

**Final Evaluation of
Nepal Monsoon Floods and Landslides
Operation 2017**

Final Report

30 April 2019

Executive Summary

Between 11 and 14 August 2017 Nepal experienced heavy rainfall resulting in widespread floods across 35 of the country's 77 districts. The rainfall led to floods and landslides that affected some 1.7 million people (866,993 male and 821,480 female). The number of people reported dead were 134, injured 22 and 29 missing. A reported 43,400 houses were destroyed and 191,700 partially damaged. Some 20,900 families were temporarily displaced. Household assets, livestock and food grains were damaged resulting in affected communities facing a shortage of food, water and non-food items (NFI).

On 13 August the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) activated its Emergency Operation Centre. District Disaster Response Teams (DDRT), Community Action for Disaster Response in Emergency and first aid teams were deployed alongside the Nepal Police force. A total of 1,289 volunteers and Junior/Youth Red Cross members and 21 National Disaster Response Team members were mobilized to help with early warning, evacuations, rapid assessments, relief distributions, logistics management and first aid services in the affected districts.

At the same time, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) allocated CHF 497,099 from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund to support NRCS in carrying out immediate relief activities. On 22 August an Emergency Appeal of CHF 3.5 million was launched to meet the humanitarian needs of 16.2 thousand families, based on the preliminary findings of the Initial Rapid Assessment (IRA) conducted by the Government of Nepal (GoN) with the involvement of NRCS, District Disaster Relief Committee (DDRCs) and the Nepal Police.

Based on the IRA findings, NRCS carried out immediate relief interventions in affected areas to support approximately 23,000 families (115,000 people) with: emergency shelter; non-food relief items (NFRIs); foodstuffs; basic health services (first aid, emergency health services, disease prevention and health promotion); and safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene promotion (WASH).

During the relief phase 13,519 families benefitted from NFRI sets; 13,944 families received WASH kits; 7,084 families received emergency shelter items (blankets and tarpaulins); 8,650 families received ready to eat food; and 4,232 Long Lasting Insecticide Nets were distributed. NRCS volunteers, together with medical/health professionals from district health offices, conducted health camps facilitating first aid, check-ups, disease screening, free medicine, reproductive health, provided psycho-social support, and nutritional screening.

In March 2018, NRCS commenced recovery phase activities in Bardiya, Mahottari, Rautahat, Saptari, Siraha, Sunsari and Udayapur Districts. The main recovery activities focused on cash-based initiatives (CBI) that supported 1,460 families with livelihood promotion schemes (agriculture and livestock management) and 706 families with latrine construction schemes. In addition, 35 elevated tube-wells were constructed (catering for 1,750 people) accompanied by health promotion activities in seven districts focusing on participatory hygiene and sanitary transformation in the communities and child hygiene and sanitation transformation in schools. Key disaster preparedness and risk reduction activities included Community Evacuation (CEC) construction, and the provision of search and rescue training to selected community members and forming ward level response teams.

Overall, NRCS reached approximately 23,000 families (115,000 people) through the relief and recovery interventions, of which the IFRC Appeal supported 15,000 families (75,000 people). In addition to NRCS and IFRC, a range of other in-country Partner National Societies (PNSs) provided technical inputs during the relief phase of the operation. Notably, for the recovery phase, the American Red Cross and the British Red Cross provided bilateral support to NRCS in Sarlahi and Jhapa districts respectively.

The Operation faced a number of external problems and challenges during implementation at both HQ and district chapter levels. These included the election campaigns conducted at district and central government level from late October to early December 2017 that resulted in the GoN enforced suspension of all relief, recovery and assessment activities; and the late GoN led Post Flood Recovery Need Assessment that affected the NRCS's ability to undertake timely recovery planning. At district and chapter level, problems included poor road access, no electricity, late distribution of relief items from HQ, and the time required to transport materials to communities from warehouses. These challenges were compounded by a lengthy relief to recovery transition period of some 4-5 months.

The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the:

1. Main evaluation questions related to relevance, appropriateness, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, impact, connectedness and sustainability.
2. Process for conducting assessments after the flood in accordance with the NRCS Response Operation Manual.
3. Effectiveness of the relief and recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting and decision making of NRCS.
4. Effectiveness of the logistic and procurement processes during relief and recovery.
5. Appropriateness and effectiveness of CBI for livelihood and household latrine construction during recovery.
6. Sustainability of NRCS/IFRC contribution towards strengthening National Society (NS) response capacity.
7. Progress made in relation to the planned outcomes detailed in the Emergency Plan of Action.

The scope of the evaluation covered the MDRNP009 Nepal Monsoon Floods and Landslides 2017 response from the period when NRCS and IFRC initiated their response until time the evaluators collect the data. The geographical coverage for the evaluation was NRCS HQ and four out of seven districts - Bardiya, Mahottari, Rautahat, and Sunsari. The overarching method to the study combined a range of survey techniques consisting of semi-structured/structured key informant interviews; field visits to the target districts using focus group discussions, household (HH) visits and beneficiary questionnaires.

The evaluation team met with beneficiaries, Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) stakeholders in NRCS (at HQ and in the four districts), PNSs, and interviewed relevant informants from the IFRC Secretariat, IFRC Nepal Country Office (CO) and Asia Pacific Regional Office. The team also interviewed Operation partners from GoN in each of the four districts and in Kathmandu. The evaluation took place in March/April 2019, including a country visit to Nepal between 10 March and 2 April.

The following conclusions were drawn in relation to the evaluation criteria.

Relevance and appropriateness

The evaluation established that the relief assistance provided reached the most vulnerable among the targeted affected population and was relevant and appropriate in responding to their particular circumstances. However, WASH relief was provided for only 15 days (rather than the expected 30 day period). Recovery assistance reached only a limited number of the affected population, with not all recipients being considered 'most vulnerable'. Basing the recovery assistance phase solely on community driven data was not the most appropriate way of identifying target beneficiaries.

The recovery support provided in the form of livelihoods, latrines, health promotion and WASH support was relevant and appropriate in responding to the particular circumstances of those targeted. Overall beneficiary satisfaction for relief and recovery assistance was high. While

support for latrines was considered mostly sufficient help with construction efforts, assistance for livelihoods was considered sufficient only for small projects. NRCS targeting of vulnerable communities is considered fair and appropriate given the circumstances, however, the evaluation found examples of reasonably well-off HHs in one district having received both latrine and livelihood support.

Coverage

Relief coverage reached most of the population groups in need (as per ward allocation), including those in remote areas who would have otherwise not received humanitarian assistance. There was one instance where NS district chapter (DC) decision making was reported to have led to the intentional exclusion of a beneficiary group based on their location. Local political interference also meant that some identified beneficiaries did not receive their relief or recovery entitlements. Coverage for recovery aspects of the Operation however were severely restricted due to budget availability, resulting in only a small percentage (estimate 18-24%) of the affected targeted population receiving recovery support (livelihoods and latrines).

Efficiency, effectiveness and accountability

The evaluation established that the coverage secured through the relief aspect of the Operation was an efficient use of available resources, however, the allocation (or spreading) of recovery activities - principally livelihoods, latrines and tube wells - across all seven districts was not the most efficient modality for resource utilisation (a more concentrated approach in one or two districts would have assured a more efficient use of resources). This said, the spreading of recovery activities across the districts ensured that all 7 NRCS chapters gained practical experience in recovery implementation, most notably CBI, and thus developed useful capacity in this modality and other disaster risk reduction (DRR) aspects.

The NRCS' Flood Recovery Operation team's (HQ level) lack of experience in dealing with recovery operations adversely affected overall efficiency and effectiveness. This was most evident in late decision-making that impacted on operational design, planning, budgeting and implementation; which in turn, was responsible for the lengthy relief to recovery transition period. Greater NS investment in select preparedness measures (more district warehouse relief stocks, more numerous equipment such as boats with engines, better contingency planning, speedier procurement processes) would have resulted in a more efficient, effective and less costly intervention.

The IFRC CO maintained well ordered, clear and adequate tracking systems to ensure both transparency and accountability. Aspects of capacity building, Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA), and Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) were integrated into core sector activities as cross-cutting measures in various degrees. GESI activities were considered appropriate and targeted. The effectiveness of the 'whole' CEA approach is not well proven as communities were not involved in all aspects of assessment, planning, project orientation and monitoring as per operational design. However, communities were actively engaged in implementation aspects, particularly in assessments (notably beneficiary selection) and the main operational activities, which ensured a high degree transparency and accountability.

Impact

The CBI modality contributed to a strengthening of affected community livelihoods and improving access to and use of water and sanitation facilities. Individual skills and capacity aimed at improving livelihoods and resilience were enhanced through appropriate trainings. CBI has had a positive impact on the local economy with many HHs able to generate a level of profit. Female beneficiaries (women in targeted HHs) have acquired a new degree of economic independence and a level of empowerment through engaging their families in discussions on business opportunities.

Using CBI for the provision of latrines has had a positive impact in multiple ways: improved personal safety and security of beneficiaries (particularly women and girls), reduced open defecation, and improved hygiene practices (together with other WASH initiatives - hygiene promotion and tube wells). A significant impact has been the immediate reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities (16% improvement). The latrine scheme also injected cash into the wider community (small businesses/traders) and provided gainful employment to local skilled and unskilled men.

The overall positive impact the Operation has had on the affected beneficiaries is illustrated in the baseline-endline comparison. Notable improvements include the percentage of the targeted population whose livelihoods are (restored to/or improved) from pre-disaster levels (+34.3%); the percentage of targeted people with increased knowledge of and practiced preventive health behaviour (+24.1%); the percentage of target population that has access to sufficient safe water (+16.3%); and the percentage of target population that is using adequate sanitation (+16.1%).

Connectedness and Sustainability

In terms of connectedness, there are gaps in the links between local government, officials, and community groups that need to be filled to enable communities to sustain livelihood activities. The CBI livelihoods initiative was not well linked to government and other actors responsible for aspects of animal husbandry and/or the marketing of livelihood products (crops and animals) to ensure a sustainable intervention. While affected communities including district authorities were engaged in beneficiary assessment/selection processes and some monitoring activities, they were not involved in aspects of operational design or planning. Positively, NRCS volunteers were actively engaged in relief aspects, and select beneficiaries were fully involved in recovery aspects through livelihood and WASH initiatives (although the total number was relatively small compared to the size of the affected population).

From a sustainability perspective, the livelihoods CBI has allowed people to take control of their lives and maintain greater dignity; enabled people to recover productive assets that they lost during the disaster; reduce the threat of people engaging in risky behaviour, and helping the 'informal' local economy in the affected areas to recover. The conditional grant however was relatively low, and it is felt that a more generous grant would have created capacity for HHs to invest in initiatives that were both more appealing and ultimately worthwhile. The Operation has contributed somewhat to helping communities cope with future disasters (the completion of the CEC's will enhance this).

Livelihood initiatives have contributed to reducing vulnerability of households to future shocks and the training of local disaster response teams (DRTs) provides a degree of immediate response support during times of disaster, but DRTs are poorly equipped and not sufficiently integrated into communities. Positively, however, other resilience factors such as improved health and hygiene point to greater sustainability. Nonetheless, communities are still highly vulnerable to disaster and remain exposed to many of the same risks experienced during the floods, which indicates a need for ongoing disaster risk reduction initiatives and longer-term development support.

The evaluation made twelve (12) recommendations aimed at improving current and future Operation relevancy, appropriateness, coverage, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact.

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Acronyms and abbreviations used in this report


APRO - Asia Pacific Regional Office (Kuala Lumpur)
BoQ - bill of quantities
CCC - Community Construction Committees
CADRE - Community Action for Disaster Response in Emergency
CBI – Cash Based Initiative
CBO – community based organisation
CDO - Chief District Officer
CEA - Community Engagement and Accountability
CEC – Community Evacuation Centre
CfW - Cash for Work
CGI - corrugated iron sheet
CHAST - child hygiene and sanitation transformation
CHF – Swiss Franc
CNDRC - Central Natural Disaster Relief Committee
CO - Country Office
DA - district authority
DC - District Chapter
DDRC - District Disaster Relief Committee
DDRT - District Disaster Response Teams
DEOC - District Emergency Operations Committee
DFID - Department for International Development
DREF - Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DROM - Disaster Response Operational Manual
DRR - disaster risk reduction
EOC - Emergency Operations Committee
EPoA – Emergency Plan of Action
ET - Evaluation Team
FGD - Focus Group Discussion
GESI - Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
GoN – Government of Nepal
HFRO - Head of Flood Recovery Operation (NRCS)
HH - Household
HR – Human Resources
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC - International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO - International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRA – Initial Rapid Assessment
KI - Key Informant (interviews)
LLIN – Long Lasting Insecticide Net
MoHA - Ministry of Home Affairs
NEOC - National Emergency Operation Centre
NDRT - National Disaster Response Team
NFI - non-food item

NFRI - non-food relief item
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation
HQ – National Head Quarters (NRCS)
NPA - National Planning Commission
NPR – Nepalese Rupee
NRA - National Reconstruction Authority
NRCS – Nepal Red Cross Society
NS – National Society
OM – Operations Manager
PFRNA - Post Flood Recovery Need Assessment
PGI - Protection, Gender and Inclusion
PHAST - participatory hygiene and sanitary transformation
PMER - Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
PNS - Partner National Society
PSS - psycho-social support
RCRC - Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
RTEF - ready to eat food
SGBV – Sexual and Gender Based Violence
TL – Team Leader
ToR – Terms of Reference
UN - United Nations
UNICEF - United Nations Children’s Fund
WASH - Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP - World Food Programme

1. Introduction and background to the Operation

Between 11 and 14 August 2017 Nepal experienced heavy rainfall resulting in widespread floods across 35 of the country's 77 districts. The rainfall led to floods and landslides that affected some 1.7 million people (866,993 male and 821,480 female). The number of people reported dead were 160, injured 45 and 29 missing.¹ A reported 43,400 houses were destroyed and 191,700 partially damaged. Some 20,900 families were temporarily displaced.² The most flood affected districts were: severely affected (18): Kailali, Bardiya, Banke, Dang, Nawalparasi, Chitwan, Makawanpur, Parsa, Bara, Rautahat, Sarlahi, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Siraha, Saptari, Sunsari, Morang and Jhapa; affected (6): Surkhet, Kapilvastu, Rupandehi, Palpa, Sindhuli and Udayapur.³

Map: 2017 Flood Affected Districts⁴



Flood water damaged 449 water supply schemes, 142 shallow tube wells, and 120 sanitation facilities that resulted in many people suffering infections from contaminated water. Agricultural losses (land along with crops ready for harvest) were estimated at USD 69.5 million. Household assets, livestock and food grains were damaged resulting in affected communities facing a shortage of food, water and non-food items (NFI). A total of 99 health facilities were damaged of which 5 were fully destroyed and 94 partially damaged. A total of 961 government managed irrigation schemes and river training infrastructures in Terai Region were affected to various degree by the floods.⁵

The Government of Nepal (GoN) took the lead in rescue, relief and response, and welcomed external assistance to support the response. On 13 August 2017 the Ministry of Home Affairs

¹ Office of the Resident Coordinator. Situation Report No. 9. 20 September 2017.

² Ibid.

³ Post Floods Recovery Needs Assessment (PFRNA). Government of Nepal. National Planning Commission 2017.

⁴ Government of Nepal. National Planning Commission, December 2017.

⁵ IFRC PoA 2017/2018 and ToR 2019.

(MoHA) called for an emergency flood and landslide response coordination meeting with cluster leads and co-leads at the National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC). The activation of the cluster system resulted in coordination and immediate response to the needs emerging in the affected communities. The MoHA mobilized stockpiles from its regional emergency warehouses and District Disaster Relief Committees (DDRCs) in all affected districts. Security personnel and civil servants were mobilized to support relief efforts, rescue the stranded and injured, deliver aid, and distribute emergency stockpiles to meet emergency needs. At the same time the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) activated its Emergency Operation Centre (EOC). District Disaster Response Teams (DDRT), Community Action for Disaster Response in Emergency (CADRE) and first aid teams were deployed alongside the Nepal Police force. A total of 1,289 volunteers and Junior/Youth Red Cross members and 21 National Disaster Response Team (NDRT) members were mobilized to help with early warning, evacuations, rapid assessments, relief distributions⁶, logistics management and first aid services in the affected districts.

On 13 August, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) allocated CHF 497,099 from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)⁷ to support NRCS in carrying out immediate relief activities. On 22 August an Emergency Appeal of CHF 3.5 million was launched to meet the humanitarian needs of 16.2 thousand families, based on the preliminary findings of the Initial Rapid Assessment⁸ (IRA) conducted by the GoN with the involvement of NRCS, DDRCs and the Nepal Police. The IRA identified the immediate humanitarian needs of people displaced by the floods. Based on the IRA findings, NRCS carried out immediate relief interventions in affected areas to support approximately 23,000 families (115,000 people) with: emergency shelter; non-food relief items (NFRIs); foodstuffs; basic health services (first aid, emergency health services, disease prevention and health promotion); and safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene promotion (WASH).

During the relief phase 13,519 families benefitted from NFRI sets; 13,944 families received Water Sanitation and Hygiene promotion (WASH) kits; 7,084 families received emergency shelter items (blankets and tarpaulins); 8,650 families received ready to eat food (RTEF); and 4,232 Long Lasting Insecticide Nets (LLINs) were distributed. NRCS volunteers, together with medical/health professionals from district health offices, conducted health camps facilitating first aid, check-ups, disease screening, free medicine, reproductive health (including condom distribution), provided psycho-social support (PSS), and nutritional screening.

During September/October 2017, the National Planning Commission (NPC) in coordination with MoHA, conducted a Post Flood Recovery Need Assessment (PFRNA)⁹ in the affected districts.¹⁰ The objective of the assessment was to estimate the impact of the floods that affected the Terai Region and to identify medium-term recovery needs. Post flood recovery needs identified in the PFRNA that were in keeping with RCRC expertise included: (i) WASH - rehabilitation and reconstruction of water supply schemes e.g. tube wells; rehabilitation and reconstruction of sanitation facilities; and provision of hygiene items and promotion of hygiene behaviour. (ii) Livelihoods – implementation of productive activities aiming at restoring livelihoods; and land clearing to remove sand brought by the flood through a cash for work (CfW) initiative. (iii) Shelter - repair and retrofitting of partially damaged houses through owner-

⁶ Food items: biscuits, beaten rice, instant noodles, staple foods – some distribution in conjunction with the World Food Programme. WASH kits: soap, bucket, oral rehydration salts, chlorine tablets; and LLINs.

⁷ Flood Response Operations – MDRNP009.

⁸ 7 September 2017.

⁹ There was no Cluster specific (CSDA) or Multi-cluster/sector Initial Rapid Needs Assessment (MIRA) undertaken.

¹⁰ Published December 2017.

driven processes.¹¹ Aspects of capacity building, Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA), and Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) were to be integrated into core sector activities as cross-cutting measures.

Between 5 and November 2017, NRCS and IFRC undertook pre-assessment visits in seven affected districts accompanied by representatives from the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and the British Red Cross (BRC).¹² The pre-assessment visit and subsequent analysis (which took some 4-5 months) resulted in the first revision of the IFRC appeal on 23 March 2018 by defining recovery activities as well as revising the budget from CHF 3.5 million to 2.96 million. This extended the Operation timeframe from 12 to 16 months with an expected end date of 31 December 2018¹³, reduced the number of target families for relief to 15,000 (75,000 people), and incorporated the construction of three (3) community evacuation centres (CECs) as part of disaster preparedness interventions.¹⁴ The amended target for the recovery phase was 7,000 families (35,000 people) in 7 districts, with scheduled activities adjusted accordingly in the revised Plan of Action (PoA). In late February 2018 the Operation commissioned a baseline survey (see further Section 3).¹⁵

In March 2018 recovery phase activities commenced in Bardiya, Mahottari, Rautahat, Saptari, Siraha, Sunsari and Udayapur Districts. The main recovery activities focused on cash-based initiatives (CBI) that supported 1,460 families with livelihood promotion schemes (agriculture and livestock management) and 700 families with latrine construction schemes. In addition, 35 elevated tube-wells were constructed (catering for 1,750 people) accompanied by hygiene promotion activities in seven districts focusing on participatory hygiene and sanitary transformation (PHAST) approach in the communities and child hygiene and sanitation transformation (CHAST) in schools: the aim being to improve hygiene behaviour, reduce diarrhoeal disease and encourage effective community management of water and sanitation services. Key disaster preparedness and risk reduction activities included CEC construction, and the provision of search and rescue training to selected community members and forming ward level response teams.

Overall, NRCS reached approximately 23,000 families (115,000 people) through the relief and recovery interventions, of which the IFRC Appeal supported 15,000 families (75,000 people). In addition to NRCS and IFRC, a range of other in-country Partner National Societies (PNSs) provided technical inputs during the relief phase of the operation. Notably, for the recovery phase of the Operation, the American Red Cross and the British Red Cross (BRC) provided bilateral support to NRCS in Sarlahi and Jhapa districts respectively.¹⁶

¹¹ These recovery interventions were outlined in the original IFRC EPoA (22 August 2017) and with the exception of (i) shelter, which was deprioritized following a change in GoN strategy; and (ii) CfW, which never began; were included the March 2018 EPoA.

¹² DFID staff visited two districts.

¹³ In December 2018 a further revision was done to complete construction of three community evacuation centres.

¹⁴ The inclusion of CECs was also in response to the GoN's strategy change on shelter.

¹⁵ IFRC. (2018). Baseline Survey of Floods and Landslides Recovery Operation Final Report. March/April 2018. Kathmandu.

¹⁶ The evaluation did not target these districts and is therefore unable to be specific about the interventions supported by those Partner National Societies.

2. Objectives and scope of the evaluation

2.1. Evaluation Objectives

The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the:

1. Main evaluation questions related to relevance, appropriateness, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, impact, connectedness and sustainability.
2. Process for conducting assessments after the flood in accordance with the NRCS Response Operation Manual.
3. Effectiveness of the relief and recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting and decision making of NRCS.
4. Effectiveness of the logistic and procurement processes during relief and recovery.
5. Appropriateness and effectiveness of cash-based interventions (CBI) for livelihood and household latrine construction during recovery.
6. Sustainability of NRCS/IFRC contribution towards strengthening National Society (NS) response capacity.
7. Progress made in relation to the planned outcomes detailed in the Emergency Plan of Action.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation is contained at Annex A.

2.2. Evaluation Scope

The scope of the evaluation covered the MDRNP009 Nepal Monsoon Floods and Landslides 2017 response from the period when NRCS and IFRC initiated their response until time the evaluators collect the data. The geographical coverage for the evaluation was NRCS HQ and four out of seven districts - Bardiya, Mahottari, Rautahat, and Sunsari. The four districts were identified considering the volume and type of interventions carried out, their geographical locations, target communities and socio-economic profile of the beneficiaries. Table 1 below details the relief provision for each of the evaluation focus target districts. Table 2 details the recovery provision for the target districts.¹⁷

Table 1: Relief provision for each of the evaluation focus target districts

District	Relief Phase				
	WASH	RTEF	LLIN ¹⁸	NFRI	Shelter
Bardiya	922	0	0	1029	595
Mahottari	589	842	0	589	0
Rautahat	1626	0	0	1100	0
Sunsari	601	0	0	1170	35
Total HH¹⁹	3738	842	0	3888	630

¹⁷ Sources: NRCS/IFRC beneficiary lists.

¹⁸ Long lasting insecticide nets.

¹⁹ Households.

Table 2: Recovery provision for each of the evaluation focus target districts

District	Recovery Phase				
	CBI	WASH	Latrines	LLIN	CEC ²⁰
Bardiya	280	1365	100	1365	0
Mahottari	180	1279	100	1279	0
Rautahat	180	950	100	950	0
Sunsari	280	980	100	980	1
Total HH	920	4574	400	4574	-

3. Evaluation approach and outline method

The summary method (main techniques/approaches) used for the evaluation is outlined below:

- Literature review
- Interviews (face-to-face and via Skype/telecon)
- Field visit to Nepal (Kathmandu and 4 target districts)
- Beneficiary questionnaire survey
- Household (HH) visits
- Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
- Direct observation of physical infrastructure, commodities and systems

The overarching method to the study combined a range of survey techniques primarily consisting of semi-structured/structured key informant interviews (KIIs); field visits to the target districts using FGDs, HH visits and beneficiary questionnaires. During the evaluation, the evaluation team (ET) met with beneficiaries, Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) stakeholders in NRCS (at HQ and in the four districts), Partner National Societies (PNSs), and interviewed relevant informants from the IFRC Secretariat, IFRC Nepal Country Office (CO) and Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO) Kuala Lumpur). The team also interviewed Operation partners from GoN in each of the four districts and in Kathmandu. The key informant list is contained at Annex B.

The evaluation took place in March/April 2019, including a country visit to Nepal between 10 March and 2 April. An overall Evaluation Matrix is contained at Annex C. The matrix framed the evaluation questions (and suggested sub-questions) according to evaluation criteria and selected methods.

A key aspect of the evaluation focused on the creation of an endline survey. The evaluation replicated aspects of the baseline survey (see Annex D) necessary for obtaining the required endline data including HH sample sizes (shown in Table 3 below). The consultant that conducted the baseline survey undertook the statistical analysis of endline field data.

²⁰ Community Evacuation Centre.

Table 3: Sample size per district and community engagement

The Table below indicates the community engagement (e.g. HH survey/FGD) approaches used during the evaluation and the number of sample target beneficiaries per district.²¹

Method/Focus	Bardiya	Rautahat	Mahottari	Sunsari
HH surveys	163	123	83	78
FGD (general relief/recovery)	57	83	41	57
FGD (Livelihoods/CBI)	48	83	44	54

The endline method mirrored the baseline survey method and is considered statistically reliable. Sample size and sex disaggregated data for the endline survey is shown below.

Total sample size

District	Sample HHs	
	Baseline	Endline
Sunsari	78	78
Mahottari	83	80
Rautahat	123	123
Bardiya	163	158
Total	447	439

Sex distribution of respondents

Sex	Baseline (N=706)	Endline (N=439)
Men	40.2	42.6
Women	59.8	57.4

Age distribution of respondents

Age group	Baseline (N=706)	Endline (N=417)
18-40	39.5	52.0
40-60	43.5	37.7
60 or more	16.9	10.3

3.1.7 Unforeseen issues with the evaluation

Based on a review of the literature, a number of foreseen issues/risks with the evaluation were identified. Successful mitigation measures were put in place to address these. However, a number of unforeseen issues arose with the evaluation as follows:

	Unidentified issue	Resolution measures taken
1	Evaluation team composition: The ToR indicated that the ET would comprise 4 members (independent team lead (TL), IFRC, PNS and NS). On arrival in-county, the TL was informed that individuals from IFRC, PNS or NS had not been identified to be part of the evaluation team. This had	During the first in-country evaluation briefing, NRCS staff members and one local IFRC staff member were identified to fill the IFRC and NS roles to the best extent possible (but no PNS role). However, the individuals had not undertaken any of the literature review and were not familiar with the Inception Report. On

²¹ Purposive sampling was used to determine the number of FGD participants (approx. 80 per district representing 40 female and 40 male) for overall inquiry evaluation areas and evaluating the CBI modality. Consideration was given to the gender/diversity balance of all FGDs.

	Unidentified issue	Resolution measures taken
	serious implications for the evaluation as the method detailed in the Inception Report had to be significantly adjusted at the last minute to accommodate this shortcoming. See further Section 5 – Additional Learning.	17 March, one IFRC staff member from Sri Lanka joined the ET, but had to leave Nepal on 29 March. ²²
2	Festival days during the field visit: Holi day fell while the ET were in Mahottari District. The estimated disruption to field activities was severely underestimated. As a result, the ET experienced considerable time inefficiencies.	The ET adjusted field activities in Mahottari District as best as possible. However, it is felt that the disruption Holi day causes should have been factored into scheduling (it is not just for one day).

4. Evaluation findings

This section of the report considers the main findings from the various aspects of the evaluation. These are (in order of presentation):

1. Main evaluation questions related to relevance, appropriateness, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, impact, connectedness and sustainability.
2. Process for conducting assessment after the flood in accordance with the NRCS Response Operation Manual.
3. Effectiveness of relief and recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting and decision making of NRCS.
4. Effectiveness of logistic and procurement process during relief and recovery.
5. Appropriateness and effectiveness of cash-based interventions for livelihood and household latrine construction during recovery, impact, sustainability and areas for future.
6. Sustainability of NRCS/IFRC contribution towards strengthening National Society response capacity.

4.1. Main evaluation questions

This section of the report addresses the main evaluation questions as per Annex 1 of the ToR.

As an introduction to this section, it is important to provide the operating context in which the NRCS response took place. Based on learning from the 2015 earthquake response, the GoN decided that flood relief materials should be distributed through a single channel coordinated by the DDRCs, with relief materials being distributed throughout each district via the NRCS or another identified organisation. While this was considered a positive step in aiming for a coordinated approach to relief distribution, the strategy was adopted with minimal prior preparation, leading to a lack of clear coordination among stakeholders and delays in both the rescue and relief processes. Particular challenges for the NRCS included a lack of adequate warehouse facilities, with some external analysis claiming there was a lack of trained human

²² The ET are grateful to the Senior Programme Manager – DCPRR & OP, Sri Lanka for joining the evaluation at short notice.

resources in NRCS chapters (it was also reported that other agencies poorly supported NRCS in carrying out of relief works). Recognising that this 'one-door' policy for rescue and relief could not be implemented, the GoN halted the coordinated approach and reverted to aid agencies continuing with their usual single agency approach to relief distribution.²³

The Operation also faced a number of external problems and challenges during implementation at both HQ and district chapter levels. These included the election campaigns conducted at district and central government level from late October to early December 2017 that resulted in the suspension of all relief, recovery and assessment activities; and the late PFRNA that affected the NRCS's ability to undertake timely recovery planning. At district and chapter level, problems included poor road access, no electricity, late distribution of relief items from HQ, and the time required to transport materials to communities from warehouses. All these challenges were compounded by a late start to the recovery phase.

4.1.1. Relevance and appropriateness of the relief and recovery operations

This section of the report addresses the relevance and appropriateness questions detailed in the terms of reference.

In terms of planning for the distribution of relief and recovery assistance, NRCS district chapters (DCs) relied largely on the IRA survey and consultation with local district authorities for identifying target communities. Key informants from the MoHA felt that NRCS's use of the IRA as the basis for planning relief activities and targeting beneficiaries for relief assistance was appropriate, however, using it for planning the recovery phase was in the MoHA's view not 'rational'.²⁴ Moreover, the World Food Programme (WFP) in Nepal estimated that the IRA contained a 35% inclusion-exclusion error, the highest ever recorded by the agency. The definition of 'beneficiaries' also caused some challenges among all response actors that hampered effective beneficiary targeting.

Beneficiaries interviewed for the evaluation reported that the relief (NFRIs and RTEF) provided through the Operation reached those that needed it and responded to their particular circumstances during the initial emergency stages. This was achieved by a blanket targeting of relief to the entire affected population in the wards that were allocated to NRCS by the municipal authorities. Some beneficiaries reported not receiving relief assistance in the immediate post-flood period, but these cases were resolved once highlighted to NRCS or municipal/ward authorities. One very remote community reported that NFRIs were only received from NRCS some 15 days after the flood (due to access problems), with the shortfall being made up by other organisations engaged in the relief effort.

Most beneficiaries reported that the relief received was broadly sufficient and appropriate to meet needs, but commented that the 15 day supply of WASH consumables (e.g. soap and chlorine tablets) was insufficient.²⁵ The one-monthly package of relief food supply was considered by beneficiaries to be sufficient but not ample. NRCS DCs reported that locally held NFRI stocks (approx. 100-125 HH kits) were inadequate and necessitated HQ despatching the remaining required quantities. A number of beneficiaries felt the NFRIs were

²³ Bhandari, D., Uprety, M., Ghimire, G., Kumal, B., Pokharel L., Khadka P., (2018), Nepal flood 2017: Wake up call for effective preparedness and response, Rugby, UK: Practical Action.

²⁴ Although the IRA was not used by the NRCS as the basis for planning the recovery phase, in the absence of any subsequent formal assessment process (acknowledging the community-driven/participatory assessments undertaken), it undoubtedly informed aspects of NRCS HQ decision-making and influenced beneficiary identification and targeting.

²⁵ Despite enquiries the ET were unable to establish why NRCS did not plan for a 30 day supply as is normal.

more appropriate than a cash grant in the immediate flood period as they were unable to buy goods due an inability to access local markets.

Beneficiaries reported being involved in the Operation to the extent of being engaged in the beneficiary selection process and knowing that the flood Operation was taking place, however, the extent of their meaningful involvement was limited. Many beneficiaries reported not being involved in final decision making processes, with one CBI FGD suggesting that the final beneficiary list (as agreed by the community) was later changed by ward officials. One community in Bardiya district (Ward 4) reported that they were not involved at all in beneficiary selection consultations, not aware that community meetings were taking place, nor informed of the type of relief that they could expect. There was no evidence to indicate that beneficiaries were involved in aspects of Operation assessment, planning or design. However, some beneficiaries reported that they were involved in informal monitoring activities that mostly focused on ensuring key activities (e.g. latrine construction) were completed. Overall, most beneficiaries felt that the selection process was fair, appropriate and effective, especially the way damaged HHs were targeted for both relief and recovery.

These findings lead to Recommendations 1 and 2 in Section 7 of this report. Conclusions on relevance and appropriateness can be found in Section 6.

4.1.2. Coverage

This section of the report addresses the coverage questions detailed in the terms of reference.

The vast majority of beneficiaries reported that the assistance reached all population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance (even to the extent of some non-affected HH receiving NFRIs). Some beneficiaries felt that coverage based on pre-flood status was inequitable as everyone incurred heavy losses whether rich or poor. However, several community members in Bardiya District reported being omitted from both relief and recovery distribution by ward authorities “on purpose” due to their perceived political affiliations (self-identified as Maoist). This assertion was confirmed by the District Head, who suspected that ward officials manipulated the beneficiary lists. Other district chapters reportedly avoided this conflict of interest by adhering to strict assessment and selection criteria, however, one external key informant felt that NRCS were ‘not impartial’ when selecting areas to target relief efforts.²⁶

Two NRCS DCs (Mahotari and Sunsari) felt that other communities could have been selected for support, but were restricted in their coverage scope by a lack of resources and a realism that the district chapters ‘cannot do everything’.²⁷ Other factors that limited district chapter scope to increase coverage related to the GoN allocating difficult to access and the most affected areas to the NS, which extended available resources (human, physical and financial) to the limit.

Suggestions from the community to improve coverage and distribution methods included: NRCS conducting its own assessments rather than relying on municipality data²⁸; producing a ‘most vulnerable’ list to aid priority targeting; and giving information to children in schools as a better conduit for information sharing. The ET established that less than half of the

²⁶ The comment was not made in relation to any of the districts visited by the evaluation team.

²⁷ The ET established that vulnerable communities in neighbouring wards were being supported by other organisations such as Oxfam, Unicef and Unhabitat.

²⁸ This extended to suggestions that NRCS do a more in-depth assessment to ensure accuracy and lack of bias. The finding also supports Recommendation 1.

communities visited for the evaluation had any knowledge of response teams (never mind well-equipped ones), with two communities (Sunsari) reported not having any response teams at all.

Conclusions related to coverage can be found in Section 6.

4.1.3. Efficiency, effectiveness and accountability

This section of the report addresses the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability questions detailed in the terms of reference.

In beginning this section, it is important to reiterate that the Operation faced some key challenges in conducting relief and recovery activities. A significant external event was the late election period (October to early December 2017) when the GoN suspended all relief, recovery and assessment activities due to security concerns. This ultimately slowed both relief implementation progress, and the subsequent planning and commencement of recovery activities.

In terms of adequate resourcing (financial, human, physical and informational) to district chapter, and effective and efficient resource utilisation, chapters reported a number of factors that prevented them from engaging in an efficient relief/response effort. These included challenging road conditions, insufficient number of warehouses and insufficient warehouse stock levels²⁹, along with a high community expectation of the NRCS regarding the level of anticipated relief. A lack of appropriate response equipment also limited response ability (district chapters only had rubber paddle boats, not motor boats).

In terms of efficient and effective operating modalities, the approach to management and coordination of the Operation (between NRCS, IFRC, government bodies, PNSs, INGOs, clusters, and local authorities) is schematically outlined in the August 2017 EPoA. Additional supporting narrative is provided that illuminates Movement Coordination, the role of the GoN in the operation, interaction modalities related to Clusters, and the NRCS's role in the Central Natural Disaster Relief Committee (CNDRC), CEA working group, and national level cash coordination group. Descriptions and explanations are considered satisfactory for the purposes of the Operation with working modalities being confirmed by relevant key informants.

The NRCS/IFRC working structure for the Operation is detailed in Table 3 of the March 2018 EPoA. All KIs (HQ and district level) reported that there was adequate and relevant staffing to support the Operation. However, a significant number of KIs raised concerns about the capacity and experience of the NRCS HQ team to manage the recovery aspects of the operation given that they were a new team, and very few individuals had any prior experience of working in a recovery setting.

More significantly, the appointed NRCS Head of Flood Recovery Operation (HFRO) reportedly had no previous RC experience (other than as a consultant) and no experience of managing relief/recovery operations. KIs indicated that this resulted in *inter-alia* delayed decision-making, slowed processes (specifically budgeting of the 2018 EPoA), and a reported 'tense' working relationship with IFRC that caused operational activities to slow and back-up.³⁰ For the most part, KIs complemented the NS district teams' management of the Operation, suggesting that

²⁹ District chapters reported acquiring additional relief materials from other organisations such as Plan, Caritas, Save the Children. The finding also supports Recommendation 2.

³⁰ This was reportedly due to HFRO difficulties in following agreed protocols (related to standard operating procedures and decision-making modalities) and reaching joint consensus on operational planning modalities.

greater devolution of responsibility from HQ to district level would be a significant positive step in improving future operational efficiency and effectiveness.

From a recovery efficiency and effectiveness perspective, DCs reported that the delayed transition gap from relief to recovery most negatively affected their response efficiency. District chapter KIs mostly attributed this to planning complications at HQ between NRCS and IFRC; along with a lack of clear guidance from the GoN on how to move forward with recovery. All district chapters commented on the insufficient funding for latrines; noting that livelihoods support was only sufficient for smaller animal husbandry schemes. Human resources (staff and volunteers) were considered adequate. Despite these setbacks, district/sub-chapters continued to mobilise volunteers and conduct relief operations with the GoN and other organisations.

In terms of adequate tracking systems in place to ensure transparency and accountability, the Operation's monitoring processes kept by IFRC PMER were well ordered and clear. Operation updates were kept cumulatively, enabling an overview of how targets were progressively secured and thus aiding effectiveness analysis. EPoA updates were also useful in providing a summary of the response and illustrating progress towards key targets in graphic form and in more depth through the Detailed Operational Plan (see Section C of the EPoA updates).³¹

Challenges at community level that impacted overall effectiveness included the demand from the community for longer food relief items rather than just the one month (which to a degree was supplemented by private sector and other organisation donations). In some communities, poor education levels (including high rates of alcoholism) were reported to have hampered NRCS recovery initiatives. In one community all the houses collapsed resulting in a 2 ½ month wait for any recovery work to begin. District chapters also reported that it was difficult to select 180 HH for recovery from among the many deserving HHs in the ward. Other challenges to operational effectiveness included political interference, constant input from community-based organisations (CBOs), remote communities, security issues, and working alongside other organisations providing a higher latrine grant than the Operation (NPR 8,000 more). The main approach to managing these problem and challenges involved working closely with the GoN and mobilising the community.

In terms of Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA), NRCS had in place two main complaints/feedback mechanisms for community questions and concerns. The first, and most widely advertised, was the NRCS Hotline number 1130. The second was through the district level project staff (social mobilisers) that had responsibility for visiting beneficiaries and communities during the implementation period. None of the beneficiaries interviewed made use of the Hotline, primarily because the social mobilisers were considered so effective in their role of engaging with the community. Other beneficiaries reported having direct access to district authority officials, police, local representatives, and NRCS staff and volunteers, which again negated the need for those communities to use the Hotline.

Overall beneficiary satisfaction for the relief assistance was recorded as high, with food and cooking utensils being rated as most useful. Beneficiary satisfaction for recovery assistance was also high, especially livelihoods, as it allowed families to create income generating opportunities. Activities orientated to improving water supply (elevated tube wells³²) along with hygiene promotion activities were also highly rated by the community. The main recovery satisfaction exception concerned the low latrine grant, which had to be supplemented by HHs and often resulted in taking on a level of debt.

³¹ See e.g. EPoA update n°4 (12-month update) date of issue: 19 October 2018.

³² The evaluation established that it was not possible to rehabilitate any tube wells due to their original shallow depth. Provision of new tube wells was the only viable option.

These findings lead to Recommendation 3 in Section 7 of this report. Conclusions related to efficiency, effectiveness and accountability can be found in Section 6.

4.1.4. Impact

This section of the report addresses the impact questions detailed in the terms of reference, beginning with an analysis of how the interventions met their immediate and intended results according to the PoA indicators.

Accounting for the fact that the majority of shelter activities were deprioritised in late 2017, an analysis of Operation updates indicates that all other ‘activity’ interventions met their immediate and intended results according to PoA indicators (100% achievement) except DRR activities related to (a) CEC construction, and (b) first aid and rescue training for community members.³³ The CEC construction process was delayed due to unexpected changes caused by the new GoN federal structure that lengthened building processes. First aid and rescue training targets were 86-88% achievement at time of reporting.

In occasional cases, activity targets were exceeded (e.g. by 185-200%), but mostly these were orientated to conducting health promotion work targeting pregnant and lactating women or conducting community awareness raising sessions. One activity (conducting community safe shelter awareness sessions) was only 54% secured at the time of reporting, however, this activity was deprioritised in late 2017 and was not expected to be completed.

In terms of progress to securing the Outcome indicators detailed in the EPoA log frame, Table 4 shows the Baseline-Endline value comparison. The final column – variance – illustrates the increase and therefore level of impact achievement compared to the original baseline value.

Table 4: Baseline-Endline value comparison

Sector	Outcome	Indicators	Base value ³⁴	Endline value	Variance
Shelter	Outcome 1: Communities in disaster and crisis affected areas restore and strengthen their safety, well-being and longer-term recovery through shelter and settlement solutions	Indicator 1a1.1 % of families living in shelters meeting agreed standards for emergency shelter for the specific operational context	0%	16.3%	+16.3%
		Indicator 1b: % of target families who have increased knowledge about safe shelter construction	1.4%	13.6%	+12.2%
Livelihoods and basic needs	Outcome 1: Communities, especially in	Indicator 1a: % of those assisted for whom food	3.7%	6.8%	+3.1%

³³ Minor adjustments will be made following final IFRC reporting in July 2019.

³⁴ The baseline report contains the base values for each outcome indicator (with the exception of Inclusion and Protection) along with a note on the statistical calculation method(s) and a copy of the survey instrument used for the entire baseline exercise.

Sector	Outcome	Indicators	Base value ³⁴	Endline value	Variance
	disaster and crisis affected areas, restore and strengthen their livelihoods	consumption is equal or greater than the minimum food basket equivalent Indicator 1b: % of targeted population whose livelihoods are (restored to/or improved from) pre-disaster level	53.1%	87.4%	+34.3%
Health	Outcome 1: The immediate and mid-term risks to the health of affected populations are reduced	Indicator 1a: % of targeted people with increased knowledge of and practiced preventive health behaviour	41.2%	65.3%	+24.1%
Health	Outcome 2: The medium-term risks to the health of affected populations are reduced	Indicator 2a: % of people in the operation catchment area who can access appropriate health services	33.9%	50.2%	+16.3%
WASH	Outcome 1: Immediate reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities	Indicator 1a: % of target population that has access to sufficient safe water	30.3%	46.4%	+16.3%
		Indicator 2b: % of target population that is using adequate sanitation	10.5%	32%	+16.1%
WASH	Outcome 2: Sustainable reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities in the recovery phase	Indicator 1b: % of target population that has increased knowledge of hygiene practices	40.1%	54%	+13.9%
Inclusion and Protection	Outcome 1: Communities identify the needs of the most vulnerable and particularly disadvantaged and marginalised groups, as a result of inequality, discrimination and other non-respect of their human rights and address their distinct needs	Indicator 1a: % increase in knowledge and awareness about gender based violence	No base	Respondents citing physical, mental and sexual violence. Some respondents indicating 'don't know'.	Significant increase in awareness

Sector	Outcome	Indicators	Base value ³⁴	Endline value	Variance
DRR	Outcome 1: Communities in high risk areas are prepared for and able to respond to disaster	Indicator 1a: % of targeted communities with an active and well-equipped response team for community search and rescue, First Aid and Response	0%	Low community awareness	Not established

In analysing the endline data, it may be said that the Operation has had a good deal of positive impact on the affected beneficiaries. The most significant increase (+34.3%) has been the percentage of the targeted population whose livelihoods are (restored to/or improved) from pre-disaster levels. Given that CBI was one of the mainstays of the Operation, this is a welcome result. Similarly, significant gains were recorded in the percentage of targeted people with increased knowledge of and practiced preventive health behaviour (+24.1%); the percentage of target population that has access to sufficient safe water (+16.3%); and the percentage of target population that is using adequate sanitation (+16.1%). Again, all welcome results that help illustrate the level of positive impact the Operation has had on the targeted population.

In terms of Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGI) incorporating GESI and CEA, the EPoA outlines the Operation's approach to PGI in that issues were to be considered during assessments, through gathering sex and age disaggregated data, analysis of who is being reached and who is missing out, and constant reporting on protection issues for children, risks of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and sector-specific safety concerns.³⁵ The ET established that awareness-raising sessions on GBV (prevention and response³⁶) were conducted in target districts, with PGI being introduced appropriately as a cross-cutting theme. Significantly, none of the participants attending focus group discussions raised any concerns related to Protection, Gender and Inclusion.

While activities were secured as per LFA targets, the ET was unable to determine actual meaningful progress and results related to GESI. This was mainly due to the omission of schools from the field schedule (although it is known that a total of 29 girls anti trafficking sessions were conducted in seven districts reaching 829 school students - 687 female). As noted earlier in this report, communities were not involved in all aspects of assessment, planning, project orientation and monitoring as per operational design, however, were actively engaged in implementation aspects, particularly in assessments (notably beneficiary selection) and the main operational activities.³⁷ District level project staff and social mobilisers were key to this approach as a mechanism to coordinate with communities during the implementation period.

In terms of longer-term impact, none of the beneficiaries interviewed felt that the assistance received to date³⁸ through the Operation had particularly helped them to cope with future disasters. Communities still lived in vulnerable locations, houses were still prone to flood and

³⁵ Related to health, WASH, shelter and livelihoods.

³⁶ Through adherence to the Minimum Standard Commitments to Gender and Diversity in Emergency Programming.

³⁷ Including through community-based approaches such as forming or re-forming community self-help committee/groups such as water user committees.

³⁸ The CECs were still under construction and could not be considered an accessible benefit.

subsequent damage, and HH items/livestock were likely to be washed away during flood. Moreover, identified evacuation points (e.g. schools) were still prone to flooding.³⁹ There was strong evidence that NRCS Chapters had undertaken DRR advocacy for target communities: had lobbied DDRCs for CECs; had worked alongside human rights activists as a means of joined-up advocacy; and had made representations to local government for disaster preparedness and risk planning.

While the livestock opportunities were welcomed by those that received them, they did not necessarily guarantee secured income generation for the poorest of HHs (these HHs did not always have the means to support proper animal rearing e.g. foodstuffs, vaccinations etc.). One of the interventions that had the highest impact measure was the provision of elevated tube wells, with beneficiaries positively remarking on subsequent reduction in waterborne diseases in the community.

Municipality authority and NRCS suggestions to better increase community resilience against disaster risks included: more community disaster risk reduction (DRR)/prevention awareness; formation of rescue teams and provision of rescue materials; more CECs; stronger houses; NRCS working more at the palika level on emergency preparedness for communities; and supporting communities with longer term development needs including health and hygiene promotion activities.

Progress toward key outcome indicators that help illustrate the Operation's impact are shown in the baseline-endline comparison Table 4 (above). Further analysis provides strong evidence that the intervention (both relief and recovery) has contributed to the reduction of suffering, particularly through the provision of initial shelter support, NFRIs and RTEF. Similarly, the affected populations were assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity particularly through the CBI and WASH activities. The provision of latrines in communities that did not previously have them has greatly improved aspects of PGI, particularly for women and girls, as they no longer have to practice open defecation under risky circumstances (i.e. at night, in secluded spots). However, there were relatively few interventions related to enhancing disaster preparedness. Annex F of this report contains a short case study orientated to illustrating Operation impact.

Conclusions related to impact can be found in Section 6.

4.1.5. Connectedness and sustainability

This section of the report addresses the connectedness and sustainability questions detailed in the terms of reference.

The operational design had intended to engage beneficiaries in both a comprehensive and meaningful way through stages of assessment, planning, project orientation, monitoring, and implementation. However, actual community contributions to the relief stage of the Operation were limited. The only examples cited during the evaluation were community representation in beneficiary selection processes, some monitoring activities, and the community helping facilitate relief access by building mud pathways. NRCS volunteers were mostly involved in implementation activities, but not in the Operation's design nor planning. As previously noted, beneficiary engagement in implementation of recovery activities, particularly livelihoods and latrine construction were fully secured.

³⁹ One positive, but rather ironic comment, shared with the ET was a beneficiary who said that he still had a tarpaulin which could be used for future disaster situations.

There was little evidence to indicate that local government were involved in aspects of project design, with most GoN contributions related to supporting implementation, coordination and monitoring activities. From a livelihood sustainability perspective, communities felt that more options were required than just the animal husbandry/crop growing opportunities offered. Suggestions for improvement included: beautician, seamstress, motor cycle repair, and mobile telephone/electronics repair training.

Concerns raised by communities during the Operation mostly centred on post-flood aspects and issues related to sustainability of the intervention. The specific concerns cited to the ET included: insufficient livelihood grant for larger livestock purposes (i.e. a preference for buffalos); longevity of goats compared to cows/buffalos; the need to pay separate livestock insurance; adequate land for latrines; lack of CECs; and insufficient Operation funds to meet larger community latrine/livelihood needs.

In terms of wider connectedness, the evaluation established that local government were only involved in minimal aspects of project design, planning and implementation; and there was a very limited contribution from local government to the Operation. These particularly relate to linking communities with other actors responsible for aspects of animal husbandry/veterinary, and the marketing of livelihood products (crops and animals) to ensure a more sustainable intervention (see further Section 4.5.1).

It is difficult to imagine that those responsible for the Operation had the issue of sustainability in the forefront of their minds when planning the recovery aspects, and there is limited formal evidence of planning for this in the EPoAs and other documents. However, all things considered, there is a realistic possibility of project activities being sustained following completion of the interventions principally due to the ownership driven approaches that embodied much of the CBI and WASH initiatives. The impact the interventions have had on how communities will be able to cope with subsequent disasters is a little mixed. Community resilience levels have increased for the reasons stated earlier in this report, but the fact that the communities remain vulnerable to flood makes the sustainability of some interventions less assured.

These findings lead to Recommendation 4 in Section 7 of the report. Conclusions related to connectedness and sustainability can be found in Section 6.

4.2. Process for conducting assessments after the flood in accordance with the NRCS Response Operation Manual

The key source document for conducting assessments after floods is the NRCS Disaster Response Operational Manual (DROM).⁴⁰ Section 3 (3.1 - 3.1.2.6) of the DROM deals with the issue of assessment in the following topic range: definition and purpose; types and phase; process for general and specific assessment; principles; tools and methods; overcoming biases; engaging beneficiaries; and situation update reporting. The evaluation considered the extent to which the NRCS adhered to the DROM after the floods to conduct and facilitate assessment.

NRCS DCs conducted IRAs in each ward immediately after the water levels dropped (within 24 hrs to 2-3 days depending on the situation) as a means of prioritising assistance. NRCS HQ compiled the initial data sets, which were used to inform decision making at HQ and DC levels. An analysis of the IRA finds relevant data related to: # of rural municipality affected; #

⁴⁰ Dated 2010 and developed with the support of the Danish Red Cross.

of municipality affected; # of wards, population dead, missing and injured; # of affected families; # of displaced families; # of damaged houses; # of damaged infrastructure (schools, health posts, community centres); crops planted/cultivated lands; cattle lost; grocery shops damaged; fish ponds damaged; and the agencies working in the surveyed areas. DDRCs verified the data.

Following participatory meetings⁴¹, organisations were allocated thematic sectors and geographical areas: NRCS was allocated NFRI, and Shelter as cluster lead. The IRA enabled discussion among HQ and DCs in close coordination with the Government of Nepal. NRCS subsequently prioritised its interventions, releasing DC and HQ warehouse stocks to facilitate relief. It was reported that as data was jointly collected with government officials, security services, and other NGOs, there was higher acceptance of the data collected. However, WFP felt that the IRA data was highly error prone.

In the DROM, a key aspect of conducting assessments is the formulation of survey teams, normally comprising the following 'critical' roles: Team Leader, Relief/Logistics, WASH, Health and Nutrition, Livelihood/Food. The evaluation established that district chapters were more flexible in determining team structure, for example by using a mix of programme coordinator/officers, social mobilisers, governance roles and volunteers to undertake assessments. The size of survey teams reportedly differed from between 5 and 3 members. A constraint within this approach is that generalists are appointed to survey teams rather than specialists as per DROM guidelines. The implication being that surveys are less analytical than is required for a thorough assessment.

Another key aspect of the DROM relates to overcoming biases, with the manual containing the following specific clause: 'If Volunteers and staff are actively involved in politics or parties to the conflict and if it is perceived that this might affect the institution adversely, concerned persons are supposed to apprehend the situation themselves and refrain from active involvement in the Red Cross' (p.17). While the ET have no first hand evidence to indicate that assessments were not impartial, one credible external key informant spoke of some DCs openly exhibiting bias when selecting target areas ('NRCS didn't want to go there due to history').

In terms of data assessment aimed at assisting the recovery phase, NRCS initiated detailed assessments in the targeted districts. However, this exercise was abandoned following the GoN's plan for a PFRNA and a GoN ruling that prohibited any detailed assessments prior to the 7 December 2017 elections. Despite this limitation, NRCS undertook pre-assessment visits to seven target districts to obtain an overview of needs and identify recovery activities as a first step to revising the Emergency Plan of Action.

4.3. Effectiveness of NRCS relief and recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting and decision making

Source documents for relief and recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting and decision making include the: NRCS Disaster Management Policy (2008); NRCS Disaster Management Strategic Framework 2010–2015; and the DROM. For purposes of this evaluation the DROM is considered the key operation document as section 2 (2.1 – 2.2.1.6) deals with decision making; Section 3.2 deals with planning; and aspects of Section 3.3 deal with beneficiary targeting. The evaluation considered the extent to which the NS adhered to each of these section guidelines after the floods.

⁴¹ Involving the Chief District Officer (CDO) as chair, NRCS, INGOs/NGOs, clusters, ward and rural municipality representatives.

The ET established that assessment data gathered at DC level was used for preparing the EPoA. However, DC staff reported that while they provided data for the planning process, they were not necessarily directly involved in preparing the plan. HQ KIs reported that the NRCS Monsoon preparedness and response plan 2018 minimised time taken for planning and facilitated a quicker disaster response to the floods. DC staff had limited input into the DREF and emergency appeal, and were only engaged in development at activity level: this suggests the NS approach to planning for this Operation was rather top-down.⁴²

In terms of beneficiary targeting, NRCS used the IRA data plus a range of selection criteria that included; direct observations (damaged houses, no food, dead animals); agreeing criteria in line with guidance from HQ; and using a community-based approach (e.g. prioritising minority groups). District Chapters felt the main challenges related to beneficiary targeting were:

- a. Politicised selection by DAs due to elections. In efforts to overcome this, NRCS attempted to select the most vulnerable using its own assessment criteria, however, this was sometimes interpreted as NRCS staff and volunteers selecting their own relatives for assistance.
- b. Demands from the community. As noted earlier in this report, the expectations of NRCS to meet affected communities' assistance needs were very high and it was difficult at times for the DCs to manage these expectations. DCs felt that it was vital to communicate selection criteria to the communities and the processes used for beneficiary targeting.

For CBI (recovery phase), the NRCS cash guidelines follow GoN cash-based guidelines. Beneficiaries were selected via a community selection approach, which is intended to enhance transparency and build trust among the affected population.⁴³ DCs reported that this process involved forming a committee, of which the following individuals were members: village secretary, ward leader, and NRCS DC president. The final agreed beneficiary list was endorsed by the ward leader; with the following criteria used: livelihoods - family is landless, economically vulnerable, single women in HH, elderly, disabled etc; WASH (in addition to the above livelihood criteria) – no HH toilet, destroyed by floods or not usable.

The NS has a range of documents used to facilitate decision-making and guide its actions during emergency response operations. The NRCS also has disaster pre-plans prior, which are prepared by the DCs and submitted to NRCS senior management for approval.⁴⁴ When a disaster strikes, HQ and DCs establish a HQ Emergency Operations Committee (EOC) and District Emergency Operations Committees respectively. NRCS trained resources DDRTs and NDRTs are deployed to assist operations. The evaluation established that while NRCS leadership and senior management have a clear understanding of the systems, policies and guidelines, DC staff have a varying understanding of these processes and the tools available to them. This indicates that DCs are in need of some basic awareness training related to the NS' emergency response modalities.

⁴² The ET believe it is important that all levels of the NS have an equal understanding of the EPoA if an effective Operation is to be secured.

⁴³ Beneficiaries were given a beneficiary card.

⁴⁴ However, at district chapter level, social mobilisers were not aware of the pre-plan.

4.4. Effectiveness of procurement and logistic processes during relief and recovery

4.4.1. Procurement

The NRCS was in charge of all procurement during the Operation. The evaluation looked at the procurement processes used for higher volume/value items during the relief and recovery stages. NRCS has a set of written procurement guidelines (dated 2014) that follow the GoN's procurement processes. The guidelines are lengthy, but with regard to higher volume/value items can be summarised as: (i) a normal tendering process in periods of non-emergency - estimated time minimum of 4 months from tender posting to award; and (ii) a tendering process for use in emergency periods - estimated time 7-30 days from tender posting to award.⁴⁵ A critical process/speed factor in both tendering processes is securing the relevant authorisation from the various approved NS signatories, an 'end process' that ultimately stops with the NRCS Chairman.⁴⁶ The most relevant procurement issues related to this evaluation concern the purchase of LLINs and CECs (issues related to latrine material are considered in Section 4.5.2). These are considered in turn below.

LLINs - sixteen thousand (16,000) LLINs were due to be distributed to beneficiaries during the relief phase of the Operation. Commencing August 2018, NRCS issued 4,232 LLINs from warehouse stocks, with distribution continuing until November 2018. The tender for the remaining LLINs was published on 5 November 2017 and followed NRCS normal tender procedures i.e. non-emergency procedures. The agreement with the supplier was reached on 27 February 2018 with an estimated delivery date of 19 April 2018.

NRCS acknowledge that the procurement process for the remaining LLINs should have commenced August 2018, however, in a response letter to DFID reported that due to HQ senior management visits to the flood affected areas during September (coupled with the October festival season), both submission and approval process were significantly delayed. The request to purchase the LLINs was finally submitted to the NRCS Procurement Department at the end of October 2018.⁴⁷

The evaluation believes that that the NS Flood Operation's Team should have (i) advance communicated the need for LLINs to the Procurement Department, and (ii) invoked the emergency procurement process for the remaining 12,000 LLINs in August 2018 as soon as the shortfall was known. However, neither was done, which resulted in significant delay. The counterpoint to this is the positive decision that led to decentralising tube well procurement to DCs, which contributed to greater efficiency and speedier construction.

This finding leads to Recommendation 5 in Section 7 of the report.

Community Evacuation Centres: The construction of CECs was not part of the initial EPoA. Following the 'pre-assessment for recovery process' conducted in November 2017 by NRCS/IFRC, the CECs were identified as genuine community DRR need and thus included in the revised EPoA (March 2018). The provisional budget for construction was allocated from un-earmarked funds. The initial approach to CEC construction was intended to take place through three district Community Construction Committees (CCCs), however, establishing

⁴⁵ The emergency procurement process has a reported nine process conditions/steps.

⁴⁶ The NRCS have a back-up system in place to obtain approved signatures in the absence of senior management.

⁴⁷ It transpires that the Procurement Department were not briefed or advised of the Operation plans, and therefore had no advance knowledge of the need for LLINs.

these proved to be a lengthy process under the new GoN federal structure and it was decided instead to initiate the standard NRCS tendering process as a means of speeding CEC progress.

Prospective building companies tendered for the construction in each of the three districts, with the contract being awarded to companies that most closely met the bidding criteria - price, previous construction experience of this type, work history, financial stability, and legal status. The evaluation reviewed the tender documents and found all was in order. Section 4.7 considers the CEC construction process in further detail.

In conclusion, the NRCS' procurement process, and the procurement decision-making made by the Flood Operation Team (especially in relation to LLINs) negatively impacted on operational efficiency and effectiveness. However, the decision to decentralise the tube well procurement to DC's contributed to greater efficiency and speedier construction.

4.4.2. Logistics

The Operation's logistics activities relate to management of the supply chain, which includes clearance, storage, forwarding to distributions sites in accordance to IFRC logistics standards, and processes and procedures for fleet movement of operational staff and supplies (issues related to procurement are considered in 4.4.1). The IFRC CO supported the logistics aspects of operation by assigning vehicles to facilitate the movement of staff and volunteers. The CO logistics team also provided technical support to NRCS for procurement, fleet and general logistics. The IFRC AP Operational Logistics, Procurement and Supply Chain Management (OLPSCM) department in Kuala Lumpur also extended support to the NRCS and IFRC CO when requested.

NRCS has one central warehouse at HQ level, 4 regional level warehouses and a further 5-6 smaller warehouses each at sub-regional or district level. The level of stocks held in regional level warehouses is in the region of 3,000 NFI kits. The main logistics challenges faced by the Operation as reported by NRCS staff related to: (a) the insufficient number of vehicles (trucks) at region/district level capable of moving and delivering relief goods (from central warehouses to district warehouses, and district warehouses to NRCS distribution points)⁴⁸; and (b) flooding of some NRCS DC offices, which meant that relief goods had to be distributed from drop-off points near highways. Aside from the warehousing and procurement issues highlighted earlier in this report, and the lack of vehicles described in this section, there were no other specific issues regarding the Operation's logistics process.

4.5. Appropriateness and effectiveness of CBI for livelihood and household latrine construction during recovery

4.5.1. Cash-based interventions for livelihoods

The original cash for work initiative outlined in the August 2017 EPoA (Livelihoods Outcome, Output 3.1) aimed: 'To inject cash in the community and provide gainful employment to the most vulnerable'. The initiative specified that some 2,000 people would be engaged in cash for work for 20 days in order to rebuild community infrastructure, including identifying strategies to ensure men and women are represented as direct recipients of cash and employment initiatives' (p.9).

⁴⁸ Vehicles had to be hired, which although was not considered time consuming was costly.

The EPoA provides no details as to what the cash and employment initiatives would entail, but NRCS KIs indicated they would likely be unskilled in nature and orientated to post flood access/debris clearing. However, due to delays in commencing this aspect of the Operation and a failure to identify any cash for work activities, the initiative never began. In an effort to continue some form of CfW initiative, the Operation 'considered'⁴⁹ paying for unskilled community labour to support elevated tube well construction, but this idea was progressed no further. The only reference to this particular CfW idea appears in an IFRC April 2018 Appeal⁵⁰ update that reads:

'Initially, NRCS had proposed to rehabilitate or construct 35 tube wells in the seven targeted districts . . . This will be a community driven initiative with support from NRCS technical engineers for supervision. Skilled and unskilled workers will be selected at community level and trained. Cash for work modality will be used to pay the workers for their services.' (p.9)

Subsequently, DFID raised a justifiable concern regarding changes in the original CBI modality by noting the tube well initiative was not 'cash for work' that targeted the most vulnerable disaster affected people, but rather just straightforward employment for skilled/unskilled people without any particular targeting'.⁵¹ In an NRCS management response to DFID (undated), the NS acknowledges that the tube well CfW exercise was deprioritized due to the unavailability of sufficient community skilled manpower and limited district chapter management capacity in managing cash-based interventions. This situation has been the subject of much criticism by partners and appears to centre on a poorly thought through CfW approach, coupled by a lack of NS and IFRC communication and consultation with one of its main partners.

By March 2018, the CfW approach was abandoned as evidenced through the revised EPoA (March 2018) that detailed a different approach to meeting community livelihood needs. This now entailed targeting 180 families in each district for 'agricultural and livestock management training as well as cash grants for livelihoods (total of 1,460 families or 6,300 people)'. The livelihood CBI was finally used to support a range of small-scale projects: 1,292 animal husbandry, 49 agriculture and 86 small business initiatives – a small increase on the original target number.

The decision to implement CBI was based on pre-assessment recommendations. A field assessment was carried out to determine the feasibility of using CBI, as well as market factors, but these market assessments were rudimentary and not sufficiently detailed to inform a strategic CBI approach. The guidelines for conducting the Operation's CBI are contained in the Flood Recovery Operation 2017-2018 Guidelines for Livelihood Activities (January, 2018) which includes appropriate sections related to: beneficiary selection, orientation, business planning, trainings, cash grant distribution model, progress monitoring, and reporting. District chapters were motivated to work on the CBI model for cash readiness. Experience from the Earthquake recovery operation was used to aid decision making. Financial service providers were chosen on the basis of their service delivery capacity to target affected communities (in most cases bank processes were done within the community by bank staff going to the field).

⁴⁹ This initiative was rather informal and did not appear in the revised March EPoA.

⁵⁰ MDRNP009 - 30 April 2018.

⁵¹ In the original appeal, Output 3.1 was '2,000 people provided employment opportunities through cash for work to rebuild community assets/infrastructures'. This was deprioritized in later appeal revisions (e.g. 3/2018) and the March 2018 EPoA, but seemingly not well communicated to partners.

The evaluation established that for the most part, the guidelines were adhered to and proved useful for conducting CBI at field level. In summary, communities were consulted according to the guideline protocols, with NRCS social mobilisers key to this process.⁵² Selection criteria was adhered to, and agreed among the community (considered transparent and fair) in consultation with ward representatives and NRCS chapter staff. Selection lists were verified by ward offices. Beneficiaries received orientation and trainings on select livelihoods initiatives according to guidelines. Cash instalments were paid according to guidelines (10,000 plus 5,000 for livelihoods⁵³; 7,000 plus 3,000 for latrines). HHs that had either lost latrines through flood or had none to begin with were prioritised for the latrine grant, however, families that did not have land were ineligible. However, as previously stated, market assessments were inadequate to inform a strategic CBI recovery approach that effectively targeted HH needs.

The majority of beneficiaries reported that while latrine and livelihood recovery support was greatly appreciated by those that received it, it was not (i) sufficient to cover all costs⁵⁴, or (ii) sufficient to meet whole community needs. The latrine grant was not sufficient to build the superstructure, which required many HHs to take out additional loans. The livelihood grant was only sufficient for small-scale projects. This was due to the limited number of latrines and livelihood opportunities⁵⁵ available through the Operation coupled with the limited budget available. Those that received livelihood recovery support appreciated the opportunity to have a 'new occupation' and thus a source of income not previously enjoyed.⁵⁶ The latrine scheme also injected cash into the wider community (small businesses/traders) and provided gainful employment to local skilled men (but not necessarily men from the affected communities).

As noted in the Regional Mid-Term Review Cash Preparedness Initiative Asia Pacific Report (2018), NRCS has implemented a number of CBI schemes in partnership with the British, American, Danish and Spanish Red Cross. This myriad of CBI schemes has partially developed NRCS's capacity for some HQ staff and some DCs, but has reportedly failed to change systems and institutionalise CBI (the reasons are outlined in the report and will not be repeated here). This evaluation draws the same overall conclusion i.e. despite the development of many project-based guidelines and tools following the earthquake operation, NRCS has not transferred learning from experience nor effectively institutionalised CBI in a meaningful way. The 2018 Mid-Term Review Report made a number of recommendations (some have been progressed), but many of those remain to be actioned before NRCS can be considered 'cash ready'.⁵⁷

In future CBI modalities, the IFRC/NRCS need to give careful thought to the NFI/CBI trade-off i.e. the optimum balance between the two options. For example, where there are no functioning markets during times of disaster, the value (i.e. utility) of a NFI – as seen from a beneficiary viewpoint – is higher than that of cash. This is simply because NFIs cannot be bought when there are no functioning markets, and the utility of cash *at that particular time* is diminished. This suggests that holding a level of NFI stock in warehouses is a strategic consideration and

⁵² The value of social mobilisers has been highlighted on a number of occasions in this report which leads to Recommendation 6.

⁵³ District Chapters felt the amount was insufficient as it is less than GoN CBI recommended allocation of NPR 25,000 during normal times.

⁵⁴ A more in-depth assessment and analysis was required to calculate the value of the cash grant.

⁵⁵ The business plan approach to livelihoods, which was sensible, also meant that not all individual choices for livelihoods (e.g. bicycle repair) were available to beneficiaries as only 'majority' schemes (e.g. goat rearing) were selected for inclusion in the Operation.

⁵⁶ The livestock support did not replace an existing income, but was a new scheme for many HHs.

⁵⁷ NRCS has drafted a CBI SOP which is waiting endorsement.

one that should not be forgotten/discounted in the pursuit of cash solutions. The aim is to make an informed CBI relief decision based on accurate market assessments in the affected areas. These findings and conclusions lead to Recommendations 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in Section 7 of the report.

4.5.2. Conditional cash grants for household latrine construction

NRCS supported 706 families from 7 districts to construct individual household latrines through the recovery phase of the Operation (100 latrines per district). The revised EPoA (March 2018) detailed the approach to latrine construction that involved one unskilled and two skilled workers to whom NRCS engineers would provide a set of toilet drawings and list of required construction materials; with NRCS paying the skilled workers directly. The support modality was through a conditional cash grant of NPR 10,000 per household paid in two instalments (NPR 7,000 and NPR 3,000).⁵⁸ The first instalment was used to purchase materials and commence the construction process. The second instalment was made on completion of the latrine. Three further issues that relate to the construction of individual household latrines concern allocation, design and cost.

Allocation: the provision of 100 latrines per district was an arbitrary allocation determined by NRCS aimed at dividing available financial resources equally among the 7 target districts. While district level targeting was theoretically orientated to the most vulnerable, the ET found that in some districts a number of reasonably well off HHs benefited from latrine provision. It is understood that in this case, the term vulnerability was applied to flood and not necessarily other vulnerability factors such as socio-economic status. However, NRCS indicated at least double the number of latrines would have been required to respond appropriately to the affected population’s particular circumstances. It was also reported that some poorer HHs found it difficult to build the latrine with the cash grant provided, often due to a lack of available land. In such cases, NS provided an additional grant or encouraged building of the latrine within the HH which did not require additional land.⁵⁹



⁵⁸ The national level WASH cluster standardized the design of household latrines fixing the cash grant at NPR 8,000 per HH. Due to market rate increases, and also to maintain some consistency with national standards, NRCS increased its cash grant amount by a further NPR 2,000.

⁵⁹ There are doubts as to the sustainability of this latter solution due to cultural norms that dictate that latrines should not be within the home.

Design: the NS issued latrine design plans (NRCS Annex 10) stipulate that corrugated iron sheet (CGI) sheets should be used for the superstructure (as shown in the picture above), however, many latrine superstructures seen by the ET were made of concrete. Reasons given for deviation from design plan related to ‘pressure’ applied by municipality, ward authorities and the NRCS on HHs to build a more permanent structure.

Cost: for HH latrine construction, the NS’ bill of quantities (BoQ - Annex 11) details material and construction costs for latrine construction including superstructure at NPR 10,000 (a more realistic cost is reported to be 15,000 NPR). The cost of latrines varied between districts, for example, in Badiya District, latrine material and installation (labour) cost without superstructure was NPR 10,000 (HHs contributed an additional NPR 5,000 for the superstructure); whereas in Sunsari District, the latrine cost with superstructure was NPR 11,000 (which included a HH NPR 1,000 contribution for wood, hinges etc.). The ET found that a number of HHs had taken out loans to fund the latrine superstructure.

Issues of latrine design and cost aside, the provision of latrines has had a very positive impact on those communities that were fortunate enough to receive them. In one district visited by the ET, an entire community benefited from latrines where none had previously existed (100 latrines to serve 400 HH). In addition, trained NRCS staff and social mobilisers have conducted hygiene promotion activities using key elements of participatory hygiene and sanitary transformation (PHAST) approach in the community and child hygiene and sanitation transformation (CHAST) in schools. Trained NRCS volunteers have also conducted hygiene promotion activities in the community.⁶⁰ The efficacy of these hygiene promotion activities was clearly illustrated to the ET through a textbook handwashing demonstration provided by a young HH member.⁶¹

In terms of sustainability of the latrine intervention, all the latrines seen by the ET were clean, well maintained and in use. The provision of latrines was highly appropriate intervention although the initiative could have been more effective had it allowed for more flexibility in construction design and had the conditional grant covered the full cost rather than a partial amount (66%). These issues notwithstanding, the provision of latrines has had a very positive impact on those affected communities that were fortunate enough to receive this recovery support from the Operation. Given that communities have made the connection between improved sanitation and hygiene practices and reductions in common communicable disease, there is a strong likelihood that many HHs will continue to use them.⁶²

4.6. Sustainability of NRCS/IFRC contribution towards strengthening National Society response capacity

NRCS Leadership noted how important IFRC support for the Operation had been in strengthening NS response capacity for this particular operation, especially in the way IFRC had facilitated the transfer of operational learning/knowledge from the Earthquake Response into the floods operation, which also enabled the specific creation of a dedicated NRCS floods team based on that experience and learning.⁶³ The IFRC APRO was singled out by NRCS Leadership for praise, particularly for its ‘helpfulness and support’ in raising the necessary funding for the Operation.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ This finding supports Recommendation 6.

⁶¹ This was requested by the ET and not prepared in advance.

⁶² There is good evidence of community awareness related to the need to empty pits when they are full.

⁶³ NRCS Leadership however acknowledged that they did not get the ‘team structure’ quite right.

⁶⁴ NRCS Leadership felt fund raising was especially challenging given the recent earthquake operation.

Key NRCS HQ informants were highly appreciative of the technical and coordination support IFRC provided during the Operation, highlighting back-up technical support for WASH, Logistics, Shelter Cluster coordination, information sharing, and engaging the NS in consultation processes that enabled the identification and application of prior institutional learning: in other words, a type of process facilitation that greatly helped the NS to draw on its own learning and to apply that learning in practice. The IFRC's support for the CBI modality was highly appreciated by those at HQ that had responsibility for that particular aspect of the Operation. NRCS DC informants positively welcomed the presence of IFRC colleagues in the field during key operational visits especially in providing guidance for relief and recovery aspects, however, were unable to say if IFRC had contributed towards strengthening NS response capacity other than through the provision of material support secured by the emergency appeal process (it is likely DCs were not aware of the support IFRC provided at to the NS at HQ level).

In conclusion, there is a good degree of evidence to indicate that IFRC support has strengthened and complemented the response capacity of the NRCS. This is more evident at HQ level rather than district level, but perhaps this is not surprising given that HQ is where the most support and resource investment took place. There is also strong evidence to indicate that IFRC has enhanced the institutional capacity of the NRCS, in terms of: (a) the NS' ability to implement recovery programmes, and (b) ability to prepare for and respond to disasters in a timely, efficient, and coordinated manner. Despite aspects of the Operation not going to plan, and limitations in using available resources efficiently and effectively, NRCS Leadership are aware of where mistakes were made and what future improvements need to take place.

Given the many challenges faced by the affected communities and their continued vulnerability to flood, RCRC progress towards effectively mobilizing communities at risk to cope with future disasters has some way to go. And while the support provided through the Operation has made for more resilient communities (particularly through the WASH and livelihood initiatives), much more needs to be done to reduce their overall vulnerability.

This finding leads to Recommendation 11 in Section 7 of the report.

4.7. Community Emergency Evacuation Centres

There was no specific outcome under the shelter component of the Operation for CEC construction, however, three (3) CECs (in Udayapur, Sunsari and Siraha districts) were supported from the recovery budget (the majority proportion of funding from this budget). The evaluation team visited one CEC under construction in Sunsari District (pictured below). The Sunsari CEC construction began 24 December 2018 and is expected to be completed at the end of April 2019. The building land has been selected due to its high elevation (it is in a flood prone area) and is owned by the municipality.⁶⁵ It is understood that a standard operating procedure will be developed to determine protocols for use e.g. during non-disaster times.

The centre design is based on an IFRC plan and is designed to accommodate 50 people from a surrounding community of 700 households. For the most part the plan has been followed (there are room size differences and minor design differences in the adjoining latrine/shower block). The disabled access ramp (pictured centre) did not follow the IFRC design, and is too steep for wheelchair users to use safely.⁶⁶ Adjacent to the centre is a latrine/shower block

⁶⁵ The elevated land can also host tents.

⁶⁶ There are 12 reported wheelchair users in the community.

under construction (pictured below) with separate male/female facilities, however, it is not elevated which will make it inaccessible during flooding. Appropriate disabled latrine features are planned. The site is served by an electricity supply and has an existing tube well (not pictured), which is planned to be elevated as part of the final construction process. There are no reported cost overruns, and assuming this remains the case, the CEC will cost a total of CHF 71,025.⁶⁷



⁶⁷ The total allocated budget for the 3 CECs was CHF 213,075.

In conclusion, the Sunsari CEC is suitably elevated⁶⁸, of good design, and well-constructed and is suited to the disaster related needs of the affected community. The modifications made to the room sizes are appropriate given that women have been allocated more space (important as they will likely have children to accompany them). The wheelchair ramp was not fit for purpose at the time of inspection and should be modified to the original design plan before construction continues any further.⁶⁹ The latrine block will be prone to flooding and therefore unusable in times of emergency – this is considered a major design flaw. The cost of the CEC at CHF 71,025 is considered to represent fair value for money.

These findings lead to Recommendation 12 in Section 7 of the report.

5. Additional learning

There are three key additional learnings that emanated from this evaluation.

1. There is significant opportunity to build NS PMER capacity by engaging key staff in the evaluation process. This evaluation sought to meaningfully involve NRCS members of the ET in all relevant/possible aspects of the evaluation process (from design of field tools to presenting the evaluation findings to a stakeholder audience). The Team Lead learned that there is considerable talent among NS team members and the skills developed through the evaluation process should be: (a) further honed as a means of building on experience gained through this evaluation; and (b) actively utilised by the NRCS to ensure the NS benefits from the skills gained. This will require some small investment in targeted capacity building and the NRCS to be creative in finding opportunities to utilise the NS team members' skills. It is suggested that the IFRC CO support this process.
2. The NRCS DROM should be formally reviewed. The original DROM was developed in 2010 and is a comprehensive and thorough document. Based on learning from the Floods Operation and this evaluation (and no doubt the earthquake operation/evaluation) it is believed that aspects of the DROM need to be updated and revised (see for example Recommendations 1 and 3). In addition, the NS should adhere more closely to the guidelines contained in the DROM (particularly 'assessments') to ensure a more effective and efficient response. It is suggested that the IFRC CO or suitable PNS support this process.
3. The IFRC must be more evaluation ready. On arrival in-country the Team Lead learned that the envisaged ET as per the ToR (1 PNS member and 1 IFRC member) had not been assembled. This led to: (a) making last minute changes to the evaluation method; (b) a requirement to seek support from the NRCS to fill the ET gap; and (c) apportioning additional responsibilities and work tasks to ET members beyond what might be considered reasonable. This situation must be avoided in future.

6. Conclusions

Relevance and appropriateness

The evaluation established that the relief assistance provided reached the most vulnerable among the targeted affected population and was relevant and appropriate in responding to

⁶⁸ Although the latrine block is not.

⁶⁹ It is understood that an instruction to this effect has been issued.

their particular circumstances. However, WASH relief was provided for only 15 days (rather than the expected 30 day period). Recovery assistance reached only a limited number of the affected population, with not all recipients being considered 'most vulnerable'. The use of IRA data to identify and target beneficiaries for recovery assistance was not appropriate.

The recovery support provided in the form of livelihoods, latrines and WASH support was relevant and appropriate in responding to the particular circumstances of those targeted. Overall beneficiary satisfaction for relief and recovery assistance was high. While support for latrines was considered mostly sufficient (approx. 66% of cost) to help with construction efforts, assistance for livelihoods was considered sufficient only for small projects. NRCS targeting of vulnerable communities is considered fair and appropriate given the circumstances, however, the evaluation found examples of reasonably well-off HHs having received both latrine and livelihood support.

Coverage

Relief coverage reached most of the population groups in need (as per ward allocation), including those in remote areas who would have otherwise not received humanitarian assistance. There was one instance where NS DC decision making was reported to have led to the intentional exclusion of a beneficiary group based on their location. Local political interference also meant that some identified beneficiaries did not receive their relief or recovery entitlements. Coverage for recovery aspects of the Operation however were severely restricted due to budget availability, resulting in only a small percentage (estimate 18-24%) of the affected targeted population receiving recovery support (livelihoods and latrines).

The evaluation established that the coverage secured through the relief aspect of the Operation was an efficient use of available resources, however, the allocation (or spreading) of recovery activities - principally livelihoods, latrines and tube wells - across all seven districts was not the most efficient modality for resource utilisation (a more concentrated approach in one or two districts would have assured a more efficient use of resources). This said, the spreading of recovery activities across the districts ensured that all 7 NRCS chapters gained practical experience in recovery implementation, most notably CBI, and thus developed useful capacity in this modality and other DRR aspects. From a RCRC perspective, the efficiency-capacity building trade-off is justified.

Efficiency, effectiveness and accountability

The coverage secured through the relief aspect of the Operation is considered an efficient use of available resources, however, the allocation (or spreading) of recovery activities - principally livelihoods, latrines and tube wells - across all seven districts was not the most efficient modality for resource utilisation (a more concentrated approach in one or two districts would have assured a more efficient use of resources). This said, the spreading of recovery activities across the districts ensured that all 7 NRCS chapters gained practical experience in recovery implementation, most notably CBI, and thus developed useful capacity in this modality and other DRR aspects. From a RCRC perspective, the efficiency-capacity building trade-off is considered justified.

The NRCS' Flood Recovery Operation team's lack of experience in dealing with recovery operations negatively affected overall efficiency and effectiveness. This was most evident in late decision-making that impacted on operational design, planning, budgeting and implementation; which in turn, was responsible for the lengthy relief to recovery transition period. Greater NS investment in select preparedness measures (more district warehouse relief stocks, more numerous equipment such as boats with engines, better contingency planning, speedier procurement processes) would have resulted in a more efficient, effective and less costly intervention.

The IFRC CO maintained well ordered, clear and adequate tracking systems to ensure both transparency and accountability. Aspects of capacity building, Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA), and Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) were integrated into core sector activities as cross-cutting measures in various degrees. GESI activities were considered appropriate and targeted. The effectiveness of the 'whole' CEA approach is not well proven as communities were not involved in all aspects of assessment, planning, project orientation and monitoring as per operational design. However, communities were actively engaged in implementation aspects, particularly in assessments (notably beneficiary selection) and the main operational activities, which ensured a high degree transparency and accountability.

Impact

The CBI modality contributed to a strengthening of affected community livelihoods and improving access to and use of water and sanitation facilities. Individual skills and capacity aimed at improving livelihoods and resilience were enhanced through appropriate trainings. CBI has had a positive impact on the local economy with many HHs able to generate a level of profit. Female beneficiaries (women in targeted HHs) have acquired a new degree of economic independence and a level of empowerment through engaging their families in discussions on business opportunities.

Using CBI for the provision of latrines has had a positive impact in multiple ways: improved personal safety and security of beneficiaries (particularly women and girls), reduced open defecation, and improved hygiene practices (together with other WASH initiatives - hygiene promotion and tube wells). A significant impact has been the immediate reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities (16% improvement). The latrine scheme also injected cash into the wider community (small businesses/traders) and provided gainful employment to local skilled men.

The overall positive impact the Operation has had on the affected beneficiaries is illustrated in the baseline-endline comparison. Significant increases (+34.3%) were recorded in the percentage of the targeted population whose livelihoods are (restored to/or improved) from pre-disaster levels. Notable improvements were also recorded in the percentage of targeted people with increased knowledge of and practiced preventive health behaviour (+24.1%); the percentage of target population that has access to sufficient safe water (+16.3%); and the percentage of target population that is using adequate sanitation (+16.1%).

Connectedness and Sustainability

In terms of connectedness, there are gaps in the links between local government, officials, and community groups that need to be filled to enable communities to sustain livelihood activities in the future. The CBI livelihoods initiative was not well linked to government and other actors responsible for aspects of animal husbandry and/or the marketing of livelihood products (crops and animals) to ensure a sustainable intervention. While affected communities including district authorities were engaged in beneficiary assessment/selection processes and some monitoring activities, they were not involved in aspects of operational design or planning. Positively, NRCS volunteers were actively engaged in relief aspects, and select beneficiaries were fully involved recovery aspects through livelihood and WASH initiatives, although the total number was relatively small compared to the size of the affected population.

From a sustainability perspective, the livelihoods CBI has allowed people to take control of their lives and maintain greater dignity; enabled people to recover⁷⁰ productive assets that they lost during the disaster; reduce the threat of people engaging in risky behaviour, and helping

⁷⁰ Many of the adopted livelihood schemes were new to HH, so the reality is more 'have for the first time' than recover or replace what was lost.

the 'informal' local economy in the affected areas to recover. The conditional grant however was relatively low, and it is felt that a more generous grant would have created capacity for HHs to invest in initiatives that were both more appealing and ultimately worthwhile.

The Operation has contributed somewhat to helping communities cope with future disasters (the completion of the CEC's will enhance this). Livelihood initiatives have contributed to reducing vulnerability of households to future shocks and the training of local disaster response teams (DRTs) provides a degree of immediate response support during times of disaster, but DRTs are poorly equipped and not sufficiently integrated into communities. Positively, however, other resilience factors such as improved health and hygiene point to greater sustainability. Nonetheless, communities are still highly vulnerable to disaster and remain exposed to many of the same risks experienced during the floods, which indicates a need for ongoing disaster risk reduction initiatives and longer-term development support.

The evaluation makes twelve (12) recommendations aimed at improving current and future Operation relevancy, appropriateness, coverage, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, which are detailed in Section 7 below.

7. Recommendations

This section details the key recommendations arising from the Findings (Section 4) in order of appearance in the report. Accompanying each recommendation is a rationale for its inclusion, along with an indication of its strategic purpose e.g. to increase *relevancy, appropriateness, coverage, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and/or impact*.

The recommendations include a priority rating, suggested timeframe and responsible person/unit i.e. the entity that has the responsibility for ensuring the recommendation is enacted. These will need to be finalised in discussions with relevant NRCS/IFRC individuals.

Following accepted practice, all recommendations leave room for fine-tuning in terms of final wording and the implementation approach to be adopted by implementers and users.

Recommendations Matrix

No.	Recommendation	Rationale	Action
1	NRCS should undertake its own assessments for <u>recovery</u> operations rather than waiting for government assessments or relying on <u>relief</u> assessments.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>relevance, appropriateness and coverage</i>.</p> <p><i>Refer to findings in Section 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.2 and Section 5.</i></p> <p>This will ensure more appropriate beneficiary targeting. As part of this process NRCS should update the assessments sections of the Disaster Response Operation Manual.</p>	<p>Priority: High.</p> <p>Time frame: At commencement of next emergency or response operation.</p> <p>Responsible person: NRCS Head of DM Department.</p>
2	NRCS should increase district and sub-district warehouse capacity (number and volume) as well as maintain higher levels of NFRI stocks.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>efficiency and effectiveness</i>.</p> <p><i>Refer to findings in Section 4.1.1, 4.1.3.</i></p> <p>Capital funding support may be required from RCRC partners.</p>	<p>Priority: High.</p> <p>Time frame: Preparations should begin immediately.</p> <p>Responsible person: NRCS Head of DM Department.</p>

No.	Recommendation	Rationale	Action
3	NRCS HQ must appoint qualified and experienced human resources to manage emergency and recovery operations.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase overall operation <i>efficiency, effectiveness</i> and <i>impact</i>. <i>Refer to findings in Section 4.1.3.</i></p> <p>This could be addressed by including an appropriate person specification for the NRCS HFRO in the DROM.</p>	<p>Priority: High.</p> <p>Time frame: Immediately.</p> <p>Responsible persons: NRCS Leadership and NRCS Head of DM Department.</p>
4	Future cash-based initiatives need to be better linked to government and other actors to ensure a more sustainable intervention.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>connectedness</i> and <i>sustainability</i>. <i>Refer to findings in Section 4.1.5.</i></p> <p>For example, those responsible for aspects of animal husbandry/veterinary, and the marketing of livelihood products (crops and animals). Enacting this recommendation will necessitate a revision of the NRCS' CBI guidelines. Future interventions should have more livelihoods technical support to overcome this issue.</p>	<p>Priority: Low.</p> <p>Time frame: Within 6 months.</p> <p>Responsible person: NRCS CBI Lead.</p>
5	Wherever practicable and economically efficient, procurement should be devolved to the closest point of utilisation i.e. latrines, tube wells etc. should be procured by district chapters.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>efficiency</i>. <i>Refer to findings in Section 4.4.1.</i></p> <p>Enacting this recommendation will necessitate a revision of the NRCS' procurement guidelines.</p>	<p>Priority: Medium.</p> <p>Time frame: Within 3 months.</p> <p>Responsible person: Head of Finance and Procurement.</p>
6	NRCS District Chapter social mobilisers should be retained to ensure aspects of the Operation are sustainable.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>impact</i> and <i>sustainability</i>. <i>Refer to findings in Section 4.5.1.</i></p>	<p>Priority: High.</p> <p>Time frame: Within 1 month.</p> <p>Responsible person: NRCS Leadership.</p>

No.	Recommendation	Rationale	Action
		This will ensure behaviour change and risk reduction gains are maintained.	
7	Future cash-based initiatives grants should be more generous in nature, covering whole costs in the case of latrines, and allowing for the purchase of higher value items e.g. livestock.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>impact</i> and <i>sustainability</i>.</p> <p><i>Refer to findings in Section 4.5.1.</i></p> <p>It is suggested that a CBI grant range is developed for various initiatives: this flexibility will allow for a contextualised grant depending on circumstances rather than having a fixed sum. Enacting this recommendation will necessitate a revision of the NRCS' CBI guidelines.</p>	<p>Priority: Medium.</p> <p>Time frame: Within 3 months.</p> <p>Responsible person: NRCS CBI Lead.</p>
8	Cash based initiatives need to be more focused, targeted and rationalised to ensure a better balance between technical and political decision making.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>impact</i> and <i>efficiency</i>.</p> <p><i>Refer to findings in Section 4.5.1.</i></p> <p>An economic analysis of beneficiaries should be done prior to providing cash support. Enacting this recommendation will necessitate a revision of the NRCS' CBI guidelines.</p>	<p>Priority: Medium.</p> <p>Time frame: Within 3 months.</p> <p>Responsible person: NRCS CBI Lead in consultation with thematic leads e.g. WASH, livelihoods.</p>
9	NRCS needs to be better prepared to implement CBI at all levels within the National Society.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>impact</i> and <i>efficiency</i>.</p> <p><i>Refer to findings in Section 4.5.1.</i></p> <p>This includes ensuring the directions and recommendations made in the IFRC and BRC Regional Mid-Term Review Cash Preparedness</p>	<p>Priority: High.</p> <p>Time frame: Within 1 month.</p> <p>Responsible persons: NRCS CBI Lead with NRCS Leadership support.</p>

No.	Recommendation	Rationale	Action
		Initiative Asia Pacific Report (November 2018) are enacted in a timely way.	
10	NRCS must address the vulnerability of unregistered/landless populations 'within the scope of its recovery remit'.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>appropriateness</i> and <i>coverage</i>.</p> <p><i>Refer to findings in Section 4.5.1.</i></p> <p>For example, ensuring that unregistered people receive recovery; constructing community latrine and bathroom blocks.</p>	<p>Priority: High.</p> <p>Time frame: Beginning next operation.</p> <p>Responsible person: NRCS Head of DM Department.</p>
11	NRCS and IFRC need to consider how to support affected communities with longer-term development needs in order to reduce long-term vulnerability.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>impact</i> and <i>sustainability</i>.</p> <p><i>Refer to findings in Section 4.6.</i></p> <p>For example, by engaging PNS'/other partners in development programming discussions for the affected communities.</p>	<p>Priority: High.</p> <p>Time frame: Beginning next operation.</p> <p>Responsible persons: IFRC CO and NRCS Leadership.</p>
12	Current and future community evacuation centre latrine block design should be flood resistant.	<p>This recommendation is made to increase <i>relevance</i> and <i>effectiveness</i>.</p> <p><i>Refer to findings in Section 4.7.</i></p> <p>Future latrine blocks can be elevated and joined to the CEC via a connecting walkway to ensure accessibility during flooding.</p>	<p>Priority: High.</p> <p>Time frame: Immediately, beginning with the 3 CECs under construction.</p> <p>Responsible person: IFRC Head of Operation.</p>

Key References

An evaluation literature folder was prepared for the evaluation. The documents are too numerous to include in list form here, however, the key references included the following:

Bhandari, D., Uprety, M., Ghimire, G., Kumal, B., Pokharel L., Khadka P., (2018), Nepal flood 2017: Wake up call for effective preparedness and response, Rugby, UK: Practical Action.

Government of Nepal. (2017). Post Floods Recovery Needs Assessment. National Planning Commission 2017.

Levine, S. and S. Bailey. (2015), Cash Vouchers or in-kind? Guidance on evaluating how transfers are made in emergency programming. HPG Report. London: ODI.

IFRC. (2011). Guidelines for livelihoods programming. Geneva.

IFRC. (2017). Floods and Landslides Recovery Operation Emergency Plan of Action. 22 August 2017.

IFRC. (2018). Floods and Landslides Recovery Operation Emergency Plan of Action. 23 March 2018.

IFRC. (2018). Baseline Survey of Floods and Landslides Recovery Operation Final Report. March/April 2018. Kathmandu.

IFRC. (2018). Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (M&E Plan) Nepal: Monsoon Floods and landslides response and-recovery phase.

IFRC and BRC. (2018). Regional Mid-Term Review Cash Preparedness Initiative Asia Pacific Report. November 2018.

IFRC. (2019). Endline Survey of Floods and Landslides Recovery Operation. March 2019. Kathmandu.

NRCS. (2008). Disaster Management Policy.

NRCS. (2010). Disaster Response Operational Manual.

NRCS. (2010). Disaster Management Strategic Framework 2010 - 2015.

NRCS/IFRC. (2017-2018). Various beneficiary lists.

NRCS/IFRC. (2017-2018). Various documents populated in the evaluation report desk review folder.

NRCS (2018). Report on the Effectiveness of Volunteers Mobilisation in Flood Affected Areas of Rautahat and Sarlahi Districts of Nepal. May, 2018.

NRCS (2018). Flood Recovery Operation 2017-2018. Guidelines for Livelihood Activities. January, 2018.

Annex A: Terms of Reference

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

3.1 Purpose

The evaluation will assess the **appropriateness** and **effectiveness** of the systems³, processes, implementation and areas of improvement in the following areas of the operation:

- relief and recovery planning;
- conducting assessments, beneficiary targeting;
- delivery of emergency relief services and recovery activities; logistics and procurement process followed

The evaluation will also assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of cash-based interventions for livelihoods, household latrine construction and community evacuation centres construction.

The evaluation will enable NRCS and IFRC to provide recommendations in order to further strengthen effective response system and capacities both at headquarters and district chapter levels. Recommendations may inform NRCS and IFRC in defining strategies and approaches to recovery programming under new federal structure of Nepal that would improve the service delivery and accountability to the affected people, donors and other stakeholders.

The evaluation would also analyse the achievements of the response operation against NRCS Response Operational Manual and the planned outcomes in the Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA).

- **Livelihoods and basic needs Outcome 1:** Communities, especially in disaster and crisis affected areas, restore and strengthen their livelihoods
- **Health Outcome 1:** The immediate and mid-term risks to the health of affected populations are reduced
- **Health Outcome 2:** The medium-term risks to the health of affected populations are reduced
- **WASH Outcome1:** Immediate reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities
- **WASH Outcome 2:** Sustainable reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities in the recovery phase
- **Inclusion and Protection Outcome 1:** Communities identify the needs of the most vulnerable and particularly disadvantaged and marginalised groups, as a result of inequality, discrimination and other non-respect of their human rights and address their distinct needs
- **DRR Outcome 1:** Communities in high risk areas are prepared for and able to respond to disaster

3.2 Scope

The evaluation will be carried out in between February to April 2019. The evaluation will be conducted to assess the response and recovery activities conducted by NRCS during 2017 flood operations. The geographical coverage will be NRCS NHQ and four out of seven districts, namely Bardiya, Mahottari, Rautahat, and Sunsari. The four

districts have been identified considering the volume and type of interventions carried out, their geographical locations, target communities and socio-economic profile of the beneficiaries.

Apart from meeting with beneficiaries, the Evaluation team will also meet with and interview key Red Cross Red Crescent stakeholders in NRCS, Partner National Societies (PNSs), and the relevant IFRC Secretariat (in the four districts, IFRC Nepal Country Office (CO) and Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO) Kuala Lumpur). The team will also consult with critical partners from GoN, and other organizations such as the UN, national Shelter Cluster, INGOs/NGOs as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives.

A baseline survey was conducted before starting recovery activities in March 2018 and the findings will be taken into consideration during this evaluation. This evaluation will also focus to fulfil the need of the end line survey as well.

The evaluation will cover the MDRNP009 Nepal Monsoon Floods and Landslides 2017 response from the period when NRCS and IFRC initiated their response until time the evaluators collect the data.

4. OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA

4.1 Objectives

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

- To assess the process for conducting assessment after the flood in accordance with NRCS response operation manual.
- To assess the effectiveness of relief and recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting and decision making of NRCS.
- To assess the effectiveness of logistic and procurement process during relief and recovery.
- To assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of cash-based interventions for livelihood and household latrine construction during recovery, impact, sustainability and areas of areas for future.
- To assess the sustainability of NRCS/IFRC contribution towards strengthening Nation Society response capacity.

4.2 Criteria

The following criteria will be used to guide the evaluation recommendations:

- Relevance and appropriateness
- Coverage
- Efficiency and effectiveness
- Impact
- Connectedness and sustainability

4.3 Evaluation questions

The consultant will develop process, methods and questionnaires for the evaluation in consultation with NRCS and IFRC team based on the above objectives. Key questions proposed for the evaluation based on the criteria above are outlined in the Annex-1. The sample questions need to be adjusted based on the situation /operation, in agreement with the evaluation management team (EMT) and outlined in the inception report.

5. METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS

The methodology will adhere to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluations](#), with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted and utilized.

Interviewees will include NRCS and IFRC personnel (e.g. managers, field officers, direct implementers, volunteers and community mobilizers), beneficiaries and potentially, other organizations who rendered relief services, and people who did not receive assistance.

The evaluation team will consist of up to four people:

a) one **external evaluator as team leader**, with knowledge of local context who will

provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations. The external evaluator will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he will not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation or context being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence and ethics and integrity for this. S/he will provide insights and advocacy on the subject matter and report on progress or challenges to the management group.

2. b) one evaluation practitioner from the **IFRC** to provide context on IFRC Framework for Evaluation and with technical experience on evaluations;
3. c) one evaluation practitioner from **NRCS** who will provide the interface with the Secretariat offices in country and will help to clarify internal processes and approaches for the team; and
4. d) one evaluation practitioner from **PNSs** to participate and support the team as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives.

The team will be gender balanced and ideally the team leader or one of the team members should have regional knowledge/experience and speak Nepali, and ideally all candidates will have some experience with evaluation practices and the IFRC disaster response systems. It is expected that all evaluation team members have strong evaluation experience and are able to conduct a reliable and informed evaluation of the emergency operation and the surrounding context that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

The specific evaluation methodology will be detailed out in close consultation between the evaluation team, EMT, Commissioner and relevant key stakeholders, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

- **Desktop review** of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, including IFRC as well as NRCS and National policies, prior IFRC reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data etc.
- **Field visits/observations** in project communities in Bardiya, Mahottari, Udayapur and Sunsari districts.
- **Key informant interviews** (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate).
- **Focus group discussions** (institutional and beneficiaries) as time and capacity allow.

The detailed evaluation design will be defined by the external evaluation consultant; however, the following should be considered:

- **Sampling method** is to be decided by the evaluator, as long the final sample to be evaluated on includes both NRCS and IFRC involved in the floods operation interventions, district chapters, sectors of the intervention and the ‘most vulnerable’ beneficiaries.
- **Data collection methods** and pace are to be decided by the evaluator, in consultation with the NRCS and IFRC country office focal person(s).
- **The evaluation team should visit** a representative number of beneficiaries, communities in the districts where the response operations was implemented.

6. OUTPUTS/DELIVERABLES

The evaluation team will deliver the following outputs:

1. **Inception Report:** The consultant will prepare inception report reflecting purpose, process, methods and detail activities and submit to the IFRC before the field visit. The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the evaluation and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, questionnaire, sampling method, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team.
2. **Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels:** The team will report its preliminary findings to the NRCS and IFRC country office prior to leaving the country.
3. **Draft report:** A draft report identifying key findings based on facts, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within three days after presenting the initial findings.
4. **Final report:** The consultant will submit the draft and final reports to EMT, who will ensure the quality of the report providing input for necessary corrections. The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned and clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final report will be submitted two days after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.

The following criteria will be used to guide the evaluation recommendations:

Note: below mentioned are standard questions that will need to be adjusted, in agreement with the EMT, at the stage of the inception report.

a. Relevance and appropriateness

- How effective were the interventions in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and responding appropriately to their particular circumstances?
 - Was the beneficiary selection process fair, appropriate and effective?
 - What strategies were used to ensure quality, timely and relevant delivery to target

beneficiaries including mechanisms to capture beneficiary complaints/feedback?

- Was the assistance provided appropriate and sufficient to meet intended needs?
- To what extent were the beneficiaries involved in the assessment, planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of the interventions?
- Were intervention strategies and priorities in line with local customs and practices of the affected population, the priorities of the Government authorities and other key humanitarian actors?
- Were the interventions in line with NRCS and IFRC strategies, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and guidelines?
- What problems and constraints were faced during implementation and how did the interventions manage these?
- What important lessons have been identified that can improve future interventions in the Nepal and be shared more widely?

b. Coverage

- Did the interventions reach all population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance?
- Were there exclusions or differential impact between groups based on their location?
- How could the coverage and distribution methods be improved?

c. Efficiency/effectiveness/accountability

- Did the interventions meet their immediate and intended results?
- Were there adequate resources (financial, human, physical and informational) available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?
- Were adequate tracking systems in place to ensure transparency and accountability?
- Were complaints/feedback mechanisms put in place for community questions and concerns to be answered? What were the concerns raised by communities during the intervention?
- Would greater investment in preparedness measures have resulted in more efficient, effective and less costly interventions?

- How were programme activities managed and coordinated, particularly between NRCS, IFRC, other partners, clusters, and local authorities?
- Was the capacity of the human resource system enough to fulfil the needs of the interventions and beneficiaries? Were personnel skills utilized in an efficient and effective manner?
- Was there adequate and relevant staffing including: a) decisions concerning the number of staff members needed, where, when, with what competences, at what levels, and at required availability and b) decision-making chain regarding staffing?

d. Impact

- What evidence (both direct and indirect) is available that the interventions contributed to the reduction of suffering and that the affected populations were assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and enhancing disaster preparedness?
- What impact did the interventions have on how the communities coped with subsequent disasters?

e. Connectedness and Sustainability

- Did the interventions result in enhanced institutional capacity of the NRCS, in terms of: a) ability to implement recovery programmes, b) ability to prepare for and respond to disasters in a timely, efficient, and coordinated manner; and c) ability to mobilize communities at risk to cope with future disasters?
- Did the support of the IFRC strengthen and complement the response of NRCS district chapters and coping mechanisms, or hinder them?
- How will the support to enhance the capacities of NS will enable NRCS to better face future disasters?
- How the links between the local government, officials, community groups enable communities to sustain their livelihood activities in the future.

Annex B: Key informants

Name	Organization	Designation
Juja Kim Herve Gazeau	IFRC	HoCo Program Coordinator
Mona Aryal Rudra Neupane Hari Mohan Shrestha	NRCS	DM Director Dy Director, DM Dy Director, DM
Krishna Ghimire Rashmi Shrestha	NRCS	Head of Health Dept Dy Director
Dibakar Behera Manorama Gautam	IFRC	PMER Delegate PMER Officer
Sanjeev Thapa Dev Ratna Dhakhwa	NRCS	Chairman Secretary General
Dharma Dutta Bidari Achyut Bhattarai Madan Phoju	NRCS	Dy Director, Finance Sr. Finance Officer Sr. Officer, Procurement
Umesh Prasad Dhakal	NRCS	Executive Director
Rajesh shreevastava	British RC	Country Representative
Bed Nidhi Khanal	MoHA	Head of NEOC/MoHA
Henry Donati	DFID	Disaster Resilience Manager
Leela Mulukutla	American RC	Country Representative
Laxman NIROULA	WFP	Service Delivery Manager – SCOPE
Saroj Shrestha	NRCS	EQ Operation, Livelihood Coordinator
Dolakh Dangi	NRCS	Flood Response Coordinator
Prajwal Acharya	IFRC	Sr. Project Officer
Bardiya District		
Krishna Gautam	NRCS	President
Kerung Wang	GoN	Chief District Officer
Bimala Rijal	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Lee Singh	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Kapil Gautam	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Shubham Acharya	NRCS	Finance Officer
Rautahat District		
Sanjeeb Kumar Mallik	NRCS	President
Kiran Thapa	GoN	Chief District Officer
Mahendra Yadav	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Ajay K. Mahato	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Arun Jaiswal	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Bandhu Prasad	Private Bank	Officer
Mahottari District		
Deepak Mishra	NRCS	President
Pragya Sharma	NRCS	Sub Branch
Murali K. Singh	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Madan Chaube	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Sunsari District		
Umesh Thapa	NRCS	President
Prem Prakash Upreti	GoN	Chief District Officer
Kundan	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Bishnu Mandal	NRCS	Social Mobiliser
Rachana Thapa	NRCS	Finance
Mohan Bhattarai	NRCS	Program Officer
Kiran K.C.	NRCS	Section Officer

Annex C: Evaluation Matrix (overall)

Key evaluation questions and criteria	Sub-questions	Data sources/collection methods
1. Relevance and appropriateness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • of processes for conducting assessment after the flood in accordance with NRCS response operation manual. • of cash-based interventions for livelihood and household latrine construction during recovery for impact and sustainability. 		
<p>1.1 How effective were the interventions in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and responding appropriately to their particular circumstances?</p> <p>1.2 Was the assistance (relief and recovery) provided appropriate and sufficient to meet intended needs?</p> <p>1.3 To what extent were the beneficiaries involved in the assessment, planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of the interventions?</p> <p>1.4 Were intervention strategies and priorities in line with local customs and practices of the affected population, the priorities of the Government authorities and other key humanitarian actors?</p> <p>1.5 Were the interventions in line with NRCS and IFRC strategies, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and guidelines?</p>	<p>What vulnerability analysis/evidence exists?</p> <p>Was the beneficiary selection process fair, appropriate and effective?</p> <p>What selection criteria evidence exists?</p> <p>Could other communities have been selected?</p> <p>What strategies were used to ensure quality, timely and relevant delivery to target beneficiaries?</p> <p>Were complaints/feedback mechanisms put in place for community questions and concerns to be answered?</p> <p>What were the concerns raised by communities during the intervention?</p>	<p>Document sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IRA/Baseline study • Project stakeholder analysis • NRCS/IFRC strategies, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and guidelines • Response Operation Manual • Selection criteria • Minutes of meetings • NRCS gender strategies <p>Methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NRCS/IFRC/PNS KI Interviews • Community discussions with beneficiaries • HH surveys • Community discussions with beneficiary vulnerable groups (e.g. disabled, elderly) • Interviews with government officials • Interviews with other humanitarian actors

<p>1.6 What problems and constraints were faced during implementation and how did the interventions manage these?</p> <p>1.7 What important lessons have been identified that can improve future interventions in Nepal and be shared more widely?</p>		
<p>2. Coverage</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • of relief and recovery interventions • of cash-based interventions for livelihood and household latrine construction during recovery 		
<p>2.1 Did the interventions reach all population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance?</p> <p>2.2 Were there exclusions or differential impact between groups based on their location?</p> <p>2.3 How could the coverage and distribution methods be improved?</p>	<p>Did the interventions reach all population groups in need, including those in remote areas?</p> <p>Were there exclusions or differential impact between groups based on their location?</p> <p>Have all beneficiaries benefited from the interventions?</p>	<p>Document sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring documents • Beneficiary lists • Situation updates • Change stories • PDM survey <p>Methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with NRCS staff/volunteers • Community discussions with beneficiaries • Community discussions with beneficiary vulnerable groups (e.g. disabled, elderly) • Interviews with government officials • Interviews with other humanitarian actors
<p>3. Efficiency, effectiveness and accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • of relief and recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting and decision making of NRCS • of logistic and procurement process during relief and recovery 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> of cash-based interventions for livelihood and household latrine construction during recovery 		
<p>3.1 Did the interventions meet their immediate and intended results according to the LFA indicators?</p> <p>3.2. Were there adequate resources (financial, human, physical and informational) available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?</p> <p>3.3 Were adequate tracking systems in place to ensure transparency and accountability?</p> <p>3.4 Were complaints/feedback mechanisms put in place for community questions and concerns to be answered? What were the concerns raised by communities during the intervention?</p> <p>3.5 Would greater investment in preparedness measures have resulted in more efficient, effective and less costly interventions?</p> <p>3.6 How were programme activities managed and coordinated, particularly between NRCS, IFRC, PNS, other Movement partners, clusters, and local authorities?</p> <p>3.7 Was the capacity of the human resource system enough to fulfil the needs of the interventions and beneficiaries? Were personnel skills utilized in an efficient and effective manner?</p> <p>3.8 Was there adequate and relevant staffing including: a) decisions concerning the number of staff members needed, where, when, with what competences, at what levels, and at required availability and b) decision-making chain regarding staffing?</p>	<p>To what extent were the project inputs (financial, HR, technical, material resources) used to achieve the outputs and outcomes?</p> <p>How effective were processes for planning, monitoring and quality management, (e.g. use of assessment data, internal reviews and other quality assurance mechanisms)?</p> <p>What problems and constraints were faced during implementation and how did the interventions manage these?</p> <p>Did the interventions meet their immediate and intended results according to the LFA indicators?</p> <p>What evidence (both direct and indirect) is available that the project contributed to reducing the negative impact of disasters on communities?</p> <p>To what extent are the community members satisfied with the project outputs and outcomes?</p> <p>How effective were processes for planning, monitoring and quality management, (e.g. use of assessment data, internal reviews and other quality assurance mechanisms)?</p> <p>What problems and constraints were faced during implementation and how did the interventions manage these?</p>	<p>Document sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring documents Logistics and procurement SOPs Sit Reps Field reports Beneficiary lists Complaint mechanisms Organograms Job descriptions Management decision-making protocols <p>Methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with NRCS/IFRC/PNS staff/volunteers Community discussions with beneficiaries Community discussions with beneficiary vulnerable groups (e.g. disabled, elderly) Interviews with government officials Interviews with Cluster and humanitarian actors

4. Impact <ul style="list-style-type: none"> of relief phase of recovery phase (particularly cash-based interventions for livelihood and household latrine construction) 		
<p>4.1 What evidence (both direct and indirect) is available that the interventions contributed to the reduction of suffering and that the affected populations were assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and enhancing disaster preparedness?</p> <p>4.2 What impact did the interventions have on how the communities would be able to cope with subsequent disasters?</p>	<p>To what extent are the community members satisfied with the project outputs and outcomes?</p> <p>What should be done to better increase resilience of target communities against disaster risks?</p> <p>Has the support provided to affected communities enabled them to enhance their resilience to withstand possible future disasters?</p> <p>What is the condition and longevity of the project provided infrastructures?</p> <p>Has NRCS undertaken DRR advocacy for target communities?</p>	<p>Document sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring documents Project reports Change stories <p>Methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with NRCS staff/volunteers Observation of physical infrastructure Community discussions with beneficiaries Community discussions with beneficiary vulnerable groups (e.g. disabled, elderly) Interviews with government officials Interviews with other humanitarian actors
5. Connectedness and Sustainability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> of NRCS/IFRC contribution towards strengthening National Society response capacity 		
<p>5.1 Did the intervention result in enhanced institutional capacity of the NRCS, in terms of: a) ability to implement recovery programmes, b) ability to prepare for and respond to disasters in a timely, efficient, and coordinated manner; and c) ability to mobilize communities at risk to cope with future disasters?</p> <p>5.2 Did IFRC support strengthen and complement the response of NRCS district and coping mechanisms, or hinder them?</p>	<p>Has the impact of project activities been sustained following completion of the interventions?</p> <p>What should be done to build capacity in terms of DRR for the local government and Red Cross in a more effective way?</p> <p>What impact did the interventions have on how the communities would be able to cope with subsequent disasters?</p> <p>Was the approach to sustainability well thought through and</p>	<p>Document sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring documents NRCS DRR strategies <p>Methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with NRCS/IFRC/PNS staff Community discussions with beneficiaries Interviews with government

<p>5.3 How will the support to enhance the capacities of NS enable NRCS to better face future disasters?</p> <p>5.4 How will the links between the local government, officials, community groups enable communities to sustain their livelihood activities in the future.</p>	<p>realistic?</p> <p>To what extent were communities including volunteers involved in the project design, planning and implementation?</p> <p>What contributions did community members/local government make to the project and how was the process managed?</p> <p>To what extent were local government involved in the project design, planning and implementation?</p> <p>What had worked well, what has not worked well?</p>	<p>officials</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with other humanitarian actors
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Annex D: Baseline-Endline Matrix

Source:

- IFRC (2018) Baseline Survey of Floods and Landslides Recovery Operation Final Report.
- IFRC (2018) Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (M&E Plan) Nepal: Monsoon Floods and landslides response and-recovery phase.

Sector	Outcome	Indicators	Base value	Calculations used for baseline
Livelihoods and basic needs	Outcome 1: Communities, especially in disaster and crisis affected areas, restore and strengthen their livelihoods	Indicator 1a: % of those assisted for whom food consumption is equal or greater than the minimum food basket equivalent	3.7%	Baseline Value: 3.7% (Table 4.6 (a)) Numerator: # of respondents that report an increase in food security in their family=26 Denominator: Total # of respondents =706
		Indicator 1b: % of targeted population whose livelihoods are (restored to/or improved from) pre-disaster level	53.1%	Baseline Value: 53.1% Households whose income were restored/unchanged=47.2% (Table 4.7) Households whose income were improved=5.9% (Table 4.7) Targeted population whose livelihoods are restored to/or improved = (47.2%+5.9%)=53.1%
Health	Outcome 1: The immediate and mid-term risks to the health of affected populations are reduced	Indicator 1a: % of targeted people with increased knowledge of and practiced preventive health behaviour	41.2%	Baseline Value: 41.2% calculated through composite index by taking 30% weight to knowledge and 70% weight to practice as (30% * 32.2% * 45.1) Knowledge Knowledge on any three causes of diarrhoea:30.8% (Table 5.3) Knowledge on prevention of diarrhoea: 35.7% (Table 5.5) Knowledge on causes of malaria/dengue (mosquito bite): 49.6% (Table 5.6) Knowledge on the methods to prevent malaria/dengue:12.6% (Table

				<p>5.7) Average of above 4 = $(30.8\%+35.7\%+49.6\%+12.6\%)/4=32.2\%$ Practice Practice on diarrhoeal treatment: 88.8% (Table 5.4) HHs using insecticide treated mosquito nets: 25.1% (Figure 5.3) Methods adopted by the HHs for vector control: 21.5% (Table 5.8) Average of above 3 = $(88.8\%+25.1\%+21.5\%)/3=45.1\%$</p>
Health	Outcome 2: The medium-term risks to the health of affected populations are reduced	Indicator 2a: % of people in the operation catchment area who can access appropriate health services	33.9%	Baseline Value: 33.9% calculated through composite index by taking 70% weight to quality services and 30% weight to accessibility of health services $(70\% * 10+30\% * 89.6)$
WASH	Outcome1: Immediate reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities	Indicator 1a: % of target population that has access to sufficient safe water	30.3%	<p>Base value: = 30.3% calculated through composite index by taking 30% of (a) and 70% of (b)</p> <p>a) Access to sufficient water = 71.9% calculated through composite index by taking 40% of (i), 30% of (ii) and 30% of (iii)</p> <p>(i) % of HHs reached to drinking water source in less than 5 minutes=91% (Table 6.3)</p> <p>(ii) % of HH with fixed sources of drinking water i.e. the sources have not been changed= $(100-48.9)\% = 51.1\%$ (Figure 6.1)</p> <p>(iii) HHs with adequate/sufficient water =67.3% (Table 6.7)</p> <p>b) Safe water = 12.5% calculated through composite index by taking 50% of (iv) and 50% of (v)</p> <p>iv) % of deep tube-well in the community=10% (during FGDs and KII, it was pointed out that 90% were shallow tube-well in the project area)</p>

		Indicator 2b: % of target population that is using adequate sanitation	10.5%	v) % of HHs who used to drink treated drinking water all year around=15% Base value: 5.5+5.0=10.5% Percentage of HHs having private flush toilet =5.5% (Table 6.10) Percentage of HHs having private offset flush toilet =5.0% (Table 6.10)
WASH	Outcome 2: Sustainable reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities in the recovery phase	Indicator 1b: % of target population that has increased knowledge of hygiene practices	40.1%	Base value: 40.1% Knowledge on critical time for hand washing=59.9% (Table 6.12) Knowledge on health risk from lack of hand washing and personal hygiene=19.4% (Table 6.11) Average of above two= (59.9%+19.4%)/2=40.1%
Inclusion and Protection	Outcome 1: Communities identify the needs of the most vulnerable and particularly disadvantaged and marginalised groups, as a result of inequality, discrimination and other non-respect of their human rights and address their distinct needs	Indicator 1a: % increase in knowledge and awareness about gender based violence	No base	
DRR	Outcome 1: Communities in high risk areas are prepared for and able to respond to disaster	Indicator 1a: % of targeted communities with an active and well-equipped response team for community search and rescue, First Aid and Response	0%	Base value: 0% (No task forces are formed and communities are not equipped with SAR materials)

Annex E: Impact case study

Musahar Community Case study – by Dr. Madhurima Bhadra

As one enters the village of Dothaura in Mahottari District, one walks into a cluster of mud homes and adjoining blue CGI bounded latrines, with children running in and out the small alleys. A 100 households of the Musahar people comprises this village, which is nestled between a river bank and the construction of a railway platform. Considered to be one of the most marginalized Dalit groups, the Musahar gain their name of “rat catcher” from their dietary habit of eating rodents. Education is not valued, thus majority of the community is uneducated with children seldom attending school even to this day.

During the last big flood of 2017, the Musahar were displaced from their homes for over 2 months. The river flooded right at the mouth of their village, submerging their homes, driving them out to be temporarily sheltered on the elevated platforms being built for the railway track. The relief support provided by the NRCS Mattotari chapter, reached the entire population with NFRIs like blankets, mosquito nets, cooking utensils and clothes for women and children.

In addition, food items like rice, daal, cooking oil, salt and sugar were also provided. This helped to bring the community to a semblance of normalcy but due to the full-fledged destruction of homes by the flood, the community had to wait for over 2 months to return to their homes as they had to totally reconstruct their homes from the ruins.

The recovery phase of the assistance provided by NRCS and IFRC has helped to support 130 families in animal husbandry focused livelihoods and 100 families with latrines. The 100 families who received latrines also received livelihoods support. The NRCS team worked with local authorities to ensure that 30 families who lacked citizenship papers were endorsed as local residents, thus facilitating their receipt of recovery support. Since these families did not have bank accounts, they were handed over the grants in cash.

That the recovery assistance has helped the community is evident from the lack of open defecation and cleanliness in the tiny village. Women and men speak highly of the livelihoods support they have received especially for its instrumental role in introducing animal husbandry as a way of regular income generation instead of one off sales during festival seasons. The project has built 5 elevated tube wells for the community which can be accessed even during floods.

Though the relief and recovery support has been of encouragement to the Musahar community, their vulnerability to the floods is ever present. For the now, they have built a levy to safe guard them from the rising river but if this levy is breached then they again face risks to life, livestock and homes. The NRCS and the community members share a felt need for CECs in the community so that they can be safe during flooding.

NRCS & IFRC Management Response for the Nepal Floods and Landslides 2017 Operation Final Evaluation

Background information:

- **Date and duration of evaluation:** 5 February to 30 April 2019
- **Evaluator:** Mark Shepherd
- **Evaluation Management Response Team members:** NRCS Executive Director, NRCS Director of Disaster Management Department, IFRC Programme Coordinator, IFRC PMER Delegate and IFRC Senior Project Officer
- **Background Information:** In late 2018, IFRC head of country office in Nepal commissioned a final evaluation in order to assess the impact of Nepal Monsoon Floods and Landslides 2017 recovery operation (MDRNP009) implemented by the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS). An independent external international consultant was supported by IFRC and NRCS team carried out the field works related to the evaluation exercise between 10 March to 2 April 2019. The consultant used a range of survey techniques and covered four out of seven districts where recovery interventions were implemented. The initial findings from the field visit was shared with wider stakeholders on 2 April 2019 for consultation and feedbacks.

Summary of Management Response:

The consultant provided 12 key recommendations with priority ranking and suggested timeframe for implementation, of which 7 are partially accepted and 5 fully accepted by the NRCS. While drafting the management response, it has taken into consideration the current context within NRCS and feasibility of implementing some of the recommendations due to practical challenges on the ground. Hence, a flexible implementation timeframe has been kept for key actions mentioned below.

Recommendation 1: NRCS should undertake its own assessments for recovery operations rather than waiting for government assessment or relying on relief assessment.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
	Being auxiliary to the government for response, NRCS needs to work in close coordination with the	1. Collaboration between NRCS, Government		

<p>□ Partially accepted</p>	<p>government. Since government has endorsed one-door-policy for conducting assessments both for emergency and recovery operations in Nepal, it is not logical to carry out parallel assessment by NRCS. However, NRCS has been coordinating with the Government in carrying out recovery assessment on time. This is crucial to maintain good working relation with government and avoid assessment fatigue in the community.</p>	<p>(Ministry of Home Affairs and key concerned sectoral ministries) and partners for revising detailed assessment template</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Organizing recovery assessment template revision workshop between NRCS, Government and partners. 3. Train local volunteers on ACT and IRA and supporting the formation of response team at municipal and district levels. 	<p>August 2019 to December 2020</p>	<p>DM director, NRCS</p>
<p>Comments: Assessment guideline 2015 and detailed assessment templates which is developed by the government with technical support from NRCS are being used so far by various agencies in Nepal. However, it is realized that detailed assessment template needs to be revised by the government. Likewise, it is necessary to train the volunteers at municipal, local, provincial and national levels on Assessment Coordination Team (ACT) and conducting IRA by using mobile application.</p>				
<p>Recommendation 2: NRCS should increase district and sub-district warehouse capacity (number and volume) as well as maintain higher levels of NRCS stocks.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<p>□ Accepted</p>	<p>NRCS district chapters are responsible to manage 50 NFRI sets locally from their own sources. But in practice, it is not the case always in all 77 districts due to the financial constraints. District chapters are getting 50 NFRI sets from the NRCS regional warehouses and stockpiles them locally anticipating the future disaster.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Coordination meeting with the district and sub-chapters and develop the plan of action 2. Capacity assessment of district chapters (using DRCE) on an annual basis. 3. Develop resource management plan of district chapters 	<p>Continue from June 2019 to December 2020</p>	<p>Secretary General/DM Director, NRCS</p>

	<p>Whereas for the sub-chapter, it is not mandatory to maintain the stockpile, as they are getting at least 5 NFRI sets.</p>	<p>4. Procure relief items and stockpile them at district chapters level</p>		
<p>Comments: The capacity of NRCS district chapters differs depending their source of resources. NRCS NHQs has been assessing the capacities of chapters however in-depth assessment is still required. It may take few years to conduct assessment of all 77 chapters, analyse the capacity and gaps, define minimum required level of capacities, generate resources and put the system for capacity building in place. As part of the plan of action, NRCS NHQ will start assessment and gradually put efforts to enhance their capacities in coming years.</p>				
<p>Recommendation 3: NRCS HQ must appoint qualified and experienced human resources to manage emergency and recovery operations.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<p><input type="checkbox"/> Accepted</p>	<p>Agreed to findings</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revise and update HR policy according to the needs and context. 2. Depute focal person and supporting staff for response in DM Department to be functional throughout the year. 3. Maintain regular coordination with technical departments. 4. Update ToR of focal person, supporting staff and technical departments to ensure smooth implementation of the future operations. 	<p>July 2019 to December 2020</p>	<p>Senior management, NRCS</p>
<p>Comments: Following this recommendation, NRCS will consider the recruitment of the necessary staff to manage recovery operation in the future. However, as a first option, NRCS will empower existing staff members to manage the operation.</p>				

Recommendation 4: Future cash-based initiatives need to be better linked to government and other actors to ensure a more sustainable intervention.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	<i>Agreed to findings</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Finalize and endorse Cash Based Intervention (CBI) SoP.</i> 2. <i>Conduct cash programming trainings at district and provincial levels.</i> 3. <i>Coordination meeting with local government and other relevant actors/stakeholders</i> 4. <i>Propose incorporative programme implementation modality to the government and other stakeholders.</i> 	<i>July 2019 onwards</i>	<i>NRCS HQ Programme Manager/Staffs and District Chapter</i> <i>IFRC CO</i>

Comments: The cash-based intervention will be piloted in 2019 (if any disaster occurs) and efforts to continue this modality in every disaster based on learning from response.

Recommendation 5: Wherever practicable and economically efficient, procurement should be devolved to the closest point of utilisation i.e. latrines, tube wells etc. should be procured by district chapters.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<i>The standard practice so far is all district chapters have been following the HQ procurement policy which is in line with the government rules and regulations. Before providing the procurement authority to the district chapters, an assessment should be conducted regarding their capacity and market availability at the district level in line with the</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Regular update of procurement regulations both at HQ and DC levels</i> 2. <i>Feasibility study on procurement capacity and system at district levels.</i> 3. <i>Explore and operationalize the stand-by agreement with vendors.</i> 	<i>July 2019 and December 2020</i>	<i>Director, DM department, Head of Finance and Procurement, NRCS</i>

	<i>NRCS financial and procurement policy.</i>			
<p>Comments: All DCs have prepared their own procurement regulations based on HQ policy. Secondly, all kind of procurement (smaller to bigger) may depend on DC capacity, market availability, availability of quality items and capacity of venders, etc. NRCS will address the local procurement practices while revising the HQ regulations as per feasibility and making compatible with national level government regulations.</p>				
<p>Recommendation 6: NRCS District Chapter social mobilizers should be retained to ensure aspects of the Operation are sustainable.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<i>Social mobilizers are contract based paid volunteers, NRCS local units (District chapters/ Sub-chapters) do not have full-capacity and regular source of funding to sustain them after end of the operation. However, NRCS can link them with local government to engage in the local community-based activities. In addition, NRCS local units will maintain a roster of volunteers and such trained people and keep engaging in regular programmes of chapters/sub-chapters.</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Update and maintain roster of community volunteers, social mobilizers and trained people.</i> 2. <i>Engage these people in future training and other social activities by district chapters</i> 3. <i>Explore with local municipalities to include them into municipal level response teams.</i> 4. <i>Linking volunteers with the local government (Palika level)</i> 	<i>Starting from 2020 (upon resource availability)</i>	<i>NRCS leadership and concerned department Managers, NRCS</i>
<p>Comments: None</p>				
<p>Recommendation 7: Future cash-based initiatives grants should be more generous in nature, covering whole costs in the case of latrines, and allowing for the purchase of higher value items e.g. livestock.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility

<p>□ Partially accepted</p>	<p><i>National WASH Cluster and the government has defined standards for supporting latrines construction (design, materials and cost). Most of the agencies need to follow and there may be little flexibility towards significant changes. In Open Defecation Free (ODF)declared districts, full grants for latrine construction cannot be provided by any agency. Therefore, NRCS provided partial grant support to ensure ownership and use of the latrines by beneficiaries.</i></p> <p><i>Likewise, NRCs will consider the market rate and take necessary steps to ensure flexibility in livelihoods grant support to beneficiaries according to their business plan, local market and also maintain synergy on grant as per local context.</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Ensure and decide on a standard amount for CBI in livelihoods cash grant and for latrine construction.</i> 2. <i>Follow participatory planning process in future, with involvement of beneficiaries, local government and as per local market situation</i> 3. <i>Develop process as per possibilities of co-funding, collaboration and partnership modalities at local levels.</i> 	<p><i>From July 2019 and onward</i></p>	<p><i>Programme Managers, Finance Head, Senior Management of NRCS</i></p>
<p>Comments: Being auxiliary to the government, NRCS will consider this recommendation. Market rates analysis and necessary coordination with WASH Cluster and government will be done in future to address this issue.</p>				
<p>Recommendation 8: Cash based initiatives need to be more focused, targeted and rationalized to ensure a better balance between technical and political decision making.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility

<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<i>Although targeting needs to be rational which is acknowledged by the management, the social context is different in the country due to which it was difficult to target beneficiaries accordingly and blanket approach was used.</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Revise and update targeting criteria, beneficiary selection criteria and process.</i> 2. <i>Ensure rationalized and focused targeting in the future operations and orient districts accordingly.</i> 	<i>July 2019 to December 2020</i>	<i>Programme Team, Department Heads, Senior Management of NRCS</i>
Comments: NRCS will also benefit from the strong literature analysis available in-country from other partners.				
Recommendation 9: NRCS needs to be better prepared to implement CBI at all levels within the National Society.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<i>There is a need for wider institutional capacity building efforts for implementation of CBI and make the NRCS cash ready at all levels. Although efforts are ongoing in terms of trainings and awareness sessions as part of the cash preparedness programme.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Training/ orientation on CBI.</i> • <i>Form team among trained persons</i> • <i>Advocacy to NRCS other programme and partners</i> • <i>Advocacy to District chapters</i> • <i>Institutional capacity building at district chapters for preparing plan to cash based initiatives.</i> 	<i>July 2019 to July 2021</i>	<i>NRCS leadership, Programme teams of NRCS in coordination with the Cash Working Group and Cash focal point</i>
Comments: Cash based initiative programme has been implementing through the coordination with IFRC and the British Red Cross.				
Recommendation 10: NRCS must address the vulnerability of unregistered/landless populations 'within the scope of its recovery remit'.				

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<p><input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted</p>	<p><i>NRCS has developed vulnerability criteria to select beneficiary for response operation. Every vulnerable people may not be necessarily be the landless since there are other type of vulnerability factors from humanitarian perspective. Being humanitarian agency, NRCS always give priority to address humanitarian crisis/immediate needs rather than directly engaging in right-based issues such as landless people. However, issue of landless is also one of criteria, out of other vulnerable criteria and they are not completely left out in the past. Therefore, NRCS will always try to maintain balance focusing on humanitarian issues and need. NRCS must address the vulnerability, but for unregistered landless population NRCS can only coordinate with government and advocate to address land issue for the poor.</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize coordination meeting with different levels government 2. Advocate to the government to address land issue 3. Take consideration while updating beneficiary criteria from broader vulnerability perspective. 	<p>July 2019 to December 2020</p>	<p>Senior management (SG) Programme unit of NRCS</p>
<p>Comments: NRCS has considered this recommendation, as part of current Monsoon Preparedness Plan.</p>				
<p>Recommendation 11: NRCS and IFRC need to consider how to support affected communities with longer-term development needs in order to reduce long-term vulnerability.</p>				

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<p>□ Accepted</p>	<p><i>So far, IFRC support has been based on the comparative vulnerability analysis of NRCS (past disaster trend, demography, access). In addition, there is gap in terms of strong linkage and integration of NRCS CBDRR programmes with the nationwide development process at local level. Therefore, the collaborative efforts with local government should be further enhanced to be more sustainable. In future, recovery programmes should be supplemented with long-term development programmes to ensure better disaster response. NRCS has planned to utilize the balance funds from flood response operation for strengthening its response capacity at municipal and district levels. Long term CBDRR programme could not be planned immediately after the recovery, but NRCS has taken into consideration and explore possibilities to link with future programmes.</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Draft proposal for development programme in flood affected districts.</i> 2. <i>Ensure the sustainability of recovery initiatives through future long-term development projects.</i> 3. <i>Based on the data and information, NRCS with support from IFRC/PNSs will conduct a collective mapping of the most vulnerable areas in the flood affected areas.</i> 4. <i>A joint review of programmes and develop how the NRCS intervention can complement to the DRR action plan of the government at local level in the most affected areas through the long- term engagement within the resource available</i> 	<p><i>From August 2019 and onwards</i></p>	<p><i>NRCS leadership, DM Department NRCS, IFRC CO and partners</i></p>
<p>Comments: By using the residual funds and mobilizing the locally available resources like trained volunteers and local government funds under new federal structure, NRCS with technical support of the IFRC has developed a plan of action outlined in the decision paper. From, the fourth quarter onwards, this will be implemented as part of the Operational Plan.</p>				

Recommendation 12: Current and future community evacuation centre latrine block design should be flood resistant.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	<p><i>Modification in already constructed structure will be completed within December 2019 and the new design should be considered within project time frame and construction based on proper site assessment.</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>For the current toilet block, the renovation and modification are ongoing to make it flood resistant and accessible.</i> 2. <i>For future constructions, if proceeded by taking consulting services for the design the consultant shall be made aware of the purpose of EECs and flood resistant design that need to be considered.</i> 3. <i>Based on the recommendations, further actions to improve the latrine to protect from next flood.</i> 	<p><i>From August to December 2019</i></p>	<p><i>NRCS DM Department Project Manager, Assigned technical persons (Engineer/sub engineer) and IFRC country office</i></p>

Comments: NRCS is coordinating with the contractor and a team from HQ will visit to the site of the EECs to review the toilet design and then plan for making it flood resistant.