



# International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

## COMOROS FLASH FLOODS EMERGENCY APPEAL EVALUATION



*Volunteers from the Comorian Red Crescent initiate clean-up activities*

*Credit - CRCO*

*Peter Rees-Gildea  
ReesGildea Consulting  
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## **ACRONYMS**

ADB	African Development Bank
CHF	Swiss Franc
CF	Comorian Franc
COSEP	Government General Direction of Civil Protection
CRCo	Comoros Red Crescent Society
DM	Disaster Management
DMIS	Disaster Management Information System
DMU	Disaster Management Unit
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECV	Epidemic Control for Volunteers
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
JD	Job Description
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NDRT	National Disaster Response Team
NFI	Non-food item
PIROI	Plate-Forme d'Intervention Régionale de l'Océan Indien
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDMT	United Nations Disaster Management Team
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
WASH	Water and Sanitation (UN)
WatSan	Water and Sanitation (IFRC)
WFP	World Food Programme

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The management and staff of the Comoros Red Crescent Society were excellent hosts to support the field mission and provided open and candid responses to support the evaluation.

Finally I would like to acknowledge the tireless work of the CRCo volunteers who contributed so much of their time and energy to respond to the humanitarian needs caused by the unprecedented floods of April 2012



*National Society volunteers*

*Credit: CRCo*

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## **1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The purpose of this review is to examine the extent to which the goal, objectives and expected results of the Comoros Flash Floods emergency operation were achieved in terms of its relevance to the needs of the beneficiaries and its effectiveness and timeliness and assesses lessons to be learned for future operations.

The review provides learning for the Comoros Red Crescent Society (CRCo) to prepare for future emergencies and learning for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in regard to how to provide efficient and timely support to a national society facing a sudden-onset large-scale emergency.

The main tools used to conduct the review included a thorough document research, key informant structured and informal interviews, field research with beneficiaries and community representatives and group and individual meetings with staff of the CRCo.

The review concluded that the CRCo conducted a fast and effective response to immediate needs of the affected population, especially in the areas of rapid assessment, first aid, and evacuation of the wounded and community clean-up activities.

The CRCo quickly moved from rapid assessment to distributions which provided essential relief to 1,600 families, though the distributions could have benefitted from a more detailed follow-up assessment as part of the registration process.

The role played by PIROI in providing immediate technical support along with the supply of NFI for 2,000 families was critical in ensuring a fast relief response to the affected population. The relations between IFRC project managers and the CRCo was not always clearly understood, unaided by somewhat ambiguous job descriptions.

The CRCo distributed Non-Food Items (NFI) provided by the French Red Cross Indian Ocean Platform (PIROI) to 1,600 families as well as distributing World Food Programme (WFP) energy biscuits and UNICEF WASH kits. The CRCo conducted an excellent process to evaluate beneficiary attitudes in regard to the quality and usefulness of the NFI that were distributed which concluded that overall the NFI items were of a high quality and useful, though the distribution of AquaTabs and chlorine sachets should be discouraged in a context where the population is not used to such products.

An estimated 3,300 people benefitted directly from the cleaning and disinfecting of over 300 water cisterns, 56 of which were repaired. The WatSan programme was well designed, well assessed and efficiently implemented by CRCo, supported by one RDRT member.

A total of 85 volunteers were trained in hygiene promotion and Epidemic Control for Volunteers (ECV) and conducted awareness activities for over 23,000 households

and distributed 3,406 mosquito nets. A Knowledge Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey was conducted before the hygiene awareness programme started and was repeated after the sensitisation was completed. The results were positive in regards to improved knowledge of different types of disease but appeared to have little impact on changing hygiene behaviour and probably needed a longer term education programme to promote change.

After an initial survey of a number of DRR projects the CRCo selected four for implementation, three focussing on clean water supply and one on village flood protection through the construction of a protective wall. Community participation was observed to be extensive and the quality of the work completed of a high standard. Comoros is ideally suited for risk mitigation programmes based on its high level of risk and receptive community attitudes.

The overall conclusion is that CRCo managed an effective initial response, conducted excellent WatSan and DRR programmes, and managed distributions of NFI to 1,600 families and partially implemented hygiene promotion programmes. CRCo has learned some lessons in regard to vulnerability assessment and distribution planning which will be incorporated into future responses. PIROI proved instrumental in providing effective support and materials to the CRCo and should be relied upon for similar interventions in the Indian Ocean Islands.

It is recommended the IFRC reimburses the CRCo for the outstanding invoices from the beginning of the operation and works with the CRCo on preparing a final budget to lead to the closure of the programme in March 2013.

IFRC should review the job descriptions for delegate project managers and ensure it has a clear understanding about the support role played by delegates.

While KAP exercises are to be encouraged, it does require time spent on training, likewise training for assessments are important especially if a national society has not conducted an emergency appeal or large operation for some time.

Donors should be encouraged to continue investments in further DRR mitigation projects in the Comoros.

## 2.0 BACKGROUND

The CRCo was formed in 1982 and recognised by their government three years later in 1985. Their recognition into the Red Cross Movement took place in 2005.

The CRCo exists in an impoverished country with a poverty level of 46%,<sup>1</sup> with under five year old malnutrition at 25% and a low level of access to clean drinking water (45%) and a high dependency on rural agricultural as a living. The 2012 floods mostly affected the poorer rural communities.

The CRCo, like their government is financially challenged, but has been recognised by the government as a principle player in disaster response and sits on the government disaster response board and is included as a major player in epidemic and natural disaster response roles in the national response contingency plans:

*'Il ne s'agit pas d'inclure tous les acteurs à tout les niveaux de la prise de décision, mais les privilégier, voire de sélectionner ceux qui possèdent les ressources et l'expertise requises. Il est certain que l'Armée et le CRCo représentent à ce titre des acteurs indispensables.'*

*'Les organisations dans la société civile, en particulier le CRCo se substituent à l'Etat dans nombreux secteurs, tels que la préparation et la réponse aux catastrophes'.<sup>2</sup>*

The government disaster management statutes recognise the critical role played by CRCo, the support provided by the French Red Cross regional platform PIROI and the capacity of the RDRT mechanism and the role of the IFRC.

The response to the 2012 floods was the first international emergency appeal ever carried out by the CRCo, having previously responded to volcano emergencies in 2005, 2006 and 2007 supported bilaterally by the French Red Cross regional platform PIROI, then responded to a cholera outbreak in 2008 with DREF support of CHF 139,000 deploying 140 volunteers to support 150,000 beneficiaries with public health interventions; an air-crash in July 2009 involving 100 volunteers to support 994 beneficiaries and a shipwreck in 2011 supporting 900 beneficiaries, all supported by small-scale DREF funding.

International management support to the 2012 floods came first from PIROI which helped develop the Emergency Appeal, then from Operations Managers deployed by IFRC supported by RDRT staff in the areas of relief and WatSan. PIROI also provided support in assessment, relief, procurement and logistics.

Very heavy rainfall hit the three Comoro islands in two waves, the first from 11 April 2012 which was mostly absorbed by the alluvial soil but filled river basins and the second from 20 April leading to flash floods that were particularly severe on 25

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<sup>1</sup> UNICEF 2012

<sup>2</sup> Mission de préparation à la réponse aux catastrophes, UNDAC, 12 March 2010

April.<sup>3</sup> In the island of Grand Comoros the extensive water catchment area on the west side of the main volcano near Moroni is well forested but has little in the way of organised water management. The flash floods far exceeded the holding capacity of the small unorganised rivers and forced new water courses down towards the coastal plains bringing thousands of tons of rock and mud into unprotected villages and flood waters of up to three metres. Roads and infrastructure were destroyed and houses and schools were destroyed, damaged or filled with mud. Latrines overflowed and water cisterns were flooded with polluted water and filled with mud and rubble.

Assessment data indicated there were three persons dead, 46,000 affected and 9,000 displaced.<sup>4</sup>

Without further assessments these figures were used by the UN and the IFRC throughout the operation. The rains caused flash floods, landslides,



*A destroyed mosque near Boeni-Credit: PRG*

mudslides, destruction of crops, and loss of livestock, flooding of wells, water tanks contamination and damage to water supply systems. This was one of the largest disasters in the Comoros islands in decades, affecting nearly 9% of the population leading to the government announcing a state of emergency and requesting international support on 25 April.

On 25 April the CRCo deployed rapid assessment teams in all three islands and assisted with evacuations and provided first aid to 72 people wounded by the floods in the Hambou region. Some 200 CRCo volunteers worked in the communities helping promote and organise clean-up programmes, getting the mud and rubble cleared out of houses and getting paths and roads cleared.

On 4 May the IFRC released CHF 100,000 from the DREF and launched an Emergency Appeal for CHF 801,000 to assist 4,000 families (20,000 beneficiaries) at the request of the Comoros Red Crescent Society. The Emergency Appeal was designed to support first aid and PSP activities, household and community clean-up projects, the distribution of NFI and WASH kits, repair broken water systems, clean and disinfect flooded cisterns, conduct hygiene promotion and health education, initiate DRR mitigation projects and build the capacity of the CRCo.

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<sup>3</sup> Precipitation data from IRI forecasting tool on DMIS

<sup>4</sup> Figures taken from the joint rapid assessment of the government, UNDAC and CRCo and were adjusted downwards from initial estimates of 4 dead, .83 severely injured and 64,987 directly

It was planned that the operation would last for six months, but by the appeal end deadline the DRR projects had not started, though projects had been identified, therefore on 8 January<sup>5</sup> a revised Emergency Appeal was issued extending the operation to the end of March 2013 and reducing the budget from CHF 801,000 to CHF 624,000.

On 16 May \$2.5 million was disbursed from the CERF to support five UN Agencies.<sup>6</sup> As the only country-wide national humanitarian organisation the CRCo was the only available partner for UN Agencies that needed a partner to identify beneficiaries and manage distributions. The CRCo became the operational partner of the WFP which provided 28 metric tonnes of energy biscuits for distribution and also the operational partner of UNICEF that required assistance to distribute 990 WASH kits. ICRC gave the CRCo 900 mosquito nets for distribution and in January 2013 the African Development Bank gave CRCo USD \$ 1 million for food and relief supplies.<sup>7</sup>

PIROI provided non-food items (NFI) from their stocks held in La Reunion and Mayotte for 2,000 families which, supplemented with some local purchases, provided kitchen sets, sleeping mats, lanterns, stoves, AquaTabs and mosquito nets for 1,600 households. Some items that were not distributed were set aside as preparedness stocks.

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<sup>5</sup> The Emergency Appeal was due to end on 31 October 2012. Between November 2012 and January 2013 there were discussions (and some confusion) as to whether an operations extension could be done through an Operations Update, if a Revised Emergency Appeal was required or if the Zone should produce an Interim Final Report.

<sup>6</sup> The CERF report is due to be issued on 15 May 2013

<sup>7</sup> The ADB project is not included in the Emergency Appeal

### 3.0 PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

From the review TOR:

*The purpose of this review is to examine the extent to which the goal, objectives and expected results of the Comoros Flash Floods emergency operation were achieved in terms of its relevance to the needs of the beneficiaries and its effectiveness and timeliness. Also, this review will highlight strengths and weaknesses which can be identified as lessons to be learned for future operations. Finally, realistic recommendations will be proposed in order to improve CRCo and IFRC Management.*

Additional to the TOR the review has looked at the CRCo response in the context of the wider UN and government led humanitarian response, as it was at that level some of the key issues were identified.

The objectives of the review, also taken from the TOR are to:

1. Examine the extent to which the operation has achieved its goal, objectives and expected results. Examine the relevancy of beneficiary selection process throughout the appeal.
2. Assess relevance and appropriateness of activities implemented in the course of the EA. Evaluate the capacity of CRCo and IFRC to deliver these activities.
3. Assess the RC/RC's response in terms of timeliness of delivery, scope and scale of the Operation.
4. Examine the Federation cooperation mechanisms and relationships between CRCo and IFRC. In doing so determine if the CRCo is satisfied with the support provided by IFRC regarding the mobilisation of external assistance and coordination mechanisms.
5. Determine how widely IFRC policies are accessible, known and referred to when emergency and recovery operations are planned and implemented by CRCo staff and volunteers. Identifying if IFRC planning processes and guidelines are adequate to ensure that policies are followed during planning and implementation of emergency and recovery programmes.
6. Assess key achievements, challenges and areas of success, as well as areas for improvement within the operation and make realistic recommendations to improve and inform future program managers.
7. Assess the impact of IFRC regarding the implementation and respect of Standard procedures in Logistics and Finance throughout the EA.
8. Assess the efficiency of the work and the quality of Communication between PIROI (Rapid Intervention Platform in the Indian Ocean of the French Red Cross), IFRC and CRCo.
9. Assess the quality of the monitoring of the activities implementation and related expenses throughout the EA.

The key questions which are listed under the scope of the TOR have been used as the basis of the review chapter on Findings.

The review started with a document search through the IFRC website Appeals and Reports pages and DMIS field reports, a search through ReliefWeb for UN and other reports and further reports were accessed through the IFRC operations managers in Comoros, Disaster Management Unit of the IFRC Zone office in Nairobi and through PIROI in La Reunion. The documents identified are listed in annex 7.3, supplemented by assessment spread-sheets and copies of e mail communications.

The document search identified discrepancies in regard to the number of people affected and laid out a number of questions in regard to the accuracy of reported figures<sup>8</sup> which were followed up, where possible, during the field mission.

Skype and face to face interviews were conducted with IFRC operations delegates, IFRC delegates in Madagascar and Nairobi, IFRC staff in the Geneva headquarters, the French Red Cross (PIROI), and with CRCo staff in the Comoros.<sup>9</sup> The interviews were semi-structured using the questions posed in the review TOR sections on objectives and scope. A number of specific follow-up questions were managed by e mail and Skype. Attempts were made to hold Skype discussions with the UN Resident Representative and the OCHA coordinator but contact requests were not responded to, leaving a number of important questions unanswered.

Assessment data and goods delivery data were accessed and studied and triangulated with comparative data from OCHA. District level assessment and goods delivery data was cross-checked with examples of beneficiary registration data and summary level data which identified some weaknesses in managing the transfer of handwritten field level data into Excel spread-sheets.<sup>10</sup>

Photos and videos were researched to verify the dates and types of CRCo interventions.

The field mission in the Comoros was designed by the IFRC operations manager and the CRCo based on the review TOR. Face to face meetings were held with all key operations, management and support staff of the CRCo. These interviews were generally unstructured and focused on the specific responsibilities of the participant. A field visit was conducted in Vouvouni village in Bambao district and Bangoi and Salimani villages in Hambou district to inspect the level and causes of damage, to look at a number of cleaned and repaired cisterns and to visit two of the risk reduction projects and meet programme beneficiaries, village leaders and CRCo community volunteers. It was only possible to conduct community visits in Grand Comoros and mostly to semi-urban communities. While the most affected communities were visited this cannot be considered as representative of the entire beneficiary community, most of whom in more rural areas and on the other islands are more likely to be living in tin sheet or reed houses which are more likely to have been destroyed and more likely to be poorer than those that were visited.

The review was greatly aided by two key reports: the KAP review and the NFI review which provided real-time evidence of the impact of the public health programme and of the impact of the NFI programme. The KAP review results are questionable and the author poses a number of questions at the end of the review to understand why there appeared to be a negative impact of the health education programme in some specific areas, while the NFI feedback provided some key lessons regarding the perceived value of the NFI products and the methodology of the distribution approach taken by the CRCo.

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<sup>8</sup> For example see 4.1.1 on assessment data

<sup>9</sup> See Annex 7.2 for the list of informants

<sup>10</sup> Every evening after field assessment visits, field data was transferred to Excel spread-sheets which formed the basis for distribution planning. Errors in data entry from tired volunteers only recently trained in using Excel were not surprising

## 4.0 KEY FINDINGS

### 4.1 Main strategic and operational findings from the evaluation<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.1.1 Humanitarian response in the first week

While the Emergency Appeal covered the four main programme areas of NFI distribution, WatSan activities, Hygiene Promotion and Disaster Risk Reduction it is also important to evaluate the activities undertaken by the CRCo in the first week following the flash floods to 'highlight strengths and weaknesses which can be identified as lessons to be learned for future'.<sup>12</sup>



CRCo volunteer evacuates a child

CRCo

The CRCo responded immediately to the flash floods on April 26<sup>th</sup> and deployed 200 volunteers, including 20 trained NDRT volunteers to provide immediate humanitarian services. The

volunteers provided first aid and psycho-social support<sup>13</sup> to 26 injured and three paramedics assisted in two health centres receiving patients from the floods. CRCo volunteers supported the government fire brigade and COSEP to evacuate 45 families from Vouvouni village to the government relief centre and assisted in the evacuation of 515 families across the three islands. Tents were provided to a small number of families in Hamavouna on Moheli island for those that had lost their houses and could not be accommodated in the community and locally donated food was distributed by CRCo volunteers. The volunteers were immediately active in supporting clean-up operations to remove mud and debris from houses, streets and community

<sup>11</sup> Questions selected from the TOR. Some 'missing' questions are considered to have been covered in replies to other questions in this chapter

<sup>12</sup> Evaluation TOR: Purpose for the review

<sup>13</sup> Based on beneficiary feed-back it would appear that just the presence of the CRCo volunteers in the first hours of the emergency provided psycho-social support to all the affected population

buildings. The CRCo took the lead in initiating a rapid assessment as well as accompanying an UNDAC assessment mission.

To achieve these essential humanitarian activities in the first hours and days from the flash floods the CRCo demonstrated considerable capacity to manage the volunteer deployment: such a deployment requires a solid alert system for volunteers, good protective equipment for volunteers – especially as they were deployed into an area with considerable levels of mud and debris and were working on clean-up and evacuation management while the rains continued. Volunteers and managers needed to ensure good communications during the operation and sufficient logistics support to get them to and from the location of the activity as well as getting food support and managing per diems during the first week of the activity. The fact that all these support services were well managed assured a competent volunteer response and demonstrated the capacity of the CRCo to effectively fulfil the auxiliary disaster response mandate as assigned by the Government of Comoros.

The only poor reflection on the initial response was the inability to fully reimburse all the initial costs through the Emergency Appeal, a matter that is still under resolution and one that could leave the national society with debts that it can ill-afford and was not responsible for.

#### **4.1.2 The assessment**

It has proven difficult to deconstruct the early assessment data and there was clearly some confusion on beneficiary numbers and the classification of beneficiary types by both the CRCo and the UNDAC. Initial incorrect beneficiary numbers were quoted in nearly all reports and there appears to have been no attempt to revisit the initial findings. There were assessed needs in the UNDAC report that were not responded to by any organisation, such as the need to find return shelter solutions<sup>14</sup> for families whose houses had been destroyed or severely damaged in the floods.

It is important to note the environment in which the rapid assessment took place. A number of key CRCo community volunteers were evacuated along with their families; some of the most severely affected communities were only visible from the road and any detailed survey was impossible as the communities were still flooded at the time of the assessment and paths and roads blocked by mud and rubble.

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<sup>14</sup> Displaced families were adequately supported by others in the community

On April 26<sup>th</sup> the CRCo started assessments in Bambao and Hambou in Grand Comoros; in the south-west and north-east of Anjouan and in the central region, Djando region and Mlédjelé region in Mohéli. An UNDAC assessment took place during 1 – 4 May which included members from UNDMT, COSEP, CRCo and MSF. In a report issued on 3<sup>rd</sup> May<sup>15</sup> the CRCo identified 1,808 households whose housing had been damaged or destroyed and 2,257 households directly ‘affected’ by the floods. Excel spread-sheets indicate that those that lost their houses were included as part of the total of those ‘affected’ by the flood, but the ‘affected’ and those losing a house were added together by mistake to indicate a beneficiary population of 4,065 families which formed the basis of the IFRC Emergency Appeal. The statistics for those affected by the flood were not consistent with the data sub-sets. An apparent typographical error on the excel spread-sheets possibly added a large number of homeless families in one district. The summary beneficiary document was inconsistent with the regional spread-sheets where nearly all numbers had been adjusted upwards (though a few had been adjusted downwards). Despite some training of the CRCo assessment volunteers by PIROI in the use of Excel spread-sheets, the assessment results indicate that there was a lack of experience in using Excel and that there was insufficient checking of the data entry.

The evaluation field visit went to those communities most affected where the beneficiary numbers were most suspect. The visit concluded that accurate data collection was virtually impossible at the time of the assessment and that what initially appeared to be over-reporting could well have been under-reporting based on population size and percentage of households evidently affected.

On 26 April the Government issued a report indicating 46,139 people were affected with 9,228 people homeless<sup>16</sup> which is close to the CRCo figures of 1,808 households if a family size is estimated at just over 5 persons per household and reported 46,139 people affected. On 28 April OCHA reported the same figures.<sup>17</sup> In the Comoros Early Recovery Plan issued by OCHA and the government the figures had increased to 64,987 people affected but this figure included all those without ‘access to basic social services’, and included, for example, 23,336 school children whose could not attend schools which had been damaged in the floods and an estimated 40% of women who had lost livelihoods. Pregnant women were included in the beneficiary total without explanation of how they were affected. The reported number of households that had lost their shelters was recorded as 557 families. It is unusual to use the concept of lack of access to basic

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<sup>15</sup> It is unclear if this evaluation was part of the UNDAC assessment mission

<sup>16</sup> Etat D’évaluation des Besoins D’Appui a L’Union des Comoros

<sup>17</sup> ReliefWeb 01 May 2012

services as a criteria for beneficiary selection. As the early 'affected population' data probably took a similar approach to beneficiary criteria one has to consider very carefully if the reported beneficiary figures throughout the operation had any grounding on a proper assessment.

In the Situation Report #3 issued in early May by the Office of the Resident Coordinator the figure of 1,800 displaced families was used again but the average family size was recorded as 7.7 per household while the IFRC used the standard family size of five persons in their Emergency Appeal. In the beneficiary NFI review conducted by the CRCo the average size of the beneficiary households was 9.6 persons. PIROI informed the CRCo that family size varied between two to sixteen persons and that needed to be taken into account when planning distributions, but as can be seen in section 4.1.2 below distributions were very varied regarding quantities of articles and family size does not seem to have been taken into account.

On 14 May OCHA reported<sup>18</sup> 137,000 people affected and 1,800 houses completely destroyed with 4,000 families hosted by relatives or in the community.

In the IFRC Emergency Appeal launched on 4 May, the Operations Updates of 15 June and 15 August and the revised emergency Appeal of 8 January 2013 the figures of 9,000 people displaced and 46,000 affected were repeated.

While assessment data included the type of house,<sup>19</sup> the data in regard to affected families and families 'sans arbri'<sup>20</sup> was not disaggregated sufficiently in regard to a house that had been flooded but not damaged, but required mud and debris cleaning and the replacement of household goods, damaged houses and destroyed houses. Data on evacuated families<sup>21</sup> was inconsistent with what actually happened.

Interview responses indicated that there were no vulnerability criteria used by the CRCo in the assessment and beneficiary selection process and that some beneficiaries were not the most vulnerable. In the CRCo beneficiary review it was stated '*Plusieurs familles sinistrées et plus vulnérable ne sont pas recensées. Donc elles n'ont pas bénéficié de l'aide*'.

Households were asked what items they needed but had not received to which the main responses were food (23%), beds and bedding

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<sup>18</sup> ReliefWeb : CERF gives \$2.5m, 16 May 2012

<sup>19</sup> Breeze Block, tin sheet or woven reeds

<sup>20</sup> Without Shelter

<sup>21</sup> Often women, children and the elderly were evacuated while men remained on site

(50%) and shelter materials (13%). In an OCHA report<sup>22</sup> it was stated *'the priorities for emergency aid are providing families with shelter and restoring the water supply on Grande Comore'*. A report on 28 April from the Office of the Resident Representative stated: *'The main needs as identified by initial rapid assessments are in water and sanitation, food, shelter, education and communications sectors'*. The same document said *'more temporary shelter is required ...there is a possibility of more people in need of shelter'*. A week later, report number 3 from the same office had received the assessments from the UNDAC mission and referred to setting up clusters for Food Security, Health and Nutrition, WASH, NFIs, Logistics and Education. The report made *no* reference to shelter needs or shelter coordination. When asked about emergency shelter needs PIROI said they did not propose including shelter in the IFRC response as this was beyond the capacity and experience of the CRCo. In the government and UN Recovery Plan of August 2012 a budget of \$3.5m is proposed for shelter out of a total budget of \$18.35m. In this report under the heading Response to Date: Shelter it states: *Distribution of tents were reported many times in the local media, but details on the number of beneficiaries have not been verified.* In the CERF Implementation Report in the same document it states that UNDP received \$134,743 and spent 70% of that on *'Provision of NFI/emergency shelter to flood affected families in Anjouan, Moheli, and Grande Comore'* though there is no publically available evidence of any action taken by UNDP. In the recovery report the original shelter figures from April/May are still used, though the report proposes: *As a first step to the recovery efforts in the sector of shelter, there is an urgent need for updating a survey of the present situation with regard to populations which have been temporarily or for longer term displaced, in terms of their numbers, profile (men, women, children, old, handicapped) and to ascertain their essential needs and the degree of precariousness of their living conditions.*

The overall problem to properly assess and respond to shelter needs indicates a seriously weak coordination role played by the UN. This analysis has been included in this evaluation as it exposes the weak humanitarian environment in which the CRCo had to operate. An equal amount of text could be used to review the value and impact of the nutritional assessment and the WFP response of providing 28 mt of energy biscuits close to expiry date distributed by the CRCo to 12,000 beneficiaries.<sup>23</sup>

The assessment of damaged or flooded water cisterns was, however, extremely detailed and accurate and could be verified by reports, financial accounts and field visits. The DRR project assessment and decision making process was also commendable.

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<sup>22</sup> Comoros: Aid workers arrive as emergency declared, 30 April 2012, OCHA

<sup>23</sup> Informal questions asked during the field visit indicated that the biscuits were not well received and were almost an insult as being appropriate for situations of starvation and not appropriate for floods response

### 4.1.3 NFI Distributions

The CRCo is to be congratulated on carrying out a detailed beneficiary review of its NFI programme, interviewing 400 of the 1,703<sup>24</sup> families that received NFIs. The beneficiary review confirmed some early issues in organising distributions of the NFIs.<sup>25</sup> CRCo volunteers returned to villages the day after conducting the assessment but did not always inform the village that they would be returning for a distribution and did not always work through the village leadership to plan and organise the distributions, leading to some problems. However, the beneficiary review stated that 74% of respondents felt the distribution organisation was good, 12% average and 15% bad, the main problems being in Anjouan Island where only 53% were satisfied with the management of distributions. When asked how to improve distribution management respondents 59% of respondents asked that distribution organisation be improved, 30% asked that security be improved and 11% asked for improved information management. It would appear that one of the key reasons for problems with the distributions was, similar to assessment problems, the CRCo national committee not working through the regional committees who naturally had better contacts with the multiple community based Red Crescent villages whom could have better planned distributions and reduced the incidences of violence, improved security, access and communications, however, one needs to take account that many of the CRCo volunteers were either

evacuated or out of contact during this difficult period.

It was reported in the NFI review that there was some inconsistency in the NFI articles



*NFI registration and distribution Credit: CRCo*

<sup>24</sup> The beneficiary review refers to 1,703 families that received NFI while the warehouse stock report refers to supplies for 1,600 households being issued, supported by detailed beneficiary receipts. The discrepancy may come from the 'additional' relief supplies that came from ICRC or were given to CRCo from individuals and organisations.

<sup>25</sup> Based on feedback from Operations Managers and PIROI

distributed with registered families not receiving all the articles anticipated, but this data is clearly inconsistent with beneficiary goods receipts. For example 89% of beneficiaries interviewed as part of the beneficiary survey received a kitchen set, only 54% received a stove, 97% received a bucket, 91% received at least one sleeping mat, 74% received at least one mosquito net and 85% received soap. These figures are, however, inconsistent with logistics reports that indicate all families received the same goods, though there was a shortage of stoves and soap.

The number of NFI items distributed per household appears to be below SPHERE standards and household size was not taken into account in the distributions. For example, the average number of sleeping mats provided to each household was 1.1; the average number of mosquito nets was 1.5 per household in Anjouan Island, 1.7 per household in Mohéli and 2.2 per household in Grand Comoros. An average of 1.8 Jerry Cans was distributed per household. As noted above in 4.1.1 the average household size was 9.6 and the 'planned for' family size was 5. However, one needs to take into consideration the confusion at the time with households evacuated or returning and the impossibility of providing a detailed beneficiary list during the rapid assessment conducted by the CRCo.

In the beneficiary survey households were asked to score the quality and the usefulness of the goods provided. The results were very positive (except for the Aquatabs which is explained below). Overall respondents scored 95% on quality and usefulness of the NFI provided, for example the kitchen sets, which often be a culturally sensitive issue, were graded as 100% of good quality and 96%<sup>26</sup> as useful, while stoves were scored at 100% good quality and 97% as useful. Figures were similar for buckets, sleeping mats, mosquito nets, lanterns, jerry cans and soap. The response regarding sleeping mats was surprising as the mats were too small<sup>27</sup> and too thin for sleeping, thus one can see a relationship to the distribution of mats and NFI report stating that the greatest outstanding need was sleeping materials, thus families did not identify the mats with sleeping materials.

Aquatabs were distributed alongside the NFI and proved to be somewhat controversial. While the quality feedback indicated 100%, the utility feedback scored only 37% in Grand Comoros and Moheli, but 75% in Anjouan. There were similar results for water purification sachets. One key reason for the low scoring on the utility of the

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<sup>26</sup> The reports were provided by island without cumulative scores, the writer has taken some self-judged estimates to provide a cumulative figure

<sup>27</sup> The mats were little larger than 1.30m x 0.5m

AquaTabs and sachets may be the failure to provide instruction on how to use these products, with only 46% of respondents replying that they had received instruction on the use of AquaTabs and only 33% receiving instruction on use of the sachets. After initial beneficiary feedback on AquaTabs and chlorine sachets the AquaTab distributions were stopped in Grande Comore (47%) and Anjouan (71%) and the chlorine sachets were not distributed in Grande Comore. The withheld stocks are in the PIROI warehouse in Moroni and are available for operations in countries where the use of AquaTabs and chlorine sachets is better understood. Normal water purification practice in the Comoros is the boiling of water while there is little knowledge in regard to the use of AquaTabs and sachets. This indicates two key issues: the provision of AquaTabs and water chlorination sachets that were not culturally understood and the failure to provide education linked to the distributions. It may have been more appropriate to reinforce the cultural tradition of boiling water before drinking than introducing a poorly understood product without sufficient education support.

#### **4.1.4 Hygiene Promotion and Epidemiological Surveillance**

85 volunteers were trained in hygiene promotion and Epidemic Control for Volunteers (ECV) and conducted awareness activities for over 23,000 households and distributed 3,406 mosquito nets. A Knowledge Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey was conducted before the awareness programme, and was repeated after the hygiene education was completed. The results were positive in regards to knowledge of different types of disease but appeared to have little impact on changing hygiene behaviour and probably needed a longer term education programme to promote change. The survey author posed relevant questions at the end of the second survey and asked if the KAP survey volunteers had been appropriately trained and fully understood the questions they were transmitting and how they were understanding and recording results and whether appropriate levels of monitoring had been put in place for the survey. It had been planned to provide epidemic surveillance for a period of six months, but with some budget restrictions and lack of post flood epidemics this activity was not fully implemented.

#### **4.1.5 Water and Sanitation Activities**

The WASH kit distributions which were part of the WatSan objectives have been reported under the NFI section in 4.1.2.

At the beginning of the operation, volunteers started cleaning and disinfecting houses. However it was quickly realized that affected beneficiaries were cleaning and disinfecting their houses themselves.



The key to the WatSan programme success was the cleaning and disinfecting of water cisterns. 522 water cisterns were assessed and 306 selected for cleaning and disinfecting.

*CRCO volunteers prepare to pump out a flooded cistern*

These tanks provided clean water for an estimated population of 3,300 beneficiaries with a total water volume of 1,774 cubic metres. 56 of the cisterns required repairs which were covered out by the programme. The repairs included the introduction of a



guttering system for rainwater collection and the construction of a CGI roof to protect the water from impurities, rubbish and also to reduce the risk of children falling into the previously unprotected cisterns. The repairs included

*A repaired water cistern with guttering and roof PRG*

raising the height of the cistern walls which will also protect the cisterns from future floods.

Initially the CRCO volunteers cleaned the cisterns themselves, but soon the communities assisted with the cleaning and repairs and provided the sand and labour for the repairs.

#### 4.1.6 Disaster Risk Reduction Activities

The emergency appeal included DRR objectives to train volunteers on DRR assessment, conduct VCA training and VCA activities, produce community level risk maps, promote public awareness on DRR and select four proposed mitigation projects. All of these activities took place with just one mitigation



project to be finalised.

The DRR project was in the initial Emergency Appeal which was over-ambitious in regard to the anticipated timeframe. The DRR projects could not be completed within the timeframe, thus the Emergency Appeal

*Retaining wall protecting the village of Boeni PRG*

was extended. It was a good decision to extend the Emergency Appeal so that the DRR mitigation projects could be completed, while it was unrealistic to expect the process of planning and implementing DRR could be completed within a six month programme.

Two of the mitigation projects were visited during the evaluation. It was impressive to witness the quality of the work done on the protective wall in the village of Boeni where not only had the protective wall been successfully completed but the village had mobilised a large number of volunteers to



start a new large wall which is being implemented by the community itself.

The level of risk to floods in the Comoros is high, especially noting the potential for increased flooding incidents due to climate change and the increased intensity of those

*Large cistern layout ready for roofing cover PRG*

events. Villages below the rain catchment areas are seriously exposed to flood risk and need to initiate protection programmes as one cannot

anticipate the government financing the massive canalisation works that would be required to control water flows and protect villages.

Villages have an excellent sense of community and appear to be willing to fully engage in risk mapping and making major contributions to mitigation projects. The level of risk and the engagement of communities makes the Comoros a very attractive opportunity for cost-effective risk reduction mitigation programmes.

#### 4.1.7 Organisational Development and Capacity Building

The national society had already demonstrated considerable capacity at the outset of the operation, managing to organise and deploy 200 volunteers to provide immediate response to the crisis in the areas of evacuation management, first aid, psycho-social support, clean-up and rapid evaluation.

The flash floods response was a test of the organisational capacity of the national society which had never faced a disaster of such proportions and had never engaged with the IFRC at the level of an Emergency Appeal. It provided a platform to support the national society with capacity building at many levels.

With the support of PIROI and the IFRC *'systems and procedures have been improved in relation to finance management, logistics, monitoring, and reporting'*.<sup>28</sup>



Training meeting at the CRCo

Credit: CRCo

The logistics department was helped with preparedness such as establishing a fuel reserve, reviewing transport operations comparisons. Financial management was assisted through the introduction and training

in Excel and a data management tool also useful for expenses tracking, forecasting and monitoring. Budget forecasting, cost planning and monitoring were also further developed to improve operational efficiency.

<sup>28</sup> Quote from the Revised Emergency Appeal, IFRC, 08.01.13

At the programme level 24 volunteers have been trained in DRR assessment and 51 volunteers were trained by RDRT staff in food and NFI distributions. 85 volunteers received training in hygiene promotion and epidemic management (ECV) and 51 volunteers received training in WatSan assessment methodology.

## **4.2 Findings as related to the questions posed in the Terms of reference**

### **4.2.1 Examine the extent to which the operation has achieved its goal, objectives and expected results. Examine the relevancy of beneficiary selection process throughout the appeal.**

Beneficiary selection for the NFI operation was a challenge though selection was well planned for the WatSan and DRR programmes. The discussion on target beneficiary numbers has been explained in section 4.1, and the revised Emergency Appeal adjusted the beneficiary targets to the level of actual implementation, thus one could state the operation did achieve its goal. The KAP survey raises questions about the impact of the surveillance and hygiene promotion programme, but these programmes were curtailed before they could be completed for reasons of funding.

### **4.2.2 Assess relevance and appropriateness of activities implemented in the course of the EA. Evaluate the capacity of CRCo and IFRC to deliver these activities.**

As referred to in section 4.1.1 the inclusion of the DRR programme could be considered as inappropriate for an Emergency Appeal, though the outcomes were positive. The exclusion of shelter programmes at the expense of DRR programmes raises questions, especially as no other organisation appears to have taken up this challenge. The CRCo and IFRC clearly had the ability to deliver the programmes as planned, excluding the DRR programme which took longer to implement, unsurprisingly, as planned.

### **4.2.3 Assess the RC/RC's response in terms of timeliness of delivery, scope and scale of the Operation.**

The CRCo was extremely fast in deploying volunteers and could have benefitted by slowing down and investing an extra 24 hours in volunteer training in assessment and distribution methodologies. The speed with which the NFI programme was implemented was extraordinary while the ability to clean and disinfect 306 cisterns, 56 of which required repairs, within the timeframe was also very impressive. The scale of the operation was appropriate to the capacity of the CRCo and the needs of the population while the scope could have avoided planning for DRR mitigation projects.

### **4.2.4 Examine the Federation cooperation mechanisms and relationships between CRCo and IFRC. In doing so determine if the CRCo is satisfied with the support provided by IFRC regarding the mobilisation of external assistance and coordination mechanisms.**

The relationship between the CRCo and the IFRC was not optimal, with IFRC delegates taking decision-making powers that would normally belong to a national society but which were explicit in the delegate's job description (JD), for example *'Ensure the application of the strategic direction of operations and focusing on achievement of the planned objectives.'* Or they were confusing, such as: *'The Operations Manager will provide leadership and guidance for the relief and recovery operation for the Emergency Appeal (Flash Floods) in support of the Host National Society'*.

Despite the fact that the JD had been translated and shared with the CRCo this confusion of roles and responsibilities led to the closure of some planned activities and more importantly led to an occasional lack of trust between the CRCo and the IFRC that had negative consequences for the operation.

**4.2.5 Determine how widely are IFRC policies accessible, known and referred to when emergency and recovery operations are planned and implemented by CRCo staff and volunteers. Identifying if IFRC planning processes and guidelines are adequate to ensure that policies are followed during planning and implementation of emergency and recovery programmes.**

The CRCo logistics department was fully conversant with IFRC tools and guidelines and followed these during the operation. The relief operation started so quickly that at the time of assessment and distribution standard IFRC tools were not available or understood, though the appropriate tools arrived later. After the NFI review the relief department reviewed the standard assessment and distribution tools and have now printed these and are ready to use these for the next operation.

**4.2.6 Assess key achievements, challenges and areas of success, as well as areas for improvement within the operation and make realistic recommendations to improve and inform future program managers.**

See section 4.1 and chapter 6.

**4.2.7 Assess the impact of IFRC regarding the implementation and respect of Standard procedures in Logistics and Finance throughout the EA.**

The Emergency Appeal budget and expenditure was very well controlled by both the CRCo and the IFRC, though it is recommended the Operations Manager should be the budget holder and appeal manager. Some misunderstandings took place in regard to eligible expenditure where IFRC staff should have sought advice. The Emergency Appeal should have been revised within the original timeframe.

The main logistics operation was carried out extremely efficiently by PIROI and met the highest standards.

**4.2.8 Assess the efficiency of the work and the quality of Communication between PIROI (Rapid Intervention Platform in the Indian Ocean of the French Red Cross), IFRC and CRCo.**

The communications between the IFRC and PIROI and the CRCo and PIROI were excellent with PIROI taking pro-active measures to ensure that partners were well informed. The IFRC could have done more to keep the

CRCo up to date on the implementation of the programme and on the status of the finances as well as communicating better on challenges and leaving final decision making to the national society.



PIROI relief items arrive at the airport in Moroni

Credit: CRCo

**4.2.9 Assess the quality of the monitoring of the activities implementation and related expenses throughout the EA.**

The budget was extremely well monitored and managed and the NFI review was of the highest standard. The KAP had some problems but was a good effort to monitor the impact of the hygiene promotion programme.

**4.2.10 How effective has the operation been in terms of responding to the needs identified by the affected communities? Were the activities planned and quality determined as per beneficiary need? Did it focus on the priorities of the target groups? And to what extent was the most vulnerable population reached / provided with assistance relevant to their needs?**

It is clear that clean water and NFI were required in response to the floods and these were provided by the CRCo while the overall assessment of needs and coordination of response by the UN was highly questionable. The priorities of the affected population were only partially met with little indication that recovery needs will be addressed at all. The CRCo volunteers



Volunteers assist a victim in hospital

Credit: CRCo

did not use vulnerability criteria at the time of assessment and the registration process was not effective in identifying the most vulnerable, though those

that received assistance were very positive about the quality and utility of the support provided, except for the distribution of Aquatabs and water purification sachets that were distributed without sensibilisation.

**4.2.11 What important lessons have been learned which can improve future implementation of programmes in Comoros and be shared with the wider RC/RC?**

Refer to section 4.1 for key findings, Chapter 6 on Conclusions and Chapter 7 on Recommendations.

**4.2.12 Was the management structure adequate and performing? What are the key reasons which lead to subsequent compromises/adjustments?**

The structures of both the CRCo and the IFRC were adequate for the operation, the problems coming from a lack of understanding by both parties on roles and responsibilities. The IFRC budget holder should be the Operations Manager and not the regional office.

**4.2.13 What changes in capacity, capability, understanding and learning have occurred within the CRCo and IFRC as a result of the Operation?**

24 volunteers have been trained in DRR mitigation projects, 51 volunteers trained in food and NFI distributions, 30 volunteers trained in water tank disinfection and a further 20 in WatSan assessments. This can only be considered as capacity building if these volunteers are retained and available for future operations. The often poor relations between the CRCo and the IFRC delegates will have a negative impact on future operations unless the current levels of distrust can be overcome and roles and responsibilities better understood when managing emergency appeals.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

One cannot expect any national society to maintain a disaster response capacity for a disaster that may only occur every few decades. The CRCo showed exceptional capacity for this major operation considering that their recent experiences have been for smaller localised beneficiary populations,<sup>29</sup> and their ability to mobilise 200 volunteers at very short notice across the country does them credit. While some of the operational challenges could have been mitigated the overall management and scale of the response was commendable.

The operation was planned in an environment of poor overall humanitarian assessment and coordination. While this does not reflect poorly on the CRCo, a stronger lead played by the UN could have made CRCo planning easier. As the only nation-wide humanitarian organisation the CRCo took on partnerships with WFP and UNICEF for distributions of their supplies. There are mixed responses on how this affected the IFRC operation though it would appear that taking on these extra responsibilities from the UN did not significantly undermine the IFRC operation.

The failure of the humanitarian community to respond to shelter needs, recovery and livelihoods was surprising, especially noting the impact that the floods had on agricultural production and the WFP intervention of providing energy biscuits seems a bizarre response to the nutritional needs after the floods.

The IFRC Emergency Appeal had been prepared by PIROI who assisted the CRCo at the beginning of the operation. The Appeal plan of action did not entirely reflect the humanitarian needs and included a Disaster Risk Reduction programme that was inappropriate for an Emergency Appeal, though the NFI and WASH programmes clearly met humanitarian needs. It is important to note however, that PIROI support (fulfilling its agreed role within the IFRC) was critical in getting a large response operation started with a speed and quality that would possibly have not come through the IFRC structures alone.

The relationship between the CRCo and the IFRC was not optimal, with IFRC delegates taking decision-making powers that would normally belong to a national society but which were explicit in the delegate's job description. This led to the closure of some planned activities and this led to a general lack of trust between the CRCo and the IFRC that had negative consequences for the operation.

The lack of volunteer refresher training in assessment, registration and distribution was a lost opportunity and led to some miscalculations that continued throughout the operation and need to be taken into account in future operations. The initial lack of coordination and information sharing between the CRCo National Committee and the Regional Committees led to assessment and distribution problems though the response of the affected communities was very positive in regard to the quality and utility of the materials provided.

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<sup>29</sup> The 2009 air crash and the 2011 shipwreck

The water and sanitation programme conducted by the CRCo had a direct impact on peoples' access to clean water and was a major contributing factor to the success of the overall programme.

The CRCo is to be commended for conducting an open and transparent beneficiary feedback process for the NFI programme that both highlighted the successes of the NFI programme as well as identifying areas that will require more attention in future operations. The CRCo is also to be commended on initiating a KAP survey early in the operation though the somewhat bizarre results of a negative hygiene impact emanating from the KAP follow-up survey was partly instigated by the early closure of the programme by the IFRC and will need more investigation to properly assess how results in some health aspects could actually be negative.

Without longer-term development support in DM, WatSan and Health the CRCo will not have the activities required to maintain an active volunteer base and maintain a stronger organisation. This anticipated reduction in capacity will be detrimental to the response to future disasters. Noting the position played by the CRCo as a critical part of the government disaster response, any lack of capacity of the CRCo will have a negative impact on those affected by future disasters.

## **5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Human Resources and national society support**

- 5.1.1** Particular attention needs to be paid by the IFRC when supporting a national society undertaking an Emergency Appeal for the first time and ensure that the national society and the delegates are clear about their roles and responsibilities and that such roles and responsibilities are stated clearly in any job description.
- 5.1.2** Delegates undertaking programme authority must receive a full briefing on IFRC standards and procedures and be briefed on managing the complex relations with a national society and have a clear line of support from the IFRC.
- 5.1.3** Documents, including tools, procedures and guidelines need to be in the language of the national society and brought to the attention of the national society, especially where the national society may be new to managing DREF Operations or Emergency Appeals.

### **5.2 Finance**

- 5.2.1** Reimburse the CRCo for the eligible expenses committed between 26 April to 05 May to allow the CRCo to repay the loans received from ICRC and PIROI.
- 5.2.2** Present to the CRCo the final budget balance (international funds and the balance of funds from the last working advance) and agree an appropriate budget use of all outstanding funds, though these may all be required to reimburse the initial costs explained in 6.2.1.
- 5.2.3** Ensure that IFRC DM and finance staff understand the eligibility of the use of funds in the period between a disaster and the DREF or Emergency Appeal launch.
- 5.2.4** Be transparent with national societies from the beginning to the end of an operation in regard to budgets and the international and national implementation of the budgets.

### **5.3 Assessment, Registration and Distribution**

- 5.3.1** If a national society has not conducted assessments, registration of distributions for some time, or on the scale of a new disaster, a quick training is recommended to refresh volunteers on the use of assessment, registration and distribution tools and guidelines.
- 5.3.2** In an operation such as a floods response, changes to needs and population movements can be anticipated requiring a follow-up(s) to an initial assessment.

### **5.4 Emergency Appeal Planning and Programming**

- 5.4.1** If considering implementing DRR or DP programmes in line with the 10% guideline, delegates and national societies should consider the appeal timeframe carefully before undertaking DRR mitigation projects unless they can be completed within the appeal timeframe.

- 5.4.2** If there are few other national organisations in the country of operation one should be prepared for additional demands on the national society from UN Agencies and other organisations, especially if the national disaster management authorities are weak, and plan accordingly, noting the overall capacity of the national society.
- 5.4.3** Revisions to Emergency Appeals must take place within the Appeal timeframe.
- 5.4.4** Delegates and national societies need to be aware that they are allowed to budget for actions, such as emergency assessments, that take place between the onset of the disaster and the launch of a DREF Operation or an Emergency Appeal and that a national society's expenditures on such activities are considered as eligible expenditure.
- 5.4.5** The Budget Holder should be the IFRC Operations Manager.
- 5.4.6** KAP exercises can bring real value to an operation, but it is important to invest the time in volunteer training before starting a KAP survey.
- 5.4.7** The use of AquaTabs or chlorination sachets should only be distributed where there is existing experience of using such products or where the distributions are strongly reinforced with information and training on the use of such products.
- 5.4.8** Opportunities should be taken to promote the image and visibility of the national society, be it through the media, a presence at IASC meetings or other methods.

## **6.0 ANNEX**

### **6.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE**

#### **Terms of Reference for the Comoros Flash Floods Emergency Appeal Evaluation**

##### **Background**

Heavy rains inundated Comoros Islands from April 20<sup>th</sup> 2012, causing the worst flooding since decades. As of April 26<sup>th</sup>, over 64,987 people were affected and more than 9,000 displaced on all three Islands of the Archipelago (Grand Comore, Mohéli and Anjouan). Overall, 4 persons have lost their lives in the disaster, 83 persons have been severely injured, 174 houses were completely destroyed, 307 houses lost their roof and 1,774 were flooded.

##### **RCRC response**

This Appeal was launched on May 4<sup>th</sup> 2012 with a budget of CHF 801,629 (cash and in kind donation or services) for a period of six months to assist 20,000 beneficiaries (4,000 families). CHF 100,000 were initially allocated from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) to support the National Society in the initial emergency phase. After a revision in October 2012, it has been decided to extend this Emergency Appeal until March 31<sup>st</sup> 2013. Also, Initial Budget was revised downward based on actual contribution from donors. Revised budget is now CHF 624,074 (100% of the donor contributions).

This appeal was articulated around four main activities as shown below:

Non Food Items (NFI) Distribution started shortly after the Floods. Overall, 11,139 beneficiaries (1,703 families) received kitchen sets, buckets, jerry cans, soaps, stove, sleeping pads, mosquito nets, and lanterns. In order to improve hygiene and to minimize a risk of water borne diseases, aqua tabs have also been distributed to affected families. Beneficiaries have been identified through Field Assessments executed by CRCo Volunteers during two weeks. First Distribution activities started on May 9<sup>th</sup> and last distribution took place on May 30<sup>th</sup> 2012. This activity took place on all three Islands of the country across 48 Communities. After the end of this activity, CRCo conducted a strong review of the Distribution upon a sample of 402 Families in Grand Comore, Anjouan and Moheli Islands. This study was aimed at assessing the level of planning, quality and pertinence of Distributed Items. It also looked at Beneficiaries' Satisfaction Level and showed uncovered needs.

Watsan Activities have been held shortly after the beginning of the Operation. Volunteers started cleaning and disinfecting houses, but the focus was quickly put on water tanks. Overall, upon 522 assessed Water Tanks, 306 have been cleaned and disinfected between May 17<sup>th</sup> and July 29<sup>th</sup> 2012 across 17 Communities on Grand Comore Island. These tanks cover a population of 18,054 beneficiaries.

The continuity of the Watsan Activity was to identify the 30 most damaged Water Tanks upon the 306 that have been cleaned and disinfected. Started in October for a period of 2 months, 56 Water Tanks (26 more than planned) have been repaired and covered to offer to 3,289 beneficiaries a safer source of water. Also, rain water collection systems have been improved or installed if inexistent. Through this activity, we have also reduced the risk for children to fall into Water Tanks.

Hygiene Promotion and Epidemiological Surveillance Activity started in the course of September with the training of 85 volunteers on all three Islands and ended on Oct 31<sup>st</sup>. The goal was to reinforce prevention messages in 48 affected Communities in order to minimize risk of

contamination and death. Topics were namely Hygiene and Food, Safe Water, Malaria, Measles and importance of using mosquito nets. Pre and Post KAP Surveys (Knowledge, Attitude and Practice) have been conducted before and after the realization of this activity upon a sample of 360 households. Overall, 23,359 households have been sensitized by CRCo Volunteers.

A Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Activity was launched in the beginning of October. Overall, 24 volunteers (2 teams of 4 on each Island) have been attending a one week training provided by CRCo. 6 teams worked in 12 Communities that have been affected by the Flooding and are vulnerable to natural Hazards. Volunteers have conducted Community trainings and, together with local authorities, led Vulnerability Capacity Assessments (VCA). The target was to identify key and realistic DRR Projects to be implemented with the active support (human and material) of these Communities. Five projects that have a sustainable impact on Beneficiaries Livelihood have been chosen by a Selection Comity. 4 water tanks located in Health Facilities will be rehabilitated or built in Hoani, Wanani and Nioumachoua on Moheli Island and in Vouvouni on Grand Comore Island. Also, a pilot project aimed at building a protective wall along a river will be built in Bangoi Hambou (Grand Comore Island). Finally, a vulnerable Community named Mara Haré located on Anjouan Island was selected to be trained and to conduct a Vulnerability Capacity Assessment (VCA).

On a more general aspect, this operation also focused at reinforcing CRCo Organisational Development and Capacity Building in a sustainable manner which leaves behind a stronger set of skills and capacities at headquarters and branch levels. This was facilitated by the support of an Operation Manager based in CRCo Head Office in the Capital Moroni for the duration of the appeal and by RDRT missions held in the beginning of the operation.

### **Purpose of the review**

The purpose of this review is to examine the extent to which the goal, objectives and expected results of the Comoros Flash Floods emergency operation were achieved in terms of its relevance to the needs of the beneficiaries and its effectiveness and timeliness. Also, this review will highlight strengths and weaknesses which can be identified as lessons to be learned for future operations. Finally, realistic recommendations will be proposed in order to improve CRCo and IFRC Management.

### **Objectives**

Specifically the review will:

10. Examine the extent to which the operation has achieved its goal, objectives and expected results. Examine the relevancy of beneficiary selection process throughout the appeal.
11. Assess relevance and appropriateness of activities implemented in the course of the EA. Evaluate the capacity of CRCo and IFRC to deliver these activities.
12. Assess the RC/RC's response in terms of timeliness of delivery, scope and scale of the Operation.
13. Examine the Federation cooperation mechanisms and relationships between CRCo and IFRC. In doing so determine if the CRCo is satisfied with the support provided by IFRC regarding the mobilisation of external assistance and coordination mechanisms.
14. Determine how widely are IFRC policies accessible, known and referred to when emergency and recovery operations are planned and implemented by CRCo staff and volunteers. Identifying if IFRC planning processes and guidelines are adequate to ensure that policies are followed during planning and implementation of emergency and recovery programmes.
15. Assess key achievements, challenges and areas of success, as well as areas for improvement within the operation and make realistic recommendations to improve and inform future program managers.

16. Assess the impact of IFRC regarding the implementation and respect of Standard procedures in Logistics and Finance throughout the EA.
17. Assess the efficiency of the work and the quality of Communication between PIROI (Rapid Intervention Platform in the Indian Ocean of the French Red Cross), IFRC and CRCo.
18. Assess the quality of the monitoring of the activities implementation and related expenses throughout the EA.

### **Scope of work**

The review will cover the entire duration of the operation from May 4<sup>th</sup> 2012 until January 15<sup>th</sup> 2013, including NFI Distribution, Watsan, Hygiene Promotion & Epidemiological Surveillance and DRR activities. The consultant will namely address the following key questions / focus areas:

#### ***Quality, relevance and accountability***

- 7.0 What problems and constraints have been faced during the implementation of the operation and how did the operation deal with those?
- 8.0 What aspects of the operation were improved to ensure the needs of the affected population or communities were met?
- 9.0 How effective has the operation been in terms of responding to the needs identified by the affected communities? Were the activities planned and quality determined as per beneficiary need? Did it focus on the priorities of the target groups? And to what extent was the most vulnerable population reached / provided with assistance relevant to their needs?
- 10.0 To what extent were the beneficiaries involved in planning, design and monitoring of the operation?
- 11.0 How effective has the operation been in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and in developing appropriate strategies to respond to their particular circumstances? Was the beneficiary selection modality/process fair, appropriate and effective?
- 12.0 What strategies were used to ensure quality, timely and relevant delivery to target beneficiaries?
- 13.0 What important lessons have been learned which can improve future implementation of programmes in Comoros and be shared with the wider RC/RC?
- 14.0 What unanticipated positive or negative consequences arose out of the operation and why?

#### ***Effectiveness and efficiency of management***

- 15.0 Has the operation met its stated objectives in an efficient and effective way? (e.g. were inputs used in the best way to achieve outcomes and if not why not?)
- 16.0 Was the management structure adequate and performing? What are the key reasons which lead to subsequent compromises/adjustments? What are the key lessons for the CRCo and IFRC learned for future relief and recovery work?
- 17.0 Were there adequate resources (financial, human, physical and informational) available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?
- 18.0 Was there adequate integration across the different programmes?
- 19.0 Was there effective information management / sharing system across the stakeholders in place?
- 20.0 Was there effective coordination between CRCo HQ and IFRC?
- 21.0 What changes in capacity, capability, understanding and learning have occurred within the CRCo and IFRC as a result of the Operation?

### **Policy Framework**

- 22.0 Has the policy guidance resulted in changes in the way the emergency and recovery operation was implemented? Factors to consider include;
- 22.1** the linkages to external partners including government, civil society organisations, PNS and the affected communities
  - 22.2** community participation and consultation with other partners
  - 22.3** consultation processes within the National Society
  - 22.4** community assessment to assess to what extent policies are implemented
  - 22.5** link to National Societies, their mandate and roles in their country
  - 22.6** beneficiary identification and targeting
- 23.0 How were IFRC policies used in the development and planning of the operation by the CRCo and IFRC? How are policies disseminated within the CRCo? Who is responsible in the CRCo for policy making and dissemination? What are the consequences for not following policies?
- 24.0 Is there overlap or confusion in the policy guidance provided by the IFRC? Identify any global policy guidance which poses difficulties for the RCSC in its particular operating environment. What type of support if any, is needed for NS to ensure better implementation of policy?

### **Evaluation methodology**

- 25.0 *Development of methodology and work plan:* the consultant will develop detailed methodology and work plan guides for meeting the objectives of this review. The methodology will incorporate desk research, interviews with stakeholders, small group discussions, direct or indirect discussions with beneficiaries, documentation, and reflection and feedback. The proposed methodology and work plan will be submitted to the CRCo/IFRC and agreed upon prior to the commencement of field work.
- 26.0 *Background documentation and briefing:* As part of the preparation process, the IFRC Operations Manager in Comoros will gather key background documents including appeal documentation, operations updates, plans, assessment reports plus other relevant programme documentation and forward documents to the consultants. Briefings will be held in IFRC East African Office in Nairobi and in CRCo National Office in Moroni.
- 27.0 *Briefings, interviews and field visits.* The evaluation team will meet with relevant staff members of the CRCo, national authorities/partners, end-beneficiaries, which are deemed important for the tasks of the review team. Briefings, interviews and field visits will be arranged in consultation with and through the CRCo/IFRC.

An end of evaluation debrief will be undertaken to share the broad findings of the evaluation team with CRCo and IFRC representatives. The debriefing meeting will also constitute a formalised opportunity for summarising the consultation process as well as an opportunity for the key stakeholders to raise relevant questions. A draft report on key findings will be presented before the departure of the review team.

### **Deliverables or outputs**

The following outputs are expected to be delivered by the evaluation team:

- 28.0 Inception note, which is a detailed outline of the proposed methodology and work plan of how the team intends to undertake the review.

- 29.0 Draft Evaluation report: The initial results of the evaluation will be presented in a draft report prior to the departure of the evaluation team. The report should focus on delivering clear lessons for the operation in Comoros and for the wider IFRC.
- 30.0 Final report will be prepared by March 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 (latest) and based on the initial feedback provided in the debriefing provided by CRCo and IFRC. This report should not exceed thirty pages (not inclusive of annexes), and will follow the format outlined in Annex 1. All information and analysis should be gender disaggregated to the extent possible.

The evaluation report will be shared with participants and key stakeholders. It will also be made available to a wider audience through the IFRC's standard communication channels such as FedNet and the public website. Management from the CRCo and IFRC commits, to ensuring that the findings and in particular the lessons learned will then be shared with key departments across the IFRC, and will feed into wider lesson learning linked to other major disaster response and recovery operations.

### **Composition of team**

The Evaluation team should compose of a maximum of 2 members not directly related to Comoros Operation. The team leader will be an independent professional with several years of experience in humanitarian program evaluation.

The team members should comprise the following skills and experience:

- 31.0 Have a background that includes disaster response and or Watsan / Relief / risk reduction.
- 32.0 Have experience in conducting evaluations for medium scale operations.
- 33.0 Ability to manage relations with representatives from national societies, government, donors, and the community, including diplomacy and consensus building skill.
- 34.0 Have experience of working at community level gathering beneficiary feedback through a variety of methodologies.
- 35.0 Ideally be familiar with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement.
- 36.0 Excellent skills in quantitative and qualitative analysis.
- 37.0 Demonstrate experience in the use of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies.
- 38.0 Knowledge and working experience in Africa.
- 39.0 Excellent level in English (spoken and written) required and ability to speak French will also be of great benefit.

### **Timeframe, location and logistics**

It is estimated that the team will require 2 weeks to carry out this evaluation. This would include 2 days in Nairobi for briefing, 10 days in Comoros for Assessment and 2 days in Nairobi for debriefing and sharing of the key findings with Disaster Management Department.

The mission is planned to start in the middle of January 2013. Draft report to be submitted to IFRC on the first week of February (one week after the debriefing in Nairobi). Comments will be provided by IFRC and CRCo within two weeks to enable the report to be finalized at the latest on March 1<sup>st</sup> 2013.

Necessary logistical support will be provided to the evaluation team by the CRCo and IFRC.

## **INFORMANTS**

Daniel Bolanos	Head DMU	IFRC Nairobi
Bocojean Coffi	OD Delegate	IFRC Indian Ocean
Rocio Fischer	Operations Manager	IFRC Comoros
Papa Ibrahima Sene	Finance Manager	IFRC Nairobi
Christine South	Quality Assurance	IFRC Geneva
Cyril Stein	Operations Manager	IFRC Comoros
Julien Marcheix	Logistics, PIROI	French Red Cross
Eric Sam Vah	Head, PIROI	French Red Cross
Said Abdou	Director, Disaster Management	CRCo
Hitami Alaoui	Distribution Coordinator	CRCo
Al Bakir	Mapping	CRCo
Ramoulati Ben Ali	Communications	CRCo
Abdouramahne Bacari	Logistics	CRCo
Daniel Ali	Programmes Director	CRCo
Mohammed Assan	National Treasurer	CRCo
Darouèche Doukaine	National Accounting	CRCo
Said Hassani	Secretary General	CRCo
Mohamed Mohamed	Income Generation	CRCo
Mohamed Mahamoud	Logistics	CRCo
Said Mohedine	WatSan Coordinator	CRCo
Abdoulfatah Said	Regional Secretary General	CRCo
Moustadrane Salim	President	CRCo
Mohammed Soilihi	Head of Operations	CRCo
Daniel Ali Surmaili	Hygiene Promotion	CRCo
Ali Ben Ali Fazila	Hygiene Promotion	CRCo
Kamaria Hassane	Hygiene Promotion	CRCo
Ramoulati Ben Ali	Communications	CRCo

### **39.1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS**

- Contrôle Physique entrepot et besoin d'achat, Logistics dept, CRCo
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- Delegate Final Report, August 2012
- DREF Operation Final Report, Shipwreck, IFRC, 24 December 2011
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- ECHO Visit Report, ECHO, June 2012
- Emergency Appeal, Comoro Islands, Flash Floods, IFRC, 4 May 2012
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- Inondations d'Avril et Mai 2012 – Synthesis de l'operation pour les 10 premier jours, CRCo, May 2012
- Job Description, Operations Manager IFRC, IFRC Nairobi
- Project Financial Management Report, PKM007, 04.05.2012-31.12.2012, IFRC
- Rapport de la période du 26 Avril au 05 Mai
- Rapport financier de la période du 26 Avril au 05 Mai
- Résultats de l'enquête CAP menée sur les 3 îles des Comoros
- Résultats de l'enquête portant sur la distribution de kits non alimentaires à 1,703 familles entre Mai et Juin 2012, Mohamed Hitami Alaoui, CRCo, 2012
- Revised Emergency Appeal, IFRC, 8 January 2013
- Situation Reports 1 and 3, Office of the Resident Coordinator, 28 April 2012, 5 May 2012