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Final Report

IFRC / NRCS

Final Evaluation –

Nepal Earthquake Response Operation

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Finally, Global Emergency Group would like to thank both, NRCS and IFRC for having been given us the opportunity to undertake this final evaluation.

As this is an independent evaluation, the authors assume responsibility for all opinions, recommendations and any inadvertent errors that appear in this report.

3. Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABCD	American, British, Canadian & Danish Red Cross Consortium
CBHFA	Community-based Health and First Aid
CDO	Community Development Office
CDMC	Community Disaster Management Committee
CEA	Community Engagement and Accountability
CfW	Cash-for-Work
CGI	Corrugated galvanised iron
CHF	Swiss Franc(s)
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard
CHV	Community Health Volunteer
CMM	Cooperation Management Meeting (NRCS, IFRC, ICRC)
DC	District Chapter
DCC	District Coordination Committee (prev. DDC – Development Committee)
DDRC	District Disaster Relief Committee
DHO	District Health Office
DoA	Delegation of Authority
DUDBC	Department of Urban Development and Building Construction
D-WASH-C	District Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Coordination Committee
DWSS	Department of Water Supply and Sewerage
EA	Emergency Appeal
EMT	Evaluation Management Team
EPoA	Emergency Plan of Action
ERO	Emergency Response Operation
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
FE	Final Evaluation
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GoN	Government of Nepal
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HH	Household
HRRP	Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform
ICB	Institutional Capacity Building
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEC	Information, Education, Communication
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IM	Information Management
IPRA	Integrated Participatory Rural Appraisal
KII	Key Informant Interview
LDRMC	Local Disaster Response Management Committee
LLW	Lessons Learned Workshop
MoHP	Ministry of Health and Population (GoN)
MCM	Movement Coordination Meeting
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NHQ	Nepal Red Cross National Headquarters
NPR	Nepali Rupee(s)
NRA	National Reconstruction Authority
NRCS	Nepal Red Cross Society
OPEX	Operational Excellence Review
OU	Operations Update
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PGI	Protection, Gender, Inclusion
PMER	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluating and Reporting

PHC	Primary Health Care Centre
PNS	Participating National Society
PWD	People with disabilities
RAG	Recovery Action Groups
RCM	Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
SC	Steering Committee
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TCB	Transition Consultative Body
ToR	Terms of Reference
TPO	Transcultural Psychosocial Organization
USD	American Dollar(s)
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
VDC	Village Development Committee
VWASHCC	Village WASH Coordination Committee
WASH	Water, Sanitation, Hygiene
WUC	Water User Committee

4. Executive Summary

With its complex geophysical structure and vulnerability to a variety of disaster types, Nepal ranks as one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. An earthquake measuring 7.8 magnitude struck an area between Kathmandu and Pokhara on the morning of April 25, 2015. The epicentre was 80 kilometres northwest of Kathmandu but its impact was felt across 57 of Nepal's 75 districts. A series of severe aftershocks caused further damage to essential infrastructure of roads, bridges, buildings and, critically, water systems, and loss of life. The strongest aftershock, measuring 7.3 magnitude, struck on May 12, 2015. The Evaluation Team have checked a number of official casualty and damage sites (including UNOCHA, IFRC and NRCS and other agencies) and every organisation uses slightly different numbers for deaths, injuries, damaged homes govt buildings etc. The Evaluation Team decided to use the official figures of the GoN Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) rather than statistics from other sources, and add programme specific information. As such, the two earthquakes took the lives of 8,896 and injured seriously 22,303 people. The earthquakes destroyed 604,930 houses completely and 2,88,856 houses partially. It is estimated that the total value of disaster effects (damages and losses) caused by the earthquakes is NPR 706 billion or its equivalent of US\$ 7 billion. (PDNA, NPC 2015).

Following a very impressive initial emergency relief operation that made full use of national, regional and international contingency planning and response tools, the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS), with the support of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (RCM = IFRC, ICRC and Participating National Societies (PNS) in-country) has been supporting recovery activities in the 14 government identified priority districts through a 'Movement Recovery Plan' that was agreed in June 2016 and built on the 'Recovery Framework' endorsed at a partnership meeting in June 2015. This plan aimed to ensure a coherent Movement-wide approach under the leadership of NRCS. The plan **promotes an integrated approach bringing together shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene promotion (WASH), livelihoods and health activities, together with NRCS institutional capacity building (the so-called "4 + 1" approach)**. The roll-out of the plan had been considerably delayed, due to firstly, external factors related to the a period of political uncertainty, the creation and mobilisation of the hitherto non-existing National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) by the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the development of policies to guide the recovery process, Secondly, internal factors as the NRCS and RCM similarly scaled up its capacity to respond to the challenges of delivering its biggest ever recovery programme across many districts while the country was in the midst of a major political restructuring process.

This Final Evaluation (FE) will mainly focus on new findings and recommendations. It will, however, also compare these with findings and recommendation made in previous evaluations (Real-Time Evaluation and Mid-Term Evaluation) and, wherever necessary or useful, highlight any relevant action (or inaction) taken.

KEY FINDINGS¹

Shelter – The delayed (and compulsory) shelter decision-making process at GoN level caused a significant delay beyond the ability of the RCM to address. Nonetheless, once started, the owner-driven approach was deemed most successful and impressive progress has been made in providing people who had lost their dwellings with new houses. However, it is felt that the dual assessment indicator protocol prescribed by the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) caused considerable problems as the assessment of 'destroyed' houses (resulting in reconstruction) versus 'damaged' houses (resulting at best but not always in retrofitting) frequently caused the feeling of unfairness among communities and left a considerable number of people without adequate housing at the end of this programme.

One of the few major downsides of the shelter component was the fact that a considerable majority of people who rebuilt their houses could be left more vulnerable as they had to take out considerable loans from various sources (bank or private) with either using their land as collateral or even selling their remaining land and livestock.

The FE found sufficient evidence suggesting that, in future, a much more realistic time frame needs to be set for a housing recovery programme. Given the magnitude of damage and the geographical challenges in Nepal and, particularly, in the programme areas, makes the two-year time frame initially insisted on more than unrealistic. In most other countries affected by such large-scale disasters, recovery programmes often last for five to six years with

¹ Findings have been developed from a compendium detailed review, analysis and interpretation of information harvested from the following: Secondary data documentation, Primary data from FGD and KII interviews, field visit observations and one-to-one feedback from beneficiaries and photographic evidence, professional experience and knowledge of the operation by team members and support staff. The data had been entered into and further measured in a data systems coding and weighting matrix process on which to further construct findings and recommendations.

communities often fully recovering only after 10 years or more. Such extended and more realistic time frame would allow households to find alternative ways to pay for reconstruction. As such, the FE was unable to determine beyond reasonable doubt whether the decision to become involved in reconstruction was, in hindsight, a wise one.

The question occasionally raised whether the RCM approach could have been more effective if it had been focused less on reconstruction but more on technical support, capacity building and training is hypothetical and cannot be answered by this evaluation. However, the question should be considered very carefully in future operations of such scale.

The relief phase communal shelter also raised a number of questions to consider in future events of this magnitude. It became clear that more gender-sensitive and culturally appropriate solutions for emergency communal shelter alternatives must be examined in future planning, particularly in a culture where societal conventions play a dominant role.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) – The WASH interventions implemented during the relief and recovery phases have definitely increased the resilience of affected communities in the three districts to natural disasters. As such, the FE found clear evidence that WASH was a highly relevant priority. The WASH programming was also highly successful in integrating with other sectors throughout the relief and recovery phases. In fact, the level of positive effects of WASH on other sectors, such as livelihoods (farming and animal husbandry), social and economic changes, is, indeed, impressive. So impressive that the Evaluation Team decided to add a third case study (Livelihoods) to the required two case studies in an attempt to demonstrate how well the integrated approach to recovery had worked. The sectoral linkage of WASH with health was also impressive with the occurrence of diarrhoeal and skin diseases significantly reduced and the general health reportedly increased in all locations where WASH interventions had successfully been completed. The programme significantly reduced or, in some cases, even eradicated the risk of water-borne diseases, allowed more time for other activities, and has markedly improved the sanitation and hygiene levels of entire communities. The positive effect was also noted in schools and through the extensive use of kitchen gardening, and by the fact that new water points are accessible for adults, children and disabled people.

While generally highly successful, the FE also noted that even as the programme was coming to an end and funds appear still available, there were a considerable number of projects still unfinished and not all communities had been able to benefit from the recovery intervention. Likewise, several communities were of the opinion that the interventions should have also considered more low-tech and affordable technologies, such as rain water harvesting. As such, some communities often felt left out of the planning process.

Livelihoods – A highly noticeable positive impact, social and economic effect, and even life-changing increase in female participation was evidenced. Such positive outcomes are further confirmation that the integrated approach to support was the right way – the only, most relevant and most appropriate way to address not only the short- and medium-term needs of the earthquake affected communities but also to put them on a more self-sustainable footing in the longer term.

Health – Generally, the inter-sectoral benefits described had a significantly positive effect on the general health of the disaster-affected population in the visited districts. However, emergency health activities (e.g. ERUs) and recovery interventions (e.g. reconstruction) have somewhat touched the surface. The FE found in all discussions with beneficiaries that even four years after the disaster occurred, considerable adverse psychological effects persist, especially among, but not limited to, children and their socialising behaviour. Fear, despair, distress, shock, and sadness were only a few emotions mentioned. As such, the FE opines that in terms of health care and the absence of adequate psychological First Aid or trauma management, the intervention was not sufficiently appropriate and that more planning and inclusion of this subject is required in future similar operations.

Institutional Capacity Building and Sustainability - Although the sheer scale of the disaster had initially overwhelmed NRCS' as well as GoN and other agencies' capacities, a very successful WASH programme and an equally robust shelter and livelihoods intervention have been able to help NRCS increasing its management and operational capacity as well as gaining valuable lessons to be learned at both, HQ and district levels.

The greatest concern many key informants and communities expressed was the question of real sustainability. On the part of NRCS and its achievement of greater operational capacity, a lot will depend on how partners/the RCM will view and apply the use of left-over funds in an effort to put the significant achievements on a longer-term sustainable footing. Within the communities, the FE found that in many locations, and obviously due to the enthusiasm and engagement of the local NRCS branch, a very encouraging process had begun, namely the initiative of many villages and communities

taking steps outside any planned format to establish small contingencies and saving funds for ongoing and future maintenance, repairs, restocking, ongoing expenses and even the establishment of village-run health posts.

NRCS has gained a vast amount of credibility both, in government and in the various communities; this momentum could be harvested by NRCS focusing volunteer drives on the assisted communities. Likewise, communities could become involved in simulation exercises at ward and district levels to enhance their preparedness levels and retain at least a minimum of capacity within the communities at risk.

Coordination, Cooperation and Partnership

The FE noted from both, prior evaluations and this one, that RCM partnership cooperation and coordination during the past four years has experienced considerable challenges; some were resolved, others apparently not and building up the potential for a truly integrated team seemed at times elusive. Among the findings, valuable NRCS human resources were lost to competition from RCM as some of the PNS (as well as UN and some other agencies) reportedly paid higher or at least highly competitive salaries. While the FE was unable in the short time available to gather sufficient evidence, the evaluation team recommends thoroughly investigating this issue as such behaviour, if confirmed, does not behave members of the RCM who supposedly worked towards capacity building of NRCS.

The FE also identified a certain lack of transparency and sharing of funding levels and balances across all RCM partners. There are, however, considerable funds left over at the end of the recovery operation, and these could be used to (a) complete unfinished construction and WASH project work, and (b) continue to support organisational capacities at district level proven to have been successful and needed to further strengthen NRCS capacity.

While the ERO platform was generally regarded as having a real potential for future major operations, much more concept design, planning, training and thought needs to be given to related and identified issues. These require considerable approach and management style changes within the NRCS administration, management and governance if they are to succeed. Examples for such required changes are adjusted sign-off responsibility and authority, the development of SOPs, the urgent establishment of separate procurement and logistic section (to facilitate and speed up procurement, logistic and HR resourcing arrangement in emergencies), more transparency, clarity and strong selection process for roles and responsibilities of managers and their deputies. An ERO can only succeed and become operational if the concept of delegation of authority is effectively introduced and applied.

It would appear that a greater physical presence, especially in the field, of RCM delegates specialised in PGI would have been highly desirable as both, trainers and programme advisors, particularly during the emergency phase of the operation. As such, this sector was considerable under-staffed. In fact, it was the opinion of many (see details in the report) that in particular the IFRC delegation had been somewhat under-staffed with technical delegates during the relief / emergency phase of the operation, compared to other disaster operations of such scale in the past (e.g. Indian Ocean Tsunami). Conversely during the recovery phase over-staffing of PNS delegates seems to have been noted while IFRC remained under-staffed, specifically in order to manage a dual role as coordinator and implementer of programmes.

With the high profile and credibility NRCS has gained through the successful implementation of this programme, the National Society should harvest the benefits by using this time now to brand itself to be better “fit-for-purpose” going forward. This would, in the long term, make NRCS an even stronger partner of the GoN, including advocating for a Red Cross Law, strengthen NRCS’ commitment to the Fundamental Principles of the RCM and avoid some of the identified pitfalls described in this report.

SUMMARY of STRATEGIC and TACTICAL RECOMMENDATION (Details listed under 9.2.1. and 9.2.2.)

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS (S 1 – S 16)

- **Recommendations from the Real-Time Evaluation and the Mid-Term Review should be revisited and, where appropriate and not yet done, implemented to further strengthen the impact of the Earthquake Response Operation and the capacity of NRCS. Findings of this FE, therefore, are either based on new evidence or, where appropriate, use previous findings to reemphasize their importance. (S 1)**

- **As considerable amounts of left-over funding exist at the end of the operation, it is recommended that NRCS, IFRC and PNS carefully consider the utilisation of these funds for the development and implementation of a reinforced transitional strategy to address the identified concerns of sustainability, maintenance and longer-term development of the otherwise excellent programme progress. (S 2)**
- **A Final Meta-Analysis of all recently conducted ‘final’ evaluations should be commissioned to use their respective findings in a broader, global learning and knowledge-sharing context. (S 3)**
- **A thorough investigation is recommended into the alleged practice of some PNS to pay significantly higher salary to NRCS and new PNS staff thus draining the National Society of skilled manpower. (S 4)**
- **RCM should accommodate the option for communities experiencing scarcity of water to utilise water harvesting opportunities (S 5)**
- **The important recommendation expressed in earlier reviews to establish a proper logistics, procurement and HR department in NRCS is re-emphasized to address operational capacity building of the National Society and support future disaster preparedness. (S 6)**
- **Following the exit of the ERO support, NRCS should focus on DRR WASH programming and interventions, especially at sub-district level. (S 7)**
- Future disaster planning should focus more on involving communities in all processes (S 8).
- WASH contingency planning and other scenario-based training should include PGI, CEA and SPHERE standards. There also other IFRC guidelines, such as IFRC WASH guidelines for hygiene promotion in emergency operations, household water treatment and safe storage in emergencies field manual, and minimum standard commitments to gender and diversity in emergency programming. (S 9)
- NRCS should work with NRA/GoN to develop long-term recovery contingency planning with realistic time frames. (S 10)
- NRCS could work with NRA/GoN to plan for transitional shelters as part of a post-disaster recovery strategy and disaster preparedness planning. (S 11)
- NRCS should agree with NRA/GoN on vulnerability criteria. (S 12)
- NRCS should strengthen its partnership with HRRP as a repository for good practices. (S 13)
- In future, NRCS should undertake its own assessments with RC-sourced engineers in designated areas of operation. (S 14)
- NRCS, possibly with IFRC support, should obtain customs pre-approval, stock piling and pre-positioning key IFRC-standard equipment, NFI and tarpaulins for fast release after a major disaster. (S 15)
- **Psychosocial assistance needs to be integrated into health recovery programming. (S 16)**

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS (T 1 – T 23)

- **Immediate allocation of lump sum payments to Water Users Committees (WUC) from unspent earthquake funds. (T 1)**
- **WASH infrastructure should be monitored at least bi-annually by branches. (T 2)**
- **Ongoing advocacy by NRCS to GoN for subsidised power supply for water lifting schemes. (T 3)**
- **Additional and more substantial maintenance training should be provided to WUCs by NRCS. (T 4)**
- **All water schemes should be assessed for sustainability issues. Based on review outcomes, advice at sustaining continuity of water supply could then be provided to the WUCs and communicated to communities. (T 5)**
- **NRCS should obtain from IFRC / PNS standard packing lists for Water ERUs to obtain pre-clearances from MoPH, DWSS, and Customs. (T 6)**
- **NRCS should ensure that those communities, whose water projects have not yet been finalised, are not forgotten but, instead, prioritised to be supported under non-emergency WASH programming. (T 7)**
- **Future disaster planning should also ensure greater collaboration with DWSS. (T 8)**
- **Provision of temporary gender-segregated toilets for women and girls during the relief phase. (T 9)**
- **Communal shelters should be well lit and internally partitioned either by family, caste or by gender. (T 10)**
- **In emergencies, standardised “dignity kits” / menstrual hygiene kits should be provided to women and adolescent girls. They should be included in the standard list of emergency provisions and stockpiled accordingly. (T 11)**
- **NRCS should develop for all districts a WASH Training Package that includes PGI and CEA. (T 12)**
- **A similar but briefer training should be provided to management. (T 12)**
- **Similarly, SPHERE standards contents should be provided to staff, volunteers and management, as SPHERE standards also apply in emergencies. (T 12)**
- **Where practical and in particular when close to roads, water points should be provisioned with screening so that people can bathe in privacy. (T 13)**
- **NRCS should work with NRA to review appropriate levels of assistance. (T 14)**
- **NRCS should provide additional training for shelter officers and social mobilizers in the field on the design stage of the reconstruction process. (T 15)**
- **NRCS could work with NRA on how to encourage reconstruction of earthquake code buildings according to traditional styles e.g. via special grants. (T 15)**

- **NRCS should appoint a focal point within the organization for shelter issues. This shelter focal point can compile lessons learned, enhance linkages with NRA, GMALI, MoHA and provide training for volunteers and staff on shelter operations. (T 16)**
- Training for District Disaster Response Teams (DDRT) should include setting up appropriate communal shelters as well as the provision of special assistance for the most vulnerable (e.g. elderly, pregnant, disabled, landless, etc...). (T 17)
- NRCS could add 'debt load' as an additional assessment criterion to assess vulnerability in emergencies. (T 18)
- For future operations, relocated families receive additional assistance to cover the extra cost of reconstruction. (T 19)
- For future operations, NRCS could consider reducing or consolidating payments for remote communities to reduce the number of times that affected families need to travel to collect funds. (T 20)
- NRCS should consider two-tiered training for masons and carpenters for future operations (T 21)
- NRCS should explore the GoN loan program and provide training to local RC volunteers and staff. (T 22)
- Livelihood support to farmers, including livestock insurance, artificial insemination and veterinary care awareness should be more targeted and customized. (T 23)

5. Background of IFRC/NRCS Nepal Earthquake Response Operation

With its complex geophysical structure and vulnerability to a variety of disaster types, Nepal ranks as one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. An earthquake measuring 7.8 magnitude struck an area between Kathmandu and Pokhara on the morning of April 25, 2015. The epicentre was 80 kilometres northwest of Kathmandu but its impact was felt across 57 of Nepal's 75 districts. A series of severe aftershocks caused further damage and loss of life. The strongest aftershock, measuring 7.3 magnitude, struck on May 12, 2015. The combined impact of the initial earthquake and the severe aftershocks resulted in²

- the loss of 8,896 lives;
- 22,303 people were seriously injured.
- A total of at least 604,930 houses were completely and 288,856 houses partially destroyed.
- Estimated value of the total disaster defects (damages and losses) were estimated at NPR 706 billion or the equivalent of USD 7 billion.

The Evaluation Team have checked a number of official casualty and damage sites (including UNOCHA, IFRC and NRCS and other agencies) and every organization uses slightly different numbers for deaths, injuries, damaged homes, govt buildings etc. It is for that reason that the Evaluation Team decided to use these official figures rather than statistics from other sources, and add programme specific information.

Following initial emergency relief activities, the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS), with the support of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (RCM = IFRC, ICRC and Participating National Societies (PNS) in-country) provided seasonal cash support and, in some districts, sectoral assistance in WASH and school reconstruction, and has been supporting recovery activities in the 14 government identified priority districts through a **Movement Recovery Plan** agreed in June 2016 which built on the **Recovery Framework** endorsed at a partnership meeting in June 2015. This plan aimed to ensure a coherent Movement-wide approach under the leadership of NRCS. The plan **promotes an integrated approach bringing**

² Government of Nepal (GoN) Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) 2015

together shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene promotion (WASH), livelihoods and health activities, together with NRCS institutional capacity building (the so-called “4 + 1” approach).

The roll out of the plan had been considerably delayed, due to both external factors related to the a period of political uncertainty, the creation and mobilisation of the hitherto non-existing National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) by the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the development of policies to guide the recovery process, and also internal factors as the NRCS and RCM similarly scaled up its capacity to respond to the challenges of delivering its biggest ever recovery programme across many districts that were in the throes of undergoing administrative re-structuring.

6. Evaluation Purpose, Methodology and Standards

This section outlines the approach and methodology that was used by the consultancy team. It builds on the ToR drafted by IFRC as well as on the proposed approach and methodology that was outlined in GEG’s offer for this assignment, and the subsequent discussion with IFRC around the content and the scope of the work prior to signing the contract for this assignment. From the GEG proposal and the ToR discussions a detailed Inception Report was drafted as the primary navigating tool for the ensuing evaluation. This section also includes an outline of the constraints in the implementation of the evaluation.

The Secondary Data information library, provided only just before the start of the evaluation field phase, contains many wide-ranging documents covering the start to the present RCM earthquake operation. Among these, a number of key documents were noted as having particular relevance. They are available and should be read in conjunction with this report. **The Real Time Evaluation (RTE), the Mid-Term Review (MTR) and the Lessons Learned Workshop (LLW)** all contain important information, findings opinions and recommendations relevant to the time and purpose for which they were commissioned. As such, whilst noting the content and, **where deemed appropriate**, to reference and link information to the FE findings, **it is not the intention of this report to duplicate their content.**

The evaluation criteria are based on OECD/DAC for evaluations in complex emergencies (OECD/DAC, 2006) and the criteria and questions mentioned below will be addressed.

	Primary Intended Users	Intended Uses
1	IFRC Regional Office and its sectoral departments	To understand the effectiveness of its overarching role in the management of the programme, as commissioners of the evaluation, and to inform improvements in short, medium, and long-term approaches to increase APRO countries policy and action to build DRM capacity.
2	IFRC Country Office	To understand the effectiveness of its role in the management of the programme, the evaluation and to inform improvements in short, medium, and long-term approaches to increase IFRC support to and collaboration and coordination with the NRCS and, where appropriate, PNS and the ICRC in-country in enhancing national DRM policy and action to build DRM capacity.
3	Nepal Red Cross HQ	To understand the effectiveness of its role in the management of the operation, the evaluation and as a national lead agency in DRM and to inform improve-ments in short, medium, and long-term approaches to increase IFRC support to the NRCS in enhancing national DRM policy and action to build DRM capacity.
3	Field Staff of both, NRCS, IFRC and PNS	To understand the effectiveness and utility of systems and structures intended to improve their DRR/DRM programmes (e.g. deployable technical experts, capacity building, knowledge management and M&E tools).
4	GoN sub-regional implementing agencies, Governments, civil society, communities	To understand the effectiveness and utility of systems and structures intended to improve DRR/DRM agendas and programmes.
5	Other partners UN INGO Actors	To understand how the IFRC & NRCS and other actors and groups interact, collaborate, communicate, coordinate, and share learning and experiences with each other.

6.1. Evaluation Questions

Closely following the outline provided in the ToR with clarifications and further elaborations in the Inception Report, the team has proposed a detailed approach and method for answering the evaluation questions. We have also developed an evaluation framework with a set of evaluation questions for each of these criteria, and associated indicators. The criteria and evaluation questions were generally seen as evaluable, however, with the caveat that question III.3. (ToR) on 'Impact' refers to pure speculation (What would the situation have been if the interventions had not taken place?). The consultants attempted to answer this question; however, there was insufficient time to visit non-project communities.

The evaluation questions are listed per criteria below.

CRITERIA	QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED	MEASURE/INDICATOR	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION METHODS
RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS	Key Relevance Question: To what extent were the specific interventions relevant to the needs, priorities and rights of the target communities, and to what extent did target communities (including women and girls) participate in the planning, design and implementation of the programme?	• See below	• See below	• See below
	Relevance Sub Questions:			
	1. Was the scale of the programme appropriate and proportional to IFRC / PNS and NRCS' capacity, experience and mandate?	• Level of adaptation and integration of the EQ Response Operation (EOS) to existing IFRC, NRCS and PNS capacities, experience and mandates	• NRCS strategic docs • NRCS 7th Devt Plan • MWOP • "One Plan (4+1)" • Emergency Appeals and updates	• Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans • Key informant interviews
	2. To what extent did IFRC / PNSs consider the absorption and delivery capacity of NRCS (in programme design and during programme implementation)? (e.g. other programmes)	• Evidence (or not) that supports (or not) appropriateness and alignment of emergency response planning, assistance and advocacy to NRCS capacities	• MWOP • Meeting records • OPEX, MTR • NRCS 7th Devt Plan	• Secondary data review • Key informant interviews
	3. What did IFRC/PNSs do to enhance identified capacity gaps? (e.g. Scale up / Do no harm)	• Evidence (or not) of needs assessments, identified gaps • Evidence of these findings being incorporated into EOS programming • Special consideration of scale-up and Do-no-harm concepts	• Needs assessments • Planning documents • HR scale-up • Do-no-harm policies • Meeting records	• Key informant interviews • Secondary data review
	4. How effective was the mechanisms for communication, feedback and complaints?	• Evidence (or not) of any specific communication and feedback mechanisms • Quantity and quality of communication • Quantity of complaints	• Records of complaints management • Internal reports • Communication records	• Key informant interviews • Secondary data review
	5. How did NRCS collect and act on community feedback?	• Quantity of complaints and quality of resulting acting	• Records of complaints management • Communication records • Internal reports	• Key informant interviews • Secondary data review

	6. Have different options for interventions been considered in programme design?	Records of coordination meetings, team meetings, programme drafts	- Planning documents - MWOP - Coordination meeting records	- Key informant interviews - Secondary data review
EFFECTIVENESS	Key Effectiveness Question: To what extent has the programme achieved its intended outcomes?	See below	See below	See below
	Effectiveness Sub Questions:			
	7. What were the positive or negative unintended results / impact of the programme?	- Evidence (or not) for particularly positive or negative results - Relating these findings to the planned programme objectives	- NRCS/IFRC/PNS staff, volunteers - HQ and district staff - Beneficiaries - Local authorities	- Secondary data review - Key informant interviews and focus group interviews
	8. Did all outputs contribute to intended outcomes under the “One Plan” approach?	- Evidence (or not) of recorded outputs - Relating these to the “One Plan” approach and intended objectives	- NRCS/IFRC/PNS staff, volunteers - HQ and district staff - Beneficiaries - Local authorities	- Secondary data review - Key informant interviews and focus group interviews
	9. How effective has the programme been in coordinating with external actors?	- Number of coordination meetings with various external actors - Evidence of successful coordination	- Secondary data - Coordination meeting records - PNSs/Movement partners - Local authorities	- Case studies - Key informant interviews and focus group interviews
	10. Has the disaster preparedness capacity of the NRCS increased due to the recovery programme?	Evidence (or not) of any capacity increase (level, sector)	- NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers - Local authorities - Community leaders, etc. - Comparative action	- Secondary data review - Case studies - Survey - Key informant interviews and focus group interviews - Anecdotal evidence - Direct observation
IMPACT	Key Impact Question: To what extent has the recovery programme reached and had a positive impact and ensured safety on the most vulnerable, in particular women, children and young people, elderly, people with disability, and people from different castes / ethnic groups and communities?	See below.	See below	See below
	Impact Sub Questions:			

	10. To what extent and in what ways has capacity building translated into more effective operations at district and HQ levels?	Evidence (or not) of any capacity increase (level, sector)	- Secondary data (Organizational charts and work plans) - Emergency Roster processes and systems - NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers - Local authorities - Community leaders, etc. - Comparative action	- Secondary data review - Case studies - Survey - Key informant interviews and focus group interviews - Anecdotal evidence - Direct observation
	11. What would the situation have been in the target areas if the intervention had not taken place? <i>[Pure assumption]</i>	ASSUMPTION	Can only be addressed if time permits to visit / interact with other non-project communities	ASSUMPTION
	12. What are the economic and social effects positive or negative of the interventions, e.g. local markets, social relations, on district chapters' structure and volunteering spirit?	Evidence (or not) of economic and social changes pre- and post-programme	- NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers - Local authorities - Community leaders, Beneficiaries, etc. - Comparative action	- Case studies - Survey - Key informant interviews and focus group interviews - Direct observation
	13. How was the level of sectoral linkage and integration? What was the impact of the integrated programmes?	Evidence (or not) of integration of programmes and the impact thereof.	- NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers - Local authorities - Community leaders, Beneficiaries, etc. - Comparative action	- Case studies - Survey - Operations Updates - Key informant interviews and focus group interviews - Direct observation
EFFICIENCY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS	Key Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness Question: 14. How have management, logistics, financial and technical arrangements in the districts and in HQ facilitated to meet the project's objectives?	See below.	See below	See below
	Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness Sub Questions			
	16. How did we work together within the Movement and with other agencies or against one another (e.g. partnership, coordination, structure, synergy) in line with the "One Movement Recovery Plan (4+1)" model?	- Evidence (or not) of any particular modes of collaboration among Movement members and other agencies/partners - Coordination meetings	- Secondary data (Organizational charts and work plans) - Emergency Roster processes and systems - NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers	- Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans - Key informant interviews - Operations Updates - FGDs

			- Local authorities - Movement partner documentation - Comparative action	
	17. How timely was the delivery of outputs been in relation to needs?	- Funding records - Purchasing - Distribution records - Appeal process	- NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers - Local authorities - Movement partner documentation - Comparative action	- Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans - Key informant interviews - Base line data - Needs assessment data - Time lines - Operations Updates
	18. How efficiently were activities carried out in terms of time and costs?	- Funding records - Purchasing - Distribution records - Appeal process	- NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers - Local authorities - Movement partner documentation - Comparative action	- Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans - Key informant interviews - Base line data - Needs assessment data - Time lines - Operations Updates
	19. Was the recovery programme built on NRCS' existing strategy, capacities and the "4+1 model"?	- Evidence (or not) of integration of recovery into NRCS strategies, capacities, etc. - Organisational processes / charts / changes	- NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers - Movement partner documentation - Comparative action	- Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans - Key informant interviews - Operations Updates - FGDs
SUSTAINABILITY	Key Sustainability Questions: 20. Have the capacities and responsibilities of the recovery programme been transitioned to NRCS' normal structure?	See below	See below	See below
	Sustainability Sub Questions			
	21. Has the recovery programme strengthened NRCS chapters and the internal functioning of the National Society (e.g. skills, resources and structures)?	- Evidence (or not) of integration of recovery into NRCS strategies, capacities, etc. - Organisational processes / charts / changes	- NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers - Movement partner documentation - Comparative action	- Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans - Key informant interviews - Operations Updates - FGDs

	22. Has the sustainability approach / concept (e.g. skills, resources, structures) introduced and followed the community infrastructure related projects after programme closure? What was or would have been required to accomplish these benefits and sustainable approaches?	• Evidence (or not) of integration of sustainability into NRCS strategies, capacities, etc. • Organisational processes / charts / changes • Comparative action in terms of sustainability before/after	• NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers • Movement partner documentation • Comparative action • Relevant financial records	• Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans • Key informant interviews • Operations Updates • FGDs • Direct observation
	23. Was the programme environmentally and financially sustainable?	• Evidence of environmental impact (if available) • Comparative action in terms of sustainability before/after	• NRCS HQ and district staff, volunteers • Movement partner documentation • Comparative action • Relevant financial records	• Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans • Key informant interviews • Operations Updates • FGDs • Direct observation
	24. To what extent did the recovery programme engage local stakeholders, such as local authorities, community leaders, policy makers, academia, etc. to tap into local knowledge for sustainability of the programme?	• Planning documentation	• NRCS HQ and district staff, vols. • Movement partner documentation • Community leaders, external agencies, academic institutions • NRCS strategic docs • NRCS 7th Devt Plan/"One Plan" • MWOP • Emergency Appeals and updates	• Secondary data review/analysis of strategies/work plans • Key informant interviews • Operations Updates • FGDs

Category	Number of KILs	Number of FGDs	Number of Interviewees	Men	Women	% men / women interviewed
NRCS (NHQ)	15		15	11	4	73.3% male / 26.7% female
NRCS (Districts)	25	3	31	28	3	90.3% male / 9.7% female
IFRC (Kathmandu)	12		12	11	1	91.7% male / 9.3% female
IFRC (Other/APRO) / ICRC	11		11	8	3	72.7% male / 27.3% female
PNS	5		5	4	1	80.0% male / 20.0 % female
GoN Authorities (Kathmandu and Districts)	49		49	38	11	77.6% male / 22.4% female
Beneficiaries in operations location:						
- Okhaldhunga		10	164	56	108	34.1% male / 65.9% female
- Sindhuli		10	208	122	86	58.7% male / 41.3% female
- Ramechhap		8	144	68	76	47.2% male / 52.8% female
SUB-TOTAL		28	516	246	270	47.7% male / 52.3% female
TOTAL	117	31	639	346	293	54.2% male / 45.8% female

To attain the generally acceptable 95% confidence level with max 5% error margin, a minimum of only 381 respondents were needed to be interviewed in order to achieve a statistically significant result.

The evaluation had a strong learning focus and the consultants highly depended on beneficiary interviews. Gender in particular played a pivotal role and we ensured the inclusion of women and girls in meetings and interviews. The evaluation team sought to maximise the potential to utilise the knowledge and experience of stakeholders, drawing key lessons from the project period. The evaluation conclusions aim to be based on a shared understanding among the evaluation stakeholders and the consultants as to what generally affects and constitutes positive effects and important achievements within the scope of the project, the context within which it operates, and as a result of the interventions undertaken.

6.4. Evaluation quality and standards

The evaluation fully respects the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and was carried out under the strict observance of the IFRC evaluation standards, i.e. utility, feasibility, impartiality and independence, transparency, accuracy, collaboration and participation and all applicable ethics and legality. The evaluation also observed the 'Do No Harm' principle and applied all standard ethical considerations for evaluations, i.e. safe and secure environment, informed choice, and the voluntary participation in this evaluation. All interviewees were asked to provide their consent and were fully informed of the purpose of this evaluation. All interviewees and FGD respondents verbally agreed to participation to, where applicable, agreed to be quoted.

Where applicable, 'SPHERE' standards were used for assessing results.

Data protection was assured by treating all information strictly confidential. Any contextual information was coded and / or published only with the expressed consent of the individual. Information obtained for use in case study was either anonymized or the specific consent of respective individuals was obtained prior to usage. This also applies to photographs. Any recorded interviews (for the purpose of later transcription) were erased once transcribed, and all data held by the consultant(s) will be erased once the final product has been accepted by the client.

6.5. Assumptions, constraints and actual hindrances

A key issue that had emerged was the **timing** of the field study. Initially, the ToR anticipated the evaluation to start on March 01, 2019 and be completed by May 16, 2019 with a total of 40 chargeable working days. Due to a considerable delay in the approval process of approximately three weeks, the consultancy is now starting on the day the contract was signed, i.e. March 19, 2019 with the completion date is now set to June 17, 2019.

This additionally led to further pressures in the post-field phase of the evaluation where already committed team member priorities diverted some time away from the secondary data analysis and the drafting of the Final Report. Secondary data analysis was also affected as, on a number of key documents, such as the Mid Term Review, the team had "eyes-on only" access or had yet to receive final management sign offs. In the case of the recent (March 2019) and relevant Lessons Learned Workshop (LLW), the minutes were still to be circulated and signed off. **Reference has been made only where the information was deemed of sufficient relevance or supportive of a finding from these documents**, but the constraints also noted.

Assumption	Risk	Mitigation
The consultancy team will have timely access to programme documentation and materials.	Documents for review were received two days prior to departure	Document review had to be continued after the actual field work.
The team will be able to meet with key stakeholders in Kathmandu, Okhaldhunga, Ramechhap, and Sindhuli. Other stakeholders, e.g. in Kuala Lumpur and/or Geneva and at PNSs NHQs will be available to be interviewed by phone.	Some key stakeholders were not available in Kuala Lumpur (due to short time available) and in Kathmandu.	Attempts were made to interview the unavailable stakeholders on Skype after the actual field work. In some cases, this was successful. Not all of these stakeholders could be traced, nor were they available despite several attempts of making contact.

Baseline data is available (or possible to reconstruct) for key areas where change is to be assessed.	Baseline data was initially largely dependent on GoN data from damage assessments.	NRCS, together with IFRC support, and in-country PNS completed baseline studies the three IFRC supported districts and in other relevant districts of Nepal
Sufficient time is allocated to accommodate time-consuming field travel to remote locations. IFRC/NRCS indicates priority areas.	Given the partly difficult access to remote locations and the number of necessary FGDs, time for actual field work was comparatively limited.	The team had to concentrate on locations that are logistically close and comparatively easier to reach. However, on several occasions even remote households were visited. The evaluation team split into two sub-teams to maximize the use of time.
Feedback / Management response is provided by IFRC / NRCS in a time manner.	Feedback / Management response by IFRC / NRCS is delayed.	The team stayed in close dialogue with IFRC/NRCS; however, if client feedback is received late, this will invariably delay the final product.

7. Key Findings

(Please, note that percentages do not always add up to 100% as not all questions were answered by all respondents.)

7.1. Relevance and Appropriateness



Photo: Gert Venghaus, GEG



Photo: Gert Venghaus, GEG

7.1.1. SHELTER (see also case study in annex)

75.8% of beneficiaries interviewed felt that the shelter intervention was fully or at least partly relevant to their needs and priorities. The majority of families spent the first few days in the open air, cattle sheds, plastic covered 'green house' facilities or temporary communal shelters. **Temporary communal shelters were generally stressful for vulnerable persons but were especially difficult for women** due to personal safety and menstruation needs.

The initial needs assessment process varied across the three districts covered by this evaluation – some FGDs reported that municipal engineers undertook first assessments, others noted that the first to arrive were local police or NRCS officers. There was a similar variation in terms of the speed of the assessment process – some areas received rapid assessments within hours of the earthquake, others (likely due to poor access) had to wait weeks. On arrival, NRCS generally used a consultative process with the affected communities, setting up committees to agree on priorities. Priority was given to those affected by landslides.

The primary decision by the GoN to provide CGI sheets to all affected households turned out to be unrealistic and it took GoN considerable time to realise that there was a serious shortage of sufficient numbers of CGI sheets in the entire South-Asian region. This, in turn, caused equally serious delays as initial decision were reversed and agencies had to follow rapidly changing new rules and regulation. This shift from CGI to tarpaulins adversely impacted also NRCS and other agencies' initial response and delayed the distribution of essential emergency shelter items. In many cases, the prompt arrival of tarpaulins from NRCS (generally one per HH), however, and receipt of Temporary Shelter/Winterization Grants allowed families to move from communal shelters to individual shelters close to their destroyed houses. **This was a key step in the early recovery process and especially benefitted women and children in terms of personal safety and mental health. It is recommended that NRCS consider obtaining customs pre-approval, stock piling and pre-positioning IFRC-standard equipment and tarpaulins for fast release after a major disaster.**

NRCS used NRA assessments and periodic reviews on house damage status to determine beneficiaries of the 300,000 Rupees reconstruction grants. Allocation of the three districts to NRCS by NRA ensured minimal duplication of shelter assistance by other agencies. It is acknowledged that due to the uncertain political situation following the earthquake, there were unavoidable delays in setting up the NRA and hence implementation of the housing strategy. It is also acknowledged that NRA demonstrated impressive flexibility in responding to confirmed unmet shelter needs by adjusting the strategy as needed (e.g. the introduction of 'emergency shelter', 'winterization' and 'shelter top up' grants).

Those whose houses were not recorded as fully damaged or damaged beyond repair received only minimal benefits. **As a result, 5.1% commented that their needs had not or insufficiently been addressed;** in almost all cases these respondents were those members of the community whose houses had only been partially damaged and who, as a result, had not been included in the NRA beneficiary list. There appears to be an imbalance in assistance levels between those respondents assessed as having damaged houses versus those assessed as having destroyed or irreparably damaged houses.

The NRA dual assessment indicators protocol everyone had to follow for evaluating destroyed (= reconstruction) versus damaged homes (= retrofitting) seems to have contributed to this imbalance. This has led to discrepancies in the database where the technical solution e.g. to rebuild, is not matched by the level of damage, e.g. minor cracks. This is due to some extent to poor data entry but could have been avoided if there had been only one set of indicators.

In many KIIs from both, RC and GoN, the suggestion recurred that **a single assessment protocol would have been more easily and fairly managed**. Equally there was a significant feedback as to whether the RCM approach could have been as effective and wide ranging, **if the focus had been less on actual reconstruction and more on technical support and capacity building, training to standards**. However, the pressure to implement and various aspects of programming the partly earmarked funding may have driven the final decision.

FGD also revealed that there is a close connection in many beneficiaries' minds between NRCS and local authorities. It was noted that the NRA list was only based on damage to affected houses. There was no filter based on assessed vulnerability of households. This led to some cases where it was reported that wealthy families were recipients of the NRCS reconstruction grants and had used the funds to assist in the construction of multi-storey buildings. There were also some incidences witnessed by the evaluation team where an existing structure was listed as irreparably damaged but was still in use and the completed shelter was not or under-used. On the other hand, as the damage assessment criteria were nation-wide, it would have been very difficult politically for NRA to change this once it was publicly announced (even if NRCS and IFRC had advocated for this). For equity reasons, it would not have been feasible to have had a different criteria set in the three provinces covered by IFRC. There could be a recommendation that NRCS and IFRC could advocate now for a vulnerability assessment process with NRA prior to future disasters in Nepal.

Feedback from the draft report suggests that in other districts there may have been advocacy efforts by IFRC and NRCS for NRA to revise their criteria or perform cross-checks. However, in the three districts evaluated, the Evaluation Team did not find any evidence for this.

Some 57.7% of beneficiaries confirmed they had been actively involved in planning, designing and implementing the shelter intervention, while a disappointing 22.5% felt totally left out of the planning process. The relative lack of communal involvement in the planning stage could account for the following concerns:

The relief phase communal shelter planning approaches raised some questions for future events of this magnitude. It is accepted that, by its nature and timing in the disaster, this is a complex challenge to address. However, it became clear that more gender sensitive and culturally appropriate solutions for emergency communal shelter alternatives should be examined.

Emergency Response Tarpaulins are a very important item for community shelter – they allow for better communal shelters and quicker relocation of families from communal to individual temporary shelters on the site of their damaged/destroyed houses. **NRCS should consider stockpiling/prepositioning and be ready to distribute two per household regardless of vulnerability criteria be applied. Furthermore, it came to the attention of the Evaluation team, contrary to IFRC standards of two tarpaulins per household, in areas visited households had received one tarpaulin.**

Although the overall distributed number of tarpaulins / CGI was impressive, giving tarpaulins / CGI sheets alone does not fully address the issues of gender sensitivity, dignity, cultural / caste conventions. However, numbers still seemed insufficient to permit appropriate and adequate separation by gender (to address menstrual convention among high caste and training in addition to special assistance for elderly, pregnant and disabled) and for separation into households, hygiene and appropriate toilet facilities, etc. Partitions in communal shelter allowing allocation either by HH or gender are an important option.

Masonry and Carpentry Training and Demonstration Houses

NRCS training for masons and carpenters on earthquake code construction was generally well appreciated. It was noted that some respondents indicated that seven days training was barely enough for experienced trades people and inadequate for those with no previous experience. This was offset by active onsite monitoring by NRCS technicians during construction. In some areas, only previously experienced tradespeople could undertake the training. This disadvantaged women who generally did not have previous experience. The vast majority of people trained as masons and carpenters by NRCS were male. In comparison, another active NGO in the region, Helvetas, provided fifty-day training for masons and carpenters tailored for those with no previous experience



Photo: Iain Logan, GEG



Photo: Courtesy IFRC



Photo: Gert Venghaus, GEG



Photo: Gert Venghaus, GEG

These initiatives were effective in showing earthquake code construction techniques and, although provided by a Swiss NGO and distributed by the NRCS, **Solar lighting** for the permanent shelters was also appreciated – especially by those who could not afford state electricity. As several respondents were of the opinion that NRCS should maintain them, it is important to note, that **local supplier is used to ensure some sustainability and access to spare parts, if needed.**

Dissemination and application of the Nepal earthquake building code at the village level was generally very good in the evaluated districts. NRCS shelter technicians visited regularly and provided an important conduit for shelter questions and concerns to be addressed. Demonstration houses (see above) were effective in showing earthquake code techniques.

NRCS needs to have a flexible approach to incorporating innovative techniques in shelter construction – the focus needs to be improving quality and effectiveness of the shelter. This could be achieved in situations where the respective agency (e.g. NRCS) does not have the required expertise and skills, by using external specialist NGOs or even private companies. Such approaches were, for instance, applied in other large-scale relief and recovery operations, such as Haiti or Indian Ocean Tsunami.

7.1.2. WASH (see also case study in annex)

The earthquake impact on communities had caused widespread and major destruction of water and sanitation infrastructure in villages, houses, government facilities, schools and health posts. Many water sources had been either totally destroyed or had dried up due to dislodgment of rock structures, falling water tables or landslides. Water infrastructure, such as pipes and canals had either sustained major damage or were rendered obsolete due to drying water sources. Many water points had been completely destroyed. This kind of destruction resulted in all locations visited not only to varying degrees of water shortages but also to the destruction of intricate irrigation systems, in turn leading to an adverse knock-on effect on health, farming and agricultural activities.

Sanitation infrastructure, typically constructed with dry-stone masonry, collapsed during the earthquakes and usually resulted in cracking of the ceramic toilet plates. The extreme scarcity of water also impacted sanitation as any latrines that may not have been damaged became inoperable since there was insufficient water to flush them, eventually leading to open defecation. Substantial aftershocks worsened this dire situation.

The combination of extreme water scarcity, inoperable sanitation systems, and difficulties for people maintaining good hygiene standards impacted the health of communities residing in the affected areas. The incidence of water borne diseases and health issues associated with contaminated water and poor hygiene increased markedly after earthquakes and was exacerbated by poor living conditions in temporary shelters.

According to KII and FGD respondents from the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (RCM) and from communities sampled, the WASH related needs within the disaster affected populations during the relief and recovery phases comprised:

- Having access to clean, safe water supplies;
- Having sanitation infrastructure that was adequate for individuals (incl. children), families and communities;
- Maintaining hygiene standards at a level that is conducive to good health, i.e. living in an environment free from waterborne diseases and health issues typically associated with poor personal hygiene.

Many respondents sampled also informed the Evaluation Team that adequate water supplies for livestock, kitchen gardens and cash crops were equally important to them.

Water, sanitation and hygiene is crucial to the earthquake affected communities and stakeholders involved in the response. The objectives and interventions of both, the relief and recovery phases, were highly relevant to the needs, priorities and rights of the communities affected.

The key objective of the WASH response was to achieve a sustainable reduction in risk of waterborne and WASH related diseases in targeted communities. This was to be achieved through the following interventions:

- Strengthening partnerships and coordination linkages at all (national, regional and community) levels;
- Ensuring that the target population has access to safe water from community managed water schemes by repairing damaged or constructing new water supply schemes;
- Providing the target population with improved access to sanitation by rebuilding damaged or improving existing sanitation facilities;
- Increasing hygiene awareness and practices by providing the target population with hygiene promotion activities.

The approach taken by NRCS to address WASH needs was consistent with the master plan of the GoN and aimed to ensure that all programme areas were left free of open defecation. It also aimed to be inclusive of vulnerable people and provide interventions that addressed the various needs of girls, boys, men and women.

As the relief phase transitioned to recovery, the approach taken by NRCS WASH sector adapted to another critical priority of the affected population: To have sufficient water for house construction. The availability of water for construction became an emerging issue, particularly in arid locations, such as Rampur in Ramechhap district where most water sources had dried up. **NRCS, therefore, wisely prioritised restoration and construction of new water supply schemes to ensure construction of houses could proceed, minimising delays.**

This approach by NRCS was appropriate for the recovery phase in order to maximise potential impact of concurrent interventions. It highlights the imperative of flexible programming and maintaining an integrated approach to building back communities where shelter, WASH, health and livelihoods sectors are interlinked.

Clearly, this approach and interventions taken by NRCS WASH sector was highly relevant to priority needs of target communities.

Almost 82% of all respondents regarded the operation's WASH intervention as relevant and appropriate to their real priorities, needs and rights. Across the wide range of stakeholders interviewed in the FGD and KII sessions, with some exceptions, the WASH interventions received positive to very positive overall ratings in terms of the added value of assistance provided.

☒ **However, the two areas of concern were (a) the fact in several specific sites work on restoring or establishing water supplies had not been completed despite the recovery programme coming to an end, and (b) the future sustainability of the systems and services enjoyed to date (See sustainability below).** Feedback on the draft report suggests that since April 2019 a follow-up project is being implemented to complete unmet drinking water supply schemes targeted through the earthquake recovery programme. Hong Kong Red Cross supports the reconstruction of six drinking water supply schemes in Sindhuli as part of a development programme), however, at the time of this evaluation work had not been completed.

Affected communities generally participated in the planning, design and implementation of the WASH programme in various ways (over 60%), while a disappointing 21% felt they had been totally left out of any of the planning stages.

The level of involvement obviously varied with the locally taken approach by NRCS District Chapters and GoN offices. In the many areas where communities felt fully or at least partially involved, NRCS had worked with communities to locate potential water sources that could be considered in the design for water scheme. Once the most reliable and feasible water source had been identified by engineers, a project plan was submitted to local government. After approval to utilise the water source, the project proceeded with procurement of resources and construction. Communities provided labour. Some community members received training in plumbing, welding and masonry through the IFRC/NRCS earthquake recovery programme. People with skills were paid for their services, while others provided voluntary labour.

In many, though not all, locations, community members established Water User Committees (WUC) to ensure ongoing operation and maintenance of water schemes. Committees were trained in basic maintenance and administration of funds collected from households connected to water schemes. WUCs also set the fees to be collected from households for the use of water. Most communities visited by the Evaluation Team had employed one or two community members who were appointed as caretakers to manage maintenance activities. They were generally paid a small wage for their services.

"Community participation was always strong, we could rely on entire communities to work on the construction of water schemes, women, men, everyone. If we asked people to dig deeper irrigation channels, then they did so. Community participation was one of the strongest aspects of the projects because communities were so keen to have access to nearby water."

(Former RCM technical specialist)

Community members were able to decide where toilets were built. Respondents indicated during FGDs and KIIs that toilets were built back better than before the earthquake, and that toilets were typically located where there was easier access. They were also constructed closed to water points that were child and disability accessible.

The capacity of NRCS to meet the WASH and relate needs of the affected population was clearly overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the disaster.

A diverse range of respondents from FGDs and KIIs – from NRCS NHQ level to community members – identified a broad range of challenges that had impacted both, the implementation of relief as well as the recovery WASH programming. These included:

- Scale of the disaster;
- Widely dispersed population;
- Geographic and topographic challenges;
- Seasonal weather challenges (most WASH construction could not progress during monsoon);
- Delays associated with GoN policies and continuously revised procedures;
- Scarcity of WASH construction resources;
- Capacity constraints at all organisational levels, incl. recruitment of suitable qualified WASH technical staff;
- Poor and damaged road access;
- Extremely limited time frame allocated to recovery. This is a critical challenge given the scope of outputs achieved.

Given these challenges, NRCS immediately requested support from IFRC and PNS. Both provided effective support to NRCS by filling critical capacity gaps, especially WASH technical and managerial support at NRCS NHQ and District Chapter levels.

According to several key informants, the support provided by IFRC and PNS was effective in increasing the response momentum for WASH relief and recovery.

Many KII respondents and FGDs held with NRCS and communities confirmed in many locations that a range of different options had been considered for new water scheme designs. Several informants, however, that the low-tech rain water harvesting from rooftops had neither been offered nor provided as available option.

These included gravity feed and water lifting (see annexed Case Study). Feasibility considerations included geographic location of the village in relation to water sources, costs, complexity and reliability, financing to fund maintenance and

supply costs (i.e. electricity). Respondents in communities informed the evaluation that, in most cases, the selection of water points and decisions about providing individual or communal water points involved consultation with community members. Many of the rain harvesting systems observed were makeshift constructions, built from left over hardware and improvised household items. While some areas affected would receive minimal annual rainfall, providing rain water harvesting does have its merits as an addition to other schemes, particularly in areas where there is little or no available surface water, where ground water is inaccessible, or where water schemes provide limited quantities. It had been reported³ though that rain water harvesting had been provided in some locations in Kathmandu Valley districts.

7.1.3. LIVELIHOODS (see also additional case study in annex)

Over 80% regarded the livelihoods support as completely or mostly relevant and appropriate to their needs and priorities.

This included in many areas visited a **very noticeable and often life changing increase in female participation (see livelihoods case study)**. These positive outcomes are, yet, further confirmation that the **integrated approach to support was the right way** to address not only the short- and medium-term needs of the earthquake affected communities, but to put them on a more sustainable footing with a view of increasing household income, diversifying activities and income, and putting people back in charge of their lives.

Over 50% of all beneficiaries interviewed reported significant stability or even increases in their household income. This referred to both, agricultural activities as well as animal husbandry (goats, buffalo, pigs and poultry) along with the widespread introduction and uptake of basic veterinary care and Artificial Insemination (AI) breeding, rather than the costly and uneconomic investment in breeding male animals.

Some 55% of beneficiaries felt they had been actively involved in planning this intervention, while 21.5% expressed their frustration of not having been involved at all.

The large majority of interviewees confirmed that their and their children's nutritional status has significantly improved over time.

NRCS, in coordination with District Livestock Officers, undertook to be involved in an interesting and innovative but, for most beneficiaries, a new and rather complex initiative, to participate in a **livestock insurance** programme. (*See further under Effectiveness*)

7.1.4. HEALTH

Over 75% of beneficiaries interviewed confirmed the definite relevance and appropriateness of NRCS/IFRC health interventions. While these were mostly referring to the emergency / relief phase and less so to recovery, communities were highly appreciative to the many health camps and other health provisions that had been conducted after the earthquake. Only a small number of community members – mostly those living in very remote areas – expressed their frustration to the FE that “nobody” had cared for them and they had to travel / carry their injured too far away hospitals or health posts.

Many FGD participants highlighted the trauma to their lives as a result of the earthquake: “fear and despair”, “distressed – especially children”, “shock”, “sadness”, “children having difficulties socialising”, etc.

Thanks to the **integrated approach** of linking health with safe housing, safe and accessible water, and improved household livelihood, the vast majority (over 80%) interviewees reported a significant improvement in their own and their family's health and a reduction in URTI, children's diseases, skin infections and diarrhoeal and intestinal diseases.

Improvements to providing pregnancy related issues and challenges seem to have leveraged also some identified improvements in birthing facilities where the Evaluation Teams were able to visit those facilities. **However, at times decisions seem to not reflect the actual assessed need rather than opportunistic leverage of the availability of funding.** This applies in particular to health posts that had not been damaged by the earthquake but had received additional delivery facilities (Rampur) at a time when the health post would see a maximum of 12 deliveries per annum of which 50% would be referred to the nearest hospital due to complications.

³ Nepal; Earthquake Response Operations Update January 2016 – March 2018

First aid training: Current volunteers and social mobilisers received first aid training, a useful competency for them to have during this and any future operation. However, given the robust presence in the field of these resources there may have been an opportunity to further leverage these **simple first aid techniques and skills** as a component of work site safety to be included as a module in carpenters and masons training.

7.1.5. ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES (Contingency, Planning, Cross-Cutting Issues, etc)

7.1.5.1. NRCS/RCM – Contingency Planning:

Almost 60% of KII respondents at GoN and NRCS senior level noted and considered the degree to which there had been a lack of focus on recovery / reconstruction contingency planning. **This was considered across the board as an issue that needs to be to be addressed.**

Persistent feedback from multiple GoN, RC/RC and other external interviews indicated that there has been, indeed, a clear prioritisation and focus devoted to emergency preparedness and response contingency planning. The main focus, however, had been for an earthquake in the Kathmandu Valley rather than elsewhere in the country. The consequence of this was a lack or even a total absence of a matching post-event contingency plans for the transition phase leading into to recovery and reconstruction.

7.1.5.2. NRCS/RCM – PGI:

The Evaluation Team received a lot of positive feedback on the advances made in cross-cutting opportunities during the operation. This is highlighted in the respective sections of this report, e.g. in WASH, and in the significant examples of benefits ranging from elevated awareness, understanding and application of best practices to significant social changes.

However, despite these very positive findings, the Evaluation Team received many comments in FGD and KII relating to the low number of PGI SMEs available during the emergency and reconstruction phase of the operation. It was also mentioned that those few PGI SMEs actually present had limited ability to cover the districts effectively. It is, therefore, one of the recommendations of this evaluation that more physical presence of RCM PGI SME is needed in future similar operations.

7.1.5.3. NRCS/RCM – IFRC: Coordinator versus Implementer:

Almost all RCM KII interviews (including NRCS) pointed to the fact that the dual role IFRC played in the operation, specifically the recovery/reconstruction phase, was confusing, contradictory and lacking a clear explanation and interpretation. Likewise, there were some points made that PNS often also had their own and not always coordinated agendas.

Initial feedback on the draft report explained that IFRC support was given to the three districts where PNS did not provide support despite the GoN's classification as 'prioritized districts', and that upon request by NRCS, an IFRC intervention was agreed by the partners (One Movement Recovery plan). The Evaluation Team, however, can only record the facts that evolved from interviews. Regardless of any "agreements" or "requests" made for the three districts in question, it was particularly the PNS who felt that the overall role of IFRC in this operation was ambiguous and the engagement in the three districts diverted "coordination" resources and time, contributed to a perceived less functional "team environment", and was in conflict with the IFRC primary role as coordinator, not as implementer. In a way, this difference of opinion reaffirms the perceived lack of team cohesion.


There was a general feeling that, if IFRC had operational funds and intended to implement them either themselves or with the National Society, a different implementation model was needed. As above, this is an opinion expressed primarily by the PNS interviewed. However, this is a common and recurring point elsewhere in the world in operations where PNS view IFRC to be in competition rather than just focusing on coordination. This could be an important learning point for IFRC and the dialogue with PNS. Although it is not within the scope of this evaluation, the above also needs to be considered in context of the proposed ABCD consortium initiative to avoid the recurrence of a similar situation.

As IFRC has a Status Agreement, concerns were raised during some KIIs on the liability risks if and when PNS work unilaterally, bilaterally or in some other construct (e.g. consortium). In the interest of good and collaborative operational practice, the legal aspects including liabilities and responsibilities should be clarified at the earliest possible opportunity.

7.1.5.4. NRCS/RCM – IFRC: Planning, Monitoring, Evaluating, Reporting and Information Management:

PMER-IM has been one of the key cross-cutting areas where the IFRC has provided support in terms of both, technical and financial, from the beginning of the operations until now. IFRC hired a dedicated PMER Delegate from the early stage of the operations, a fact that has contributed to further enhance the PMER-IM capacity of NRCS through a mentoring process. Practical outputs included regular, timely, and comprehensive Operations Updates (OU), Appeal Revisions and update information of social media.

7.2. Effectiveness and Timeliness



Data provided by NRCS as of April 25, 2019

7.2.1. SHELTER

A very encouraging 66.3% of interviewed beneficiaries confirmed that the Shelter component of the intervention had fully or at least partly achieved the intended outcome.

KII with NRCS and GoN indicated an absence of planning for transitional shelters for future emergencies. This would allow for better designed and suitable communal and other forms of shelter.

The three-milestone payment process for reconstruction was generally well understood and implemented.

Payments to beneficiaries were generally faster for NRCS recipients than GoN recipients (*"I built my house in 17 days, I think the fastest in our village, and I received the 300,000 all at once"*). Most persons whose destroyed houses were rebuilt in the evaluated districts had received complete payment from NRCS.

There were several positive ☒ or negative ☒ unintended results of the programme:

- ☒ **Cost of construction was generally higher than 300,000 Rupees provided by the NRCS/GoN. Additional funding was also frequently required since, due to high demand, construction and material costs increased thus reducing the value of the housing grant.**

This was, to some extent, offset by re-use of existing building materials from the demolished houses and active involvement of the beneficiary in the construction of their house (e.g. if there was a trained mason or carpenter in the family). The integration of livelihoods into the overall response also assisted with the provision of additional resources at the family level and this should be replicated for future operations. Nevertheless, the FE found a disturbingly high number of cases where families had to take out NRs 300,000 - 600,000 loans at high interest (14% > 20% depending on the source). Some respondents had to sell their few remaining livestock or lease the little land they owned or use their land as collateral for a bank loan.

- ☒ **Eventually, and with no or very limited sources of additional income to repay the loan over 5 or 10 years, these individuals could face a greater level of vulnerability and a rather uncertain future even to the level of eventually losing their house of land.**
- ☒ **The cost of rebuilding was higher for those who were not permitted to rebuild on their original land as, in many cases, it was not possible to re-use existing materials from the destroyed houses.** Although they received a special land procurement grant, it did not offset the additional cost of materials required for reconstruction.
- ☒ **The FE found a certain lack of understanding regarding the sample house designs provided by NRCS/NRA.** Many respondents thought that these designs were the only ones approved by NRA for reconstruction when in fact, the purpose was to illustrate how the earthquake code could be applied and customized. This led to some families constructing houses that do not meet their individual needs e.g. one respondent noted that the "house design did not include a kitchen – I would have preferred this". It has also led to a 'homogenization' of houses in the reconstruction areas leading to a loss of local heritage buildings. Many houses comprise two rooms (one often serves as a kitchen) and an attic area. The attic floor is insulated with bamboo and mud to provide heat barrier from the CGI sheeting roof during the day time.
- ☒ Cash payments were issued by selected banks and for beneficiaries in remote locations frequent travel to some of these banks were time-consuming, expensive and a security risk. This would not have meant a reduction of bank payments but a reduction in travel and a better and more appropriate cash flow for beneficiaries

14.5% felt that the intervention had either somewhat or insufficiently addressed their needs after the earthquake. These were invariably either those community members who had received no housing grant due to the level of damage of their house, or those individuals for whom the NRs 300,000 had been insufficient and who had to take out sizeable loans.

- ☒ **The Grant Cash component, though new to NRCS, was handled exceptionally well, and beneficiaries were full of praise.** Beneficiaries were particularly happy that the total of NRs 300,000 were handled with less bureaucracy than the GoN contribution (which was more cumbersome). Generally, very little, if any, delay in instalment payments to those entitled.

Building on this positive feedback, NRCS nonetheless needs to have a more **flexible approach to incorporating innovative techniques in shelter construction** – the focus needs to be on improving quality and effectiveness of the shelter. **The role of shelter cluster/HRRP as a repository for good practices needs to be encouraged.** The owner driven approach was deemed successful, with clear policies adhered to by NRCS and partners as well as appreciation from the communities. It should be replicated in future operations, also taking into consideration specific local contexts.

- ☒ **Carpenters' and masons' training was widely seen as a great success and a highly effective and essential intervention.** (See also above "Relevance and Appropriateness") The opportunity for women to participate in the training was mixed within the three districts. Where it was carried out it was very successful and the women felt they could and should be a part of that. Interestingly the men in those groups, including masons and

carpenters all agreed. It was more difficult in some rural areas where it was not seen as women's work – needs to be more actively encouraged in these areas.

7.2.2. WASH

RELIEF PHASE: The relief phase of the WASH programme progressed with the necessary urgency and was generally reported as having been highly effective in achieving the intended outcomes.

These outcomes comprised reducing the number of waterborne, water related and vector-borne diseases in targeted communities. The NRCS, acknowledging that responding to the scale of the disaster was well beyond its capacity, immediately requested support from IFRC, ICRC and PNS. Existing relief resources (e.g. hygiene kits, water purification tablets, water containers) at district level were distributed within three days to affected communities in some locations, while in others it was reported that *“the District Branch had mobilised staff and volunteers within hours, and they were well prepared and reached the communities quickly”*. During FGDs in Sindhuli and Ramechhap, NRCS volunteers and social mobilisers explained that they had been mobilised to affected communities within an hour of the earthquake.

“An NRCS member from the local chapter arrived on the first day to say that help was on the way, and over the next few days extra help did arrive, resources were distributed and an assessment was conducted.”
(Respondent in Ramechhap)

Most people in communities in Ramechhap and Sindhuli reported that distribution of essential resources came within the first week. In remote locations in Okhaldhunga, however, initial support was provided by GoN, while NRCS reportedly arrived after several weeks and even months.

Repairs, where possible, were made to damaged water schemes, and temporary toilets were constructed. Where water schemes could not be repaired or where access to water was too far, water was provided with trucks access permitting. In some locations, bladder tanks were reportedly provided, periodically refilled and treated. As already mentioned earlier, the distribution of dignity kits very highly valued and appreciated by women and young girls. In addition to dignity kits, pregnant women were also provided with soap, mosquito nets, etc. **However, the Evaluation Team also found that, according to respondents in focus groups, the distribution of dignity kits did not take place in all locations.** This led the Evaluation Team to the recommendation (see there) that NRCS should include such essential supplies in the standard list for emergency provisions and stockpile these supplies accordingly.

Respondents from most communities visited recalled that hygiene promotion had been very thorough with a focus on hand washing, toilet use and how to treat and store water. **Respondents also informed the Evaluation Team that NRCS branches had used a diverse range of communication for WASH related issues, i.e. community theatre / street theatre, radio and TV programmes, group meetings, and even house-to-house visits.**

While most information about the relief phase gained during the field work was very positive about outcomes achieved and activities implemented, **there were some issues concerning quality, time taken to provide WASH relief and the reach of services to beneficiaries:**

“Initially it was not possible to achieve SPHERE standards because of the content, urgency of relief, we were basically getting essential services to those in desperate needs as best as we could with the available capacities.”
(Key Informants of RCM)

“During the relief phase, we often did not focus on vulnerable groups because the risks were often the same for everyone, eg. if diarrhoeal diseases develop, they put everyone's health at risk, so we had to use a blanket approach delivering temporary latrines.”
(Key Informants of RCM)

Respondents from a small number of FGD discussions informed the Evaluation Teams of some relief programme issues. **In both, Okhaldhunga and Ramechhap, several communities reported that WASH and other initial essential support took more than a week and even several months.** While most rapid assessments had been carried out within the first week after the earthquake, a small number of respondents reported that assessments had occurred only after 10 days to one month after the disaster.

RECOVERY PHASE: During the recovery phase, WASH interventions were implemented very successfully with communities, GoN, health services, schools and RCM generally being complementary and proud of achievements made.

The programme intended output was to achieve sustainable reduction of the risk of waterborne and WASH related diseases in targeted communities. Evidence gained during this evaluation indicates that this was achieved in most communities visited. Communities linked the reduction of water borne diseases directly to:

- The repair or construction of water schemes thus providing clean water;
- The repair of damaged agricultural irrigation schemes;
- The construction of toilets at houses and schools, and the subsequent elimination of diarrhoeal diseases;
- Hygiene promotion, particularly hand washing.

A WASH technical package was developed by the ERO to provide technical guidance at all WASH projects developed or built. This allowed a standard to be complied with and aimed to establish consistency with construction quality. It consisted of a WATER master plan and a SANITATION master plan. **The package detailed cross-cutting topics relevant to the WASH context, including gender, disability, climate change adaptation, and environment.** The package was shared with all disaster affected NRCS chapters, and NRCS WASH staff interviewed during the field component of this evaluation confirmed that they had applied the package to their projects.

Communities visited require consistent household water supply to maintain good hygiene and sanitation. This includes the use of pour / flush toilets and frequent use of showers. During several FGD, respondents mentioned that many people did have flush toilets prior to the earthquake but they were not used due to the scarcity of water. Now, however, toilets are used again as water is available in sufficient quantities. The combination of water supply, construction of toilets with every new house built, and hygiene promotion, has virtually eliminated diarrhoeal diseases in most communities visited.

In most communities, women, men, and children previously had to make arduous, and at times, dangerous trips to retrieve water. This would easily take up to 3.5 hours in some villages. With the construction of new water schemes, water is now available at or very close to peoples' houses. Handwashing stations have been constructed closed to toilet facilities. These typically have two or even three different height levels for taps, designed to suit adults, children and people with disabilities. Most water points also display a good quality ceramic tile with symbols and pictograms to promote good hygiene practices, e.g. safe water handling, hand washing, etc.



Water supply schemes constructed in most communities were “built back better” or provided equivalent quantities and quality as before.

Schools visited have been provided with both, upgraded toilet facilities and water points. The new school toilets also provide easy wheelchair access and wall supports to aid people with disabilities. Toilets are gender segregated and child friendly. Female toilets at high schools included disposal of sanitary pads by way of incineration. Toilets and urinals seen had differing heights so as to accommodate smaller children. Similar to water points in villages, those in schools enable easy access for children, adults and people with disabilities.

Waste disposal bins installed by NRCS were observed by the Evaluation Teams at most villages and schools, and many community members remarked on the improved cleanliness in their village. Bins installed provide sorting of waste into biodegradable, non-biodegradable, and glass material. Signs / pictograms accompany the bins promoting their proper use.

“Unlike the relief phase, the recovery phase allowed us more time to address people who were most vulnerable We did prioritize building of latrines to those in greatest need, including the very poor, the elderly, single mothers, and people with disabilities.”
(Key Informant at NRCS NHQ)

Generally, as shown above, the WASH interventions receive high praise, particularly in areas where NRCS has succeeded in establishing even more water points than initially planned. The Evaluation Team was also able to confirm that those water points that had been established on private land had public access for everyone. In virtually all areas, community members reported a significant improvement of general health, a reduction of intestinal / diarrhoeal illnesses and of skin infections among children.

In areas where the WASH component also included **repair of irrigation** the praise was highest as this had an enormously positive effect not only on the availability of much needed water for cultivation, but also on livestock rearing, additional agricultural activity and cultivation resulting to greater income generation and better nutrition, and last but not least, to re-establishing walkways across repaired irrigation canals to neighbouring villages.

Things that could have been improved:

There were several areas where intended outcomes were not achieved as well as intended. According to both, NRCS staff and community respondents, several communities did not receive support for water scheme development or repair.

63.1% of beneficiaries interviewed regarded the interventions as having fully, partly or somewhat achieved the intended outcomes – these people are extremely happy with the work of NRCS. **Having said that, some 18% remained unhappy with the outcome as – at the end of the operation – there was either still a lot of unfinished work or in some locations the intervention hadn't even started. There were also several community members who referred to promises that had been made but not fulfilled. Such criticism related exclusively to specific water provision of individual families or smaller communities. There were several reasons for this:**

- One community in Ramechhap had been provided with the option of having a road improved or having a water supply scheme repaired. The community was in dispute regarding which option to select. In the end road improvement was chosen and NRCS did not proceed with the water scheme repair.
- In other cases, the time allowed for the recovery intervention was too short. Such protracted work would frequently be caused by limited availability of construction material or by protracted and cumbersome procurement processes.

Following exhaustive KIIs and FGDs, it became apparent to the Evaluation Team that there was quite some variance in successful completion of water supply schemes between locations. Implementation of water schemes in Okhaldhunga province and Rampur municipality were more problematic than in other locations.

☒ **Project quality issues related to the cross-cutting subject of PGI were observed in some communities and raised by several FGDs in different locations. Some of these issues are discussed later under “Impact”.** Several NRCS informants confirmed that they had never received training on PGI or GESI. Even some senior NRCS staff were unable to answer very basic questions about PGI, **which suggests that they, too, have not received specific PGI training.**

There were several positive ☑ or negative ☒ unintended results of the programme:

- ☑ During KIIs with senior NRCS staff in Okhaldhunga it was revealed that **children participating in school WASH act as peers to their parents and bring new knowledge into their own family home.** This is an effective communication channel that should be utilized and encouraged with hygiene promotion programming in any future disaster or DRR trainings.
- ☑ **Several women stated that they had witnessed a significant change in their community in terms of how people think about menstruation.** While this is obviously also an issue of caste, it was, before the earthquake operation, not possible for women to sleep in their beds during menstruation. They were sent outside instead. However, now after the earthquake operation, they have started questioning these beliefs. They feel they are not right, and an increasing number of women have been speaking up. Some women stay in their own beds now, and men feel more at ease talking and hearing about menstruation issues. Women also stated that they can now ask for help if their menstruation is painful and they require medication.
- ☑ The affected communities who received water supply schemes were overwhelmingly positive and all indicated that the amount of time and efforts saved was significant. During FGDs in Sindhuli, women reported that – previously – they needed to walk at least 1 ½ hours to retrieve water. **Now they have water points next to their home. This frees up time which they use for tending kitchen and cash crop production, selling produce at the market and time to socialise and relax.**
- ☑ During several KIIs with GoN health post staff, respondents spoke very positively about the collaboration between NRCS and their health facility. While dependency of GoN on NRCS and vice versa can be a potential issue and of serious concern, there are most certainly benefits in mutual collaboration.

*“Before the earthquake, our relationship was not very strong. After the earthquake, we collaborate on many things, we communicate better, both organisations seem to be more capable to deliver their services. We now meet on a monthly basis to discuss work and needs of communities”.
(Health worker, Rampur)*

- ☑ In several instances, the reconstruction of water supply schemes has subsequently resulted in the reconstruction of other damaged community infrastructure. In Harkapur, an irrigation canal had been damaged by a landslide and rendered inoperative for almost a year resulting in once fertile and productive land being left barren. After reconstruction of 35 meters of water channel was completed, over 1,000 ropani (= 50+ hectares) land could, once again, be agriculturally used, providing cash crops for several neighbouring communities. In addition, the repaired channel also restored an important walkway between two villages.



- ☒ While beneficiaries who were provided access to new water sources were extremely positive about the benefits, beneficiaries of **water schemes that attracted an electricity fee or maintenance charge were somewhat subdued with their enthusiasm** as they now had to generate additional funds to pay for these. **Financial poverty is already widespread in the earthquake affected areas and these charges further exacerbated the situation of many families, particularly those who had to take out loans for house construction. The combined financial burden considerably increased their vulnerability.** In Sindhuli, the Evaluation Team was informed that NRCS had, indeed, advocated with local government some mitigating initiatives, however, the team was unable to verify that any such initiatives had already taken hold. In Okhaldhunga, no such evidence was found, while in Ramechhap local government had shared some electricity support in several locations.

From the WASH perspective, the disaster preparedness of NRCS has increased substantially. This was also confirmed by KIIs and FGDs at NHQ and at district level.

The knowledge and skills acquired by the experience of working through the disaster was a common response to the question of disaster preparedness capacity.

In several instances NRCS' relationship with communities was strengthened and subsequently recruitment of large numbers of volunteers would be a relatively easy task.

District branch staff confirmed that their knowledge and understanding of the communities had increased, particularly in terms of environmental and social contexts. Some also mentioned that their relation with external agencies had been strengthened, especially with GoN health services and District Water and Sewerage Services (DWSS) which, in turn, will help coordination of disaster responses in the future.

7.2.3. LIVELIHOODS

Nearly 80% of interviewed beneficiaries confirmed that the programme had achieved the intended outcomes and fulfilled their expectations. Gardens and livestock management skills had improved considerably especially in areas benefitting from irrigation improvement schemes. However, the FE observed during FGD visits some evidence in villages, even those very close to each other, that there are noticeable, but not fully explained reasons not completely linked to technical reasons, why **one group are very successful in growing fruit and vegetables or raising animals while others struggle more.** Coordinated and mentored skill and knowledge cross fertilisation between groups and engagement between villages could introduce peer learning exchange and benefits as well as bonding different skills sets and developing mutual aid between neighbours.

- **Agriculture / Horticulture training:** Included appreciated knowledge and skill transfer in **tunnels cultivation, mushroom and vegetable farming** that were most useful for households with good access to water e.g. where there is an irrigation component in the NRCS operation. Future similar support operation could benefit from **more targeted assistance for farmers or customization.**

- **Animal husbandry** (e.g. **goats**). This was most useful in areas where access to water and irrigation is difficult. The design and funding for **Goat shelters** was a good initiative but could have benefitted from more focus in the training modules on how to utilise these better especially as there were frequent mentions of animal deaths during the colder winter months. **Animal insurance** – pro/cons: Whilst the scheme was well intentioned, it lacked sufficient awareness training in the “small print” common to all insurance plans. This resulted in confusion where there were many cases of claims being denied for reasons covered in the policy but not well understood by the beneficiary. **A more in-depth training on this aspect along with those mentioned above of livestock management in this would have benefitted the roll out of the scheme and should be considered in future similar interventions. If a product is being offered by the RCM, then its implementation and consequences should be considered beforehand.**

7.2.4. HEALTH

Almost 80% regarded the health provisions very highly and were of the opinion that they had achieved what they were intended for.

Combined with the frequently quoted benefits achieved by WASH and Livelihoods interventions, health activities not only resulted in the urgent treatment of injuries, but also in improving the general health of the community, reducing diarrhoeal and skin diseases, and serving as a definite proof that an **integrated approach to disaster management** is the most promising and successful one.

7.3. Impact

7.3.1. SHELTER

Some 71.5% felt that the intervention had reached and had a positive impact on the most vulnerable members of the community, the very young, the elderly or people with disabilities. FGD respondents generally felt safer in their newly constructed houses. In some locations, KII indicate that the population are now in a better situation compared to the situation before earthquake. Better services and infrastructure, specifically WASH, health and shelter.

The ‘owner driven’ approach to housing reconstruction was appropriate for Nepal and appreciated by the affected communities. It should be replicated for future operations. That said, an urban housing strategy should be considered to anticipate how to manage affected families living in one dwelling, renters and landless people. **If not already done so, since the disbanding of the ERO, it is recommended that NRCS appoint a focal point within the organization for shelter issues. The shelter focal point can compile lessons learned, enhance linkages with NRA, GMALI, MoHA, provide training for volunteers and staff on shelter operations, develop SOPs and operational guidance and strategy documents based on such SoPs and best practices.** An adequately skilled and experienced person could also play a pivotal part in the future training of NDRTs and emergency response personnel.

The FE noted a higher level of satisfaction and lesser complaints among the members of lower castes while high caste members often expressed a higher level of expectation and dissatisfaction. **9.3% were of the opinion that there had been no special provisions for the elderly, most vulnerable or people with disabilities although there were reports that elderly had received 50,000 Rupees assistance from GoN.** In addition, some FGD noted that training was provided for those with disabilities and that masons in some areas prioritized reconstruction of houses according to level of vulnerability.

There were a number of KII interviewees, who, whilst acknowledging the overall positive impact of the shelter programme, questioned whether there should/could have been a greater focus on more technical training and capacity building support on standards and monitoring versus actual construction activities.

There is a strong correlation between the completion of shelter reconstruction and the psychological recovery of the population. As most people experienced anxiety and fear after the EQ, it would be beneficial to include training and materials for psycho-social support as part of DDRT training. Can include simple items such as games and toys for infants to allow them to recover faster.

7.3.2. WASH

Health issues and diseases caused by poor water quality and poor hygiene had much improved since WASH relief and recovery interventions had been implemented.

"People used to obtain water from a spring. This presented a health risk as it was untreated water and led to an increase in diarrhoeal diseases we had to treat after the earthquake. Now, with the triple lifting water scheme, people are provided with clean drinking water. This has led to a noticeable and rapid decrease in such related diarrhoeal and skin diseases and we are seeing far fewer patients here at the health post after the water scheme had been completed."

(Senior health worker, Rampur)

"The NRCS recovery programme has affected communities in a very positive manner. There is much greater awareness of health risks associated with poor hygiene practices. There is also improved waste disposal including incineration of sanitary pads, and there is now safe drinking water in communities. These activities have resulted in much improved health outcomes for earthquake affected communities, especially with reducing cases of diarrhoea and skin infections."

(Senior health worker, Sindhuli)

Almost 60% of all respondents confirmed a noticeable positive impact on specific vulnerable groups, particularly the elderly, people with disabilities and the children. This had been achieved not only by setting a large number of water points and water storage tanks within the various communities, but also by a uniquely ingenious design of the water points:

- Each water point comprises a high tap (for use by adults, younger and able-bodied people),
- A lower tap (for people with disabilities, for the elderly and for children, and
- A durable ceramic tile picturing a simple demonstration of how to treat and store water safely.



Behavioural changes in hygiene habits have reportedly occurred in all communities since WASH interventions were implemented post-earthquake.

Knowledge, attitude and practice studies (KAP) were conducted previously, however, time limitations did not allow this FE to undertake an endline study to provide proof beyond anecdotal and interview evidence. What did become very obvious was the deep knowledge acquired by virtually every member of FGDs at village level, and particularly the women and children were able to recite the hand-washing instructions and demonstrate how they put them into practice.

NRCS has achieved significant gains in improving sanitation standards in communities where it had implemented WASH relief and recovery operations.

As stated earlier, there is also a much greater utilisation of toilets and in the locations visited no more open defecation was reported or observed. Toilet management at all sites visited, including homes and schools, was well managed. All locations visited were free from open defecation – a fact which complies with GoN guidance for recovery operations in ensuring that VDCs where response operations were implemented were free of open defecation by the end of the intervention.

Most responses were also very positive on the environmental impact of the recovery programme. In addition to better sanitation, many villages were now better able to manage waste disposal due to the use of waste bins.

Most villages visited had started fitting public waste bin in their communities and their sorted (bio-degradable and non-bio-degradable) waste was disposed of by means of regular incineration.

Communities were also growing more plants because they now have sufficient water to grow or expand their kitchen gardens.

Evidence on the evaluation generally indicates that good attention was paid to prioritising vulnerable groups, e.g. women, children and young people, the elderly, people with disabilities, and people from different castes / ethnic groups and communities.

The most positive impact for vulnerable groups has been the provision and subsequent utilisation of proper toilet facilities and the provision of clean, safe drinking water in schools and communities. The needs of children were accommodated by different heights of toilets and water points. Gender segregated toilets provide for male and female children in schools. Toilet construction was often prioritised for community members who were most vulnerable, i.e. the elderly and people with disabilities. **NRCS had reportedly been advocating to relevant authorities for reduced water and power charges for vulnerable households.**

☒ The Evaluation Team did interview a blind community member in Harkapur who confirmed that NRCS provided him after the earthquake with a new toilet, hand-washing training and soap. However, as this blind man has to retrieve every day water from a source 1 km away from his house, he really would have appreciated assistance to access water more easily.

☒ Several women in various locations stated that water points used for washing should provide some form of screening. They felt quite uncomfortable using these water points, and quite a number washed in the toilet shed, instead.

The WASH programming has been highly successful in integrating with other sectors throughout the relief and recovery phases. There were also noticeable economic outcomes that are attributable to WASH (see also Livelihoods Case Study in annex).

While shelter was a high priority in earthquake affected areas, housing construction could not be achieved without sufficient water. This presented a challenge in particularly arid areas. **NRCS had to address a challenging combination of logistic difficulties and water scarcity in order to expedite any type of construction. In some areas, NRCS WASH sector managed to have water trucked up to remote locations on mountain ridges so that construction could commence.** Economic and social effects were particularly noticeable where irrigation schemes had been repaired and water was sufficient once again to undertake agricultural activities or recommence livestock rearing. Another area of positive economic change was the vocational training in masonry. In one location, a masonry trained individual had become a NRCS volunteer and had recruited 14 others from within his village.

Sectoral linkages and integration were also strong between health and with livelihoods, where all gained from the provision of water. These examples highlight and reinforce the inherent value of the integrated approach (4+1) of building back more resilient communities where shelter, WASH, health and livelihoods are interdependent.

Nearly 70% of beneficiaries interviewed were of the opinion that the intervention also catered for and addressed specific needs of the elderly, the younger generation, people with disabilities and particularly vulnerable single households.

A small percentage of 4.8% felt that more focus should have been given to people with disabilities – in some villages this particularly referred to blind villagers and among these more specifically to those without relatives.

7.3.3. HEALTH

- The change in access to and knowledge through NRCS training of women and children health habits was manifested in observations of the **use of toilets hand-washing facility use** linking with the increased and active **presence of women in health, agriculture and livestock projects**
- Most FGDs reported that there was a **decrease in water borne illnesses** after NRCS training and DWS assistance. It was noted that there was a close relationship between improved access to drinking water and health awareness training and a significant improvement in health indicators. However, as most people experienced anxiety and fear after the earthquake it would be beneficial **to include training and materials for psycho-social support as part of DDRT training. Such training material is widely available through the IFRC from the Psychological Resource Centre.** This could include simple items such as games and toys for infants to allow them to recover faster.

7.4. Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness

SHELTER: There was an acknowledged lack of understanding of transitional housing planning.

This was confirmed by a number of GoN departments' KII under the NRA structure at both capital and District and Municipality levels. Individuals candidly admitted there was an unbalanced focus on an emergency and relief contingency planning mindset based on a catastrophic event in the Kathmandu Valley and not necessarily elsewhere in the country. This distracted from any focus on contingency for the recovery and reconstruction phase and was later somewhat corrected via the provision of an emergency shelter grant.

While emergency shelter solutions were clear: tarpaulins, plastic sheeting tents etc. Eventually, the reconstruction policy was an interim solution bridging the two. The time line was a problem. This derived from a very clear statement from the NRA HQ supported by KII in the field that the GoN had no clear understanding of and certainly no policy or planning for Transitional Housing, i.e. a solution that would have first accepted that full reconstruction would take five to eight years and not the two years the GoN at the time was advocating. It also seems there was no coordinated initiatives by the RCM to address this question or to assess and use the lessons learnt from the transitional challenges in other large-scale disasters, such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami and Haiti.

SHELTER: A single assessment protocol would have been more easily and fairly managed.

In many interviews with KII informants from both RC and GoN the suggestion recurred that a single assessment protocol would have been more easily and fairly managed. **Equally there was significant feedback in particular from a range of KII interviewees, as to whether the RCM approach could have been more effective and wide ranging, if the focus had been less on actual reconstruction and more on technical support, capacity building and training of the local population of earthquake-resistant standards.** However, the pressure to implement and programming the funding may have driven the final decision to include support for shelter construction. It can be noted that the Movement as a whole has provided housing reconstruction support for approximately 7,000 households. This represents around 1% of the total planned housing support to affected households across Nepal.

SHELTER: The question whether the RCM approach could have been more effective if it had been less focused on reconstruction and more on technical support, capacity building and training is hypothetical and cannot be answered by this evaluation. It should, however, be carefully considered in future similar operations.

It is not clear how many beneficiaries were aware of low interest government loans for reconstruction – especially as this program did not appear to be widely disseminated. **It is recommended that NRCS investigate the government loan program and, if feasible, provide training to local RC volunteers and staff at the district level on options to beneficiaries of how to transfer from high interest to low interest loans.**

Recovery takes time – even for highly developed countries such as the United States (e.g. Hurricane Katrina). Longer time frames for shelter reconstruction (e.g. 3-4 years) would allow more time for households to find alternative ways to pay for reconstruction, reduce pressure on material and labour costs and reduce the need for loans. It would also allow more time to downsize operations and ease expectations from the communities and local government regarding RC support. **It is recommended that NRCS work with NRA/GoN to develop long term recovery planning with realistic time frames.**

WASH: Respondents in KIIs at NHQ and District Branch levels were unanimous and consistent in stating that delays associated with decision-making in logistics and procurement adversely impacted on the rate of construction of water schemes and sanitation facilities. This was further aggravated by a tedious and complex bidding process, sometimes with up to 28 bidding vendors.

The process of securing project resources could take anywhere between 30 to 60 days, then delivery of resources would take another 30 days – a total of 90 days is simply unacceptable even in the relief phase of an emergency operation.

Adding to this complexity was the fact that, of all recovery programme areas, WASH was the most demanding with 183 item lines. **This cascading of ever-increasing delays starting from the decision-making process at NRCS NHQ to the final receipt of necessary construction material resulted in very slow progress at community level.**

WASH: Cost-effectiveness in humanitarian operations is always difficult to ascertain. Good plans were made, but as a Red Cross Movement, the various components did not always function well in terms of harmonised approaches or putting agreed plans into practice.

A human resource (HR) plan was developed at NRCS NHQ a few months (!) after the earthquake. It was established to facilitate the organised management of PNS, IFRC and NRCS staff. I also aimed to provide a balance of staff and to help ensure that PNS would not function as independent entities or setting up separate structures or parallel processes. Operationally, it prescribed that WASH teams would consist of one PNS technical delegate, one IFRC member, and one NRCS member. Senior IFRC WASH staff confirmed that whilst this was a good plan of action, and although the plan had been implemented and communicated with partners, **some PNS still chose to operate autonomously, using their own staff, presumably pressured by donor agencies to “deliver projects” quickly.**

Additional HR challenges existed during the relief and recovery phases: While hiring good and experienced WAS staff was challenging and while many highly qualified engineers were available in Nepal, very few of them had sufficient and up-to-date WASH experience / knowledge. This meant that time and resources had to be invested in training these recruits before they could be used in the field.

NRCS / RCM: The evaluation identified a certain lack of transparency and sharing of funding levels and balances across all RCM partners.

While it is perfectly standard and accepted practice for PNS and IFRC to part-fund overheads from generated financial resources, it seems ironical that, while partners insist on NRCS being more financially transparent, they themselves do not release funding information to NRCS.

Financial Statement (see also annexed Financial Report for details)			
Total Funds Received	Value of MoU signed with NRCS	Transferred to NRCS (as of April 16, 2019)	Remaining balance against MoU (as of April 16, 2019)
CHF 56,137,989.00	CHF 28,865,280.85	CHF 25,628,735.71	CHF 3,236,545,14

(Source: IFRC KTM and IFRC Emergency Appeal Financial Report May 10, 2019 – Annex 10)

The Evaluation Team limited the financial information to the above appeal budget, as several PNS representatives could not be reached and it was felt that it would have been unfair to only declare financial statements of a few selected PNS. Furthermore, it was not within the scope of this Final Evaluation to determine the reasons why each and every PNS had not declared their respective individual left-over funds. This should be the task of IFRC rather than a small Evaluation Team working within a limited time frame.

NRCS / RCM: The ERO platform was generally regarded as having a real potential for future major operations provided more planning and thought is given to related issues and necessary changes within the NRCS administration, management and governance.

Almost 70% of KIIs respondents confirmed that the ERO Platform:

- Had a real potential for future large operations;
- Its efficiency and effectiveness, however, was to a greater or lesser extent limited in the earthquake operation due to the fact that ERO was “built on the run” lacking sufficient planning and concept, such as SoPs and essential standard protocols;
- Delegation of Authority (DoA) was insufficiently incorporated, thus hampering timely and creative decisions and decision-making.
- The recent response to the Flash Flooding during the GFE demonstrated the ongoing need to address the basic concept design.
- Most KII respondents felt **a focused analysis would be worth investing in on how to better set up an “ERO-like structure” for future operations. This, however, would need to be a process rather than a product or parallel structure.**

7.5. Sustainability

GENERAL: One recurring feedback from most FDG and many KII interviews was varying level of concerns around overall post- earthquake operation programme ongoing sustainability, and across all of the “4 +1” sectors. Findings on sustainability are drawn from the FE covering operations sectoral project issues as well as internal RCM / NRC / GoN institutional sustainability factors. The latter findings are captured and addressed in more detail in other sections of the report, specifically 7.7-7.10 below. Financial, HR capacity and sustainability were repeated frequently, this to maintain and develop the viability of many excellent projects in Shelter, WASH, Health, and Livelihoods.

Having said that, it was positive to note many villages and committees have taken steps themselves, outside any planned format, to establish small contingency and saving funds for ongoing maintenance repairs restocking and other ongoing expenses.

SHELTER: It may be useful in future operations to allow more than two years to complete houses.

Newly constructed shelters are generally more robust and better built than pre-disaster shelters. With regards to shelter access, this has created more resilient communities in case of future emergencies.

NRCS training for masons and carpenters had strong linkages with the provision of additional livelihood support for the affected communities and local dissemination of the importance of strong foundations and strapping. FGD respondents noted that many masons now had much better engineering-based skills and techniques that they can use to maintain existing houses and access further work. Not providing an effective training for those without previous experience was a lost opportunity to increase the number of women trained in this field.

The shelter program, using cash grants, stimulated local economies and supply chains – factors that are likely to have a significant degree of economic sustainability in the communities. The NRCS shelter program has created an experienced group of shelter technicians who can be called upon quickly to assist in the event of another disaster.

It is recommended to allow at least 5-6 years (experience in most countries shows that it takes up to 12 years to fully recover). This would allow more time for households to find alternative ways to pay for reconstruction, reduce pressure on material and labour costs and reduce need for loans. It would also allow more time to downsize and properly operations thus easing expectations from the communities and local government regarding RC support.

WASH: A WASH Transition Plan exists, however, the document seen by the Evaluation Team, though providing a clear pathway for responsibilities and capacities of the WASH component of the recovery programme to be transitioned into NRCS normal operational structure, neither seems to have been ratified or approved. Interviews with NRCS staff, particularly at branch level, regarding transitioning the WASH programming from “recovery to development” provided inconsistent and scant information and led the Evaluation Team to conclude that there existed very little appreciation of this challenge within NRCS branches. This could either indicate that no concise plans existed for the actual implementation of actions and processes or that staff at NRCS branches visited did not verbalise these interventions when being interviewed.

- FGD respondents from many communities informed the evaluation **that insufficient technical skills development was provided to community members to adequately maintain infrastructure associated with water lifting schemes.** Whilst basic maintenance training had been provided, preventative maintenance on pumps and repairs to electrical components was not. Consequently, as the infrastructure ages, maintenance costs may increase concurrently given that contractors would be needed to repair pump and electrical failures. Many of these issues could be addressed by using engineers, (preferably those who were involved with establishing the scheme/s) to review the water source, capacity to supply & usage patterns. Allocation of lump sum payments to Water User Committees, from unspent EQ funds, would mitigate to some extent future exhaustion of maintenance funds due to high cost budget items failing, e.g. pump. This is, however, a double-sided sword: Lump sum allocation would provide some time buffer against significant costs until a time when the community can manage to contribute to a sustainable fund to manage future expense when they occur. It may also create some expectations, but so does any activity. Instead, a possible solution could to be if emergency operations were to consider cost as a factor before introducing certain technologies which may be too expensive for communities to maintain, especially after the exit/completion of the operation.
- Although management mentioned in the feedback to the initial draft of the report that, according to NRCS WASH policy/procedure, an operation and maintenance fund was created in the beginning of the construction of DWSS in

participation with and contribution by community, the Evaluation Team was not aware of that specific policy point mentioned. Such funds were created for most WSS but not all. Allocation of **lump sum payments to WUC from unspent funds should be interpreted as either establishment of a fund, if there was none created or as a top up.**

NRCS / RCM – HR: NRCS staff and volunteer retention:

HR issues emerged as a challenge from almost 80% of the KII interviews. The GoN offices were affected in much the same way, but more so than the NRCS. Particular emphasis / concerns focused on the following components of this challenge:

- **NRCS NHQ/Central:**
 - Loss of staff to competition from RCM as many of them paid higher or at least competitive salaries
 - Loss of staff to competition from UN/GoN and other agencies as these paid higher salaries
 - More of a problem during the recovery/reconstruction phase, compensated partially by a good initial return of former NRC staff during emergency phase
- **NRCS District:**
 - Retention of volunteers and staff.
 - In general, NRCS has very good standing in the district communities and from the good work done the community sees what NRCS **CAN** do.
 - Though it has raised expectations within community, NRCS could cash in on this by **starting to develop a stronger volunteer base among communities that have benefitted from the EQ response.**
 - These volunteers could become “permanent” social mobilizers and with support an extra asset for NRCS.
 - **This could lead to a stronger preparedness level and sustainability:** These volunteers would be “NRCS agents” in the community, could establish community profiles and identify most vulnerables **BEFORE** a disaster strikes, thus enhancing “**feedback mechanisms**” and Preparedness.
 - Together with more decentralized DRR / DM and DPP, DoA and hardware would turn NRCS into a trusted and capable partner for the GoN, **but with more clearly defined mandates and without jeopardizing the Fundamental Principals of the RCM “Independence” and “Impartiality”.**
- **NRCS ERO:**
 - Hiring and retentions challenges. Loss of ERO institutional operations knowledge and competencies
- **NRCS/RCM HR:** Feedback from a number of KII indicated a need to establish an NRCS professional HR department with the ability and mandate to address the following:
 - Best practice competency-based selection and recruitment;
 - The competition and duplication or gaps in RCM HR;
 - PNS over-staffing issues they are focused on “getting delegate number up/getting people IN”;
 - Some PNS had larger departments (e.g. communications) than NRCS;
 - Address above competition and remuneration differences among RCM partners.
- **NRCS Branding:** About 50 % of KII across the RCM indicated there was an opportunity given the overall positive outcomes for the RCM from the earthquake operation and the GoN relationship for the NRCS, to significantly leverage the moment to rebrand itself to be better” fit-for-purpose” going forward. Among the recommendations and suggestions were:
 - Great opportunity to finally drive for a Red Cross Law. Over 60% of KII mentioned this.
 - Needs to consider a meaningful restructuring to address the GoN/NRCS move to localisation and decentralization of some DoA and capacity enhancement.
 - Address awareness of DoA expectations and capacity training to match the moves.
 - Coordinate with GoN initiatives.
 - Define and focus on what the NRCS DOES and what it should NOT DO.
 - Strengthen social mobilisers who did a very good job by all accounts in most areas.
 - Limit at any given time RCM geographical commitments.
 - Address and limit GoN vs Beneficiary and community expectations in line with above and respects the real NRCS capacity going forward.

- **NRCS/GoN Relations:** Major issues of sustainability for any of the successful ERO projects revolve around the **complex relationship between GoN and NRCS and then the affected communities.**

On one hand, there is mutual trust and respect. GoN and communities were candid at all levels we interviewed that RC was far quicker, better trained and effective than GoN, and that they could not cope without NRCS, but expectations are almost unreasonably high from those groups. On GoN side they are heavily dependent on NRCS to implement and even lead many GoN DM and reconstruction projects.

On the NRCS side, there exists the risk of over-extended capacity, skills, training and resources and volunteer surge. The communities expect both to deliver services effectively. But this largely positive relationship is not limitless and **the risk is these three diverging expectations can create challenges to be factored in on planning and commitments** (See NRCS Rebranding below).

7.6. Inclusivity and Participation

Partial or full beneficiary participation in the planning and implementation of IFRC/NRCS activities ranged between 54.8% in WASH and Livelihoods to 57.7% in Shelter, while 21.5% - 22.5% of community members felt that their input had not been sought and local community wisdom had not been given the rightful importance in the planning process. The latter can be partly attributed to the fact that identification and planning for the major component (Shelter) had been done by NRA and was outside the RCM responsibility.

With regard to the FE, the age distribution among beneficiary respondents was:

- Age > 16 years-	1.6%
- Age 17-45 years	- 43.6%
- Age 46-65 years	- 32.5%
- Age 65> years	- 22.3%

The relatively low number of young people can be attributed to (a) children being at school and (b) teenagers and young adults having moved away in search of work.

However, there was a notable exception in the field of masonry training where women seemed to have been left out from training in many of the visited locations. This is, in a way, curious, as (a) women are frequently seen carrying out extremely hard work (e.g. carrying heavy loads from childhood, splitting rocks and stones in road construction work), and (b) the male masons interviewed showed no obvious objections to women being trained as masons. It, therefore, appears to have been a matter of selection, in which case further investigation into selection criteria at district level might be useful and indicated.

Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGI) was an important cross-cutting element in the earthquake operation. It was, however surprising for the evaluation team to see that this important section had not even been budgeted for in the Emergency Appeal.

The evaluation teams observed many very positive examples on Protection, Gender and Inclusion and received very good feedback from both, FGDs and KIIs on the advances made in this cross-cutting opportunity within all phases of the operation. **Significant examples are noted within the narrative of this report, as are their wide-reaching benefits from elevated awareness, understanding and application of best practice, to actually bringing about considerable social changes in communities.** In general, the FE was able to identify in most location that women had developed a much stronger self-awareness and self-confidence, and were in a better condition to take control over their own lives. **In one location, women reported that they had successfully prevented several attempted child marriages within their village.**

Despite the obvious fact that the IFRC delegation may have been insufficiently resourced or simply that distances and logistics for staffing of PGI were constrained, the outcomes are very promising, indeed. **It would, however, appear that a greater physical presence of RCM PGI SMEs in the field both, as trainers and programme advisors, would have been welcomed and highly desirable. This, however, would necessitate that PGI activities are at least budgeted for !**

7.7. Red Cross Movement Learning and National Society Capacity Building

Contingency Planning: Almost 60% of KII interviews at GoN/NRCS/RCM senior level noted the degree to which there has been a lack of attention to recovery / reconstruction contingency planning as opposed to that devoted to relief. An overly focused, almost obsessive lens, has been on emergency response contingency planning and more particularly for an event in the Kathmandu Valley and the capital itself. It was widely agreed and considered to be an issue to be addressed as a priority.

Red Cross Movement (RCM):

IFRC as Movement Coordinator vs Implementer: In almost all RCM KII interviews, feedback mentioned that the coordination role IFRC played in the relief phase of the operation and the deployment of the FACT, ERU and RDRT teams to support the NRCS operation was highly appropriate, most effective and impactful and displayed the "power and strength of a regional and global network". This was seen as less successful during the recovery / reconstruction phase where the function of coordinator was viewed to be at odds with the considerable implementing role the IFRC took. This was variously described as confusing, contradictory and lacking clear explanation and interpretation. PNS felt the Movement never quite managed to achieve the management balance that would have been possible; the unclear dual IFRC role may have contributed to that.

The IFRC participation in the "4+1" and its support function to the host NS (if it was in fact needed and accepted) is clear and unquestioned. The point that was raised PNS was the concern expressed by all the PNS interviewed, and reflected in the MTR report as well, around the specific dual role the IFRC played and the perception of its capacity and resourcing constraints to deliver on both roles that were questioned. The Evaluation Team have no particular position on this and accept that there is a case for the IFRC to do both. The finding, however, is that because of the observations from the PNS some alternative modality, agreement or solution as to exactly how the dual coordinator /implementer role functions and resources clearly requires revisiting. This is not a new situation and has been evident on most major operations for years.

Equally, it evolved that some partners often also had their own individual priorities and, not always coordinated, agendas. **The suggestions were made a number of times that, if in the future the IFRC had operational funds and intended to implement them either themselves or with the National Society, a different model for that was needed to ensure the Country Delegation's ability to act first and foremost as the overall RCM coordinator.**

The IFRC position at both, country and regional levels, required that the other partners, including NRCS, fully participate in and support the IFRC role. This discussion also needs to be considered in parallel with the proposed "ABCD consortium initiative", details of which were neither within the scope of this final evaluation nor fully available to the Evaluation Team.

As the IFRC has a Status Agreement in Nepal the question was raised several times as to what are the liability risks when / if PNS have "issues". Is it then the IFRC responsibility? This was seen by some KII as a potential challenge to be addressed separately from this evaluation.

- **Decentralisation of DRR / DM DoA and Localisation:** More than 75% of KII interviews addressed this subject in their responses in one way or another. Whilst some progress has been made in some areas during both, the relief and recovery phases, there remains a continued resistance to address the decentralize decision making process.

Recognition that as the GoN advances its decision to decentralize roles, responsibilities and therefore decisions, sign off levels at NRCS with its close relationship with the GoN should mirror that initiative.

At the same time, it is accepted that there is a need to significantly expand both the technical skills and knowledge but, importantly, the awareness and confidence of the officials tasked to carry out this task to feel able to deal with that responsibility.

It is generally accepted that the GoN, for the moment at least, is set on initiating the new Strategy for DRR. As the lead and most trusted domestic GoN partner in DM, interviewees see that the **NRCS should logically mirror those initiatives and seeks to enhance the same capacities and local competencies.**

The **Principal of Subsidiarity**⁴ (not to be confused with Localisation) is a meaningful and accepted approach to effective and efficient decentralised DM. This is understood to some extent within the Nepal DM community and, in an ad hoc way, applied with degrees of success. However, the quid pro quo is that to be effective, GoN and NRCS staff capacity at each level needs to fully understand and have the confidence, training and competency to effectively operationalise the Delegations of Authority as well as the financial tools and systems that are needed to empower “No Regrets Decision Making” **As an example, the previous NRCS DCDP initiative was raised in a number of KII/NRCS interviews as a model worth reconsidering and revisiting. This would match well the feedback received in most GoN HQ and district level interviews of the direction GoN was taking to increased DRR/DP capacity at the district level and was noted as an initiative that was attracting considerable USAID, DFID and other funding interest.**

- **The ERO:** Almost 70% of the KII interviews that raised and/or addressed questions around the ERO platform felt:
 - a. It had real potential for the future.
 - b. Its efficiency and effectiveness were noted in many instances but to a greater or lesser extent limited in the earthquake operation mostly due the fact it was “built on the run” and lacked essential structural and operational guidelines.
 - c. **It thus lacked the advance planning of a concept with associated SoPs, and protocols, as well as...**
 - d. ...agreed implemented levels of Delegation of Authority (DoA) to take more timely and creative decisions.
 - e. The recent response to the flash flooding during the FE demonstrated the ongoing need to address the basic platform concept design.
 - f. Primary among the elements of assessing the Proof of Concept for the ERO potential will be **designing a model with robust pre agreed operations management structures including that there is a Deputy Head of ERO position to reduce bottlenecks in decision making when Head of ERO is not available.** Clear user-friendly Standard Operation Procedures (SoP) for future operations for HR recruitment, finance, procurement and logistics and other key SOPs.

The concept of ERO lacked advanced planning as well as the associated need for SoPs, protocols, adjusted sign-off authority, transparency and clarity of roles and responsibilities. In an emergency, a construct such as ERO can only function if regular authority and decision-making is mirrored by appropriate delegation of authority.

Most KIIs felt a **focused analysis was worth investing in on how to better set up the “ERO” platform for future operations** but as a process rather than a parallel structure

- **RCM / NRCS Sustainability issues:**
 - a. **The fact that contracts of key NRCS district staff (e.g. recovery coordinators) are not extended beyond end April 2019** (the appeal runs until 30 June 2019) and there are still significant funds remaining with the RCM) **does NOT indicate a particular capacity increase!** (According to IFRC Country Office Nepal, the extension was done solely for the benefit of this evaluation. To save money, contracts were NOT extended until end of May / end of the operation). **Considering the efforts and labour-intensive inputs in getting the evaluation organised and then adjusted it would be interesting to quantify if there was that much of a difference in cost to get the badly missed time in the field.**

⁴ "The principle, that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed at a more local level". The concept is applicable in the fields of government, political science, neuropsychology, cybernetics, disaster management and in military command....." Extract from Oxford English Dictionary. And ... UNDP: "Decentralization, or decentralizing governance, refers to the restructuring or re-organisation of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the Principle of Subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels.

- b. **Volunteers:** Suggest NRCS undertake a volunteer drive in the districts to take advantage of current high profile of NRCS and provide ongoing support for new and existing volunteers e.g. opportunities to continue working in the community to reinforce their training.
- c. **Simulation exercises at ward or district level would enhance Preparedness and establish at least some form of operational capacity building and community skill development** – Possible development of “Escape Routes” at district level.
- d. NRCS DRR plan) is for **five NRCS regional warehouses and one central WH**. There may also be some sub-regional warehouses.
- e. Possible opportunity: Similar to Sri Lanka Red Cross, NRCS could establish with comparatively small amount of **funding a community-based early warning system** making use of the fact that virtually everyone – even in remote areas – has mobile phone. At a minimum, early warning messages [e.g. SMS] could be sent from NHQ to the district chapters from where very remote areas could be warned by volunteers. **Could also be used for preliminary data collection of first needs.**

7.8. Beneficiary Communication, Complaints/Feedback Management

WASH: It became evident through the field work and desk review that considerable efforts had been made by IFRC and NRCS to ensure that Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) approaches had been established.

This aimed to create a communication channel between Red Cross partners with communities, assisting coordination with stakeholders and enhancing accountability of agencies involved including their agents or contractors.

At the community level, 4.1% of interviewed beneficiaries felt that the NRCS mechanism of feedback, information and complaint handling was effective. 47.7% were partly or fully satisfied and comfortable with the way NRCS responded to their complaints and queries. These figures directly refer to community members or leaders being aware of how to contact NRCS, communicating directly with offices or discussing issues with social mobilisers.

A disappointing 21.1% felt the feedback mechanism of NRCS was ineffective and 27.4% commented on the fact that their requests or complaints were rarely or never followed up properly or addressed by appropriate action.

In virtually **all** locations visited, beneficiaries regarded the Feedback Boxes as ineffective:

- They were often fitted too high up, preventing easy access especially for the elderly and physically infirm.
- Virtually none of the beneficiaries interviewed had been informed of their purpose and any follow-up.
- A considerable number of community members are illiterate and were unable to read the information leaflets distributed in some areas.
- **There was also a missed opportunity: Rather than handing out leaflets, the Hotline Telephone Number could have been affixed to the Feedback Boxes (or replaced immediately if damaged) to enable people at least to use phone contact.**
- If necessary, people would rather call the GoN Ward Office or the local chairman if they wanted to voice any complaints – **this could be interpreted as a sizeable number of community members regarded NRCS as some kind of GoN entity.**

The **Hotline** was established relatively late in the operation. It was fairly well publicized, however, community members rarely made use of that facility.

In discussions with NRCS NQ staff, the success of Feedback Boxes and the large number of phone calls and their management were often quoted, yet, the FE as unable ascertain the same success in the three districts evaluated. It was disappointing to witness the fact that in these three districts important lessons from other large-scale international disaster operations (e.g. Indian Ocean Tsunami, Pakistan Earthquakes) obviously had not been applied, namely the use of **Community Billboards** to inform the local communities and share updates, concerns or information on upcoming activities. -

7.9. Coordination, Management, Governance and Partnership

There is a need for better communication and closer collaboration in future operations.

During the operation, Technical Working Groups on Shelter, WASH, Livelihoods and Cross-Cutting Issues were initially working in isolation. Eventually there was more information sharing.

In evaluating these elements of the earthquake operation, the Evaluation Team spoke with RCM representatives and, where appropriate and relevant, external partner staff, such as GoN and some other non-RC stakeholders. Given the ToR for the Final Evaluation, the Evaluation Team was only able to develop real time findings based on interviews in the three districts visited and on KII interviews in Kathmandu. As the Movement was only represented by NRCS and IFRC in these three districts, this limited pertinent inputs and feedback from other RCM actors. However, secondary data research on the RTE, MTR and LLW allowed extrapolation on some elements of this section that were addressed in full or part in these earlier documents. In addition, they are noted in the tables above and in various sections of the report, where deemed linked and germane to the FE ToR⁵. In addition, the four elements in this section are often cross-cutting or linked to each other.

Coordination, Management and Partnerships - General:

There was an overarching understanding and acceptance among RCM partners, reflected in numerous documents agreed and signed from the operation that the RCM must aspire, seek and work towards the best possible internal (Movement) and external (DM agency) management practice based **on communication, collaboration and coordination environment and culture**. Given the complexity of the RCM and the shifting emergency to relief to recovery and reconstruction environments, achieving this has always been and likely will remain a challenge and the Nepal earthquake experience has been no exception.

KII feedback reaffirmed the findings in the RTE and MTR that **the relief phase coordination both, internally and externally, was deemed very strong**, in one case being described as “text book”. There were some positive feedbacks that indicated improvement from the time of the Mid-Term Review findings and recommendations on Movement Coordination and Inter-RCM management relationships.

As part of its coordination role, the IFRC country office worked closely with the NRCS and in-country PNS to develop and implement a comprehensive transition framework called the “One Master Transitional Plan” to transition and manage remaining earthquake recovery activities through NRCS permanent department structures and longer-term development programmes.

This took into consideration some of the outcomes and recommendations from the mid-term review (MTR) (see 8.2.) conducted between June to August 2017 and ‘Way Forward Meeting’ (WFM) held in October 2017 which paved the way for preparations of the transition process of the Earthquake Recovery Operation. Since then, a transition process was initiated and IFRC hired a Transitional Coordinator whereas NRCS appointed a Liaison Coordinator to oversee the transition process.

As a result of this process,

- NRCS leadership endorsed the earthquake interim transition structure through a joint transition review meeting on 26 July 2018 until end of December 2018.
- NRCS, IFRC Country Office and PNSs started a gradual phase-out from Earthquake Recovery Operation after July 2018 by minimizing its earthquake recovery structure in line with a hand-over plan of the remaining activities from NRCS ERO structure to NRCS permanent programme structures.
- Although not totally relevant to this Final Evaluation (in the districts of Okhaldhunga, Sindhuli and Ramechhap), it is worth noting that some partners completed their earthquake recovery programme in June 2018 and changed their directions to support long term programmes of NRCS. Belgian RC -Flanders, Spanish RC and Norwegian RC closed their Nepal office in early 2019 upon completing a significant portion of earthquake recovery commitments and handed over remaining activities to the Nepal Red Cross. Most of the PNS will either close their Nepal office by December 2019 (Australian RC – June 2019, Qatar RC and Korean RC - December 2019). In line with the transition process, some in-

⁵ With the caveat and constraint, noted in this report that the latter two are, as yet, not fully signed off.

country PNS, namely American Red Cross, British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross and Danish Red Cross are discussing to create a bilateral working modality/mechanism for long-term engagement with NRCS through forming a consortium

“The coordination role for IFRC is better now” but the objectives in the Recovery Framework, namely “that the recovery operation would be characterized as one demonstrating “joint responsibility, light coordination (and) swift decision making”⁶ fell short of that goal. Cooperation modalities appear to have ebbed and flowed during the past 4 years from Relief to Recovery.

“We were never a real management team, far too fragmented”

(Key Informant, Kathmandu)

We had considerable concern on the actual managerial capacity and structure of both the IFRC and the NRCS, but more importantly the lack of sufficient management competencies to carry out functions”¹

(Key Informant, Kathmandu)

The “One Plan (4+1)” initiative to establish a coordinated recovery platform appears to have garnered **initial good acceptance** but implementation also varied and was at times fragmented. KII interviews indicate almost 40% felt it was implemented partly and 30% “somewhat”. *“There was a rigid interpretation of the One Plan approach by the National Society with little room for even logically economic or appropriate solutions”. “The One Plan and 4+1 were good concepts but needed more flexibility in application with PNS”*

The establishment of the ERO, despite some constraints in its roll-out, resulted in significant effectiveness and impact, but brought its own coordination role challenges. There remain high expectations on the side of beneficiaries in the community – this at a time when the operation is being scaled down and ending.

In order to ensure a level of post operation sustainability it will be necessary to bring about a better coordination and balance of expectations and operational capacity. Remaining funding which is understood to be available across the RCM, but also presumably in other agencies, with good collaboration, collaboration and sharing between the partners, could be used to provide a financial safety cushion for District Chapters to retain some of the positive activities while bringing the community’s expectations down to a more realistic level. This, however, might take 2-3 years and could be linked to the planned “3+4 model” of NRCS.

Movement Coordination with external partners (GoN/UN/INGO):

FE KII and FGD interview feedback generally supported the positive findings in the RTE, MTR and LLW⁷ on relief phase coordination⁸ success and the rather less effective recovery coordination. **Over 70% of the feedback from FE KII interviews indicated external to the RC relationships were consistently more harmonious than internal RCM.** Following the success of the relief phase there was an expectation, possibly unrealistic in hind sight, on the NRCS and RCM partners providing and continuing that surge in the recovery phase, particularly at community level. It emerges from most KII inputs and many FGD the earlier well-coordinated front appeared far weaker **in the recovery and reconstruction phase.** In large parts this can be attributed to the already noted GoN of the time’s insistence on a “wait and see” approach to kicking off the reconstruction phase as well as an across the board institutional lack of Transition / Recovery / Reconstruction Contingency Planning and experience of addressing such major reconstruction challenges.

One fact that demonstrates the internal quandary is this FE is only one of several planned RCM ‘Final Evaluations’ to be commissioned. RCM KII in the operation gave various explanations of why this was so; from different partner reporting requirements, back donor accountability to a simple refusal to participate in a single Earthquake Final Evaluation of all RCM assistance and programmes. Regardless and given the significance of this operation in Nepal and the RCM important role in it, **it would benefit ALL RCM partners to commission a consolidation of these ‘Final Evaluations’ by way of a meta-analysis of the combined findings and deliver an all-movement assessment of the Red Cross earthquake operation.**

Various findings are covered in several earlier sections of the report that address directly or indirectly issues of management, governance and partnership opportunities and challenges. One major and persisting challenge is the recurring issue of the willingness to adopt (with acknowledgement of the attendant opportunities and risks) a more decentralised and less hierarchical Delegation of Authority, Responsibility and No Regrets decision making culture in the NRCS in order to enhance effective disaster management and coordination.

⁶ MTR July-September 2017

⁷ With the caveat and constraint, noted in this report that the latter two are, as yet, not fully signed off.

⁸ The integration and inclusion within FACT (including the ICRC) /ERU/RDRT tools were much improved and effective during the relief phase, resulting in the high level of rapid assistance, trust and confidence and equally dependency in both GoN and the affected communities. RTE and MTR and the LLW Final Reports

General GoN coordination and expectations on NRC:

Consistent feedback (GoN and NRCS at all levels) that one significant contribution to the weak start up to the recovery and reconstruction phase was the consequential **lack of decision making from a minority Governance and the hugely inflated and unrealistic insistence and instructions that reconstruction be “completed in 2 years”**. In the absence of either Transition Plans or a strong Recovery & Reconstruction Contingency Plans this became a real hurdle to effective start-up of the recovery. **GoN at district level is clearly stating that they “need” NRCS** and would be very happy to gain from NRCS experience (a) because the government structure of federalism is also new to GoN, and (b) GoN considers NRCS as the most trusted and “understood” partner among all NGOs.

This, along with other opportunities from the ERO COULD open the door for a long overdue start of the process to work on a possible “Red Cross Act”.

8. Progress from earlier evaluations

8.1. Progress in relation to Real-Time Evaluation

RTE Recommendation Category	RTE Recommendation (relevant to this Final Evaluation)	Progress vis-à-vis Final Evaluation (FE) *
Relief Operation Management	Finding: By the time the RTE team arrived in September, the prevailing view amongst both RC Movement and external key informants was that the momentum for the recovery phase had been lost. Recommendation: Improving internal (RC) and external communications to clarify how the NRCS Earthquake Response Operations cell will help to implement the recovery phase, including describing viable exit strategies and how expected results and risk mitigation strategies have been based on lessons learned from similar large-scale disasters (e.g. the South Asian tsunami).	FE confirmed that the recovery phase remained hampered in part by the GoN constraints. Momentum was, in part, regained in the last three years 2016-2019 but the conclusion (see Recommendations) is that the GoN and NRCS / RCM need to address the need for a more comprehensive Recovery / Reconstruction Contingency planning initiative. Staffing of the ERO was strengthened and proved invaluable to a surge in recovery implementation. However, there is a concern about the loss of that institutional knowledge as the ERO coordinators and the operation closes down. Centralisation of ERO decision making remained a challenge.
	Finding: Lack of a dedicated logistics department in NRCS undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of the response. Recommendation: Invest in and restructure logistics and procurement capacities so that they can effectively support	The same procurement and logistics challenge continued to during the recovery/reconstruction phase to the present time. Still no NRCS dedicated logistics department in place. This was also brought to the evaluation team's attention by the IFRC APRO.
Recovery Operation Planning	Finding: There was an expectation, mainly amongst PNS and external key informants, that NRCS and IFRC could have played a more prominent advocacy role at national level based on lessons learned from large-scale shelter reconstruction programs (such as the responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami or 2013 Typhoon Haiyan) to support the government in developing shelter reconstruction policies and guidelines. Recommendation: Shelter reconstruction should draw upon lessons learned from similar disasters (Indian Ocean tsunami, Typhoon Haiyan) and prepare for the issue of government policies by working at both, community and national level.	The relationship and influence of NRCS at the GoN-NRA level increased and the added value of the RC contribution, role and support to the GoN shelter strategy in the past 3 years has been notable and acknowledged. However, there remains little evidence that the suggestions to apply lessons from the prior operations were adopted by the RCM in general.

	• Finding: Although there had been a specific focus on assisting disabled people, gender approaches often did not meet standards in the Gender Development Policy of the NRCS. There were a number of pilot deployments being undertaken for the first time. The value-added of these pilot deployments was not always clear and what had been the follow up, if any. In view of their status as pilots, findings suggest that it will be important to review their value-added and provide recommendations for improving similar deployments in future. • Recommendation: Facilitate a self-assessment and peer review of implementation of NRCS policies (gender, inclusion, etc.) by district chapters. Commission a peer review together with national stakeholders to assess how the deployed capacities that were piloted for the first time in Nepal (e.g. gender and inclusion adviser, beneficiary communications, civil military liaison) contributed to the response and how similar deployments could be improved in future.	Considering there was no budget for PGI in the Emergency Appeal Budget (!), the FE did find evidence that during the recovery phase efforts had been made to reinforce PGI services to communities through training and visits and that commendable social changes had resulted from the earthquake response operation. However, the lack of IFRC PGI SME resources did not permit the desired level of field visits and advisory services.
	• Finding: Lack of effective IFRC leadership for the recovery phase was an area where the RC Movement has had difficulties in satisfying the 9th and 10th RC Principles for humanitarian assistance. • Recommendation: Develop a recovery/reconstruction tool composed of a team of two-three well trained and experienced experts who could be deployed soon after a large disaster event to remain in place for 4-6 months, support the NS with technical advice and smooth the transition from emergency to recovery.	The FE established that in Nepal the GoN, RCM, and INGOs all lacked any real Transition / Recovery / Reconstruction Contingency Planning or dedicated expertise for such a disaster. Focus remained on Emergency CP for the Kathmandu Valley. So rapid deployment team of local specialists has yet been established.
	• Finding: There was a general perception prior to the earthquake that NRCS was a relatively-well prepared National Society, but some of the expectations about NRCS capacity turned out to be unrealistic when faced by a disaster of this magnitude. • Recommendation: Revise the system for well-prepared National Societies to accommodate large-scale disasters using relevant lessons learned from the earthquake response in Nepal. (Syria)	The FE findings support the view that, despite the scope and size of the impact that would have challenged most NS and governments in the region, for the Relief Phase the NRCS with the support of the RC partners proved to be much better prepared due to preparedness initiatives and contingency planning. The recovery / reconstruction phase did expose weakness in this preparedness due to the reasons mentioned above and in the narrative of the report. To date no Recovery / Reconstruction Contingency Plan has yet been prepared.

RCM relationships	Finding: While NRCS has been able to provide sustained leadership in key positions there was an increased tendency for PNS, under pressure from their respective HQs and back donors, to increasingly move to bilateral actions outside the IFRC coordination structure. Recommendation: Offer constructive support to NRCS and IFRC that maximizes each partner's contribution and helps develop a realistic recovery plan that adds value to disaster-affected communities.	FE findings confirm that, whilst some partners reported improved RCM relationships in the past three years of the Recovery Phase, RCM relationships continue to ebb and flow
		*Black text – MTR recommendation fully / mostly addressed. Maroon text – MTR recommendation not yet or only partially

8.2. Progress in relation to Mid-Term Review

MTR Recommendation Category	MTR Recommendation (relevant to this Final Evaluation)	Progress vis-à-vis Final Evaluation (FE) *
Recovery Operation Planning	Planning should start at the district level, activity by activity, community by community. These plans should then inform a review of the staffing requirements and the <u>gradual reduction of staff (both at district and central levels) and delegates which will feed into a Movement-wide staffing plan, aiming to reduce overall staffing numbers and bringing partners' technical delegates inside the ERO to provide support across districts</u>	The clear direction of both GoN and NRCS to a more localized decision and planning model for Disaster Management across the board is reflected and supported by various inputs throughout the FE. A strategic and operational planning process, supported at district level, proved to be instrumental in enhancing the positioning of chapters in this operation. KII interviews with partners support the Disaster Management "Principle of Subsidiarity" i.e. enhancing the responsibility and capacity to deal with disasters first at the most local level to the event and rolling back as events demand. This principle needs to be investigated further to match parallel initiatives by the GoN to follow this precedent. NRCS District level DRM planning and preparedness still takes too much of a secondary role to national and needs to be strengthened and empowered more. There also appears to be, however, a need to further strengthen capacities of committee members, staff and volunteers to mobilize local resources in support of such plans. Both GoN and NRCS believe that the move to district level DRM must be accompanied by robust capacity building for staff tasked with the responsibilities to deliver the planning. RC need to be more engaged in the recovery phase with training and skill development for members of the community in order to support the construction and livelihoods.

Recovery Operation Planning		In remote communities, one could – for instance - consider provision of vocational trainings to build the capacity of lesser educated youths.
	NRCS and partners are recommended to develop a common approach to budgeting across all districts, so that the big picture of budgets versus expenditure can be explored and understood. Ensuring that a district-level budget for each district is in place will provide an important management tool for the DPC and the steering committee to oversee progress in the district.	This need to reinforce not only district financial but other sectoral management function capacity was still noted during the FE and is addressed in sections below and elsewhere in the report.
	The RCM should explore with NRA ways to extend support in districts where many VDCs are not supported by external assistance, for example including trainees from neighbouring VDCs in future training courses, extending technical guidance etc.	The FE noted at meetings with NRA HQ and District Officials that continued and positive progress was maintained in coordination and implementation of shelter initiatives since the MTR. Feedback focused especially on coordination with authorities and was, at all levels, seen as very successful. In particular, the learning about how relationships with National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) were built and sustained over time should be well captured for future replication. The only caution on this positive development is the need to ensure that the high level of trust and importance placed on the NRCS by NRA is balanced by the realistic understanding and expectation management that there is a fine balance to be noted and evaluated on the expectations on the GoN side versus the “real” capacity of the NRC versus the inevitable expectations from affected communities versus the Fundamental Principles of the RCM – namely Independence and Impartiality
Recovery Operation Planning	NRCS could play a useful role in gathering data regarding whether highly vulnerable families are being excluded from safely building back their houses due to not having access to funds to supplement the 3 Lakhs grant. This data could provide evidence on which NRCS could advocate for the provision of additional support for these households.	
	Disaster risk reduction should be at the heart of the next phase of the recovery operation leading into the transition and exit planning. It will be important to find ways to engage with the local structures (CDMCs, LDRMCs). For those districts where direct DRR responsibilities are allocated to other organisations, there is still room for NRCS as an important national volunteer organisation to engage and these should be actively pursued.	In all three districts, the FE found confirmation that the move by the government to decentralise more responsibility for DDR to district levels was evidently now in motion and reflects the need and the challenges for the NRCS to mirror such “localisation’ initiatives across the board but especially in DRR/DRM It was stated by some that, in the long term, one of the key strategies of NRCS must be a more robust investment in Disaster Risk Reduction at all levels, from NHQ to sub-districts This will not only strengthen existing

		and create new partnerships at local level, but also enhance coordination and operational capacities in future disasters and major emergencies.
	The plan for NRCS institutional capacity building as part of the recovery operation should be reviewed to ensure that it is offering maximum opportunities to the entire organisation to strengthen through the process of implementing the operation, beyond the 14* priority districts to all chapters. The ICB strategy needs to be built upon the foundation of an objective capacity assessment and gap analysis and could be designed at all three levels: the policy and strategic level, institutional and operational level, and individual level focusing on skill and knowledge development.	The FE found parallel evidence to support this as a priority initiative. Given the stated intentions expressed by the NRA and other government KII of an intention and need for the GoN to boost its DRM/DRR capacity, specifically at district levels, NRCS should do likewise. Where the GoN goes, so logically but appropriately should go the NRCS. GoN feel that, already, the NRCS is far more advanced in this than they are – a fact that could further strengthen the position of NRCS if used wisely and properly. This would also support the call for the RCM to consider longer recovery time frames, scale up strategies and follow-up programmes to complement GoN strategies and priorities, and fill existing or future gaps.
ERO structure and processes	NRCS and partners need to consider integrating PNS technical staff and structures into the ERO in order to downscale the number of staff in an effort to reduce indirect costs.	Inputs from KII were consistent at all levels that whilst the ERO platform was created “on the move” and as such had certain inevitable flaws and limitations, it was nonetheless widely regarded as a better way to manage L3/4 or indeed smaller operations. Thought and consideration was suggested to review this further.
	Given that the shelter programme not only supports activities related to individual owner-driven housing, but also all the other building-related activities , it may be useful to review the work plans for the unit to ensure that it has the appropriate workforce in place to be able to support these infrastructure projects going forward in a timely manner.	Concurrence that this assessment was continued into the Final Evaluation feedback from KII and FGD. The “Owner driven approach” was deemed successful, with clear policies adhered to by NRCS and partners as well as appreciation from the communities. It should be replicated in future operations, also taking into consideration specific local contexts.
	Budget authorisation levels needs to be reviewed and increased in order that the recovery operation at the district level can take the timely decisions it needs to take.	This issue was brought forward consistently throughout the FE from both IFRC/NRCS and partners that a complete review of the budgeting Delegation of Authority and Sign-off levels at the District Level need to be a priority. This being just one important element of an overall strategic review of the ERO model and decision-making component of decentralised DRR/DRM and Operations Management. In particular, respondents and other sources agreed that the recovery operation included major procurement processes in support of all sectors. As such, a lot of experience was gained, which should now contribute to a thorough review of NRCS Procurement policy , in line with applicable rules and regulations and including specific provisions for relief and recovery phases, as well as community-level transactions. Such a review would also be highly useful and relevant In line with decentralization processes, and new policies could carefully review levels of decision-making to allow a clearer definition of accountabilities among

		levels while ensuring quality of the goods, services procured, and transparency of processes
Rebuilding relationships	Using the findings of this (MTR) report as a starting point, NRCS and its partners need to undertake a mediated dialogue to reflect upon their own behaviours and processes, understand the views and opinions of all parties, confront some of the barriers that may be impacting negatively upon effective ways of working together and construct an approach for working together during the remainder of the recovery operation implementation and transition period that builds on the strengths of all parties for mutual benefit.	Feedback from FE interviews indicates this was an issue at the time of the MTR though not openly expressed. Whilst there were improvements in the overall RCM relationship, there are still some ongoing issues since the MTR. Some disagreement remained around the status of the IFRC as a coordinator, i.e. its mandated role, as opposed to an implementing partner that it was playing in the three districts under evaluation. That communication, collaboration and coordination by the IFRC with the PNS to present a more cohesive face with the NRCS was a victim of the IFRC role as effectively a PNS operating and providing service deliveries as its priority.
	A peer review process could be considered to allow an objective assessment of the plans and working methodologies of each partner in order to identify good practices and areas where adjustments may need to be made in order to help construct a more collegiate and shared working relationship between partners and NRCS.	The evaluation team received strong and consistent feedback regarding the decision promoted by most PNS of unwillingness to support a single Final Evaluation and the need to carry out multiple evaluations possibly to pressure to satisfy back donors. This may satisfy donors but results in a fractured and complex assessment of the overall RCM effort and obstructs more complex learning. Support is strong that a thorough meta-analysis to consolidate these evaluations could address the need for a single concise overarching assessment of the RCM operations in the response and recovery assistance to the Nepal earthquake.
ERO Governance	The current terms of reference of the ERO steering committee should be shared with all partners immediately.	FE could not find any evidence that this issue has been resolved to the satisfaction of many partners. While IFRC was occasionally being invited to meetings, no official minutes were produced or shared from NRCS.
	The SC terms of reference should be jointly reviewed, adjusted and shared so that it builds on the experience of the last two years and helps contribute to a spirit of joint endeavour, while ensuring that NRCS, as the leading RC partner in Nepal, retains its leadership role. This should include a definition of appropriate timelines for different decision-making processes and it is suggested that all decisions submitted for decision to the SC are tracked to ensure that the time-lines are respected. It is recommended that the terms of reference should make explicit the obligations that come with being a member of SC.	The FE received statements reflecting on this from a wide range of stakeholder interviews, indicating that there still remains a need to address these issues. The establishment of a dedicated structure Earthquake Response Operation (ERO) ensured the delivery of large-scale programme commitments within given timeframe. There seems to be quite wide agreement that the ERO delivered considerable added value especially at the field level to operational delivery, especially in WASH projects and some other areas. However, there is some uncertainty among PNS as to how effective the ERO (given it was launched “on the run” with little in the way on concept and development processes), was in terms of actual strengthening of the core internal DRM capacity of the NRCS. So many of the ERO staffing were drafted from outside the structure departments, only to be let go at the end of the operation with the consequential loss of institutional knowledge and memory. Given the

ERO governance		opportunity and the considerable level of left-over funding currently available and the high level of trust and confidence the NRCS has with government, an initiative could be undertaken well before the next major event to launch a much more focused and targeted design and development of the ERO concept. This would need to be undertaken with 100% backing and support of the SMT. The recommendation for future operation remains the same, namely to have policies and procedures (SoPs) in place allowing to quickly mobilize such temporary structure in support of existing capacities within the NRCS. This could be achieved through the clearly defined roles and responsibility, specific SoPs developed for specific emergencies, specific teams of adequately and appropriately trained individuals, shared allocation of resources among departments as well as agreed mechanisms to transition back to long-term programming as part of the recovery planning. It is somewhat disappointing and very obvious that NRCS neither has accepted IFRC as a true equal partner, nor has seen the need to review the ToR of the SC or to establish / revise SoPs. It would appear that NRCS is unaware that ToRs and SoPs are both parts of a process rather than end products.
	It is strongly recommended that the SC be reconfigured to include representation of the partners in a way that it is acceptable to all; this could be IFRC and one or two partners. This reconfiguration will contribute to rebuilding a strong and positive partnership between NRCS and partners over time.	FE indicates that some very limited progress only has been made to address this during the period since the MTR. However, the advance notice process and preparation by both, IFRC and NRCS, to coordinate this remains somewhat ad hoc, irregular and could be improved further.
	Both the agendas and minutes of future SC meetings should be made available to all RCM actors in Nepal.	FE notes that, while this has occasionally occurred, it has not yet become a standard operational process and has not been advanced in a consistent, mutually acceptable manner.
	It is recommended that the senior management of the NRCS facilitate a review of the policies, procedures and governance structures that influence the recovery operation (e.g. the recruitment and procurement committees), with a view to developing a set of recovery policies and procedures that can be used to guide and support the current operation and could be activated in the future if required. NRCS partners (line agencies, NGOs and PNS) should input into this review.	The FE notes the priority consideration for the SMT emerging from the largely successful NRCS Earthquake Operation. This is the huge opportunity to undertake an in-depth review, capitalising on the lessons learned from the RTE, MTR, this Final Evaluation Report and apparently from Lessons Learned Workshops and other similar events. to rebrand the NRCS including a push for a Nepal Red Cross Law, reinforced with upgraded DRR/DRM Policies and Procedures.

		KII with partner NS support the need to seize the opportunity to promote a new and committed Red Cross Law initiative. Such review could also include addressing issues, such as quality assurance of goods and services provided, contractual matters as well as procurement standards and guidelines.
Movement-wide Reflection	A full investigation into the cost effectiveness of the Nepal operation needs to be agreed between all the partners and should be led by IFRC Geneva and/or Kuala Lumpur given the global implications of such an exercise. This will require reaching agreement of what constitutes direct and indirect costs and the scope of this cost effectiveness exercise – i.e. looking only at funds that come into the country or will it look at the use of all funds collected by partners from the point at which it is received.	No progress was noted on this issue during the FE.
	The RCM needs to be able to call upon longer-term recovery expertise early on in a large-scale relief operation. This position should be embedded into the relief operation at an early stage to research and fully understand the context and capacities and help connect the Movement to learning from past recovery operations so that the recovery plans can be built upon realistic foundations. This recovery expert should be engaged for a minimum of six months.	Feedback from a variety of stakeholders confirmed that there is still a critical need to clarify the working modalities of an “integrated approach”, including cross-cutting components such as CEA, Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI), Planning Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting, as well as Information Management (PMER-IM) and communication (incl. complaint management). This can be done by adapting existing relief and recovery policies and guidelines based on the overall long-term strategic priority areas of the NRCS. This should be based on the wide experience and lessons learnt from this operation and could be of significant benefit to the entire RCM for similar operations elsewhere.
	Recovery plans must always be accompanied by a scale-up strategy, involving a review of systems, procedures and policies of the NS and the Movement. While this process is being followed through (it may take six months), at the affected community level, a relief/early recovery strategy should be delivered.	The Integrated Approach (One Movement, One Set of Principles, One plan) was overwhelmingly considered by all partners as a good practice that should be replicated in other similar contexts. Its implementation, however, varied from Partner to Partner, district to district and sector to sector. And while there should always be room for “some flexibility”, this level of flexibility must be clearly defined in order to retain the credibility of the integrated approach.
	It is recommended that contingency planning processes include pre-checks on the key systems (human resources, finance, procurement, logistics, etc) of a NS to ensure that they are fit for purpose in the event of needing to be scaled up to deliver a large-scale recovery programme. These pre-checks (against a set of globally set benchmarks) could lead to pre-agreements being put in place that spell out how the NS/Movement will enable a rapid up-scaling of capacity if required.	The FE noted wide-spread confirmation that both GoN, UN and NRCS/IFRC, prior to the earthquake, had been overly focused on Emergency Response and Continuity of Operations (COOP) Contingency Planning and more particularly for an event in the Kathmandu Valley. All this lacked any significant attention to or focus on post-event “Transition to Recovery” Contingency Planning. There exists, therefore, still the need for NRCS to revisit its policies, procedures and guidelines with regard to post-disaster recovery.

Movement-wide reflection	As well as developing a recovery plan that defines what the Movement's recovery response will be, time must be devoted to building a common approach to how this will be delivered. This should include definition of common methodologies and tools to be used by all partners working together with the NS of the affected country to avoid a proliferation of different approaches.	
	The experience in Nepal suggests that RCM could have reached many more affected people if it had pursued a complementary support role to the GoN, focusing on training and technical oversight, rather than providing cash grants for comparatively small numbers of families.	Indications from the FE were mixed on this question. Feedback was that cash incentives, be it shelter, livelihoods or WASH, were very useful and appreciated, but that the value of more integrated training and technical skills development and assistance alongside the GoN, who depended anyway on RC capacity knowledge and access being stronger than their own, may have had a wider and greater impact overall. Furthermore, and complying with the RCM Fundamental Principles and the complementary role of the RC, a gap-filling approach based on own assessments or, at least, verifications could have had a greater impact in some locations.
	The more extensive use of participative methodologies, such as VCA could have helped to ensure that the most vulnerable people in each community were prioritised at the needs assessment stage and that communities better understood these decisions because they had actively participated in them. This approach also emphasises the importance of strengthening existing structures rather than creating new ones and creates the foundation for DRR as a cross-cutting theme across the operation.	The FE discovered a mixture of opinions on VCA approaches in different districts. These ranging from few complaints in the way of beneficiary selection and prioritising in one (Sindhuli) to frequent complaints in Okhaldhunga and some in Ramechhap. These indicated that, on the one hand, more transparency may be needed in beneficiary selection, selection criteria and communication while, on the other hand, NRCS should also consider a review of staff skills and capacities in the different districts in an effort to bring about a more uniform approach. Feedback from stakeholders also indicated that beneficiary selection processes need to be contextualized and carried out using objective vulnerability criteria in close coordination with local authorities to ensure mutual transparency and accountability, and minimize social and political interests or bias.
		*Black text – MTR recommendation fully / mostly addressed. *Maroon text – MTR recommendation not yet or only partially addressed.

9. Conclusions and Recommendations

9.1. Conclusions (SHELTER)

9.1.1. The owner driven approach was deemed successful.

9.1.2. The NRA dual assessment indicators protocol everyone had to follow for evaluating destroyed (= reconstruction) versus damaged homes (= retrofitting) seems to have contributed to this imbalance. This has led to discrepancies in the database where the technical solution e.g. to rebuild, is not matched by the level of damage, e.g. minor cracks. This is due to some extent to poor data entry but could have been avoided if there had only been one set of indicators and clearer damage criteria for the assessment teams.

9.1.3. The relief phase communal shelter planning approaches raised some questions for future events of this magnitude. It became clear that more gender sensitive and culturally appropriate solutions for emergency communal shelter alternatives could be examined.

9.1.4. The question whether the RCM approach could have been more effective if it had been less focused on reconstruction and more on technical support, capacity building and training is hypothetical and cannot be answered by this evaluation. It should, however, be carefully considered in future similar operations.

9.1.5. It may be useful in future operations to allow more than just two years for a housing recovery programme. It is recommended to allow at least 5-6 years (experience in most countries shows that it takes up to 12 years to fully recover). This would allow more time for households to find alternative ways to pay for reconstruction, reduce pressure on material and labour costs and reduce need for loans. It would also allow more time to downsize and properly operations thus easing expectations from the communities and local government regarding RC support.

9.1.6. A more flexible approach to incorporating innovative techniques in shelter construction – the focus needs to be on improving quality and effectiveness of the shelter. **The role of shelter cluster/HRRP as a repository for good practices needs to be encouraged.**

9.2. Conclusions (WASH)

9.2.1. Improvements in WASH throughout the relief and recovery phases have improved people's lives by:

- ☑ Decreasing the risk and prevalence of water borne, vector-borne and skin diseases among the disaster-affected communities;
- ☑ Significantly reducing the time spent retrieving water in water-scarce communities;
- ☑ Providing better supply of safe water that is being used for drinking, washing, sanitation, kitchen gardens, and irrigation;
- ☑ Improving sanitation, hygiene and the natural environment through increasing hygiene understanding and awareness, eliminating open defecation, providing waste bins and increasing the water supply at household level;
- ☑ Providing child-, gender- and disability-friendly WASH facilities constructed at schools. This means they are easier to use, more accessible and encourage better hygiene.
- ☑ Increasing the yield of kitchen gardens and, in some locations, repairing irrigation water schemes has restored and increased agricultural and farming productivity.

9.2.2. The WASH interventions implemented during the relief and recovery phases have increased the resilience of communities to natural disasters.

9.2.3. The WASH interventions have also increased the management capacity of NRCS to manage future disasters of a similar scale.

9.2.4. It was evidenced that WASH is a highly relevant priority and that NRCS has expertise and capacity to

implement effective programmes. This places NRCS in a good position for future partnering with GoN and donor agencies, provided NRCS succeeds in ensuring the Society's independence and impartiality within the Fundamental Principles of the RCM.

- 9.2.5. NRCS reputation and relationship with communities has been significantly strengthened by this largely successful emergency and recovery intervention. As a large number of affected people and communities have benefitted from this support, NRCS could capitalize on this positive image by focusing on these operational areas in a subsequent recruitment of district branch or sub-branch volunteers.
- 9.2.6. The capacity of NRCS to meet the WASH and relate needs of the affected population was clearly overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the disaster.
- 9.2.7. The WASH programming has been highly successful in integrating with other sectors throughout the relief and recovery phases. There were also noticeable economic outcomes that are attributable to WASH (see also Livelihoods Case Study in annex).
- 9.2.8. Sectoral linkages and integration were also strong between health and with livelihoods, where all gained from the provision of water. These examples highlight and reinforce the inherent value of the integrated approach (4+1) of building back more resilient communities where shelter, WAQSH, health and livelihoods are interdependent.
- 9.2.9. Respondents were unanimous and consistent in stating that delays associated with decision-making in logistics and procurement adversely impacted on the rate of construction of water schemes and sanitation facilities. This was further aggravated by a tedious and complex bidding process, sometimes with up to 28 bidding vendors.
- 9.2.10. WASH interventions requiring immediate or future improvements:
- ☒ Delays caused by procurement-related decision-making, actual procurement and the distribution of WASH resources impacted negatively on the process of an already complex operation, particularly at district level.
 - ☒ Many KII respondents and FGDs held with NRCS and communities confirmed in many locations that a range of different options had been considered for new water scheme designs. Several informants, however, mentioned that the low-tech rain water harvesting from rooftops had neither been offered nor provided as available option. This was investigated further but the result remained the same. Team B actually observed in some locations that community members had tried to construct some makeshift rain harvesting. This indicates that communities would have been rather receptive to such an option, yet, in none of the locations visited this low-tech option had been suggested.
 - ☒ Much time was lost in an operation that was already plagued by a far too short timeframe allocated for recovery. This resulted in several WASH projects not having been implemented or completed.

9.3. Conclusions (LIVELIHOODS)

- 9.3.1. A very noticeable and often life changing increase in female participation (see livelihoods case study) was observed. Such positive outcome is, yet, further confirmation that the integrated approach to support was the right way to address not only the short- and medium-term needs of the earthquake affected communities, but to put them on a more sustainable footing with a view of increasing household income, diversifying activities and income, and putting people back in charge of their lives.

9.4. Conclusions (HEALTH)

- 9.4.1. A significant number of FGD participants highlighted the trauma to their lives as a result of the earthquake: "fear and despair", "distressed – especially children", "shock", "sadness", "children having difficulties socialising", etc. This trauma remained largely unaddressed during the relief as well as the recovery phase.

9.5. Conclusions (SUSTAINABILITY)

- 9.5.1. **One recurring feedback from most FDG and many KII interviews was varying level of concerns around overall post- earthquake operation programme ongoing sustainability, and across all of the “4 +1” sectors.** Findings on sustainability are drawn from the FE covering operations sectoral project issues as well as internal RCM/NRC/GoN institutional sustainability factors.
- 9.5.2. **It was positive to note many villages and committees have taken steps themselves, outside any planned format, to establish small contingency and saving funds for ongoing maintenance repairs restocking and other ongoing expenses.**
- 9.5.3. **Volunteers for NRCS:** Suggest NRCS undertake a volunteer drive in the districts to take advantage of current high profile of NRCS and provide ongoing support for new and existing volunteers e.g. opportunities to continue working in the community to reinforce their training.
- 9.5.4. **Simulation exercises at ward or district level would enhance Preparedness and establish at least some form of operational capacity building and community skill development** – Possible “Escape Routes” could be developed at district level by volunteers in collaboration with local administration.
- 9.5.5. **There is a possible opportunity:** Similar to Sri Lanka Red Cross, NRCS could establish with a **comparatively small amount of funding a community-based early warning system** making use of the fact that virtually everyone – even in remote areas – has a mobile phone. At a minimum, early warning messages [e.g. SMS] could be sent from NHQ to the district chapters from where very remote areas could be warned by volunteers. **This system could also be used for preliminary data collection of first needs, surveys, etc.**

9.6. Conclusions (COORDINATION, COLLABORATION, PARTNERSHIP)

- 9.6.1. **The evaluation identified a certain lack of transparency and sharing of funding levels and balances across all RCM partners.** While it is perfectly standard practice for PNS and IFRC to part-fund overheads from generated financial resources, it seems ironical that, while partners insist on NRCS being more financially transparent, they themselves do not release funding information to NRCS.
- 9.6.2. **It would appear that a greater physical presence of RCM PGI SMEs in the field both, as trainers and programme advisors, would have been welcomed, highly desirable and most appropriate.**
- 9.6.3. **There are considerable funds left over at the end of the recovery operation. These funds could be meaningfully used to (a) complete unfinished work, and (b) continue to support organisational capacities and structures proven to be successful in an effort to significantly strengthen NRCS’ operational capacities and strengths gained from this operation.**
- 9.6.4. **The ERO platform was generally regarded as having a real potential for future major operations provided more planning and thought are given to related issues and necessary changes within the NRCS administration, management and governance. The concept of ERO lacked advanced planning as well as the associated need for SoPs, protocols, adjusted sign-off authority, transparency and clarity of roles and responsibilities. In an emergency, a construct such as ERO can only function if regular authority and decision-making is mirrored by appropriate delegation of authority.**
- 9.6.5. **The FE noted that valuable NRCS human resources were lost to competition from RCM as many of the PNS reportedly paid higher or at least highly competitive salaries. While the FE was unable in the short time available to gather sufficient evidence, the evaluation team recommends to thoroughly investigate this issue as such behaviour, if indeed confirmed, does not behove the members of the RCM.**
- 9.6.6. **NRCS Branding:** Given the overall positive outcomes for the RCM from the earthquake operation and the GoN relationship for the NRCS, there exists significant leverage for NRCS to rebrand itself to be better “fit-for-purpose” going forward. This would, in the long term, make NRCS an even stronger partner of GoN and **avoid some of the potential pitfalls in the process:**

- Great opportunity to finally drive for a Red Cross Law.
- Meaningful restructuring to address the GoN/NRCS move to localisation and decentralization (as already started)
- Define and focus on what the **NRCS DOES** and what it should **NOT DO**.
- Strengthen social mobilisers who did a very good job by all accounts in most areas.
- Limit at any given time RCM geographical commitments.
- Address and limit GoN vs Beneficiary and community expectations in line with above and respects the real NRCS capacity going forward.
- **Avoid any risk of compromising the two Fundamental Principles of “Impartiality” and “Independence”**

10.1. STRATEGIC Recommendations (with suggested priority ranking)

No.	Area	Entity	Strategic Recommendation	Priority
S 1	General	NRCS / IFRC / PNS	Recommendations from the Real-Time Evaluation and the Mid-Term Review should be revisited and, where appropriate and not yet done, implemented to further strengthen the impact of the Earthquake Response Operation and the capacity of NRCS. Findings of this FE, therefore, are either based on <u>new evidence</u> or, where appropriate, use previous findings to reemphasize their importance.	1
S 2		NRCS / IFRC / PNS	Given the considerable amounts of left-over funding, it is the recommendation of this FE that NRCS, IFRC and PNS carefully consider the utilisation of these funds for the development <u>and implementation</u> of a transitional strategy to address the identified concerns of sustainability, maintenance and longer-term development of the otherwise excellent programme progress.	1
S 3		NRCS / IFRC / PNS	Given the complexities of this operation and the considerable number of individual, partly ongoing evaluations, it is strongly recommended to commission a consolidation of these individual 'Final Evaluations' by way of a meta-analysis of the combined findings and deliver an all-movement assessment of the Red Cross earthquake operation (similar to the Indian Ocean Tsunami Report)	1
S 4		IFRC	A thorough investigation is recommended into the alleged practice of some PNS to pay significantly higher salary to NRCS staff thus draining the National Society of skilled manpower at HQ and district levels and contradicting the self-professed focus on capacity building.	1
S 5	Post-disaster = Pre future disaster WASH programming	NRCS / IFRC / PNS	NRCS / IFRC / PNS should accommodate the option for communities experiencing scarcity of water to utilise <u>water harvesting</u> opportunities at homes, schools, health facilities, NRCS offices and other structures with suitable roof catchment. Such systems would be <u>in addition</u> to main water supply schemes (<u>not as a substitute !</u>)	1
S 6		NRCS	The important recommendation expressed in earlier reviews to establish a proper logistics and procurement department in NRCS is re-emphasized to address operational capacity building of the National Society and support future disaster preparedness.	1
S 7		NRCS	Following the exit of the ERO support, NRCS should focus on DRR WASH programming and interventions, especially at sub-district level. Specifically: a) Sharing of lessons learnt with ALL communities, particularly those who were not included in the current earthquake response. b) Standardisation, preparation and pre-positioning of i. Emergency WASH resources ii. Hygiene kits iii. Dignity kits iv. Other WASH essentials and consumables, such as collecting vessels, collapsible water containers, water purification tablets c) Preparing and compiling in advance WASH communication resources, such as radio spots, radio drama, IEC material and community theatre scripts d) An audit of available resources should be conducted to ascertain existing resources and quality.	1

S 8		NRCS	Future disaster planning should focus more on involving communities in all processes, including DRR programming.	3
S 9	Quality and cross-cutting issues	NRCS / IFRC	WASH contingency planning and other scenario-based training should include PGI, CEA and SPHERE standards.	2
S 10	Post-disaster = Pre future disaster	NRCS	It is recommended that NRCS work with NRA/GoN to develop long-term recovery planning with realistic time frames.	1
S 11		NRCS / IFRC	NRCS could work with NRA and GoN to plan for transitional shelters as part of a post-disaster recovery strategy and disaster preparedness planning.	1
S 12		NRCS	NRCS should agree with NRA/GoN on vulnerability criteria to allow for more targeted and equitable shelter aid in the event of future emergencies. Once agreed, the criteria need to be publicly posted and transparently applied.	2
S 13		NRCS	NRCS should strengthen its partnership with HRRP and/or other relevant partner organisations as a repository for good practices.	2
S 11	SHELTER programming	NRCS	For future damage assessments, that NRCS should undertake its own assessments with RC-sourced engineers in the designated areas of operation. It is a question of how such assessments are carried out and depends on whether relevant protocols have been agreed with GoN <u>before a disaster event</u> , for instance that RC would complement any assessment to ensure added value as an independent assessor. This would go a long way to head off and placating donors, back donors and the public.	3
S 15		NRCS / IFRC	It is recommended that NRCS, possibly with IFRC support, consider obtaining customs pre-approval, stock piling and pre-positioning IFRC-standard equipment and tarpaulins for fast release after a major disaster.	2
S 16	Health	NRCS / IFRC	It is recommended that psychosocial assistance be integrated into health recovery programming – especially for children.	1

1	Immediate remedy / implementation recommended
2	Remedy / implementation at the earliest opportunity recommended
3	Remedy / implementation recommended for preparedness and future operational planning.

10.2. TACTICAL Recommendations (with suggested priority ranking)

No.	Area	Entity	Tactical Recommendation	Priority
T 1	Sustainability	NRCS / IFRC	Allocation of lump sum payments to Water Users Committees (WUC) from unspent earthquake funds should be provided with the aim mitigating, to some extent, future exhaustion of maintenance funds due to large budget items failing and requiring replacement. Lump sum allocation would provide some time buffer against significant costs until a time when the community can manage to contribute to a sustainable fund to manage future expense when they occur. Another possible solution could be to consider cost as a factor before introducing certain technologies which may be too expensive for communities to maintain, especially after the exit/completion of the operation.	1
T 2		NRCS	Community WASH infrastructure, particularly water schemes, should be monitored at least bi-annually by branches and with the DWSS over a period of 2 years to ensure that communities are capable of sustaining the systems. Gradually, NRCS should work towards transitioning responsibility of support to the DWSS.	1
T 3		NRCS	Ongoing advocacy by NRCS to GoN for subsidised power supply for water lifting schemes should be maintained and achieved.	1
T 4		NRCS	Additional and more substantial maintenance training provided to WUCs by NRCS so that higher cost components and system of water schemes (e.g. electric pumps) can be maintained by communities, thereby economising on financial outgoings to paid contractors.	2
T 5		NRCS / IFRC	All water schemes should be assessed for sustainability issue with a view to identifying and remedying any issues threatening the continuity of supply. This would preferably be conducted with suitably skilled engineers (preferably those who were initially involved). Based on review outcomes, advice (e.g. restriction of water access points, hours of access) aimed at sustaining continuity of water supply could then be provided to the WUCs and communicated to the communities. Ideally DWSS should also be involved in this process.	2
T 6	Post-disaster =	NRCS	NRCS should obtain from IFRC / PNS standard packing lists for Water ERUs to obtain pre-clearances from MoPH, DWSS, and Customs, thus facilitating speedy and instant customs clearance and importation in future major disaster events.	1
T 7	Pre future disaster	NRCS	Quite a number of communities had their damaged water schemes not repaired due to lack of resources, capacity or timeframe allocated to recovery. NRCS should ensure that these communities are not forgotten but, instead, prioritised to be supported under non-emergency WASH programming.	1
T 8	WASH programming	NRCS	Future disaster planning should also ensure greater collaboration with DWSS.	3
T 9	Quality and cross-cutting issues	NRCS / IFRC	The provision of <u>temporary</u> gender-segregated toilets would provide a safer environment for women and girls during the relief phase.	1
T 10		NRCS / IFRC	Wherever possible, communal shelters should be well lit and internally partitioned (using wooden panelling or CGI sheeting) either by family or by gender.	1
T 11		NRCS / IFRC	In emergencies, “dignity kits” / menstrual hygiene kits should be provided to women and adolescent girls. They should be included in the standard list of emergency provisions and stockpiled accordingly.	1
T 12		NRCS	NRCS should develop for all districts a WASH Training Package that includes PGI and CEA. The training package should be implemented at chapter level for <u>all</u> WASH related staff and volunteers.	1

	Quality and cross-cutting issues		A similar but briefer training should be provided to management. The training package should be practically oriented, covering basic theory and how it applies to emergencies as well as development scenarios. Examples, relevant issues and good practices outlined in this evaluation should be provided in the training package to contextualise the topics. Similarly, SPHERE standards contents should be provided to staff, volunteers and management, as SPHERE standards not only apply in emergencies but are also useful in early recovery, recovery, reconstruction and preparedness activities.	
T 13		NRCS	Where practical and in particular when close to roads, water points should be provisioned with screening so that people can bathe in privacy.	3
T 14	Post-disaster = Pre future disaster SHELTER Programming	NRCS	NRCS should work with NRA to review appropriate levels of assistance for those with damaged houses versus destroyed or irreparably damaged houses, not only for the current operation but also in preparation for the next major earthquake disaster.	1
T 15		NRCS	For future operations, NRCS should provide additional training for shelter officers and social mobilizers in the field on the design stage of the reconstruction process. It is also recommended that NRCS work with NRA on how to encourage reconstruction of earthquake code buildings according to traditional styles e.g. via special grants.	1
T 16		NRCS	If not already done so, since the disbanding of the ERO, it is recommended that NRCS appoint a focal point within the organization for shelter issues. The shelter focal point can compile lessons learned, enhance linkages with NRA, GMALI, MoHA, DM DoA, and DUDBC and provide training for volunteers and staff on shelter operations.	1
T 17		NRCS	Training for District Disaster Response Teams (DDRT) should include setting up and appropriate lay-out of communal shelters as well as the provision of special assistance for the most vulnerable (e.g. elderly, pregnant, disabled, landless, etc...).	2
T 18		NRCS	NRCS should add 'debt load' as an additional assessment criterion to assess vulnerability following future emergencies.	2
T 19		NRCS / IFCRC	For future operations, relocated families receive additional assistance to cover the extra cost of reconstruction.	2
T 20		NRCS	It is recommended that for future operations, NRCS consider reducing or consolidating payments for remote communities to reduce the number of times that affected families need to travel to collect funds.	2
T 21		NRCS	NRCS should consider two-tiered training for masons and carpenters for future operations: • one for previously experienced masons and carpenters (7-10 days) and • a longer one for those with no previous experience (50 days). This could be in partnership with established NGOs such as <i>Helvetas</i> . The second-tier training should actively encourage women participants as they are unlikely to have had previous experience.	3
T 22		NRCS	It is recommended that NRCS investigate the government loan program and, if feasible, provide training to local RC volunteers and staff at the district level on options to beneficiaries of how to transfer from high interest to low interest loans.	3
T 23		NRCS / IFCRC	While the integrated support has proven to be the right and most appropriate way of assistance, livelihood support to farmers should be more targeted and customized, and more in-depth training of livestock management would benefit the roll out of the scheme and should be considered in future similar interventions.	3

Annex 1 – CASE STUDY: Shelter

The importance of shelter for a person's well-being

(Gita, Jarayotar, Harkapur / Okhaldhunga, visited and interviewed April 1, 2019)

Gita (not her real name) has had a hard life – her husband died when she was 21 years old and pregnant with her only daughter. With her daughter now married and far away, she has lived alone for many years. Then the earthquake in 2015 came. As she said *“I have always had serious problems over the past 30 years and the earthquake just added one more to the list”*.

Since 2015, Gita has **had to move no less than four times before being able to find a permanent home where she can feel safe and move on with her life**. Gita's situation is worse than most but it illustrates that finding or constructing a **secure home is a key step to recovery from the trauma of a major disaster**.

After her original two storey house collapsed in the earthquake (fortunately she was not in the house when it occurred), and after only being able to retrieve some key household belongings from the rubble, Gita lived in a tarpaulin covered communal shelter with four other families close to her old house. It was an anxious time for her and Nepal Red Cross was able to provide some food, blankets, tarpaulins and cooking utensils.



Figure 1. Gita standing outside her temporary shelter

After a week, she decided to move because her neighbours were also leaving: *“I had to move from my previous location. It was not what I would have chosen but I had no choice, being a single woman with no family member. I felt unsafe staying behind while all others were moving. I had to be sure of a safe neighbourhood.”* Fortunately, she was able to arrange to stay in a neighbour's partially damaged house for a year until the owners asked her to leave.

That first winter, NRCS, as part of its Winterization Program, provided 10,000 Rupees so she could buy blankets and household items.

After the winter, Gita had to move to another location as the owner of the partially damaged house wanted to use the house for his own family – it had only been a temporary arrangement. After leaving the partially damaged house, Gita moved to her own agricultural land further down the hill from her old house and set up a temporary shelter made out of bamboo and CGI sheeting (NRCS provided 15,000 NRs for temporary accommodation assistance). She lived in this ‘cold in the winter and hot in the summer’ shelter for two years until her new house was constructed.



Figure 2. Inside the temporary shelter



Figure 3 Inside the new home

Last year, after a construction period of four months, Gita's two room earthquake-resistant single storey house (with an attic) was completed (she also received funds for a new latrine and goat shed) and was ready to move the final time. Since the construction cost was twice the 300,000 NRs grant from NRCS, along with many other housing beneficiaries, she took out a personal loan (20%) to cover the cost of the new house. With no significant income (only a small government allowance of 1,000 NRs/month), she does not know how to meet the monthly instalments but is earning some income from selling goats – a livelihood activity covered by NRCS.

Sitting outside her new home, she reflects that the size of the new shelter was smaller than the old house but, with the old shelter adjoining the new house and now converted to a kitchen, it meets her needs. **Gita's financial situation is so tight that she cannot afford state electricity and instead relies on NRCS-supplied solar panel and lights for power.**

There is still work to be done (e.g. the attic needs stairs) but **Gita is thankful for her new home – she is back among neighbours she can rely on, enough land to grow food, a cow given to her by her sister and some goats. With Nepal Red Cross assistance, she has largely been able to move on from the earthquake.**



Figure 5 New latrine



Figure 4 Outside the new home

Annex 2 – CASE STUDY: WASH

Water-Lifting Technology: A solution to water scarcity with far reaching positive effects

Ramechhap district is one of the drought prone areas of Eastern Nepal where many communities regularly face severe drought, impacting directly on the availability of water for drinking, bathing, sanitation, agriculture and livestock. Water scarcity is exacerbated during the dry season, particularly amongst the communities situated high in the remote ranges.



Image 1. Typical arid high country near Danda Tol village. Rampur sub-district. Ramechhap district

As difficult as it is to think that the water supply situation could become more extreme, this was the reality after the catastrophic 2015 earthquake occurred. The earthquake caused precious water sources in many villages to recede and dry up. People were left essentially with two extremely difficult options - either to resettle elsewhere or to survive by hiking daily to water sources, far in the valleys below. A walk to retrieve a few litres of water takes up to three hours.

Community members of Danda Tol Village, in Rampur sub district, have always faced an uphill battle to obtain sufficient safe, clean water but they did survive despite the limited supply. After the earthquake, however,

obtaining sufficient water for drinking, bathing and washing became even more problematic. The well-being of people suffered, too as extreme water scarcity impacted on health due to deteriorating hygiene conditions and poor water quality. Some community member comments provide insight to the context:

Female water management committee member: "After the earthquake we had to walk for two hrs (return trip) to collect water because our nearby source had dried up. Sometimes it is dangerous, because we can fall"

Male water user: "It was a difficult time for my family. We were preparing to leave the village permanently, but we did not have anywhere to go to. My family history goes back generations here, it was very sad to have to contemplate leaving our village and never returning".

One mother reported: "Children often got up before sunrise to collect water, long before school started. During school they often fell asleep. The water scarcity affected many things in our community."

After the initial relief phase in the aftermath of the earthquake had passed, rebuilding houses and establishing supplies of drinking water were highest priorities identified by communities, government and the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS).

Danda Tol is one of many villages where solving the conundrum of efficiently and economically providing clean water was exceptionally challenging and was something that the NRCS had never had to confront before. If could, indeed, be described as a monumental challenge in uncharted waters!



Image 2. NRCS District Project Coordinator and Water user committee member discuss construction challenge on top of the 20,000 litre water tanks.

NRCS met the challenge by utilising **water-lifting technology** to pump ground or spring water to reach affected populations. This method was pioneering for the NRCS, and Danda Tol was the first of many successful water schemes established to provide clean and safe water in sufficient volume to enable meet the needs of the village for drinking, washing, livestock and sanitation. The scheme also provides sufficient water for irrigating kitchen gardens. Most families conserve waste water which can be used for sanitation purposes or irrigating gardens. Provision of water through water-lifting schemes has changed the lives of people for the better, supplying enough water for the entire community. Community members commented that:

"We used to have to walk for hours to get water, now we just walk a few meters from our house and we have all the water for our needs, having much more time for other important tasks."

"Health issues that had affected people in my village after the earthquake have been very much improved and almost completely disappeared thanks to the clean drinking water, improved latrines and hygiene training provided by NRCS."

One community member summarized her feelings: "It is like a dream to have clean water provided so close to my house. The only problem now is that it is difficult to find the money to pay the monthly cost."

Water lifting schemes do provide an innovative solution to communities living with water scarcity, however, some inherent limitations and expenses associated with the technology do need to be managed. **These include maintenance, electricity costs and supply limitations.**⁹ Current water supply volumes, provided by the lifting schemes, are insufficient to irrigate cash crops.

The construction of the all water schemes managed by NRCS utilised local labour who were paid cash for their work. **This created additional jobs and income in the community. All water schemes are community managed and maintained by water management committees.**

One of the key reasons for the successful implementation of the post-earthquake recovery program in Nepal was community participation and contribution. In this particular project, the Evaluation Team was told the community had contributed NPR 2,135,765.00 (18% of the total cost of the project) and provided in-kind labour cost amounting to about 14% of the total cost. The total contribution is said to be about 32%.



Image 3. Water lifting schemes utilise a series of 'pump and tank stations' to pump water to communities located above water sources. The NRCS highest water lifting scheme constructed lifts water 940 meters from source to community supply. Pictured are the two 20,000 litre water tanks, Danda Tol village.

⁹ Due to the shortage of time, it was not possible for the Evaluation to determine exact electricity rates for the individual communities.

Annex 3 – CASE STUDY: Livelihoods

Reeshma and Nisu:

From Despair to Hope - A new future of opportunity, dignity, self-reliance and confidence



Of the many inspiring people, the Nepal 2015 earthquake evaluation team met, this is the short story of two indomitable women who were devastated by the impact of the earthquake. With the help of the Red Cross, they have gone beyond creating basic improvements to their lives and have grasped an opportunity to establish real independence, freedom and a living for themselves and their children for the future. Reshma and Nisu (not their real names) are similar in their situation; both are long-term widows with grown families living with them and came from an impoverished life before the earthquake, during which they lost what little they owned. One lives high up in a mountain village

and, prior to the earthquake, far from any kind of water supply and least of all a reliable one. The other lives down below on the valley floor closer to the river but still had a long physical walk to gather limited water.



Prior to the disaster neither Reshma nor Nisu had more than a basic knowledge of subsistence gardening and neither had fertile soil in which to grow crops. Following the establishment of the NRCS/IFRC recovery and reconstruction programmes, both women, having been assessed as being within a priority vulnerable group, benefitted from WASH and Shelter projects that provided them with safe houses and delivered reliable domestic water and, most importantly, irrigation sources for gardening projects, such as vegetable and fruit production. The Nepal Red Cross projects brought to these women the opportunity to receive modern training in gardening skills and methodology along with knowledge of water and financial management to enhance their opportunities. Both “seized the day” and took complete advantage of these skills to develop their own businesses.

When the devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck the high foothills of Nepal’s Himalayan Mountains in April 2015, followed by a second severe tremor in May, it resulted in dramatic figures of fatalities, injuries and enormous destruction and damage to homes and infrastructure. The priority response of the government and its lead disaster management partner, the Nepal Red Cross, along with the UN and international and domestic aid agencies in the weeks immediately following the impact was the life-saving delivery of emergency supplies of food and non-food items and water and shelter materials.

However, as the weeks of relief increasingly addressed the immediate survival needs and led into early recovery, it quickly emerged that the loss of previous forms of livelihoods including crop production, vegetable gardening and livestock husbandry was a second and serious additional factor with severe adverse consequences to the already impoverished vulnerable population of the worst hit districts. As is the way in such disasters, those of a lower caste, higher vulnerability and, more particularly, single women households, widows and the poor were impacted the most. Whilst this help was welcomed it quickly emerged that of even greater importance than just

the material was the critical need to expand the knowledge, understanding and skills of the affected population to better manage these resources. The Government of Nepal, in close coordination with the Nepal Red Cross and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement as their implementing partners, initiated a series of training courses including livestock husbandry, management and vegetable and fruit gardening, as well as the invaluable skills needed in masonry and carpentry to reconstruct homes, animal shelters and water sources. Now, along with the cash incentives, came new water projects for both, domestic and irrigation use, that not only provided the essential needs to grow and nurture agriculture but, for the first time in memory for many people and, more specifically, women and girls, a freedom from time consuming and back-breaking hours of walking down steep slopes to gather water from distant wells or the river at the valley floor, returning home with barely enough water to sustain their basics needs. This, combined with their newly acquired skills and up to three or more saved hours of time to devote to productive work, created **a life-changing and hugely significant opportunity for an improved, healthier and productive living and life.** Along with that came confidence, economic possibilities, independence and social balance that have improved immeasurably the lives of many. From this has emerged a palpable sense of happiness and hope, especially among those less fortunate and vulnerable families who would have never thought to experience it.

More than four years after the despair and sadness of the earthquake and its aftermath, Reshma from her mountain top allotment and Nisu from her river bottom land have a thriving garden business that feeds their extended families and, of even greater importance, provides extra for sale in the local markets, and to hotels and restaurants in the district.

Reshma's impressive "green fingers" and new skills resulted in her growing prize-winning cauliflowers and cabbages that have gained her recognition in both the local and national media. She has purchased a small tractor and diversified into growing seeds and transferring her knowledge to other women.

Nisu and her daughter have expanded growing vegetables and greens into tropical fruits, flowers and herbs they sell to the local hotels, hostels, offices and restaurants.

With their new found knowledge and skills these two impressive women have managed to accumulate significant financial savings, personal confidence and independence, and see more opportunities far beyond anything they ever dreamed was possible for them, both as widows and as vulnerable caste-challenged women. A new world has opened for these two and many, many other women to contribute to the well-being, health and security of their families. The social changes have revealed their ability to work alongside their men folk as equals and it was most gratifying to witness the acceptance and recognition those same men expressed in supporting these changes.



Annex 4 – Documentation review

No.	Title of Document	Type of Document	Date
1	Emergency Appeal	Appeal	April 2015
2	Emergency Appeal Revision	Appeal (Revised)	27.04.2015
3	Emergency Appeal Revision	Appeal (Revised)	16.05.2015
4	Operations Update #1	Ops Update	02.05.2015
5	Operations Update #2	Ops Update	11.05.2015
6	Operations Update #3	Ops Update	14.05.2015
7	Operations Update #4	Ops Update	06.06.2015
8	Operations Update #5	Ops Update	07.07.2015
9	Operations Update #6	Ops Update	19.08.2015
10	Operations Update #7	Ops Update	28.09.2015
11	Operations Update #8 <i>Transition to Recovery Phase and IFRC Seasonal Response to Earthquake Affected Families in Nepal</i>	Ops Update	07.12.2015
12	Operations Update #9	Ops Update	15.01.2016
13	Operations Update #10	Ops Update	10.06.2016
14	Operations Update #11	Ops Update	08.07.2016
15	Operations Update #12	Ops Update	21.10.2016
16	Operations Update #13	Ops Update	13.04.2017
17	Operations Update #14	Ops Update	13.11.2017
18	Operations Update #15	Ops Update	17.04.2018
19	Operations Update #16	Ops Update	24.05.2018
20	Operations Update #17	Ops Update	18.12.2018
21	Audit Report #1	Financial Audit	15.07.2016
22	Audit Report #2	Financial Audit	08.12.2017
23	Audit Report #3	Financial Audit	03.12.2018
24	Real Time Evaluation of Nepal Earthquake Response Operation	Evaluation (RTE)	October 2015
25	NRCS Management Response to above	Evaluation (RTE)	undated
26	Mid-Term Review of Nepal Earthquake Recovery Operation <i>(July – September 2017)</i>	Review (MTR)	08.11.2017
27	IFRC Head of Emergency Operations End of Mission Report	Report (End of Mission)	26.04. – 20.08.2015
28	NRCS 3 rd Quarterly Report 2016	Quarterly Report	20.11.2016
29	NRCS Annual Report 2016	Annual Report	01.01.-31.12.2016
30	NRCS 1 st Quarterly Report 2017	Quarterly Report	21.04.2017
31	NRCS 2 nd Quarterly Report 2017	Quarterly Report	16.07.2017
32	NRCS 3 rd Quarterly Report 2017	Quarterly Report	29.10.2017
33	NRCS 4 th Quarterly Report 2017	Quarterly Report	30.01.2018
34	NRCS 1 st Quarterly Report 2018	Quarterly Report	29.04.2018
35	NRCS 2 nd Quarterly Report 2018	Quarterly Report	05.08.2018
36	NRCS 4 th Quarterly Report 2018	Quarterly Report	04.11.2018
37	Nepal Earthquake: One Year Progress Report (RCM)	Annual Report	2018
38	Post-Distribution Monitoring (RCM)	Report	08.11.2015

39	The Earthquakes Shelter Cluster in Nepal (IFRC)	Report	20.06.2017
40	Assessment and Baseline Survey Guidance (RCM)	Policy	19.12.2016
41	Integrated Recovery Programme Baseline Concept Note (NRCS)	Policy	undated
42	ERO Position Paper	Policy	15.04.2016
43	ToR Consultative Body (NRCS)	Policy	27.12.2018
44	DRAFT Model Transition Plan (IFRC)	Policy	09.03.2018
45	NRCS/EOU Integration Statement of Intent (NRCS)	Policy	September 2015
46	Earthquake Evaluation Framework DRAFT (NRCS)	Policy	08.09.2019
47	Earthquake Recovery Plan (RCM)	Policy	undated
48	NRCS Organizational Structure (Graph)	Policy	undated
49	ERO Transition Plan - Joint Review Meeting (NRCS)	Meeting Records	26.07.2018
50	Okhaldhunga baseline report	Assessment	
51	Ramechhap baseline report	Assessment	
52	Sindhuli baseline report	Assessment	
53	Note for acceptance and approval of the ERO WASH transition to WASH-Division	Note for acceptance	24.05.2018
54	PASSA - Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness	Guideline	
55	Post Disaster Recovery Framework – GoN – 2016-2020	NRA Framework	May 2016
56	Earthquake Response Operation 2015	IFRC Presentation	

Annex 5 – Work Plan

Tasks		Owner	Start	End
Overview				
0	Start-Up			
	Proposal Submission	GEG	15/02/2019	15/02/2019
	Contract Signed	IFRC/GEG	19/03/2019	19/03/2019
1	Planning & Methodology			
1.1	Kick-Off Meeting (Skype)	IFRC/GEG	19/03/2019	19/03/2019
1.2	Identify Key Internal and External Stakeholders	IFRC/GEG	20/03/2019	22/03/2019
1.3	Finalize Methodology, Tools and Scope of Inception Report	GEG	20/03/2019	22/03/2019
1.4	Finalize Administrative and Logistical Arrangements	GEG	20/03/2019	22/03/2019
1.5	Inception Report Writing	GEG	20/03/2019	25/03/2019
1.6	M1: Inception Report	GEG	19/03/2019	25/03/2019
2	Desk Review and Field Data Collection			
2.1	Desk Review	GEG	20/03/2019	24/03/2019
2.2	Travel to Kuala Lumpur (GV)	GEG	23/03/2019	24/03/2019
2.2	Meetings at IFRC in Kuala Lumpur	GEG	25/03/2019	25/03/2019
2.2	Travel top Kathmandu (GV)	GEG	25/03/2019	25/03/2019
2.3	Travel to Kathmandu (IL)	GEG	23/03/2019	23/03/2019
2.4	Briefing and meeting with IFRC, NRCS and evaluation team (IL)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	24/03/2019	24/09/2019
2.4	Interviews with key stakeholders in Kathmandu (IL)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	25/03/2019	26/03/2019
2.5	Travel Team 1 to Okhaldhunga (GV)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	27/03/2019	27/03/2019
2.5	Meetings w/NRCS DC and data collection field work Okhaldhunga (GV)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	28/03/2019	02/04/2019
2.6	Travel Team 2 to Sindhuli (IL)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	27/03/2019	27/03/2019
2.6	Meetings w/NRCS DC and data collection field work Sindhuli (IL)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	28/03/2019	01/04/2019
2.7	Travel Team 1 from Okhaldhunga to Ramechhap (GV)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	03/04/2019	03/04/2019
2.8	Travel Team 2 from Sindhuli to Ramechhap (IL)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	02/04/2019	02/04/2019
2.8	Meeting w/NRCS DC Ramechhap (IL)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	02/04/2019	02/04/2019
2.8	Data collection field work in Ramechhap (IL)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	03/04/2019	06/04/2019
2.9	Data collection field work in Ramechhap (GV)	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	04/04/2019	06/04/2019
2.10	Return travel Team 1 and Team to Kathmandu	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	07/04/2019	07/04/2019
2.11	Data analysis and preparation to share initial findings	GEG	08/04/2019	09/04/2019
2.11	Presentation of initial findings to IFRC/NRCS and others (GVA and KL likely to join by Skype conference)	GEG	10/04/2019	10/04/2019
2.12	Departure of GV and IL	GEG	10/04/2019	11/04/2019
2.7	M2: Interim Findings Presentation	IFRC/NRCS/GEG	10/04/2019	10/04/2019
3	Further analysis and Reporting			
3.1	In-depth analysis/preparation of DRAFT report together with thematic studies	GEG	06/05/2019	15/05/3029
3.2	M3: Submission of DRAFT Report	GEG	15/05/2019	15/05/2019
3.3	Review of DRAFT report by IFRC/NRCS	IFRC/NRCS	15/05/2019	28/05/2019
3.4	Revision of DRAFT report and preparation of FINAL report	GEG	29/05/2019	30/05/2019
3.5	Review of FINAL report and management response by IFRC/NRCS	IFRC/NRCS	01/06/2019	07/06/2019
3.6	M4: Presentation of FINAL report	GEG	08/06/2019	08/06/2019
3.7	Final approval of Commissioner	IFRC	17/06/2019	17/06/2019

Annex 6 – Stakeholders to be interviewed (= *evolving document*) – Updated 07.05.2019 GV

Ser.	Interview Date	Stakeholder Category	Stakeholder Name	Individual Position	Location	Phone	E-Mail
A	Nepal Red Cross – NHQ Kathmandu						
	Cancelled, unavailable	RCM	Sanjeev Thapa	Chairman	Kathmandu		sanjeev.thapa@nrccs.org
1	26.3.2019	RCM	SG, Treasurer, Executive Director	Senior Leadership Team	Kathmandu		
2	26.3.2019	RCM	Dev Ratna Dhakhwa	Secretary General	Kathmandu		dev@nrccs.org
3	08.4.2019	RCM	Umesh Dhakal	Executive Director	Kathmandu	0985-1056 369	umesh@nrccs.org
4	09.4.2019	RCM	Mona Aryal	Head, Health Division	Kathmandu	0984-9109665 ?	mona.aryal@nrccs.org
5	08.4.2019	RCM	Dharma Dutta Bidari	Head, Finance Department	Kathmandu	0985-1060 842	dharma@nrccs.org
6	07.4.2019	RCM	Madan Phoju	Head, Procurement Division	Kathmandu	0985-1049 560	madan.phoju@nrccs.org
7	26.3.2019	RCM	Birendra Sahi	ERO WASH Coordinator	Kathmandu		
8	07.4.2019	RCM	Dibya Raj Poudel	Director Communications	Kathmandu	0985-1172 258	
9	27.4.2019	RCM	Ramesh Ghimire	Shelter Focal Point	(Skype)	0984-1253 443	
10	26.3.2019	RCM	Ishwor Regmi	EQ Liaison Coord./former ERO Log Coord	Kathmandu		
11	09.4.2019	RCM	Bishnu Hari Devkota	OD Advisor	Kathmandu		
12	25.3.2019	RCM	Tara Devi Gurung	Deputy Director	Kathmandu		
13	25.3.2019	RCM	Sarita Dhungana	CEA officer	Kathmandu		
14	25.3.2019	RCM	Sumira Neupane	ICB officer	Kathmandu		
15	25.3.2019	RCM	Pushpa Khanal	PGI Officer	Kathmandu		
B	Nepal Red Cross – Okhaldhunga District Chapter						
16	28.3.2019	RCM	Suman Rajbhandari	DC President	Okhaldhunga		
17			Pokar Nath Dahal	DC Vice President	Okhaldhunga		
18			Indra Pathak	PMER Officer	Okhaldhunga		
19			Narayan Gopal Darshan	Admin/Finance Officer	Okhaldhunga		
20			Gopal Shrestha	DC Vice President	Okhaldhunga		
21			Kamu Maya Bhujel	DC Member (Steering Comm)	Okhaldhunga		
22			Dhalak Krishna Shrestha	DC Member (Steering Comm)	Okhaldhunga		
23		RCM	Resham Babu Khadka	District Project Coordinator	Okhaldhunga		
C	Nepal Red Cross – Ramechhap District Chapter						
24	02.4.2019	RCM	Shiv Kumar Karki (and Steering Committee)	President (and Steering Committee)	Ramechhap (Manthali)		

25	26.3.2019	RCM	Birendra Sahi	ERO WASH Coordinator	Ramechhap		
D	Nepal Red Cross – Sindhuli District Chapter						
26	28.3.2019	RCM	Ashok Shrestha (and ERO coordinators)	President (and ERO Coordinators)	Sindhuli		
27-32	28.3.2019	RCM	n.n.	President Vice President PMER, District Coord, Sec.Gen / Dy Sec Gen Treasurer / Dy Treasurer Logistics Coord, Shelter Coord	Sindhuli		
33-44	30.3.2019	RCM	10 male – 2 female volunteers		Sindhuli		
45	26.3.2019	RCM	Veeo Brehou Dasal	District Chairlady	Sindhuli		
46	26.3.2019	RCM	Bharat Kumar Shrestha	Project Coordinator	Sindhuli		
E	IFRC – Nepal Country Office, Kathmandu						
47	26.3.2019 and 05.4.2019	RCM	Juja Kim	Head, Country Office	Kathmandu		juja.kim@ifrc.org
48	05.4.2019	(RCM)	Makal Niraula	Consultant – former Transition Coordinator	Kathmandu		
49	Continuously during assignment	RCM	Herve Gazeau	Programme Coordinator	Kathmandu	0985-1221 996	herve.gazeau@ifrc.org
50	Continuously during assignment	RCM	Dibakar Behera	PMER Delegate	Kathmandu	0985-1225 117	dibakar.behera@ifrc.org
51	05.4.2019	RCM	Pradeep Mittal	Admin / Finance Delegate	Kathmandu	0985-1108 942	pradeep.mittal@ifrc.org
52	26.3.2019	RCM	Birendra Sahi	ERO WASH Coordinator	Kathmandu		
53	26.3.2019	RCM	Laxman Chhetry	Former Shelter Coord.	Kathmandu		
54	26.3.2019	RCM	Deepak Giri	Former Shelter Coord.	Kathmandu		
55	26.4.2019	RCM	Abhinav Sharma	Former IFRC HR, seconded GVA > 06/2019	Skype		abhinav.sharma@ifrc.org
56	27.4.2019	RCM	Kaustubh Kukde	Former WASH Delegate	Skype		
57	07.0.2019	RCM	Yadav Dahal	Former Admin/Fin Mgr Nepal	Skype		yp.dahal / adav.dahal@ifrc.org
58	26.4.2019	RCM	Anand Pillai	Former Fin Del IFRC Nepal	(Syria) Skype		
F	IFRC – Asia Pacific Regional Office, Kuala Lumpur / ICRC Regional Office, Kuala Lumpur						
59	25.3.2019	RCM - IFRC	Xavier Castellanos	Regional Director	Kuala Lumpur		xavier.castellanos@ifrc.org
60	25.3.2019	RCM - IFRC	Alice Ho	Operations Coordinator	Kuala Lumpur		alice.ho@ifrc.org
	Not available	RCM - IFRC	Isidro Navarro	Livelihoods / Cash Prep. Coord.	Kuala Lumpur		isidro.navarro@ifrc.org
	Not available	RCM - IFRC	Federica Lisa	Shelter / Settlement Coordinator	Kuala Lumpur		federica.lisa@ifrc.org
61	25.3.2019	RCM - IFRC	Alka Kapoor Sharma	Act. Deputy Director	Kuala Lumpur		
62	25.3.2019	RCM - IFRC	Riku Assamaki	Logistic Coordinator	Kuala Lumpur		
63	25.3.2019	RCM - IFRC	Necephor Mghendi	Head of DCPRR	Kuala Lumpur		
64	25.3.2019	RCM - IFRC	Vijay Kumar Ummidi	DM / Surge Capacity Coord.	Kuala Lumpur		

65	25.3.2019 10:00-11:15	RCM - IFRC	Jessica Letch	Emergency Ops Coord Mgr.	Kuala Lumpur		
	Not available despite several attempts	RCM - IFRC	Pierre Kremer	Head, Partnership/Resource Devt	(Skype)		pierre.kremer@ifrc.org
	No interview but E-Mail comments	RCM - IFRC	Michael Higginson	Former Earthquake Programme Coord.	E-Mail	+61447404891	mike_higginson@hotmail.com Skype: mike_higginson
66	05.4.2019 13:30-14:30	RCM-ICRC	Pramesh Poudel	Head, Cooperation Dept	Kathmandu		ppoudel@icrc.org
G	Participating National Societies (PNS)						
	Contacted, no response	RCM	Rajesh Srivastava	Country Rep British RC			rsrivastava@redcross.org.uk
67	05.4.2019	RCM	Richard McCabe	Country Rep Canadian RC	Kathmandu		
	Could not be contacted	RCM	Hrusikesh Harichandan	Prog Coord British RC	Kathmandu		hharichandan@redcross.org.uk
68	08.4.2019	RCM	Leela Mulukutla	Country Rep American RC	Kathmandu		leela.mulukutla@redcross.org
69	08.4.2019	RCM	Kazuyo Igarashi	Country Rep Japan RC	Kathmandu		
70	09.4.2019	RCM	Mukesh Singh	Country Rep Australian RC	Kathmandu		msingh@redcross.org.au
71	26.4.2019	RCM	Hanna-Leena Tikkanen	Country Rep Finnish RC	Skype		hanna-leena.tikkanen@redcross.fi
	Contacted, no response	RCM	Silvia Crespo	Country Coord Danish RC			silcr@rodekors.dk
H	Government of Nepal						
	unavailable	MoHA	Bamshi Kumar Acharya	DRR Focal Point (NEOC)	Kathmandu	0985-1097 651	
	unavailable	DUDBC	Suresh Chandra Acharya	Sen. Geographer	Kathmandu		sureshkhaira@gmail.com
72	28.3.2019	HRRP	Loren Lockwood	HRRP Coordinator	Kathmandu	0981-0032 049	
73	28.3.2019	NRA	Dr Diwat Kumar Shrestha	M&E Consultant/Head NRA-CLPIU (Building)	Kathmandu		
74	28.3.2019	NRA	Sushil Gyawali	CEO NRA	Kathmandu		
75	08.4.2019	DWSS	Devendra Jha	Head, Environ./Sanitation Div., Dept of WASH	Kathmandu		
76	26.3.2019	NSET	Surya Narayan Shrestha	Executive Director NSET	Kathmandu	0985-1103 625	
77-81	26.3.2019	NRA - DLPIU	Sushil Gyaali CEO NRA Dr. Chandra Shestra NRA Dhruba Sharma NRA Dr. Diwal Kumar, M&E consultant Jhapper Vishokarma, CLPIU	CEO NRA NRA Kathmandu NRA Kathmandu M&E Consult., CLPIU (Buildings) Dy. Project Director, CLPIU	Kathmandu		
82	28.3.2019	District Office	Ms Manuka Neupane	Chief District Officer	Okhaldhunga		
83	28.3.2019	DLPIU	Prabhakarial Karna	Head DLPIU	Okhaldhunga		
84-88	28.3.2019	AKC Agr Knowledge Centre	Devesh Rai Santhan (plus 4 staff members)	Dy. Head, AKC	Okhaldhunga		
89	28.3.2019	Mayor's Off	Mohan Kumar Shrestha	Mayor, Siddhicharan Municipality	Okhaldhunga		
90	28.3.2019	GMALI Gd Mgmt/ Local Infrastr.	Yubraj Kharel (Former Head, NRA)	Head, GMALI	Okhaldhunga		
91	28.3.2019	Municipality	Gyan Prasad Dhakal	CDO	Sindhuli		

92	26.3.2019	MoH	Sher Bahadur Kalikot	DHO	Sindhuli		
93-102	31.3.2019	MoH	Nisa Basal (+7 female/2 male health staff)	District Health Post In-Charge	Sindhuli		
103	28.3.2019	DDC	Shankhar .Barma	District Dis Com Coordinator	Sindhuli		
104	29.3.2019	DLPIU	Prabhakar Lal Karma	DLPIU Coordinator	Sindhuli		
105-106	30.3.2019	Municipality	Dipa Bohora Dahal +1 staff	Ward member	Sindhuli (Ward 6)		
107	04.4.2019	DLPIU	Prabhakari Karna/Jagdish Khan	Head DLPIU / Engineer	Ramechhap		
108	03.4.2019	DCC	Prem Bahadur Khadka	DDC Chairman	Ramechhap		
109-112	04.4.2019	MoH	Krishna Tamang (and three female staff)	In-Charge Health Post	Ramechhap (Rampur)		
113	03.4.2019	MoH	Dr Pushpa Adhikari (and staff)	Medical Superintendent	Ramechhap		
114	03.4.2019	GMALI	Dr Krishna Lal Piya	Chief Officer	Ramechhap		
115	03.4.2019	MoA	Bijay Shrestha Chapagain	District Livestock Officer	Ramechhap		
116	03.4.2019	Municipality	Krishna Prasad Sharma	CDO	Ramechhap		
117-118	04.4.2019	Municipality	Nar Thapa Magar & Nyaran Das Shrestha	Deputy Mayor and assistant	Ramechhap (Manthali)		
119	04.4.2019	Municipality	Bhim Bahadur Tamang	Ward Chairman	Ramechhap (Ward 5)		
I	Academic Institutions, Coordinating Clusters, Miscellaneous						
120	26.3.201	NSET Nat Soc EQ Tech	Surya Narayan Shrestha	Executive Director	Patan Pulchowki		
	Contacted, not responded		Klaus Palkovits	Former Programme Coord. IFRC Nepal			
K	Beneficiary Groups						
	29.3.-03.4.2019	Okhaldhunga	7 male / 11 female participants				
		Okhaldhunga	9 male / 17 female participants				
		Okhaldhunga	4 male / 6 female participants				
		Okhaldhunga	5 male / 10 female participants				
		Okhaldhunga	13 male participants				
		Okhaldhunga	4 male / 14 female participants				
		Okhaldhunga	6 male / 12 female participants				
		Okhaldhunga	6 male / 10 female participants				
		Okhaldhunga	2 male / 10 female participants				
		Okhaldhunga	16 female participants				
	29.3.-02.4.2019	Sindhuli	11 male / 3 female participants				
		Sindhuli	12 male / 4 female participants				
		Sindhuli	18 female participants				

		Sindhuli	15 male / 1 female participants				
		Sindhuli	16 male / 1 female participants				
		Sindhuli	15 male / 12 female participants				
		Sindhuli	9 male / 10 female participants				
		Sindhuli	16 male / 8 female participants				
		Sindhuli	14 male / 7 female participants				
		Sindhuli	15 female participants				
	03.4.-07.4.2019	Ramechhap	8 male / 17 female participants				
		Ramechhap	6 male / 8 female participants				
		Ramechhap	9 male / 13 female participants				
		Ramechhap	6 male / 9 female participants				
		Ramechhap	2 male / 3 female participants				
		Ramechhap	12 male / 10 female participants				
		Ramechhap	12 male / 9 female participants				
		Ramechhap	13 male / 5 female participants				

Annex 7 – Evaluation Team composition

Name	Organization	Position
Gert Venghaus	Global Emergency Group – GEG	Team Leader
Iain Logan	Global Emergency Group – GEG	Deputy Team Leader
Angus Walker	Australian Red Cross	Team Member / SME WASH
Martin de Vries	Canadian Red Cross	Team Member / SME Shelter
Runjini Raman	IFRC / CCST Bangkok	Team Member / SME PGI
Deepak Giri	Nepal Red Cross	Team Member (coord Team A)
Rukmagat Kafle	Nepal Red Cross	Team Member (coord Team B)
Samjhana Dhakal	Nepal Red Cross	Team Member
Deepika Timalisina	Freelance	Translator
Ramchandra Ghahre	Freelance	Translator

Annex 8 – Terms of Reference (initial)



International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Terms of Reference

Final Evaluation - Nepal Earthquake Response Operation

1. Summary

- 1.1. Purpose:** The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) seeks to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the Nepal Earthquake Response Operation (MDRNP008) from June 2015 to June 2019.
- 1.2. Location of consultancy:** IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO) in Kuala Lumpur, Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) National Headquarters and IFRC Country Office (CO) in Kathmandu, with field visits to Okhaldhunga, Ramechhap and Sindhuli districts.
- 1.3. Evaluation team composition:** The team will consist of four to five people - two external evaluation consultants (one team leader and one Nepali speaking), one member each from IFRC, NRCS and possibly PNS. The team members are required to understand the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and have experience of evaluating post-disaster relief and recovery programmes, preferably within the Movement.
- 1.4. Methodology summary:** The evaluation will use a range of methodologies, including secondary data collection and review, including the quantitative data from sectoral projects, field and other reports and the findings from other evaluations and lesson learning reviews, primary data collection through interviews in the field and HQ offices of the NRCS, IFRC and other RCRC and external stakeholders. The evaluator will also analyse and best utilize the MIS data from the operation.

2. Background

On Saturday, 25 April 2015, a powerful earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale struck an area between Kathmandu and Pokhara. The epicentre was about 76 kilometres northwest of Kathmandu, but its impact was felt in 32 of Nepal's 75 districts. A series of aftershocks continued to cause further damage and panic, with the strongest aftershock, measuring 7.3 magnitude, hitting the country on 12 May. The combined impact of the earthquake and the major aftershocks caused the death of around 9,000 people and injured more than 22,000¹, with a total of over 1.1 million families affected, and 700,000 families displaced. In addition, there has been extensive damage to housing², livelihoods and infrastructure, as well as disrupted access to basic services, such as health, water and sanitation.

Nepal has not experienced such a mega disaster for the last 80 years. The impact of the earthquake and aftershocks were primarily on the poor and vulnerable people in the remote rural and mountainous regions. According to the Government, 14 severely affected districts were classified 'Category A'³, with a further nine districts, with medium damage were classified 'Category B'. A state of national emergency was declared by the Government of Nepal (GoN) on 25 April 2015 and an official request for international assistance was made within hours of the first tremor. Many humanitarian actors, including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC Movement) mobilized the full range of their resources to support the first international response in Nepal. On 26 April, the IFRC Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) released CHF 500,000 as start-up funding for the operation and on 27 April, the IFRC launched an Emergency Appeal for CHF

33.4 million (MDRNP008) seeking funding for the most urgent needs. IFRC activated its global response tools to support NRCS in its response and in its coordination with Movement and external partners. Within the first weeks of the emergency response, over 200 international delegates arrived to support the operation. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and Cluster mechanisms were formally activated for the response, and IFRC and NRCS jointly coordinated with UN-OCHA and the GoN to ensure complementarity of the national

¹ Post-Disaster Need Assessment [report](#), Government of Nepal.

² Secondary data analysis and earthquake intensity mapping indicate that up to 600,000 houses were fully destroyed and a further 280,000 damaged.

³ Gorkha, Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, Lalitpur, Sindhupalchowk, Ramechhap, Dolakha, Nuwakot, Dhading, Rasuwa, Sindhuli, Okhaldhunga, Makwanpur, and Kavre.

response and participated in country cluster meetings and technical working groups. The IFRC delivered its dedicated role as Convenor of the Shelter Cluster, which was funded through the Emergency Appeal.

IFRC officially closed its relief operation in December 2015 and began working closely with NRCS and partners to plan for recovery. In June 2015, Movement partners (NRCS, IFRC, PNSs and ICRC) confirmed their commitment to promote a "one vision, one plan, one structure, one team approach" to recovery and to set up a "Movement-Wide Recovery Framework" and "Integrated Movement Recovery

Plan” (‘One Plan’) to guide all recovery activities. The partners also agreed that NRCS would lead and report on the ‘One Plan’ and all its activities, which were based on an integrated “4+1 approach” (four technical sectors – shelter, WASH, livelihoods and health - plus National Society capacity building). Community engagement and accountability (CEA), protection, gender and inclusion (PGI) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) were also important cross-cutting elements across all sectors, as was planning, monitoring and reporting and information management (PMER-IM). NRCS had full ownership of implementing the entire programme in the 14 target districts and to support this an Earthquake Response Operation (ERO) structure was set up at NRCS HQ and in the district chapters.

All planning was based on the Government’s National Recovery Strategy and the strategies in the Earthquake Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), which prioritised shelter. The GoN has taken the lead the recovery process and set-up a common framework and guidelines for humanitarian action across all recovery programmes. This was reinforced by a Government Bill (Reconstruction of Earthquake Affected Structures) and the setting up of the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) in December 2015.

Since late June 2016, NRCS has implemented a wide range of recovery initiatives in close cooperation with the RCRC Movement partners and with the national and local authorities. PNSs have supported the recovery ‘One Plan’ in different ways, depending on priorities and available resources. 11 of the 14 worst affected districts were covered by PNSs through bilateral projects, while the remaining three districts (Okhaldhunga, Ramechhap and Sindhuli) were provided with shelter, WASH, health and livelihoods recovery support by IFRC, upon the request of NRCS (see the EPoA and [Previous Appeals and Updates](#))⁴. IFRC also supported NRCS during the recovery, with funding, coordination, and institutional capacity building.

Finally, the IFRC supported NRCS and in-country PNSs in designing and coordinating the implementation of a comprehensive transition framework - the “One Master Transitional Plan”. In line with this plan, most in-country PNSs will be phasing out their bilateral or consortia programmes by mid-2019 and moving to longer-term development programmes, with only some recovery activities, mainly construction continuing.

While NRCS was responsible for the coordination and overall implementation of the recovery plan, IFRC supported Movement coordination and partners’ contributions to the plan. This was done through a Movement Coordination Meeting (MCM)⁵, which was established prior to the earthquake and continued to meet every month during the response, to facilitate coordination and strategic / operational planning and decision-making. There were also sectoral working groups (shelter, WASH, livelihoods and PMER-IM-CEA/Comms-PGI) held to update partners and discuss sectoral issues, developments and mitigation measures. Movement partners⁶ are also ensuring close contact with external stakeholders, including the GoN (the NRA), the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), the Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC), the Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform (HRRP) and other in-country humanitarian stakeholders to ensure complementarity and learning, and minimize overlaps or gaps.

Over the last three years, there were many unforeseen delays in the recovery operation. The GoN were strict in ensuring that all recovery projects were aligned with Government policy, regulations and guidelines, although these were not in place at the time. The integrated recovery programmes were not allowed to be implemented until June 2016 - almost two years after the earthquake - following the signing of the agreement with NRA and DUDBC, to streamline the reconstruction with the GoN’s overall plan. Strikes and volatile political and social circumstances also led to a Government moratorium on humanitarian activities related to earthquake recovery during 2016. These affected areas, such as the owner-driven shelter components, which could not move forward as planned until procedures were finalised in January 2017. As a result, IFRC had to revise its emergency appeal, EPOA and timeframe several times.

⁴ Appeal time frame was extended twice: first until 31 Dec 2018 and second until 30 June 2019.

⁵ In the initial phase of the operation, MCM was held every fortnight.

⁶ Currently, there are 12 PNSs in Nepal supporting the NRCS in the implementation of the earthquake recovery plan. The in-country PNSs include American Red Cross, Australian Red Cross, Belgian Red Cross-Flanders, British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, Danish Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, Japanese Red Cross, Korean Red Cross, Spanish Red Cross, Swiss Red Cross and Qatar Red Crescent.

Alignment to the IFRC’s objectives and strategy

NRCS 7th Development Plan 2016-2020 is aligned to Strategy 2020 of the IFRC. The strategic priorities of NRCS are focused on its long-term commitment to reduce vulnerability and promote peace in line with the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. The Nepal Earthquake Response Operation is the biggest operation ever managed by NRCS in its history

This evaluation consultancy contributes to the Emergency Appeal MDRNP008 launched in April 2015 in the aftermath of the earthquake in Nepal. IFRC is committed towards increasing the impact of the Movement in terms of quality assurance, standards and a culture of lesson learning in disaster recovery operations. Those operations that require an international response and meet certain criteria of scale, scope, complexity or risk, as does the Nepal Earthquake Response Operation, are committed to carrying out this final evaluation of the recovery phase. The [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#) requires that a review be undertaken for any programme over 24 months in timeframe.

3. Evaluation purpose and scope

3.1. Purpose

This final evaluation aims to assess the relevance, effectiveness (and any clear impact), efficiency and sustainability of the systems⁷, management, and coordination, of the IFRC Emergency Appeal (MDRNP008) responding to the Nepal Earthquake.

The evaluation will:

- a) Take stock of evaluations and reviews to date (e.g the RTE) and see how recommendations and lessons from the relief operation have been addressed and implemented by the IFRC and partners, particularly during the recovery programme.
- b) Focus in more depth on the recovery programming, to see how relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable the recovery programming and the IFRC's support for the recovery has been, including for the integrated "4+1 model", in line with the 'One Plan'. (The evaluation will determine the results /degree of achievement of the recovery objectives under the 'One Plan' model and under the outcomes of the IFRC EPoA, including what worked well and what requires improvement).
- c) The team will ensure that the evaluation is done through a lens of how well the IFRC and wider partners' support has facilitated NRCS capacity development across different levels and across the whole operation.

The evaluation will provide recommendations enable NRCS and IFRC to further strengthen effective response and recovery system and capacities, both within NRCS headquarters and district chapter levels, as well as in the IFRC and wider Movement support. Recommendations may inform NRCS and IFRC in defining strategies and approaches to response and recovery programming under the new federal structure of Nepal, that would improve the service delivery and accountability to the affected people, donors and other stakeholders to analyse and improve future operations. The recommendations should take into account the realities of the context and NRCS capacities.

3.2. Scope

The findings of the RTE and the Operational Excellence Review (OPEX) highlighted the humanitarian response in the emergency phase, whereas the Mid-Term Review (MTR) captured issues around processes, systems, and structure followed in the recovery operation. The scope of this final evaluation therefore needs to review to what extent earlier findings and recommendations have been considered and delivered on in the recovery intervention. A baseline survey was also conducted before starting the recovery activities (July - September 2016) and the findings will also be taken into consideration during this evaluation, to benchmark progress and results. This team will also use any other reviews and evaluations, as well as programme monitoring data/MIS, to ensure that the evaluation is part of the long evaluative process around this operation and not a stand-alone study.

⁷ Systems mentioned here will include the guidelines, manuals, policies and frameworks from NRCS and IFRC.

The time period – The evaluation will be carried out between March to May 2019. It will look at the whole operation under the Emergency Appeal, including:

- the Relief Phase (June 2015 - 31 December 2015), This will look primarily at the follow up on the findings and recommendations of the Real Time Evaluation (RTE) and other evaluations and reviews of the relief operations, as well as the transition from relief to recovery.
- the Early Recovery Phase (January to June 2016).
- Recovery and Reconstruction Phase (July 2016 to June 2019). This will assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the overall integrated recovery programme and its transition to the long-term programming of NRCS, particularly the sustainability of what is being transitioned to the NS.

The geographical coverage – The field visits will be focused on three districts that were supported by IFRC, namely Okhaldhunga, Ramechhap and Sindhuli. All three districts have been considered for field work due to varied geographical locations, target communities and socio-economic profile of the beneficiaries.

The units of analysis to be assessed – This will cover NRCS HQ and District Chapter leadership and ERO management, and the relevant IFRC Secretariat (IFRC Nepal CO and APRO Kuala Lumpur). Apart from meeting with beneficiaries, the Evaluation team will also meet with and interview key Red Cross Red Crescent stakeholders of in-country PNSs, other key stakeholders from the government such as NRA, DUDBC and Ministry of Health (MoH), and other organizations such as UN agencies, national Shelter Cluster, HRRP, INGOs/NGOs as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives.

Deeper analysis on Shelter and WASH – Shelter and WASH are the two major components of the recovery intervention that need deeper analysis on longer-term impact, value for money and learning prospects for NRCS future programmes. **Specialist team members would be tasked to look into this on the ground during field visits to the three districts**

The evaluation should be carried out in line with Evaluation Framework of NRCS developed for the entire earthquake recovery programme as well as IFRC Framework for Evaluation.

4. Evaluation objectives, criteria and questions

Below are the specific objectives, criteria and possible key questions to be addressed in this final evaluation. These are initial guidance and can be further elaborated in consultation with the consultant and Evaluation Management Team (EMT) during the Inception Report process.

4.1. Objectives:

- Assess the level of follow up and delivery vis-à-vis the commitments made in the EPoA during the relief phase and in relation to the previous RTE and OPEX recommendations and the transition to the recovery programme and highlight any gaps or barriers to progress. This will cover the range of programmes and NS capacity support, but will, in particular provide more in-depth analysis on shelter and WASH outcomes.
- Assess in more detail, the extent to which the recovery intervention was an appropriate operation from IFRC and NRCS perspective, in terms of its priorities and capacities, and what elements advanced and hindered its delivery. Consider the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the integrated programming approach (the 4+1 model, and in using cash-based interventions) and the delivery of the One Integrated Recovery Plan outcomes. This should include a status update of what worked, what needs to be improved and what can be taken forward as lessons and next steps.
- Finally, consider how far the response (relief and recovery) have strengthened NRCS's development and longer-term community preparedness/risk reduction capacities and what could be done to further improve their capacity strengthening, transfer of knowledge and skills, and transition back to longer-term programming.

4.2. Criteria:

The evaluation will be guided by following criteria:

- i) the **relevance / appropriateness** of the operation, particularly the recovery programming, in delivering assistance based on needs and context;
- ii) **effectiveness** of the management and coordination, including any related **impact** that is evident from the effective delivery of the interventions on behalf of affected communities and in support of the National Society's capacities, both intended or not;
- iii) **efficiency** of the interventions and recovery programmes in delivering quality services with minimum (or cost-effective) resources, including **accountability** to the affected people/communities and to donors to the programmes; and
- iv) **sustainability** of the interventions and the recovery programming in relation to enhancing the resilience of assisted people against future hazards and developing the organizational capacity of NRCS for future events.

4.3. Questions:

Relevant key questions aligned to each criteria has been developed for this evaluation as a possible option, but are not exhaustive and should be seen as a guideline - based on the needs on the ground, these questions can be modified and further developed as required. They will be consolidated with the consultant as part of the inception report process.

The final evaluation criteria are based on internationally recognized practices, largely adopted from the OECD/DAC criteria, include the Fundamental Principles and Code of Conduct of the RCRC Movement in disaster management including recovery. Further guidance can be found in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation.

I. **Relevance / appropriateness**

- To what extent were the specific interventions relevant to the needs, priorities and rights of the target communities?
- To what extent did target communities participate in the planning, design and implementation of the programme?
- Was the scale of the programme appropriate and proportional to IFRC/PNS and NRCS' capacity, experience and mandate?
- To what extent IFRC/PNSs considered the absorption and delivery capacity of the NRCS (in the programme design and during programme implementation)?
- What did IFRC/PNS do to enhance identified capacity gaps?
- How effective have been the mechanisms for communication, feedback and complaints?
- Have different options for interventions been considered in the programme design?
- Did NRCS collect and act on community feedbacks and how effective have been the mechanism for communication, feedback and complaints?

II. **Effectiveness**

- To what extent has the programme achieved its intended outcomes?
- What was the positive or negative unintended results/impact of the programme?
- Have all outputs contributed to intended outcomes under 'One Plan'?
- How effective has the programme been in coordinating with external actors?
- Has the disaster preparedness capacity of NRCS increased due to the recovery programme?

III. **Impact**

- To what extent has the recovery programme reached and had a positive impact and ensured safety on the most vulnerable, in particular women, children and young people, people with disabilities and people from different castes/ethnic groups and communities?
- To what extent and in what ways has capacity building translated into more effective operations at district chapter and headquarters levels?
- What would the situation have been in the target areas if the intervention had not taken place?
- What are the economic and social effects of the intervention, e.g. local markets, social relations, on district chapter structure and volunteering spirit?
- How was the level of sectoral linkage and integration? What was impact of the integrated programmes?

IV. **Efficiency / cost-effectiveness**

- How have management, logistic, financial and technical arrangements in the headquarters and district been facilitated to meet the project's objectives?
- How did we work together within Movement and other agencies or against one another (partnership, coordination, structure and synergy) in line with One Movement Recovery Plan (4+1) model?
- How timely has the delivery of outputs been in relation to need?
- How efficiently, in terms of time and costs, were activities carried out?
- Was the recovery programme built on NRCS existing strategy, capacities and 4+1 model?

V. **Sustainability**

- Have the capacities and responsibilities of the recovery programme (been transitioned to NRCS normal structure?
- Has the recovery programme strengthened NRCS chapters, and the internal functioning of the National Society (*skill, resources and structure*)?
- Has the sustainability *approach/concept (skill, resources and structure)* introduced and followed in the community infrastructure related projects after programme closure? What was or would have been required to accomplish these benefits and sustainable approaches?
- Was the programme environmentally and financially sustainable?
- To what extent did the recovery programme engage local stakeholders such as local authorities, community leaders, policy maker, academia to tap into local knowledge for sustainability of the programme?

5. **Evaluation methodology and process**

The methodology will adhere to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluations](#), with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted and utilized.

The applicant is expected to propose an approach and methodology for the evaluation. The specific evaluation methodology will be detailed out in close consultation between the evaluation team, EMT, Commissioner and relevant key stakeholders, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

1. **Desktop review** of operation background documents, beneficiary data, background and history of relevant organizations, including IFRC as well as NRCS and National policies, prior IFRC reports as well as guidelines and policy documents of the NRA and MIS data.
2. Conduct consultation process/meetings with the partner members of 'One Plan' and other stakeholders as appropriate.
3. **Field visits/observations** in project communities in Sindhuli, Ramechhap and Okhaldhunga districts.
4. **Key informant interviews** (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate).
5. **Focus group discussions**, (institutional and beneficiaries as per need).
6. **Household survey**, to capture end line value of key indicators against outcome level baseline value, as time and capacity allows.

Interviews can be conducted in person or via Skype and will include NRCS, IFRC, and PNS personnel (e.g. managers, field officers, direct implementers, volunteers and social mobilizers), beneficiaries (e.g. central/ district/local officials, township executives/volunteers, 'most vulnerable' beneficiaries including children, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, and families with high dependency ratio) at Kathmandu and district chapters, PNSs, and the relevant IFRC Secretariat offices. The team will also consult with other partners and organizations such as NRA and other government agencies, HRRP, the UN, INGOs / NGOs as appropriate who rendered recovery support, and people who did not receive assistance. These may be in the form of key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGDs) or other participatory methods, at the discretion of the evaluation team.

The detailed evaluation design will be defined by the external evaluation consultant; however, the following should be considered:

- **Sampling method** is to be decided by the evaluator, as long the final sample to be evaluated on includes both NRCS and IFRC informants involved in the earthquake operation interventions, district chapters, sectors of the intervention and the 'most vulnerable' beneficiaries.

- **Data collection methods** and pace are to be decided by the evaluator, in consultation with the NRCS and IFRC country office focal person(s).
- **The evaluation team should visit** a representative number of beneficiaries, communities in the districts where the response operations was implemented.
- The evaluation team is expected to adapt to a qualitative research and evaluation framework considering the width of information will be available through the secondary and literature review and the evaluation team is expected to assess the operation on the 'depth' parameters of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.
- Case studies, best practices documentation, anecdotes and chronological documentation of the processes will ensure the quality of the outcomes and whether the final products can be published.

The evaluation team will consist of up to five people (at least two of which would need to have technical expertise in **shelter** and **WASH**):

- a) one **external evaluation consultant as team leader**, with knowledge of local context who will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations. The external evaluator will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he will not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation or context being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence and ethics and integrity for this. S/he will provide insights on the subject matter and report on progress or challenges to the management group;
- b) one **external evaluation consultant (Nepali speaking)** with evaluation experience of major recovery programme in Nepal. S/he will be hired in consultation with the team leader as part of his/her key team member;
- c) one evaluation practitioner from the **IFRC** to provide context on IFRC Framework for Evaluation, Earthquake Evaluation Framework of NRCS;
- d) one evaluation practitioner from **NRCS** who will provide the interface with the Secretariat offices in country and will help to clarify internal processes and approaches for the team; and
- e) opportunities will be explored to encourage participation of one evaluation practitioner from **PNSs** depending upon interest and availability to participate and support the team as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives.

The team will be gender balanced and ideally the team leader or one of the team members should have regional knowledge/experience and speak Nepali, and ideally all candidates will have some experience with evaluation practices and the IFRC disaster response systems. It is expected that all evaluation team members have strong evaluation experience and are able to conduct an independent, reliable and informed evaluation of the emergency and recovery operation context that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

6. Evaluation deliverables and outputs

- 6.1. Inception report** - The inception report should include the proposed methodologies, a data collection and reporting plan with identified deliverables, draft data collection tools such as interview guides, questionnaire, sampling method, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables and travel and logistical arrangements for the evaluation.
- 6.2. Debriefing** - A debriefing will be conducted in IFRC Nepal CO after data collection. The debriefing is to update the progress and initial findings with recommendations of the evaluation.
- 6.3. Initial findings/feedback presentations:** The team will share its initial findings with NRCS and IFRC, in- country partners in an after-review participatory meeting before the evaluator departs from the Kathmandu. A similar meeting will be organized at the IFRC Asia Pacific Office in Kuala Lumpur or in IFRC Geneva.
- 6.4. Draft report:** A draft report identifying key findings based on facts, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted to the IFRC by the team leader within eight days after presenting the initial findings. The report should also have the detailed findings from the in-depth thematic studies focused on shelter and WASH intervention as separate annex. The feedback provided by IFRC and NRCS should be validated by the Evaluation Management Team (EMT) and the same should be incorporated into the final report.
The preliminary report will be submitted through the EMT, which will ensure the quality of the report providing input if necessary. The EMT will submit the final report to the Commissioner, IFRC Secretariat stakeholders and NRCS leadership, staff and volunteers for their review and clarifications. IFRC head of country office and in Nepal will coordinate a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up. In this process, PMER can facilitate and provide necessary technical assistance. Upon receiving,

management response and clarifications, the EMT will share the report with the evaluation team leader to finalize the report.

6.5. Final report: The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention reviewed, a description of the review methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned and clear recommendations. Recommendations should be SMART that includes lessons learned and good practices. The final report will be submitted within two weeks after receiving the consolidated feedback on draft report. The report should also include:

- 6.5.1.** an analysis on how each outcome contributed to national policy and commitment to SDGs;
- 6.5.2.** two in-depth case studies analysing shelter and WASH interventions, to support NRCS learning and inform future operations; and
- 6.5.3.** appropriate appendices: copy of the ToR, cited resources, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials.

The findings and all products arising from this evaluation will be jointly owned by the Nepal Red Cross Society and IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his / her own work or to make use of the review results for private publication purposes.

All case studies, anecdotes, any rough tool used and copies of participatory tools to be submitted to the EMT to ensure scientific accountability and data protection of the evaluation.

7. Proposed Timeline and Schedule

The evaluation is expected to be completed within maximum of 40 paid working days⁸, including submission of the final report with separate thematic study findings and annexes but not including non-working days. The evaluation will commence from early March 2019 with the following schedule and deliverables.

Activity	Location	Paid working Days	Deliverables	Dates
1. Desk review: Review earthquake operation documents, and related primary/secondary resources for the evaluation. 2. Development of inception report, evaluation methodology, data collection/analysis plan schedule and tools.	Home country	4	Interview schedule and inception report and presentation of inception report	1-4 March 2019
Review and approve inception report				5-10 March 2019
Briefing and meeting: Evaluation team with IFRC and NRCS as well as PNSs	Kathmandu	1		11 March 2019
Piloting data collection tools		1		12 March 2019
In-country data collection and key Informant Interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FDG) from the target stakeholders	Kathmandu	2		13-14 March 2019
	Sindhuli and Ramechhap	9		15-23 March 2019
	Okhaldhunga	7		24-30 March 2019
Data analysis and drafting evaluation report	Kathmandu	4		31 March-3 April 2019
Presentation of initial findings, recommendations and conclusions	Kathmandu, Kuala Lumpur	2	Presentation of initial findings	4-5 April 2019

Prepare and submit draft report with thematic studies	Home country	8	Draft evaluation report	8-15 April 2019
Review of the draft report: NRCS and IFRC submits any requests for clarifications, corrections, changes on the draft report				16 – 28 April 2019
Revise and submit final evaluation report with annexes. Address feedbacks with revisions in report where appropriate	Home country	2	Final evaluation report	29-30 April 2019
Management Response by NRCS and IFRC			Management response	1-15 May 2019
Final report approval by the Commissioner			Dissemination	16 May 2019
Total days		40		

⁸ Hired consultants will not be paid for travel days into and out of country, but will be given a per diem.

EVALUATION MANAGEMENT TEAM AND RESPONSE TEAM

The Evaluation Management Team (EMT) will consist of four people not directly involved with the operation: 1 member from NRCS, 1 member from IFRC Nepal CO (programme coordinator) and 2 members from IFRC APRO Kuala Lumpur. The EMT will be led by the IFRC programme coordinator, in order to manage and oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensure that it upholds the IFRC Framework for Evaluations. It will be responsible for overseeing logistic and contractual arrangement of the evaluation, managing any external consultants, delegating responsibilities, securing approval of key deliverables according to the evaluation contract/time frame and ensuring adequate quality control throughout the evaluation process. Additional support will be given by IFRC and NRCS staff members, earthquake response operation team members and volunteers for organizing consultative meeting, field study as well as other administrative and logistical arrangements as needed.

The EMT will submit the report to the key stakeholders interviewed for review and clarifications. The Commissioner will oversee a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up.

An Evaluation Management Response Team (EMRT) will be formed representing IFRC APRO Regional Director, IFRC Nepal HoO, programme coordinator, Executive Director of NRCS, NRCS Earthquake Liaison Coordinator and NRCS Deputy Director of PMER Division at the end of the evaluation to respond to the recommendations made in the evaluation report, supported by PMER.

EMT will be contact person for the team leader in order to make necessary arrangements for field visits and evaluation process. The Team Leader will coordinate directly with the EMT and IFRC Country Office.

8. Evaluation quality and ethical standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable process outlined in the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#) and guidance in the Nepal Earthquake Evaluation Framework. The IFRC Evaluation standards are:

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.

6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the review will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at: www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

The following ethical considerations will be observed throughout planning and execution of the evaluation and during documentation and presentation of the findings:

- The process at any point will ensure 'Do No Harm' principle. This will not only relate to physical consideration but also emotional and contextual considerations that might affect the well-being or social position of the participating individuals.
- The National Society (here NRCS) will be informed about the purpose, design and the expected outcomes of the evaluation, in advance and the evaluation plan will be finalized in collaboration with NRCS and the local IFRC office.
- The methodologies and the broad generic question categories will be discussed with the NRCS leadership and the process will commence only after receiving an endorsement from them.
- Information at all levels will be confidential in nature and the analysis will be done based on blinding of the characters and context; as much as possible.
- Each person involved and the participating stakeholders will be completely briefed about the purpose of the process and the expected end products, with all the mediums to be used for documentation and presentation of the same.
- Any photograph and contextual information (name, household information, history, locality name, VDC, ward name etc.) will only be published if all the participating members endorse the process and allow publication of the same in totality.
- Any health or social status of the interviewed individuals will not be revealed with his/ her real name on it and without consent.
- The data and information collected will be triangulated in totality before publishing and the same will be done for all the secondary information received.
- The case study and monographs will use caution to present the cases with dignity and without any personal judgment and bias of the evaluator.
- The findings, case studies, photographs, process highlights and recommendations will be shared with the NRCS and IFRC Nepal CO at Kathmandu, before finalizing the document for publication.
- The methodologies and the research design to be finalized and endorsed by the Evaluation Management Team, who will act as the upholder of the ethical standards of this report.
- The evaluator (s) will not have any personal and patent rights over the raw and refined data and the end- product of this process.
- In case the author wishes to use the unpublished datasets or information's, from this evaluation; (s)he/they must seek principle approval from IFRC.
- The evaluator(s) is not authorized to promise a service or provide solution for any expressed problems. Though (s)he may document the same and make it available to the NRCS and IFRC.
- Complete orientation of the government laws and policies will be pivotal and at any point the evaluation team must respect and adhere to the local laws and policies.

9. Qualifications

The external evaluation consultants must have extensive experience of evaluating post-disaster relief and recovery programme of large-scale operations. The team leader should have significant knowledge of humanitarian response mechanisms, implementation and transition of the recovery programmes, and previous experience in National Society Development and in conducting assessment of attribution of response and recovery programmes in capacity and systemic development of National Societies.

The evaluation team members will support the team leader in conducting a successful and efficient evaluation and to deliver different objectives especially in relation to rehabilitation and recovery program outcomes, impact of the project on National Society development and help capture the successful models, strategies through the medium of chronological process document, case study compendium formation, etc.

Selection of the international and national consultant will be based on the qualifications outlined below:

1. Demonstrable experience in leading and managing evaluations and review of recovery operations in complex situations where multiple partners and sectors involved related to major disasters, preferably in Nepal;
2. Knowledge and experience working with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and knowledge of the IFRC's disaster management systems.
3. Experience of working in Nepal and familiarity with culture and political situations would be an advantage.
4. Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
5. Strong team leadership and management skills including negotiation, facilitation and time management.
6. Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner.
7. Proven track record of conducting qualitative research including the development of interview schedules and qualitative data as well quantitative data analysis, especially in emergency and recovery context.
8. Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a team;
9. Excellent writing and presentation skills in English (for international consultant) and Nepali languages (for national consultant) required.
10. Immediate availability for the period indicated.
11. Strong preference for the international consultant to have his/her national consultant and own translator with extensive expertise in evaluating major shelter and WASH programmes.

10. Application procedures

Interested applicants should submit their expression of interest to the following email: pmer.apzo@ifrc.org and herve.gazeau@ifrc.org by 11 February 2019 (Geneva time). In the subject line, please state the consultancy you are applying for, your company name or last name and first name. **(SUBJECT: Nepal Earthquake Response Operation (MDRNP008) Final Evaluation - Last Name, First Name).**

Application materials should include:

1. **Curriculum Vitae** (CVs) of international and national consultants/team.
2. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing your experience as it pertains to this evaluation, daily consultancy fees (in Swiss Francs) inclusive of rate for the national consultant and three professional references.
3. Applicants will be required to provide a **2-pager approach paper** with review methodology and a sample of previous written report most similar to that described in this ToR.
4. **Financial proposal:** It is expected from the international consultant to submit the financial bid for themselves (daily rate), full cost of a Nepali speaking national consultant and interpretation costs (if needed).

Application material are non-returnable, and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process. Please take note that incomplete application will be rejected.

11. Appendices (to be presented after appointment)

- 11.1. Package of Reference Documents for MDRNP008
- 11.2. Stakeholders list
- 11.3. List of beneficiaries
- 11.4. Nepal Earthquake Evaluation Framework

Annex 9 – Adjusted time frame

(Agreed by NRCS / IFRC CO Nepal / IFRC APRO)

Detailed Evaluation Schedule and Plan 2019

Activity	Location	Paid working Days	Dates
1. Skype call between all evaluation team members 2. Desk review: Review earthquake operation documents, and related primary/secondary resources for the evaluation. 3. Development of inception report, evaluation methodology, data collection/analysis plan schedule and tools.	Home country	4	20-24 March
Review and approve inception report			25 March
Arrival of Iain Logan in Kathmandu	Travel		23 March
Arrival of Gert Venghaus for briefing with Xavier	Travel		24 March
Briefing meeting with Xavier and KL team	Kuala Lumpur	1	25 March
Arrival of Gert in Kathmandu	Travel		25 March late evening
1. Briefing and meeting with IFRC, NRCS and evaluation team by Iain Logan 2. Piloting data collection tools and questionnaires	Kathmandu, IFRC CO	1	24 March
In-country data collection: key Informant Interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FDG) from the target stakeholders	Kathmandu	2	25-26 March
Travel to Okhaldhunga by Team-A led by Gert	Okhaldhunga		27 March
Travel to Sindhuli by Team -B led by Iain	Sindhuli		27 March
Meeting with District Chapter team and preparation for the field work	Okhaldhunga	1	28 March
Field work and data collection (KII, FDG and project site visits, etc.) <i>Coverage: 4 wards (scattered in nature)</i>	Okhaldhunga	5	29 March – 2 April
Meeting with District Chapter team and preparation for the field work	Sindhuli	1	28 March
Field work and data collection (KII, FDG and project site visits, etc.) <i>Coverage: 1 ward (scattered in nature)</i>	Sindhuli	4	29 March - 1 April
Travel to Ramechhap from Okhaldhunga by Team-A (5-6 hours' drive)	Travel		3 April
Travel to Ramechhap by Team-B (3 hours' drive)	Travel		2 April

Meeting with District Chapter team and preparation for the field work by Team-B	Ramechhap	1	2 April
Field work and data collection (KII, FDG and project site visits, etc..) by Team-B <i>Coverage: 2 wards (wider coverage)</i>	Ramechhap	4	3 – 6 April
Field work and data collection (KII, FDG and project site visits, etc..) by Team- A	Ramechhap		4 – 6 April
Return to Kathmandu by Team – A and Team- B	Travel		7 April
Data analysis and preparation to share initial findings with IFRC, NRCS, PNSs and other stakeholders	Kathmandu	2	8 – 9 April
Presentation of initial findings, recommendations and conclusions	Kathmandu (Kuala Lumpur/Geneva can join via skype)	1	10 April
Gert leaves Kathmandu (evening)	Travel		10 April
Iain wrap up and complete any unfished field work/KII		1	11 April
Iain leaves Kathmandu	Travel		12 April
Prepare and submit draft report along with Thematic studies findings as an annex	Home country	10	6-15 May 2019
Review of the draft report: NRCS and IFRC submits any requests for clarifications, corrections, changes on the draft report			15 – 28 May 2019
Revise and submit final evaluation report with annexes. Address feedbacks with revisions in report where appropriate	Home country	2	29-30 May April 2019
Management Response by NRCS and IFRC			1-7 June 2019
Final report approval by the Commissioner			17 June 2019
Total days		40	

Annex 10– Financial Report (as of May 10, 2019)

bo.ifrc.org > Public Folders > Finance > Donor Reports > Appeals and Projects > Emergency Appeal - Standard Report

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Emergency Appeal

DRAFT FINANCIAL REPORT

Selected Parameters			
Reporting Timeframe	2015/2-2019/4	Operation	MDRNP008
Budget Timeframe	2015-2019	Budget	APPROVED

Prepared on 10 May 2019

All figures are in Swiss Francs (CHF)

MDRNP008 - Nepal - Earthquake

Operating Timeframe: 25 Apr 2015 to 30 Jun 2019; appeal launch date: 26 Apr 2015

I. Emergency Appeal Funding Requirements

Thematic Area Code	Requirements CHF
AOF1 - Disaster risk reduction	2,126,698
AOF2 - Shelter	39,001,716
AOF3 - Livelihoods and basic needs	1,206,418
AOF4 - Health	1,376,038
AOF5 - Water, sanitation and hygiene	2,647,356
AOF6 - Protection, Gender & Inclusion	0
AOF7 - Migration	0
SFI1 - Strengthen National Societies	1,709,136
SFI2 - Effective international disaster management	4,304,736
SFI3 - Influence others as leading strategic partners	497,139
SFI4 - Ensure a strong IFRC	3,526,007
Total Funding Requirements	56,395,244
Donor Response* as per 10 May 2019	54,180,700
Appeal Coverage	96.07%

II. IFRC Operating Budget Implementation

Thematic Area Code	Budget	Expenditure	Variance
AOF1 - Disaster risk reduction	1,042,549	1,042,549	0
AOF2 - Shelter	36,596,753	36,519,653	77,100
AOF3 - Livelihoods and basic needs	1,098,541	1,098,539	1
AOF4 - Health	1,538,987	1,533,639	5,348
AOF5 - Water, sanitation and hygiene	2,726,024	2,716,817	9,206
AOF6 - Protection, Gender & Inclusion	0	0	0
AOF7 - Migration	0	0	0
SFI1 - Strengthen National Societies	1,330,522	1,316,372	14,150
SFI2 - Effective international disaster management	4,470,689	4,319,529	151,160
SFI3 - Influence others as leading strategic partners	361,558	355,478	6,080
SFI4 - Ensure a strong IFRC	1,720,064	1,733,542	-13,479
Grand Total	50,885,686	50,636,118	249,568

III. Operating Movement & Closing Balance per 2019/04

Opening Balance	0
Income (includes outstanding DREF Loan per IV.)	56,137,989
Expenditure	-50,636,118
Closing Balance	5,501,871
Deferred Income	0
Funds Available	5,501,871

IV. DREF Loan

* not included in Donor Response	Loan :	500,000	Reimbursed :	500,000	Outstanding :	0
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Emergency Appeal

DRAFT FINANCIAL REPORT

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MDRNP008 - Nepal - Earthquake

Operating Timeframe: 25 Apr 2015 to 30 Jun 2019; appeal launch date: 26 Apr 2015

V. Contributions by Donor and Other Income

Opening Balance					0	
Income Type	Cash	InKind Goods	InKind Personnel	Other Income	TOTAL	Deferred Income
Accenture	24,970				24,970	
AECOM	5,048				5,048	
Afghanistan Red Crescent	23,249				23,249	
Airbus	67,753				67,753	
Albanian Red Cross	18,974				18,974	
American Red Cross	6,218,896	426,040			6,644,936	
Andorran Red Cross	23,969				23,969	
Apple iTunes	622,832				622,832	
Australian Red Cross	3,532,034	1,142,395	22,800		4,697,229	
Australian Red Cross (from Australian Government*)	812,092				812,092	
Austrian Red Cross	797,368	899,506	106,800		1,803,674	
Austrian Red Cross (from Austrian Government*)	1,085,650				1,085,650	
Avanade	7,616				7,616	
Avery Dennison Foundation	9,862				9,862	
Avnet	865				865	
Bangladesh Red Crescent Society	17,238				17,238	
Belarus Red Cross	3,217				3,217	
Belgian Red Cross (Flanders)	97,329				97,329	
Botswana Red Cross Society (from Botswana Governr	17,503				17,503	
BP Foundation	26,910				26,910	
Brazilian Red Cross	68,679				68,679	
British Red Cross	1,852,725	1,270,680			3,123,405	
British Red Cross (from British Government*)	4,139,877				4,139,877	
British Red Cross (from DEC (Disasters Emergency C	652,451				652,451	
Bulgarian Red Cross	63,708				63,708	
Cartier Philanthropy	300,000				300,000	
Charities Aid Foundation	8,102				8,102	
Charities Aid Foundation (from Shell*)	123,015				123,015	
China Red Cross, Hong Kong branch	1,616,829	721,569			2,338,398	
China Red Cross, Macau Branch	35,642				35,642	
CITRIX	94				94	
Colombian Red Cross Society (from Colombia - Private	28,081				28,081	
Croatian Red Cross	16,817				16,817	
Croatian Red Cross (from Croatia - Private Donors*)	9,999				9,999	
Danish Red Cross	156,047				156,047	
Ecuadorian Red Cross	7,397				7,397	
Ecuadorian Red Cross (from Ecuador - Private Donors	4,830				4,830	
Estonia Red Cross	10,685				10,685	
Experian	5,767				5,767	
Finnish Red Cross	6,973	263,273			270,246	
Finnish Red Cross (from Suunto Oy*)	135,476				135,476	
Freshfields	3,216				3,216	
Fundraising Fees				-113,024	-113,024	
German Red Cross	260,607	420,806			681,413	
Germany - Private Donors	103				103	
Google	106,933				106,933	
Great Britain - Private Donors	9,849				9,849	

Emergency Appeal

DRAFT FINANCIAL REPORT

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Budget Timeframe	2015-2019	Budget	APPROVED

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All figures are in Swiss Francs (CHF)

MDRNP008 - Nepal - Earthquake

Operating Timeframe: 25 Apr 2015 to 30 Jun 2019; appeal launch date: 26 Apr 2015

Income Type	Cash	InKind Goods	InKind Personnel	Other Income	TOTAL	Deferred Income
Haitian Red Cross Society	22,377				22,377	
Hewlett Packard Co. Foundation	91,407				91,407	
Hill-Rom	180				180	
Hong Kong - Private Donors	659				659	
Icelandic Red Cross	179,500				179,500	
Icelandic Red Cross (from Icelandic Government*)	70,500				70,500	
ICF International	465				465	
IFRC at the UN Inc	1,904				1,904	
Indonesia - Private Donors	5,835				5,835	
Informa	3,064				3,064	
Invesco	97,309				97,309	
Irish Red Cross Society	58,977	107,988	53,400		220,366	
Italian Government Bilateral Emergency Fund	311,748				311,748	
Japanese Government	2,803,607				2,803,607	
Japanese Red Cross Society	828,873	206,508			1,035,381	
Kazakh Red Crescent	2,634				2,634	
KPMG Disaster Relief Fund	79,263				79,263	
KPMG International Cooperative(KPMG-I)	208,682				208,682	
Kuwait - Private Donors	7,388				7,388	
Latvian Red Cross	1,145				1,145	
Latvian Red Cross (from Latvia - Private Donors*)	2,638				2,638	
Latvia - Private Donors	747				747	
Lebanese - Private Donors	3,290				3,290	
Liberty Mutual Foundation	160,876				160,876	
Liechtenstein Red Cross	127,271				127,271	
Lithuanian Red Cross Society	9,253				9,253	
Louis Berger	15				15	
Malaysia - Private Donors	9,321				9,321	
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.	222,285				222,285	
Mauritius Red Cross Society	5,000				5,000	
Mellon Bank	12,286				12,286	
Mexican Red Cross	105,096				105,096	
Microsoft	29,083				29,083	
Monaco Government	47,016				47,016	
Mondelez International Foundation	53,016				53,016	
Mongolian Red Cross Society	17,730				17,730	
Monsanto Foundation	72,767				72,767	
Myanmar Red Cross Society	27,817				27,817	
Nestle	134,817				134,817	
New Zealand Red Cross	1,385,120				1,385,120	
New Zealand Red Cross (from New Zealand Government*)	451,782				451,782	
Norwegian Red Cross (from Norwegian Government*)	554,905				554,905	
Novartis	22,499				22,499	
On Line donations	0				0	
On Line donations (from Aland Islands - Private donors)	6				6	
On Line donations (from Albania - Private donors*)	51				51	
On Line donations (from Andorra - Private Donors*)	1				1	
On Line donations (from Antigua And Barbuda - Private Donors*)	37				37	
On Line donations (from Argentina - Private Donors*)	649				649	
On Line donations (from Armenia - Private Donors*)	170				170	
On Line donations (from Australia - Private Donors*)	12,296				12,296	

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MDRNP008 - Nepal - Earthquake

Operating Timeframe: 25 Apr 2015 to 30 Jun 2019; appeal launch date: 26 Apr 2015

Income Type	Cash	InKind Goods	InKind Personnel	Other Income	TOTAL	Deferred Income
On Line donations (from Austria - Private Donors*)	901				901	
On Line donations (from Azerbaijan Private Donors*)	172				172	
On Line donations (from Bahamas - Private Donors*)	23				23	
On Line donations (from Bahrain - Private Donors*)	114				114	
On Line donations (from Bangladesh - Private Donors*)	116				116	
On Line donations (from Barbados - Private Donors*)	1,218				1,218	
On Line donations (from Belarus - Private Donors*)	516				516	
On Line donations (from Belgium - Private Donors*)	1,313				1,313	
On Line donations (from Bermuda - Private Donors*)	4,792				4,792	
On Line donations (from Bhutan - Private donors*)	184				184	
On Line donations (from Bolivia Private Donors*)	68				68	
On Line donations (from Bosnia And Herzegovina - Pri	15				15	
On Line donations (from Botswana - Private donors*)	29				29	
On Line donations (from Brazil - Private Donors*)	10,151				10,151	
On Line donations (from British Indian Ocean Territory	0				0	
On Line donations (from Brunei - Private Donors*)	1,492				1,492	
On Line donations (from Bulgaria - Private Donors*)	532				532	
On Line donations (from Cambodia - Private Donors*)	303				303	
On Line donations (from Cameroon Private donors*)	19				19	
On Line donations (from Canada - Private Donors*)	18,449				18,449	
On Line donations (from Cayman Islands - Private Don	138				138	
On Line donations (from Chad - Private donors*)	72				72	
On Line donations (from Chile Private Donors*)	1,196				1,196	
On Line donations (from China - Private Donors*)	6,486				6,486	
On Line donations (from Colombia - Private Donors*)	3,870				3,870	
On Line donations (from Costa Rica - Private Donors*)	2,527				2,527	
On Line donations (from Croatia - Private Donors*)	309				309	
On Line donations (from Cuba - Private donors*)	0				0	
On Line donations (from Cyprus - Private Donors*)	1,229				1,229	
On Line donations (from Czech private donors*)	2,172				2,172	
On Line donations (from Denmark - Private Donors*)	565				565	
On Line donations (from Dominican Republic - Private	45				45	
On Line donations (from Dominica Private Donors*)	1				1	
On Line donations (from Ecuador - Private Donors*)	345				345	
On Line donations (from Egypt - Private Donors*)	368				368	
On Line donations (from Estonia - Private donors*)	261				261	
On Line donations (from Falkland Islands (Malvinas) - I	0				0	
On Line donations (from Fiji Private Donors*)	107				107	
On Line donations (from Finland - Private Donors*)	2,163				2,163	
On Line donations (from France - Private Donors*)	5,495				5,495	
On Line donations (from French Guiana - Private dono	109				109	
On Line donations (from Georgia Private Donors*)	274				274	
On Line donations (from Germany - Private Donors*)	6,953				6,953	
On Line donations (from Ghana Private Donors*)	2				2	
On Line donations (from Gibraltar - Private donors*)	3				3	
On Line donations (from Great Britain - Private Donors	12,440				12,440	
On Line donations (from Greece - Private Donors*)	1,212				1,212	
On Line donations (from Guam - Private donors*)	0				0	
On Line donations (from Guatemala Private donors*)	295				295	
On Line donations (from Guernsey - Private donors*)	139				139	
On Line donations (from Guyana Private Donors*)	84				84	

Emergency Appeal

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Income Type	Cash	InKind Goods	InKind Personnel	Other Income	TOTAL	Deferred Income
On Line donations (from Haiti- Private Donors*)	91				91	
On Line donations (from Holy See (Vatican City State)	55				55	
On Line donations (from Hong Kong - Private Donors*)	18,433				18,433	
On Line donations (from Hungarian - Private Donors*)	1,359				1,359	
On Line donations (from icelandic RC*)	20				20	
On Line donations (from India - Private Donors*)	52,154				52,154	
On Line donations (from Indonesia - Private Donors*)	1,338				1,338	
On Line donations (from Iranian private donors*)	49				49	
On Line donations (from Ireland - Private Donors*)	1,176				1,176	
On Line donations (from Isle Of Man - Private donors*)	19				19	
On Line donations (from Israel - Private Donors*)	1,060				1,060	
On Line donations (from Italy - Private Donors*)	3,177				3,177	
On Line donations (from Jamaica - Private Donors*)	0				0	
On Line donations (from Japan - Private Donors*)	12,433				12,433	
On Line donations (from Jersey - Private donors*)	68				68	
On Line donations (from Jordan - Private Donors*)	276				276	
On Line donations (from Kazakhstan - Private Donors*)	1,224				1,224	
On Line donations (from Kenya - Private Donors*)	130				130	
On Line donations (from Kosovo - Private donors*)	124				124	
On Line donations (from Kuwait - Private Donors*)	3,049				3,049	
On Line donations (from Latvia - Private Donors*)	281				281	
On Line donations (from Lebanese - Private Donors*)	179				179	
On Line donations (from Lithuania- Private Donors*)	877				877	
On Line donations (from Luxembourg - Private Donors*)	1,356				1,356	
On Line donations (from Macao - Private donors*)	734				734	
On Line donations (from Malaysia - Private Donors*)	17,923				17,923	
On Line donations (from Maldives Private Donors*)	249				249	
On Line donations (from Malta - Private Donors*)	252				252	
On Line donations (from Mauritius Private Donors*)	35				35	
On Line donations (from Mexico - Private Donors*)	5,833				5,833	
On Line donations (from Moldova, Republic Of - Private Donors*)	196				196	
On Line donations (from Mongolia - Private Donors*)	7				7	
On Line donations (from Morocco Private Donors*)	42				42	
On Line donations (from Myanmar - Private Donors*)	219				219	
On Line donations (from Namibia - Private Donors*)	426				426	
On Line donations (from Nepal Private Donors*)	845				845	
On Line donations (from Netherlands Antilles - Private Donors*)	91				91	
On Line donations (from Netherlands - Private Donors*)	2,427				2,427	
On Line donations (from New Caledonia Private Donor	45				45	
On Line donations (from New Zealand - Private Donors*)	3,263				3,263	
On Line donations (from Nicaragua Private Donors*)	50				50	
On Line donations (from Nigeria private donors*)	74				74	
On Line donations (from Northern Mariana Islands - Private Donors*)	25				25	
On Line donations (from Norway - Private Donors*)	4,713				4,713	
On Line donations (from Oman - Private Donors*)	293				293	
On Line donations (from Pakistan Private Donors*)	799				799	
On Line donations (from Panama Private donors*)	1,373				1,373	
On Line donations (from Peru - Private Donors*)	643				643	
On Line donations (from Philippines - Private Donors*)	1,007				1,007	
On Line donations (from Poland - Private Donors*)	6,958				6,958	
On Line donations (from Portuguese - Private Donors*)	1,681				1,681	

Emergency Appeal

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Income Type	Cash	InKind Goods	InKind Personnel	Other Income	TOTAL	Deferred Income
On Line donations (from Puerto Rico - Private donors*)	1,933				1,933	
On Line donations (from Qatar Private Donors*)	5,340				5,340	
On Line donations (from Republic of Korea - Private Donors*)	1,265				1,265	
On Line donations (from Reunion - Private donors*)	2				2	
On Line donations (from Romania Private Donors*)	2,016				2,016	
On Line donations (from Russia - Private Donors*)	8,875				8,875	
On Line donations (from Saint Helena - Private donors)	49				49	
On Line donations (from Salvador - Private Donors*)	21				21	
On Line donations (from Saudi Arabia - Private Donors)	5,000				5,000	
On Line donations (from Serbia - Private Donors*)	212				212	
On Line donations (from Seychelles private donors*)	1				1	
On Line donations (from Singapore - Private Donors*)	50,689				50,689	
On Line donations (from Slovakia Private Donors*)	132				132	
On Line donations (from Slovenia - Private Donors*)	634				634	
On Line donations (from South Africa - Private Donors*)	3,274				3,274	
On Line donations (from Spain - Private Donors*)	4,359				4,359	
On Line donations (from Sri Lanka - Private Donors*)	1,751				1,751	
On Line donations (from St Kitts and Nevis Private donors)	88				88	
On Line donations (from Swedish - Private Donors*)	6,689				6,689	
On Line donations (from Switzerland - Private Donors*)	3,260				3,260	
On Line donations (from Syria Private Donors*)	217				217	
On Line donations (from Taiwan - Private Donors*)	11,482				11,482	
On Line donations (from Tajikistan - Private Donors*)	438				438	
On Line donations (from Tanzania - Private Donors*)	116				116	
On Line donations (from Thailand - Private Donors*)	11,166				11,166	
On Line donations (from Trinidad & Tobago - Private Donors)	2,736				2,736	
On Line donations (from Tunis Private Donors*)	47				47	
On Line donations (from Turkey - Private Donors*)	3,518				3,518	
On Line donations (from Uganda - Private Donors*)	65				65	
On Line donations (from Ukraine private donors*)	430				430	
On Line donations (from Unidentified donor*)	2,534				2,534	
On Line donations (from United Arab Emirates - Private Donors)	60,207				60,207	
On Line donations (from United States - Private Donors)	487,458				487,458	
On Line donations (from Uruguay - Private Donors*)	563				563	
On Line donations (from Venezuela - Private Donors*)	475				475	
On Line donations (from Vietnam - Private Donors*)	3,492				3,492	
On Line donations (from Virgin Islands, U.S. - Private Donors)	15				15	
On Line donations (from Zimbabwe - Private Donors*)	505				505	
OPEC Fund For International Development-OFID	276,009				276,009	
Oracle Corporation	570,054				570,054	
Other	-225				-225	
Philippines - Private Donors	1,052				1,052	
Philips Foundation	33,069				33,069	
Polish Red Cross	4,588				4,588	
PricewaterhouseCoopers	617				617	
Prudence Foundation	95,562				95,562	
Qiagen	7,070				7,070	
Red Crescent Society of Azerbaijan	4,644				4,644	
Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan	1,000				1,000	
Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran	20,000				20,000	
Red Cross of Monaco	50,000				50,000	

Emergency Appeal

DRAFT FINANCIAL REPORT

Selected Parameters			
Reporting Timeframe	2015/2-2019/4	Operation	MDRNP008
Budget Timeframe	2015-2019	Budget	APPROVED

Prepared on 10 May 2019




All figures are in Swiss Francs (CHF)

MDRNP008 - Nepal - Earthquake

Operating Timeframe: 25 Apr 2015 to 30 Jun 2019; appeal launch date: 26 Apr 2015

Income Type	Cash	InKind Goods	InKind Personnel	Other Income	TOTAL	Deferred Income
Red Cross of Montenegro	2,085				2,085	
Red Cross of Montenegro (from Montenegro- Private C	1,116				1,116	
Red Cross of Viet Nam (from Vietnam - Private Donors	28,210				28,210	
Regus	930				930	
RELX	4,071				4,071	
Republic of Korea Government	274,997				274,997	
Romanian Red Cross	41,430				41,430	
Save the Children International	10,282				10,282	
Seychelles Red Cross Society (from Seychelles private	4,578				4,578	
Singapore Red Cross Society	6,685	127,796			134,481	
(SITA) Ste Intern. Telecomm. Aeronau	18,665				18,665	
Slovak Red Cross	2,091				2,091	
Slovenian Red Cross	62,505				62,505	
Slovenian Red Cross (from Slovenia - Private Donors*)	21,168				21,168	
South Africa - Private Donors	104				104	
Spain - Private Donors	9,467				9,467	
Spanish Red Cross	6,233	740,384			746,618	
Sundry Income				512	512	
Suriname Red Cross	19,339				19,339	
Swedish Red Cross	1,915,591				1,915,591	
Swiss Red Cross	122,712	215,767			338,479	
Switzerland - Private Donors	3,636				3,636	
Synaptics	259				259	
Taiwan Red Cross Organisation	1,013,826				1,013,826	
Technip S.A.	50,329				50,329	
TeliaSonera	1,931				1,931	
Teva Pharmaceutical	7,358				7,358	
Texas Instruments	3,629				3,629	
The Canadian Red Cross Society	5,061,226	200,190	329,950		5,591,366	
The Canadian Red Cross Society (from Canadian Gov	571,875				571,875	
The Netherlands Red Cross	2,629,212	1,624,100			4,253,312	
The Netherlands Red Cross (from Netherlands Govern	1,042,278				1,042,278	
The Red Cross of Serbia	5,963				5,963	
The Red Cross of The Former Yugoslav Republic of M	922				922	
The Red Cross of The Former Yugoslav Republic of M	16,800				16,800	
The Republic of Korea National Red Cross	937,875	81,726			1,019,601	
Thomson Reuters	369				369	
Turkey - Private Donors	965				965	
Turkish Red Crescent Society	46,939				46,939	
UBS	5,308				5,308	
United Arab Emirates - Private Donors	13,909				13,909	
United States - Private Donors	25,165				25,165	
United Way	16,987				16,987	
VERF/WHO Voluntary Emergency Relief	14,000				14,000	
Vitol Foundation	2,273				2,273	
Total Contributions and Other Income	47,288,822	8,448,729	512,950	-112,512	56,137,989	0
Total Income and Deferred Income					56,137,989	0

Annex 11 – Maps



Annex 12 – Interview Guides

A. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

(NRCS HQ, NRCS DCs, IFRC Nepal, IFRC India RO, IFRC ZO ?, ICRC RO, PNSs UN/INGO/GoN partners if any)

RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

1. To what extent has the design of the operation taken into account the capacities of NRCS HQ, NRCS DCs, PNSs on the ground and the IFRC?
2. To what extent did the programme make use of existing knowledge / capacities / reviews/planning/ lessons learned from earlier disaster interventions?
3. To what extent did the programme meet the needs and expectations of the affected population?
4. How were these needs assessed and to what extent did the needs assessment impact on the NRCS programme?
5. To what extent did the needs assessment reflect the vulnerabilities and capacities of the affected communities including the most vulnerable (including women & girls)?
6. To what extent were the operational capacity and the strategic priorities of NRCS reflected in the programme design?
7. How did NRCS/IFRC/PNS enhance any possibly identified capacity gaps?
8. To what degree was disaggregated assessment data available and to what degree did such data influence the design of the programme? (SPHERE Standard 1)
9. To what degree were SPHERE standards applied?
10. How did the programme adapt to changing needs, realities, circumstances? (SPHERE Standard 4)
11. How was feedback from the community collected and analysed? How did the feedback impact on the programme?
12. To what extent were non-programme beneficiaries also able to access the feedback system?
13. On which criteria were beneficiaries selected? To what extent were the target communities involved in beneficiary selection?

EFFECTIVENESS

14. To what extent were international / SPHERE standards applied to the programme planning (e.g. in terms of shelter, WASH) (SPHERE Standard 1)?
15. How were capacities, resources, and cultural norms of the affected population considered in the programme, particularly in the area of WASH and shelter activities (SPHERE standard 1)?
16. In your opinion, what were the greatest achievements of the programme? Intended or unintended?
17. In your opinion, what were the greatest challenges of the programme? Intended or unintended?
18. Have strategic priorities shifted? And if so, to what extent and in which areas?
19. To what degree did the programme complement or compete/duplicate activities of other actors (SPHERE Standard 4)?

20. To what extent has the programme approach, if applicable, been modified over time, and if so, in what respect?

21. In hindsight, could anything have been done in a different way?

22. In what way did the operation and its outputs contribute to the intended outcomes under the 'One Plan' model?

IMPACT

23. Did the intervention reach all people it intended to reach? What were the reasons for possible shortcomings?

24. In your opinion, has this programme contributed to direct capacity building of NRCS HQ and DCs and, if so, in what way?

25. What kind of economic or social changes and effects of the programme are you aware?

26. Prior to and during the programme, NRCS/IFRC/PNSs maintained and conducted a series of other community related programmes, e.g. development projects. What kind of impact did the recovery programme have on these projects (positive as well as negative)?

EFFICIENCY AND COST-EFFECTIVENES

27. Can you describe how you experienced the communication, coordination and collaboration between the various partners of the RCM and if applicable other external actors (GoN/UN/INGO) ?

28. What were the particularly positive points?

29. Were there any challenging experienced? If so, how could they be addressed, in your opinion?

30. How do you perceive the level of success of the "One Movement Recovery Plan" model?

31. Was the assistance provided in a timely manner to meet beneficiary and community needs? Did the integrated approach affect the timeliness of the operation (SPHERE Standards 2/5)?

32. To what extent were procurement, purchasing, bidding procedures followed and applied?

SUSTAINABILITY

33. Can you rate from 1-5 how you estimate the sustainability of the programme?

34. Which activities are likely to continue after the programme has now come to an end (impact)?

35. Can you name any particular activities that were aimed at establishing sustainability beyond the end of the programme?

36. To what extent has the programme contributed to the capacity building at NRCS HQ and DCs level?

37. To what extent have skills that were gained been safeguarded in terms of future sustainability and increased capacity (e.g. staff, volunteers, knowledge, operational capacity)? Would you consider NRCS/IFRC/PNSs now at a better operational preparedness for the management of major disasters (e.g. the development aspect of relief response)?

38. Do you consider the recovery programme environmentally and financially sustainable?

39. To what extent were communities, local authorities and academia involved in sharing their knowledge during programme planning?

B. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

(Non-RC actors, GoN, local administrations, academic institutions, as applicable)

1. To what extent are you aware of the NRCS/IFRC post-earthquake 2015 recovery operation?
2. To what extent were you / was your institution / department involved in the planning of this programme, or to what level were you consulted for advice?
3. To what extent did the programme make use of existing knowledge / capacities / lessons learned from earlier disaster interventions?
4. To what extent did the programme meet the needs and expectations of the affected population?
5. How were these needs assessed and to what extent did the needs assessment impact on the NRCS programme?
6. To what extent did the needs assessment reflect the vulnerabilities and capacities of the affected communities including the most vulnerable?
7. How do you assess the operational capacity of NRCS prior to the earthquake response programme and after?
8. Do you know, on which criteria were beneficiaries selected? To what extent were the target communities involved in beneficiary selection?
9. In your opinion, what were the greatest achievements of the programme? Intended or unintended?
10. In your opinion, what were the greatest challenges of the programme? Intended or unintended?
11. To what degree did the programme complement or compete/duplicate activities of other actors?
12. To what extent has the programme approach, if applicable, been modified over time, and if so, in what respect?
13. In hindsight, could anything have been done in a different way?
14. Did the intervention reach all people it intended to reach? What were the reasons for possible shortcomings?
15. Can you describe how you experienced the collaboration between the various partners of the RCM?
16. What were the particularly positive points?
17. Were there any challenging experiences? If so, how could they be addressed, in your opinion?
18. **Although difficult to answer – in your opinion, what would have been the effect if this programme had NOT been implemented?**
19. Do you consider the recovery programme environmentally and financially sustainable?
20. To what extent were communities, local authorities and academia involved in sharing their knowledge during programme planning?
21. On which criteria were beneficiaries selected? To what extent were the target communities involved in beneficiary selection?

B. FGD (Communities, community leaders, women's and youth groups, beneficiaries)

1. What kind of assistance did you receive from the Red Cross after the 2015 earthquake and specifically in the past three years? Was this assistance timely?
2. How were your needs assessed? Who assessed them?
3. Do you feel that the support you received was relative to your needs? If not, what could have been done differently?
4. To what extent did the programme meet your needs and expectations?
5. To what extent did the needs assessment reflect your real vulnerabilities, especially the most vulnerable?
6. How did the programme adapt to changing needs, realities, circumstances?
7. When you had problems or complaints, were you able to address them with NRCS? How was your feedback collected?
8. Did you / do you have a contact number and/or address of someone in charge whom you contact to express your opinion?
9. Have you contacted NRCS during the programme with any specific request and to what extent do you feel / have you see that your concerns have been listened to?
10. Even if you were not a direct beneficiary, were you still be able to access the feedback system?
11. How were beneficiaries selected? To what extent were the target communities involved in selecting beneficiaries?
12. How were your capacities, resources, and cultural norms of the affected population considered in the programme, particularly in the area of WASH and shelter activities? Did people listen to your concerns, suggestions, ideas?
13. What concise support did you receive?
14. In your opinion, what were the greatest achievements of the programme? Intended or unintended?
15. In your opinion, what were the greatest challenges of the programme? Intended or unintended?
16. Did you observe any duplication with other actors? If so, in what areas?
17. In hindsight, could anything have been done in a different way?
18. Naturally, the earthquake had an extremely damaging effect on everyone. However, have you observed since the programme (the earthquake response operation) any particular effects in terms of economic, social or even cultural changes? (Please, describe at liberty).
19. Are you doing anything different now in your community compared to before the earthquake or before the Red Cross response programme – in what way, if any, have you changed any behaviour / do anything differently now? (Ask specifically in relation to shelter and WASH).
20. Now that the programme will come / have come to an end, is there anything you / your community will continue in terms of activities and/or skills learned? If so, what kind of activities are these?

Evaluation Management Response for the Nepal Earthquake Response Operation 2015 Final Evaluation

Background information:

- **Date and duration of evaluation:** 19 March 2019 to 30 May 2019
- **Evaluator:** Global Emergency Group (GEG) (Gert Venghaus (Team Leader) and Iain Logan (Deputy Team Leader))
- **Evaluation Management Response Team members:**
 - IFRC
 - Asia Pacific Regional Director
 - Head of Nepal Country Office
 - Programme Coordinator
 - NRCS
 - Executive Director
 - EQ Liaison Coordinator
 - Deputy Director of PMER Division
- **Background Information:** In early 2019, IFRC Regional Director, APRO commissioned a final evaluation in order to assess the impact of Nepal Earthquake Response Operation 2015, especially recovery programmes implemented through IFRC Emergency Appeal (MDRNP008) by the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS). An independent external international consultant was supported by IFRC and NRCS team carried out the field works related to the evaluation exercise between 19 March to 30 May 2019. The consultant used a range of survey techniques and covered three districts where recovery interventions were implemented in line with the 4+1 approach under One Recovery Plan. The initial findings from the field visit was shared with wider stakeholders on 10 April 2019 for consultation and feedbacks.

Summary of Management Response:

The consultant provided 39 key recommendations with priority ranking and suggested timeframe for implementation under two broad headings – 1) Strategic Recommendations and 2) Tactical Recommendations, of which 13 are partially accepted and 25 fully accepted and one rejected by the NRCS. While drafting the management response, it has taken into consideration the current context within NRCS and feasibility of implementing some of the recommendations due to practical challenges on the ground. Hence, a flexible implementation timeframe has been kept for key actions mentioned below.

Strategic Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Recommendations from the Real-Time Evaluation and the Mid-Term Review should be revisited and, where appropriate and not yet done, implemented to further strengthen the impact of the Earthquake Response Operation and the capacity of NRCS. Findings of this FE, therefore, are either based on new evidence or, where appropriate, use previous findings to reemphasize their importance.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> ☐ Accepted ☐ Partially accepted ☐ Rejected	The EQ response operation in Nepal has 5-year life cycle in terms of its operational period. The reports will present precious information for us to learn and capture on how the operation has been unfolded in different phases from relief, recovery and transition to the long term.	After the Movement Meta-Evaluation is completed early 2020, IFRC CO in close consultation with KL DCPRR, will study how the overall review on different documents can be made.	Early next year	IFRC CO and APRO

Comments:

NRCS comments: Meta evaluation is being held soon which will consolidate key recommendations of different evaluations. The consolidated recommendations will be taken as lessons learned for future disaster response.

Recommendation 2: Given the considerable amounts of left-over funding, it is the recommendation of this FE that NRCS, IFRC and PNS carefully consider the utilisation of these funds for the development and implementation of a transitional strategy to address the identified concerns of sustainability, maintenance and longer-term development of the otherwise excellent programme progress.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted ☐ Partially accepted	It will be considered in developing the long-term strategy with NRCS and Partners collectively also	One of the actions is to develop one Consolidated National Society Development	From January 2020	IFRC CO, PNS

□ Rejected	linking up to the NRCS 8th Development Plan 2021-2025. Longer term DRR and other development programmes/projects have to be implemented by using the leftover fund.	(NSD) plan having subsequent discussion and dialogues among NRCS, IFRC, ICRC and PNS. After having clear picture of total spending and saving while the final report of the ERO is developed, consultative meetings will be held to use the remaining fund as per the priority of NRCS, starting from the support to the implementation of the above Consolidated NSD Plan. DRR and other development projects/programmes based on established policy, strategies and other relevant framework should be followed in planning for such funding reallocation.	NRCS Executive Director supported by concerned departments and division
Comments: <u>IFRC comments:</u> IFRC and PNS need to agree to the basic rules of engagement in supporting the long-term plan of NRCS to ensure the support will be based on the need of communities as well as priorities of NRCS and the changing country context demonstrating their flexibility so that projects driven support by Partners can be reduced but more collective support can be provided under agreed common long-term objectives.			
Recommendation 3: Given the complexities of this operation and the considerable number of individual, partly ongoing evaluations, it is strongly recommended to commission a consolidation of these individual ‘Final Evaluations’ by way of a meta- analysis of the combined findings and deliver an all-movement assessment of the Red Cross earthquake operation (similar to the Indian Ocean Tsunami Report)			

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Through the consultative process with NRCS and PNS in-country, having the Meta-Evaluation was agreed. IFRC CO has prepared and developed the detailed process and action plan.	The Movement Coordination Meeting (MCM) agreed to the timelines and ToR for the Meta Evaluation on 19 July 2019. A taskforce was also formed to lead the process.	From July 2019 to February 2020	IFRC, NRCS and PNS through the Taskforce
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
NRCS comments: Meta evaluation is being held soon which will consolidate all key recommendations which will consolidate key findings of all evaluations of ERO.				
Recommendation 4: A thorough investigation is recommended into the alleged practice of some PNS to pay significantly higher salary to NRCS staff thus draining the National Society of skilled manpower at HQ and district levels and contradicting the self-professed focus on capacity building.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	There were agreed processes and standards for human resources both at NRCS and partners' levels (through IFRC integration procedure). In addition, any specific allowances and salaries from NRCS side were approved by the Steering Committee. More accurate information on the issue concerned in particular needs to be identified for further necessary review and actions.	Bring this issue to the attention of meta evaluator	Fourth quarter of 2019	IFRC CO and NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

	For this, the meta evaluation planed at end of 2019 will review whether similar finding was identified through other evaluations, then only IFRC and NRCS will discuss the opportunity of deeper analysis of this issue.			
Comments: <u>NRCS comments:</u> Earthquake Response operation was a special case that needed specific attention to ensure successes of the operation. There was a huge need of competent Human Resource in the country. There was a big competition in the market, therefore a special decision was made to address the situation. NRCS paid slightly higher than the regular salary structure where it was ensured that no obligations remain with organization and individual staff after the end of the operation. In case of staff recruited by PNS and IFRC (under integration agreement), it was an opportunity for individual and arrangements were done through HR processes. However, as such colleagues were involved within the Movement for the operation, it can be taken positively as well.				
Recommendation 5: NRCS / IFRC / PNS should accommodate the option for communities experiencing scarcity of water to utilise <u>water harvesting</u> opportunities at homes, schools, health facilities, NRCS offices and other structures with suitable roof catchment. Such systems would be in addition to main water supply schemes (not as a substitute!)				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	This will fulfil water need at the community level where spring water is not sufficient. This will supplement the existing water facilities supported through recovery programme. In Earthquake Response Operation, the focus was more water harvesting at institutional	In new projects, NRCS will incorporate rainwater harvesting as appropriate in all type of building constructions.	January 2020	NRCS WASH division and departments which implement WASH components.
☐ Partially accepted		Software activities will also be designed for proper use of the rainwater harvesting system.		
☐ Rejected				

	levels such as health posts and schools.			
Comments:				
<u>IFRC comments:</u> Considering the topography in Nepal where communities suffering from no proper access to water source, in a long run, NRCS as part of WASH intervention needs to identify the need and develop how to respond to the need based on its support through the EQ operation.				
Recommendation 6: The important recommendation expressed in earlier reviews to establish a proper logistics and procurement department in NRCS is re-emphasized to address operational capacity building of the National Society and support future disaster preparedness.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	There is a need to have a thorough review of logistics and procurement system of NRCS based on its practice during the Earthquake Response operation and then identify specially what went well and what needs to be improved to be more accountable. This issue was raised during the Movement Wide Lessons Learnt Workshop as well in March 2019.	This needs to be included in One NSD plan and a detailed action plan be drafted further. • Review of existing provisions and procedures of logistics management system • Carry out assessment • Work on possible structure and take needful actions, as appropriate.	January 2020 – 2025	NRCS Supported by partners
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
	NRCS is planning for restructuring of its management and administrative structure including logistics management system. Careful assessment is needed for this. NRCS has already initiated some assessment procedure and by analysing the			

	possible consequences at different levels, needful actions will be taken to make logistic management system further effective.			
Comments:				
Recommendation 7: Following the exit of the ERO support, NRCS should focus on DRR WASH programming and interventions, especially at sub-district level. Specifically a) Sharing of lessons learnt with ALL communities, particularly those who were not included in the current earthquake response. b) Standardisation, preparation and pre-positioning of i. Emergency WASH resources ii. Hygiene kits iii. Dignity kits iv. Other WASH essentials and consumables, such as collecting vessels, collapsible water containers, water purification tablets c) Preparing and compiling in advance WASH communication resources, such as radio spots, radio drama, IEC material and community theatre scripts d) An audit of available resources should be conducted to ascertain existing resources and quality.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Learning from past disaster responses and recent Earthquake Response Operation, NRCS has prepositioned WASH response kits and materials in different	• NRCS will preposition more WASH kits/ materials and dignity kits in the collaboration with partners every year in	Start from 2019	• NRCS WASH division, • DM department, • Health department, • GESI department;
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

	strategic locations and headquarters which are dispatched immediately for distribution during disasters.	accordance with stock depletion rate. • Design and implement inclusive WASH programme; • Further strengthening media partnership through radio programmes, local news paper		• Communication department
Comments:				
Recommendation 8: Future disaster planning should focus more on involving communities in all processes, including DRR programming.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Involving community in DRR programming is an integral part of NRCS plan and policies and is also spelled out in the DM policy and resilience framework/policy. The DM department review meeting also focused on building Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) in its way forward	• Proper planning, localization of NRCS DRR and Resilience <i>policy</i>, approach paper and strategy • Implementation of minimum standard commitment to protection gender and inclusion strategy • Strengthen CEA and mainstream it	From 2020 January – 2025	• All programme coordinators/managers • NRCS (community development, communication and GESI departments and PMER-IM division)
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
IFRC comments: to have practical and realistic planning process with active participation from all levels (HQ/Chapters/Sub-chapters), the planning should be supported with evidence-based information and data, so that communities can see strong added-value and benefits to prepare their preparedness/DRR plan.				

Recommendation 9: WASH contingency planning and other scenario-based training should include PGI, CEA and SPHERE standards.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS is developing WASH programme framework (WASH contingency plan) which include PGI and CEA. In addition, NRCS is developing training curriculum which includes PGI, CEA and Sphere related scenario exercises in the training	• Mainstreaming of PGI and CEA • Dissemination of SPHERE standards • Adapt appropriate indicators to monitor WASH contingency plan implementation and all scenario-based trainings	2020	• CDD/WASH division • Disaster management department • Communication department • GESI department • PMER-IM division
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 10: It is recommended that NRCS work with NRA/GoN to develop long-term recovery planning with realistic time frames.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS always works closely with Government. NRA is new structure created by the Government after the earthquake only. The NRA coordinated and provided guidance for the partner organizations to support Government's effort and carry out recovery programmes by the partners. In terms of longer-term planning, the timeframe of NRA and Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement recovery operation was different. However, NRCS handed	• Share learnings and experience with NRA/Government. • Participate in recovery planning meetings and provide appropriate inputs. • Share resources with NRA/Government.	As needed	NRCS at strategic and operational levels
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

	over the operation to the local authorities which has been built as continuation of the recovery/reconstruction programme carried out by the Government.			
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Comments:

IFRC comments: in case of Nepal EQ operation, due to the frequent change of NRA chief as well as the uncertainty affected by the transition government in 2015 and 2016, the recovery programs of NRCS were significantly delayed. So, for preparedness purpose for future disaster, NRCS needs to have a strategic discussion with MoHA how NRCS can be in a better position to deliver its humanitarian operation (relief and early recovery programs) not being heavily affected by political situation and prepare it through long-term programs.

Recommendation 11: NRCS could work with NRA and GoN to plan for transitional shelters as part of a post-disaster recovery strategy and disaster preparedness planning.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	It is important to support for transitional shelter, but NRCS has to work in line with government's policy and decision.	- Advocate about importance of transitional shelters with Government. - Incorporate transitional shelter in disaster preparedness plans in future.	2020	NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

Comments:

Though there were many challenges, NRCS's shelter intervention through owner driven construction approach demonstrated many positive elements. Therefore, more study needs to be done if the transitional shelter is better intervention in Nepal context.

Recommendation 12: NRCS should agree with NRA/GoN on vulnerability criteria to allow for more targeted and equitable shelter aid in the event of future emergencies. Once agreed, the criteria need to be publicly posted and transparently applied.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
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☐ Accepted				
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected	Following the 2015 earthquake, NRA was created which worked as the nodal agency for coordination and guiding the overall recovery/reconstruction work in the country. All the partners involved in the recovery operation needed to sign the project agreement with the government. Partners needed to follow the standards set by the NRA/Government. Beneficiary selection in case of shelter support was done by the Government where all the partners were bound to follow the beneficiaries list provided by the Government and the shelter cash grant support was a blanket approach. However, in case of livelihood, WASH and health support, NRCS followed targeted intervention in collaboration and consultation with stakeholders including Government.	Continue dialogue/ advocacy with the Government for vulnerability criteria guideline	2020	NRCS
Comments: Once the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Agency (NDRRMA) is established in 2020, there will potentially be more opportunities in longer-term policy dialogue with national authorities related to the difficult question of targeting in recovery context. Agreeing on criteria with NRA at this point of time might not be the most successful approach as the mandate of NRA is limited in time and scope.				

Recommendation 13: NRCS should strengthen its partnership with HRRP and/or other relevant partner organisations as a repository for good practices.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS has good partnership with HRRP. NRCS has been participating in the meetings called by HRRP. NRCS provided report to HRRP in 4W and later in NRA's 5W in coordination with HRRP IM team. Likewise, NRCS had invited HRRP in Earthquake Response Operation Movement Wide lessons learnt workshop as a panellist.	Continue to strengthen partnership with relevant partner organizations	As needed	NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

Comments: N/A from IFRC

Recommendation 14: For future damage assessments, that NRCS should undertake its own assessments with RC-sourced engineers in the designated areas of operation. It is a question of how such assessments are carried out and depends on whether relevant protocols have been agreed with GoN before a disaster event, for instance that RC would complement any assessment to ensure added value as an independent assessor. This would go a long way to head off and placating donors, back donors and the public.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS is team member of the initial rapid assessment (IRA) led by Nepal Government in any disaster in Nepal. But in case of total damage assessment, government carries by the assessment through the experts assigned by Government. NRCS	Continue advocacy with Government for future operation	2020	NRCS

☐ Partially accepted	can coordinate with local government and involve in the team.			
☐ Rejected	In case of WASH infrastructure damage assessment, NRCS undertakes damage assessments, detail design and estimate in line with Governments' guideline in the NRCS programme area. Immediately after earthquake, Government carried out post disaster need assessment. Likewise, Government developed Post Disaster Recovery Framework to guide recovery/reconstruction programme in Nepal. Earthquake response is a big operation, and Government carried out damage assessment and RCRC Movement, was obliged to follow it.			
Comments: N/A from IFRC				
Recommendation 15: It is recommended that NRCS, possibly with IFRC support, consider obtaining customs pre-approval, stock piling and pre-positioning IFRC-standard equipment and tarpaulins for fast release after a major disaster.				

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	We need to share with MoFA and the MoHA logistics hiccups when brining goods and vehicles into the country for the relief operation.	IFRC with NRCS prepares the real case and have a discussion on how to improve the situation in case next disaster happens. NRCS will work closely with IFRC on this issue	From January 2020	IFRC CO and NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 16: It is recommended that psychosocial assistance be integrated into health recovery programming – especially for children.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	This recommendation is in line with major trends in terms of humanitarian needs in the country, as well as the Health Operational Plan 2019-2020 of the National Society. IFRC technically supports NRCS to prepare more integrated health recovery programme.	• Develop NRCS PSS policy and procedure. • Develop and adopt PSS standard training curricula in line with IFRC PSS manual • Train human resources at HQs and DCs on PSS • Prepositioning the PSS tools such as IEC, PSS kit for response • IFRC with NRCS health team needs to consult it with APRO and review how it can be reflected in the contingency plan.	January 2020 – December 2022	Health Service Department, PSS focal person IFRC CO
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

Comments:				
Tactical Recommendations				
Recommendation 1: Allocation of lump sum payments to Water Users Committees (WUC) from unspent earthquake funds should be provided with the aim mitigating, to some extent, future exhaustion of maintenance funds due to large budget items failing and requiring replacement. Lump sum allocation would provide some time buffer against significant costs until a time when the community can manage to contribute to a sustainable fund to manage future expense when they occur. Another possible solution could be to consider cost as a factor before introducing certain technologies which may be too expensive for communities to maintain, especially after the exit/completion of the operation.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Operation and Maintenance fund (1% out of total in general has been allocated in every Water Users Committee in beginning of water scheme.			
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 2: Community WASH infrastructure, particularly water schemes, should be monitored at least bi-annually by branches and with the DWSS over a period of 2 years to ensure that communities are capable of sustaining the systems. Gradually, NRCS should work towards transitioning responsibility of support to the DWSS.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS district chapters are the sustainable units which remain active at local level in the long-term, so this is effective and realistic to discuss and agree on plan for follow up which will help for sustaining the system.	Discuss within NRCS and with partners about pros and cons for a WASH infrastructure monitoring fund at headquarters.	January 2020	- NRCS senior management - NRCS WASH division
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

	NRCS is discussing to establish WASH infrastructure monitoring fund at headquarters.			
Comments:				
Concise plan needs to be prepared with clear roles and responsibility after series of discussion-preparation within programme management team and further shared with NRCS HQS governance team for their consent. Only then after, it needs to be communicated to district chapter for its effective implementation.				
Recommendation 3: Ongoing advocacy by NRCS to GoN for subsidised power supply for water lifting schemes should be maintained and achieved.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS has already initiated this practice in Sindhuli district. GoN has subsidised power supply for water lifting schemes in Sindhuli district.	NRCS will discuss with local government for subsidy of power supply for water lifting schemes.	2020	NRCS WASH division and other department which implement WASH components in their programmes.
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments: N/A from IFRC				
Recommendation 4: Additional and more substantial maintenance training provided to WUCs by NRCS so that higher cost components and system of water schemes (e.g. electric pumps) can be maintained by communities, thereby economising on financial outgoings to paid contractors.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS had provided operation and maintenance trainings to the WUCs during the operation period. But it is not possible to provide more trainings for the same WUCs after the closing of the operation.	Include operation and maintenance trainings in future programme coordinated by headquarters and/or the programme implemented	2020	NRCS WASH division
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

	However, NRCS will incorporate further/refresher trainings to the WUCs in future programme coordinated by headquarters and/or implemented directly by district chapters.	directly by district chapters. NRCS headquarters will provide technical support and share training manual with district chapters for the trainings.		
Comments: N/A from IFRC				
Recommendation 5: All water schemes should be assessed for sustainability issue with a view to identifying and remedying any issues threatening the continuity of supply. This would preferably be conducted with suitably skilled engineers (preferably those who were initially involved). Based on review outcomes, advice (e.g. restriction of water access points, hours of access) aimed at sustaining continuity of water supply could then be provided to the WUCs and communicated to the communities. Ideally DWSS should also be involved in this process.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS considers sustainability issues of water schemes since the beginning of the project, for instance, establishment of operation and maintenance (O&M) fund, fund mobilization policy, formation of WUC, conduction of O&M training to WUC, registration of water sources, provision tool kit and spare parts in the water schemes and hand over of water schemes to WUC and local Government who will take responsibility of sustainability of the water schemes.	Continue this practice in future projects		NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

	In addition, concerned district chapter and sub-chapter will monitor functionality of the schemes time to time.			
Comments:				
Recommendation 6: NRCS should obtain from IFRC / PNS <u>standard packing lists for Water ERUs</u> to obtain pre-clearances from MoPH, DWSS and Customs, thus facilitating speedy and instant customs clearance and importation in future major disaster events.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	IFRC is ready to provide relevant technical support through coordination with PNS.	Depending on the dialogue with MOHA and MOFA (see strategic recommendation 15 above), this will be further pursued in coordination with Partners, and based on existing contingency plans (as well as for example the annual pre-monsoon planning exercise)	2020	IFRC
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
<u>NRCS comments:</u> NRCS received dispatch list of Water ERU prior to its deployment for customs clearance. However, requirements depend on government's custom clearance policy which may change time to time.				
Recommendation 7: Quite a number of communities had their damaged water schemes not repaired due to lack of resources, capacity or timeframe allocated to recovery. NRCS should ensure that these communities are not forgotten but, instead, prioritised to be supported under non-emergency WASH programming.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Water is right for all so none should be left behind.	It will be kept in priority while planning for new programmes/projects in future.	January 2020 onwards	NRCS CDD/WASH division
☐ Partially accepted				

☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 8: Future disaster planning should also ensure greater collaboration with DWSS.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	DWSS plays role as overarching secretariat through in country WASH cluster, where Red Cross is one of the active members. NRCS had implemented all water schemes in Earthquake Response Operation with approval from and coordination with DWSS.	Closer collaboration will be further enhanced.	November 2019 onwards	NRCS CDD/ WASH division
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 9: The provision of <u>temporary</u> gender-segregated toilets would provide a safer environment for women and girls during the relief phase.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS constructs <u>temporary</u> gender-segregated toilets with Sphere Standard in camps and communal shelters during emergency. But in many cases, people tend to stay in or near to their house immediately after disasters. In such cases, it is not possible for constructing gender segregated toilet for each household.	NRCS will continue construct gender segregated toilets in community shelters during relief phase.	Future disaster	NRCS WASH division in coordination with DM department.
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

Comments:				
Recommendation 10: Wherever possible, communal shelters should be well lit and internally partitioned (using wooden panelling or CGI sheeting) either by family or by gender.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Communal shelter is usually established in schools, community buildings. Therefore, partition is usually difficult. However, NRCS can advocate and support for lights in the camps.	Advocate with Government for lights and internal partition in communal shelters in future.	2020	NRCS DM department
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Not sure whether it is the area that NRCS has to engage directly but the NS can share with the government as recommendation for future operation in designing the house.				
Recommendation 11: In emergencies, “dignity kits” / menstrual hygiene kits should be provided to women and adolescent girls. They should be included in the standard list of emergency provisions and stockpiled accordingly.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Dignity kits” / menstrual hygiene kits are important to women and adolescent girls during emergency. NRCS has been distributing dignity kits as donation received from different partners.	• Translate menstruation management in emergency guideline and disseminate it; • Approach for resources/funding for preposition of menstruation kits/ dignity kits • Standardization of menstruation hygiene kits.	2020	NRCS WASH division in coordination with health and GESI departments
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

Comments:				
Recommendation 12: NRCS should develop for all districts a WASH Training Package that includes PGI and CEA. The training package should be implemented at chapter level for all WASH related staff and volunteers. A similar but briefer training should be provided to management. The training package should be practically oriented, covering basic theory and how it applies to emergencies as well as development scenarios. Examples, relevant issues and good practices outlined in this evaluation should be provided in the training package to contextualise the topics. Similarly, SPHERE standards contents should be provided to staff, volunteers and management, as SPHERE standards not only apply in emergencies but are also useful in early recovery, recovery, and reconstruction and preparedness activities.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	WASH training package with PGI an CEA as focused component helps to develop the clear understating in field level staffs and volunteer in wide. It further sensitization the team, who are the real implementer in real situation most of the times NRCS has been conducting WASH training as per WASH competency framework of IFRC since 2019. This framework includes PGI and CEA components.	CEA and PGI included WASH response training manuals will be developed.	CEA and PGI included WASH response training manuals will be developed in 2019 and implemented from 2020.	Led by NRCS WASH division and in coordination with concerned departments such as GESI and communication
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 13: Where practical and in particular when close to roads, water points should be provisioned with screening so that people can bathe in privacy.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted			2020	

☐ Partially accepted	Privacy matters lot. But it is the responsibility of the local Government.			
☐ Rejected	NRCS has experience of construction of washing and bathing stations at tap stations as part of menstruation hygiene management initiatives in WASH programme which was highly accepted by local community in Bajhang district. This can be replicated in other NRCS programme area gradually.	NRCS will advocate with local government for provision of screening at water points. Replicate experience of Bajhang district about construction of washing and bathing stations in other WASH programme areas.		WASH division and departments which implement WASH programme.
Comments: Nepal government has endorsed policy about private connection instead of communal so this will be well addressed in future designs.				
Recommendation 14: NRCS should work with NRA to review appropriate levels of assistance for those with damaged houses versus destroyed or irreparably damaged houses, not only for the current operation but also in preparation for the next major earthquake disaster.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	NRCS has been participating in all the meetings called by NRA/Government and providing its technical and strategic inputs.	- Share lessons learnt, challenges and experience of the Earthquake Response Operation with NRA/Government; - Participate in the disaster preparedness planning meeting called by the	2020	NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

		Government and provide input		
Comments: N/A from IFRC				
Recommendation 15: For future operations, NRCS should provide additional training for shelter officers and social mobilizers in the field on the design stage of the reconstruction process.				
It is also recommended that NRCS work with NRA on how to encourage reconstruction of earthquake code buildings according to traditional styles e.g. via special grants.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	During Earthquake Response Operation- integrated recovery programme, NRCS had recruited common social mobilizers for all sectors so that activities can be implemented in an integrated way in the community. The social mobilizers were provided with different sectoral trainings.	NRCS will provide trainings to shelter officers in design stage of the reconstruction process in future disaster response operation. The officers will then orient social mobilizers as needed.	Future disaster	NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 16: If not already done so, since the disbanding of the ERO, it is recommended that NRCS appoint a focal point within the organization for shelter issues. The shelter focal point can compile lessons learned, enhance linkages with NRA, GMALI, MoHA, DM DoA, and DUDBC and provide training for volunteers and staff on shelter operations.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Red cross is the co-lead of shelter cluster in Nepal. Disaster Management Department is the focal point for the shelter issues	SOPs have to be developed and endorsed	From January 2020	NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				

☐ Rejected	and having the regular coordination with concern authorities like MOHA, MOFAGA, NEOC, DUBDC etc. But during the emergency situation, the role of focal unit needs to be increased. Full authority needs to be given to the unit.			
Comments:				
Not sure this recommendation is practically implementable in NRCS as the shelter construction is not main activities in NRCS. Probably, the focal point for shelter cluster can be in charge of this.				
Recommendation 17: Training for District Disaster Response Teams (DDRT) should include setting up and appropriate lay-out of communal shelters as well as the provision of special assistance for the most vulnerable (e.g. elderly, pregnant, disabled, landless, etc...).				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	This has already been included in the DDRT and NDRT courses and the training includes simulation on communal shelter management with a focus on provisions for special assistance.	Ensure the skill of participants on communal shelter management in the DDRT training.	From 2020 January	Training coordinators
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 18: NRCS should add ‘debt load’ as an additional assessment criterion to assess vulnerability following future emergencies				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted			From September 2019	• NRCS DM department

☐ Partially accepted	MOHA with the technical support of NRCS has already developed Assessment Coordination Team (ACT) guideline and launched IRA mobile application in order to have a better assessment.				PMER-IM division
☐ Rejected	In the guideline, assessment criteria have clearly been mentioned. But learning from the past disasters such as Tornado in Bara and Parsa districts and flood in 2019, there is need of revising the assessment criteria.	NRCS together with MOHA is working on this area			
Comments:					
Recommendation 19: For future operations, relocated families receive additional assistance to cover the extra cost of reconstruction.					
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility	
☐ Accepted	Families have been linked to the Government and advocated for their support. They will also give priority in future projects.				
☐ Partially accepted					
☐ Rejected	In 2015 Earthquake Response, NRCS' focus was more in integrated recovery programme catchment area. Also, there was no clear strategy for the support for relocated families in the beginning of the Earthquake Response Operation.	NRCS will consider for support to relocated families as appropriate and based on availability of resources in future operation	Future operation	NRCS with support from partners	

Comments:

Recommendation 20: It is recommended that for future operations, NRCS consider reducing or consolidating payments for remote communities to reduce the number of times that affected families need to travel to collect funds.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	Financial Service Provider's mapping was done in all province through the Cash Preparedness Initiative for preparing an effective cash transfer programme in future operation in coordination with service provider who can provide context specific services to beneficiaries.	Implement effective cash transfer programme in future operation	From January 2020	NRCS
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

Comments:

Recommendation 21: NRCS should consider two-tiered training for masons and carpenters for future operations:

- one for previously experienced masons and carpenters (7-10 days) and
- a longer one for those with no previous experience (50 days)

This could be in partnership with established NGOs such as Helvetas. The second-tier training should actively encourage women participants as they are unlikely to have had previous experience.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted	In Earthquake Response Operation, NRCS had conducted 7-day mason training following Government's training curriculum in all earthquake most affected districts for the experience masons and piloted 50-day on the job	NRCS will include both types of trainings as appropriate in future operations.	as needed	NRCS DM department, Community Development Department
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				

	training in Sindhupalchowk district. In large operation such 2015 Nepal Earthquake Response Operation, large number masons/carpenters have to be trained. As it takes comparatively huge resources for 50-day training, it is not practical for large number of trainings.			
Comments:				
Recommendation 22: It is recommended that NRCS investigate the government loan program and, if feasible, provide training to local RC volunteers and staff at the district level on options to beneficiaries of how to transfer from high interest to low interest loans.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted		NRCS will incorporate this activity in new programmes/projects in the earthquake affected areas.	2020	NRCS departments which implement programme/projects in earthquake affected areas.
☐ Partially accepted				
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 23: While the integrated support has proven to be the right and most appropriate way of assistance, livelihood support to farmers should be more targeted and customized, and more in-depth training of livestock management would benefit the roll out of the scheme and should be considered in future similar interventions.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
☐ Accepted			2020	

☐ Partially accepted		NRCS will discuss with concerned government offices about in-depth training on livestock management and implement as needed in future projects/programme.		NRCS Community Development department
☐ Rejected				
Comments:				