

IFRC- Evaluation Management Response

IFRC Management Response to Recommendations for The Bahamas: Hurricane Dorian (MDRBS003) Evaluation

Background information:

- **Date and duration of evaluation:** January 2020-June 2020
- **Evaluator/s:** David Stone (independent consultant), Kathy Ann Moran (Director General of the Grenada Red Cross Society) and Mununuri Musori (Senior Officer, Planning and Information Management)
- **Evaluation Management Response Team members:** Terez Curry, Baylar Talibov, James Bellamy, Nasir Khan, Ariel Kestens, Felipe Del Cid, Jono Anzalone, Steve McAndrew
- **Background Information:** Hurricane Dorian hit the country on 1 September 2019. It made several historical records as the strongest Atlantic hurricane documented to directly impact a landmass since records began, tying it with the Labour Day Hurricane of 1935. While the Bahamas has over 700 islands, the hurricane significantly impacted the islands of Abaco and Grand Bahama and the surrounding Cays. The official death count is 74 casualties (63 Abaco and 11 Grand Bahama) and 282 persons still missing. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) estimated a total of 15,000 people in need of food or shelter, following the hurricane, with an estimated 5,000 people evacuating to Nassau, New Providence. The government stated Dorian caused USD 3.4 billion in losses and damage in the country.

This RTE sought to ascertain the effect and efficiency of the support provided to the Bahamas Red Cross Society's (BRCS) response to Hurricane Dorian by evaluating IFRC Secretariat operational support, National Society operational capacity in its auxiliary role of public authorities and the resource mobilization and allocation of this operation. The evaluation sought also to contribute to organizational learning for the IFRC and its member National Societies, the BRCS and other Movement partners in responding to disasters in small Island state context and inform concise recommendations and strategies to improve the coordination and management in the immediate and medium terms; as well as to support the delivery of quality humanitarian assistance to the affected communities in the Bahamas, as well as other small island/middle income States.

Summary of Management Response:

The Management Response Team wants to bring attention to the quality of the recommendations in the final report of the RTE. Some recommendations are drafted are ambiguous and are more comments instead of actionable recommendations. Some are very broad or general and do not provide new valuable insights for operations which have not been highlighted before. Other recommendations are phrased as if actions did not take place (e.g. early deployment of PGI, CEA, IM, NSD during the response, etc) when in fact actions did take place.

1. Assess the benefits of consistent oversight versus temporary leadership.

Greater consideration should be given to whether a **HEOPS or series** or Team Leaders are the likely best option for an emergency response, bearing in mind (to the degree possible) the likely expected size of the operation. If a Team Leader is put in place, a **Deputy Team Leader** should then also be deployed in advance of a disaster (or as soon as possible thereafter) to provide additional co-ordination capacity to support and allow the Team Leader to focus solely on operational needs.

This should also be seen as a training opportunity for future Team Leaders. In such cases, a gender balance should be ensured between the Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader.

Attention: Secretariat DCPRR-surge, Regional Offices DCPRR-surge.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	This recommendation fits in with the already existing D-HEOps model.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluate future operations where a deputy can also be deployed, subject to funding. Integrate gender inclusion and balance into deployment via the existing initiative in the region that seeks to further access and opportunities for female operations leadership opportunities. Continue tracking gender markers for deployments to ensure balance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing Female leadership in operations KPIs to be developed in Q3 2020 	Secretariat DCPRR-surge, Regional Offices DCPRR-surge.

Comments from IFRC CCST and ARO: This seems reasonable and seems to be in line with the D-HEOps program. Although in this operation a HEOps was not requested. With hindsight, of course, it would have been better to have a single HOps than a series of team leaders. There were only two team leaders deployed. The delay in recruitment and installation of the long-term Head of Operation contributed to the need of a second team leader rotation. However, back in September of 2019, IFRC did not have elements to predict the large flow of contributions from American Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross and others. If IFRC would have known what the RTE team calls the "the likely expected size of the operation", then, likely, the decision would have been different. Practically, it may not be possible to identify and deploy both a team leader and a deputy at the same time. Surge team will have to have a readily available pool of qualified candidates to ensure this is achieved. For gender balance, the Region is committed to making bold advanced in providing access and opportunities for female operations leadership which will be measured through key KPIs. The region is committed to ensure gender balance in operational leadership and will measure this commitment with 50% of male and female leader-roles as target KPIs. This method is further recommended for future operations, but then from the onset.

2. Strengthening the capacity of a National Society should be prominent during an emergency response.

While it should not be assumed that a National Society will be able to devote its own resources to an emergency response, advantage should be taken of the presence of experienced, deployed personnel from within the Movement to help build the internal capacity of the National Society and enable it to further develop its auxiliary role. National societies should be encouraged to use emergency preparedness as a learning opportunity for capacity/needs assessments and view their capacity building as a continuous process: actions should build on previous and other ongoing measures.

Attention: NSD and PER, Regional human resources officer, NSD and National Society Preparedness Teams.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<p>For this operation, a very senior NSD resource was there just a week after the disaster, and he had been part of the OCAC team the same year. A month later the OCAC team had been mobilised to the Bahamas and had drafted a full NSD plan based on the OCAC Plan of Action and had the approval on the plan by the leadership. NSD has been there from the start of the operation and the support has been seamless between the NSD resources. So, this recommendation should build upon the lessons learned from those deployments in the operation.</p>	<p>Document lessons learnt from the early NSD response and the seamless transition to the long term NSD plan based on the OCAC and developed by the OCAC facilitation team.</p> <p>During the OCAC review exercise planned for January 2021 dedicate a session to learning around OCAC and the Dorian Response to analyse the NSD and capacity building response of the operation.</p>	<p>Sept 2020</p> <p>Jan 2021</p>	<p>NSD delegate</p> <p>NSD delegate</p>
<p>Comments from BRCS: BRCS agrees that its capacity needed to be strengthened. Delegates have worked along with BRCS Staff to transfer knowledge and increase capacity.</p> <p>Comments from IFRC CCST level: A valid recommendation and the NSD team is doing the needful to attend to this recommendation. Learning from all the previous operations, we are all well aware that during the emergency phase, focus will always be on implementation, expenditures and reporting back to donors. Instead of making a general recommendation, it would have been useful to have a few clear recommendations to focus on one or a maximum of two aspects of the NS capacity building, focusing on the NS team, both staff and volunteers to respond to future emergency situations, reducing dependency on external sources by venturing into income generating activities and or building capacities of NS on financial policies and procedures, etc. There could be more analysis around if the NSD staff deployed in the operation were at the correct time, in the correct amount.</p> <p>A very senior NSD resource was there just a week after the disaster, and he had been part of the OCAC team the same year. A month later the OCAC team had been mobilised to the Bahamas and had drafted a full NSD plan based on the OCAC Plan of Action and had the approval on the plan by the leadership. NSD has been there from the start of the operation and the support has been seamless between the NSD resources.</p>				
<p>3. Monitoring systems and capacity within a National Society should be assessed at the start of an operation.</p> <p>In anticipation of a situation such as this disaster (and considering the number of disasters experienced in The Bahamas within the past five years), there was an obvious need for an appropriate level of M&E to be put in place in the BRCS, as is likely the case on many other small island states in the Caribbean.</p> <p>The IFRC and participating PNSs need to be more understanding and supportive to National Societies in this regard. Failure to do so, as in this case, means that there are no proper means of verification concerning relief aid or cash distributed which are basic requirements for transparency and accountability.</p>				

In addition to specific topics that might be tracked (e.g., relief distribution) this should also improve accountability.				
Attention: Geneva and Regional Units, with National Society.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<p>This assessment is part of the BOCA, OCAC processes. There was a good level of pre assessment available for the BRCS from the recent analysis. The assessment was done prior to the response, which is the correct way to do this. And it informed the need for technical profiles to support the response of the NS.</p> <p>A full M&E assessment is difficult in the first days of response. The existing materials should be considered in the response plan, which was done in this case</p> <p>An OCAC Plan of Action was already completed highlighting PMER as a priority area in BRCS. BRCS hired a PMER officer in May 2020. NS should also ensure sustainability of this area beyond the operation.</p> <p>Prior to the emergency, there were manual and paper-based monitoring systems in place. BRCS agrees that assistance could be given to improve the system.</p>	<p>Follow up with BRCS to the PMER component in the OCAC plan for the BRCS</p> <p>For future operations, ensure available assessments such as PER, OCAC are shared with operations & PMER team to understand M&E needs from the start.</p>	<p>January 2021 (in line with OCAC review)</p> <p>Ongoing</p>	<p>BRCS PMER officer, IFRC PMER delegate</p> <p>PMER ARO</p>
<p>Comments from BRCS Leadership: Monitoring done by BRCS was done manually with intake and outtake forms. The information was then transferred to an Excel database for tracking. Monitoring was done, but not in an automatic format. We have since hired a PMER Staff who is being trained by the PMER delegate and coming up to speed quickly on the requirements of the position.</p>				
<p>4. Rapid identification of people in need should be a priority.</p>				

The lack of preparedness at the national level extended to there being no procedures in place at the BRCS prior to Hurricane Dorian. Initial support from the IFRC and PNSs also failed to address this need which throws a shadow over the operation by questioning whether in fact those people most affected by Dorian – which is not only related to those whose houses might have been damaged but also the very many people in need of PSS – were actually reached.

Attention: Secretariat, Regional Offices, PNS and National Society.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<p>While the selection process could have been improved and procedures at NS-level for selection were not in place.</p> <p>Challenges of receiving and managing the response related to the internally displaced population who moved to Nassau vs the population that remained in the affected island, particularly Abaco.</p> <p>PSS was provided from the start of the operation even in coordination with the Bahamas Psychological Association.</p>	<p>-Support the BRCS to define a minimum vulnerability criteria for disaster response.</p> <p>-Reassess now with a mid-term or a recovery assessment</p>	<p>End of 2020</p>	<p>BRCS, + PER delegate</p>

Comments from BRCS Leadership: From BRCS viewpoint, beneficiaries were assisted whether they had a house or business destroyed or not. PSS services were provided at the airport by BRCS from the beginning of the evacuation process to the end. The majority of persons came to New Providence at the Odyssey Airport. Beneficiaries were met at the airport and offered PSS support. Those who were taken to the Shelters were met at the particular shelter by BRCS PSS support. They received support. Persons who came to BRCS for relief items, PSS Support worked the lines and spoke to persons to get them to go to the PSS Support cottage for assistance and talk through what they encountered. Case follows ups were done to all persons who were encountered to check on them to ensure they were coping. Extra help was provided to those who needed medical services or help with accommodations. On Grand Bahama, PSS Support was given to beneficiaries. At the MPC distribution points in New Providence, Grand Bahama and Abaco, PSS support was present for persons. The BRCS leadership perspective is that BRCS did a great job on PSS in this Hurricane.

Comment from IFRC CCST: A valid recommendation but may not be a practical one in situations such as Hurricane Dorian. The evaluation team is casting doubt on target population and this needs to be addressed. More practical examples should have been provided to help IFRC and the PNS address this issue effectively.

Comment from IFRC Geneva: This effort should be supported by PGI professionals in the region such as the regional PGI coordinator. Assessing vulnerabilities is meaningless without solid PGI considerations and analysis and the risk of providing generic and non-relevant services to so many is very high without ensuring understanding of the different needs of different people

5. Proactive logistics measures are needed in the region.

National Societies in The Caribbean – in addition to the ARO and CCST – should consider a series of proactive steps, including:

- having updated instructions for import/customs/shipping in the different countries they support;
- standard Framework Service agreements in place;
- knowledge (for ARO/CCST) of stock levels of all NSs in the Caribbean. This has started and is ongoing but remains a challenge because of staff changes; and
- repositioning of modest numbers of core relief items.

Attention: Regional Logistics Unit.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	As part of the ongoing PER process, work has been underway to map and access the capacities of the NSs within the region, including logistics capacities. This includes an investment and project in 2019 funded by the Belgian government to increase stocks in strategic locations in the Caribbean. While this effort and the overall recommendation deemed important, lack of stable funding often prevent such efforts from being sustained year over year.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue the PER process in the Caribbean • Secure funding to continue the trainings, prepositioning • Continue looking to secure funds, by ARO, CSST or PNS (as French RC) to better prepare the NS in basic stock management. and Logistics Disaster Response Mechanising. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Ongoing</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NS • CSST • ARO

Comments from IFRC ARO: *This recommendation should be a recommendation and not a statement of problem. But it can be understood as to "build upon and increase the logistics capacity in the region."*

1. Customs regulation in all the Caribbean countries are known by each NS and they change dramatically in case of disasters, adding to that the high rotation of NS staff and not dedicated staff to logistics activities due to the small size of the NS in terms of staff and volunteers, make it necessary to update those as immediate action after an emergency situation, where the customs regulations are normally easy. RLU does a general check before the hurricane season on the contact person for logistics, normally SGs, ask the update of the shipping instructions to each NS and check the stock level of basic relief stocks, as preparatory measures among others to the season.
2. Standard Framework Service agreements are long term contract based on need, and availability of supplies in the respective country of location. NS response plans should consider those base on the possible scenarios and response objectives. ARO RLU has the Framework agreement to the most common used commodities and services. The level of preparedness of the NS is related to its capacity to work in normal time in preparedness measures. Logistics have not been one of the prioritized areas to allocate funds to preparedness., neither at local by the NSs, nor regional or global by IFRC. PER approach should give the balance to funds allocation where the NS really needs it, based on their own criteria.

- 3. In the pre-hurricane meeting every year, or before the Hurricane Season starts, ARO ask all NS the actual stock of basic relief items, the consolidation is manual, but the information is available, as far as the NS share.
- 4. Almost all Caribbean NS including Bahamas has been granted with small stocks for initial disaster response, 200 Households in Bahamas just weeks before the Dorian Hurricane. The long-term issue is the low rotation of the stocks, that happened with the Japanese Container project that ends in 2014th, the stock mostly ends destroyed by the time and elements, in some time not useful at the moment needed, with no funds to replenish and allocate new to be consider at the time funding proposals are made.

6. Guidance and tools from IFRC to support National Societies’ role in supporting governments with Mass Fatality Planning.

Governments of small island states may not have adequate knowledge or capacity to deal with dead bodies. National Societies have a potentially important role to fill in this instance through their auxiliary support role. In this instance, had no experience with this though support was provided by ICRC expertise from the Washington, D.C. Delegation. The Delegate, however, was only deployed 20 days after Dorian struck landfall. In the meantime, government authorities had not considered how to handle bodies during debris removal. At first reluctant to work alongside the ICRC, as needs were realised, this barrier was removed.

Attention: IFRC.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	Mass Fatality Planning does not fall under the mandate of IFRC. ICRC has developed tools including “Management of Dead bodies after disasters”. Under the framework of SMCC, ICRC deployment was coordinated based on their expertise on this subject			

7. Guidance and tools from IFRC to support National Societies to ensure minimal body management knowledge.

Cultural implications of handling dead people are also important, and particularly in the case of Haitians. In addition, timely and appropriate consideration needs to be given to bereaved families to alleviate stress and trauma: A final important element of equal importance is the need to provide adequate training to body recovery teams to mitigate stress among team members.

Attention: IFRC.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	Mass Fatality Planning does not fall under the mandate of IFRC. ICRC has developed tools including “Management of Dead bodies after disasters”. Under the framework of SMCC, ICRC deployment was coordinated based on their	Whilst this is not a part of BRCS plan of action. BRCS will however work with Government to develop their policy for the management of dead bodies and ensure that they are treated humanely. BRCS met with Government to ensure	End of 2020	BRCS President

	<p>expertise on this subject. IFRC and ICRC signed an agreement for ICRC to support with identification of bodies through a forensic expert and RLF support.</p>	<p>the dignity of the dead. Also worked with beneficiaries to locate loved ones and if deceased, work to assist them in securing the remains of their loved one.</p>		
<p>8. Emergency operations need to feature and sustain PGI, NSD and CEA from the outset.</p> <p>All different in their intent, though with a common mission, PGI, NSD and CEA should be inbuilt core competencies of all emergency response operations and not left as an afterthought or an unmet gap (in the case of PGI), as in the current instance. Some key considerations that could have shaped the operation in a more positive vein include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • greater focus, emphasis and advocacy on initial protection issues would likely have helped transparency and accountability issues in relation to undocumented Haitian nationals; • early and clear communication with people affected by the disaster needed to be put in place from the start, including appropriate feedback mechanisms; • much better targeting and selection of affected people – assuring gender inclusion – would have happened though improved community engagement; • consideration of NSD issues could have helped BRCS avail of external support and bolster it against competing needs and approaches of members of the Movement; and • related to this, better communication would likely have averted the negative sentiments against the NS immediately after the hurricane when many rumours were circulating within the National Society, including the intended role of the BRCS. <p>Attention: Regional Disaster and Crisis Rapid Response, Regional Office DCPRR and Rapid Response.</p>				
<p>Management Response</p>	<p>Decision Rationale</p>	<p>Action/s to be taken</p>	<p>Timeframe</p>	<p>Responsibility</p>
<p><input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted</p>	<p>The surge and integration of PGI, NSD, and CEA from the onset of the operation is critical, however, levels of support from the IFRC should be needs-based and are also somewhat dependent on available donors’ support made through a DREF or Appeal. Assessment of PGI, NSD, and CEA capacities of impacted NS’ must be considered in each operation.</p> <p>For this operation, NSD, Volunteering, CEA and PGI were deployed early in the operation (September) with different rotations and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to evaluate operation needs and ability to sustain PGI, NSD, and CEA support to NS as well • Advocate to key donors regarding the need for unearmarked funding in order to support PGI, NSD, and CEA allowing for more flexibility in addressing operational needs. 	<p>Ongoing</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARO PRD • ARO DCPRR and PSK • CCST

	<p>sustained until the 2nd quarter of 2020, with specific functions handed over to NS PGI and CEA focal points. NSD delegate remains supporting this component.</p>			
<p>Comment from IFRC CO, CCST and ARO levels: The recommendation seems to state that PGI, NSD and CEA were seen as <i>afterthought or an unmet gap</i>; however, these profiles were deployed early in the operation and sustained as much as possible based on the needs identified, available profiles and funding. The recommendation is obviously an acceptable recommendation for all operations. The including of NSD is not always recommended in first round deployments. Also, some NS's have these capacities already in place, and therefore deployment is not always necessary.</p>				
<p>Comment from IFRC Geneva – PGI: It will be crucial for PGI, NSD and CEA technical experts to be involved and thus share the responsibility as DCPRR, PRD, PSK and or CCST roles are not necessarily holding competencies to evaluate the operational need for PGI, CEA, NSD or to advocate to key donors of the need especially for PGI (as it should be based on a proper assessment and analysis by a qualified PGI professional) If ARO capacity is stretched, file holders from other regions or HQ can be requested for support. Basic PGI and CEA are about quality, accountability, relevance and reach for any service provided and are/should not depend on donors' investment in the same, but rely on donors' investment in whichever activity they are partnering with us for such as health, wash etc. It is then our responsibility to ensure these services are informed by minimum standards</p>				
<p>9. Maximise deployment effectiveness. To make the above most effective, consideration should be taken of matching timeframes for external technical and administrative support missions. Such missions need to be well co-ordinated and give consideration to the needs and opportunities for capacity strengthening of the National Society, if possible and required. Attention: IFRC Programmes and Operations (Geneva and Americas).</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<p><input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted</p>	<p>Agree with the spirit of the recommendation. Deployment of technical teams and leaderships must match needs-based requirements, when requested by the NS impacted, as well as the availability of resources available to surge staff. Deployments and sustainable support from the IFRC to the NS may be limited by strictly earmarked funding from donors, which could hamper the ability to fully actualize this recommendation.</p>	<p>Surge or Ops to develop a live tracker for the Operations Team in-country to see all deployments in country, in process and upcoming of all profiles.</p>	<p>End of 2020</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GVA and/or ARO DCPRR IM

	Increased communication needs to be maintained with the Operations Team on the ground to ensure deployments are well coordinated.			
10. Early deployments should include a Risk Management Officer.				
<p>In cases where there is no resident capacity, an internal auditor/risk management officer should be deployed to support field teams and oversee risk compliance/monitoring. This is particularly important in situations like The Bahamas where the volume of response was unprecedented and unanticipated and where the IFRC's reputation was potentially at risk. Such a delegate would also be in position to ensure that recommendations stemming from the risk assessment were acted on during the first six months of the emergency operation.</p> <p>Attention: Regional Office Disaster and Crisis surge and Geneva Audit and Internal Investigation Unit.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<p>Based on the scale of the operation, the identification and oversight of the risk management registry falls under the lead of the Operations Management with close coordination with project managers and finance as well as the Regional Office and CCST.</p> <p>For the Bahamas, a risk audit was carried out in November 2019, and identified risks are followed up by Operations Team on a regular basis.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A risk management surge alert will be sent out for large scale operations, and if no responses are identified, posting of either a consultancy or full time IFRC position will be made, and budgeted for in the operation. Development of a Risk Management talent pool/ or explore Service agreement with some of specialized companies to be used globally on operations. IFRC Americas ARO to hire a full time IFRC Senior Office for Risk Management that can provide guidance and support on the risk management file for operations where there is no surge or short-term coverage of the file. 	<p>Ongoing/when there is an operation</p> <p>By mid 2021</p> <p>By July 30, 2020</p>	<p>DCPRR (ARO and GVA if global operation)</p> <p>GVA USG for Programs and Operations</p> <p>Americas ARO Regional Director</p>
<p>Comments from IFRC CCST: It might not be fully correct to assume that the solution to risk management is deployment of yet another external team member. The Decision Rationale is clear that the Ops Manager should be able to identify, pre-empt and manage risks in a proactive manner.</p> <p>All sectors & support areas are relevant and want to be in the first deployment, and again, the decision of who is in that first team depends on the context of the operation. Furthermore, in the case of the Hurricane Dorian, there were two persons playing that role and supporting the leadership to manage risks.</p>				
<p>11. The cycle of deployments needs to be seen as a medium-term engagement, from the outset.</p>				

<p>There is a need to find a balanced, but sustainable, system for HR deployment to allow quality staff to be deployed in a short time without diminishing staff capacity at the “home office” – the CCST or ARO in this case. Anticipated longer term positions need to be opened at the same time as surge deployment to avoid gaps in coverage. Visa issues for delegates need be considered when identifying possible deployments.</p> <p>Attention: Regional Office Disaster and Crisis Rapid Response and Regional Office Senior Management Team.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	<p>Balancing of the right staff at the right time is essential to any emergency response operations. Also, embracing the “as local as possible, as globally as needed” approach ensures localization is at the core of our strengthening of local capacities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Based on size and scope of the operation, post key medium- and long-term position within the first several weeks of the operation, such as finance, human resources, PMER, and IM, as needed 	<p>Ongoing based on disaster operations underway</p>	<p>ARO DCPRR and CCST, along with HR</p>
<p>Comments from IFRC CCST level: While we agree with this recommendation, it might not be possible to find medium term team members during the emergency response phase. Most of the FACT and RIT team members are only available for short term deployments.</p>				
<p>12. Improve Human Resource planning and co-ordination for deployments. Fast track emergency recruitment – building on pre-classified job descriptions – should be in place for all commonly needed positions, e.g. the Operation Manager. Deployments should be for a minimum of one month, but ideally three months: anything less risks being disruptive for continued functioning of that position/role, particularly if there is no satisfactory handover. It also risks that frameworks or systems are altered or changed on account of an individual’s preference. Planning for longer term staff deployments should also commence at the outset of an operation. Attention: Secretariat, Regional Offices, PNS and National Society.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<p>Only 4 long-term delegates positions were opened during the first months. Only Ops Manager, Deputy Ops Manager, Finance, Logistics and PMER Delegate position were launched from the operation outset.</p> <p>Not all the positions were launched from the onset, the request was received by November and because of funding for the long-term positions required had a significant delayed, plus Visa Issues of the Hired delegates.</p>	<p>For future emergencies Promote the use of pre-classified JD and close coordination with SMT about staffing needs required and funding allocations.</p> <p>Pre-classify other job descriptions, other than Ops Manager for Yellow or Red Emergency, as well for Relief JD to decrease days or time to hire International Emergency operation personnel less than 90 calendar days.</p>	<p><i>End 2021</i></p>	<p><i>HR GVA in coordination with HR Americas Regional office</i></p>

<p>13. Data management systems should be in place as early as possible. Data collection, analysis, storage and retrieval systems need to be developed in the first few days of an emergency response, conducted ideally together with experts in primary data collection. An information analyst and Information Management Coordinator should be deployed, together for the first one month – together with other members of the Assessment Cell. The Information Management coordinator works as the link with sectoral teams and with the remote SIMS support to ensure alignment with operational needs and provide the technical support for development and usage of “IM tools”. Sufficient time needs to be built into the operation to allow for briefing/debriefing of those being deployed.</p> <p>Attention: Regional and Geneva Disaster and Crisis, Rapid Response and IM teams.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	IM deployments took place since start of the operation, without any gaps. However, consistent data collection was not ensured by the different relief teams.	- Standardize data collection forms for ERUs/Relief phase to ensure that information collected can be centralized and in the same manner.	December 2021	DCPRR GVA PMER GVA IM GVA
<p>14. Streamline the EPoA process and procedure. Consideration should be given to establishing a new, more streamlined EPoA process, particularly concerning the review process. In the current situation, too many people spent too much time on both the narrative and subsequent financial components, placing unnecessary pressure on an over-stretched response team and detracting from an individual’s specified role and purpose for being in country. Attention: Geneva Disaster and Crisis Department and Geneva PMER.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	Efficiencies gained from a streamlined EPoA process and procedure will lead to saved person hours that can focus on mission related activities.	We should have a focal point for the revision process and a meeting with all technical leads should be done to set the steps for each revision, together with finance. Issuance of an EA/EpoA review and Q&A guidance	Ongoing/next operations May 2021	IFRC PMER and Operations at both GVA and ARO level
<p>15. Re-examine earmarking strategies. Future emergency appeals/responses need a better strategy for earmarking, with more transparency regarding support to local actors who may be in a better position to respond than international partners of a particular PNS. Quality and timely funding is needed for critical sectors (commonly protection/PGI, shelter and WASH) but also for expected cross-cutting activities such as communications, CEA and PSS. Earmarking in the current context prevented some of these activities from receiving adequate support, which has likely detracted from the overall impact of relief provided and the number of people reached. In some cases, the merits of</p>				

<p>taking a narrower and more focused approach (compared with what is currently required in the EPoA, for example) might be more appropriate than attempting to cover all sectors. Highly technical interventions that are unlikely to contribute to National Society development should be avoided. Attention: IFRC PRD (Geneva and Americas) in coordination with donors.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	<p><i>The strict earmarking from donors on this operation lead to many key AoF and SFI unable to be addresses, at the expense of the needs expressed via the National Society. Unearmarked funding is essential to ensure meeting the greatest needs are able to be addressed and is in line with the 2016 Grand Bargain.</i></p>	<p><i>Agree on a minimum percentage of operational costs / support costs for pledges. / Or allocate a % that is unearmarked per pledge. FOR PRD to identify or respond to this recommendations</i></p> <p><i>Continue to advocate for unearmarked funding, in line with the Grand Bargain Agreement of 2016</i></p>	<p><i>Ongoing/per operation</i></p> <p><i>Ongoing</i></p>	<p><i>GVA and ARO PRD</i></p> <p><i>GVA and ARO PRD Global leadership</i></p>
<p>16. Adequate time and resources need to be made available for thorough needs assessments. Recognising the need to respond to peoples’ most immediate requirements following a disaster, those responsible for conducting needs assessments should be given sufficient time and resources in order to conduct this vital work so as to adequately inform planning and budgets. This was especially the case in The Bahamas where three distinct situations needed to be addressed – Abaco, Grand Bahama and displaced people in Nassau. Emergency needs assessments should, however, also consider an operation’s capacity to absorb funds. Detailed actor mapping is required. Attention: Disaster and Crisis Surge Team, Regional DCPRR.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	<p>Needs assessments form the basis of each operation and adequate time and resources should be dedicated to this key step in each disaster relief operation. This steps much be inclusive of a CEA and PGI based approach. Additionally, expectations with funders should be such that taking the time to allow for a proper assessment is the norm. This is also relevant for recovery assessments.</p>	<p><i>Ensure assessment team members arrive on the same schedule and have sufficient time to complete assessment (in each location). As well as competencies in CEA and PGI.</i></p> <p><i>Continue to advocate for unearmarked funding, in line with the Grand Bargain Agreement of 2016</i></p>	<p><i>Ongoing/per operation</i></p> <p><i>Ongoing</i></p>	<p><i>ARO and CCST DCPRR/Operations (in coordination with PGI/CEA)</i></p> <p><i>GVA and ARO PRD Global leadership</i></p>
<p>17. IFRC should be prepared to make calculated risks to respond instantly to most affected locations.</p>				

The delay in setting up a basecamp in Abaco – without question the island most severely impacted by Hurricane Dorian – stands out as a serious misjudgement in this operation, given the reported scale of destruction and loss of life. This should have happened irrespective of potential sensitivities related to undocumented migrants. Justification for such an installation was all the more important given the lack of the BRCS’ visibility on the island following the damage to its former office. Attention: Disaster and Crisis Surge Team, Regional DCPRR.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	A basecamp was established in October 2019 in Abaco and closed until housing accommodation was found for the team. MPCGs continued to be the main form of relief support until February 2020. Long term delegates arrived in February and were deployed to Abaco in the same month. COVID-19 restrictions also hindered the movement of staff since March 2020 until July 2020.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Continue building local capacity at BRCS Abaco branch (recruitment of volunteers, in addition to increase staff presence in Abaco after COVID-19 restrictions are lifted. - Ensure that any changes in the scope or objectives of future Basecamp ERU ToRs are agreed by higher operational leadership at country and regional level. If not, Ensure ERU implement the setting up a basecamp as per standard ToR 	Now- December 2020	Operations Manager and Deputy Operations Manager.

18. Cash and Voucher Assistance needs to be approached as an integrated activity.

The IFRC as a whole needs to invest in getting cash transfers right from the start in order to be a recognised first-class cash agency in this sector. Questions need to be asked regarding the manner in which this was handled in this operation. CVA should not be seen as an independent activity as it was largely at the outset of this operation: an integrated sectoral approach cannot be realised if this is the case. All stakeholders in the CVA process should be aware of the entire series of validation steps to follow in this process: roles and responsibilities of all those operating through the ERU – or similar – need to be clearly articulated and linkages established with other sectors.

Attention: Cash and Voucher Assistance Team.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	Obviously, an operation with heavy multipurpose cash component, will have strong attention, however the recommendation about ERU role is well taken and should be clarified in future operations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash-preparedness: Internal advocacy and awareness for the NS buy-in at ALL levels. Conduct training to BRCS on Cash Transfer Programming to build local capacities. Identification of CVA focal point(s) for mentoring –join efforts with American Red Cross as an important influencer-. 	Advocacy and awareness should be permanent priorities. Training: Q3 2020 Mentoring: Q3-4 2020	IFRC ARO CVA Delegate and Livelihood Resource Centre

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engaging with Global Surge to identify better handover and transitions of surge CVA support, improving its integration to the Operations team (and throughout the implementation). In accordance with the drafted Regional Guidelines on the use of the Prepaid Debit Cards, develop a checklist for set up, implementation, feedback mechanism and reporting to be used by any Global Response Tool. 	Handover process: Q3 Guidelines: Q3-4 2020	CVA Delegate, Finance Delegate, RLU
<p>19. Planning for recovery needs to start early. Consideration should be given to recovery as early as possible in the operation and recovery needs should be integrated into the overall response. Transition to recovery should be a visible, integral and committed part of emergency response, with a suggested Exit Plan and handover strategy already defined for when the opportunity occurs. This will need to be regularly monitored and updated with all implicated partners – internal and external. Attention: BRCS and IFRC DCPRR and CCST, in co-ordination with national structures and donors.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted	<p>The early recovery assessment team was deployed in October-November but had limited time as a unified team to develop a quality product. There was consideration of recovery options early from sectors, but the problem with a lack of unearmarked funding meant that progress could not be made (e.g. – livelihoods).</p> <p>The assessment deployments missed the opportunity to end the assessment mission with a joint analysis / planning workshop with the whole operations team, to define the way forward. Also, not everyone had the same understanding of how these assessment resources would work within the surge team.</p> <p>Not all the team members need to be there for a month, depending on the context. The NSD</p>	<p>Ensure Recovery Assessment Team has a structured hand-over to the long-term operations management as well as clear briefing from management at the beginning of the assessment process.</p> <p>Recovery Assessment Team should be deployed for at least 6 weeks (at least the Assessment Coordinator).</p> <p>Recovery Assessment Team deliverables should be delivered.</p> <p>Conduct a recovery assessment in the present.</p>	<i>Ongoing/next operation</i>	<i>ARO and CCST DCPRR/Operations</i>

	<p>component in this case was comprised by the old OCAC team and we worked one week in the field to have a comprehensive NSD plan based on our experience pre- Dorian. The Assessment Coordinator needs to be there for the full period, so s/he meets all team members. In the case of NSD, the Assessment Coordinator had left when the NSD focal point for the assessment arrived.</p>			
<p>20. Remain realistic and focused on mandate. The Movement needs to be reasonable and not over-ambitious in its planning for recovery, bearing in mind the future intentions/aspirations of the National Society and balancing this with “informed knowledge” of what is needed and what can be achieved. The decided approach to building resilience needs to be holistic, addressing social, economic (livelihoods) and environmental needs. Attention: BRCS and IFRC Programmes and Operations (Americas and CCST), in co-ordination with national structures, specialist NGOs/agencies and donors.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p>Collaboration between BRCS and IFRC and PNs was done to build resilience and looking at BRCS with its goals and plans to ensure that they are in sync with what is being offered.</p>	<p>BRCS along with IFRC and PNs is completing a single NSD plan that encompasses what BRCS sees as its objectives.</p>	<p>End of 2020</p>	<p>BRCS operations, IFRC and PNs</p>