis of the national disaster management frameworks and laws, and the auxiliary roles and responsibilities expected from the NS) could help raise the understanding of the NS and its supporting Movement partners on status and needs in preparedness and readiness to ensure it can deliver a localised response.

- **Define and implement tailor-made NS development programmes with defined targets for the intended level of capacity.** (Secretariat, HNS)

Based on the current level of preparedness and readiness within the strategic context in country (as described above), specific targets may define the required level of preparedness / readiness and response capacities of the HNS to lead a localised response in country. Deriving from current NS development practice, key capacities to be considered may include (yet not be limited to) leadership, operational planning, coordination, human resource / volunteer management, finance, and specific sectoral capacities. Subsequent development programming should be carried out in a coordinated effort across all Movement actors in country (regularly with the HNS as the coordinator), and be prioritised and measurable. Programming may include expertise available in country (e.g. within academia, the private sector, the NGO-community and Governmental programming). It should not follow a ‘one-size-fits-all’-approach or be resources-driven. The approach may prioritise high risk countries for disaster or conflict, and could be linked to the new NSIA, the latter offering an additional opportunity to fast-track capacity development of these NS.

- **Explore benefits and risks of a certification process for NSs.** (Secretariat, NS)

Some stakeholders suggested a certification process for NSs that would provide the opportunity to validate the preparedness and readiness of a NS to manage a localised response. A certified high grade of preparedness / readiness would be a ‘seal of quality’, stating the readiness to ensure quality implementation and donor accountability. It might thereby be the entry level for direct international funding. The certification might include peer-to-peer and/or external reviews (including by donors), would be renewable and also include the review operational performance, if it comes to disaster.

However, ‘*binding*’ certifications are widely uncommon in the humanitarian sector, and the suggested approach would in fact change existing paradigms and was considered ‘*paternalistic*’ by other stakeholders. Careful exploration and a consolidated approach across the humanitarian sector, going well beyond the Movement, would be required ahead of implementing models like this.

- **Explore options for direct international NS-funding.** (Secretariat, NS)

Options to increase direct funding to NS need to be analysed. The model applied in Japan in the 2011 earthquake and tsunami operation (a national appeal, welcoming international assistance, with IFRC Secretariat support for quality assurance / accountability) might offer a relevant approach. The IFRC’s pooled DREF, a good practice example of localised funding, could be further explored with regard to options expanding its scope (eligible activities) and scale (maximum funding). As well, the UN’s Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF) could provide learnings for direct funding opportunity for NS.

- **Move towards less risk-averse systems.** (Secretariat, NS)

As with ‘traditional’ response models, the risk of inefficient and inappropriate response implementation also exists for localised response models. A vast majority of donor compliance requirements and the IFRC Secretariat’s system apply an onerous level of checks and balances, rigid frameworks and little tolerance for error. IFRC is encouraged to continue working with donors (including NSs with their own governments) to find solutions enabling direct funding, thereby advocating for lighter and less risk-averse procedures. These should also be reflected in IFRC’s own system.

Recommendation 3: Shift the narrative from response towards preparedness

Localisation benefits from a changed narrative of disaster preparedness and response – contributing to shaping both internal and external perceptions. Movement actors are called on to be the champions of localisation-diplomacy, especially with the donor, supporting the change of the humanitarian ecosystem and ‘ego-system’.

- **Change the narrative from the ‘response cavalry’ to ‘preparedness building, with a local lead and international support’.** (Secretariat, NS, HNS)

Current disaster response often sells ‘expatriate humanitarian heroes’ and international assistance in less-developed, disaster-shaken, and overwhelmed countries. The future RCRC narrative may prioritise the central role of local and national response, highlight success-stories of capacities that have been built and result in less need for international interventions, and stress the supporting nature of international RCRC solidarity.

- **RCRC actors are called to advocate for change on all levels, especially with the donor community.** (Secretariat, NS, HNS)

With localisation, international actors in the humanitarian ecosystem are facing a change of roles from ‘implementing to supporting’ and changing power dynamics, confronting them with less decision-making and influencing power. The donor community has a key role to make a change by reshaping funding frameworks towards localised action, enabling the move from local subcontractors to more direct funding and increased investments in national preparedness. RCRC actors are encouraged to strengthen their humanitarian diplomacy efforts with donors on this. This also changes the role the IFRC Secretariat and PNSs (and to a lesser extent ICRC), coming at some (loss of overhead) cost for them, and requiring the alignment of internal resource mobilisation and financing policies.

Recommendation 4: Optimise IFRC tools, including support processes

The Surge Optimisation process widely reflects the localisation drive⁷⁴. More surge personnel coming from high-risk-countries for disaster and additional focus on ‘supporting’ soft competencies of surge personnel would foster localisation. IFRC support processes will benefit from reduced complexity.

- **Prioritise soft competencies and local language skills for surge delegates, roll out IFRC APRO’s business continuity approach.** (Secretariat, NS, HNS)

The shift for surge delegates from operating towards supporting roles is putting even more focus

⁷⁴ ‘As local as possible, as global as necessary’ is one of the guiding principles of the process.

on ‘soft competencies’, such as attitude, judgement, sensitivity to cultural context, and ‘humility’ of surge delegates. In addition, the role of ‘translating’ between national and international processes and procedures might gain importance. Ensure that the shift is adequately reflected in the learning and development of new and existing surge personnel, as well as in the ToR, onboarding and briefing of delegates. Local language skills for delegates add value in national-led operations, which use local language for command, control and coordination.

“Perhaps the role of the incoming can be tweaked a bit – the incoming are the counterparts dealing with the international bureaucratic requirements.”

PNS stakeholder

IFRC APRO’s ‘business continuity’ approach, allowing for quick deployments of regional IFRC personnel (with cultural and language background), and replacing them in their line-function with staff from other IFRC offices or surge HR, is a good practice, recommended for broader roll-out across the IFRC Secretariat.

- **Prioritise training and deployments of surge personnel from disaster-prone NSs to increase their capacities and the understanding of international operations.** (Secretariat, NS, HNS)

Based on the frequency of disasters, surge personnel from high-risk NS may be prioritised for deployments (including trainee missions) to boost the NS’s capacities and increase the understanding of international operational mechanisms, thereby also benefitting the NS’s readiness to host international assistance, and strengthening capacities in proximity of disaster onsets. Widening partnerships of ERU-holding NS and disaster-prone NS would support the integration of personnel in ERUs.

- **Consider adding a ‘humanitarian analyst’ profile to surge roles.** (Secretariat)

Major or contextually complex operations may benefit from increased focus on strategic analysis, and targeted communication for high-level stakeholders. Senior decision makers of NSs and the donor community require background and informed analysis rather than operational facts and figures. A ‘humanitarian analyst / communication’ profile may support IFRC / NS management (as successfully demonstrated for the Bangladesh PMO), reporting directly to senior management level, thereby informing operational strategy and planning.

- **Make IFRC Secretariat support systems viable (finance, HR, logistics).** (Secretariat)

The IFRC Secretariat’s support systems (finance, HR, logistics) are complex, including a high level of checks and balances. As in earlier evaluations stakeholders were critical on the lack of speed, limited applicability in emergency operations and the high level of bureaucracy.⁷⁵ Increased viability and applicability requires simplified support processes, with a view to interoperability with locally owned processes. IFRC Secretariat logistics is currently working to capitalize on lessons learned from recent operation

and make current policies and procedures more suitable to the localisation agenda.

“We are not agile enough, there are too many layers, there should be a proper local procurement framework in place to expedite the procurement process”

⁷⁵ The ‘new working modality’, which is about to be piloted in disaster-prone Asia-Pacific NS, may add value.

Recommendation 5: Build trusted operational partnerships with regional⁷⁶ inter-governmental organisations

Alongside the move to localised humanitarian action, a trend of ‘regionalisation’ exists. Inter-governmental structures (such as ASEAN, EU) have developed disaster and crisis coordination and response mechanisms, with more to come (Regional Organisations Humanitarian Action network)⁷⁷. Trusted long term partnerships with Movement actors will help to maintain the humanitarian space and ensure interoperability.⁷⁸

- **Keep continuous strategic dialogue with inter-governmental disaster management actors / systems.** (Secretariat, NS, HNS)

Continuing the dialogue with inter-governmental organisations, the Movement (including ICRC) needs to promote international humanitarian law and disaster law, maintain the humanitarian space and protect the relevance and interest of the Red Pillar. Dialogue and partnership need tailored approaches. The pragmatic and results-focused relationship between IFRC APRO and ASEAN may serve as a role-model.

- **Benefit from mutual participation in training programmes and simulation exercises, joint projects, and alike.** (Secretariat, NS, HNS)

Mutual engagement in learning, development and cooperation in (research and operational) projects increases understanding for each other’s processes and procedures and provides for enhanced interoperability, as demonstrated with ASEAN and - more recently - the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

- **Assure operational coordination and cooperation.** (Secretariat, HNS)

Partnerships would also comprise exchange of information, operational coordination and cooperation. This may include deploying liaison officers to Operations Centres⁷⁹, joint (multi-agency) assessments and mutual utilisation of resources (e.g. for logistics capacities).

⁷⁶ ‘regional’ hereby refers to associations / unions of countries (such as ASEAN, or EU), not IFRC regions

⁷⁷ 12 regional inter-governmental organisations committed to strengthen capacities and collaboration within and amongst regional organisations and other humanitarian partners, ensuring greater coherence and collaboration in humanitarian responses, through the ‘Regional Organisations Humanitarian Action network’ (ROHAN). The organisations are: 1) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 2) African Union (AU), 3) Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), 4) Centro de Coordinación para la Prevención de Desastres de América Central (CEPRENAC), 5) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 6) European Union (EU), 7) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 8) League of Arab States (LAS), 9), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 10) Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 11) Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), 12) South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

⁷⁸ Similar benefits apply for global (e.g. UN) structures.

⁷⁹ An IFRC liaison person was working in the AHA Centre in the Sulawesi response.

Annexes

Annex 1: Methodology and Limitations

The evaluation applied a range of methods allowing for adequate information collection, information analysis and triangulation. All information collected has been documented and coded. Informants have been ensured discretion, thus de-identified information is stored as an 'information-trail' and can be provided, if required.

Inception phase

To prepare themselves for the field, the evaluation team leader and chief evaluator conducted a series of semi-structured inception interviews with 17 key informants, include leadership and operational personnel of IFRC (see Annex 2). Due to the limited time span (starting from 05 December), restricted availability of team members and just-in-time preparation of key informant interviews, the inception phase was of limited comprehensiveness. The inception report was submitted on 09 December 2018.

Desk based document review

The evaluation team undertook a comprehensive review of background documentation. Annex 3 provides a list of documents consulted. The EMT provided support and assistance in locating and compiling these documents.

Key Informant Interviews / Group Interviews

The team interviewed key informants face-to-face in Indonesia (Jakarta, Palu/Sulawesi, Mataram/Lombok), in Kuala Lumpur and via Skype and telephone. Informants included Movement resource persons (PMI, PNS, IFRC and ICRC) as well as GoI, ASEAN, embassies, UN, NGOs (local and national), INGOs and members of the affected population (see Annex 2). Ten group interviews were held (with PMI volunteers, PMI branch representatives, PMI sector leads, IFRC Logistics staff, in-country PNS staff, ICRC staff, UN staff, IFRC CCST staff, IFRC field staff), ranging from three to thirteen interviewees per Group Interview. All interviews were of semi-structured nature and held in safe spaces, assuring a confidential dialogue to all interviewees.

Field visits and observation

The review team undertook field visits as follows (see Annex 4):

11 – 16 December: Jakarta, Indonesia

17 – 19 December: Jakarta, Indonesia (3 team members)

Mataram/Lombok, Indonesia (2 team members)

Palu/Sulawesi, Indonesia (1 team member, supported by 1 EMT member)

20 – 22 December: Jakarta, Indonesia

Prior to the field visit, the team leader and the chief evaluator travelled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia for briefings (07-10 December).

The team observed two planning meetings (Recovery Planning Workshop, Jakarta; Recovery Planning Meeting, Mataram/Lombok).

Stakeholder feedback / validation session

The team presented preliminary results at a validation session on 21 December in Jakarta (with PMI staff and IFRC delegates in the plenary, and dial-in participants from IFRC APRO and IFRC HQ). The purpose of the session was to share initial findings, lessons learned and recommendation; gain further information to strengthen findings and fine-tune recommendations, and build ownership for future implementation.

A draft version of the final report was shared for an initial round of stakeholder feedback on 30 December 2018 ahead of final submission.

Interview statistics

The team undertook 129 informant consultations (female: 25% [n=32], male: 75% [n=97]) in Indonesia, Malaysia, Switzerland and some other countries (for returned delegates) face-to-face, via skype and telephone:

Consultation modality	Female	Male	Total
Group Interview	14	44	58
Interview (face-to-face)	9	45	54
Interview (Skype / phone)	9	8	17
Total	32	97	129

Table 4: Resource persons consulted by consultation modality and gender (see Annex 2)

Consulted	Female	Male	total
PMI	7	35	42
IFRC Secretariat	16	25	41
Movement (ICRC / PNS / ERU / RDRT / FACT)	3	10	13
GoI / ASEAN	1	6	7
Foreign Government	2	5	7
NGO	0	7	7
UN / INGO	2	7	9
Consultants	1	1	2
Affected population	0	1	1
Total	32	97	129

Table 5: Resource persons consulted by entity (see Annex 2)

Limitations

Supporting the RTE came on top of an already heavy workload for PMI and IFRC CCST: recovery planning, the revision of the EPoAs, and a Forecast-based Financing workshop hosted by PMI, were being dealt with simultaneously. The time span of the inception phase (5 days) was limited, availability

of team members was restricted (only three out of six members could make themselves available throughout the entire evaluation), and arrangements for interviews during the field visit partially had been taken on short notice. Overall, the setup of the evaluation was perceived to be rushed, and recruitment of evaluation team members delayed. More lead time for future RTEs will benefit preparation and execution, allowing for more in-depth research on context and background.

Annex 2: List of persons consulted (alphabetic order)

no	Name of source	position	organisation	gender
1	Abdoel Malik	OCHA officer	OCHA Sulawesi	m
2	Abdul Majid	Staff	PMI, West Lombok district branch	m
3	Adelina Kamal	Executive Director	AHA Centre	f
4	Agus Ali	Board member	PMI, Central Sulawesi province branch	m
5	Ahmad Sami	Regional National Society Development Coordinator	IFRC APRO	m
6	Ahmad Zaki Ali	PMI NHQ representative	PMI HQ (originally PMI Jogja Province)	m
7	Ahyanto N.	Head of office	PMI, East Lombok district branch	m
8	Alexandre Faite	Head of Regional Delegation to Indonesia and Timor-Leste	ICRC	m
9	Alfin N.	village leader	Central Sulawesi region	m
10	Alka Kapoorsharma	Head of Regional Logistics Unit	IFRC APRO	f
11	Andi Satar	RFL Sector	PMI, Central Sulawesi province branch	m
12	Andrea Reisinger	FACT Team Leader (rotation 3)	IFRC Palu (Austrian Red Cross)	f
13	Andreas von Weissenberg	FACT Team Leader (rotation 1)	Finnish Red Cross	m
14	Andrie Rachmat	Volunteer	PMI, Palu district branch	m
15	Anthea Webb	Representative & Country Director	WFP	f
16	Arifin Muhammad Hadi	Head of DM	PMI HQ	m
17	Awaluddin Atjeh	Country Coordinator	Japanese Red Cross	m
18	Ayu Paraswati	Public Relations	PMI HQ	f
19	Ben Lark	Regional Civil Military Relations Coordinator	IFRC APRO	m
20	Bernd Shell	NSD Advisor	IFRC HQ	m
21	Chandra Aprinova	Head of Social Protection for Affected People of Natural Disaster	Ministry of Social Affairs NTB Province	m
22	Charis Chan	Head of International	Singapore Red Cross	f
23	Chiran Livera	Senior Manager, Operations	Canadian Red Cross	m
24	Christie Samosir	Senior Officer, Disaster Response	IFRC CCST Indonesia & Timor Leste	f
25	Coree Steadman	Senior Officer - Localisation	IFRC HQ	f
26	Dani Hoidady	-	Sulteng Bergerak	m
27	Daniel von Rege	Country director	MSF	m
28	Dave Hodgkin	Shelter Cluster Coordinator	Humanitarian Benchmark Consulting	m
29	David Fisher	Manager, Policy and Diplomacy Unit	IFRC HQ	m
30	Deasy Sujatiningrani	Acting Head of Planning and RD Bureau	PMI HQ	f
31	Denny Fauzi	-	KPKPST	m
32	Dian Chairul	Program & Partnerships Coordinator	Australian RC	f
33	Dianing K.	Information Management / Command post	PMI, Central Sulawesi province branch	f
34	Dimas Respati Puji Utomo	-	Sulteng Bergerak	m
35	Djoko N.	Head of office	PMI, West Lombok district branch	m
36	Don Johnston	IFRC Lead Coordinator for operational sectors	IFRC Palu (Australian Red Cross)	m

37	Donny A.N.	-	IBU Foundation	m
38	Dwi Handayani	Senior Health Officer	IFRC Palu	f
39	Erna Trisnawati Wally	Admin/HR officer	IFRC Palu	f
40	Erwin N.	Volunteer	PMI, Palu district branch	m
41	Fabian Mauchle	Swiss Embassy	Swiss Embassy staff	m
42	Febriyanto B. Yusuf	Shelter Sector	PMI, Banggai Laut district branch	m
43	Ferri Novrianto	dispatcher / security focal point	IFRC Palu	m
44	Freddy Nggadas	ICRC Cooperation Programme Manager	ICRC	m
45	Fuad A. Yado	Coordinator	PMI, Palu district branch	m
46	Gabrielle Emery	Disaster Law Coordinator	IFRC APRO	f
47	Ginandjar Kartasasmita	Executive Chairman	PMI HQ	m
48	Hadi N.	Volunteer	PMI, Donggala district branch	m
49	Harland Hale	Regional Advisor - OFDA at USAID	US Embassy	m
50	Harun N.	Volunteer	PMI, East Lombok district branch	m
51	Hasna Pradityas	CEA Senior Officer	IFRC Palu	f
52	Helen Barrette	Senior Program Officer, International Humanitarian Assistance Operations	Global Affairs Canada	f
53	Hilman N.	Staff	PMI, West Nusa Tenggara province branch	m
54	Husni Ali	Head of Office	PMI, West Nusa Tenggara province branch	m
55	Husni Husni	Community Engagement and Accountability Coordinator	IFRC APRO	m
56	Ibrahim Burki	Fact Logistics (third rotation)	IFRC Palu (Pakistan Red Crescent)	m
57	Ilham Huznu	Logistics Bureau	PMI HQ	m
58	Ir. Harmensyah	Head of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction	BNPB	m
59	Irsad N.	Coordinator	PMI, Sigi district branch	m
60	Irvan Dinal	Hub Coordinator for Shelter Cluster Coordination Support	IFRC HQ	m
61	Istianasari N.	Health Division	PMI HQ	f
62	Jagan Chapagain	USG Programmes and Operations	IFRC HQ	m
63	Jamain N.	Logistics Sector	PMI, Central Sulawesi province branch	m
64	Jan Gelfand	Head of CCST	IFRC CCST Indonesia and Timor Leste	m
65	Jane Rovins	NDRF advisor	freelance consultant	f
66	Jemilah Mahmood	Under-Secretary General (Partnerships)	IFRC HQ	f
67	Kartika Juwita	ICRC Cooperation Delegate	ICRC	f
68	Katherine Susan Mueller	FACT Communication (third rotation)	IFRC Palu (Canadian Red Cross)	f
69	Kendall RePass	Country Representative	American RC	m
70	Khairil Teuku	Program Manager	Australian RC	m
71	Khairul Basri	Staff	PMI, East Lombok district branch	m
72	Krista House	Deputy Director, Natural Disaster Response Division	Global Affairs Canada	f
73	Louis Henley	Humanitarian team	Australian Embassy	m
74	Martin Faller	Deputy Regional Director	IFRC APRO	m
75	Masfuri N.	Logistics Bureau	PMI HQ	m
76	Matthieu Grenade	Logistic, Procurement & Supply Chain Excellence manager Asia Pacific	IFRC APRO	m
77	Mawardi N.	Volunteer	PMI, North Lombok district branch	m
78	Michael Brazier	Resource Mobilisation Coordinator in Emergencies	IFRC APRO	m
79	Moh Rizky	-	KPKPST	m
80	Moh. Indah Irawan	Volunteer	PMI, Donggala district branch	m
81	Mohd Fadzli Saari	Senior Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Officer, FACT PMER (rotation 1)	IFRC APRO	m
82	Muhamad Arif	WASH	PMI HQ	m

83	Muhammad Iqra Fitriasyah	-	Kelompok Perjuangan Kesetaraan Perempuan Sulawesi Tengah (KPKPST)	m
84	Muhammad Reza	Volunteer	PMI, Palu district branch	m
85	Muhammad Rum	Head of unit	BPBD, West Nusa Tenggara Province	m
86	Mustawan N.	Senior Officer for Operation	Indonesian Armed Forces	m
87	Nasrus Syukroni	Deputy Manager for Emergency Response	Plan International Foundation	m
88	Necephor Mghendi	Manager Emergency Operations and Information Management	IFRC APRO	m
89	Nelson Bosch	Programme Coordinator Strategy and Support	IOM	m
90	Nur Janah	UNDP Mataram	UNDP	f
91	Nuryanti N.	Sector : Field Kitchen	PMI, Central Sulawesi province branch	f
92	Oliver Lacey-Hall	Head OCHA Indonesia	UNOCHA	m
93	Pascale Meige	Director of Disaster and Crisis management	IFRC HQ	f
94	Patrick Elliott	Operations Coordinator	IFRC APRO	m
95	Peder Damm	Regional Disaster Management Delegate Asia	Danish RC	m
96	Pedro Basabe	Head of the Swiss Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office	Swiss Embassy	m
97	Peter Lomas	Specialist - Emergency Preparedness & Response	WFP	m
98	Pierre Kremer	Head of Partnerships	IFRC APRO	m
99	Rahmad Arif	Volunteer Division	PMI HQ	m
100	Razik N.	Volunteer	PMI, Sigi district branch	m
101	Richard Casagrande	RAT Team Leader	British Red Cross	m
102	Ridwean Mumu	Head of Social Office	MoSA, Provincial Office of Central Sulawesi	m
103	Rifkianto Aribowo	Information Management Officer	OCHA Sulawesi	m
104	Riku Assamaki	Logistics Coordinator	IFRC APRO	m
105	Risma N.	Board member	PMI, Donggala district branch	f
106	Ritola Tasmaya	Secretary General	PMI HQ	m
107	Roger Alonso	Relief Coordinator (rotation 1)	Swedish Red Cross	m
108	Rosemarie North	Regional Communications Manager	IFRC APRO	f
109	Sahabudy N.	Field Coordinator	PMI, North Lombok district branch	m
110	Saiful N.	Head of Office	PMI Central Sulawesi Province	m
111	Samsinar N.	-	Himpunan Wanita Disabilitas Indonesia Sulawesi Tengah (HWDI Sulteng)	m
112	Sekar Elkana	Finance Manager	IFRC CCST Indonesia and Timor Leste	m
113	Sene Papaibrahim	Regional HR Manager	IFRC APRO	m
114	Steve McAndrew	Head of Emergency Operation Indonesia	IFRC CCST Indonesia and Timor Leste	m
115	Subhan Halim	RFL Sector	PMI, South Sulawesi province branch	m
116	Suherman N.	Volunteer	PMI, Donggala district branch	m
117	Sutrin N.	Logistics Sector	PMI, Central Sulawesi province branch	f
118	Tiffany Loh	Senior Officer Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)	IFRC HQ	f
119	Tri Priyanto	Head of Mobilization and Management of Volunteers	PMI HQ	m
120	Uvarani Trasanayagam	Senior Finance Analyst	IFRC CCST Indonesia and Timor Leste	f
121	Vincent Guérend	Ambassador of the European Union to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam	EU embassy	m
122	Vinod Muniandy	Interim Field Coordinator (Lombok)	IFRC APRO	m
123	Warjo N.	PMI NHQ representative	PMI HQ (originally PMI Central Java Province)	m

124	Willem Rampangilei	Minister, Head of BNPB	BNPB	m
125	Winnie Maganda	Regional HR Manager	IFRC APRO	f
126	Xavier Castellanos	Regional Director	IFRC APRO	m
127	Yos Maryo Malole	Preparedness & Response Officer	AHA Centre	m
128	Zahra Bolouri	Partnerships and External Relations Coordinator	IFRC APRO	f
129	Zulfakar N.	Staff	PMI, West Nusa Tenggara province branch	m

Table 6: Persons consulted for the RTE

Annex 3: List of documents consulted

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103	RCM, 2007, "30th International Conference 2007: Resolution 2- Specific nature of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in action and partnerships and the role of National Societies as auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field", 30 November 2007. available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/resolution/30-international-conference-resolution-2-2007.htm
104	Coghlan, M., Viandrito, J., Cipullo, L., Kelly, T., Lee, S.J., and Fisher, D., 2014 "International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) in Indonesia - An analysis of the impact and implementation of Indonesia's legal framework for international disaster assistance", IFRC
105	UNISDR, 2015 "Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030", adopted 18 March 2015. Available at: http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf
106	Laksmana, E.A., 2010 "The Indonesian Defence Forces and Disaster Relief: Potential Pitfalls and Challenges", RSIS Commentaries, S. Raharatnam School of International Studies. Available at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO10160.pdf
107	IFRC, 2013 "Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance", Geneva.

Table 7: Documents consulted for the RTE

Annex 4: Summary of daily field movements

Day	Activity
07-Dec	Kuala Lumpur briefings and interviews
08-Dec	Kuala Lumpur work on inception report
09-Dec	Kuala Lumpur interviews, submission of inception report
10-Dec	Kuala Lumpur interviews, arrival Jakarta
11-Dec	Briefings, interviews Movement Jakarta
12-Dec	interviews Movement Jakarta
13-Dec	interviews Movement Jakarta
14-Dec	interviews Movement, UN Jakarta
15-Dec	Work on report, additional interviews (weekend)
16-Dec	Work on report, additional interviews (Weekend) flight to Lombok / Sulawesi (split team)
17-Dec	interviews Movement, Government Jakarta interviews Movement, UN Lombok interviews Movement Sulawesi
18-Dec	interviews donors Jakarta interviews Movement, Government, INGOs Lombok interviews Movement, UN, Government, NGOs, population Sulawesi
19-Dec	return flights to Jakarta interviews Government, INGOs, work on report
20-Dec	interviews Movement, work on report
21-Dec	interview AHA Centre, Movement presentation of findings & recommendations
22-Dec	work on report, departure Jakarta (for home-bases)

Table 8: Summary of daily field movements (07 Dec – 22Dec 2018)

Annex 5: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference Real-Time Evaluation of the Indonesia Earthquakes and Tsunami Response

1. Summary

- 1.1. Purpose:** This real-time evaluation (RTE) will assess the ongoing IFRC operation (MDRID013) to support Indonesian Red Cross/Palang Merah Indonesia (PMI)'s response to the Indonesia Earthquakes and Tsunami, and its context from late July 2018 with a particular focus on how the localization model has been applied and impacted the operational, cooperation and coordination mechanisms as well as the decision-making process, planning and service delivery both within and outside of the Movement. The outcome of the RTE will inform the continued response as well as IFRC readiness in adapting emergency operations, and coordination efforts with, and readiness requirements, including with public authorities, to adapt to locally-led operating conditions. The evaluation will aim at also reflecting a localized approach in analysing localized elements of the response.
- 1.2. Commissioners:** This RTE will be commissioned by Jagan Chapagain, the Under-Secretary General of Programmes and Operations, IFRC Geneva and Xavier Castellanos, the Regional Director, IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office, Kuala Lumpur.
- 1.3. Audience:** This RTE will be used by PMI, the IFRC country cluster support team (CCST) in Jakarta, the Asia Pacific regional office (APRO) in Kuala Lumpur, the IFRC headquarters in Geneva. It will also inform the National Societies participating in the response operation, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), non-RCRC donors and ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre).
- 1.4. Duration of consultancy:** not more than 30 days (with approximately 14 days in the field).
- 1.5. Estimated dates of consultancy:** December to January 2019.
- 1.6. Location of consultancy:** Indonesia (Lombok, Sulawesi and Jakarta), Kuala Lumpur and Geneva.

2. Background

Indonesia was struck by a series of four strong earthquakes on Lombok Island in July and August, causing more than 510 deaths, destroying more than 80,000 houses and affecting more than 500,000 people. In July, IFRC allocated 211,569 Swiss francs (CHF) from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) to enable PMI to meet the humanitarian needs of 1,000 households (4,000 people) in Lombok. In August, IFRC launched an Emergency Appeal for CHF 8.9 million to support PMI to provide assistance to 20,000 households in Lombok, and the DREF loan was increased to a total of CHF 500,000.

In late September, another strong earthquake followed by a tsunami and liquefaction affected the island of Sulawesi with more than 2,100 casualties, almost 70,000 houses damaged, and more than 430,000 people affected. IFRC allocated CHF 750,000 from DREF to the response in Sulawesi, bringing the total DREF advance for the response in Lombok and Sulawesi to CHF 1.25 million. Additionally, the Emergency Appeal was revised to CHF 22 million to incorporate the response in Sulawesi, enabling PMI to deliver assistance to 40,000 households (20,000 in Lombok and 20,000 in Sulawesi). Currently, the Emergency Appeal has been revised up to CHF 38.5 million to assist 160,000 people (40,000 families) for up to 30 months.

The Government

The Government of Indonesia (GoI) decided to restrict access to foreign aid personnel and international assistance in both occasions. For Lombok, the disaster was declared a provincial disaster, with no

international assistance requested, however it was accepted through defined channels. The Sulawesi response was declared a national disaster, but a similar approach towards international actors equally applied. While none of the UN Agencies or major INGOs could operate on the ground in Lombok, certain assistance, that (e.g. logistics and assessments) received approval were supported by international actors (e.g. WFP, DHL and MapAction) in Sulawesi. At Jakarta level, a preference was made to prioritize delegates from the ASEAN region.

The GoI's criteria on disaster declaration and requests, acceptance or denials of international assistance is based on Government regulations⁸⁰. The consideration for the determination of status and level of disaster is based on six main variables and the overarching principle of decentralization: the number of those affected, loss of physical material, damage to infrastructure, size of the affected territory and socio-economic impact, and most importantly, if there is a functional provincial administration in place to manage the emergency operation.

Indonesian Red Cross (Palang Merah Indonesia, PMI)

PMI is auxiliary to the public authorities in all humanitarian action, as outlined in the recently revised Red Cross Law (2017). Even as an independent organisation, PMI is required to follow GoI directions provided through the *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB)*, the national disaster management agency, which is governed by the Prime Minister. As stipulated by the Red Cross Law, the BNPB allowed PMI to launch an international appeal through the IFRC, despite the GoI not requesting international assistance. This gave PMI a unique position towards international donors as they were the major channel for providing international assistance (some local NGOs were also allowed to receive international assistance through their international partners like World Vision, Plan International, etc.). In the early phase of the Sulawesi operation, the GoI also placed PMI into the role of receiver and coordinator of assistance for other foreign NGOs, a role new for PMI.

As with the GoI, PMI is also following a decentralized approach for disaster relief operations. While the initial phase of the operation is supported by HQ staff, the respective provincial chapter has to request, organize and manage operational support (e.g. volunteers) from other PMI chapters for the relief phase and is expected to take over full responsibility of the management of the operation after three months. It remains to be seen how PMI will manage this process, as at the time of the occurrence of the Sulawesi earthquake, the local management structure for the Lombok earthquake operation was not yet in place.

IFRC and RCRC Partners

IFRC provided immediate assistance in the form of operational support through national staff of the CCST office and the allocation of a DREF. With the issuance of the Emergency Appeal, limited international staff (mainly consisting of Bahasa-speaking APRO staff) were allowed to work in Lombok. However, as agreed between BNPB and PMI and between PMI and the IFRC, only very limited numbers of international staff could be present in the operational area in Lombok. This also applied for Partner National Society (PNS) staff. The IFRC established a "One Plan" approach to reflect the PMI plan and enable a common coordination and reporting mechanism across the response in Lombok and Sulawesi. IFRC and Indonesia-based partners followed these instructions quite strictly, and various PNS joining bilaterally, were accommodated and coordinated by PMI. The IFRC also partnered with the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (AHA Centre) on civil-military relations and to share information on the needs and ongoing response on the ground.

Humanitarian Imperative

There are specific questions that can be raised in this context, given the localization approach. For example,

⁸⁰ Based on the Government Regulation of 2008, domestic Disaster Risk Management framework (includes the Disaster Management Law 2007 and associated implementing rules and regulations, including the National Disaster Management Framework (NDRF).

have the conditions imposed by the GoI for international humanitarian organisations to work on the ground in Lombok and/or Sulawesi constricted in any way a timely, effective response in compliance with humanitarian principles and standards? This question cannot be easily answered as there has not been any independent assessments of the services delivered nor analysis of the gaps. Compared to the 2004 Tsunami response, major GoI-led assistance could be observed and was visible on the ground. Additionally, PMI and various other national NGOs provided assistance and services, many of them indirectly supported by their international partners' organisations. However, not seeing a UN agency or major INGO present on the ground is a very different scenario. As the UN cluster system was only partially in effect, several ministries and the BNPB established local coordination mechanisms, which seem to be work in progress. The question of whether international humanitarian standards (e.g. SPHERE) have been followed is also unclear as no independent monitoring was taking place, but certain efforts were made by the AHA Centre.

- **Evaluation purpose & scope**

The IFRC is committed to ensure quality and apply standards, and to a continued learning culture in its disaster response. The IFRC, as such, is committed to carrying out RTEs during all major disasters requiring an international response, and meeting certain criteria of scale, scope, complexity or risk⁸¹. All RTEs aim to improve service delivery and accountability to affected communities, donors and other stakeholders and to build lessons for the improvement of the IFRC disaster response system and operating model(s). The Indonesia earthquakes and tsunami response operation falls within these criteria.

The cooperation and coordination context for this operation is particularly complex and interesting for the humanitarian system and to the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. As such, the RTE will evaluate the following areas, focusing on the localization agenda:

- i. the **relevance, appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness and coherence** of the IFRC support of PMI response and coordination system, including coordination with its Movement partners (NS, PNS and ICRC) and external actors (GoI, AHA Centre, other INGOs/NGOs) aimed at optimizing the response, based on a **localized model for coordinating international assistance**;
- ii. the **ability and preparedness** of PMI to lead its own response and work wide a wide range of local partners and donors; and
- iii. the **effectiveness and relevance** of existing response and readiness tools and for the humanitarian diplomacy approach used vis-a-vis other stakeholders (partner organisations, governmental, etc.).

The RTE will review what is working well, whether it is appropriate and relevant, what requires improvement, taking into consideration the context and capacities of IFRC, PMI and other Movement components and what measures IFRC should take to ensure that it is best suited for future operations following a similar approach. The RTE will also look at how the Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) model has been relevant and if so, applied. To this extent, ICRC will be fully briefed on this RTE and will be encouraged to provide input into its findings. The RTE team will also recommend specific follow up actions that are realistic and feasible.

PMI shall be fully associated in the design, conduct and implementation of the RTE. AHA Centre will also be closely associated to the process, as an associate or adviser.

The RTE team will meet with and interview key Red Cross Red Crescent stakeholders in PMI, PNSs, and the relevant IFRC Secretariat (in both field locations (Lombok and Sulawesi), CCST Jakarta, Regional Office Kuala Lumpur and IFRC Geneva) and ICRC offices. The team will also consult with critical partners from GoI, AHA Centre, and other organisations such as the UN, INGOs/NGOs as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives. While the focus will not be specifically on discussions with affected people, the team will take the

⁸¹ As per the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#).

opportunity to meet with volunteers from local branches, beneficiaries and other community actors as possible and in appropriate contexts.

The evaluation will cover the MDRID013 Indonesia Earthquakes and Tsunami response from the period when the first Lombok and Sulawesi earthquakes struck and PMI and IFRC initiated their response until the time the evaluators collect the data, considering earlier existing contingency planning and coordination for the operation.

3. Evaluation criteria and key questions

The specific criteria and possible key questions to be addressed in this RTE are listed below. Emphasis should be placed on the localization agenda in the ongoing response and coordination. The RTE is also required to consider possible future scenarios, options and directions for the IFRC disaster management systems and operational modalities.

The questions below provide an initial guidance and are expected to be further elaborated by the RTE team:

1. How is the IFRC system equipped to respond effectively, efficiently and with impact to disasters and crises under the localization agenda?

- a. How relevant was the Grand Bargain and the IFRC's role in it in this context? How did the localization agenda contribute to designing and shaping the operation? What have been the advantages of this? And what have been the gaps or concerns, including those around national and international capacities to work in this way?
- b. How did the IFRC manage to maintain readiness and adapt its operational modalities under the framework of the localized response modalities during the response?
- c. How have relations with the PMI and Government of Indonesia been leveraged to prepare for the localized aid scenarios?
- d. Was and is the IFRC's organisational structure/model operations, both at field and Jakarta level as well as country and regional levels, appropriate according to the needs of the complex emergency situations in Indonesia?
- e. How did the localized approach contribute to shape the operation and what were its main gaps?
- f. Are there any recommendations for adjusting operational modalities for international response in similar contexts (particularly within ASEAN)?
- g. Are the surge deployment mechanisms in place and use of global tools in line with IFRC commitments to the localization agenda? How has surge optimization been addressed through the localized response context?
- h. How have the IFRC's regional and global structures/models had to adapt to the localized model of operating? What have been the opportunities and challenges for surge deployment mechanisms and global tools in this environment?
- i. Are there humanitarian diplomacy recommendations relevant for IFRC which could assist to strengthen relationships, improve coordination and preparedness as well as formalise processes with PMI and the GoI authorities, which better fit the localized approach in large scale disaster response operations?
- j. Are there humanitarian diplomacy recommendations relevant for IFRC which could assist to strengthen relationships, improve coordination and preparedness as well as formalise processes with ASEAN and other relevant international and regional actors, which better fit the localized approach in large scale disaster response operations? What specific demands has working in this operation made on the capacities of the national and international actors? And what lessons are there from this for the future?

2. Effectiveness of IFRC's tools in coordinating the operation vis-a-vis other stakeholders (partner organisations, governmental, etc.) in local context.

- a. What role has IFRC taken in this operation? How could this role be strengthened in the future and what lessons should the IFRC take from this experience to improve this operation in the coming months or for other operations in future? How could the IFRC adapt its role to streamline and improve Movement coordination and cooperation in this context, to improve trust and operational efficiency now and in the coming months?
- b. What key messages were identified and how well were these communicated or used for advocacy in this context? How could the IFRC improve its humanitarian diplomacy priorities for the coming months?
- c. What, if any, has been the impact of PMI and IFRC international disaster response law (IDRL) advocacy in Indonesia since 2007 and can a direct correlation be made to the more confident and assertive leadership demonstrated by the GoI authorities in relation to the management of international assistance? And how will this relationship need to be developed to support the ongoing operational modality or for future responses?
- d. Which levels of engagement with PMI, the GoI and local authorities, as well as AHA Centre, diplomatic missions, local NGOs, militaries and civil protection actors worked particularly well or threw up specific challenges and what were these? How can these be improved or developed in the future coming months?

4. Evaluation methodology & process

The methodology will adhere to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#), with particular attention to the processes of upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

An **RTE management team** will manage and oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The RTE management team will consist of four people not directly involved with the operation: two of which are from IFRC APRO PMER and IFRC Geneva PMER, and the other two who have direct experience in emergency operations and assessments – one from CCST Jakarta and one from PMI.

The **evaluation team** will consist of up to six people:

- a) one **internal IFRC evaluator** with strong knowledge of the localization agenda, humanitarian diplomacy and the South-East Asia context as **team leader**, who will provide insights and advocacy on the subject matter and report on progress or challenges to the management group.
- b) one **external evaluator** with knowledge of local context who will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations. The external evaluator will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he will not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation or context being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence and ethics and integrity for this evaluation.
- c) one evaluation practitioner from the **IFRC PMER** to provide context on IFRC Framework for Evaluation and with technical experience on evaluations; and
- d) two to three evaluation practitioners from **PMI, PNSs and external partner organisations** who will also provide the interface with the Secretariat offices in country and will help to clarify internal processes and approaches for the team.

The team will be gender balanced and should comprise as many Indonesians as possible (or at least one team member must be Indonesian). Ideally the team leader or one of the NS representatives should have regional

knowledge/experience and speak Bahasa Indonesia, and ideally all candidates will have some experience with evaluation practices and the IFRC disaster response systems. It is expected that all evaluation team members have strong evaluation experience and are able to conduct a reliable and informed evaluation of the emergency operation and the surrounding context that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

The specific **evaluation methodology** will be detailed in close consultation between the RTE team and IFRC, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

1. **Desktop review** of operational background documents, relevant organisational background and history, including prior any relevant sources of secondary data;
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites and to the Country/Regional offices;
3. **Key informant interviews** (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate); and
4. **Focus group discussions** (institutional and beneficiaries) as time and capacity allow.

The RTE team will meet with and interview key and critical stakeholders in PMI, government officials, PNSs, ICRC and the relevant IFRC Secretariat offices. The team will also consult with other partners and organisations such as the UN and INGOs/NGOs as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives, including beneficiaries.

The RTE team will also be briefed in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Geneva.

Initial findings will be shared with PMI and the partner operational response teams in Indonesia. A draft report will be prepared by the evaluation team leader for **review**. This review process should occur within four weeks of submitting the draft report to the evaluation management team, and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

- **Submission of the initial draft of evaluation report (week 4):** The evaluation management team to check content is in line with this ToR and IFRC evaluation standards. Stakeholders who participated in the evaluation to provide feedback on any inaccuracies or clarifications (differences of opinion should not be put forward here but outlined in the management response). Following this, a final draft is prepared.
- **Submission of the final draft of evaluation report (week 8):** The evaluation management team is responsible to liaise with the evaluation team leader to ensure all comments are addressed in the final draft and forward to the commissioners for final review and approval.

The IFRC RTE Guide and Procedures will be used for this RTE and made available to the evaluation team.

5. Evaluation deliverables & illustrative timeline

The following will be developed and delivered in line with the IFRC RTE Guide and Procedures:

- **Inception Report** – The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the RTE and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection, data analysis and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team.
- **Debriefings/feedback to management at all levels:** The team will report its preliminary findings to the IFRC APRO in Kuala Lumpur and the team or team leader will debrief in Geneva, in a timely manner and will adhere to the above-mentioned review process.
- **Draft report:** A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for

the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within two weeks of the evaluation team’s return from the field. The report should clearly outline information/data reliability and verification measures to ensure findings and derivation of recommendations are accurate.

- **Final report:** The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, data analysis, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final RTE report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.
- **Management response.** An evaluation management response team (MRT) should be identified from within the IFRC with the responsibility to formulate a management response and action plan to be disclosed jointly with the evaluation as an annex. The MRT will submit the management response and action plan to the USG of Programmes and Operations, who will oversee a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his/her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

The RTE will be commissioned by the IFRC USG of Programmes and Operations and Asia Pacific Regional Director, and will be managed by a management group (see section 5). The management group will oversee the conduct and quality of the evaluation. The team leader will report on progress or challenges to the management group. The preliminary and final reports will be submitted through the management group, who will ensure the quality of the report providing input if necessary.

The following is an illustrative timeline that will be revisited and refined with more detail during the inception stage of the RTE:

Time Schedule	Activities	Deliverables
Week 1 (3-9 Dec)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Desktop study of background information. 2. Initial briefings, planning and interviews to inform development of inception report. 3. Development of detailed inception report, or data collection/analysis plan and schedule, draft methodology, and data collection tools. 4. Virtual key informant interviews (by phone/Skype). 	1. Inception report with detailed data collection/analysis plan and schedule, draft methodology, and data collection tools.
Weeks 2-3 (10-23 Dec)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Virtual key informant interviews (by phone/Skype). 2. Data collection in country (key informants across all stakeholder groups in both locations – Lombok dates and Sulawesi dates according to data collection schedule. 3. Regional office visit/debriefing. 4. Geneva interviews/visit and debriefing. 	
Week 4 (24-30 Dec)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prepare draft evaluation report. 	1. Draft version of evaluation report.
Weeks 5-7 (31 Dec-13Jan)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IFRC Review 	
Week 8 (14-16 Jan)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revise and submit final evaluation report. 	1. Final draft of evaluation report.

6. Evaluation quality & ethics

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organisational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that considers the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the [seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent](#): 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality.

7. Qualifications

Selection of the external evaluation consultant will be based on the following qualifications:

- 1) Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programs responding to major disasters, with specific experience in RTEs preferred
- 2) Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders
- 3) Understanding of localization of aid/Grand Bargain preferred
- 4) Expertise in understanding and analysing operational, social, cultural and political contexts with due consideration of specific factors that exert local influence
- 5) Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner
- 6) Experience in qualitative data collection and data analysis techniques, especially in emergency operations
- 7) Knowledge and experience working with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement preferred
- 8) Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a multi-discipline, multi-national team
- 9) Excellent English writing and presentation skills in English, with relevant writing samples of similar evaluation reports.
- 10) Regional knowledge of the region/context and fluent in Bahasa Indonesia preferred but not required
- 11) Immediate availability for the period indicated

8. Application procedures

Interested candidates should submit their application material by 25 November 2018 to the following email: pmer.apzo@ifrc.org. Application materials are non-returnable, and any late or incomplete applications will not be considered. We thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process.

Application materials should include:

1. **Curricula Vitae** (CV).
2. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing your experience as it pertains to this RTE, your daily rate, and three professional references.
3. At least one **example of an evaluation report** most similar to that described in this ToR.

Annex 6: Key findings and lessons learned from the Lombok and Sulawesi operation (grouped by topic)

Findings and lessons drawn are discussed in more detail in section 4 of the report.

topic	no	headline	finding	lesson learned
Preparedness and readiness	1	Gol message unheard	Global and policy level efforts on localisation have not yet filtered through to the operational level among international aid actors, resulting in a disconnect between the 'talk' and the 'walk' at the international level.	Continued efforts are required to highlight the importance of localisation, and to ensure the transition from policy to operations among international aid actors.
	2	Operationalising the Disaster Management Act	Gol's significant efforts in reshaping Indonesia's disaster management framework now need to move to the next step and see the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and articulation of roles and responsibilities.	Continued PMI efforts with Gol to transform disaster management framework into concrete operational procedures.
	3	Delegating authority and responsibilities to PMI provinces and branches	PMI tendency to delegate responsibilities without related decision-making power.	Need to demonstrate HQ commitment in line with PMI decentralisation, and to enhance leadership capacities at provincial and local branch levels.
	4	Humanitarian standards	Lack of humanitarian standards guiding operations; national actors are not familiar with humanitarian standards.	Continued PMI / IFRC efforts to establish and implement (national or international) humanitarian standards.
Coordination	5	Coordination with Gol actors	PMI coordination with military worked well, despite no defined civil-military standards.	PMI, with support of IFRC and ICRC, to engage with its national military and define an agreed approach for civil-military relations in peace-time and for future operations.
	6	Coordination with ASEAN structures	The AHA Centre's experience and capacity have developed significantly in recent years. This growth will need to continue if the AHA Centre is to reach its potential as a regional platform for facilitating cooperation and coordination.	Continued IFRC partnership with ASEAN's regional disaster management structures, thereby contributing to capacity development and to building stronger synergies between the AHA Centre, IFRC and National Societies of ASEAN Member States.

	7	PMI coordination capacities	New roles attributed by the Gol posed an uncommonly high level of coordination needs for PMI.	PMI is required to strengthen its internal and external coordination capacities.
	8	Strategic IFRC analysis and stakeholder communication	Lack of informed analysis and tailor-made communication for high-level PNS decision-makers, donor and foreign government representatives.	IFRC Secretariat to continue investing in strategic analysis and high-level communication in politically sensitive and/or complex operations.
	9	Movement coordination	The integration of bilateral and ICRC capacities into response worked, despite Movement coordination mechanisms at a strategic level not being fully established.	Further need to strengthen Movement coordination mechanisms and readiness planning in Indonesia – both in the current response and beyond.
Response capacities	10	PMI volunteer resources	PMI was able to quickly mobilise capacity from its strong network. However, challenges persist with sustaining volunteer capacity (both quantity and required competencies) for the current operations.	PMI is encouraged to explore solutions to sustain the required volunteer resources in the operation.
	11	Operational shortcomings	Despite significant growth in national / local capacities over the last decade, Gol and PMI experienced shortcomings in operational integration of emergency needs assessments, information management, quality assurance, CEA, and PGI.	Further support to develop these capacities requires continued preparedness investments. Humanitarian diplomacy efforts will support mainstreaming these capacities into national humanitarian standards and Government-contingency planning.
	12	PMI finance and logistics capacities	PMI finance and logistics capacities were not working according to IFRC standards.	Need to increase PMI finance and logistics systems / capacities. Revisit respective IFRC support processes.
	13	Resource Mobilisation	Successful domestic PMI resource mobilisation. PMI did not receive direct international funding (except from DREF allocations).	PMI may widen the focus for domestic fundraising, and develop resource mobilisation capacities. IFRC needs to explore options to enable direct international funding to National Societies.

	14	Surge capacities	IFRC positively managed the shift from implementation towards support roles (with pragmatic personnel), despite complex international processes. Communication offered room for improvement.	Further need to communicate surge optimisation to PNS stakeholders, and to make IFRC support processes (finance, HR) coherent with localised response. IFRC APRO's approach for staff deploying in surge roles commends to broader roll-out in the Secretariat.
	15	Maximising capacity	International capacities complemented NS capacities at different scale in Lombok and Sulawesi.	Maximising the 'Red' footprint necessitates case-by-case decisions, considering a number of parameters.
Humanitarian diplomacy	16	Humanitarian diplomacy with the GoI	Challenges resulting from PMI's auxiliary role as a lead disaster response, and the role of influencing the GoI in the humanitarian sphere.	Use the PMI network and Movement diplomacy to maintain adequate humanitarian space and to obtain a clear set of roles and responsibilities in the national disaster management system. Build on the commendable humanitarian diplomacy work already undertaken by PMI and IFRC to support the GoI in strengthening its national disaster management system, with a focus on articulating roles and responsibilities of stakeholders and for response efforts to adhere to humanitarian standards.
Meeting needs	17	Where the need of the affected population met?	The lack of comprehensive data makes it difficult to assess whether all humanitarian needs were met.	There is a need for analysis of the national-led operation, at best a multi-agency effort supported by PMI and IFRC.

Table 9: Key findings and lessons learned from the Lombok and Sulawesi operation

Annex 7: Key recommendations and enabling steps on localisation for PMI and IFRC in the Indonesian context

Recommendations and enabling steps are discussed in more detail in section 5 of the report.

no	recommen- dation	context	enabling steps / areas of interest
1	Advocate for and contribute to a multi-agency in-depth study	<p>The national-led response would lend itself to validating the benefits and challenges of localisation. A comprehensive multi-agency in-depth study should be conducted to evaluate the impact of the Lombok and Sulawesi response⁸². The evaluation may benefit from comparison with a ‘traditional’ response setup characterised by significant international assistance. It should seek to answer the key question, if needs would have been better met if more international assets were on the ground.</p> <p>PMI, IFRC Secretariat, ICRC and PNSs involved in the operation are called to advocate for the delivery of this evaluation (within the next six months) and participate as national (PMI) and international actors (IFRC).</p>	<p>Areas of interest (not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leadership, decision making and coordination • Sectoral coverage, including cross-cutting issues • Quality of emergency needs assessments • Roles and responsibilities of national, regional and international actors • Capacities of local, national and international actors involved • Benefits and gaps resulting from limitations for international actors • Adherence to national / international (such as Sphere) standards • Benefits and gaps of national-led response versus ‘traditional’ response • Outreach and impact of the national-led response versus ‘traditional’ response
2	Delegate authority and responsibility to provincial and local levels	<p>Localisation is not only about shifting powers from international to national level, but also from national to provincial and local levels. Delegation of both authority and responsibility, including financial authority and responsibility, is a key component of success and may require humanitarian diplomacy efforts.</p>	<p>Enabling steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distinct national level commitment to decentralisation and empowerment of local and provincial levels. • Involve provincial / local leadership in planning and decision making to increase ownership, empower middle management to take timely tactical decisions, thereby assuring the operational flow. • Encourage bottom-up contingency planning, including thresholds for required capacities, check lists for activities and simulations to test preparedness and readiness. • Create a pool of team leaders on local / provincial level trained according to RDRTs standards.

⁸² The evaluation may as well include the recent Sunda Straits Tsunami (22 December 2018) response.

3	Ensure continued human resource mobilisation for the recovery phase	The following enabling steps aim to contribute to ensuring mobilisation of human resources in PMI's recovery operation in accordance with the HR needs defined for successful implementation of the recovery phase. The enabling steps aim to contribute to ensuring mobilisation of human resources in PMI's recovery operation in accordance with the HR needs defined for successful implementation of the recovery phase:	<p>Enabling steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design and implement an effective volunteer management system. Consider the creation of a country-wide pool of trained volunteers available for the recovery phase of the operation. • Ensure comprehensive briefing and proper hand-over (with outgoing personnel) for incoming staff and volunteers. • Enhance technical capacities of human resources conducting on-the-job training for volunteers and staff. • Consider setting up a specific operational structure (cell, office) for the recovery phase. • Consider operational involvement of community-based initiatives and local NGOs under participatory approaches and partnerships with local authorities to increase resources and optimise outcomes (e.g. for shelter, camp management, health and WASH activities).
4	Build and implement additional cross-cutting capacities (CEA, PGI)	The implementation of cross-cutting issues have been considered as an area of improvement during the response (with CEA in the Sulawesi response working). CEA and PGI, both essential components in comprehensive response operations, should be mainstreamed in all operations.	<p>Enabling steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMI and IFRC should analyse gaps and ways to strengthen PGI and CEA components in the current operation • CEA and PGI awareness should be included in learning and training of all PMI volunteers • Improve tools, develop and maintain additional specific volunteer / staff capacity for CEA and PGI (with support of IFRC and PNS) • Consider integrating CEA and PGI basics in learning and training of community-based teams supporting in response and recovery • Revise contingency plans integrating cross-cutting activities
5	Strengthen coordination capacities across all levels	<p>Effective coordination and communication are pivotal for any operation. Coordination between managers at PMI HQ level, and between HQ, provincial and local levels are considered to be key areas of improvement. As well, external stakeholder coordination will benefit from increased PMI capacities across all levels. Last but not least, affected people are a key stakeholder for coordination, benefitting from increased involvement (see CEA-recommendation).</p> <p>Coordination mechanisms need to be established and practiced in non-response time. Local and provincial levels of PMI will benefit most from increasing coordination capacities.</p>	<p>Enabling steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop arguments on the advantages of improved coordination and keep communicating it to internal stakeholders. • Internal coordination mechanisms need to be established involving all stakeholder levels from local branches to Movement partners in country. • HQ managers and staff are considered to be role-models for coordination. Establishing a coordination culture needs to start at the top level. • Staff and volunteers can develop coordination skills through training, but more importantly, they need to gain coordination experience through constant practice. • Linking to other recommendations, coordination can be fostered by clearly defining roles, responsibilities and authorities, both for operational and administrative processes, and an effective system of information sharing. • Establish regular fora involving all Movement actors in country to strengthen Movement coordination and cooperation.

6	Strengthen financial and logistics capacities	Sound financial procedures and a strong logistics system are required to achieve a cohesive response. Robust and reliable financial systems and procedures need to be developed and put into practice to provide a cornerstone for effective PMI emergency response. Similarly, PMI's logistics system would benefit from a review with the aim of increasing capacity and decentralisation.	<p>Enabling steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise financial systems to benefit efficiency and transparency of the organisation. This will also enhance donor confidence in line with their Grand Bargain commitments, and facilitate interoperability with IFRC finance procedures. • Invest in developing finance human resources with focus on provincial and local level. • Prioritising high-risk areas, further decentralise warehousing to district level for improved response timing. • Develop capacities of logistics staff, ensuring compliance with existing guidance and practical training (focus on emergency procurement, warehousing, supplies standards and quality assurance at national, provincial and local level. • Identify, assess and map local, regional and national suppliers / markets to support logistics preparedness.
7	Strengthen humanitarian diplomacy efforts with the GoI	Understanding its auxiliary role also as a humanitarian diplomacy role, PMI is encouraged to utilise its network to strengthen humanitarian diplomacy efforts with GoI actors, both on governance and operational level. IFRC and ICRC may play a supporting role.	<p>Enabling steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue efforts to communicate principles and rules guiding humanitarian assistance in order to maintain the humanitarian space for the Red Pillar and beyond. • PMI, with support of IFRC and ICRC, to engage with Indonesia's national military and define an agreed approach for civil-military relations in peace-time and future operations. • Organise joint trainings, visits, briefings and simulation exercises for increased understanding of roles and responsibilities with TNI, other government and non-governmental actors. • Increase efforts to integrate emergency needs assessments, information management, logistics, quality assurance, CEA and PGI in government response and recovery planning. • Strengthen efforts to establish humanitarian standards and disaster management SOPs, translating governmental frameworks into practical procedures coordination mechanisms, and including delegation of authority and adequate financing of roles entrusted by the GoI. • Consider tripartite pre-disaster agreements (GoI - PMI - IFRC) agreements on national level, defining models of cooperation, rights and responsibilities.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider PMI-agreements with ASEAN and UN actors. • Continue efforts on disaster management law with the GoI.
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Table 10: Key recommendations and enabling steps on localisation for PMI and IFRC in the Indonesian context

Annex 8: Key general recommendations and enabling steps on localisation for the Secretariat and National Societies

Recommendations and enabling steps are discussed in more detail in section 5 of the report.

no	recommen- dation	context	enabling steps	involved entities		
				IFRC Secre- tariat	all National Societies	Host National Society
1	Define a SMART way ahead, tackling benefits and limitations	To achieve IFRC's commitments, measurable action will support the transformation towards localisation. Perceived limitations related to localisation require open discussion.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue sensitisation of Movement actors⁸³ Discuss both benefits and limitations of localisation IFRC Secretariat to lead the development of a RCRC Localisation Roadmap with SMART indicators for success, and report on the implementation⁸⁵ 	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	
2	IFRC to enable conditions for greater empowerment of National Societies towards a localised response	As the HNS is central to delivering the localised response, supported by Movement partners as required, it is crucial that NS capacity development receives continued support around preparedness and readiness. Acceptance of the power shift towards the NS and related funding might be supported by a certification process and amended emergency funding tools.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFRC Secretariat to develop holistic tools to analyse internal capacities (based on existing PER, OCAC/BOCA, Readiness Plans) in the wider strategic context of the country-specific situation Define and implement tailor-made NS development programmes with defined targets for the intended level of capacity Explore benefits and risks of a certification process for NSs Explore options for direct international NS-funding Move towards less risk-averse systems 	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓

⁸³ enabling step reaching out to ICRC

3	Shift the narrative from response towards preparedness	Localisation benefits from a changed narrative of disaster preparedness and response – contributing to shaping both internal and external perceptions. Movement actors are called on to be the champions of localisation-diplomacy, especially with the donor, supporting the change of the humanitarian ecosystem and ‘ego-system’.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Change the narrative from the ‘response cavalry’ to ‘preparedness building, with a local lead and international support’ • RCRC actors are called to advocate change on all levels, especially with the donor community⁸⁵ 	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓ ✓
4	Optimise IFRC tools, including support processes	The Surge Optimisation process widely reflects the localisation drive. More surge personnel coming from high-risk-countries for disaster and additional focus on ‘supporting’ soft competencies of surge personnel would foster localisation. IFRC support processes will benefit from reduced complexity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritise soft competencies and local language skills for surge delegates, roll out IFRC APRO’s business continuity approach • Prioritise training and deployments of surge personnel from disaster-prone NS to increase their capacities and the understanding of international operations • Consider adding a ‘humanitarian analyst’ profile to surge roles • Make IFRC Secretariat support systems viable (finance, HR, logistics). 	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓
5	Build trusted operational partnerships with regional⁸⁴ inter-governmental organisations	Alongside the move to localised humanitarian action, a trend of ‘regionalisation’ exists. Inter-governmental structures (such as ASEAN, EU) have developed disaster and crisis coordination and response mechanisms, with more to come (ROHAN ⁸⁵). Trusted long term partnerships with Movement actors will help to maintain the humanitarian space and ensure interoperability.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Keep continuous strategic dialogue with inter-governmental disaster management actors / systems⁸⁵ • Benefit from mutual participation in training programmes and simulation exercises, joint projects, and alike • Assure operational coordination and cooperation 	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓

Table 11: Key general recommendations and enabling steps on localisation for the Secretariat and National Societies

⁸⁴ ‘regional’ hereby refers to associations / unions of countries (such as ASEAN, or EU)

⁸⁵ 12 regional inter-governmental organisations committed to strengthen capacities and collaboration within and amongst regional organisations and other humanitarian partners, ensuring greater coherence and collaboration in humanitarian responses, through the ‘Regional Organisations Humanitarian Action network’ (ROHAN). The organisations are: 1) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 2) African Union (AU), 3) Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), 4) Centro de Coordinación para la Prevención de Desastres de América Central (CEPRENAC), 5) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 6) European Union (EU), 7) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 8) League of Arab States (LAS), 9), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 10) Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 11) Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), 12) South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Management Response to the Real-time Evaluation (RTE) of the Indonesia Earthquakes and Tsunami Response

IFRC

Background

- **Date and duration:**
 - 5 December 2018 to 16 January 2019
- **Evaluation Team:**
 - Ghulam Muhammad Awan, team leader
 - Said Faisal, special advisor
 - Juergen Hoegl, chief evaluator
 - Louise McCosker, Australian Red Cross
 - Siew Hui Liew, IFRC Asia-Pacific Regional Office
 - Andreane Tampubolon, Palang Merah Indonesia
- **Evaluation Management Response Team members:**
 - Jagan Chapagain, Under-Secretary General of Programmes and Operations, IFRC Global, Geneva
 - Xavier Castellanos, Regional Director of IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO), Kuala Lumpur
 - Jan Gelfand, Head of IFRC Country Cluster Support Team (CCST), Jakarta
- **Background information:**
 - Indonesia was struck by a series of four strong earthquakes on Lombok island in July and August; and another strong earthquake followed by a tsunami and liquefaction in Sulawesi in late September. IFRC launched an Emergency Appeal that subsequently was revised to CHF 38.5 million to assist 160,000 people (40,000 families) for up to 30 months.
 - The Government of Indonesia (GoI) decided to restrict access to foreign aid personnel and international assistance in both occasions. The GoI's criteria on disaster declaration and requests, acceptance or denials of international assistance is based on Government regulations. With the issuance of the Emergency Appeal, limited international staff were allowed to work in Lombok. However, as agreed between BNPB and PMI and between PMI and the IFRC, only very limited numbers of international staff could be present in the operational area in Lombok. This also applied for Partner

National Society (PNS) staff. The IFRC established a “One Plan” approach to reflect the PMI plan and enable a common coordination and reporting mechanism across the response in Lombok and Sulawesi. IFRC and Indonesia-based partners followed these instructions quite strictly, and various PNS joining bilaterally, were accommodated and coordinated by PMI.

- The cooperation and coordination context for this operation is particularly complex and interesting for the humanitarian system and to the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. As such, the RTE evaluated the following areas, focusing on the localization agenda:
 - the **relevance, appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness and coherence** of the IFRC support to PMI response and coordination system, including coordination with its Movement partners (NS, PNS and ICRC) and external actors (Gol, AHA Centre, other INGOs/NGOs) aimed at optimizing the response, based on a **localized model for coordinating international assistance**;
 - the **ability and preparedness** of PMI to lead its own response and work wide a wide range of local partners and donors;
 - the PMI role in **leading coordination**, including **engagement** with national and regional actors for coordination; and
 - the **effectiveness and relevance** of existing response and readiness tools and for the humanitarian diplomacy approach used vis-a-vis other stakeholders (partner organizations, governmental, etc).

Summary of the Management Response: The evaluation was useful to evaluate IFRC and PMI’s systems and readiness based on the localization model. The recommendations will be useful to improve the future of the localization agenda in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Overall, there are 12 recommendations stipulated by the final evaluation report and all have been fully accepted except 2 that are partially accepted with rationale.

Acronyms

AHA centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
AMCDRR	Asian Ministerial Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction
APRO	Asia Pacific Regional Office
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BNPB	<i>Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana</i> (Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management)
BOCA	Branch Organizational Capacity Assessment
CCST	Country Cluster Support Team
CEA	Community Engagement and Accountability
CP3	Community Epidemic and Pandemic Preparedness Program
DCPRR	Disaster, Crisis, Prevention, Response and Recovery
DL	Disaster Law
DM	Disaster Management
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
EPOA	Emergency Plan of Action
ERAT	Emergency Response and Assessment Team
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
FACT	Field Assessment Coordination Teams
FBA	Forecast-Based Action
GoI	Government of Indonesia
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HoCCST	Head of CCST
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDRL	International Disaster Response Laws
IIS UGM	Institute of International Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NSD	National Society Development
NSLCE	National Society Logistics Capacity Enhancement
OCAC	Organizational Capacity Assessment and Certification
OLPSCM	Operational Logistics, Procurement and Supply Chain Management

PER	Preparedness for Emergency Response
PfR	Partners for Resilience
PGI	Protection, Gender and Inclusion
PIFS	Pacific Islands Forum
PMI	<i>Palang Merah Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Red Cross Society)
PRD	Partnership and Resource Development
PSK	Policy, Strategy and Knowledge
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Teams
RTE	Real-time Evaluation
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SMCC	Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation
SMT	Senior Management Team
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
WWPP	Working With Project Partners

Section 1: Key recommendations on localisation for PMI and IFRC in the Indonesian context

Recommendation 1: Advocate for and contribute to a multi-agency in-depth study			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	a. IFRC to have dialogues at all levels with stakeholders and donors to advocate for a multi-agency in-depth study: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian Country Team (CCST Jakarta) • Regional Coordination Group (APRO) • Global dialogue on localisation (Global) 	HCT in May 2019; Regional Coordination Group in June 2019 (Bangkok/ KL);	CCST Jakarta (HoCCST); APRO (PRD); Global (PRD)
	b. Recommend this study to OCHA and AHA centre	Ongoing	CCST Jakarta (HoCCST)
<p>Comments: Commit to accept this recommendation, but action requires engagement with other entities, and the success will depend on their response.</p> <p>IFRC will propose to the localisation workstream at Geneva: the possibility of conducting a meta-evaluation with other partners who have done similar evaluations or are interested to coordinate the study (e.g. AHA centre, UN OCHA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).</p>			

Recommendation 2: Delegate authority and responsibility to provincial and local levels			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Partially accepted (led by PMI and supported by IFRC)	a. Support PMI to adopt tools that exist on delegation of authority, e.g. defining thresholds (e.g. budget, recruitment, procurement) especially in emergencies and recovery operations	Ongoing	CCST Jakarta (HoCCST)

	b. Conduct dialogues on decentralisation e.g. through BOCA, Red Ready (subject to PMI decision)		
Comments: This may require deeper study by the PMI, looking beyond emergency operations and legal base of the NS in the country. The IFRC will support the PMI in the process.			

Recommendation 3: Ensure continued human resource mobilisation for the recovery phase			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	a. CCST Jakarta continue to recruit local staff who can support PMI in implementation of recovery operations in a cost-effective and sustainable manner. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification and recruitment of key positions in PMI, in line with the approach of reducing international presence • Prioritization of current international positions (HR plan for the operation) • Development and utilization of regional based peer-to-peer resources. • Role management of volunteers (selection role, structure) • Activation of the agreed upon operational structure 	April 2019 to gradually shift towards national staff, and by Jan 2020 more national than international in the workforce	CCST Jakarta (HoCCST, HR, Operations Manager)
	b. Guide CCST Jakarta to incorporate recommendations into their operational plan	30 May 2019	APRO (HR)
	c. Recommend a specific line of assistance to PMI, to assist with volunteer management, including use of technology and surge support	Ongoing	CCST Jakarta, APRO
Comments: As of 4 January 2019, ongoing discussion with PMI concerning the roles structure and HR planning.			

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Recommendation 4: Build and implement additional cross-cutting capacities (CEA, PGI)			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	a. Ensure human resources are identified within PMI and IFRC	April 2019	CCST Jakarta (DRM, CEA)
	b. Development of the CEA dashboard and analysis system with PMI supported by IFRC	started April 2019	
	c. CEA and PGI training with PMI staff and volunteers at all levels (as per the EPOA)	in May 2019	
	d. Capacity development for PMI CEA team	Ongoing	
	e. Support PMI to incorporate PGI into policies, using the <i>PGI in Emergency Minimum Standards</i> .		
	f. Capacity building training with AHA Centre through the ERAT assessment tools.		
	g. Leadership accountability around PGI and CEA		CCST Jakarta
	h. Leadership induction on PGI and CEA		APRO

	i. CEA to test Feedback Starter Kit in Indonesia	end April 2019	APRO (Surge Desk, CEA, PGI)
	j. Enhance pool of deployable surge (RDRT, FACT/CAP) specialising in PGI and CEA	by June 2019	
	k. Mainstream PGI and CEA by providing guidance to CO/CCSTs (in support to NS) to incorporate PGI and CEA into emergency operations and operational plans	start immediately	APRO (CEA, PGI)
Comments: IFRC CCST has hired a CEA coordinator to assist in the capacity building with PMI as of 3 March 2019. Capacity building training for CEA at the regional level is available in May in Yangon.			

Recommendation 5: Strengthen coordination capacities across all levels			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	<u>For Movement coordination</u>		
	a. Implement thematic think tank meetings with PMI and ICRC, to improve coordination of quality programming (e.g on PGI, CEA, etc.).		CCST Jakarta (HoCCST)
	b. Formalized meeting between Federation-wide and PMI staff to improve coordination of the implementation and quality across all technical areas.	Immediately	PMI; CCST Jakarta (HoCCST, Operations Manager)

	c. Complete the Federation Readiness Plan for coordination of potential risks and threats	October 2019	CCST Jakarta (DRM) supported by APRO (DCPRR)
	d. Create Indonesia coordination platform: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic level: Heads of ICRC, IFRC, PMI • Operational coordination: Heads of Operations and PNSs • Technical: technical/ thematic coordination 		CCST Jakarta (HoCCST, Operations Manager)
	e. Develop coordination training modules to improve Movement Coordination	Training to be delivered 2 to 8 September 2019 in Austria	Global Surge Desk together with SMCC and ICRC (supported by the Reference Group 1- Leadership and Coordination, Surge Optimisation)
<u>For External coordination with public authorities, HCT, AHA centre, others</u>			
	f. Continual engagement with HCT	Ongoing	CCST Jakarta (HoCCST)
	g. Identify key areas to build stronger cooperation, coordination with MoSA, BNPB that will enhance internal coordination and dialogue		
	h. Prepare to deploy staff to specifically coordinate with AHA centre (wherever AHA centre is deployed)	Develop ToR by June 2019	APRO (DCPRR)

	i. Develop guidance and training on coordination with external partners, including with the UN and the Humanitarian Country Team	External Coordination guidance due to be delivered by Q3 2019	Global (IASC Focal Point in PSK)
Comments:			

Recommendation 6: Strengthen financial and logistics capacities			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
	<u>Financial capacities</u>		
Accepted	a. As of March 2019, financial staff for operations have been hired upon request from PMI, in order to expedited finance reporting for the operations.	Completed as of March 2019	CCST Jakarta (Finance)
	b. Financial advisor from IFRC already sitting within PMI to support capacity of PMI Finance		
	c. Regulate and implement scheduled monitoring oversight for finance and logistics with field operations.	Ongoing	
	d. With PMI's agreement and planning, to select branches for finance training, with consideration towards peer to peer branch support (i.e. invest in strengthening certain branches to support sister branches). Further the National Society is implementing an ERP software (Microsoft Dynamics/ Navision) due to go-live in August		APRO (DCPRR, Finance); Geneva (Finance)

	<p>2019. There are plans to roll out this software to selected branches (including training to branch staff). Having done this, accounting and reporting should be more seamless between HQ and branches.</p>		
<p><u>Logistics Capacities</u></p>			
	<p>e. Regulate and implement scheduled monitoring oversight for logistics with field operations.</p>	<p>Ongoing</p>	<p>CCST Jakarta (Operations Manager); APRO (OLPSCM)</p>
	<p>f. The ongoing Logistics development Project (NSLCE) incorporates all elements of logistics (namely warehouse, procurement, fleet and the broader supply chain management) and has developed a PoA which addresses some of the issues as are highlighted in the RTE report. The Logistics Development Delegate together with PMI, will capitalize on the lessons learnt from the recent Operation to further strengthen the local supply chain.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pilot a review of the local supply chain preparedness to further enhance our understanding of in country supply chain capacities and will guide us to strengthen the preparedness of in-country operational supply chain capacities • Review and revise manual with PMI – look into dissemination and implementation of manual (part of development project) 	<p>PoA utilisation start by Dec 2019</p>	<p>APRO (OLPSCM)</p>
<p>Comments:</p>			

Recommendation 7: Strengthen humanitarian diplomacy efforts with the GoI			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	a. Sharing and dissemination of the Humanitarian Diplomacy online course under development with IIS UGM (being developed in country with PMI through PfR)		PMI; CCST Jakarta (HoCCST, ASEAN Representative, DRM Delegate/ ASEAN Liaison) with support from APRO
	b. Develop national Civil Military Relations plan for PMI	April 2019	
	c. Support PMI to develop focused humanitarian diplomacy agenda (e.g. PGI) connected to current DM regulations and laws. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organize humanitarian dialogues • Look into Aceh study to compare on localisation – to see how it affects PMI and IFRC capacity for response and how it can be improved 		
	d. Consider a formal tripartite pre-disaster agreement (PMI, GoI, IFRC) including financing modalities and roles as entrusted by GoI		
	e. Consider PMI/IFRC agreements with AHA Centre in support of structured coordination mechanisms.		
	f. New workplan in development with AHA Centre which includes joint SOPs and ACE training	Workplan to be validated in mid-April, and be	

		ongoing through 2019	
	g. Maintain humanitarian agenda with ASEAN	Ongoing	
	h. As part of readiness plan, organise simulation exercises with government authorities, PMI, AHA centre and strengthen efforts to agree on humanitarian standards in disaster management SOPs, translating governmental frameworks into practical procedures.		
	i. Increase efforts to integrate emergency needs assessments, information management, logistics, quality assurance, CEA and PGI in government response and recovery planning (move point to joint-training)		
	j. Facilitate PMI/IFRC leadership engagement on strategic issues as required in case of high reputation or operational risks arise		
<p>Comments: The humanitarian diplomacy role is a principle role of PMI, with the strong support of IFRC (and ICRC). The proposed approach is to prioritise and further invest on preparedness and readiness related actions, including the possibility of a tripartite pre-disaster agreement.</p>			

Section 2: Key general recommendations on localisation for the IFRC Secretariat and National Societies

Recommendation 8: Define a SMART way ahead, tackling benefits and limitations			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	a. Present the findings of the RTE at an invite event	Mid 2019 - mid 2020	CCST Jakarta (DRM); APRO (IDRL)
	b. Champion Gol (e.g. MoFA) and PMI as country of localisation with activities		
	c. Produce a case study for localization in learning, for events such as the AMCDRR 2020 (where the focus is on localization) and review operations against the WHS localization key areas.		
	d. Ensure localization roadmap is fully including in informing the Strategy 2030 development process (as a cross-cutting theme)	Ongoing	Global (Policy and Diplomacy Unit)
	e. Leverage co-convener role in localisation workstream	June 2019	Global
Comments: IFRC's current roles as Grand Bargain localization Workstream co-convener provides a platform to share learnings on the response as well as an opportunity for further internal reflection and action on the Movement's localization agenda and or model.			

Recommendation 9: IFRC to enable conditions for greater empowerment of National Societies towards a localised response			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Partially accepted (led by PMI and supported by IFRC)	a. IFRC will continue to provide space and support for strengthening branches and coordination with the local governments, through long term programmes which have a focus on preparedness building and capacity development such as Forecast-based Action (FBA) e.g. village funds, PER, Roadmap to Resilience and CP3. This will include looking into local financing options	Ongoing	CCST Jakarta (DRM, NSD); Global (FBA)
	b. IFRC will support the alignment of Movement partners for preparedness systems with NS—including funding available from current partners for risk and threat monitoring with local actors	FBA partners alignment is ongoing, with funding allocated to 2020.	
	c. Develop Branch Development framework based on the BOCA / PER assessment and OCAC Recommendation	June 2019	PMI; CCST Jakarta (NSD); with the support of APRO NSD; Global (NSD)
	d. Support implementing Red Ready Program, which focus on branch readiness	Ongoing	PMI; CCST Jakarta; American Red Cross; with the support from APRO NSD

	e. Pilot a new working modality with partners to reinforce risk management and speed up payments (e.g. WWPP Fund Transfer)	Ongoing	APRO and Global (Finance)
<p>Comments: Indonesian Red Cross has conducted BOCA and OCAC with clear recommendations, PMI is also implementing Red Ready program which has a clear focus on branch development and preparedness for response at both HQ and Branch level. IFRC would not recommend for any other tool development rather than would encourage to continue implementing Red Ready program (testing the graduation concept in the program), FBA, PER, Roadmap to Resilience and CP3.</p>			

Recommendation 10: Shift the narrative from response towards preparedness			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	a. Dialogues with donors – so they can shift their mentality through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Invest in preparedness (even before emergency) During emergency: field trips, dialogues 	Ongoing	CCST Jakarta (HoCCST); APRO (PRD)
	b. Produce a localization package which intersects the localization agenda with the agenda for early action and anticipation/preparedness. This should be at a global advocacy level, with support from CCST and PMI through case study on localization.		
	c. Produce contextual analysis to be shared on a regular basis		APRO (PRD)
	d. Engage external partners and government (national and local) in movement readiness planning platforms		CCST Jakarta (HoCCST); APRO (PRD)

	e. Senior leadership engagement – with partners		CCST Jakarta (HoCCST)
<p>Comments: This is part of the PMI ongoing work and IFRC support in country through programmes and systems development. This is dependent on back donors earmarking funds and dependencies IFRC has on back donors from the Movement (through PNS and Movement programmes) for preparedness, preparedness for response, and early actions.</p>			

Recommendation 11: Optimise IFRC tools, including support processes			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	a. Part of surge optimization working group - utilize the competency frameworks underdevelopment for future posts.	Ongoing	CCST Jakarta (DRM)
	b. CCST will support all process which assist in making support services emergency ready.		
	c. Support the development and deployment of PMI human resources to other operations, including support services.		
	d. Decentralise RDRT training and maintenance of RDRT mechanism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Keep quality, deployment and roster centralised 	Starting July 2019	Surge in APRO and Global
	e. Develop paper on diversifying surge and women's leadership	Ongoing	
	f. Add humanitarian analyst as a profile <ul style="list-style-type: none"> to consult with the NSs the need for this role 		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> to define the role profile for the “Humanitarian Analyst”, in line with the surge optimisation competencies and role profiles 		
	<p>g. When mobilising personnel, deploy someone who have knowledge of context and contribute in a respectful way</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve surge optimisation to match surge with profiles using competency framework HR and surge desk working together to match appropriate profiles for deployment Pre-deployment briefing for surge 		APRO (Surge, HR); Global (Surge)
<p>Comments: This is a global area of work where CCST Jakarta can support with information. The current IFRC financial working modality with PMI is the working advance system. The risk assurance activities (verification of documentation, level of acquittals, capping of outstanding balances, compliance with project agreements...) if not understood, may be seen as complex and bureaucratic. Compromising on these checks and balances to satisfy requests for flexibility will expose IFRC to level risks which SMT has not accepted as reasonable.</p>			

Recommendation 12: Build trusted operational partnerships with regional inter-governmental organisations			
Management Response:	Key follow-up action / deliverable:	Timeframe:	Responsibility:
Accepted	a. Regional workplan with AHA Centre for joint training and simulations, development of joint threat monitoring through Go platform with AHA Centre	Ongoing (5-year trajectory)	CCST Jakarta (ASEAN Liaison, DRM); APRO (DCPRR); AHA Centre
	b. Support the ASEAN Standardization for DM		

	c. Continue to be active members of the HCT with PMI		CCST Jakarta (ASEAN Liaison, DRM)
	d. Support the strengthening of PMIs role with BNPB, through localizing IFRC tools for use at national level.		
	e. Training PMI staff for Shelter Coordination.		
	f. Support trainings between PMI response teams and RDRT and ERAT team of ASEAN.		
	g. ASEAN Coalition for Resilience already launched <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop study on ASEAN engagement strategy – how to operationalise ASEAN Coalition for Resilience 		APRO (PRD)
	h. Engagement with partners (SAARC, PIFS on DM, DL and resilience partnership)		APRO (IDRL)
	i. Planning for large scale disaster in East Asia		APRO (DCPRR)
	j. Partnership on Civil Military Relations agenda		
	k. Readiness planning		
	l. Partnership on pandemic preparedness		APRO (Health); Global (CP3, Health)
Comments: This need to be addressed by CCST Jakarta and APRO jointly.			

