

EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF HURRICANE IRMA OPERATION IN CUBA

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

June 2019



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Acknowledgments

The evaluation team would like to thank all the people involved in this evaluation for sharing their time, experience, reflections and skills, and for being the source of information of this study.

Our gratitude to all the Cuban Red Cross team for their openness, availability and logistical support, making a busy field agenda viable - in the time and dimensions previously foreseen - as well as to the representative of the Cluster for the Latin Caribbean (Haiti, Cuba, Dominican Republic) and the team of the Regional Office for the Americas of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for their invaluable guidance and support throughout the entire process.

We also want to acknowledge all the communities that faced the tragic effects of a hurricane unprecedented since 1934. They have shown their solidarity and resilience, as well as the remarkable work of the Cuban Red Cross volunteers who, due to their commitment and effort, were able to relieving the suffering of the people affected by Hurricane Irma, thus reflecting the inestimable Power of Humanity.

Limitations

The evaluation team wants to report some limitations that have affected the evaluation process:

Due to problems in obtaining visas for the team of consultants, the field phase initially planned and agreed with the International Federation team had to be postponed for almost two months. As a result, one of the two planned consultants was not available due to other assignments, which resulted on a reduced capacity of the consultants' team to do more field visits and interviews in Cuba.

The final data was made available for the consultant team only at the end of the field visit, which limited the appropriate approach to this phase of the work and the verification of the corresponding data.

The Cuban Red Cross carried out a satisfaction survey on a sample of the population reached. At the time of the present study, the data had not yet been processed, and the results could not be taken into account for this report.

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed in this report are the exclusive responsibility of the evaluation team and do not necessarily reflect those of the Cuban Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Executive Summary

Hurricane Irma hit Cuba on September 8, 2017, with a category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale (the first since 1924) and sustained winds of more than 250 km/hour. The slow movement of the hurricane across the island and over more than two days extended the impact to almost the entire national territory, mainly affecting the central and northern areas of the country. Hurricane Irma had a strong impact on telecommunications, roads, and housing in the country; causing economic losses valued at 13.5 billion Cuban pesos, directly affecting more than 5 million people; the most affected provinces were Camagüey, Ciego de Avila, Sancti Spiritus, Villa Clara, Matanzas, Mayabeque and Havana.

The action plan developed by the Cuban Red Cross and the International Federation assisted more than 40,000 affected families, mainly in the provinces of Camagüey, Ciego de Avila, Villa Clara, Las Tunas, Holguin and Matanzas, through non-food aid and hygiene promotion actions in the response phase, and delivery of water tanks and installation of safe roofs in the recovery phase; training and workshops were held for Government representatives, volunteers and staff of the Cuban Red Cross in order to improve their knowledge of shelter, safe settlements, hygiene promotion, and the "Laws, Norms and Principles for International Disaster Response" (IDRL) as part of strengthening the capacities of institutions; and vehicles and equipment were delivered to the Cuban Red Cross. Mosquito nets, sheets and water tanks for health centers and older adults' homes were part of the direct support given to the Government.

The final evaluation aimed to improve service delivery, and accountability to the reached population, donors and other stakeholders, and to identify lessons learned to improve the IFRC's disaster response system and provide support for recovery planning and future operational responses in the region.

The methodology used for the evaluation was based on a review of the main IFRC operational documents, policies, strategies and tools for humanitarian assistance and humanitarian frameworks, interviews, and focus groups with key informants from the Cuban Red Cross, IFRC, partners National Societies, population reached, Roofing brigades and members of the Government, as well as the contributions made through a quality self-evaluation workshop, a workshop on lessons learned, and a field visit to the provinces of Matanzas, Ciego de Avila, Camagüey and Villa Clara.

The main positive points identified during the evaluation are:

- There was only one response plan for the entire country developed and implemented by the Government, which avoided duplication of actions and assistance aimed to a non-priority population.
- IFRC and CRC had a lines of action pre-identification previous to the emergency, which facilitated the design and formulation of the action plan in a shorter time
- The damage assessment and analysis of needs process and selection criteria of the reached population was very detailed, which allowed the action plan to deliver the specific aid needed to each beneficiary, thereby achieving, for example, an increase of more than 40% of the percentage of families reached by the roof reinforcement.
- Efficient use of resources.
- The significant support of the Cuban Government to CRC/IFRC action plan, assuming the transportation of humanitarian supplies from the ports to the communities, the salaries of the

CRC staff; the licenses to volunteers of their jobs; as well as the technical support of the community architects and housing technicians.

- All the material provided by the operative had a proper use, even on unforeseen actions. For example, the roof-repair kits were delivered to the communities so that they can be still used once the action plan finished.
- The members from the reached population that were interviewed were highly satisfied with the quality of the aid they received
- Prioritization of the most vulnerable individuals and families, which led to the extension of the operation to more than 400 communities; which made it possible to meet the relevance criterion and ensure coverage of less-favored areas and families.
- One of the action plan direct effects was an increase in the number of volunteers in many of the intervention areas, thus enabling the CRC to improve its status and expand its scope of action.
- Internal and external coordination: no weakness of relevance identified.

On the other hand, the main points identified for improvement are:

- The aid entry and transportation, as well as IFRC staff visas access, were noticed as the main limitations to adequate operational efficiency and effectiveness. However, as a positive point, the CRC and the IFRC have included in the plan of action awareness-raising workshops concerning the IDRL because the speeding up these procedures depends on the Cuban Government.
- Although the delays were mostly due to the complex logistical-administrative procedures for importing the aid items in Cuba, the first plan of action was unfeasible for the time initially considered.
- The system implemented to guarantee that the roofs were safe did not work properly in all the communities since not all the house technicians (responsible for its certification) had the same capacities or technical criteria, causing that approximately 10% of the visited houses evidenced severe installation defects.
- The branches, volunteers, and Roofing brigades did not have all the equipment needed to do their job properly; such as security equipment, computer equipment, visibility equipment for volunteers, etc.
- The fact that the Government led the operation, and that the Cuban Red Cross staff and the aid they delivered were not always properly identified with the Red Cross emblem resulted in the population not sure about whom provided the aid.
- The promotion of resilience must be a key area of action in every community intervention for IFRC; nevertheless, this was not integrated into the plan of action, leaving the intervention with an approach that was eminently responsive and not so innovative. However, it has been considered to include a resilient population approach in the Country Plan.

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1. Introduction

Due to its geographical location in the western part of the Caribbean Sea, Cuba is affected every year by extreme hydrometeorological phenomena, mostly hurricanes, the hurricane season comprising from June 1 to November 30.

Hurricane Irma, the fifth most intense recorded in the Atlantic Ocean, made landfall in the islands of the northeastern Caribbean during the early hours of 6 September 2017, causing catastrophic damage and fatalities in Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, St. Bartholomew, St. Maarten, and other islands in the eastern Caribbean Sea.

Two days after, on September 8, 2017, the hurricane hit Cuba with a category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale (the first since 1924) and sustained winds of more than 250 km/hour. The slow movement of the hurricane across the island, and over more than two days, extended the impact to almost the entire national territory, mainly affecting the central and northern areas of the country.

Although the hurricane significantly reduced its category, when it reached the warm waters of Florida, it intensified again, hitting on September 10 with category 4 on the Saffir-Simpson scale near Cayo Cudjoe, causing severe damage and 12 fatalities in that state of the United States. On September 11, Irma weakened to a tropical storm.

Although Cuba's civil defense¹¹ had activated its action protocols to mitigate the impact -information phase on September 5, alert phase on September 6 and recovery phase on September 10-, strong winds and torrential rains affected a total of 158,554 houses, of which 14,657 were destroyed, 16,646 were partially damaged, 23,560 houses lost their roofs, and 103,691 suffered partial damage to their roofs. Similarly, the hurricane-damaged approximately 980 health institutions, 2,264 educational centers, 466 poultry farms, and 95,000 hectares of crops. Hurricane Irma impacted the country's telecommunications and communication routes, causing economic losses valued at 13.5 billion Cuban pesos²².

Irma directly affected more than 5 million people; the provinces most affected were Camagüey, Ciego de Avila, Sancti Spiritus, Villa Clara, Matanzas, Mayabeque and Havana.

¹ National Civil Defence Staff. Document to establish circumstances amending contractual liability (force majeure) in the territory of the Republic of Cuba, September 25, 2017. <http://www.camaracuba.cu/index.php/es/descargas/category/17-servicios?download=586:con-fines-de-acreditar-fuerza-mayor-provincia-la-habana-tornado-ano-2019>

² IFRC Emergency Appeal Operations Update, 31 August, 2018. <http://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=210914>

2. Cuba Red Cross and International Federation Action Plan


On 15 September 2017, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) activated an amount of 453,459 Swiss francs from its Disaster Assistance Reserve Fund (DREF) to support the Cuban Red Cross (CRC) in its emergency response actions.

On the same day, the IFRC issued an emergency appeal for CHF 7,056,160 to provide assistance to 25,000 people (5,000 families) for a period of 12 months, including actions in water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion (including purification of drinking water, storage and hygiene items), restoring family links (RFL), as well as essential household items and repair of damaged roofs.

On 29 September 2017, the IFRC updated the Emergency Appeal based on the needs analysis, increasing the amount to CHF 7,570,948 and focusing its actions on water, sanitation and hygiene promotion (WASH), shelter (including non-food items), RFL, and CRC capacity building.

On 6 June 2018, the IFRC launched a new revision of the Emergency Appeal for CHF 9.7 million, extending it to 35,000 people assisted (7,000 families) and an 18-month intervention period (closing date 15 March 2019), maintaining the same areas of intervention and adding disaster risk reduction (DRR) actions.

In the "IFRC Operations Update No. 6, February 18, 2019" report a new extension is achieved in the implementation period of 4 months, establishing the final date of the operation as June 15, 2019, and focusing the intervention in the recovery of the affected population through the repair and installation of roofs - using for this purpose the Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter (PASSA) and community training for roof repair-, delivery of water tanks, development of hygiene promotion workshops, distribution of NFI and updating of municipal, provincial and national response plans, along with a specific CRC institutional strengthening plan.



The main areas where the action plan³ intervened are (1) Matanza, (2) Villa Clara, (3) Ciego de Avila, (4) Camagüey, (5) Las Tunas and (6) Holguín, as shown in the following intervention map.



Source: Consultant Team

³ During the emergency phase, distributions were also made in other provinces.

3. Evaluation Objectives

As specified in the ToR, the final evaluation aims to:

“To improve service delivery and accountability to the reached population (previously called "beneficiaries"), donors, and other stakeholders, and to build lessons for the improvement of the IFRC disaster response system and provide support to recovery planning and any recommendations for adjustments for the upcoming operational responses in the region”.

The final evaluation will evaluate the following areas:

- i) the **relevance and appropriateness of delivery** of humanitarian assistance to beneficiaries based on needs and context.
- ii) the **efficiency and effectiveness of the IFRC response, including coordination** with key partners and external actors aimed at optimizing the response.
- iii) the **coverage** in terms of which population groups were included in or excluded from the intervention. Special attention will be given by the evaluators to the beneficiary selection process and to what extent the response considered and addressed the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly children, pregnant women, elderly people and people with disabilities.
- iv) the **connectedness** ensuring that short-term emergency activities are implemented taking into account the longer-term activities proposed and interconnected factors
- v) The **Relevance** and efficiency of the coordination mechanisms implemented.

Similarly, in the TOR⁴, the requirements are: “the evaluators will focus on the target population selection process and the size of the response under consideration and will address the needs of vulnerable groups, in particular children, pregnant women, old adults, and people with disabilities”.

The final evaluation will consider all decisive factors during the operation (what went well and what requires improvement) taking into consideration the context and capacities of the National Society and other Movement components and will cover all the implementation of the responses.

Therefore, the study had a double objective: on the one hand, accountability towards the reached population, donors, and partners and; on the other, taking advantage of the experience and lessons learned in order to guide successive steps or actions to be undertaken -in this or in future interventions-, creating an institutional learning process that allows for greater efficiency in the Movement's operations, both in the emergency itself and in the successive phases of recovery and development.

⁴ ToR are attached in annex 1.

4. Methodology

4.1 Desktop review⁵.

A total of 17 operational documents shared by the IFRC team, IFRC humanitarian assistance policies, strategies and tools (code of conduct, framework for evaluations, etc.), and humanitarian action frameworks (Sphere, Core Humanitarian Standards) were reviewed.

4.2 Key Informant Interviews and Focus Groups Discussions

Most of the information was obtained through semi-structured interviews and focus groups discussions, during the field visit to CRC headquarters and the branches, and communities in the provinces of Camagüey, Ciego de Avila, Villa Clara, and Matanzas. Regarding the IFRC staff involved, most of the interviews were conducted via Skype and some were face-to-face. The Key informants were identified jointly with the IFRC monitoring team after the documentation review phase.

Before each interview and focus group discussion, the team ensured that informants were aware of the confidential and voluntary nature of the information provided.

The following is a summary of interviews and discussions completed:

Informant	N° Interview	N° Focal Groups (Participants)	Region
CRC	11	3 (14)	Sede Central, Matanzas, Holguín, Las Tunas, Ciego de Avila, Villa Clara y Camagüey
IFRC	12	-	Oficina Regional de las Américas y Clúster del Caribe.
Partner National Societies (PNS)	2	-	Cruz Roja Canadiense y Cruz Roja Americana.
Families reached	51	-	Matanzas, Las Tunas, Ciego de Avila, Villa Clara y Camagüey
Roofing Brigades	5	-	Camagüey, Ciego de Avila y Villa Clara
Government members and public companies	9	9 (52)	Matanzas, Las Tunas, Ciego de Avila, Villa Clara y Camagüey
Total	80	12 (66)	

Note: Focus groups with the Government always had the participation of members of the local Red Cross.

4.3 Quality self-evaluation workshop.

On May 27, 2019, a workshop was held for the implementation of the intervention quality self-evaluation tool; Government representatives, the Cuban Red Cross (headquarters and branches), the Canadian Red Cross, and IFRC took part of the workshop. The tool is based on the following ten criteria:

- *Criteria 1: Relevance and appropriateness of action plans.*
- *Criteria 2: Efficiency in the use of resources.*

⁵ The bibliography is attached in annex 3.

- *Criteria 3: Effectiveness and timely delivery of humanitarian aid.*
- *Criteria 4: Adequate coverage of action plans concerning existing needs and capacities (NS and IFRC).*
- *Criteria 5: Coherence of action plans.*
- *Criteria 6: Improvement in operations through learning from past and current experiences.*
- *Criteria 7: Participation and accountability to beneficiaries.*
- *Criteria 8: Increasing the resilience of communities.*
- *Criteria 9: Strengthening the local capacities of the NS.*
- *Criteria 10. The coordination and complementarity of the Movement's response.*

4.4 Lessons Learned Workshop

A workshop on lessons learned was held on May 28th and 29th, representatives of the government, the Cuban Red Cross (headquarters and branches), the Canadian Red Cross and the IFRC were present during the workshop. The most significant strengths and aspects to be improved in the implementation of the Hurricane Irma action plan were identified during the workshop, and recommendations for future action plans to be carried out in Cuba were obtained, based on the following criteria:

- *Relevance.*
- *Efficiency*
- *Effectiveness*
- *Coverage*

4.5 Selection and sampling system

Communities and individuals were selected based on the ToR and consultant team capacities in terms of time and access, following the recommendations of the CRC/IFRC, to define the agenda for the field visit. Although the communities reached were informed in advance about the visit of the evaluation team through the People's Councils, it is important to mention that there were no restrictions to conduct home visits or interviews with people or families reached with the aid, and not previously aimed at, in the plan. Household visits were unannounced, although government representatives always accompanied the interviewers during the visits. Families reached by the following aid distributions were selected:

- Non Food Items (NFI).
- Water Tanks.
- Hygiene promotion activities
- Roofing sheets (considering those roofs installed according to the instructions provided by IFRC technicians)

In addition to the visits to 51 families reached by the plan of action, the following activities was carried out in each province visited by the consultant:

- Interviews with key CRC staff in each provincial and municipal branch visited.
- Interviews and focus groups discussions with Government representative involved in the action plan at provincial, municipal, and People's Council levels.

During the field visit, it was not feasible to visit the hospitals, health centers and older adults' homes where donations were made through the Cuban Government since a special permit is needed to visit the facilities and the consulting team did not request it in its work plan for Cuba.

5. Evaluation criteria analysis

5.1 RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS OF DELIVERY

5.1.1 Analysis

The Cuban Civil Defense⁶, one of the most recognized worldwide, constitutes a system organized throughout the national territory and composed of institutions, social organizations, and the population, with the mission of protecting people and their assets, social infrastructure, economy and natural resources from disasters (among other threats). For this, it has at its disposal a set of military, economic, legal, and internal measures and activities, using the resources available in the country.

The Cuban Red Cross, under the Ministry of Public Health (MINSAP) by means of Act No. 41 on Public Health⁷ (and organic regulations), of which on article 9 states that "The Cuban National Red Cross Society, as a voluntary society, participates and collaborates in public health activities, in accordance with the provisions of its statutes and regulations, and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant legislation of the Republic of Cuba"; therefore frames its activities in the activities of the aforementioned Ministry. The president of the Cuban Red Cross is the Minister of Health and the salaried staff at the level of Havana, provinces (Provincial General Secretaries) and municipalities (Municipal General Secretaries) are Ministry of Health workers assigned to the organization.

Furthermore, through its institutional mandate, the Cuban Red Cross has the mission of relieving human suffering in all circumstances, protecting life and health and ensuring respect for people, particularly in times of armed conflict and other crisis, including disasters. Its areas of action include operations and relief, aquatic safety, psychological support, restoring family links, International Humanitarian Law, Organizational Development, Specialized Programs, Doctrine and Law, Volunteerism and Red Cross Youth⁸.

The tasks of the CRC Operations and Relief Department include, among others

- To support rescue and rescue efforts through the Operations and Relief Groups (GOS) according to their level of performance: GEOS (Special Operations and Relief Groups), GMOS (Municipal Operations and Relief Groups) and (GCOS) Community Operations and Relief Groups.
- To coordinate with Civil Defense, the actions to prevent, respond, and recover from the effects of natural or human-made disasters.
- To conduct damage assessment and international coordinate aid through operations.

The CRC is a fundamental pillar of the National Civil Defense System as it is an agency assigned to MINSAP; and has specific tasks in terms of community preparedness, rescue and response actions, and recovery.

Following its activation protocols, the Cuban Red Cross joined the complex and light Rescue Groups to attend to the lifesaving and rescue of persons. For this, the CRC has, at both provincial and municipal levels, Operations and Relief Groups (GOS) formed by volunteers, providing support in

⁶ <http://www.cubadefensa.cu/?q=sistema-defensa-civil>

⁷ <http://www.parlamentocubano.gob.cu/index.php/documento/ley-de-la-salud-publica/>

⁸ <http://www.sld.cu/sitios/cruzroja/>

the first response to any event that may cause a disaster; with expertise in rescue from collapsed structures, water and sanitation, rescue under challenging environments, management of victims, safe access, psychological support, first aid, response to accidents with dangerous substances, and sanitation activities, mostly owing to previous humanitarian DREF operations and IFRC Appeals.

Similarly, the CRC activated its RFL Brigades, making it possible to search for missing persons or exchange messages between families affected by the lack of communications.

In terms of damage assessment and needs analysis (DANA), provincial and municipal Defense Councils were responsible for conducting assessments and calculating the material to be assigned to each affected household, as well as assigning roles and responsibilities to the different agencies according to their capacities and specific mandate. In this respect, the CRC prepared the action plan considering the recovery of the roofs of the damaged houses, the distribution of containers for the adequate storage of water, and chlorination tablets as well as household equipment, to be a priority.

Based on the first assessment, and the needs established according to experiences from previous hurricanes such as Sandy, the CRC, and the IFRC already had a preliminary action plan that had been elaborated several months earlier; and which established the main lines of action for a category IV or V hurricane. The initial Action Plan⁹ was released on September 15 to mobilize funds to assist a total of 5,000 families; mainly in the area of relief and early recovery. This action plan was reviewed on September 29, ensuring complementarity with government actions and those of other agencies and cooperation organizations.

The areas of intervention considered were established on the basis of a coordinated action plan with national and local authorities, corresponding also with the major humanitarian needs included in the Plan of Action of the United Nations System in Cuba in response to Hurricane Irma¹⁰ - presented on September 19, 2017 and formulated in dialogue with national authorities and their technical counterparts - such as housing and early recovery, food security, water, hygiene and sanitation, health and education.

The selection of communities prioritized the provinces of Matanzas, Villa Clara, Ciego de Avila, Las Tunas, Havana, Holguin and Camagüey, being the province of Sancti Spiritus mostly covered by other institutions, such as UNDP or UNICEF, and donors such as ECHO. That also supported the response through the IFRC, appointing the Spanish Red Cross to monitor these specific activities. The IFRC took over, however, the preparation of reports and accountability with the information provided by the CRC.

The damage assessment and needs analysis process set up by the defense councils was based on individualized and detailed identification of needs, thus ensuring that the people affected received what they really needed, to the detriment of more standardized but faster humanitarian aid. The evaluations, made by the municipal technical teams with the support of the CRC, were based on three fundamental criteria:

- the socioeconomic level of the family, which considers their level of income and economic capacity to face the losses caused in their home and,

⁹ <https://www.FICR.org/docs/Appeals/17/MDRCU004ea.pdf>

¹⁰ http://onu.org.cu/files/files/CUB_ActionPlan_ESP_20170918_4.pdf

- the social vulnerability of the family, prioritizing groups such as mothers heads of family, older adults, people with special needs, sick people, among others. Although the plan of action makes explicit and specific reference to the priority attention of LGBT groups and in the terms of reference to pregnant women, neither the defense committees nor the Cuban Red Cross have made any specific reference to this group, resulting in this case more of a standard of writing than a guideline or criterion in the identification of priority groups.
- the extent to which the home is affected (in terms of shelter activities).

Families classified as the most vulnerable according to their socioeconomic level received selective humanitarian aid (according to identified needs) - as was the case of those assisted through the present operation - and those with greater resources had access to other types of aid, such as subsidies or loans with special payment conditions from the government.

According to CRC data, the figures for people reached directly are (total):

Kind of aid	N° of families	N° of population reached	Under 15 years of age	Over 65 years of age	People with disabilities
Non-Food Items	25.464	NA	NA	NA	NA
Water Tanks (Matanzas and Villa Clara)	1.162	NA	NA	NA	NA
Water Tanks (Camagüey, Ciego de Avila, Las Tunas and Holguín)	3.450	10.631	1.739	1.717	584
Safe roofs	9.928	23.627	4.383	4.471	1.019
Total	40.004	34.258	6.122	6.188	1.603

38 % of people in the tanks distribution group, and 41% from the shelter activities, were from priorities groups (under 15 years old, over 65 years old and people with disabilities).

The consultant who carried out the fieldwork noticed that people interviewed was highly aware of the selection criteria, the aid delivered was highly appreciated; and that access to a safe roof and a water reservoir were the main priorities of the population reached.

The registration of people reached at the community level was carried out manually on paper lists, which were later sent to the municipality, the province, and finally central headquarters, which took several weeks for processing.

Regarding the capacity of the operation to adapt to the contextual changes and needs of the affected people, the scenario became more complex with the occurrence of other major events requiring parallel responses by the Government and the CRC, such as the plane crash in Havana (May 2018), subtropical storm Alberto (May 2018), hurricane Michael (October 2018), the tornado in Havana (January 2019) which required a DREF fund for the response to 600 families, resulting in a slowdown of operations and the readjustment of the Action Plan. For example, due to the impact of the Alberto Subtropical Storm that affected the same areas as Irma, local authorities and the CRC had to refocus

their efforts and define a new distribution plan considering the communities most affected by both events. Therefore, in the second revision of the action plan (June 2018) 10,000 target persons (2,000 families) were added, the same process was conducted for their selection and registration, and the intervention period was extended until March 2019. In February 2019, a new extension of the intervention period by an additional 4 months was considered, establishing the final closing date of June 15th, 2019. Similarly, at the request of the provincial Governments and based on the needs found in other areas to support the recovery stage, 50 tool kits were distributed in the province of Cienfuegos and 232 kits to the province of Sancti Spiritus for repairs and reconstruction of temporary housing (November/December 2017).

On the other hand, while recommendations and lessons learned from previous operations such as Hurricane Sandy were taken into account, some other suggestions such as support for foster families were not considered.

5.1.2 Conclusions

The intervention is entirely in line with the needs and priorities established by the national Government and provincial and municipal defense councils, with the needs expressed by the people affected, and with the humanitarian mandate of both the CRC and IFRC, complementing other interventions such as the United Nations System Action Plan, or donor actions such as the European Union, whose intervention are also assigned by the Government, thus avoiding duplication and ensuring proper coverage.

The intervention strategy selected is very relevant to the problem, and contributes to meeting the specific needs of the affected families, with the CRC seen as a key actor based on its auxiliary role with the public authorities. Based on the needs of previous operations, the CRC and the IFRC had already identified the priority lines of action for a possible action plan, thus facilitating their formulation and design, focusing on the installation of safe roofs, distribution of NFI and water tanks, and hygiene promotion.

Humanitarian activities have been adapted to local needs, thereby strengthening ownership and accountability and prioritizing the social groups of the highest socio-economic vulnerability. Individual needs assessment and targeted distribution have allowed the intervention to reach a higher percentage of families as the material is distributed on a unitary basis rather than based on standard assistance kits.

However, the assistance approach has been maintained within the framework of traditional actions, without presenting innovations or new assistance approaches that would allow, for example, reducing the burden of thousands of foster families in the country's periodic hurricane season, as recommended in previous operations, or improving the registration processes of people reached based on low-cost technologies as proposed in the section on recommendations. It is also important to consider the enormous limitations in a context like Cuba, with limited access to the Internet and Internet rates not affordable by most of the population.

5.2 EFFICIENCY

5.2.1 Analysis

In analyzing the efficiency of the action plan, it is of outmost importance to consider the contextual specificities of a country that suffers a trade, economic and financial embargo since 1960, which significantly limits:

- possibility to purchase aid items locally,
- the reception of transfers from abroad,
- the feasibility to purchase supplies and equipment for the proper management of an operation, such as fuel, paper, office supplies, ink for printers, etc.

Also, the limitations of the Cuban Red Cross and its staff must be taken into account:

- cash management,
- recruiting additional staff to increase technical and operational capacities.

Based on this situation, it was considered appropriate to procure most of the humanitarian equipment and supplies through the IFRC logistics unit in Panama and to limit the local procurement of materials to those that were available and whose cost of shipping to Cuba was high, such as hygiene promotion materials (see problems identified in the analysis of effectiveness).

At the financial level, 8,088,539 CHF, 86% of the total, were executed (from the 9,360,000 allocated for the operation). According to IFRC information, all restricted funds have been executed, and the remaining funds will be used in the Country Operational Plan, subject to donor approval, in order to complement the activities of the Appeal and to respond to lessons learned.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IFRC has been responsible for the financial execution of most of the project, due to cash managements limitations in the country. The IFRC has clear procurement procedures and is a financially audited organization, which represents a guarantee in its processes. All interviewees highlighted that the purchasing procedures were highly monitored and regulated; as it was the strict selection of suppliers according to quality, delivery time, and price. The only exception was the selection process for the supplier of zinc sheets, who was selected prioritizing the criterion "delivery time" over "price", and who is currently under accountability process for non-compliance with the established delivery deadlines.¹¹

Regarding human resources total costs, which represent 4% of the total budget, it has been identified that the cost has been significantly lower than that of a similar action plan (19% in the action plan for Irma in Dominica, Bermuda and Saint Kitts & Nevis and 12% in the action plan for Matthew in Haiti), mainly due to the fact that the CRC cannot recruit extra staff for the intervention, and IFRC is not allowed to contract staff who can reside and work in Cuba.

¹¹ If there is a penalty, it will be assigned to the Country Plan

Cuban Red Cross

The main purchases made locally were fuel, prints of material for hygiene promotion trainings, and safe roof assembly dossiers.

In Cuba, prices are official and set by the Government, so there is no room for negotiation; however, IFRC purchasing procedures require a comparative table of suppliers, which - in the Cuban context - makes no sense and slows down the process.

In the field visits, the consultant observed that some public companies sell some of the items considered in the plan of action, such as zinc sheets; but, according to the explanations received, it is due to the fact that Cuban economy is based on strict planning, the aforementioned products (zinc sheets) were destined for housing policies and could not be purchased for use in this action plan.

On the other hand, coordination and collaboration with the Government at the national, provincial and municipal levels have generated significant synergies and has avoided duplication of intervention and inefficient procedures, which has undoubtedly led to increase the efficiency of the operation, being this its main contributions (at no cost to the operation):

Transport: The Government provided the transportation of humanitarian supplies from the ports to the communities. Supplies were transported to municipal warehouses, and depending on the province the aid was sent to the communities, or the beneficiaries transport it.

CRC staff: All CRC staff costs have been covered by the Government, as the staff is assigned to public entities. As mentioned in the field visit, hiring extra staff for the Cuban Red Cross is not allowed by the Government, as explained before.

Volunteers. The Government granted a work leave to many CRC volunteers to support in the early stages of the implementation of the plan of action, covering the costs of food and transport.

Technical personnel specialized. The housing technicians were responsible for checking and certifying the installed roofs and, in some municipalities, also the community architects were involved. The Government also made its Roofing brigades available -trained by CRC and IFR- available to support the installation of roofs.

The following mechanisms were used to manage risk of corruption, abuse, and irregularities:

- At the CRC level, the existing governance mechanisms were considered, such as the ombudsman in each municipality, newspapers (e.g., Granma) or online complaint through the Citizen Portal.
- At IFRC level, there is a telephone helpline, an email address and a website available, they allow the reached population and stakeholders to report complaints safely and anonymously (known as Safe call).

In the field visit, it was confirmed that the target population was aware of the government mechanisms for reporting complaints, but was unaware of the IFRC's mechanisms. As of the date of this report, no complaints had been reported.

At the same time, although the intervention maintained -in general terms- its preliminary technical approach, the plan of action, intervention schedule, and corresponding budget plan presented

substantial modifications due to the numerous operational limitations that were faced and which are detailed in the analysis of effectiveness.

5.2.2 Conclusion

The operation has been highly efficient in terms of the quality and cost of the humanitarian supplies delivered, as the IFRC has systems and procedures in place to guarantee these criteria. Similarly, government control of prices at the national level has allowed local purchases to be made according to the standards, thus avoiding any fraud or overpricing.

Although the collaboration of the Government has been crucial to making the operation viable, it has not been valued in the plan of action, leaving a financially invisible contribution despite its significant importance.

On the other hand, in terms of response time, the operation has suffered significant delays, mostly due to strong national regulations for the import and purchase of goods and supplies, having a direct impact on the availability of humanitarian aid items, compared to other response operations implemented in Cuba (e.g., Sandy). It is important to note that the IFRC, in coordination with the CRC, has held several workshops on IDRL to raise Government's awareness on the importance of implementing more flexible mechanisms for the entry of humanitarian aid into the country and access to visas for humanitarian workers.

5.3 EFFECTIVNESS

5.3.1 Analysis

For analyzing whether the action plan has achieved the objectives, according the scheduled times and adequately; in the light of the different results obtained, each outcome will be analyzed:

Disaster Risk Reduction

Outcome 1: The communities in high risk areas are prepared and are capable to respond to disasters.

IFRC inform us this outcome was not achieved due to difficulties in printing manuals locally as well as the high cost of importing such material.

Shelter


Outcome 1: The communities in the affected areas strengthen their security, well-being and longer-term recovery through shelter and settlement solutions.

As a result of the selective distribution of zinc sheets, it was possible to increase the percentage of families reached for the reinforcement of roofs by more than 40 %; since the 50 sheets per family previously planned to be delivered were not distributed in a standardized way, but on the basis of their specific needs (selective distribution) and after the corresponding technical evaluation, the average number of sheets per family was 30, considered as a great achievement of the operation.

Concerning the deadlines for the delivery of aid, although relief items such as kitchen kits, blankets, sheets, etc., which were mostly sent by air, could be delivered in the first 3 months of the operation, the same did not happen with, for example, the material sent for the roof installation, which - although it began to be received at the beginning of 2018 – most of the material could not be used for the installation of roofs until the end of 2018/first semester 2019, due to the following limitations:

a) The processes of authorization and internal transport of the aid supplies

The process of authorization and transferring products to Cuba (from the supplier's process to their delivery to the communities) requires a complex process, as shown in the following flow chart:



Source: IFRC

As it can be seen, the numerous stages of the process cause a significant delay in the availability of the item at the level of the population reached, which can be as long as weeks and even months for the most of them. It is important to explain that the vehicles used to transport goods in Cuba are owned by the Government, specifically by Escambray and Universal company, which are the only companies authorized to circulate with cargo on Cuban highways. Also, it must be taken into account that in Cuba, no cargo vehicle can transit without having a guaranteed back and forth cargo. For these reasons, the most proactive Provincial Governments with the higher number of connections to Havana (for example, Ciego de Avila) were able to transport part of the aids by road and did not need to wait for the trains; thus, significantly shortening the delivery times. It is important to note that the IFRC, in coordination with the CRC, has held several workshops on IDRL to make the Government aware

of the importance of implementing more agile mechanisms for the entry of humanitarian aid into the country and speed up the access to visas for humanitarian workers.

On the other hand, it should be noted that in some provinces, such as Las Tunas, assisted families had to wait a long time or afford the transfer of supplies from provincial warehouses to their homes, according to reports made by IFRC housing experts.

b) Lack of supporting structures for the installation of roofs

The plan of action did not include the provision of structures for the installation of the zinc sheets, generating difficulties for many of the families as they did not have the means to purchase them. It is important to mention that the IFRC proposed that the plan of action provide the supporting structures, but the Government did not accept it. As a result, the outcomes are variable depending on the decisions taken by the Government in each municipality¹².

In some communities, the zinc sheets were installed on metallic structures, achieving with this type of installation a roof of better quality and safer than the one considered in the action plan. The population reached had access to these structures through three ways:

- UNDP donation (1.092 C/ purlins beams);
- through a low-interest loan and with a subsidy of 50% of the cost of the material;
- buy from public companies.



Photos: House with a roof installed on a metallic structure

Although for this type of installation, tool kits, nails, and anti-hurricane tapes were not necessary because material provided by the Government or UNDP was used; the remaining material was used by other families who had not been benefited or was used for the reinforcement of public environments. During the field visit, interviews with CRC staff, the Government, and the population reached confirmed that all the material provided by the operation had been or would be used.¹³

In the field visit it was identified that about 10% of the roofs did not have access to a quality structure, having to use wood structures of poor quality and even plastic structures¹⁴ (as observed in the

¹² As the response is worked out through a National Plan, the decisions are made by the Government and CRC, IFRC carries out advise, advocacy, and awareness-raising actions.

¹³ It is important to note that this beneficiary population has not been taken into account in the total population reached by the Emergency Appeal.

¹⁴ The consultant was informed during the field visit that these installations would be improved when the Government provides the material for the structure to the population reached.

community of Versailles, Matanzas), thereby reducing the expected quality standards and making it necessary to be reinstalled to ensure a proper quality roof.



Photo: Sheets installed on plastic bars



Photo: Laminas installed on wood in bad condition

Also, from the reports and interviews conducted it was informed that some families used reinforced concrete structures or metal trusses built with rods (Municipality of Martí, Matanzas), all considered high-quality roofs, although during the field phase it was not possible to verify this fact.

Another problem that was identified, which can be solved quickly, is that the installation of the sheets was not always done following the instructions provided by the IFRC technical team, since the nails had not been appropriately bent, and in some cases, the anti-hurricane tapes had not been installed, or their installation was not the right one.

The main reasons identified during the interviews and field visit, that explained why the installation of roofs was not done according to the IFRC installation's requirement (resistance to Hurricanes level 5), were:

Weaknesses in municipal and provincial PASSA replicas

CRC and IFRC did not supervise that the replicas (provincial and municipal) of the PASSA training have the appropriate quality. Those attending the national PASSA training workshop carried out the PASSA replicas; in spite of having been trained, they did not have the experience and capacity needed to transmit the knowledge adequately. It is important to note that the PASSA training course was not training of trainer course, which would have been appropriate to ensure that the replicas met the IFRC's quality criteria.



Photos: Houses without proper installation (nails have not been bent).



Photo: Incorrect use of anti-hurricane tape.

Lack of installation manuals

Although the delivery of manuals to the entire reached population was considered and planned, local limitations on printing availability made it impossible to deliver to the entire population in need of them.

Most of the information provided was verbal, and only those participating in the PASSA workshop and safe roof assembly had written information.

As it can be seen in the photos obtained during the visits to the reached people houses, roofs do not comply with the instructions provided, despite having been certified by the housing technicians.



Lack of monitoring by CRC and IFRC shelter experts.

Due to the existing logistic difficulties and the extensive coverage of the operation, the monitoring actions could not be carried out in a proper manner in the country.

The main limitations were:

Cuban Red Cross. Not all branches sent volunteers to shelter training, so they did not have specialized personnel to assume such monitoring technically, and also they did not have transportation options to mobilize to the communities.

IFRC. The lack of accompaniment was mainly due to difficulties on getting visas for the shelter staff, who would undoubtedly have facilitated adequate monitoring for the installation of the roofs since the IFRC has as its standard the hiring of technical experts for this kind of operation. During the field visit, it became evident that the areas monitored by the IFRC had a higher quality of the installation. Although numerous installation errors were identified during the monitoring visits carried out by IFRC shelter experts, in general terms, subsequent reconditioning/repair was achieved, thereby improving the quality of the installed ceilings. Also, the Government supported this activity by promoting the involvement of community architects, thereby achieving a better installation of roofs according to IFRC criteria, for example, in the municipality of Santo Domingo (Villa Clara). However, during the field visit and through the interviews carried out, it could be seen in the field

visits, through the interviews carried out, and the workshop of lessons learned that not all the technicians of the Housing had the technical capacities to certify the roofs' safety.

During the field visits, it was also found that the equipment of the Roofing brigades was not appropriate as they did not have the minimum necessary to install the roofs such as ladders, harnesses, ropes, etc.; which would have allowed faster installation, with higher quality and safety.

This activity meant an improvement in the social positioning for the CRC, as most of the people interviewed had not previous knowledge that the Red Cross supported this kind of action. However, it should also be mentioned that some of the people assisted were not clear who had provided the aid, whether the Red Cross or the Government.

In general, the Red Cross intervention was considered positively by individuals and families assisted, partners, and authorities, the quality of products delivered by the Red Cross, mainly zinc sheets, were considered to be of higher quality than those provided by other donors.

The people interviewed emphasized that because of this plan of action, they have a quality roof they would not have been able to afford otherwise, as this material is too expensive and was no locally available, anyway.

Concerning the delivery time, although it was considered long by most of the interviewees, it did not cause discomfort because they had been previously informed of that.

It is important to point out that part of the tool kits were given to the Roofing brigades and to the Popular Councils delegates, which will maximize their use and benefit by the whole of the assisted communities in the future.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

Outcome 1: Immediate reduction in risk of waterborne and water-related diseases in targeted communities.

In the area of water, sanitation, and hygiene, there have been delays in the delivery of the water tanks, mainly due to the country logistical limitations, as previously explained. Likewise, many of the families could not install the tanks on the roof and connect it to the houses, as they did not have the material required to do so, or economic resources to purchase them; resulting in the tanks to be used as a reservoirs.



Photo: Water tanks.

Concerning the hygiene promotion activities carried out periodically by the CRC, these had a significant impact and were highly valued by the communities assisted, given the experience that the CRC has in this area of work. During the operation, a total of 306 workshops were held, benefiting 6,759 people directly and 19,162 indirectly in the seven provinces covered. During the field visit, it was confirmed that the families reached had knowledge about hygiene, sanitation and, water treatment, but it could not be confirmed if the interviewed persons acquired this knowledge in the workshops financed by this operation, given that the Ministry of Health and the CRC usually carry out this kind of training on regular basis.

The training and sensitization material required to conduct the hygiene promotion replicas came -on numerous occasions- after the training itself, due to the numerous difficulties in printing the material in Cuba. Although the technicians from the CRC Headquarters indicated that the training is designed without the component of written information delivered to the communities, those in charge of conducting the workshops commented that giving this kind of material to the community would have been important to achieving the expected results.



Photos: Hygiene promotion posters in the Municipality of Minas (Camagüey).

Migrations

Outcome 1: People in areas affected by hurricane Irma are able to inform their families of their fate.

One of the CRC main activities is Restoring Family Links (RFL). Thus, during the operation, the RFL network was active in 168 municipalities, being able to transmit 213 messages.

CRC followed the corresponding protocols and procedures, effectively executing all requests made. As we were informed from the interviews with key actors, it was not necessary to carry out any extra expenses for the achievement of this result.

5.3.2 Conclusions

The operation was highly effective:

- An increase of more than 40% in the number of people reached in terms of shelter, given that there was an excellent identification of the specific needs of each family;
- the use of all provide material, not wasting any material delivered;
- mentality changes, since -according to information received by the government- the action plan has positively influenced housing technicians and community architects on making them aware

of the importance of implementing new actions such as bending nails and installing anti-hurricane tapes to improve the quality of roofs installed on timber structures;

- water tanks used as water reservoirs; and the population reached's increase on the level of knowledge about the actions needed to have safe water;
- the number of people trained in hygiene promotion workshops.

However, constraints are identified as:

- having monitoring or advisory system that ensures that 100% of the roofs meet the requirements and quality appropriate to be considered safe anti-hurricane roofs;
- taking into account the existing difficulties in the country, such as the entry of aid, and access to visas for foreign personnel; in order to implement adequate planning of the operation and not having to carry out successive expansions and revisions.

As an important point, the action plan has allowed many families in high vulnerability to have access to a quality roof that they would never have been able to afford; many installation technical problems were overcome through the implementation of the Country Plan.

5.4 COVERAGE

5.4.1 Analysis

The target population was identified based on selection criteria that were socialized and explained, both at the community level and the stakeholder group, such as:

- Older adults
- Families living with a person with a disability(ies)
- Mothers head of household
- Large families

All families interviewed during the field visit met these criteria.

However, it is noteworthy the large dispersion, both of people and communities assisted, for this operation; since in each community the most vulnerable families were selected. Although this strategy allows assisting the most vulnerable population, the evident difficulties of monitoring and access by the CRC and IFRC are a point to reflect on; and in case of similar operations in the future the necessary resources to carry out an adequate monitoring of these actions should be taken into account.

Detail of the population reached by the action plan are:

Shelter

Province	Number of Municipality	Number of Communities
Matanzas	13	83
Villa Clara	4	42
Ciego de Avila	10	35
Camagüey	6	76
Las Tunas	3	35
Holguín	9	122
Total	45	393

Water and Sanitation:

Province	Number of Municipality	Number of Communities
Matanzas	2	5
Villa Clara	4	26
Ciego de Avila	4	4
Camagüey	6	11
Las Tunas	3	35
Holguín	1	6
MINSAP. La Habana	13	
Total	33	87

Considering that one of the main problems in Cuba is transportation, and given that the local branches do not have, as a whole, means of transport; this dispersion made the monitoring actions by the CRC very complicated, diminishing the effectiveness of the action plan, as described in the previous analysis.

In the same way, the CRC was exceeded in its capacity by the magnitude of this operation, having to face numerous constraints, such as:

Lack of shelter experts.

The CRC does not have a specialist or focal point in shelter, and there is also no possibility to contract one, as explained in this report.

In order to solve this problem during the implementation of the action plan, training sessions on shelter were held for CRC staff and volunteers, but given that these types of activities are specific, the knowledge needed to perform a good job was not achieved in all the branches.



Photo: Volunteers of the Popular Council of Cascajal (Villa Clara)

Lack of visibility of volunteering

Although the operation considered visibility material for the volunteers; the provided was not enough to meet the needs of more than 10,000 volunteers mobilized.

Lack of equipment and material in branches

Although the CRC is known for timely reporting, most of its municipal and provincial branches lack Internet connection, computer equipment, and office supplies, which makes it impossible to submit their reports in a timely manner.

The size of the operation could have been extended to attend those needs not foreseen and previously mentioned, (such as house structures, safety equipment and staircases for volunteers and Roofing brigades, transport of material from municipal warehouses to the houses of assisted families) using existing funds; for some of them it was proposed to do so by the IFRC, but not accepted by the Government. However, as a very positive point, the financial balance of CHF 1,671,808 will allow

the consolidation of the intervention and ensure action in the medium/long term through the Country Plan.

It is important to reiterate that the Government covered an important part of the operation costs and led the implementation of the action plan. In areas where the CRC did not have enough capacity, actions were directly taken by the Government.

5.4.2 Conclusions

The operation has had great coverage in terms of people and communities reached. Although this great coverage is highly positive -directly benefiting more than 40,000 families- the existing limitations at country level and in the CRC, caused the planning, management and monitoring capacities of CRC to be overwhelmed.

This geographic dispersion and difficulty of access to the communities and families reached were considered as a barrier to ensure the due involvement and leadership of the CRC in its operations, which were finally assumed by the Local Governments.

5.5 CONNECTEDNESS

5.5.1 Analysis

Connectedness is related to the concept of sustainability, linked to the idea that interventions should support long-term objectives and, finally, be managed without donor participation; capacity building and strengthening community resilience being strategic axes to achieve this end.

CRC Capacity Building

In the preliminary Action Plan, the following actions were considered in terms of strengthening the capacities of the CRC, which are partial and inconsistent with a capacity-building program:

- "Well-Prepared National Society" (WPNS) self-assessment process.
- BOCA training of trainers (ToT).
- Training in Management of Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) in 5 provinces and headquarters, and EOC equipment.
- National Intervention Team (NIT) workshop.
- Procurement of equipment to support the response operation (laptop and printer).
- Procurement of tents (4) for the mobilization of volunteers to the intervention areas.
- Procurement of three terrain (4x4) vehicles, three motorcycles and a truck
- Procurement of protection and visibility equipment and material for provincial and municipal volunteers. At the time of the field visit, not all visibility material and equipment had been received.

The implementation of diagnostic tools for the evaluation and Certification of Organizational Capacity of Branches (BOCA) will allow the CRC to evaluate its capacities at the local level and to have a roadmap for better institutional development. The self- assessment process "A Well-Prepared Society" (WPNS) has provided a diagnosis and lines of action for strengthening the capacities of the CRC in terms of response and preparedness for response.

On the other hand, the formation of national intervention teams and training in the management of emergency operations centers are actions with a direct impact on ensuring emergency response and management following IFRC standards.

Throughout the field visit, it was evident that most of the people interviewed did not have a clear idea about where the assistance received came from; confusion was evident at the level of Government and CRC. For this reason, the procurement of necessary equipment and visibility material for volunteers is considered as a priority to ensure the identification and protection of volunteers. The proper use of the Red Cross emblem allows for the differentiation and positioning of the CRC as a humanitarian organization at the community level. However, the vast mobilization of volunteers (more than 10,000) also makes it unrealistic to cover their needs in terms of visibility, as this is not the main objective of a humanitarian operation.

Strengthening community resilience

The IFRC defines resilience as “the ability of individuals, communities, organizations or countries exposed to disasters, crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, prepare for, reduce the impact of, cope with and recover from the effects of shocks and stresses without compromising their long-term prospects.

In this way, with a stronger capacity to adapt to and cope with disasters, crises, unrest and tensions, communities can maintain the acquired development achievements and use them to overcome their underlying vulnerabilities.

For implementation, IFRC has the IFRC Framework for Building Community Resilience¹⁵ and a Roadmap to Community Resilience¹⁶ to provide National Societies with guidance on how to support communities in this process, take specific measures to strengthen their resilience and advance the goal of 1BC (Billion Coalition for Resilience¹⁷), which seeks to build, expand and implement community-led resilience alliances among individuals, communities, organizations, private companies, Governments and other actors, and foster Billion actions for resilience.

However, the Plan of Action does not incorporate outstanding actions in the area of strengthening community resilience, except scattered and specific training actions in the areas of hygiene promotion, safe water storage, and delivery of response guides for rural and urban households. Similarly, and based on the experience of Hurricane Sandy, the CRC held a national workshop for the installation of safe roofs focused on volunteers and government officials in order to instruct them on how to install the roofs properly. However, those attending these training were not always the same, and some did not have any specific role or function in this matter; therefore, the transfer of knowledge was limited and questionable. On the other hand, the participation of the communities on roof installation is considered as an action that promotes the appropriation of knowledge and the leadership of the assisted people; who understood the importance of installing and reinforcing their roofs.

¹⁵<https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/03/IFRC-Framework-for-Community-Resilience-EN-LR.pdf>

¹⁶https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/03/1310403-Road-Map-to-Community-Resilience-Final-Version_EN-08.pdf

¹⁷<http://media.ifrc.org/1bc/>

Moreover, thanks to the effective coordination by the IFRC, in January 2019 the Canadian Red Cross began a two-year preparedness and response program with the CRC, giving some continuity to the emergency response and its presence in the region. The Americas Emergency Response Initiative (CERA) capacity building programme, a result of the Strategic Partnership between Global Affairs Canada and the Canadian Red Cross, aims to contribute to the strengthening of the CRC's emergency response capacities through the implementation of complementary self-assessment processes for organizational capacity certification (OCAC) and for assessing branch institutional capacity (BOCA). The inclusion of a pilot program in the Country Plan framework has been contemplated in the 3 regions of the country (East, Center, and West). However, the community part of the project is not necessarily connected to the areas of intervention of Hurricane Irma, thus missing an opportunity to work in a focused manner and strengthen the resilience of communities previously assisted.

The excellent financial coverage of the action plan, which has exceeded the expectations and requirements of the planned emergency and recovery phases, offers an unparalleled opportunity to complement actions in the medium and long term. In this regard, the Americas Regional Office in coordination with the Cluster for Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic is in the process of preparing a Country Plan to work on strengthening the capacities of the NS on the basis of the self-assessment processes considered (WPNS, OCAC, BOCA), or the implementation of new methodologies such as Preparation for an Effective Response (PER), which allows a National Society to systematically evaluate, measure, and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of its response system in order to take corrective measures.

5.5.2 Conclusions

Major emergencies, such as Hurricane Sandy or Hurricane Irma, are an excellent opportunity to establish emergency response programs within a context that takes into account interrelated and longer-term problems, integrating the strengthening of community resilience and the strengthening of institutional capacities of response organizations.

Although the Plan of Action has considered actions for strengthening the capacities of the CRC, as a whole it is perceived as unambitious because it is mostly focused on self-evaluation processes -which in themselves do not represent any change unless those processes were through resulting action plans that have the due resources and commitments, as well as the development of specific training and limited equipment; especially taking into consideration an Action Plan that in the end lasted 21 months and had a budget of 9.3 million CHF; an unique opportunity. Shelter training activities provided by IFRC expert staff were few, and it could be seen from the field visit that there was variation in outcomes depending on the involvement and existing capacities of local CRC staff, housing technicians or community architects, with behavioral change achieved in some areas in the population.

Likewise, while for IFRC the promotion of resilience should be a key area of action in all community interventions, it was not integrated into the plan of action, leaving the intervention with an approach mainly responsive and not very innovative.

5.6 RELEVANCE AND EFFICIENCY OF COORDINATION

5.6.1 Analysis

At internal level.

Hurricane season in 2017 was an unusually active one, with numerous tropical storms and hurricanes that had already formed before Irma. In this respect, the IFRC Office for the Americas had activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in order to be able to manage and coordinate the information, and to coordinate and assist to all the Caribbean NSs affected by Irma.

The division of the EOC into sub-groups such as Strategic EOC, High-Level Decision Makers, Operational EOC, Technical and Operational Decision Makers, Information Management EOC and PMER EOC (Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting) ensured proper coordination with the CRC and other National Societies with presence and interests in the region. Regular meetings were also held with the teams of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) located in various countries and with the regional office in Panama, ensuring inter-institutional interaction and communication for decision-making.

The staff of the IFRC Cluster for Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic could not mobilize in time due to the previous impact of the hurricane in the Dominican Republic, which caused the closure of the airport in Santo Domingo and the cancellation of all flights, arriving two days later (September 13th) together with the regional disaster management coordinator and emergency shelter focal point. However, thanks to the representative of the Cluster for the Latin Caribbean's suggestion, it was possible to mobilize the Americas IFRC communication officer before the event.

National Societies with a presence in the country either through staff already positioned, or mobilized following the impact of the hurricane, such as the Norwegian Red Cross, the Spanish Red Cross and - subsequently - the Canadian Red Cross, collaborated closely with each other and with the IFRC; sharing information and resources, especially in the initial and post-emergency operational phases. For example, the Canadian Red Cross supported the initial phase of the response by sending relief items (NFI) to 500 families through the IFRC and as part of the Action Plan. Similarly, the Spanish Red Cross delegate was an excellent resource for the development of the temporary shelter actions considered in the Action Plan. It is worth mentioning that the Regional Logistics Unit (RLU) of the International Federation in Panama also provided significant technical and operational support to ensure the transport of bilateral contributions from the Spanish Red Cross (kitchen kits and mosquito nets), and relief items funded by the Canadian government through the Canadian Red Cross.

The IFRC also maintained regular coordination and communication with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the participating National Societies to provide updated information on the situation in Cuba (as well as in the other countries affected by Irma) and the actions planned by the CRC through the dashboard-established for Hurricane Irma, which was seen as an excellent tool to coordinate the needs and available contributions, especially for the IFRC's Resource Raising and Partnership area. To ensure proper information and coordination, six Operations Updates, and the two technical reviews of the Action Plan were shared. However, the reading of these reports results repetitive and sometimes lacking clarity in terms of figures and activities.

It is relevant to inform that the Chinese Red Cross made a donation of tents, which were not coordinated with either IFRC or CRC, but was a coordinated donation between the Cuban Government and the Chinese Red Cross.

Due to delays in the implementation of the action plan, especially about roofing, the IFRC subsequently deployed two members of the Regional Intervention Teams (RITs) from the Ecuadorian Red Cross and the Peruvian Red Cross in order to supervise and accompany the work of installing safe roofs and try to minimize implementation times.

At external level

As indicated in the Country Document Cuba (2014) of DIPECHO LAC¹⁸, the Cuban Civil Defense as a system, integrates all levels of management from the nation to the community, with the application of plans and measures for prevention, mitigation and preparation at all levels in all sectors of society and the dissemination of guidelines and measures for the protection of the population, their assets and local and national economy means; the National Civil Defense Staff is the leading organization of this system.

Current Cuban legislation on disaster risk reduction establishes that the presidents of the Municipal Assemblies are the heads of Civil Defense in their corresponding territories. They are responsible for preparing disaster reduction plans, and the Civil Defense institution supports them.

In this context, the Cuban Red Cross - as an auxiliary organ of the Government - is an integral part of the system, which ensures its absolute coordination and alignment with government plans and activities as its branches are an integral part of the municipal defense councils, an entity responsible for identifying and registering the affected population, and implementing relief activities.

The IFRC and CRC held regular meetings with the Directorate General for Civil Protection and European Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) in the field to coordinate response actions as well as with the UN System and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

At the same time, the SRC in coordination with the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) managed to conduct additional workshops (replicas) to repair roofs at provincial and municipal levels, sharing the guide "How to build safe roofs with zinc sheets (CGI)", developed by the International Federation.

Collaboration with other organizations such as UNDP in the donation of C-beams to the population reached by this plan of action was managed and coordinated by the Government, with accompaniment from the CRC.

5.6.2 Conclusions.

Thanks to the role of the National Society as a part of the civil defense system, it can be concluded that the coordination of the plan of action with governmental institutions and external agencies such as the United Nations Agencies was excellent, ensuring its complementarity and alignment, as well as the direct support of donors such as DG ECHO, DFID, and AECID.

However, the information coming from the first hours/days of Cuba was insufficient because there was no technical person previously positioned in the country to be sent strategically to the field and

¹⁸ <http://dipecholac.net/docs/files/caribe/documento-de-pais-cuba.pdf>

work jointly with the CRC branches, that being a significant and recurrent limitation of the Cuban context. Although the IFRC was able to mobilize a communications officer before the impact (two days in advance), the person did not have the necessary permits to travel to the affected areas, resulting in her role limited to handling the official information available, as well as that coming from some amateur radios (it is important to mention that the CRC does not have a role in the assessment of damages and needs analysis, assigned by the Government).

The quick opening of the airport in the Dominican Republic allowed the Cluster representative and the head of operations to arrive on the island one day after Irma's impact, supporting the CRC in the management of the available information and the elaboration of the Action Plan.

On a strictly internal level, the activation of an internal EOC at the level of the Zone Office for the Americas, with strategic and technical subgroups, made it possible for the different areas of the IFRC and all actors in the movement to make decisions and interact appropriately, resulting in efficient support for the entire operation.

6. Recommendations

The following recommendations should be read and taken into account based on the analysis and conclusions made in each of the criteria analyzed. Recommendations indicated who should be the actor to implement them if the IFRC, the CRC, or both.

Relevance and Appropriateness

1. **IFRC/CRC:** The mechanisms for registering reached people remain basic and old-fashioned in detriment of specialized registration technologies (and subsequent distribution of humanitarian aid) that would allow a simpler, faster and more complete registration such as the Open Data Kit (ODK) and Mega V device, in which the IFRC is a global reference. As the damage assessment is a Government responsibility, and CRC does not always participate in that assessment, it is recommended that supporting and advising are provided to the Government in the implementation of this kind mechanism; and that the CRC becomes a national reference in the use of these technologies. Interviews with key actors showed the interest of the Cuban Civil Defense in implementing these mechanisms.
2. **IFRC/CRC:** In order to analyze the sensitivity of an intervention to gender, age or disability dimensions, the selection and analysis criteria for the intervention must provide information on how their specific needs, capacities, and interests have been considered when designing the intervention. Although specific considerations were taken into account, the analysis could contain a more detailed approach to the differentiated needs of each population group (women, girls, men, boys, older adults, people with disabilities, etc.); favoring analysis and intervention criteria, as well as a more focused response to their specific needs and capacities. For the integration of the disability dimension, it is recommended to follow the Washington Group's questionnaires.
3. **IFRC:** Regarding selection criteria, the IFRC must be transparent in the reports and give information about the real selection criteria not mentioning in a standardized manner, -as a checklist to be checked- if they have not been considered, as is the case of the LGTB community.
CRC: Given that the damage assessment is managed and coordinated by the Government, CRC should carry out advocacy actions to address the specific needs of new population categories, such as LGBT, pregnant women, and female-headed households.

In the lessons-learned workshop, participants considered that it would be important to include the LGTB category in the damage assessment and selection criteria for future action plans.
4. **IFRC:** To socialize minimum standards on gender and sexual orientation in programs to promote their incorporation in the development of emergency programs of the CRC and other NS in the region.
5. **IFRC/CRC:** It is recommended that in future operations, assistance be extended to groups such as host families who are under enormous pressure providing shelter and assistance to families, neighbors and/or friends for days, during weeks or months.
6. **IFRC/CRC:** To strengthen Government dialogue to allow the involvement of IFRC staff, as well as to ensure their access to communities, and a better understanding of the selection criteria and identification of needs; to make sure there is a constant flow of information among the technical staff of the regional office, NSP, and/or donors, among others.

Efficiency

7. **IFRC:** To have an available a database of manufacturers of zinc sheets with proven quality and capacity.
8. **IFRC/CRC:** To include Cuban public companies as an option in the procurement process whenever feasible and considered appropriate by the Cuban Government.
9. **IFRC:** To be flexible in the procurement procedures in contexts such as Cuba, where the Government set prices and price reductions based on meetings and negotiations with representatives of public companies; therefore, comparative tables of three quotations are not valid procedures.
10. **IFRC:** To develop agreements with banks that allow for sending funds to Cuba within the framework of the existing embargo.
11. **IFRC:** To have an agreement with the Government that allows the IFRC to contract an appropriate team for advice and monitoring of the actions carried out in the country and is able to move without readily to the communities.
12. **IFRC/CRC:** To include innovative approaches to community capacity building in the plan of action. For example, UNDP start-up micro-industries to manufacture blocks for housing.
13. **IFRC/CRC:** To take into account not only the needs of affected populations but also the capacities available to establish a realistic and institutionally viable and sustainable plan of action. For example, if it is not possible to hire extra staff at the CRC; this limitation must be taken into account since an operation of this size generates an enormous workload for those involved.

Effectiveness

14. **IFRC/CRC.** To include in the action plan all the materials needed for the installation of safe roofs such as, for example, structures (metallic or wood), ridge, kits of assembly tools suitable for each kind of structure, or materials for the installation of water tanks, etc. As mentioned in the analysis, the inclusion of this material was requested to the Government but it was not rejected.
15. **IFRC/CRC.** To complement community training in roofing with installations guides on paper and digital format, so that the reached population has the information to install them in hand.
16. **IFRC/CRC.** To include safety equipment (gloves, ladders, tools, etc.) for the roofing brigades to ensure safety and quality in the roof installation.
17. **IFRC/CRC.** To ensure that volunteers and CRC staff have the means of transport (bicycles, motorcycles...) necessary for the appropriate monitoring of the operation.
18. **IFRC/CRC.** Minimum visibility equipment such as bibs must be provided for CRC volunteers. Even though visibility equipment might have been included; it was not possible to reach all volunteers due to the high number of them involved (more than 10,000) in the activities.
19. **IFRC/CRC.** To train the housing technicians in order to ensure that they have the necessary technical knowledge to certify roofs, and involve community architects in the action so that they can advise the technicians, if necessary. It is considered essential and a priority to include in the country plan the certification all the installed roof

20. **IFRC/CRC.** To ensure that all the material needed to carry out the replicas of the workshops is available; and, in the case of specialized training such as PASSA and safe roofs workshop, to ensure that there is always an expert to verify the workshops are being carried out following the Movement's standards

Coverage

21. **IFRC/CRC.** To develop more focused or geographically delimited plans of action (fewer communities or closer communities) in order to achieve greater comprehensiveness and impact of assistance. Given that the Government takes the decisions, we recommend that the CRC carry out awareness-raising and advocacy activities so that in future action plans they are allowed to make IFRC/CRC actions more focused and delimited.
22. **CRC.** To organize a planning of operation meeting at the beginning of the project, involving the Government and the Red Cross branches to carry out a similar strategy in all areas and share knowledge.

Connectedness

23. **IFRC/CRC:** To design action plans (especially those of this magnitude) so that they include, from the design phase, holistic actions for capacity building and community resilience that allow for defining a pre and post-intervention, especially considering the difficulty of having the necessary resources to carry them out. Bilateral actions by other National Societies must be part of action plans and complement it.
24. **IFRC/CRC:** The distribution of guides or training material should be done together with workshops or training/information sessions; distribution of material alone does not ensure proper reading, understanding or application of the subject matter.
25. **IFRC/CRC:** To develop a medium-term country plan with consistent and comprehensive actions that aim to have a more significant impact on the communities and the capacities of the CRC, as an organization that has an important role in Cuba DRM.

Relevance and Efficiency

26. **IFRC/CRC:** In November 2007, the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent unanimously adopted a set of recommendations to help Governments to align their regulatory systems with international disaster relief interventions, establishing Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance through the IFRC International Programme of Laws, Rules, and Principles for Disaster Response (IDRL).

As stated in these guidelines, their objective is to establish specific types of legal facilities that Governments must provide to assisting states and humanitarian organizations so that they can perform properly the response to humanitarian needs; some important facilities are: the processing of visas and customs clearance for relief personnel, goods and equipment; facilitation of relief transportation, exemption from taxes, duties and charges on relief activities; and

simplification of procedures in the acquisition of temporary local legal personality in order to be able to operate legally in the country, among others.

The IFRC and the CRC should work with the Cuban Government to ensure that the technical staff of the Cluster for Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic have the permits to access communities in the case of events of great magnitude, providing technical expertise for the preparation of the action plan and sharing updated information to meet the demand of NS and donors.

For this, the CRC and the IFRC should continue working through the IFRC's International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme for the Americas, continuing the actions already developed to promote national legal preparedness to facilitate international relief and initial recovery assistance operations.

27. **IFRC:** To improve the quality and formats of reports (Operations updates, reviews) which are, on many occasions, repetitive and with confusing information at the level of actions and figures, not being friendly for reading and proper understanding of the operation.

7. Conclusions

This operation has been a big challenge for IFRC and the CRC; given its size, Cuban context limitations, and the complexity of the processes required for a response intervention in the country. It is essential to take into account that there was only one national response action plan, designed and implemented by the Government, and the role of the Red Cross was to provide humanitarian aid and advise during the implementation period.

The main positive points identified during the evaluation are:

- ***There was only one response plan for the entire country. (Relevance, Coverage)***

The assistance to all the families affected and injured by the Hurricane was done through a national plan, which was designed and coordinated by the Cuban Government; avoiding duplication of actions and assistance aimed to a non-priority population. Red Cross and other organizations interested in supporting were responsible for providing funds, humanitarian aid, and advice for planned activities.

- ***The damage assessment and needs analysis and the selection criteria of the population reached. (Relevance, Coverage)***

Proper identification of the reached population's needs was carried out, due to Government's knowledge of the community. For those affected and injured by the Hurricane, a very detailed report was made on economic, social, and housing condition. This allowed the action plan to deliver specific aid needed by each beneficiary.

- ***IFRC and CRC had an identification of lines of action previous to the emergency (Pertinence)***

The CRC and the IFRC had already identified, based on previous operational needs, the priority lines of action for a possible action plan, facilitating the formulation and design of the action plan in a shorter time.

- ***Efficient use of resources (Efficiency)***

All expenses incurred have complied with IFRC procedures, ensuring efficient use. It is important to mention that concerning the problem caused by the supplier's failure to meet the deadlines, the IFRC demonstrated that it had mechanisms for the complaint, as well as their adequate control and follow-up.

- ***The contribution of the Cuban Government (Efficiency, Coordination)***

The Cuban Government's contribution to the plan of action has been significant, including the transfer of humanitarian supplies from the ports to the communities, the salaries of CRC staff, the volunteers leaves from their jobs to support the action plan, as well as the technical support of community architects and housing technicians.

- ***Increasing families reached by more than 40 % (Effectiveness)***

As indicated above, having a detailed evaluation allowed the number of families reached to be increased by more than 40%. For example, although the PoA planned to distribute 50

sheets per family, due to the detailed analysis, the average number of sheets delivered to each family was 30.

- ***Use of material and aid items provided. (Effectiveness)***

Based on interviews and shared documents, it can be concluded that the sets of aid items provided by the operative have been used, even for unforeseen actions such as, for example:

- The toolkits provided to the roofing brigades and Popular councils delegates are still used by the community when required.
- Anti-hurricane tapes and nails that were not used by the target population were distributed to other families who need them.

- ***The satisfaction of the population. (Relevance, Effectiveness)***

The whole of the reached population interviewed showed a high level of satisfaction with the aid provided; many of them highlighting that they never dreamed of having such a high quality roof.

This information was confirmed by the Government representatives interviewed.

- ***Prioritization of the most vulnerable. (Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coverage)***

The prioritization of the most vulnerable led to the spread out of the work having to more than 400 communities; which was very positive in terms of relevance and coverage, but questionable in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

- ***Status of the Cuban Red Cross. (Connectivity, Coverage, Coordination)***

The action plan has made it possible to improve the status of the CRC and to expand its scope of action; confirming in the field phase the good opinion all the Government representatives interviewed have about the work carried out. Also, the CRC has increased the number of volunteers in the intervened areas.

- ***Internal and external coordination (Coordination)***

Coordination has been considered very good, both internally and externally, and no relevant weaknesses have been identified.

The main points identified for improvement are:

- ***Procedures for the entry of humanitarian aid and IFRC staff (Efficiency, Effectiveness).***

The entry and transportation of aid, as well as the access to visas for IFRC staff, are the main flaws in terms of adequate operational efficiency and effectiveness:

- The plan of action had to be extended from 12 to 21 months
- Difficulty in accessing visas and permits to review roofs resulted in IFRC technical teams reviewing less than 5% of installed roofs. All CRC and Government interviewees agreed that the monitoring visits made by the IFRC teams were very positive, being an invaluable input to increase the correct installation of roofs.

A positive point is that the CRC and the IFRC have included in the plan of action awareness-raising workshops concerning the IDRL because the decision to speed up these procedures depends on the Cuban Government.

- ***Estimated time needed. (Effectiveness, efficiency)***

Although the delays were mostly due to the complex logistical-administrative procedures for importing aid items into Cuba, the formulation of the action plan was unrealistic in terms of the timeframe initially considered; not being adequately estimated based on previous operations and experiences.

- ***The system to ensure that roofs are installed safely. (Efficiency)***

The system implemented to guarantee roofs were safe did not work correctly in all the communities since not all the technicians of the house (responsible for its certification) had the same capacities or technical criteria; approximately 10% of the visited houses presented with severe installation defects.

- ***Lack of necessary equipment.***

The branches, volunteers, and roofing brigades did not have all the equipment needed to do their job accordingly; such as security equipment, computer equipment, visibility equipment for volunteers, etc.

- ***Increasing the visibility of the Red Cross and donors. (Effectiveness, Coverage, Connectivity)***

The fact that the Government led the operation and that the CRC staff and the aid delivered were not always properly identified with the Red Cross emblem resulted in the population not knowing where the aid came from.

- ***Promote resilience. (Connectivity)***

Although for IFRC the promotion of resilience must be a key area of action in all community intervention, resilience was not integrated into the plan of action; leaving the intervention with an eminently responsive and little innovative approach. However, it has been considered to include a resilient population approach in the Country Plan in the future.

ANNEX 1. TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Summary

- 1.1. Purpose:** This final evaluation will assess the IFRC's response to Hurricane IRMA in Cuba from September 2017. The outcome will provide valuable information regarding the lessons learnt and approaches implemented to strengthen similar upcoming response operations to reach the most affected communities from the disaster and increase their resilience.
- 1.2. Operations:** MDRCU004
- 1.3. Participants:** The Cuban Red Cross, volunteers, beneficiaries, CCST Santo Domingo, IFRC and key stakeholders.
- 1.4. Audience:** Findings of this final evaluation will be used by the National Society participating in the response operation, CCST for the Latin Caribbean and Haiti, and the regional office in Panama.
- 1.5. Review team:** An independent evaluator consultant supported by the evaluation management team made by three members of the IFRC staff.
- 1.6. Commissioner of the evaluation:** Regional Deputy Director.
- 1.7. Duration of consultancy:** up to 45 days (including approximately 15 days in the field)
- 1.8. Estimated dates of consultancy:** February – March 2019
- 1.9. Location of consultancy:** Panama, Cuba

2. Background

Hurricane Irma struck Cuba from 8 to 10 September 2017 with powerful winds, rain and coastal flooding and leaving 10 people dead. Official reports indicated 158,554 houses, 980 health institutions and 2,264 education centres and 95,000 hectares of various crops were affected. Total damages caused by Hurricane Irma amounted to 13 billion 585 thousand pesos/ US dollars. The most affected provinces were Holguín, Ciego de Avila, Las Tunas, Camagüey, Villa Clara, Matanzas and La Habana.

Since hurricane Irma struck, the Cuban government has worked to restore health centres, schools, water supply systems, electricity services, production infrastructure and damaged houses. However, due to the **significant impact on the housing sector**, efforts are focused on supporting families who have lost their homes or have suffered damage to both the roof and the structure of their houses and who remain in collective centres.

Appeal History:

Hurricane IRMA – Cuba

- **9 September 2017:** Hurricane Irma, Category 5, strikes Cuba with hurricane winds, heavy rains and high waves, affecting the centre and north of the island.
- **13 September 2017:** The IFRC Surge Capacity is deployed to Cuba – Head of Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti CCST, and the Disaster Management / Emergency Shelter Coordinator.
- **15 September 2017:** The IFRC issues Emergency Appeal for 7,056,160 Swiss francs for

- 25,000 people for 12 months.
- **29 September 2017:** The IFRC issues revised Emergency Appeal n°1 for 7,570,948 Swiss francs for 25,000 people for 12 months.
- **October 2017:** The IFRC issues Operations Updates no. 1 and no. 2
- **24 December 2017:** The IFRC issues Operation Update no. 3.
- **5 June 2018:** IFRC issues revised Emergency Appeal n° 2 seeking approximately 9,7 million Swiss francs to assist 35,000 people for 18 months (an additional 6 months)
- **31 August 2018:** IFRC issues Operations Update no. 4.
- **16 November:** IFRC issues the Operations 12 months report

Target Population:

- 35,000 people from Cuba

Areas of intervention:

- Shelter (including household non-food items);
- Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion (WASH);
- Restoring family links (RFL)
- Disaster risk reduction (DRR)
- National Society capacity building.

3. Evaluation purpose and scope

The IFRC is committed to quality assurance, standards and a culture of lesson learning in its disaster response. This final evaluation aims to improve service delivery and accountability to beneficiaries, donors and other stakeholders and to build lessons for the improvement of the IFRC disaster response system.

The final evaluation will look at lessons learned, but also provide support to recovery planning and any recommendations for adjustments for the upcoming operational responses in the region.

The final evaluation will evaluate the following areas:

- vi) the **relevance and appropriateness of delivery** of humanitarian assistance to beneficiaries based on needs and context.
- vii) the **efficiency and effectiveness of the IFRC response, including coordination** with key partners and external actors aimed at optimizing the response.
- viii) the **coverage** in terms of which population groups were included in or excluded from the intervention. Special attention will be given by the evaluators to the beneficiary selection process and to what extent the response considered and addressed the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly children, pregnant women, elderly people and people with disabilities.
- ix) the **connectedness** ensuring that short-term emergency activities are implemented taking into account the longer-term activities proposed and interconnected factors
- x) The **Relevance** and efficiency of the coordination mechanisms implemented.

The final evaluation will consider all decisive factors during the operation (what went well and what requires improvement) taking into consideration the context and capacities of the National Society and other Movement components.

The evaluation will cover the periods of the responses in Cuba with a duration of 18 months from September 2017 to March 2019.

4. Evaluation objectives and key questions

The specific objectives and possible key questions to be addressed in this final evaluation are listed below. These questions provide an initial guidance and are expected to be further elaborated by the Evaluation Management team.

- 1. To what extent has the response achieved the expected results and been relevant and appropriate to the needs of the target groups?**
 - 1) Was the design of the operation relevant in regard to the needs identified in Cuba?
 - 2) Was the design of the operation relevant in regard to the mandate of the Cuban Red Cross?
 - 3) Did the number of targeted population estimated was reasonable given the capacities and resources available?
 - 4) Did the needs assessment consider the vulnerabilities and capacities of groups in the communities?
 - 5) To what extent has the design of the operation considered the capacities of the national societies involved, both at HQ and branch level?
 - 6) To what extent has the operation taken in to account the pre-existing Movement capacities and incorporated in to the response operation?
 - 7) Did the response adapt to changes in need, capacities and context?
 - 8) What successes and gaps can be identified in the response and are there ways these gaps could have been addressed or could be addressed in future?

- 2. To what extent has the response achieved its intended immediate results in an effective and efficient manner?**
 - 1) Have immediate results been achieved according to the intervention design, based on the indicators?
 - 2) Was there adequate time and effort invested for the integration of interventions across the different operation sectors and how could this be further strengthened?
 - 3) How effective were the contributions of regional assets (RIT, etc) and how efficient was the cooperation and coordination with NS, movement partners and external partners?
 - 4) How successful has the Movement Coordination framework been and what lessons learned are?
 - 5) Was the technical decision regarding shelter activities suitable for the given situation, taking into consideration the use of local and imported resources?

- 3. To what extend is the intervention taking into consideration long term needs?**
 - 1) How is the response building, in an inclusive way, on the capacity of local organisations and structures?
 - 2) How is the intervention building on and preserving the structures and systems in place prior to the hurricanes?

- 3) How has the response resulted in enhanced institutional capacity of national societies?
- 4) How is planned the exit strategy?

5. Evaluation methodology & process

The methodology will adhere to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluations](#)¹⁹, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

An **IFRC evaluation management team** will manage and oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of three people not directly involved with the operation: the operation coordinator from the cluster, PMER delegate for the operation, and the PMER regional manager for the Americas.

The **evaluation consultant** will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. The consultant will not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation. The evaluation consultant will report on progress or challenges to the evaluation management team.

The specific **evaluation methodology** will be detailed in close consultation between the evaluation consultant and the evaluation management team, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

1. **Desktop review** of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, and any relevant sources of secondary data, such exist surveys from IFRC participants in the operation.
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites in Cuba
3. **Key informant interviews** (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate).
4. **Carry out a lesson learnt workshop** with key stakeholders.
5. **Focus group discussions**, (institutional and beneficiaries) to collect lessons learned from the operations.
6. **Participatory workshops** with key personnel from the national societies to present results from the evaluation.

The evaluation consultant will meet with and interview key Red Cross Red Crescent stakeholders in the country, partner National Societies, and the relevant IFRC Secretariat offices. The team will also consult with other partners and organizations such as governments, the UN, INGOs / NGOs as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives, including beneficiaries.

Initial findings will be shared with the affected national societies and the partner operational response teams in the Dominica. Recommendations relevant to that team will be developed in participatory workshops.

¹⁹ <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>

Consultancy Timeframe

Consultants' Activities	Due dates	Deliverables
Develop inception report	5 days after the signed of the contract	Inception plan
Design of data collection tools for the evaluation considering the technologies available and feasible to use at local level	15 days after signed the contract	
Carry out field visits to collect data	15 days after the development of data collection tools	
Debriefing/feedback of preliminary findings to management at all levels	3 days after carrying out the field visits	Preliminary findings
Submit draft report with annexes	10 days after carrying out the data collection in the field	Draft report
EMT submits any requests for clarifications, corrections, changes	3 weeks after the submission of the draft report	
Submit final report with annexes	5 days after receiving the comments from the EMT	Final report

A draft report will be prepared for **review**. This review process should occur within 3 weeks of submitting the draft report to the evaluation management team (EMT), and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

- **Week 1-2 post review:** the evaluation management team to check content is in line with this TOR and IFRC evaluation standards. Stakeholders who participated in the evaluation to provide feedback on any inaccuracies or clarifications (differences of opinion should not be put forward here but outlined in the management response). Following this, a final draft is prepared.
- **Week 3 post review:** an evaluation management response table from within the IFRC will review the report and compile a management response to be included as an appendix to the final published evaluation report.

6. Evaluation deliverables

Inception Report – The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the evaluation and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities, a timeframe with dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements.

Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels: The consultant will report its preliminary findings to the field, CCST Trinidad & Tobago, and the IFRC in Panama (Regional Office).

Draft report: A draft report identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the consultant within two weeks of the evaluation team’s return from the field.

Final report: The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed, the data collection tools used, and any other relevant materials. The final evaluation report will be submitted 5 days after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as their own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

The preliminary and final reports will be submitted through the evaluation management group, who will ensure the quality of the report providing input if necessary. The management group will submit the report to the IFRC Secretariat stakeholders interviewed for review and clarifications. The USG PSD will oversee a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up.

7. Evaluation quality and ethical standards

The evaluator should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation consultant should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that considers the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at: www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

8. Qualifications

Selection of the external evaluation consultant will be based on the qualifications outlined below:

Education	Required	Preferred
Minimum qualification of a master's degree or equivalent combination of education and relevant work experience	x	
Experience	Required	Preferred
Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programs responding to major disasters	x	
A minimum of 7 years of experience in monitoring and evaluation of projects	x	
Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders	x	
Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner	x	
Experience in qualitative data collection and data analysis techniques, especially in emergency operations	x	
Knowledge and experience working with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and knowledge of the IFRC's disaster management systems	x	
Knowledge and Abilities	Required	Preferred
High capacity to organize and fulfill on time deadlines	x	
Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a team	x	
Knowledge of the LAC region and previous experience in the Caribbean.	x	
Immediate availability for the period indicated	x	
Technical knowledge about Shelter (supports by previous working experience and/or trainings) will be an asset		x
Languages	Required	Preferred
Excellent writing and presentation skills in Spanish and English	x	

9. Application procedures

Interested candidates should submit their application material by January 2, 2019. Application material is non-returnable, and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process.

Application materials should include:

1. **Curriculum Vitae (CV)**
2. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing the experience of the consultant(s) proposed as it pertains to this evaluation, daily rate, and three professional references.
3. Short methodological proposal to address in this evaluation. Please include data collection method, data analysis method, among others.
4. At least two examples of an evaluation report most similar to that described in this TOR.

ANNEX 2. LIST OF ACRONYMS

AECID: Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation.

BOCA: Branch Organizational Capacity Assessment.

CERA: Strengthening Emergency Response Capacity in the Americas

CRC: Cuban Red Cross

DFID: Department for International Development

DG ECHO : Directorate-General for Civil Protection and European Humanitarian Aid Operations.

DIPECHO LAC: European Commission/Latin America and Caribbean Disaster Preparedness Programme

DREF: Fondo de reserva para el socorro en casos de desastre.

DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction.

ECO: Emergency Operations Center

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross.

IDRL: International Programme of Laws, Rules and Principles for Disaster Response

IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

GOS: Operations and Relief Groups

MINSAP: Ministry of Public Health.

MINCEX: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment.

NFI: Non Food Items.

NS: National Society.

PASSA: Participatory Approach to Raising Awareness of Safe Housing

PER: Preparing for an Effective Response.

PMER: Planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting.

RIT: Regional Intervention Teams.

RFL: Restoring family links.

RLU: Regional Logistics Unit .

OCAC: Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification

OCHA: Oficina de la ONU para la Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios.

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme.

PNS: Partner National Societies

WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene.

WPNS: A Well-Prepared National Society

ANNEX 3. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ANNEX 4. EVALUATION MATRIX

CRITERIA	EVALUATION QUESTIONS The questions raised in the ToR are recorded in black. and in blue the complementary ones considered by the evaluating team	METHODS	SOURCES
Relevance and appropriateness	<p>1.1 Was the design of the operation relevant regarding the needs identified in Cuba?</p> <p>1.2 Was the Plan of Action consistent with the lines of action defined in the mandate, policies, and strategies of the Cuban Red Cross and the Federation?</p> <p>1.3 Were the capacities of headquarters and branches taken into account in the design of the operation?</p> <p>1.4 Have the Movement's existing capacities, lessons learned and previous experiences been used in the design of the operation?</p> <p>1.5 What criteria were taken into account in selecting the areas of intervention and the population to be reached? (Validity of the design).</p> <p>1.6 Were assumptions and risks identified from the design phase? Has the operation been adapted in a timely manner to contextual and target group changes? (Objectives remain valid and appropriate.)</p> <p>1.7 Has the design of the action plan taken into account and complemented the action plans of the Government and other donors? (Adequacy).</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Lessons Learned Workshop</p> <p>Self-evaluation workshop</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Focus groups with CRC volunteers</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Damage assessment and needs analysis (DANA)</p> <p>Baselines</p> <p>Government PoA</p> <p>Appeal Documents (Appeal, reviews, updates...)</p> <p>Surveys</p> <p>Census</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Policies, Strategies and Technical Reference Documents (IFRC and CRC)</p> <p>Minutes of meetings</p> <p>Agreements signed</p>
Efficiency	<p>2.1. Was the intervention executed according to its design and indicators? Have the disbursements and expenses of the operation been in line with the budget plan and the IFRC operational plan? Has the intervention schedule been respected?</p> <p>2.2. Did the operation ensure efficient use of resources in each phase considered?</p> <p>2.3. Did IFRC and CRC have the capacity, systems, resources (financial, human, physical, and information) and procedures to achieve it?</p> <p>2.4. Has there been enough and proper coordination with partners to achieve the objectives through synergies or complementarity of actions?</p> <p>2.5. Were processes and mechanisms in place to ensure proper financial management?</p> <p>2.6. Have changes been made on the basis of monitoring and evaluation, and feedback, seeking an improvement in the use of resources? (Efficiency improvement)</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Lessons Learned Workshop</p> <p>Self-evaluation workshop</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Focus groups with CRC volunteers</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Financial and technical reports</p> <p>Appeal Documents</p> <p>Surveys</p> <p>Census</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Feedback reports provided by the population reached (beneficiaries)</p> <p>Minutes of meetings</p> <p>Agreements signed</p>
Effectiveness	<p>3.1. Was the support provided by the regional/global IFRC response system (RIT, Country Cluster Support Teams, etc.) effective?</p> <p>3.2. Have the activities, outputs and outcomes of the operation been monitored in order to adapt the action plan and address possible performance gaps?</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Lessons Learned Workshop</p>	<p>Appeal Documents (Appeal, reviews, updates...)</p> <p>Financial and technical reports</p>

	<p>3.3. Has the implementation of the action plan succeeded in achieving the objectives and results, in the times and in the manner planned? Has the required humanitarian assistance been provided at the right time?</p> <p>3.4. Is the humanitarian aid delivered in accordance with the country's regulations, humanitarian rules and standards, and IFRC principles and rules? Did the items delivered and their installation meet the quality expected in the Movement's Action Plan and standards? (Quality of assistance)</p> <p>3.5. Were the staff and volunteers involved in the operation and did they have the necessary skills to implement the planned actions? Has the institutional capacity of the CRC been positively influenced? (Strengthening of the NS)</p>	<p>Self-evaluation workshop</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Focus groups with CRC volunteers</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Government Regulations for Emergency Response</p> <p>Core Humanitarian Standards</p> <p>Sphere Project</p> <p>Shelter Cluster Standards</p> <p>IFRC Principles and rules of Intervention in Humanitarian Assistance (Shelter, Water and Sanitation...)</p> <p>Interviews and meetings</p> <p>Feedback reports provided by the population reached (beneficiaries)</p> <p>Training reports</p>
<p>Coverage</p>	<p>4.1. Was the selection of the target population based on technical criteria, and did the aid provided meet their needs? Were population groups located in remote areas, minorities, or socially excluded/discriminated groups assisted?</p> <p>4.2. Could coverage methods be improved?</p> <p>4.3. Did the action plan take into account the capacities of the CRC and the affected community, and is it in line with the National Society Response Plan? Were there enough trained and experienced volunteers/local staff to cover the planned activities?</p> <p>4.4. Has the size of the operation been appropriate to the capacities and funds available?</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Lessons Learned Workshop</p> <p>Self-evaluation workshop</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Focus groups with CRC volunteers</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>DANA</p> <p>Baseline</p> <p>Selection criteria</p> <p>Appeal Documents</p>
<p>Connectedness & Sustainability</p>	<p>5.1. Have emergency activities taken into account complementary actions in the medium and long term, promoting risk reduction, post-disaster early recovery and community strengthening?</p> <p>5.2. Has the operation used local capacities and strengthened the capacities and resilience of affected communities and individuals to future emergencies?</p> <p>5.3. How has the action plan improved the capacities and visibility of the Cuban Red Cross at local and national levels?</p> <p>5.4. Have unintended negative effects been identified? (Do not harm)</p> <p>5.5. Is the exit strategy planned in the initial stages of the Appeal in order to ensure that positive long-term effects persist and to reduce the risk of dependency?</p> <p>5.6. Has the learning and the innovation been shared within the organization, with communities and people affected by humanitarian crises and with other stakeholders? (Learning and improvement)</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Lessons Learned Workshop</p> <p>Self-evaluation workshop</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Focus groups with CRC volunteers</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Government PoA</p> <p>Appeal Documents (Appeal, reviews, updates...)</p> <p>Surveys</p> <p>Census</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Policies, Strategies and Technical Reference Documents (IFRC and CRC)</p> <p>Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief</p> <p>Sphere Project</p>

			Core Humanitarian Standar Minutes of meetings Agreements signed
Relevance and efficiency of the coordination	<p>6.1. Were coordination with government, UN, and other actors appropriate and efficient?</p> <p>6.2. Have the Movement's actors coordinated and collaborated in the planning and implementation of the action plan in an efficiently?</p> <p>6.3. Have the regional and global IFRC disaster management system been adapted to the specific country context and needs?</p> <p>6.4. Did IFRC support strengthen and complement the CRC response? How could this support be improved in future emergencies? (Learning and improvement)</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Lessons Learned Workshop</p> <p>Self-evaluation workshop</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Focus groups with CRC volunteers</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Minutes of meetings</p> <p>Agreements signed</p> <p>Government PoA</p> <p>Documentos de la intervención (Appeal, reviews, updates...)</p> <p>Intervention documents from other humanitarian organisations</p>

IFRC Evaluation Management Response Template

- **The purpose of this template** is to support the good practice for management response to IFRC evaluation.

Process 5.42, Management Response. *Evaluations require an explicit response to recommendations by the evaluation commissioner/s and should not be conducted as an only as an ex post exercise. In order to ensure the utility and follow-up of the evaluation, a **Management Response Team (MRT)** should be identified with the responsibility to formulate a management response and action plan to be disclosed jointly with the evaluation as an annex. The management response and action plan should be completed in a timely manner as to not retard the dissemination and follow-up of the evaluation. It should respond to each specific recommendation. It should explain why any recommendation will not be addressed, and for those recommendations that will be acted upon, it should clearly state how the recommendation will be addressed, the timeframe, responsibilities and accountabilities. Follow up should be systematic and monitored and reported on in a reliable, timely, and public manner. (IFRC Framework for Evaluation, 2011)*

IFRC Management Response to the External Evaluation Recommendations from the Hurricane Irma Operation

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE FEDERATION

Recommendation 1:

IFRC/CRC: The mechanisms for registering people reached remain basic and traditional to the detriment of specialized technologies for registration (and subsequent distribution of humanitarian aid) that would allow for simpler, faster and more complete registration such as the Open Data Kit (ODK) and Mega V device, in which the IFRC is a global reference. In this regard, given that the responsibility for damage assessment lies with the Government and the CRC does not always participate, it is recommended that support and advice be sought from the Government in the implementation of this type of mechanism and that the CRC become a national reference in the use of these technologies. In the interviews with key actors, the interest of the Cuban Civil Defense in implementing these mechanisms was seen.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	<i>The registration mechanisms of people reached that are currently in use, fit the scope of the Cuban Red Cross and the context of Cuba.</i>	<i>Understanding the Cuban context related to the use of information technology tools.</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC - Cluster Office and Americas Regional Office</i>

<input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>Internet access and online technological platforms are not regular communications mechanisms in Cuba.</i>	<i>On behalf of the IFRC, the promotion of new forms of information gathering is proposed at the branch level. Considering the possibility of equipping them with at least one computer, to promote the registration of data collected on paper to Excel templates.</i>		
Comments:				
Recommendation 2: <i>IFRC/CRC: In order to analyse the degree of sensitivity of an intervention to the gender, age or disability dimension, the selection and analysis criteria concerning the intervention must provide information on how their specific needs, abilities and interests have been taken into account. In this sense, although it is true that certain considerations were taken into account, the analysis carried out could contain a more detailed approach to the differentiated needs of each population group (women, girls, men, children, older adults, people with disabilities, etc.), favouring the analysis and intervention criteria, as well as a more profiled response to their specific needs and abilities. For integration of the disability dimension it is recommended to follow the Washington Group questionnaires.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>The CRC works with families rather than individuals, although age, gender and disability issues are taken into consideration.</i> <i>In addition, at the time of designing the operation's action plan, a detailed needs analysis was conducted at the level that was possible with the data provided by the Cuban authorities.</i>	<i>In future initiatives, improve data collection.</i> <i>To this end, the IFRC proposes to coordinate advocacy actions with the Cuban authorities to obtain data with the level of disaggregation suggested in this recommendation, and use it in the development of the needs analysis so that it is reflected in the plan of action.</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>CRC</i> <i>IFRC</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 3: <i>IFRC: When selecting criteria, it is important that the IFRC is transparent in its reports on the actual selection criteria. Furthermore, no criteria should be mentioned in a standardized manner if it has not been considered, as is the case with the LGTB group.</i>				

CRC: Since the damage assessment is directed and coordinated by the Government, carry out advocacy and lobbying actions to address the specific needs of new categories of the population, such as LGTB, pregnant women and mothers who are heads of households.

In the lessons learned workshop, participants considered that it would be important to include the LGTB category in the damage assessment and in the selection criteria for future action plans.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>The new constitution of the Republic of Cuba includes LGBT groups and the CRC has long worked on inclusion and vulnerable groups, for example, activities around condom use are carried out with LGBT groups.</i>			

Comments:

Recommendation 4:

IFRC: Socialize minimum standards on gender and diversity in programmes to promote their incorporation in the development of emergency programmes of the CRC and other NS in the region.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected		<i>The IFRC recognizes that this is a priority issue in Cuba and therefore commits itself to socializing with CRC staff all actions, strategies, documents, etc. that are available at the Movement level. Bearing in mind that work must be done to adapt the contents to the Cuban context, in applicable cases.</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC cluster office in coordination with PGI regional coordinator in Americas Regional Office</i>

Comments:

Recommendation 5:				
IFRC/CRC: It is recommended that in future operations, basic assistance be extended to groups such as host families who suffer enormous pressure when providing shelter and assistance to families, neighbours and/or friends for days, weeks or months.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p><i>More importantly, we need to coordinate how to get inputs/resources to people. This would imply that many inputs required for the (temporary) shelters should come in the Hygiene Kits.</i></p> <p><i>It is important to keep in mind that in Cuba cash transfers are not possible, which is why the support to be given must be in-kind.</i></p>	<p><i>Consider sending hygiene kits to temporary shelters (soap, toothpaste, shampoo, wipes).</i></p> <p><i>In addition, the IFRC, in coordination with the CRC, will carry out advocacy work with the Cuban authorities to ensure that foster families are taken into account in the target population.</i></p>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 6:				
IFRC/CRC: Strengthen dialogue with the Government in order to facilitate the presence of IFRC staff, as well as their access to communities to ensure a better understanding of selection criteria and identification of needs, and ensure the proper flow of information with technical staff from the zone office, PNSs, and/or donors, among others.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p><i>The Government has worked with the CRC and provided the necessary information.</i></p> <p><i>The CRC clarified that there were no limitations for the IFRC and PNSs to interact with the authorities. Officials representing IFRC, DG ECHO, Spanish RC and Canadian RC had access to the</i></p>	<p><i>To process requests (with information requested by the Cuban Government about the participants and the purpose of their visit) with sufficient time in advance to exhaust the procedure established by the corresponding authorities.</i></p> <p><i>In the negotiations of the cooperation agreement, this issue can be addressed</i></p>	<i>2 months before the visit</i>	<i>IFRC/CRC</i>

	<i>communities (with the knowledge of the authorities).</i>	<i>so that the protocol to be followed for all future requests is established between all parties.</i>		
Comments:				
Recommendation 7:				
<i>IFRC:</i> Maintain a database of manufacturers of zinc sheets with proven quality and capacity.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected		<i>A database of suppliers at the regional level who can provide inputs to Cuba will be developed in coordination with logistics.</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC Cluster Office in coordination with the Americas Regional Logistics Unit</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 8:				
<i>IFRC/CRC:</i> Include or give the opportunity to Cuban state-owned enterprises as an option in the purchase processes whenever it is feasible and the Cuban Government considers it appropriate.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>Agreed. It was carried out in Hurricane Irma's Operation, but there were no mattresses, sheets, etc. available given the difficulties in Cuba.</i>	<i>Review payment mechanisms. Limitations of local suppliers due to foreign exchange purchases in local currency.</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC/CRC</i>

Comments:				
Recommendation 9:				
<i>IFRC:</i> Make logistics procedures more flexible in contexts such as Cuba, where prices are set by the government and price reductions are established on the basis of meetings and negotiations with representatives of state-owned companies, so that comparative tables are not valid procedures.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Aceptado <input type="checkbox"/> Parcialmente Aceptado <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rechazado	<i>The IFRC will work with the CRC to adopt the Federation's procurement procedures. Recognizing that this is a process that takes time, and has already been discussed with the National Society, it has been included within the 2020 Operational Plan.</i>	<i>During the year, once the Country Plan has been approved, coordination activities will be carried out with the CRC to this end.</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 10:				
<i>IFRC:</i> Establish predefined procedures agreed with the entities that allow the sending of funds to Cuba within the framework of the existing embargo.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Aceptado <input type="checkbox"/> Parcialmente Aceptado <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rechazado	<i>Coordination with the CRC and the Cuban authorities will continue, guaranteeing the management of funds in accordance with the processes that the country's context allows.</i>			
Comments:				
Recommendation 11:				

IFRC: To have predefined procedures agreed with the entities that expedite the transfer of funds to Cuba within the framework of the existing embargo.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>A cooperation agreement is currently being negotiated with the Cuban Government. It is important to mention that this is a process that takes time and involves negotiations at all levels.</i>			
Comments:				
Recommendation 12:				
<i>IFRC/CRC:</i> Consider innovative approaches to community capacity building in the action plan. For example, UNDP launched micro-industries for the manufacture of housing blocks.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>Agreed, as long as the IFRC supports the establishment of micro-industries.</i> <i>The Action Plan include a component for livelihoods with the necessary resources (i.e. hydroponics). These may favour institutions that provide services to vulnerable populations (elderly, mothers, rural schools, children without family protection, etc.).</i> <i>The IFRC will support innovative actions proposed by the CRC, always taking into account the feasibility of their application in</i>	<i>As a first step, the IFRC is committed to coordinate with the CRC the adoption of available methodologies in different thematic areas (Risk Reduction, Housing, Climate Change, among others) and adapt them to the Cuban context.</i> <i>These methodologies will be key for the implementation of innovative processes in future action plans of interventions to be coordinated with the CRC.</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC/CRC</i>

	<i>the Cuban context, as well as existing resources.</i>			
Comments:				
Recommendation 13:				
<i>IFRC/CRC:</i> Consider not only the needs of the affected populations but also the capacities available to establish a realistic and institutionally viable and sustainable plan of action. For example, if it is not possible to hire extra staff at the CRC, this limitation must be taken into account, since an operation of this dimension generates an enormous workload for those involved.				
RESPUESTA DE LA GERENCIA	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>The enormous workload was on the Governance and Management. The volunteers implemented initiatives and there were an adequate number of them.</i> <i>But the whole operation was run by three main people (Executive President, General Secretary and Director of Operations and Relief).</i>			<i>IFRC/CRC</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 14:				
<i>IFRC/CRC.</i> Include within the action plan all the materials necessary for the installation of safe roofs, such as structures (metal or wood), ridge tiles, mounting tool kits suitable for each type of structure, or materials for the installation of water tanks, etc. As mentioned in the analysis, a request was made to the Government to include them, but it was not accepted.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	<i>Preference is given to placing more roofs instead of spending money on drills, screws, and so on. A new shelter kit was created to maximize the number of people served. A kit was designed for families. The tiles were cut</i>	<i>The construction of the Action Plan must analyse the local context and the capacity to mobilise materials depending on the location. In the event that a material is not available locally, a</i>		

<input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>(they were divided into 4 or 5) to make trestles. New Shelter Kit adapted to these needs.</i>	<i>common strategy should be designed for all sites to further locate the response strategy.</i>		
Comments: Observation: We hope that no disaster of such magnitude occurs as CRC made it clear that if more money is invested in tools then fewer people would benefit. A great limitation in Cuba is wood and whether it should be considered in the future, since this was a great obstacle. There is pronounced forest control in the country.				
Recommendation 15: <i>IFRC/CRC. Complement the community trainings for the assembly of roofs with print and digital instruction guides, that allow the target population to have the information to install them.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>The CRC is aware and has placed its continuity in the Country Plan. It is worth emphasizing that within the framework of the appeal there were technical guides, and the creation of technical brigades with trained personnel was also considered, to ensure that all members of the brigades handled the same level of knowledge.</i>	<i>The IFRC in coordination with the CRC is committed to strengthening the technical component to ensure the same level of expertise in the brigades, taking into account the limitations that exist in the country for printing materials. As for the training materials to be used in the trainings, those that were developed in the framework of the Action Plan of the appeal will be used. It is proposed that these be revised to make changes if necessary. Finally, a strategy will be designed for the distribution and capitalization of these materials in the areas where they will be delivered.</i>		<i>IFRC/CRC</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 16:				

IFRC/CRC. Include protection and safety equipment (gloves, ladders, tools, etc.) for the roofing brigades to ensure safety and quality in the installation of the roofs.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p><i>See number 14. It is recommended that for future events the techeras brigades have safety helmets and gloves. The gloves cannot come after the zinc plates.</i></p> <p><i>It is important to mention that security materials were delivered as part of the appeal, but they were not sufficient because the needs were higher than anticipated. It was not anticipated workers installing the roofs did not have basic materials such as ladders.</i></p>	<p><i>Study the possibility of adding to the Shelter Kits: Helmets, Wood (complying with Cuban Phytosanitary measures) and gloves.</i></p> <p><i>Evaluate the local supply capacity of materials of the techeras brigades, so that they can carry out their work in full safety conditions. Complementing the material already existing in the field.</i></p>		<p><i>IFRC cluster office in coordination with the cluster Operations Manager</i></p>
Comments:				
Recommendation 17:				
IFRC/CRC. Ensure that volunteers and members of the CRC have the necessary means of transport (bicycles, motorcycles...) for the proper monitoring of the operation.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
Indicate management decision on the recommendation: <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p><i>There are fuel restrictions in Cuban context.</i></p> <p><i>CRC volunteers may access means of locomotion that adhere to the fuel restrictions in Cuba. Electric bicycles could be provided but maintenance is difficult due to the availability of spare parts, wear and tear and inputs for sustainability. This should be considered in the financing.</i></p>	<p><i>Contemplate the difficulties and fuel shortages in financing future operations.</i></p> <p><i>The IFRC is committed to maintaining the existing fleet provided under the appeal, and providing fuel support where possible.</i></p>		<p><i>IFRC/CRC</i></p>

	<i>Additional vehicles were provided under the appeal in accordance with the possibilities offered by the available resources.</i>			
Comments:				
Recommendation 18:				
<i>IFRC/CRC. Consider and provide minimal visibility equipment such as a bib or poncho for CRC volunteers. It is important to mention that if visibility equipment was included, it was not possible to provide it to all volunteers due to the high number involved (over 10,000 volunteers).</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>Include vests, polo shirts, caps and flags, among others in the next operations.</i>	<i>Purchase and distribution of CRC visibility equipment.</i> <i>Efforts will continue to be made to provide visibility materials to volunteers in accordance with IFRC capabilities.</i>		<i>IFRC/CRC</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 19:				
<i>IFRC/CRC. Promote training for housing technicians to ensure that they have the technical knowledge necessary to certify roofs, and involve community architects in the action plan so that they can advise them, if necessary. It is considered fundamental and a priority to be included in the country plan that the installation of 100% of the ceilings be certified.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	<i>It is important to mention that in the framework of the appeal 98% of the ceilings made were certified.</i>	<i>Ensure that roof brigades receive materials and trainings associated with the quality criteria. Also, that a reference technician is identified within the group of the brigade.</i>		<i>IFRC Country Cluster Office</i>

<input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted	<i>The roofing brigades did not have the capacity to certify the roofs according to the IFRC minimum safety criteria.</i>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 20: <i>IFRC/CRC. Ensure that all the necessary material are available to replicate the workshops and, in the case of specialized trainings such as PASSA and Safe Roofing Workshop, ensure that there is always an expert to verify that they are being carried out in accordance with the Movement's standards.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected		<i>Improve access to training material, and ensure that the material effectively reaches the community.</i>		<i>FICR Country Cluster Office</i>
Comentarios:				
Recommendation 21: <i>IFRC/CRC. Carry out more focused or geographically defined action plans (fewer communities or communities closer to home) to achieve greater comprehensiveness and impact of assistance. Given that the Government is the decision-maker, we recommend that the CRC carry out awareness-raising and advocacy activities so that in future action plans it will be possible for the actions of the IFRC/CRC to be more focused and delimited.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted				

<input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 22: <i>CRC.</i> Hold an operation planning meeting at the beginning of operations involving the Government and Red Cross branches with the aim of implementing a similar strategy in all areas and sharing knowledge.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	Consider this activities within the finances of the Action Plan since this implies transportation, per diem costs and logistics to mobilize the required personnel.	Secure funding and resources to hold this initial meeting on future occasions.		<i>IFRC/CRC</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 23: <i>IFRC/CRC:</i> Design the action plans (especially those of this magnitude to include, from their design phase, comprehensive actions for capacity building and community resilience that may really define a “before and after” the intervention, especially considering the difficulty of often having the necessary resources to carry them out. The bilateral actions of other NSs should be part of the Action Plan and should complement it.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accepted		<i>Improve accountability between IFRC, PNSs and CRC (PRD and donors)</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC/CRC</i>

<input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 24: <i>IFRC/CRC: Accompany the distribution of guides or training material with workshops or training/information sessions since the distribution of material - per se - does not ensure either proper reading, or adequate understanding or application of the intended subject matter. Without an adequate explanation, the distribution of material loses its usefulness.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<i>Printing capacity in the country is extremely planned. The workshops lacked the materials to deliver both to the population and to the technical staff in workshops.</i>	<i>Ensure training resources are included in the action plan (lessons learned from Operation Irma).</i> <i>This would be a good practice for implementation since technical human resources are limited due to barriers to entry.</i>	<i>Diciembre 2020</i>	<i>IFRC/CRC</i>
Comments:				
Recommendation 25: <i>IFRC/CRC: Work on a medium-term Country Plan with consistent and comprehensive actions that seek to have a greater impact on the communities served and on the capacities of the CRC as a body that plays a significant role in the framework of DRM in the country.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accepted				

<input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected				
Comments:				
<p>Recommendation 26: <i>IFRC/CRC:</i> In November 2007, the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent unanimously adopted a series of recommendations to help Governments to adapt their regulatory systems to international disaster relief interventions, establishing Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance through the IFRC's International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme.</p> <p>As noted in these guidelines, their objective is to establish specific types of legal facilities or accommodations that governments should provide to assisting states and humanitarian organizations so that they can effectively work to respond to humanitarian needs, such as processing expedited visas and customs clearance for relief personnel, goods and equipment, and facilitating relief transportation, exemption from taxes, duties and charges on relief activities and simplification of means in the acquisition of local temporary legal status to be able to operate legally in the country.</p> <p>In this regard, the IFRC and the CRC should work with the Cuban Government to ensure that the technical staff of the Cluster for Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic have the respective permits to access communities in the event of major events, providing technical expertise for the preparation of action plans and sharing updated information to meet the demand from NSs and donors, among others.</p> <p>To this end, the CRC and the IFRC should promote continued work through the IFRC's International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Program for the Americas, continuing the actions already undertaken to promote national legal preparedness to facilitate international relief and early recovery assistance.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted	<i>Once the CRC receives the necessary and complete documentation for the visa application, it can make the corresponding arrangements with the Cuban Government. It is necessary that all the required documents be sent together and on time.</i>	<i>Exhaust the visa application procedure with complete and timely documentation.</i>	<i>Whenever necessary</i>	<i>IFRC/CRC</i>

<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected				
Comments:				
Recommendation 27:				
<i>IFRC: Improve the quality and format of the reports (Operations updates, reviews) which are, in many occasions, repetitive and with confusing information at the level of actions and figures, not being friendly for their reading and adequate understanding of the operation.</i>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<i>Indicate management decision on the recommendation:</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected		<i>The use of the toolkit for the development of action plans and reports developed in 2019 for emergency operations starting in 2020 will be promoted.</i> <i>These tools will be socialized with the CRC.</i>	<i>December 2020</i>	<i>IFRC cluster office in coordination with cluster PMER senior officer and DCPRR PMER senior officer.</i>
Comments:				