



## Final Evaluation Bangladesh Floods Operation (MDRBD020)



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Photo Credit: BDRCS

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## ACRONYMS

APRO	Asia Pacific Regional Office
BDRCS	Bangladesh Red Crescent Society
CBI	Cash Based Intervention
CDC	Community Development Committee
CEA	Community engagement and accountability
CfW	Cash for Work
CGI	Corrugated Galvanised Iron
CHAST	Children Hygiene Sanitation and Training
CRM	Complaints Response Mechanism
CO	Community Organiser
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DPHE	Department of Public Health Engineering
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRRO	District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer
ECV	Epidemic Control for Volunteers
EMT	Electronic Money Transfer
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
FFWC	Floods Forecasting and Warning Centre
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FSP	Financial Service Providers
HH	Household
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGA	Income Generating Activities
KII	Key Informant Interview
LLW	Lessons Learned Workshop
NDRCC	National Disaster Response Coordination Centre
NDRT	National Disaster Response Team
NGO	Non-government Organisation
NHQ	National Headquarters
ORS	Oral rehydration salt
PASSA	Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness
PED	Planning and Evaluation Department
PGI	Protection Gender and Inclusion
PIO	Project Implementation Officer
PHAST	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
PM	Project Manager
PO	Project Officer
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
ULO	Unit Level Officer
UNO	Upazila Nirbahi Officer
UP	Union Parishad
VERF	Voluntary Emergency Relief Fund
VGD	Vulnerable Group Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Heavy monsoon rainfall caused severe flood in South Asia in August 2017, as a result of which, two-third of Bangladesh was flooded. The Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) district branches had been responding from very early after the flood. An emergency appeal was launched by International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which was later updated through a revised emergency appeal. With both local funding and IFRC Emergency Appeal funds, BDRCS provided emergency assistance in two main phases - emergency and recovery phase. The first phase was during the acute flooding and focused on the provision of food, water, shelter and basic health services. As the flood water started to recede, the second phase (commenced on 30 August 2017) started providing a more focused distribution of additional food, shelter, WASH and health services. A recovery operation was planned within the floods operation in September 2017 and it was supposed to be completed by August 2018. However, the recovery operation could not be started till July 2018 as it was halted for almost six months due to concerns raised from IFRC regarding the transparency and accountability measures in BDRCS and subsequent measures taken. After a couple of extensions, the recovery phase of the emergency operation was eventually completed on 30 April 2019. A final evaluation was commissioned by IFRC to evaluate the relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, and efficiency of recovery interventions undertaken by the BDRCS as part of the floods operation, and to analyze key areas for improvement. **Qualitative** methods were adopted by the evaluation team for information collection from both secondary and primary sources. Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted to gather information from the beneficiaries, Community Development Committee (CDC) members, local level government offices, district level government offices, volunteers, community mobilisers, BDRCS National headquarters (NHQ) and unit offices and IFRC BD and Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO).

The recovery operation was implemented in ward number 4 and 5 of Mahishkhocha Union in Aditmari Upazila (sub-district) under Lalmonirhat district. Selection of this place was appropriate from the context that it was severely affected by the floods in 2017, and it is traditionally a poor area with very insignificant development efforts from the development partners and NGOs. Beneficiaries were selected following a set of criteria developed as per IFRC and BDRCS policies and guidelines. All the selected beneficiaries were those affected from flood, losing shelter, latrines and livelihoods. A good number of the beneficiaries selected were women-headed households and households having persons with disability. Overall, the selection was appropriate, adhering to the relevant policies and guidelines. Interventions in the recovery operation were designed based on a Need Assessment conducted during August 2018, which was done through intensive discussion with flood affected peoples. As a result, requirements of the beneficiaries were reflected in the planning. However, the recovery operation did not have an exit plan in-built from the very beginning and was designed only at the end of the operation in March 2019.

Cash Based Interventions (CBI) used in recovery operations were not separate stand-alone interventions, rather mechanisms in implementing some of the interventions. There were three types of CBIs in the form of conditional cash grant – BDT 75,000 for shelter, WASH and livelihood support; BDT 50,000 for shelter and WASH support; and BDT 25,000 for livelihood support. In addition, there was a Cash for Work (CfW) component that provided opportunity for 100 households to receive cash against their labour in developing a rural road for 20 days. CBIs gave more flexibility and control to the beneficiaries, were less costly and easier to disburse and were helpful for local economy as beneficiaries purchased materials and services from local market. Therefore the CBIs included in the recovery operations were relevant and appropriate considering the local context. CBIs had a coverage of 656 beneficiaries under the conditional cash grants. In addition, the CfW component of the CBIs included additional 100 households, in which priority was for the households that did not receive conditional cash grants. A non-cash intervention, i.e. distribution of saplings and seeds had coverage of 1,438 households. All the interventions, both CBI and non-CBIs were

designed taking inputs from the beneficiaries and were found to be quite relevant in reducing vulnerability and socio-economic shock resulted from the floods in 2017.

Although the CBIs in recovery operation was designed for repairing shelters and latrines, the beneficiaries matched some fund on their own and reconstructed new infrastructures. The newly constructed shelters and latrines were found as sturdy in nature on raised plinth/platform, at least one and half feet higher than the previous flood level. The roof was built with CGI sheet distributed by BDRCS. Knowledge from the participatory PASSA and PHAST trainings were fully implemented in the construction of the shelters and latrines. The knowledge of construction was seen adopted by the non-beneficiaries in building their own house and latrines. Moreover, a group of local carpenters and masons were found trained on building the updated structures. From these, the interventions were found to be very effective. Both cash and non-cash grants were distributed under livelihood interventions. The non-cash grants, i.e. saplings and seeds have high potentials to mitigate household needs. While the vegetable seeds can meet round the year household nutrition demand, the fruit and timber saplings can become future assets. Around fifteen percent of the beneficiaries used the cash grants in livelihood options including goat, poultry, small business, etc. These have already shown promises in earning steady income for the households. Majority of the beneficiaries, however, bought cow with their livelihood grant, which means investing the entire fund on one income generating activity (IGA). While cow is a profitable venture if proper husbandry practices are adopted, quality veterinary inputs are provided and improved “beef fattening” techniques are followed. However, beneficiaries did not seem to be aware of these. BDRCS have linked them with the Upazila Livestock Officer. It will be quite interesting to see the impact of the cow-based IGA on the livelihood of the beneficiaries in near future.

Formation of the CDC was a very effective initiative under the floods operation. CDC was formed taking members from the beneficiary households. Already the CDC is working as a knowledge hub for improved shelter and latrine construction, mobilizer of local resources for the betterment of the beneficiaries, and community organization in identifying and resolving local problems. Forming the CDC in very early stages of the intervention could have leveraged more for BDRCS in selection of beneficiaries, distribution of grants and monitoring of the intervention implementation. Capacity of the CDC can further be enhanced through linkage with the upazila level government offices from which the organization can mobilize resources and supports for the community. However, proper registration needs to be done from appropriate authority to do so. Apart from CDC, BDRCS deployed community mobilizers in field, which was also an effective initiative in enhancing knowledge and awareness of the community in different important aspects of health, hygiene and livelihood.

Overall, the recovery operation created considerable satisfaction among the beneficiaries. They found their livelihood being secured and standard of living improved due to the interventions. Efficiency level of the interventions was also found to be very high. The Value for Money (VfM) of the floods recovery operation in case of cash distribution was 10.73, i.e. with spending of 1 taka, cash 10.73 taka could be disbursed among the beneficiaries. If the total benefit (cash and other materials) is considered, then the VfM stands around 12.42. This is quite remarkable and a sign of highly efficient intervention implementation.

There were human resources deployed from the NHQ, along with support from Unit Level Officer (ULO) and volunteers with appropriate quality. However, the team was short with at least one person in finance and accounting section. Due to this and the time pressure, the resources deployed were overburdened with the work. There was no specific monitoring personnel in the field level for the recovery operation – it was the additional activity of the PM. Activities of the PM, and other unit level staff were monitored from NHQ through periodic visits. There are plenty of scopes to improve the Information Management (IM) system in BDRCS, as the process of documentation and information management is quite weak.

There has been concerns from stakeholders regarding the transparency, accountability and internal control of BDRCS in the past. However, during early 2018, there were rigorous steps in improving these systemic components. The BDRCS Cash SOP was finalized. The SOP was disseminated among all the staff and volunteers associated directly or indirectly with the floods operation through training and orientation workshops. BDRCS drafted a Complaints Response Mechanism (CRM) guideline, based on which, multiple complaint handling systems were placed in the recovery operation. Advanced practical training on ODK/KOBO was organized and conducted by members from Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT). Basic orientation on ODK (user/data collection level) was provided to the volunteers in 14 districts, in NHQ and during the National Disaster Response Team (NDRT) trainings. There have been initiatives taken to deploy more resources into the internal audit department. These initiatives will further strengthen the internal control and accountability in BDRCS. Multiple channels for complaint and feedback receipt were adopted and operational plans were modified based upon receiving complaints from beneficiaries.

Overall, this was a good lesson learning for BDRCS, which it can utilize in subsequent recovery operations. Already some of the experiences and mechanisms were implemented in Shariatpur recovery operation. The WASH and Shelter interventions seem to be sustainable as the knowledge and skills are being transferred to the community and already there are signs of dissemination and replication among the non-beneficiaries. While the cow livelihood intervention has yet to prove its effectiveness, non-cow livelihood interventions have already produced positive results for the respective families and will likely to be continued in future.

The evaluation team appreciated the holistic approach of providing multiple supports to the beneficiary, as it helped reducing their vulnerability and ensured sustainable livelihood. The team recommends this focus on providing sustainable and extensive support to a small group of beneficiaries rather than providing partial benefits for a large number (“richness in benefit” rather than “the reach in number”) for other operations in BDRCS, as it ensures higher quality and longer sustainability. Implementation in smaller geographical area also resulted in high project efficiency, which is another recommendation for future BDRCS projects. There are specific recommendations on further improve the coordination, collaboration and institutional development in recovery operations. The evaluation team provided specific recommendations on implementing livelihood interventions for the beneficiaries through designing multiple IGAs, developing IGA calendar and ensuring round the year income for the families.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION


### 1.1 Context of the Evaluation

Exceptionally heavy monsoon rains above the seasonal average had severe impact on the riverine region of India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh in August 2017. This resulted in intense flooding in almost two-thirds of Bangladesh, including most of the north-western part. According to the National Disaster Response Coordination Centre (NDRCC) around 6.9 million people were affected, with approximately 593,247 houses and 650,000 hectares crops land being damaged. It was also reported death of 114 people and another 297,254 being displaced<sup>1</sup>. The floods led to an increase in people insufficiently consuming food per the national average for caloric intake. People displaced to temporary shelters were limited in their access to food. To adjust to the prevailing food insecurity, people in the most severely affected areas were adopting negative coping mechanism such as skipping a meal, reducing meal size and not taking preferred food.

The BDRCS district branches had been responding since day one as they were monitoring the situation and analyzing the information from Floods Forecasting and Warning Centre (FFWC). An emergency appeal was launched by the IFRC on 24 August 2017 for CHF 4.7 million to assist 20,000 families or households. A revised emergency appeal was launched by IFRC on 11 November 2017 requesting for CHF 4.8 million to assist 20,000 families for 12 months. With both local funding and IFRC Emergency Appeal funds, BDRCS provided emergency assistance in two main phases - emergency and recovery phase. The first phase was during the acute flooding and focused on the provision of food, water, shelter and basic health services. As the flood waters started to recede, the second phase (commenced on 30 August 2017) started providing a more focused distribution of additional food, shelter, WASH and health services. A recovery operation was planned within the floods operation in September 2017 and it was supposed to be completed by August 2018. However, the recovery operation could not be started till July 2018.

After a couple of extensions, the emergency operation was eventually completed in 30 April 2019, although a follow up phase is planned to be implemented during May-June 2019. At this stage, a final evaluation was commissioned to evaluate the relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, and efficiency of recovery interventions undertaken by the BDRCS as part of the emergency operation, and to analyze key areas for improvement. Focus of the evaluation was shelter, food security and livelihoods, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sectors in recovery and cash-based interventions (CBI).

**Figure 1: Affected Areas in Flood of 2017, Marked in Blue**



<sup>1</sup> IFRC, Emergency appeal n° MDRBD020: Operations update n° 4; Date of issue: 11 February 2019

## 1.2 Objectives of the Final Evaluation

The Terms of Reference set the objectives of the final evaluation as:

- To assess the effectiveness of recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting, information management and decision making.
- Assess the relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, and efficiency of recovery activities under flood operation against the planned outcomes in three key areas; shelter, WASH and livelihood.
- To capture the current best practices and the improvements with regards to the key target areas.
- Assess the sustainability of the programme intervention.
- Briefly assess the adequacy and effectiveness of BDRCS response and relief during the emergency phase of the operation.
- Assess BDRCS disaster response and recovery strategies and systems.
- Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of CBI

## 1.3 Methodology Adopted

The IFRC Framework for Evaluation was used as a reference for the evaluation. Qualitative methods were adopted in information collection from both secondary and primary sources. The secondary literature review included review of Emergency Appeal, Operation Updates, Pledge-based Reports, Need Assessment Report and other documents prepared during the tenure of the emergency operation. Apart from these, there was thorough review of relevant BDRCS policies, procedures and strategies, including the final drafts of – BDRCS Flood Contingency Plan, BDRCS Cash Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), BDRCS Child Protection Policy, BDRCS Gender Policy and BDRCS Strategic Plan 2017-2020. A list of documents reviewed is attached in the annexure.

Key Informant Interviews (KII) were carried out taking into participation from all relevant stakeholders of the Flood Operation, including representation from IFRC Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO), IFRC Bangladesh Office in Dhaka, BDRCS National Headquarters (NHQ), BDRCS Unit level offices, and government executive offices in district and upazila level. A list of KII participants is attached in the annexure. Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted with the beneficiary households in Aditmari Upazila of Lalmonirhat district. FGDs were also conducted with the members of Community Development Committee (CDC), Community Organisers (CO), and unit level volunteers in Lalmonirhat and Kurigram districts. A lessons learned workshop (LLW) was organised on 13 May, 2019, taking into participation from BDRCS and IFRC operational level staff, volunteers, CDC representatives, and members from National Disaster Response Team (NDRT). Findings of the evaluation were presented in the workshop on which the audience provided their feedback. In the same workshop, there were group exercises on identifying the key issues, challenges and lessons learned of the Flood Operation. Major findings of the evaluation and LLW was later disseminated among senior management of BDRCS NHQ, IFRC BD and Partner National Societies (PNS). Their feedback have been incorporated in this report.



Figure 3: KII with Government Officers. On the left, KII with Deputy Commissioner (DC) (the district administrator), Lalmonirhat. On the right, KII with the Executive Engineer, Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE), Lalmonirhat. (Photo: IFRC)



Figure 2: Discussions at community level. On the left, FGD with the community mobilisers. On the right, one of the FGDs with beneficiary households (Male Members). Similar FGDs were conducted taking participation from female members of the same households as well. (Photo: IFRC)

## 1.4 Limitations of the Evaluation

The data collection part of the study had to be completed in a **very short time** for which, **quantitative research methodology like questionnaire survey could not be implemented**. Bulk of the **quantitative information** used in this report are from the secondary literature. There have been major changes in the government offices since 2017 and hence a number of the officials participating in the 2017 flood operation could not be found in field. Therefore, not much information could be gathered on the emergency response and early recovery taking place during August to December 2017 from field. The LLW was supposed to take place on 5 May 2019. However, due to the preparedness activities of IFRC BD, BDRCS and other relevant stakeholders for the Tropical Cyclone Fani, the workshop had to be shifted to 13 May 2019. This caused almost two weeks delay against the planned schedule in completing the final report.

## 2. Proceedings in the Bangladesh Floods Operation

### 2.1 Interventions in the Floods Operation

The flood operation interventions were initially divided into two parts – the emergency phase interventions and the recovery phase interventions. However, since the recovery phase got delayed, an early recovery phase was initiated soon after the completion of emergency phase activities. Interventions in these phases are narrated in the table below.

**Table 1: Major interventions in the floods operation<sup>2</sup>**

Sector	Interventions	Outreach
<b>Emergency Phase</b>		
WASH	Distribution of drinking water	7,380 Households (HH)
	Distribution of water purification tablets	7,000 HH
	Distribution of jerry cans	6,000 HH
	Repair of tube wells	5,000 tube wells
Food security and livelihood	Dry/ cooked Food Distribution	7,493 HH
	Food package distribution	5,100 HH
	Food distribution	4,222 HH
	Response by local units	-
Shelter	Tarpaulin distribution	2,000 HH
Health	Oral rehydration salt (ORS) Distribution	13,000 HH
<b>Early Recovery Phase</b>		
WASH	Distribution of hygiene parcels	10,000 HH
	Distribution of jerry cans	5,000 HH
Food security and livelihoods	Cash grants (BDT 1,400/CHF 16)	5,000 HH
	Food package distribution	71,432 HH
	Multipurpose Cash Grant (BDT 4,000/CHF 50)	19,186 HH
Shelter	Tarpaulins distribution	5,000 HH
	Shelter materials distributions	1,894 HH
Health	Medical team deployment	18,000 HH
<b>Recovery Phase</b>		
WASH	Conditional Cash Grant for WASH (either jointly with Livelihood and Shelter; or with Shelter)	600 HH
Shelter	CGI Sheet	600 HH
	Conditional Cash Grant for Shelter (either jointly with Livelihood and WASH or with WASH)	600 HH
Livelihood	Distribution of Sapling and Seeds	1,438 HH
	Conditional Cash Grant for Livelihood (either standalone or jointly with Shelter and WASH)	500 HH
Other	Cash for Work	100 HH

<sup>2</sup> Information on Emergency and Early Recovery interventions were taken from the Operation Updates. Information on Recovery interventions were collected from the BDRCS Project Manager (PM) for Recovery Operation


Apart from above, formation of CDC was an important intervention carried out during the recovery phase. Linkage establishment of beneficiaries with Upazila level government officers, including the Upazila Livestock Officer and Upazila Women Affairs officer was also carried out. Extensive trainings were conducted at community level on Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA), Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation (PHAST), and Children Hygiene Sanitation and Training (CHAST). For community volunteers, there were additional trainings on Epidemic Control for Volunteers (ECV), Community engagement and accountability (CEA) and Protection Gender and Diversity (PGI). Since a large number of families took cattle as livelihood option, technical training on livestock rearing was also conducted through the Upazila Livestock Officer.



Figure 4: Snapshots of the BDRCS and IFRC activities during emergency response phase (Photo: IFRC)

## 2.2 Timeline for Interventions in the Floods Operation


As per the initial operational plan, the Recovery Operation was supposed to be completed within August 2018. However, several issues delayed the operation (detailed later) and eventually it was completed on 30 April 2019. BDRCS have started implementation of a two month follow up program, which is planned to be completed by end of June 2019. A synopsis of major activities and timeline is shown in the following illustration.

**Figure 5: Major Activities and Timeline in Flood Operation**

### 2.3 Operational Aspects of the Floods Operation

The Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) allocation for this operation was CHF 439,670. Overall appeal value was CHF 4,813,498, out of which, CHF 3,808,582 (79 per cent) was received by end of operation. Movement partners supported BDRCS response through IFRC Emergency Appeal or through bilateral arrangements. Partners who have contributed to the IFRC Emergency Appeal are: American Red Cross, Australian Red Cross, British Red Cross, Hong Kong branch of Red Cross Society of China, Danish Red Cross, Italian Red Cross, Japanese Red Cross Society, New Zealand Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, Pakistan Red Crescent Society, Spanish Red Cross, Swedish Red Cross, the Canadian Red Cross, the Netherlands Red Cross and the Republic of Korea National Red Cross. In addition, American Red Cross, British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, French Red Cross, Hong Kong branch of Red Cross Society of China, Philippines Red Cross and New Zealand Red Cross have provided personnel – as surge capacity – to support the operation. The Governments of Angola, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland and the United States contributed financially to this operation. Contributions also were received from the Guernsey Overseas Aid Commission, Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques (SITA), Shelter Box, the Voluntary Emergency Relief Fund (VERF)/WHO and private donors in Malaysia. Emergency and early recovery phase of the operation was carried out in 10 of the most affected northern districts of Bangladesh, namely - Bogra, Tangail, Dinajpur, Jamalpur, Nilphamary, Kurigram, Jessore, Naogaon, Rajshahi and Natore. Recovery operation was conducted in ward number 4 and 5 in Aditmari Upazila of Lalmonirhat district.

Figure 6: Area Coverage of Flood Operation



### 3. Relevance, Appropriateness and Coverage of Flood Operation Bangladesh – Recovery Phase

#### 3.1 Appropriateness of Recovery Operation

##### *Appropriateness in Selection of Operational Area*

Ward number 4 and 5 of Mahishkocha Union under Aditmari Upazila<sup>3</sup> of Lalmonirhat was selected as the geographical location for the recovery operation. Lalmonirhat (Bengali: লালমনিরহাট জেলা, *Lalmonirhat Jela* also *Lalmonirhat Zila*) is a district, situated at the northern border of Bangladesh. It is a part of the Rangpur Division. There are six rivers flowing through the district, biggest of which is the river Tista. Due to the downwards location of the districts along with the course of these rivers, flood is quite a common phenomenon, in addition to river erosion. As a matter of fact, significant part of ward number 2 and 6 of Mahishkocha union under Aditmari Upazila has already been wiped out from the map of the district. During the floods in 2017, considerable devastation was experienced by the inhabitants in Aditmari, Patgram and Hatibandha. Mahishkocha was the only union facing the flood impact in Aditmari upazila. The poverty headcount ratio here is 34.5 per cent, which is worse than the then country average poverty headcount ratio of Bangladesh of 31.5 percent<sup>4</sup>. More importantly, the development activities from development partners and non-government organisations (NGOs) is very insignificant in Lalmonirhat, in comparison to the neighbouring Kurigram and Rangpur districts. Hence, selection of this place was appropriate. Relevant government officials, including Deputy Commissioner (DC) of Lalmonirhat district, Disaster Risk Reduction Officer (DRRO) of Lalmonirhat district and Union Nirbahi Officer (UNO) of Aditmari upazila supported the appropriateness in selection of the area as well.

<sup>3</sup> Upazila refers to the sub-districts – the smallest administration unit of Government of Bangladesh

<sup>4</sup> Poverty Map of Bangladesh, 2010. Joint Technical Report of Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, World Bank and United Nation World Food Programme

### ***Appropriateness in Selection of Beneficiaries***

A set of selection criteria was fixed prior to the initiation of the Recovery Operation. The selection criteria were in line with the applicable IFRC and BDRCS policy and procedures. Some of the criteria include – severe impact of flood on Shelter and Livelihood, households with economic vulnerability, women-headed households, household having persons with disability, etc. Before selection of beneficiaries, there was a survey conducted among all eligible households (1438) using the ODK platform. From this, based on the criteria set, beneficiaries were selected for different supports. A round of validation was conducted, after selection of the beneficiaries, to check the validity of the information against each household. The evaluation identified the actual selection of beneficiaries having adherence with the selection criteria set. All the beneficiaries were seen impacted either with shelter or latrine, if not both. Almost all the beneficiaries were seen having lost their livelihood and were in economic shock. So, as per the criteria set, selection of beneficiaries were appropriate. Upon checking with local inhabitants (non-beneficiaries), UNO-Aditmari and local knowledgeable persons, the evaluation team was further confirmed with the appropriateness of the beneficiaries.

Albeit the selection of beneficiaries was appropriate, the evaluation team wants to highlight one specific criterion in the criteria list, i.e. beneficiaries either needed to have their own land (with documents) or need to have permission in case of living in other persons' or government *Khas* land. While this criterion was set upon discussion with the District and Upazila Land Office, however, it bars the inclusion of some of the most vulnerable and ultra-poor beneficiaries into the beneficiary list. Considering this type of beneficiaries will not be able to develop the shelter and latrines on their own for not having lands – however, BDRCS and IFRC can consider providing livelihood supports for them, particularly through alternative income generating activities (IGAs) that do not require land.

As mentioned before, 1,438 households were included in the survey. The evaluation team found some supports for the households being “left out” from the major interventions<sup>5</sup>. There was a “Cash for Work (CfW)” activity implemented under which a road in the vicinity was repaired. Households not being selected in the list of 656 were given priority in the CfW intervention. Also, sapling and seeds (eight types) were distributed among all the 1,438 households.

The “Khana” definition was used in case of selecting and disbursing grants among the beneficiaries. As per Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), a *Khana* refers to household members cooking and eating meals together. From this definition, adult children of parents living in the same compound but having meals separately are considered as different *Khana* (household). The evaluation found, in cases, several households living in the same compound getting supports each for Shelter and WASH. While there are plenty of justification for getting shelter support, instead of setting two or three toilets adjacent to each other, the support could have been provided to beneficiaries not being selected within 656 HH. Even, the BDRCS could have considered setting communal toilets and using the resources saved for other important aspects of WASH. Point to be noted that the Need Assessment, conducted during August 2018, recommended setting tube wells in the project area, which could not be done due to resource limitations. Setting communal toilets could have saved some resources to set up a few tube wells in the locality. The idea of communal toilet is endorsed in the Sphere standards, which indicates one of such toilets for 20 persons in general, and one for 50 persons during emergency period. As to concern whether some socio-cultural barriers to having communal latrines, which may exist even when it's being shared within the same family/extended family, no socio-cultural barriers was identified during the FGDs. The only issue that came was regarding

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<sup>5</sup> Beneficiaries were selected based on set criteria. One of the criteria was having land with proper document. Total 391 HH were excluded based on land ownership or access issue. There has been advocacy afford in national level with concern ministries of Bangladesh government through HCTT and cluster approach

the responsibility of cleaning/managing the communal toilet. Beneficiaries told that if the toilet is not owned by a particular family then nobody will take the responsibility of cleaning it.

### ***Appropriateness in Planning***

There was a need assessment conducted during August 2018. The need assessment was termed as Multisectoral recovery assessment, since various sectors were focused in the assessment (e.g. Shelter, WASH, Livelihood, DRR, Health, etc.)<sup>6</sup>. The assessment was qualitative in nature. There were KIIs with stakeholders like local Union Parishad (UP) chairman, community leaders, UNO and other government officials. FGDs were conducted with the beneficiary households. Need for the beneficiaries came out from these sessions. The FGDs were conducted by taking both male and female members of the households. These served as inputs for the interventions planning. Two model shelters were constructed by two of the beneficiaries, which served as the basis for estimating the conditional cash grant for the Shelter. The design of the latrine was taken from DPHE. However, the construction cost was again estimated in discussion with the beneficiaries. The volume of livelihood assistance was also set as per the business plans of the beneficiaries.

While there was considerable participation from beneficiaries (and equal participation from both male and female beneficiaries) in the planning process – the recovery operation did not have any specific **Exit Plan** from the beginning. That means, neither the beneficiaries nor the implementation personnel from BDRCS had any idea regarding how BDRCS would exit from the recovery operation. The Exit Plan was only developed in March 2019 and none of the activities could be seen implemented during the field visits of the evaluation team. It is not clear about how some of the wonderful interventions of the recovery operation would be carried forward, including institutionalization (e.g. registration) of the CDC, further strengthening of CDC, linking beneficiaries with important upazila and district level government offices, and periodic monitoring of the livelihood and WASH practices of the beneficiaries. In future, BDRCS should devise its Exit Plan along with the Recovery Operation’s plan simultaneously before initiating recovery interventions.

### ***Appropriateness in CBIs***

CBIs were actually not separate stand-alone interventions, rather particular mechanism for implementing some of the Recovery interventions. As shown in the table 1, there were three major CBIs – 444 HH received BDT 75,000 as shelter, WASH and livelihood support, 156 HH received BDT 50,000 as shelter and WASH support and 56 HH received BDT 25,000 as livelihood support. In addition, there was a CfW intervention that provided opportunity for 100 HH to receive cash against their labour for 20 days, BDT 400 each HH each day, i.e. total BDT 8,000 per HH. In discussion with the beneficiaries, CBIs were found to be appropriate for a number of reasons:

- Beneficiaries have more flexibility and control over cash;
- Cash disbursement is less costly and easier than distributing materials;
- Helpful for local economy as beneficiaries purchase materials and services from local markets.

Transfers were made using account payee cheques against the beneficiaries’ bank accounts. This was a new method considering the rural context in Bangladesh. Rural people typically do not use bank services in Bangladesh, and none of the beneficiaries had prior bank accounts. So BDRCS staff and volunteers had to go extra miles to open bank account for the 656 HH. This was a “mammoth work”, however, considering the amount of cash transferred in each installment, this was the most appropriate mode of transfer to ensure security, transparency and integrity.


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<sup>6</sup> Minutes of the Flood Recovery BDRCS and IFRC Joint Meeting, 12 March, Monday, 2018

### 3.2 Coverage of the Interventions

A total of 1,438 HHs from ward 4 and 5 of Mahishkhocha union were taken into the survey. However, the major support were provided to 656 HHs. Here, the term major support refers to the conditional cash grants, i.e. BDT 75,000 for Shelter, WASH and Livelihood; BDT 50,000 for Shelter and WASH; and BDT 25,000 for Livelihood. CfW support was reserved for 100 HHs, but the saplings and seeds were provided among all 1,438 HHs. Apart from these distributions, all the households surveyed were included in major trainings, i.e. PASSA, PHAST and CHAST. A knowledge base has been created in the community on improved shelter development, shelter repair, latrine construction and hygiene behaviour. The community people in the LLW informed the non-beneficiary households taking the knowledge from them and building their shelter and latrines with the same design and method. Therefore, the evaluation team believe, although the direct beneficiaries of the Recovery Operation was 656 HH, considering the “big picture”, the entire community of 1438 HH benefited in some way or other.

**Figure 7: Coverage of Different Interventions in Recovery Operation (Number of HH)**



### 3.3 Relevance of the Recovery Operation

As mentioned before, recovery operation interventions were carefully designed in close discussion with beneficiaries, local government representatives and local level government departments. From this aspect, the interventions were very relevant with the local context and needs of the beneficiaries. As mentioned before, the 2017 floods devastated the shelters of the beneficiaries. Therefore, the distribution of CGI sheets and cash grant for shelter repair were necessary to meet the needs of the beneficiaries. Almost all the latrines in the locality became obsolete, causing discomfort and serious health and hygiene issue, particularly for women and children. The PASSA, PHAST and CHAST trainings were modified to adhere with the local context and beneficiaries' level. Introduction of some of the items of the BDT 3,000 worth of hygiene parcel, however, maybe was too early for the beneficiaries (e.g. toilet papers, sanitary pads, top tier bathroom cleaners, etc.). The hypothesis was that with the BDT 3,000, beneficiaries will purchase a few months' supply of hygiene materials and will be habituated to the extent that they will buy those later on their own. It will be very interesting to see in near future whether this hypothesis still remains valid.

## 4. Effectiveness, Efficiency and Accountability of the Recovery Operation

### 4.1 Effectiveness of the Interventions, including CBIs

#### **Shelter Interventions**

Initially the shelter interventions were meant for repairing the structures damaged due to flood. BDRCS provided CGI sheets for the roof of the structure. Plinth raising and remaining repairing was planned to be completed through the CBI for shelter. However, beneficiaries decided to utilise the CGI sheets and cash grant for new construction of their shelter, instead of repairing. In almost all cases, the new construction needed additional fund (average 5,000 up to 15,000 BDT) which the beneficiaries matched on their own. While asking for the reason, beneficiaries informed that they took this opportunity to build an asset for lifetime. The newly build structures were found to be well constructed and sturdy in nature. It seems that they have utilised the knowledge from the training (based on PASSA Approach) very effectively in building these structures. The plinth was raised

*“Sir, I am a poor man, I do not have the ability to build a good home for my children. So when we got this 30,000 taka, I saw an opportunity to build something for the children. I managed 8,000 taka and built this house. It is done so well that not only me but my children will also be able to pass their lifetime in this house.”*

A beneficiary in ward number 4

one to one and half feet higher than the previous flood level. Palisades were placed around the plinth raised so that the soil is not washed away. While traditionally bamboo or wooden logs are used as columns of the structure, whereas in this case, they used concrete pillars. Instead of GI strings, high strength plastic ropes were used for attaching CGI sheets with the frame of the structure. Overall, CBI distributed in this regard seems to be utilised very effectively.



Figure 8: Newly constructed shelters. (Photo: IFRC)

Most importantly, due to the own investments of the beneficiaries, there is a considerable level of ownership grown over the structures. Another positive aspect of the shelter intervention is the effectiveness of the training sessions to orient on PASSA approach. Non-beneficiaries are taking the learnings as well from the beneficiaries in building their structures. So the shelter interventions have created a local knowledge-base, which seems to sustain for a long time.

#### **WASH Interventions**

CBI in WASH sector was the conditional cash transfer of BDT 20,000. Among these, BDT 17,000 was allocated for construction of latrine and remaining BDT 3,000 was distributed for purchase of hygiene parcel, including toilet cleaner, soap, toilet paper, brush, sanitary napkin, slippers, etc. The amount was set through discussion with the beneficiaries and they informed that it was sufficient. The design of the latrine is from DPHE. However, BDRCS helped the beneficiaries adopting it through guidance, advice and continuous monitoring. Much like Shelter, the construction of the latrines was very effectively done. The

design is from DPHE and BDRCS helped beneficiaries to adopt it. There were orientation sessions



Figure 9: (left) A latrine with a raised toilet base. Right (interior condition of the latrine – which looks clean and has a few hygiene materials) (Photo: IFRC)

arranged with the beneficiaries as well as with the local masons and carpenters in which the latrine design was explained. The base of the toilet was seen raised higher than the flood level. Ventilation system allows for plenty of light and air flow. Along with the CBI, there were PHAST training provided under WASH sector. As per request of the evaluation team, beneficiaries could recall major issues of the training. All the 16 latrines visited by the evaluation were found being maintained well, particularly kept clean and each having hygiene materials like toilet papers, slippers, water bucket, cleaners, etc. inside. By asking beneficiaries to recall their learning from the PHAST training sessions and the answers they gave,

the evaluation team found that the household members are aware of basic health and hygiene practices. They are even aware of menstrual hygiene practices, which is quite remarkable considering the local context. And like Shelter interventions, the evaluation team observed dissemination of knowledge for latrine construction, management and hygiene practices within the community from the beneficiaries. Therefore, the WASH interventions, including the CBIs were quite effective.

### **Livelihood Interventions**

BDT 25,000 was provided to the beneficiaries as seed money for an IGA. More than eighty five percent of the beneficiaries chose to buy cow with the money. The majority bought cows to rear for a short period and the idea is to sell the cow in the upcoming Eid-ul-Azha, one of the biggest festivals of Muslim community in Bangladesh. The beneficiaries told that as natural fodder (e.g. grass) is quite available in the locality, rearing cow will be cost effective and profitable. However, since they purchased these cows quite recently and Eid-ul-Azha is still almost three month away, exact effectiveness of this livelihood option is difficult to measure at this point. However, beneficiaries choosing non-cow options have already seen good results. IGA like tailoring, poultry, goat, small business, etc. are generating regular income for the households. Moreover, cow rearing is risky from the point that it is an investment intensive venture and the entire cash grant (plus in many cases beneficiaries added some more) was used to buy the cow. So, in case of mortality due to disease infestation or accident – the entire investment will be lost, increasing the vulnerability of the beneficiary. Already the evaluation team found a cow of a woman beneficiary died – resulting asset loss. This is only an example of indicating the risk of this IGA, and not a generalization. The main observation here is the effectiveness of this IGA is not yet tested as they have not sold the cows. Therefore, the effectiveness of the cow rearing is not proven yet. All the beneficiaries received basic training on livestock rearing from the trained volunteers. They have also received the orientation on good livestock choices, fattening and treatments from the Upazila Livestock Officer. The officer also shared his mobile number with the beneficiaries for distance/instant support. It is advised that BDRCS should follow up this IGA after Eid-ul-Azha and check its effectiveness.

**Table 2: Livelihood Options Adopted by Beneficiaries**

Livelihood Option	No of HH
Cow	439
Duck	52
Chicken	125
Goat	170

Livelihood Option	No of HH
Buffalo	4
Vegetable Gardening	15
Handicrafts	2
Fishing	4
Small business	51
Agriculture	13
Sewing Machine	7
Rickshaw/Van	6
Others	5

In case of non-CBI, saplings of fruit and timber trees and eight types of vegetable seeds were distributed among the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries have only planted the saplings and seeds and hence it is quite early to comment on the effectiveness. However, the mixture of vegetable seeds will allow for the household nutrition, as well as round the year regular subsistence income – if they take proper care of these.

### **Cash for Work Interventions**

During need assessment, beneficiaries discussed about repairing a road in the community, which was washed away due to flood. Being classified as “Category C” road in the Union Parishad, there was very little chance for this road to be repaired by Project Implementation Office (PIO) of the Upazila in near future. Hence, BDRCS took the initiative of repairing this road. This had dual purpose – repairing an important community infrastructure, as well as generating short term income opportunity for community people. The road was constructed under the supervision of the Project Implementation Officer (PIO) of Aditmari Upazila (initially the PIO of the neighboring upazila also provided valuable support). This was done, again, in a very effective way. The road was raised from the flood level of previous flood for at least two feet. There were palisade placed on both side of the road, which will prevent it from flood impact in near future. The CfW intervention used to construct this road was also helpful as the beneficiaries involved got some quick cash. BDRCS gave priority to the households not being selected as beneficiaries for the CBIs in Livelihood, Shelter and WASH – so this was quite a necessary intervention to satisfy those who were left out.



Figure 10: A constructed road with palisade placed on both side of the road, to minimize flood impact (Photo: IFRC)

### **Community Mobilisation Interventions**

CDC was formed in the Flood Operation, mainly with the purpose of representing the community for any consultation process. However, the CDC was found to be in the role of community mobilisation and community support role, which was probably not intended in the beginning. Already the CDC is working as a knowledge hub for construction of disaster resilient shelter and latrines. CDC was also found supporting the women-headed beneficiaries in construction of shelter and latrines. Most promising role of CDC was found in case of the beneficiary whose cow died (mentioned before). CDC took the initiative of arranging contribution from other beneficiaries and eventually bought another cow for that beneficiary. So already the CDC is in a position in identifying and resolving community issues and problems. Hence, this was a very effective community mobilisation intervention of BDRCS. Forming the CDC in very early stages of the intervention could leverage more benefit and effectiveness for other interventions. CDC could have been utilised in beneficiary selection, distribution of supports, monitoring of interventions and liaison with BDRCS local unit and upazila level government offices. As a matter of fact, if the capacity of the CDC can be improved in maintaining liaison with the upazila level offices (e.g. UNO, DPHE, etc.) then it can even mobilise resources for the community. However, for that, proper acknowledgement is necessary, e.g. registration in the relevant government authority.

Apart from CDC, BDRCS deployed four community mobilisers. Community mobilisers and volunteers were trained on important issues like ECV, CEA and PGI. The evaluation found the community mobilisers going door to door to increase knowledge of the community people on relevant health, hygiene, disaster management and other important issues. Moreover, currently BDRCS have a volunteer base in Mahishkhoa union, which was not there before. That means, in case of any future disaster (e.g. flood, flash flood – both of which are quite common in the union), there will be first responders available in the community.

### **Satisfaction of the Beneficiaries**

As there was no quantitative methods like questionnaire survey was used, the evaluation could not quantify the satisfaction level of the beneficiary households. However, all those participating in the FGDs and later in the LLW expressed their appreciation regarding the recovery operation. They thought the interventions

*“Flood took away everything me and my family had. I never thought that I would stand again on my foot. By the grace of almighty and with the help of Red Crescent, I can now at least think about my future”.*

A beneficiary in ward number 5

were helpful. In particular, they appreciated the fact that the interventions were focused on improving the entire families' vulnerability caused by flood, instead of supporting a big number of community people by giving small, minuscule grants. Even those receiving only BDT 25,000 or BDT 50,000 admitted that those receiving BDT 75,000 deserved that support. Beneficiaries were satisfied with the overall process in which the selection took place, the complaint placement

system (discussed later), cash distribution system using bank transfer, different trainings provided and the monitoring of the BDRCS NHQ, as well as unit office teams. They also highly appreciated the efforts of the volunteers that worked rigorously with them. Beneficiaries informed that they will carry forward the interventions, particularly the livelihood ones to further improve their lives. Beneficiaries think their livelihood has been secured and standard of living improved because of the interventions. Overall, the evaluation team found a highly satisfied group of beneficiaries in the recovery operation.

### **Effectiveness in Planning vis-à-vis Implementation**


Planning for the recovery operation was quite appropriate, as requirements of the beneficiaries, feedback of government officials and local government representatives and local context was addressed in the process. The implementation of recovery operation got delayed for almost six months (will further be

discussed later). The timeline eventually available for recovery operation was not very long, and even almost a month of that could not be utilized due to the parliamentary election in the country. However, the majority of the planned interventions could be implemented within the stipulated time. BDRCS planning process was found to be very flexible and responsive towards the necessary change, particularly considering local context. Ultimately, only 79 per cent of the expected fund could be mobilized for the floods operation, which means the recovery operation did not receive the expected amount in full. Due to this fund crisis, two planned interventions (identified in the Need Assessment) could not be implemented – (a) Repairing of old/flood affected tube wells and installation of new tube wells; and (b) installation of removable latrines for the landless in the community (those not receiving latrine support). Aditmari Upazila DPHE have future plans and allocations for installation of tube wells at community level. If the CDC or local community can liaison with the UNO and Upazila DPHE officer then there are possibilities of getting a few tube wells from the government in the project area.

## 4.2 Efficiency of the Interventions, Including the CBIs

As per the Operations Update number 4 (issue date 11 February, 2019, financial report timeframe covering 23 August 17 to 30 April 19), total Income for the entire floods operation (e.g. fund mobilized) (MDRBD020) was CHF 3,795,575 and total expenditure was CHF 3,075,472. Among these, total cash disbursement through different CBIs was CHF 1,030,403. This means, around 34 per cent of the total expenditure could be disbursed as “Cash” among the beneficiaries in the Flood Operation. Considering the food, cloths, CGI sheets, seeds, utensils, tools and other materials along with the cash, total expenditure on relief items was CHF 1,927,247, which was 63 per cent of the total expenditure. That means, the Flood Operation could disburse two third of the total fund mobilized among the beneficiaries. With this support, more than 103,000 people from 10 severely affected districts could be supported. This is good sign of an efficient operation. Although the situation was different, but, for simplicity of comparison, the cost effectiveness of Flood Operation of Bangladesh (MDRBD020) was compared with the Flood Operation of Sri Lanka (MDRLK006). The comparison is shown in the figure below. This is one indication of the efficiency of BDRCS in implementing Flood Operations.

**Figure 11: Comparative Benefit-vs-Expenditure in Flood Operation**



As per the information received from the PM of the Flood Recovery Operation, a total of BDT 114,164,000 was disbursed as cash grant. In total BDT 136,000,000 was distributed in terms of cash, CGI sheets, CfW, seeds and other benefits. On the contrary, administrative cost was only BDT 4,500,060. This means, the VfM of the Flood Recovery Operation in case of cash distribution was 25.37, i.e. with spending of 1 taka, cash 25.37 taka could be disbursed among the beneficiaries. If the total benefit (cash and other materials)

is considered then the VfM stands around 30.22 (i.e. with the spending of 1 taka, a total of 30.22 taka worth of benefits could be reached to the beneficiaries). This is quite remarkable and a sign of highly efficient intervention implementation.

The evaluation identified the following reasons attributable for such high cost efficiency in delivering benefits to the beneficiaries:

- Entire recovery operation was confined within a small geographical location, resulting in low logistics, transportation and administrative cost.
- No local office was rented at community level, rather, communal spaces like schools were used periodically as makeshift office.
- Heavy reliance of the recovery operation was on volunteers rather than paid staff.
- One third of the entire expenditure was cash distributed through CBIs – cash disbursement is significantly cheaper than disbursement of non-cash relief and supports. Even the cash disbursement in the recovery operation was done through bank transfer, which virtually involved no cost in comparison to other cash disbursement methods like cash-in-envelope and mobile money transfer.

### **4.3 Reasons and Aftermath of Delay in the Floods Operation**

While the floods operation was found to be quite efficient, this efficiency was hampered to some extent due to an unexpected delay during January to June 2018. The situation initiated from a delegate report sent after a monitoring visit to Gaibandha district to IFRC APRO during late 2017, with suspected fraud, corruption and weaknesses in internal control system. In response, IFRC conducted an internal audit of the systems, particularly the financial and internal control system of BDRCS during January-March 2018. In the meantime, after the allegation of fraud and corruption, BDRCS stopped the early recovery operations, particularly the Multipurpose Cash disbursement in the field for indefinite period of time. Only after the implementation of the recommendations of the audit team, the operation was resumed in July 2018.

The delay caused negative impact on the performance on the floods operation. In some areas, the cash disbursement was stopped the previous night of the stipulated date. In areas, beneficiaries arrived to receive cash, only to find out the disbursement was postponed. This created confusion and distrust among the beneficiaries regarding BDRCS activities. Majority of the Executive Committee members of BDRCS units are local reputed persons, who were under tremendous pressure from the UP chairmen, members and other local government representatives. The beneficiaries themselves were affected due to the delay. The Multipurpose Cash grant was designed so that the beneficiaries could cope up with the hardship and shocks caused by the floods. With the grant being postponed, they had to adopt alternative methods to deal with the situation, causing more havoc for them. Most importantly, the operation was halted for indefinitely, i.e. stakeholders did not know the operation would have been held for six months. As a result, the human resources, particularly the international staff already deployed had to be retained, resulting in considerable administrative expenditure. This means, if this delay was not there, the efficiency of the floods operation would have been even better. There were also some tensions created between BDRCS unit office and NHQ, and BDRCS NHQ and IFRC.

The Evaluation Team is with the view that the delay was an unfortunate event caused due to communication gap, limited notice of local context and misinterpretation of issues from both IFRC and BDRCS. Before sending the report, there could have been thorough discussion among all relevant stakeholders (e.g. volunteers, BDRCS unit office, BDRCS NHQ representatives and IFRC BD office) to further explore the issue. Even direct discussion could have been carried out with the beneficiaries and local community

leaders to further clarify the issues. There are high possibility that the allegation was due to the specific expatriate person not having ample orientation with the local culture and language barrier. The internal audit conducted by IFRC was the most appropriate step taken considering the situation. It was later found that there was no fraud or corruption involved, however, due to the unfamiliarity of the volunteers with ODK system and the issues with the National ID card of Bangladesh, there was mismatch among different information of some beneficiaries. BDRCS could have continued with the cash disbursements among the beneficiaries for whom all fields of the information were correct and matched with the documents.

The outcome of the entire process was, eventually, positive for BDRCS. The BDRCS Cash SOP was finalized. The SOP was disseminated among all the staff and volunteers associated directly or indirectly with the floods operation through training and orientation workshops. BDRCS drafted a Complaints Response Mechanism (CRM) guideline, based on which, multiple complaint handling systems were placed in the Recovery Operation. Advanced practical training on ODK/KOBO was organized and conducted by two members from Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT). Basic orientation on ODK (user/data collection level) was provided to the volunteers in 14 districts, in NHQ and during the NDRT trainings. During the field visits, the Evaluation Team found all the staff and volunteers being aware and cautious of the fraud and corruption issues.

#### **4.4 Human Resource Allocation in Recovery Operation**

BDRCS deployed a Project Manager (PM) for the recovery operation during October, 2018 to April, 2019. There was a Project Officer (PO) deployed from IFRC BD office. In addition, there were one NDRT member and two full time implementation staff throughout the Recovery Operation. There was no specific person for administration, finance, accounts or logistics. The Unit Level Officer (ULO) had to carry out these functions as additional responsibility. BDRCS provided supports from NHQ through multiple visits from NHQ personnel to the field to support in the finance and accounting related activities. There was no monitoring, documentation and Information Management (IM) personnel deployed in the field during the Recovery Operation. The PM's responsibility was to monitor the field level operation, while the Director (DR) was responsible for overall monitoring of the operation from the BDRCS NHQ. In addition, there were multiple volunteers from Unit office of Lalmonirhat deployed to support the operation. Overall, the staff and volunteers deployed had the required skill set to carry out Recovery Operation.

The Final Evaluation identified all the staff and volunteers to be highly motivated and serious in implementing the interventions. However, the really effective period of implementation was quite short (January to April, 2019) for which the staff went to giving "extra miles" in terms of efforts to implement all the interventions within the stipulated time. As per the observation of the Evaluation Team as well as from the feedback of the audience in LLW, the staff were overburdened with works while regularly working after office hours. There was considerable engagement from the ULO in financial management and accounting of Recovery Operation, which hampered some of the regular activities in the unit office. Overall, due to the time pressure, staff had to focus more on immediate works (e.g. intervention implementation) rather than activities having long term effects (e.g. coordinating/collaborating with district and upazila level government officials; planning for follow-up, exit and sustainability). The audience in LLW suggested putting an additional staff in Recovery Operations to support in finance, accounts and administration.

#### **4.5 Information Management**

As mentioned before, there was no specific monitoring personnel in the field level for the recovery operation – it was the additional activity of the PM. Activities of the PM, and other unit level staff were monitored from

NHQ through periodic visits. There were no specific schedule for these visits. Also, there was no specific checklist found for the monitoring visits. There were no monitoring visit reports found during the evaluation. The feedback mechanism was mostly found to be verbal, by the monitoring personnel during field visits. The Evaluation Team did not find feedback being provided on the reports sent from the field.

The Evaluation did not find a centralized and accessible repository of documents in BDRCS that can store the operation specific documents, which can be considered as an institutional memory. Documents seem to be with different departments and persons depending on initiator of the documentation. BDRCS does not have a functional Information Management (IM) system or department. Although, BDRCS is making further efforts to establish a compressive IM system by contracting with a local vendor, the evaluation did not find these efforts being successful. The present IM system in BDRCS does not qualify to become the institutional memory.

Through the recovery operation, BDRCS holds vital and sensitive information of the beneficiaries, including information of their bank accounts, copies of National ID card, and copies of land holding documents. Without having any functional IM system, it is not sure how the security and integrity of these information will be ensured.

#### **4.6 Transparency, Accountability and Internal Control Mechanism**

Cash transfer during emergency response and early recovery was done using “Cash-in-Envelop” method, which is in-line with the BDRCS policy. Amount of cash was fixed as per the recommendation of National Cash Working Group, during 2017 which was BDT 4,000 (75 percent of the minimum monthly expenditure of a typical family). Eligible beneficiaries were informed regarding the amount they would receive, along with the date and time of disbursement. Appropriate security measures were taken for transfer of cash, including informing local administration, police and security forces. During disbursement, beneficiary information were matched with their documents (in most of the cases the National ID card). Local UP chairmen, members and other local people were invited to verify the information of the beneficiaries. Beneficiary acknowledgement was taken upon receipt of money in the form of signature or thumb prints. Overall the distribution was done successfully.

After delay in the early recovery and recovery operation, substantial improvement was done in transparency, accountability and internal control mechanism in BDRCS, which is detailed out in section 4.3. Because of the bigger volume of CBI and to sustain the transparency and accountability, BDRCS used bank transfer for CBIs during Recovery Operation. Furthermore, there were considerable involvement from finance and accounts personnel from BDRCS NHQ and IFRC BD office to ensure transparency and accountability in the financial transactions in the Recovery Operation. Several KII respondents put emphasis on further strengthening the internal audit department of BDRCS, who has the additional responsibility of ensuring internal control within the organisation, however, is considerably understaffed. The Evaluation Team was informed that recruitment is in process for the BDRCS internal audit department, although the team had no information on specific number of staff to be deployed here.

#### **4.7 Complaint Response Mechanism in Recovery Operation**

The Recovery Phase of Flood Operation had several complaint response mechanisms, including complaint boxes in the community and setting a hotline. Two rounds of complaints and feedback were received through the complaint boxes. There were more than 900 feedback from the community in the boxes. In addition, there was a hotline number set for lodging complaint. The number was printed on stickers and pasted in visible places for the community to see. There were several complaints and feedback placed

through the number as well. Each of the meaningful complaints were investigated by BDRCS. After investigation, there were ten beneficiaries found having limited eligibility to be in the list. Those were replaced with more eligible beneficiaries based on the investigations and further validation.

## 5. Sustainability

### 5.1 Institutional Capacity Enhancement and Lessons Learnt for BDRCS

The floods operation was a regulation, standard response and recovery initiative of BDRCS, which the organisation is doing since its very beginning. However, the operation resulted in changing views, institutional working practices and future plans of BDRCS, which is a promising feature. Some of the issues in which BDRCS's institutional capacity building was enhanced due to the Flood Operation is narrated below:

- Though BDRCS follows a “Zero Tolerance” policy, after the finalisation of Cash SOP and orientation on fraud and corruption, there is a strong and conscious effort throughout the organization regarding eliminating mismanagement and building strong internal control. From the top management at NHQ till the unit level offices, there is a common consensus in this regard. Staff and volunteer in the field was found to be avoiding any behaviour or situation that can be interpreted otherwise.
- Although BDRCS had formed community development committees, however, that was only for long term development programs. Formation of CDC in Recovery Operation was a new experience for them. BDRCS want to further strengthen this concept and introduce in next Recovery Operations as a mean to implement interventions.
- There was an institutional knowledge build up regarding different modality of cash transfer, since they had to explore an alternative for “Cash-in-Envelop”. There were discussion with multiple Financial Service Providers (FSP). Taking the experience, they even introduced the Electronic Money Transfer (EMT) of Bangladesh Post Office in another emergency response operation in Shariatpur.
- EC members for BDRCS units have realisation on sustainability in the successful Recovery Operation interventions. They already are thinking about further strengthening the CDCs and continuing working with them in future. There are thoughts about periodic monitoring and follow up on the livelihood interventions of the beneficiaries. EC members are even thinking about mobilising local resources in this regard.

*“What are you talking about corruption!!! These kids are working in hot and humid conditions, but we could not even gave them a glass of water or offer them a meal. When they are thirsty, they go to the tube well and drink from there. We had bitter experience in our life regarding relief operation. But we never saw anything like this before!”*

Reaction of a beneficiary upon the question regarding bribery and corruption of the volunteers and staff involved in Recovery

## 5.2 Sustainability of the Interventions

### ***Sustainability of Shelter Intervention***

Through the recovery operation, houses for around 600 HHs could be reconstructed, using high quality materials and construction techniques. Obviously these shelters can now withstand flood severity to the same extent that happened in 2017. Due to the own investments of the beneficiaries, there is a sense of ownership grown. Repair, maintenance, and further extension is now the responsibility of the beneficiaries and they have gladly accepted it. But most importantly, the PASSA training sessions conducted have created a long-term sustainable knowledge-base in the community on how to construct and maintain disaster resilient shelter. Already there are spontaneous dissemination of knowledge from beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries to the community. A number of local carpenters and masons were trained on construction of such shelters, which means the skill is now with the community as well. So the Shelter interventions have good sustainability potentials in future.

*“Let’s say we did not use this rubber washer when screwing the CGI sheet with the frame for roof. But with this simple technique reduces the instances of rusting and increases life. We used to use one nail in the joint, now we use two. These are the small things that we learn now to build stronger shelters”.*

Answer of a beneficiary upon the question regarding learning from PASSA training.

### ***Sustainability of the WASH Interventions***

Same as the Shelter interventions, the latrines constructed are highly owned by the beneficiaries. They consider it as an asset. In rural areas, a latrine is not something for households to display – but the beneficiary households gladly showed the evaluation team the latrines as if it was one of their valuable assets. This indicates the level of ownership they have. Inhabitants in rural Bangladesh still lack considerable knowledge in cleanliness and maintenance of the latrines, particularly those donated to them. This was also found to be different in case of the beneficiaries, who maintained the latrines well and kept it clean. However, the Recovery Operation beneficiaries are doing good management of the latrines, making these clean and usable. Also the latrine construction knowledge is with the beneficiaries, again, resulting a knowledge base within the community. Local masons have the skill now to construct such facilities. The PHAST training, provided through trained volunteers of BDRCS, included knowledge to help identify health problems in the community and discover which of them can be prevented through community action; to map the community’s water and sanitation conditions; to exchange information and discuss common hygiene practices according to their good and bad impacts on health; to improve sanitation practices in the community; and tools to bring positive behavioural change. Due to the PHAST training, there is a common understanding about health and hygiene. Although they may or may not purchase materials like toilet papers or sanitary napkins on their own, however, at least they now know the low cost alternatives for these such as disinfecting cotton cloths and reusing it during menstrual cycle, use of ample water during and after defecation, etc . So the WASH interventions have good sustainability potentials as well.

### ***Sustainability of the Livelihood Interventions***

Around 15 per cent of the beneficiaries adopted alternative IGAs that suit their skills and experiences. IGAs like small business, poultry, goat, sewing, etc. already have shown promises in earning small income regularly throughout the years. The vegetable seeds distributed also will be able to provide round the year nutrition for the households. The saplings, if managed well, will become valuable assets within two or three years. The Evaluation Team still have doubts about the livelihood option adopted by majority of the beneficiaries, i.e. cow. The IGA is risky from the context that beneficiaries do not consult with the veterinary

experts regularly, they do not adopt a modern and scientific “Beef Fattening” method, and most importantly, they have invested their entire cash grant on one asset. Adopting more comprehensive IGA mixture enabling the round the year income for the household could have been resulted into a better livelihood intervention for the beneficiaries. Recommendation section further describes this idea.

## 6. Recommendations and Lessons Learnt for Future

The Final Evaluation team is presenting its recommendations in summary form below:

1. Continue working with beneficiaries in a small geographic location with comprehensive support rather than spreading out thinly over a large number of beneficiaries
2. Exit plan should always be a part of the initial Recovery Operational plan;
3. Form CDCs at early of the Recovery Operation and utilise it for subsequent intervention implementation;
4. Further strengthen the institutional capacity of BDRCS by increasing the size of Disaster Response team to handle multiple disaster at a time. Strengthen the school and college-based co-curricular activities to develop more volunteers. At the same time, ensure the timely strengthening of the Internal Audit department and operationalisation of the Information Management Department/wing;
5. Maintain close liaison with the local government offices from the very beginning till the end of the Recovery Operation;
6. Continue with CBIs in case of Recovery Operation – however, closely follow the Cash SOP throughout the operation;
7. Apply multiple mode of cash transfers in the same operation, within the allowance of the SOP as per convenience of beneficiaries and considering the local context;
8. Extensive discussion and consensus is required before taking any decision;
9. Decision should be made upon 360° Feedback from all relevant stakeholders;
10. Consider local level implication in taking any drastic decision;
11. Plan for more than one IGAs in Livelihood intervention rather than investing on one;
12. Keep a mixture of IGAs – with one giving periodic large income while another giving regular subsistence income;
13. Develop proper IGA mix and IGA calendar to ensure round the year income for the beneficiaries.

The subsequent sections further detail out these recommendations

### 6.1. Planning for Recovery Operations

Recovery operation of Bangladesh floods operation followed a “Rich in Depth” of benefits for the beneficiaries rather than “Reach in Number” of beneficiaries. That means, the focus was more on utilizing available resources to produce maximum benefits for the beneficiaries rather than spreading the resources thin in getting large number. As a result, although the number of beneficiaries was low, however, each of the beneficiaries received the required support to reduce their vulnerability. There are limited chances for these beneficiaries requiring further assistances in near future. BDRCS is different from typical development organizations and NGOs, as it has very little income. So, considering the resource availability, this approach should be followed in future recovery operations.

The geographical spread of the recovery operation was quite small, only two wards in a Union. This was again found very effective and efficient since it reduces administrative, logistics and transportation costs. Even if BDRCS went for recovery operation in another upazila of Lalmonirhat district, the cost would have

been doubled. However, in doing so, the operation could not take place in Hatibandha or Patgram upazilas, which also required support. Again, considering the resource volume of BDRCS, simultaneous implementation of recovery operation in Aditmari, as well as in Hatibandha or Patgram would not have been successful. In future, BDRCS may consider taking a cluster approach in recovery operation in which the organization can form multiple donor or implementer clusters, segregate the target locations into small blocks and concentrating individual organizational support in one or two specific blocks so that the operational costs can be minimized while maximizing the benefits. In cases where such cluster approach is not possible, BDRCS should plan geographic location that results in optimum operational cost and maximum benefits.

Exit plan should be essential part of any operational plan for future Recovery Operations. Exit plan should clearly mention the ways for gradual withdrawal from the intervention by delegating responsibilities to the community level organizations and government departments. Exit plan should be well disseminated among the beneficiaries.

## **6.2 Collaboration and Coordination**

Development and operationalization of CDC was a good lessons learnt from the floods operation. However, BDRCS can consider forming the CDC at the very beginning of the next operations. Activities like beneficiary selection, cash distribution and training arrangement could be done through CDC with BDRCS in the facilitation role. This will strengthen capacities of the CDC members, while BDRCS will get enough time to monitor the capacity building process. The strength, cohesiveness and confidence of the CDC will also be built. CDCs should be registered as legal entities for their sustainability. CDCs can even have monthly fees of nominal amount, donation and contribution from local government departments to mobilise its fund. CDCs can also provide fee-based services, e.g. advisory services for Shelter and Latrine construction. Linking CDC with local government representatives and upazila and district level government offices will further enhance their capacities at one end, and other hand will ensure resource and support mobilisation for the community. If effectively formed, CDCs can become essential response mechanism during future disasters. To ensure the sustainability and functionality of CDCs, BDRCS unit offices, as well as NHQ should have periodic monitoring and follow up. A standard guideline can be developed in this regard.

Coordination with local level government offices is very important for all phases of the floods operation. While the relationship and coordination is to some extent spontaneous during emergency phase, it tends to become irregular during recovery operations. BDRCS unit offices should continue maintaining the coordination with the upazila and district level offices, at least with the DC and respective UNO. The benefits are manifold – both DC and UNO have special allocations, which can be accessed for the beneficiaries, and at the same time, complementary supports can be mobilised from them (e.g. installation of tube wells, Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) support, CfW support, etc.). Local government offices can also conduct periodic monitoring and follow up of the interventions after withdrawal of BDRCS.

## **6.3 Institutional Development of BDRCS**

A very important issue came in the LLW regarding the capacity of Disaster Response team in terms of number of skilled members. Present size of the team is only sufficient to respond to one disaster at a time. In case of multiple disasters, the team members are deployed from one location to another, causing excessive pressure on them. Also, because of the limited resources, typically DR members are withdrawn from recovery operations to emergency responses, which means the recovery operations also suffer.

Considering the geographic and climactic situation of Bangladesh, there is no alternative but to go for expansion of the DR team. Volunteers are the major strength of BDRCS. So there needs to be continuous efforts in training more volunteers, particularly in community level. Volunteer training as co-curricular activities in schools and colleges need to be strengthened by the unit offices.

The internal audit department is responsible for the internal control within BDRCS. However, as mentioned before, the department is significantly understaffed. The evaluation team was informed that the recruitment process in the internal audit department is underway. The evaluation team recommends the process to be expedited for the time being and the department should be staffed with ample number of resources to effectively ensure transparency, accountability and internal control in the BDRCS. At the same time, as indicated, the IM department/wing needs to be set up as soon as possible with appropriate number of human resources of relevant qualification.

## **6.4 Cash Based Interventions**

From the lessons of the recovery operation, there is no doubt that “Cash” is the most effective form of support in comparison to materials. Cash disbursement also reduces significant administrative cost and gives more alternatives for the beneficiaries. However, each of the cash disbursement methods has its own merits and demerits. While bank transfer is the most effective method, beneficiaries in Bangladesh do not tend to have it and opening a bank account requires considerable time and documentation. Mobile money transfer is easy but involves significant amount of service charge. Post Office EMT is cheap, but the staff do not have capacity to disburse among a large number of beneficiaries at a time. Therefore, while BDRCS should continue adopting CBIs in subsequent recovery operations, multiple mode of cash disbursement can be adopted in the same operation, depending on the knowledge and education level of the beneficiaries, availability of the services, amount of cash grant and availability of support from the local administration. Moreover, adopting multiple distribution method in same operation gives alternatives for the staff as well and decreases pressure from them. To ensure accountability and transparency, there is no alternative but to follow the Cash SOP. The document is a comprehensive one and in-line with IFRC SOP.

## **6.5 Decision Making**

Since individuals from multiple background, nationality, language and culture works together in IFRC and BDRCS interventions – extensive discussion and consensus is required before taking any decision. Decision should be made based on evidence rather than allegation. Decision should be made upon 360° Feedback from all relevant stakeholders. A common consensus is required in case of decision making. Before taking any drastic decision, the local level implementation on the direct and indirect stakeholders should be thoroughly analysed. Until a concrete decision is made, all relevant stakeholders should be kept informed and alternative measures should be recommended. There needs to be specific timeline for decision finalisation and until that the alternative measures recommended needs to be applied.

## **6.6 Designing Livelihood Interventions**

Being an aggregation society, historically Bangladeshi citizens are lenient towards cattle. In rural Bangladesh, cattle is more of an asset rather than a mere livelihood option. Hence, majority of the beneficiaries in the country, regardless of location, prefer cattle as livelihood grant. However, as mentioned before, cattle is a risky IGA as well. Moreover, if scientific methods are not adopted then instead of an income source, cattle can become liability as there are some recurring costs in terms of feed and medicine.

So there needs to be more planning and thinking regarding livelihood interventions in the future Recovery Operations.

Rather than one single IGA, a combination of IGAs need to be selected for the participants to reduce the risks arising from one IGA. The following aspects can be considered during selection of IGA combination:

- Several on-farm IGAs to cover all the months in a year (e.g. brinjal, tomato, cucumber and red amaranth).
- Combining on-farm IGAs (e.g. vegetables) with non-farm IGAs (e.g. tinseling) .
- Combining agricultural IGAs (e.g. Bitter gourd) with livestock (e.g. beef fattening) or poultry IGAs (e.g. Indigenous Chicken).

While combining the IGAs, the following aspects should be optimized:

- Round the year income potentials.
- Steady small income rather than large income after significant time gaps.
- Best utilization of the investment grant.
- Best utilization of time of the participant and her household members.

Example of combination of IGAs are shown below.

**Table 3: Illustrative Examples of IGA Combination**

Potential IGA Combination	Aug, 18	Sept, 18	Oct, 18	Nov, 18	Dec, 18	Jan, 19	Feb, 19	Mar, 19	Apr, 19	May, 19	Jun, 19	Jul, 19
<b>Combo 1</b>												
Red Amaranth												
Brinjal												
Chicken Rearing												
Betel Nut Processing												
<b>Combo 2</b>												
Dry Fish												
Tomato												
Pumpkin												
Mung Bean												
Tinseling												

Once the IGA combination for the household is prepared, the beneficiaries need to sit with the household members and prepare an IGA calendar. This will give the household a complete picture of the cash flow for the entire year. An example for the IGA calendar of the participant household is shown in the figure below.

Table 4: Illustrative Example of IGA Calendar

IGA	Oct- Nov	Nov- Dec	Dec- Jan	Jan- Feb	Feb- Mar	Mar- Apr	Apr- May	May- Jun	Jun-Jul	Jul- Aug	Aug- Sep	Sep- Oct
	Kar Investment	Agr	Pou	Mag	Fal Return	Cha	Bai	Jai	Ash	Sra	Vad	Asw
Tomato	10,000				18,000							
Red Amaranth	1,000	2,000	1,000	2,000	1,000	2,000	1,000	2,000	1,000	2,000	1,000	2,000
Beef Fattening					26,000				38,000			
Betel Leaf										30,000		
Tinseling	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Total	10,000	3,000		3,000	8,000	3,000		3,000	38,000	27,000		3,000

## 7. Conclusion

Bangladesh floods operation 2017 was quite a standard operation for BDRCS, as the society had implemented numerous such operations in past. Due to the involvement of the staff, NDRT members and volunteers - high quality and effective response operations could be implemented. The early recovery operation was, however, disrupted in the middle due to the unfortunate halt in operation, resulting around six months of delay in early recovery and recovery phases of the operation. Eventually, the recovery operation started in July 2018, but there were delays again due to external factors (e.g. parliamentary election). So effective time for the recovery operation was, to some extent, shorter than standard BDRCS recovery operation. However, within all the limitations, BDRCS could implement all the planned activities within the stipulated time, with the required effectiveness and efficiency. For this, BDRCS can be proud of itself.

BDRCS is always in a continuous learning process – taking lessons from the past operations to make the subsequent ones more effective. There were important lessons learnt as well from the recovery operation. Some of the weaknesses of organization was identified, particularly in reporting and documentation, which the organization is in the process of strengthening. There have been enhanced efforts in strengthening transparency, accountability and internal control, something which was advised by stakeholders involved. Innovative approaches and techniques were encouraged, which resulted in some good results. There were equal contribution from the NHQ members as well as from BDRCS unit office members. IFRC APRO, IFRC BD office and the PNSs had regular contribution throughout the operation. Overall, it was a collective approach that needs to be taken as example and should be carried forward in future.

## Annex One: List of KII Participants

Name	Position title	Organisation	Date for KII	Location of KII
Rafiqul Islam Babu	Deputy Secretary General	BDRCS	6-May	Dhaka
Nazmul Azam Khan	Director, Disaster Response and International Relations & Communications	BDRCS	25-Apr	Dhaka
Farook Rahman	Project Manager, Flood Early Recovery Operation, DR & Cash Focal, BDRCS	BDRCS	27-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Mizanur Rahman	Assistant Director	BDRCS	25-Apr	Dhaka
Mohammad Nurul Amin	Assistant Director, Disaster Response	BDRCS	25-Apr	Dhaka
Farhad Alam	ULO, Lalmonirhat	BDRCS	27-Apr	Lalmonirhat
ABM Bayejid	ULO, Kurigram	BDRCS	30-Apr	Kurigram
Ashraf Hossain Badal	Secretary, Lalmonirhat	BDRCS	27-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Aminul Islam Mondol Manju	Secretary, Kurigram	BDRCS	30-Apr	Kurigram
BZM Shafiullah	Technical staff (WASH and Shelter)	BDRCS	27-Apr	Lalmonirhat
AKS Akkas	Technical staff (Livelihoods and DRR)	BDRCS	27-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Zahed Hasan Bepul	NDWRT & WaSH expert	BDRCS	27-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Tariqul Islam	NDRT & PASSA specialist	BDRCS		
Mohammad Shafiul Arif	Deputy Commissioner (DC) (District Administrator)	GoB	28-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Asaduzzaman	UNO, Aditmari Upazila	GoB	28-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Mofizul Islam	PIO, Aditmari & Kaliganj Upazila	GoB	28-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Golam Mostofa	DPHE, Aditmari Upazila	GoB	28-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Dr. Mosharraf Hossain	Livestock Officer, Aditmari Upazila	GoB	29-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Bozlar Rahman	Executive Engineer, DPHE	GoB	29-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Abdul Hasib	Chairman, CDC.	CDC	28-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Abdul Hakim	Secretary, CDC	CDC	28-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Rafiqul Islam	Member, CDC	CDC	28-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Fatema	Member, CDC	CDC	28-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Azmat Ulla	Head of Country Office	IFRC BD CO	6-Apr	Dhaka
Surendra Kumar Regmi	Programme Coordinator	IFRC BD CO	25-Apr	Dhaka
Hasibul Bari Razib	Senior Manager, Humanitarian Response and Shelter	IFRC BD CO	25-Apr	Dhaka
Mehedi Hasan Shishir	Sr. Officer, Livelihoods and Cash	IFRC BD CO	6-May	Dhaka
AKM Zahirul Alam	Programme Officer	IFRC BD CO	27-Apr	Lalmonirhat
Mohammad Sharif Khan	Sr. Programme Officer	IFRC BD CO		Dhaka

Name	Position title	Organisation	Date for KII	Location of KII
Motiar Rahman	Sr. Manager, Finance & Admin	IFRC BD CO	5-May	Dhaka
Sharif Mahmud	Sr. Finance Monitoring Officer	IFRC BD CO	5-May	Dhaka
Yirgalem H. Negeri	Risk Management Delegate	IFRC BD CO	5-May	Dhaka
Gaurav Ray	Country Representative	German Red Cross	27-Apr	Lalmonirhut
Tanvir Anjum	Finance Officer	BDRCS	5-May	Dhaka
Alice Ho	Operations coordinator	IFRC APRO	26-Apr	Skype
Isidro Navarro	Isidro Navarro Livelihoods & Cash Preparedness Coordinator IFRC APRO	IFRC APRO	26-Apr	Skype

## Annex Two: Documents Consulted

1. BDRCS, 2005. BDRCS Gender Policy
2. BDRCS, 2011. Flood Contingency Plan
3. BDRCS, 2017. Strategic Plan 2017-20
4. BDRCS, 2018. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Cash Based Intervention (CBI)
5. BDRCS, 2018. Child Protection Policy and Guideline
6. BDRCS, 2018. Need Assessment Report for Recovery Operation
7. BDRCS, 2019. Exit Strategy for Flood Recovery Operation
8. IFRC, 2017. Emergency appeal Bangladesh: Floods
9. IFRC, 2017. Revised Emergency Appeal Bangladesh: Floods
10. IFRC, 2017. Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Bangladesh: Flood
11. IFRC, 2017. Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Bangladesh: Flood Revised Emergency Plan of Action Bangladesh: Floods
12. IFRC, 2017: Emergency Plan of Action Operation Update Sri Lanka: Floods and landslides
13. IFRC, 2018. Final Evaluation of Sri Lanka Flood Operation 2016-2017
14. IFRC, 2018. Internal Audit Follow Up Report, Bangladesh
15. IFRC, 2018. Emergency Plan of Action operation update Bangladesh: Floods
16. Regular operation updates of IFRC on Bangladesh Flood Operation

## Annex Three: Schedule of the Final Evaluation

Activities	Timeline
Secondary document review	21-22 April
Briefing with IFRC and BDRCS Team Members (Skype)	23 April
Review of Inception Report	23-24 April
Updating Inception Report	25 April
KII/FGD with BDRCS NHQ, IFRC BD and IFRC APRO	25 April to 6 May
Field Visit to Lalmonirhat	27 April to 2 May
Field Visit to Kurigram	30 April
Lessons Learned Workshop	13 May
Draft Report Submission	17 May

As per the initial plan, Lessons Learned Workshop was supposed to take place on 5 May. However, due to the preparedness of the Tropical Cyclone “Fani” it had to be postponed for one week, which eventually delayed the draft report submission.

## Annex four: Evaluation Matrix

Research Criteria/Questions	Specific Questions
<b>Relevance, Appropriateness and Coverage</b>	
How effective were the interventions in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and responding appropriately to their circumstances?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the most appropriate beneficiaries selected?</li> <li>• What vulnerability analysis/evidence exists?</li> <li>• Was the beneficiary selection process fair, appropriate and effective?</li> <li>• What selection criteria evidence exists?</li> <li>• How the strategies, guidelines and processes of IFRC and BDRCS ensured selection of the most appropriate beneficiaries?</li> <li>• Did the intervention covered specific needs of all diversified group?</li> </ul>
Did the interventions reach all population groups in need, including those in remote areas who would otherwise have not received humanitarian assistance?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What was the coverage of the assistance?</li> <li>• How many beneficiaries were covered by specific types of assistances and interventions (e.g. livelihood, shelter, WASH, CBI, etc.)?</li> <li>• Were the beneficiaries from remote areas covered with the assistances?</li> <li>• Could other communities have been selected?</li> <li>• Were there exclusions or differential delivery of assistances among beneficiary groups? If so then what were the reasons for the differential deliveries?</li> <li>• Was the beneficiary selection process and the final list communicated with the community?</li> </ul>
Was the assistance provided appropriate and sufficient to meet intended needs of women, men and children, and is of a quality and scale that meets RC commitments and expectations?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Could the assistances provided meet the needs of the beneficiaries (immediate needs vis-à-vis longer term needs for self-sufficiency)?</li> <li>• Were the specific needs of the women, men and children met through the interventions/assistances provided?</li> <li>• Were the assistances in line with IFRC and BDRCS policies, procedures and guidelines?</li> </ul>
To what extent were the beneficiaries, in terms of the participation of men, women, children and PWD, involved in the assessment, planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of the interventions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How the interventions were designed?</li> <li>• Were the beneficiaries involved in the design process? If yes then how?</li> <li>• What were the concerns raised by communities during the intervention? How those were addressed?</li> <li>• What strategies were used in the design to ensure quality, timely and relevant delivery to target beneficiaries?</li> <li>• Were the beneficiaries involved in implementation of the interventions? If yes then how?</li> <li>• Were complaints/feedback mechanisms put in place for community questions and concerns to be answered?</li> </ul>
What problems and constraints were faced during implementation and how did the interventions manage/adapt to changes in need, capacities and context?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How adaptive were the intervention and implementation modality adaptive in addressing local context and needs?</li> <li>• What were the major issues in implementing the interventions? How those were addressed?</li> <li>• Were there enough flexibility in the intervention design and implementation to address changing scenarios?</li> </ul>
<b>Efficiency, effectiveness and accountability</b>	

Research Criteria/Questions	Specific Questions
Did the interventions meet the immediate and intended results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent, the community received support for their recovery as needed? Did they receive those in right time?</li> <li>To what extent were the communities, specifically women, children, the elderly etc., satisfied with the delivery of the response and the recovery assistance? Did it meet their overall expectations?</li> <li>Were there any delays in the provision and what sort of impact did this have? How could this be improved in future? What internal and external factors could be attributed for such delay?</li> <li>How did the community receive the information about distribution such as what support, when and to whom the assistance will be provided? Were there any gap to deliver the support and information?</li> </ul>
How effective were processes for planning, coordination, implementation, monitoring and quality management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent the interventions could be implemented as per the plan? If there were significant deviation in implementation than planned then what were the reasons? What aspects of the interventions were not covered well during planning?</li> <li>Were adequate tracking systems in place to ensure timeliness, transparency and accountability? Did these work well?</li> <li>How effective was the coordination with government officials, local government and non-government entities?</li> <li>How were programme activities managed and coordinated, particularly between BDRCS, IFRC, other Movement partners?</li> <li>Could the beneficiaries effectively place their complaints/feedback through the system installed?</li> </ul>
Were there adequate resources (financial, human, physical and informational) available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What was the unit cost for delivering different assistances among the beneficiaries?</li> <li>Was the cost justified to ensure the timeliness, and specific needs of the beneficiaries?</li> <li>Was there any delay in fund disbursement and did it have any effect on the intervention implementation?</li> <li>What were the specific measures taken to ensure quality implementation in least cost method?</li> </ul>
Was the capacity of the human resource system enough to fulfil the needs of the interventions and beneficiaries?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was the number of staff adequate to implement the interventions effectively as per the plan? If not then what could have been the ideal number? Or was there redundancy in staffing?</li> <li>Was the staff deployment at different tiers (District, Upazila, Union, etc.) adequate?</li> <li>Did the staff deployed have the required skills and experiences? Was there any trade-off in staff recruiting for timeliness or cost?</li> <li>Was the cost of staff justified?</li> <li>Was there delay in staff deployment?</li> </ul>
<b>Connectedness and Sustainability</b>	
Did the interventions result in enhanced institutional capacity of the BDRCS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>With this Floods Operation, is there any improvement in BDRCS capacity?</li> </ul>
How is the intervention (response and recovery project), in an inclusive way, triggering to enhance the capacity of local community response capacity and local organizations?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did this operation increase the response capacity of the DDMC and UzDMC? To what extent they were involved in planning and designing? To what extent they were involved in assistance delivery? To what extent they were involved in monitoring?</li> </ul>

Research Criteria/Questions	Specific Questions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did it enhance response capacity of the local government institutes, NGOs and civil society? To what extent they were involved in planning and designing? To what extent they were involved in assistance delivery? To what extent they were involved in monitoring?</li> <li>• Did it enhance response capacity of the local volunteers and community mobilisers?</li> </ul>
Has the impact of programme activities, sustained following completion of the interventions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have the relevant district and upazila offices adopted or scaled up the interventions implemented in livelihood, WASH and shelter during early recovery or recovery phase?</li> <li>• Was there any reflection of the interventions in the local level planning and budgeting?</li> <li>• Are the beneficiaries still using the knowledge gathered from the relevant trainings? Did they experience any benefits of these trainings?</li> </ul>

### Annex five: CBI Evaluation Matrix

Research Criteria/Questions	Specific Questions
Relevance and Appropriateness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What criteria were considered in choosing the transfer? How reasonable was the decision?</li> <li>• How the decisions regarding CBI was made, based on what evidence?</li> <li>• Was there consideration of local context while designing the CBIs?</li> <li>• Were the CBIs designed in-line with the IFRC and BDRCS policies, standard operating procedures and guidelines?</li> </ul>
Effectiveness and Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What did the transfer enable people to do that they might not otherwise have been able to do? What changes occurred as a result of the transfer?</li> <li>• Did people get the right amount of cash? What was it used for?</li> <li>• Were people able to access vendors or distribution points? If cash or vouchers were provided, was the market able to provide the right goods, of the right quality at the right price?</li> <li>• Were there any delays related to the choice of transfer? If so, what caused the delays? What were the consequences?</li> <li>• What are the main benefits according to beneficiaries? What do they feel are the main downsides? What type of transfer would beneficiaries have preferred and why?</li> <li>• Was the specific delivery mechanism successful in delivering the transfer to recipients? Were any major challenges encountered?</li> <li>• Did the type of transfer affect the targeting process or targeting outcomes?</li> <li>• Has the assistance caused any obvious positive or negative impacts on the economy? Is there reason to think that the choice of transfer has influenced production or local trade? Has the intervention encouraged or discouraged the supply of certain goods? Has it caused changes in the prices of any goods?</li> <li>• Has the assistance resulted in any positive or negative impacts on households beyond the stated objective?</li> </ul>

Research Criteria/Questions	Specific Questions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the assistance resulted in any positive or negative impacts on non-beneficiaries and communities?</li> <li>• Which kinds of traders (e.g. large or small, local or regional) have benefited or lost out from the intervention?</li> <li>• How does the cost of the transfer compare with the provision of other possible transfer types at the same scale?</li> <li>• What costs (including opportunity costs) were incurred by beneficiaries (e.g. travel, transport of goods, time)?</li> <li>• How did the actual costs compare with the predicted costs used in planning and decision making?</li> <li>• What was the total cost of the project per beneficiary?</li> <li>• Were appropriate systems in place or developed in order to provide the transfer in an accountable manner?</li> </ul>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the type of transfer created any opportunities for exit strategies, sustainability or linking with government programmes/strategies?</li> <li>• How sustainable are the achievements and what recommendations could be made to improve sustainability?</li> </ul>

**IFRC Management Response to Recommendations for the  
Final Evaluation of Bangladesh Floods Operation (MDRBD020)**

**Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS)  
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Bangladesh Country Office (CO)**

**Background information:**

- **Date and duration of evaluation:** 19 April 2019 – 18 May 2019
- **Evaluator/s:**
  - Md. Foyzul Bari Himel (Team Leader)*
  - Afroza Sultana (BDRCS/Team Member)*
  - Samina Jahan Mustary (German Red Cross/Team Member)*
- **Evaluation Management Response Team members:**
  - BDRCS:**
    - Mr. Rafiqul Islam, Deputy Secretary General (DSG)*
    - Mr. Md. Belal Hossain, Director, Disaster Risk Management (DRM)*
    - Mr. Mijanur Rahman, Director In-Charge, Disaster Response (DR)*
    - Mr. Farook Rahman, Field Officer and Cash Focal, DR (Project Manager for the 2017 Flood Recovery Operation)*
  - IFRC Bangladesh CO:**
    - Mr. Surendra Kumar Regmi, Programme Coordinator (PC)*
    - Mr. Hasibul Bari Razib, Senior Manager, Humanitarian Response and Shelter*
    - Raqibul Alam, Senior Manager, Programme Support*

**Background Information:** During August 2017, heavy monsoon rains severely impacted the riverine region of India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. This resulted in intense flooding in almost two-thirds of Bangladesh affecting around 6.9 million people. IFRC launched an Emergency Appeal (EA) on 24 August 2017 for CHF 4.7 million to assist 20,000 families or households affected by the floods for a duration of 12 months. A revised Emergency Appeal was issued on 11 November 2017 and the appeal amount was increased to CHF 4.8 million. With both local funding and IFRC Emergency Appeal funds, BDRCS has provided

*emergency assistance in two phases. The first phase was during the acute flooding and focused on the provision of food, water, shelter and basic health services. As the flood waters started to recede, the second phase was carried out and provided a more focused distribution on additional food, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health services. The IFRC revised emergency appeal aims to assist 100,000 people (20,000 families) affected in 10 targeted districts in providing immediate relief and longer-term recovery assistance. A recovery operation was planned within the floods operation in September 2017 and it was supposed to be completed by August 2018, however, following a couple of extensions, the emergency operation was eventually completed in 30 April 2019.*

*To evaluate the relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, and efficiency of recovery interventions undertaken by the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) as part of the Bangladesh Flood Operation (MDRBD020) supported by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and to analyse key areas for improvement, the IFRC commissioned a final evaluation during April – May 2019. The evaluation specifically focused on shelter; food security and livelihoods; and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sectors in recovery. The evaluation also had focus on the use of cash-based intervention (CBI) in Bangladesh context. The evaluation aimed at:*

- *Assessing the effectiveness of recovery planning process, beneficiary targeting, information management and decision making.*
- *Assessing the relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, and efficiency of recovery activities under flood operation against the planned outcomes in three key areas; shelter, WASH and livelihood.*
- *Capturing the current best practices and the improvements with regards to the key target areas.*
- *Assessing the sustainability of the programme intervention.*
- *Briefly assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of BDRCS response and relief during the emergency phase of the operation Assess BDRCS disaster response and recovery strategies and systems.*
- *Assessing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of CBI.*

**Summary of Management Response:**

*The evaluation, by and large, reflects the reality and comes with practical recommendations that will certainly help improve future operations. Though most of the recommendations are already being applied, such good practices will be continued in future as well. Some of the recommendations such as concentration in a limited geographical area for better impact, having an exit plan already at the outset, greater involvement of the community committees in planning and implementation, strengthening BDRCS response capacity, close coordination with the local authority, implementing more income generating activities, etc. are all being considered in the relief and recovery operations/projects conceived in 2018 and beyond. These recommendations however will certainly help BDRCS and IFRC stay focused and continue these good approaches in future. The BDRCS/IFRC management therefore accepts most of the recommendations, kindly see below for detail, and commits to implement the agreed actions as appropriate. Furthermore, we wish to thank the evaluation team for the good work and timely completion of the evaluation.*

**Recommendation 1:** *Continue working with beneficiaries in a small geographic location with comprehensive support rather than spreading out thinly over a large number of beneficiaries.*

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
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<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Partially accepted</b>	<i>In the recovery phase of this operation, small geographical location was considered rather than spreading out. Also, BDRCS has provided integrated support in terms of livelihoods, shelter, WASH and DRR. The report itself mentioned (please refer to 6.1 para) that the approach was found very effective and efficient.</i>	<i>Recommended approach is already in practise and BDRCS will consider this in future too based on operational contexts and needs on the ground.</i>	<i>Already in practise.</i>	<i>BDRCS and IFRC Disaster Response (DR) team.</i>
<b>Comments:</b> <i>This will be considered in the recovery phase of the current floods operation (MDBRD022).</i>				
<b>Recommendation 2:</b> <i>Exit plan should always be a part of the initial Recovery Operational plan.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Accepted</b>	<i>Agreed, the exit plan should be part of the original plan from the beginning of the recovery operation and well consulted with the communities and local stakeholders.</i>	<i>In future operations, this will be considered from the very beginning of the recovery phase of any operation by engaging community and local stakeholders.</i>	<i>Future operations.</i>	<i>BDRCS and IFRC Disaster Response (DR) team.</i>
<b>Comments:</b> <i>In current floods operation (MDRBD022) during the recovery operation this recommendation will be applied.</i>				
<b>Recommendation 3:</b> <i>Form CDCs at early of the Recovery Operation and utilise it for subsequent intervention implementation.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Accepted</b>	<i>BDRCS formed the CDC in this recovery operation considering the experience of development programmes. These approaches were effective and a good lesson learnt for the recovery operation.</i>	<i>In future operation(s), the CDCs/community committee will be formed during the inception of the recovery phase.</i>	<i>Future operations.</i>	<i>BDRCS DR team.</i>
<b>Comments:</b> <i>Again, this will be considered in the recovery phase of the current floods operation (MDBRD022).</i>				
<b>Recommendation 4:</b> <i>Further strengthen the institutional capacity of BDRCS by increasing the size of Disaster Response team to handle multiple disaster at a time. Strengthen the school and college-based co-curricular activities to develop more volunteers. At the same time, ensure the timely strengthening of the Internal Audit department and operationalisation of the Information Management Department/wing.</i>				

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<p><input type="checkbox"/> <b>Accepted</b></p>	<p><i>This is always a priority for BDRCS to strengthen the capacity with the support of IFRC and Movement partners. BDRCS not only focuses in terms of disaster response but in other areas including DRR.</i></p>	<p><i>Increase the capacity and provide skill development training to the National Disaster Response Teams (NDRTs), National Disaster, Watsan Response Teams (NDWRTs), including training of new batches to increase the human resources.</i></p> <p><i>Develop Plan of Action (PoA) on Preparedness for Effective Response (PER) self-assessment exercise and regular follow up.</i></p> <p><i>Formation of upazilla (sub-districts) level youth volunteer group in all 64 districts to support and disseminate the BDRCS activities in local level.</i></p> <p><i>Intensive follow up of the accountability PoA.</i></p> <p><i>BDRCS has developed a Central Data Information Management System (CDIMS) in 2019 and will start operationalizing from the beginning of 2020. Disaster Response data will be incorporated in that system. Also, BDRCS is in process to hire an IM Official.</i></p>	<p><i>By June 2020.</i></p> <p><i>PoA by Dec 2019 and follow up 2020 onward.</i></p> <p><i>June 2020.</i></p> <p><i>June 2020.</i></p> <p><i>March 2020 onward.</i></p>	<p><i>BDRCS DR.</i></p> <p><i>BDRCS DR</i></p> <p><i>Youth &amp; Volunteer (Y&amp;V), Unit Affairs directors and DSG.</i></p> <p><i>Accountability Focal Point, BDRCS and PC, IFRC</i></p> <p><i>BDRCS DR, IM and PMER teams.</i></p>
<p><b>Comments:</b> <i>BDRCS with the support of the IFRC and other Movement partners is continuously working on developing their capacities following the Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification (OCAC) plan of action. In October 2019, BDRCS had a self-assessment exercise of Preparedness for</i></p>				

*Effective Response (PER) which will help BDRCS to address this recommendation as well. In terms of strengthening the internal audit and information management system, BDRCS is already working on these too. BDRCS also has plans to increase the capacity of its volunteers and attracting new ones in the system.*

**Recommendation 5:** *Maintain close liaison with the local government offices from the very beginning till the end of the Recovery Operation.*

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Partially accepted</b>	<i>BDRCS did liaison with local government offices during the recovery operation in Lalmonirhat and relevant government departments also provided technical support and training on livestock, agriculture, sewing etc. In addition to that DRR activities were also liaised with local government. However, more emphasis can be given for this in the future operation(s).</i>	<i>Emphasize will be given to engage with the local government, eg. sharing of the recovery plan and regular update, etc.</i>	<i>Future operation(s).</i>	<i>BDRCS DR along with field level implementation team.</i>

**Comments:** *Already mentioned above.*

**Recommendation 6:** *Continue with CBIs in case of Recovery Operation – however, closely follow the Cash SOP throughout the operation.*

**Recommendation 7:** *Apply multiple mode of cash transfers in the same operation, within the allowance of the SOP as per convenience of beneficiaries and considering the local context.*

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Accepted</b>	<i>Cash based Interventions (CBIs) are one of the priorities for BDRCS in the response and recovery operation as well as in the other development programs. Approval of BDRCS Cash SOP in this January 2019 is definitely a key achievement for the NS and guiding the CBI activities. This SOP also covers the multiple mode of the cash transfer modalities and</i>	<i>Practise and utilize the cash SOP in every operation.</i>  <i>According to the SOP, BDRCS has agreements with the financial service providers (Bangladesh Post Office, bKash) and currently using their services for the CBIs.</i>	<i>On-going.</i>  <i>On-going.</i>	<i>BDRCS DR and Cash Focal.</i>

	<i>BDRCS &amp; its partners are following this SOP now.</i>	<i>Orientation and training on cash SOP at different levels for BDRCS staff and volunteers as well as for IFRC and PNSs staff.</i>	<i>On-going.</i>	
<b>Comments:</b> <i>N/A</i>				
<b>Recommendation 8:</b> <i>Extensive discussion and consensus is required before taking any decision.</i>				
<b>Recommendation 9:</b> <i>Decision should be made upon 360° Feedback from all relevant stakeholders.</i>				
<b>Recommendation 10:</b> <i>Consider local level implication in taking any drastic decision.</i>				
<b>Management Response</b>	<b>Decision Rationale</b>	<b>Action/s to be taken</b>	<b>Timeframe</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Partially accepted</b>	<i>Normally, the BDRCS and its branches and partners are consulted before making any operational decision.</i>	<i>The operation team and the management of BDRCS and IFRC will engage in proper consultation with appropriate and relevant people in BDRCS, IFRC and partners.</i>	<i>Continuously (a standard practice).</i>	<i>BDRCS and IFRC Senior Management.</i>
<b>Comments:</b> <i>As mentioned above.</i>				
<b>Recommendation 11:</b> <i>Plan for more than one IGAs in Livelihood intervention rather than investing on one.</i>				
<b>Recommendation 12:</b> <i>Keep a mixture of IGAs – with one giving periodic large income while another giving regular subsistence income.</i>				
<b>Recommendation 13:</b> <i>Develop proper IGA mix and IGA calendar to ensure round the year income for the beneficiaries.</i>				
<b>Management Response</b>	<b>Decision Rationale</b>	<b>Action/s to be taken</b>	<b>Timeframe</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Partially accepted</b>	<i>Livelihoods interventions in recovery operation are designed based on communities' need. The IGAs are developed and finalized after orientation and training to the affected population. Then they prepare the proposals considering their needs, capacities as well as seasonal calendar. Based on these, local government officials are also engaged during the sectoral training (eg. agriculture, fisheries,</i>	<i>Importance will be given on multiple and mixture IGAs in future orientation with the communities so that they can come up with relevant and practical options considering seasonal calendar.</i>	<i>Future livelihoods interventions in recovery and development programs.</i>	<i>BDRCS DR, DRM Project Managers and IFRC Livelihood focal.</i>

	<i>livestock, etc.) for community people and local volunteers.</i>			
<p><b>Comments:</b> <i>Sharing of learning from this flood recovery operation and identification of local experts from the same community on specific livelihoods activities and sharing their expertise and suggestions to the other members of the communities will be emphasized. Following the support provided, the community people are linked with the local government expertise.</i></p>				