

Federation-wide Livelihood Program Evaluation

Evaluation Report

Final draft

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This report is part of the Federation-wide Livelihood Program Evaluation commissioned by IFRC.

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TABLE OF ACRONYMS

Acronyms	Description
ARC	American Red Cross
BRC	British Red Cross
CRC	Canadian Red Cross
DRC	Danish Red Cross
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECSSA	Environmental Cleaning Solutions S.A.
EDM	Entrepreneurs du Monde
FRC	French Red Cross
GRC/AutRC	German Red Cross/Austrian Red Cross
HH	Household
HR	Human Resources
HRC	Haitian Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGA	Income Generating Activity
INA	Integrated Neighborhood Approach
ItRC	Italian Red Cross
KNFP	Konsej Nasyonal Finansman Popilè
LRRD	Linking Relief, Recovery and Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFI	Microfinance Institution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Netherlands Red Cross
RCRC	Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
SRC	Spanish Red Cross
TMC	Technical Movement Coordination
ToR	Terms of Reference
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
WatSan	Water and Sanitation

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Executive Summary

BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

On January 12th 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince and its surrounding areas. The earthquake was devastating. More than 220,000 people were killed, with many more left injured and homeless. Due to unplanned urban development and poor construction quality, the level of material destruction was unprecedented. The Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies responded to the emergency and some of its members have implemented livelihood interventions. This is the case of:

- American Red Cross;
- British Red Cross;
- Canadian Red Cross;
- French Red Cross;
- German/Austrian Red Cross;
- International Federation of the Red Cross;
- Italian Red Cross;
- Netherlands Red Cross;
- Spanish Red Cross.

IFRC Technical Movement Coordination commissioned this evaluation. It was envisaged as a learning exercise and an assessment of the current situation in terms of accountability. The evaluation analyzed information according to OECD/DAC criteria¹: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coverage and connectedness, accountability, sustainability and impact and complies with ALNAP² ethical guidelines and with key evaluation principles. The evaluation took place in October 2012 and had a first phase of data collection based on documentation, followed by a field visit in Haiti where interviews were carried-out as well as two field visits to project sites with focus group discussions.

KEY LEARNING

Clarity of livelihood interventions strategy

Livelihood interventions should be designed within a clear strategy proposing a well-defined journey for beneficiaries from livelihood provision, through livelihood restoration to livelihood development. During this process, activities should be tailored to take into account beneficiaries' vulnerability and to making sure that the program reinforces their resilience and does not expose them to new risks. Ambiguity in the definition and sequencing of the interventions can be harmful for the beneficiaries, and also impacts project effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

Importance of intervention timeliness

Timeliness is critical for post-disaster livelihood intervention to avoid damaging coping strategies (de-capitalization of business and/or household assets, sale of assets and acquisition of new debts to informal lenders) and a general aggravation of the household situation. This can be not only in

¹ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprograms/dacriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

² Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action

terms of financial capital but also social, human and environmental capital. Different livelihood phases need to be timed and sequenced in the right order. If the relief and recovery phases come too late, they become counter-productive and weaken long-term development interventions.

Need for flexibility and adaptation to circumstances

In an instable post-disaster environment, organizations need to be able to react with flexibility and adapt to new circumstances emerging from sudden migration flows, new economic opportunities or threats and emerging needs. Unrestricted funding is a critical success factor for this flexibility and organizations' ability to adapt. A capability and willingness to listen to other stakeholders is an important step toward understanding new circumstances.

Direct implementation of livelihood improvement programs by IFRC could be made more efficient

Within the current structures, human resources and decision-making processes, direct implementation of livelihood promotion programs by IFRC is not very efficient. The approach considerably impacts intervention timeliness and cost efficiency. Direct implementation should be limited to livelihood provisioning and recovery activities, where IFRC's capacities and procedures for rapid deployment and large-scale interventions have a clear added value.

Necessity to identify strong partners and to establish a sustainable and balanced collaboration

IFRC needs to identify strong partners, with good knowledge of the local environment and specific technical capacities. The partnership established with these partners should be based on a balanced collaboration where each organization is measured on the same level of accountability vis-à-vis the other partner but also to the public. Intervention design and strategy should be created and elaborated in a collaborative fashion where each partner brings its expertise and added value. Capacity building of the partner organization should be considered as an integral part of the collaboration. This type of relationship is more sustainable than the simple sub-contracting approach. In the framework of disaster preparedness, IFRC and particularly national societies need to identify these potential partnerships to be ready for disasters or crisis.

Improve protection mechanisms to improve beneficiaries' resilience during relief and recovery phase

During relief and recovery phases, it is critical to put in place livelihood protection mechanisms. Instruments such as saving groups, micro-insurance schemes, assets protection strategies, etc. can improve households' recovery and therefore help make the impact of the humanitarian aid intervention sustainable. Experience shows that households have a natural tendency to engage in the aforementioned strategies³ but they are rarely aware or able to thoroughly analyze the safest options and therefore expose themselves to new risks⁴.

Need for an exit strategy

³ In all programs including cash grants, beneficiaries declared to have made savings or to have bought livestock (which in rural areas is considered as saving strategy).

⁴ For instance in the case of livestock investment, if no support is provided there is a risk that the investment is lost because of lack of capacity (for vaccination for example)

Exit strategies need to be planned for the intervention design phase and cannot be postponed until the end of the program. This strategy is not only important for sustainability issues, but is also essential in supporting beneficiaries in their livelihood development and resilience.

Necessity of a better LRRD approach and coordination with external stakeholders

Considering the limits of IFRC's scope and intervention, coordination with external stakeholders such as authorities, civil society, and development actors is critical for program relevance, sustainability, impact and efficiency. In this perspective a LRRD approach needs to be envisaged from the start of a post-disaster intervention to improve program impact.

A holistic and integrated approach is required

"Livelihoods" can no longer be considered as an independent sector working in isolation from other interventions. Stakeholder engagement has shown that vulnerable populations consider livelihood as a key priority in a post-disaster context. Therefore the issue needs to be integrated into other relief interventions such as shelter, WASH, food security, etc. The approach towards disaster response needs to take into account every dimension and ensure that all activities work towards the same theory of change, and send the same message to beneficiaries about long-term recovery and the need for community empowerment and contribution.

1 Introduction

1.1 Program Context

On January 12th 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince and its surrounding areas. The earthquake was devastating. More than 220,000 people were killed, with many more left injured and homeless. Due to chaotic urban development and poor construction quality, the level of material destruction was unprecedented. The overall economic damage was estimated at USD 2 billion including USD 771 million to micro and small companies⁵ in an overall context characterized by low private investment and structural poverty.

In this context, RCRC deployed 21 Emergency Response Units and 3 other response units⁶ and focused on food, water and basic non-food items as well as health, water and sanitation and emergency shelter solutions. The graphs presented hereafter show the evolution of funding allocation from 2010 to 2011.

Figure 1 Funding allocation up to September 2010 (in million CHF)⁷





Figure 2 Funding allocation up to September 2011 (in million CHF)⁸



From 2010, a small percentage of the funds (5%) were allocated to livelihood interventions, which took various forms⁹:

- Cash for work programs;
- Livelihood support grants, loans or other forms of financial support;
- Economic resiliency and development programs;
- Livelihood strengthening and diversification programs;
- Asset replacement programs (if not already included in the other categories);
- Payment of school fees to free resources to be used for economic recovery activities;
- Long-term livelihood programming.

⁵ Post-Earthquake survey on Private sector losses, Forum Economique du secteur Prive (FEsP) and USAID/WINNER

⁶ IFRC, *Haiti Earthquake 2010, One-year progress report*, 2010, page 8

⁷ Idem, page 33

⁸ Idem, page 35

⁹ Idem, page 46

Several RCRC members have decided to implement livelihood interventions¹⁰:

- American Red Cross;
- British Red Cross;
- Canadian Red Cross;
- French Red Cross;
- German/Austrian Red Cross;
- International Federation of the Red Cross;
- Italian Red Cross;
- Netherlands Red Cross;
- Spanish Red Cross.

The national society of the Haitian Red Cross has also included livelihood interventions in its Action Plan¹¹ but has not yet implemented livelihood projects¹².

1.2 Livelihood Definition

The different interviews and discussions that took place during the evaluation highlighted the need to have a common definition about “livelihood” terminology. According to the definition of the Sphere Standards, which is also used by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and by the International Recovery Platform:

“Livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.”¹³

Any intervention aiming at changing capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living should therefore be considered as livelihood activities. As a consequence, all project activities in this field, even if they do not aim at achieving a sustainable livelihood, are considered as livelihood intervention as they will impact beneficiaries’ means of living, and their coping strategies.

1.3 Evaluation Purpose and Objectives

The terms of reference presented by IFRC clearly state four objectives to this evaluation:

- To assess current progress on outcomes (at the level of households and communities) of livelihood interventions: which changes took place at the community or family level through livelihood program interventions. The assessment is to be made on the basis of primary data collection and on the basis of comparing baseline and current data where available.

¹⁰ However, one should not consider that none of other Partner National Societies have had livelihood interventions. The definition of livelihood remains generally quite unclear within RCRC and therefore several PNSs have probably implemented such activities without specifically labeling them that way.

¹¹ Haitian Red Cross, *Plan d’action gestion des risques et désastres 2012-2015*, December 2011

¹² HRC was the partner of other PNSs for livelihood program implementation but did not implement livelihood activities.

¹³ UNDP, UNISDR, IRP, *Guidance Note on Recovery, Livelihood*, page 1, quoting Chambers, R., & Conway, G. *Sustainable Rural Livelihood: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century*, 1991

- To assess the community needs and demands and how PNSs can best address them. To provide practical step-by-step implementation recommendations in the form of strategies as to better facilitate sustainable livelihood outcomes in Haiti for the target population.
- To assess the livelihood program intervention outcomes and potential for impact at the community level based on current design as well as implementation practices, compared with the plan of each National Red Cross chapter given their given capacity, interest and resources.
- To suggest how data collection can be modified in order to improve opportunities to assess effectiveness in the future. In particular, to look for opportunities for quasi-experimental assessment to compare the results of the different forms of livelihood intervention currently employed.

These objectives reflect two different goals: a learning exercise and an assessment of the current situation in terms of accountability. This evaluation should be analyzed on the background of recent IFRC efforts to support Partner National Societies (PNSs) in moving from cash grants and transfers to a more sustainable approach. In this transition the issue of results-based management and impact demonstration has been very important considering that the projects implemented are often small (in their outreach, geographic scope and duration) and therefore PNSs are under scrutiny from their donors to demonstrate the impact of such projects.

In this sense the evaluation intended to provide PNSs' management with clear evidences of their outcomes, results and potential impact, as well as to provide guidance for effective livelihood intervention planning taking into account their resources, capacities and interest. The evaluation also needs to suggest improvements for M&E in order to support this transition process within PNSs and with their respective donors.

In addition to what was presented in the Terms of Reference, it appears that the evaluation will also be an important tool to guide the National Society in its strategic position vis-à-vis livelihood and to help it come to informed decisions on future interventions in the arena.

2 Evaluation Methodology and Limits

2.1 Approach

The evaluation analyzed information according to OECD/DAC criteria¹⁴: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coverage and connectedness, accountability, sustainability and impact. The criteria were further complemented with key issues that had been identified during the inception phase and desk-work preparation. The issues can be summarized as follows:

- Integrated approach: how is livelihood support integrated into shelter, resettlement, food security and disaster risk management interventions and strategies?
- Regarding Haitian Red Cross and PNS capacity and partnerships with other organizations: what are the internal capacities to implement such projects, how does it influence partnerships and does it have an impact on efficiency?

¹⁴ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprograms/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

- Intervention timing and limits: what is the influence of humanitarian funding on project design, the ability to carry out needs assessments and to take a participatory approach regarding the question of ownership?
- Livelihood strategies: clarity of objectives, going beyond a project approach, and the tension between vulnerability criteria for beneficiary selection and achievements sustainability.

This evaluation complies with ALNAP¹⁵ ethical guidelines and with key evaluation principles such as:

- Triangulation of information: the evaluator compares data from different sources of information in order to ensure that the different perspectives are taken into account and that the analysis is complete;
- Confidentiality of information: the evaluator guarantees the confidentiality of key respondents (whether beneficiaries or staff members) and did not attribute comments and analysis to individuals;
- Do-no-harm: the evaluator ensures that the process does not create difficulties for the project staff and beneficiaries and tries to limit the evaluation process' impact on daily activities of the different stakeholders (*see evaluation limits section below*).

The evaluation also aims to comply with IFRC Evaluation Standards:

- Utility: Evaluations must be useful and used.
- Feasibility: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost-effective manner.
- Ethics & Legality: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
- Impartiality & Independence: Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
- Transparency: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
- Accuracy: Evaluations should be technically accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its value or merit can be determined.
- Participation: Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process where feasible and appropriate.
- Collaboration: Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

2.2 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation followed three different phases:

- Inception phase: This first phase corresponded to secondary data collection (strategy documents, project documents, existing evaluation reports, relevant livelihood reports in

¹⁵ Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action

Haiti in a post-earthquake context). This phase helped identify key evaluation questions to be addressed to inform evaluation criteria. It took place from September 25th to October 5th 2012.

- **Field study:** The field study phase was the primary data collection phase. The study included semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and a participatory assessment (rating change methodology). At the end of this phase two debriefings took place: one with the IFRC head of mission and one with the PNS Heads of Mission, Livelihood delegates and Movement Technical Coordination delegates. This phase took place from October 8th to October 18th 2012.
- **Report writing:** Based on the report structure mentioned in the ToR, the evaluator prepared a first draft of the report addressing evaluation questions and criteria and respecting quality standards. Some follow-up interviews and data collection took place during this phase in order to complement and triangulate data that had already been collected.

- **Participatory Method to Rate Changes**¹⁶

- ***Context:*** This method is mostly used with illiterate persons.
- ***Objective:*** This method helps to rate different factors according to relative importance. It could also be used to rate preference in a program.
- ***Material required:*** Cardboard, colored paper and adhesive colored dots
- ***Animation:*** 1 person to animate the discussion and 1 person to take notes
- ***How to run the exercise:***
 1. Introduction
 2. Identification of key changes
 - First of all, the animator needs to explain the objective of the exercise and re-state that answers will be anonymous and will not change the beneficiaries' status or rights to future projects.
 - On each piece of colored paper or card, a change is drawn (more money, less money, school, hospital, faith in future, etc.). These changes are explained to the group.
 - Each person is given 3 colored dots to attribute to and place on the main change they experienced in the past 15 months. They have 10 minutes to make this decision individually. They then present it to the group.
 3. Identification of key drivers of change
 - After this, a new set of colored cards is presented to the group. These represent a factor for change (Red Cross projects, other humanitarian assistance, family support, elections, better health, education, etc.)
 - Each person is given 3 colored dots to place on the main driver of change they can identify. They have 10 minutes to make this decision individually. They then present it to the group.
 4. Conclusion and thanks
 - At the end of the exercise, the animator asks the group what they have learned during this exercise, whether or not there were any surprises. Then he/she concludes by thanking the group for their contribution to the Red Cross' interventions improvement.

3 Programs Description

The diversity of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies and National Society leads to a broad spectrum of projects. Two classifications can be proposed for reference:

¹⁶ This method is adapted from the methodology used by the Microinsurance Academy in Delhi (India) to design community-based Microinsurance products. <http://www.microinsuranceacademy.org/>

1. Differentiation of the program based on whether livelihood is the main intervention or one component of a larger program
2. Categorization based on intervention phase: relief, recovery or development.

The table below summarizes the different programs shared with the evaluator¹⁷.

Table 1 Overview of RCRC Livelihood Programs

Red Cross Society	Program name	Sector of intervention	Partner	Area of implementation	Program starting date ¹⁸	Program duration ¹⁹
American Red Cross	Kore Famni Fonkoze Program	Livelihood, microfinance	Fonkoze (Fondasyon Kole Zepol)	National level	March 2010	9 months
American Red Cross/British Red Cross/Danish Red Cross ²⁰	DRC Host Family Support Program	Education, livelihood, capacity building	Haitian Red Cross ²¹	South Department	July 2010	15 months
American Red Cross	Cash Assistance for School Fees	Education, livelihood	None	IDP camps Port-Au-Prince	December 2010	12 months
American Red Cross	Integrated Neighbourhoods Approach	Community development, livelihood, health, DRR	To be identified	Carrefour Feuille	June 2012	30 months
American Red Cross	North Community Based Integrated Programme	DRR, livelihoods and food security, health and WatSan	To be identified	10 "section communales" in the north, northeast and northwest	January 2013	36 months
British Red Cross	Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration Program	Livelihood	KNFP, Zafen (Fonkoze)	Delmas 19 (Port-Au-Prince)	April 2012	20 months
British Red Cross	Conditional cash grant	Resettlement, livelihood	None	Delmas 19 (Port-Au-Prince)	February 2011	18 months
French Red Cross	Program de renforcement des moyens de subsistance alimentaire et économique des populations victimes du séisme sur leurs zones de vie	Livelihood, food security	Entrepreneur du monde, BRAC	Croix-des-Bouquets	September 2011	14 months
French Red Cross	Integrated Neighborhood Approach	Livelihood and community approach	To be identified	Delmas 9 (Port-Au-Prince)	September 2011 for phase 1 and November	15 months for phase 1 and 10 months

¹⁷ This table is based on project and programs documents shared with the evaluator who was not able to check their accuracy. Therefore it should be read with this limitation in mind.

¹⁸ Starting date corresponds to the starting date in the proposal but does not take into account potential delays in implementation that reduced the program duration.

¹⁹ For programs finalised, the duration corresponds to final duration (including extension). For project planned or under implementation it corresponds to what is intended. It should also be highlighted that in some cases (like INA program of IFRC) the program duration is unclear and depends a lot on a budget that is still to be finalized and shared with the livelihood delegate

²⁰ This program was shared by the American Red Cross, but was co-financed by the British Red Cross and the Danish Red Cross (with support from DANIDA) and implemented by the Danish Red Cross

²¹ HRC was a partner in this project but did not implement livelihood related activities in this framework

					2012 for phase 2	for phase 2
German and Austrian Red Cross	Joint Recovery Program Léogâne GRC/AutRC	Livelihood	SUCO, Swiss Red Cross	Léogâne and Gressier area	February 2012	16 months
IFRC	Integrated Neighborhood Approach	Livelihood and community approach	KNFP, Zafen, Fonkoze, Haitian Red Cross, EDM, ECSSA, Haiti Tech	Delmas 30, Carrefour Feuille, Cabaret	May 2012	24 month
ItRC	Village Haitian Solferino	Shelter (permanent), livelihood	FHRD (Haitian Foundation for Recovery and Development)		May 2012	22 months
Netherlands Red Cross	Protecting people and livelihood	DRR, livelihood	Haitian Red Cross	Bainet and Cotes de Fer (South Department)	November 2011	36 months
Spanish Red Cross	Improve livelihood and income generation of vulnerable families affected by disasters	Livelihood	Haitian Red Cross	Gaillard (South Department)	June 2011	9 months
Spanish Red Cross	Improve livelihood and income generation for communities	Livelihood, food security	Haitian Red Cross	Grand Riviere (Léogâne)	October 2012	18 months

4 Key Findings

4.1 Relevance/Appropriateness

Considering the attainment stage of these programs and the fact that for a majority of them activities had not yet been implemented at the time of the evaluation, the assessment focused particularly on relevance. OECD/DAC criteria for evaluation of development assistance defines relevance as *“the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partner and donor policies”*. In its guidelines for humanitarian action evaluation²², ALNAP describes appropriateness as *“the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly”*²³. Considering the fact that RCRC programs are a mix of humanitarian and development interventions, both definitions were used to assess them.

4.1.1 Relevance/Appropriateness of Livelihood Overall Approach

After a loss of USD 771 million to micro and small enterprises²⁴ in a country where a large percentage of the population depends on this sector, who would question the need for a livelihood

²² ALNAP, *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, an ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies*, March 2006

²³ Idem, page 20

²⁴ Post-Earthquake survey on Private sector losses, Forum Economique du secteur Prive (FESP) and USAID/WINNER

intervention? The question is all the more pertinent considering that in the aftermath to the 2010 earthquake livelihood were not considered a priority. The initial response focused on providing for basic needs (shelter, health, food, water and sanitation). Therefore no dedicated cluster was put in place by the UN coordination for livelihood issues²⁵. This dimension was added later as organizations got involved in cash transfers²⁶, and the Cash Transfer Coordination Group became the Livelihood Working Group, which until now is still only a sub-component of the Early Recovery Cluster²⁷. Funding allocation also demonstrates that the early recovery (including livelihood) has not been a priority for the humanitarian sector's intervention. According to the Mid-Year Review of the 2012 CAP²⁸, only 14% of the funds requested for Early Recovery were provided for, while the average was 37%. Some sectors such as food aid received 69% of the requested funds. This lack of focus on livelihood highlights the difficulties in applying lessons learned from prior interventions to a new context. The importance of livelihood in recovery has been highlighted by numerous evaluation reports and lessons-learning exercises such as *"Livelihood are the key to recovery: agencies should give the same priority to livelihood as does the affected population"*²⁹. However the relief and recovery interventions in Haiti did not seize the opportunity to engage in this area early on.

As livelihood was largely neglected in the humanitarian response to the earthquake, RCRC's decision to include this dimension into its response was very relevant. Initially, cash transfers and cash for work activities were considered support activities for larger programs focused on shelter or education and therefore as part of RCRC relief and recovery intervention.

However, the approach to livelihood was more focused on strengthening the impact of relief interventions rather than aiming at a significant economic recovery result. During programs implemented in the first two years after the earthquake, the main objective was to provide some livelihood support to families that were also targeted for other activities (for instance with education support). The re-establishment or improvement of their overall livelihood situation was not taken into consideration. The risk of this approach has been very well analyzed after the 2004 South Asia tsunami. *"The fundamental question in assessing the relevance of livelihood support is whether it represents an effort to build upon how people survive, or whether stylised and set-piece programming has created pseudo livelihood that will disappear when artificial, aid-financed labour markets are dismantled."*³⁰

The framework in which livelihood interventions have been envisaged is also critical to ensuring their relevance. Arguably more than other humanitarian activities, livelihood recovery programs should take into account the pre-disaster situation: economic context, opportunities and pitfalls and stakeholders. This analysis is essential in understanding to what extent activities address disaster-related losses or structural poverty.

²⁵ The first five key clusters put in place were Food, WASH, Health, Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI) and Logistics

²⁶ According to UNDP report on *Cash programming in Haiti, Lessons learnt in disbursing cash* (2011), cash transfers were initiated because the population preferred cash over food (page 20)

²⁷ The Early Recovery Cluster includes Debris Management Working Group, Host Communities Working Group, Livelihood Working Group and Logement Quartier Working Group

²⁸ UNOCHA, Mid-Year Review Haiti 2012 CAP, 2011, page 6

²⁹ ALNAP, *Responding to earthquakes 2008: Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations*, page 17

³⁰ Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, *Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response, A Synthesis of Initial Findings*, Ian Christoplos, July 2006, page 50

Interventions aimed at reducing unemployment and creating new income-generating activities and business opportunities are relevant in the Haitian context: a country suffering from acute poverty related to low education level, a lack of private investment and inadequate economic infrastructure. But such programs should not be confined to the recovery phase but in stead link recovery efforts with development, preferably in line with a national economic development strategy Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The LRRD approach targets both types of poverty: poverty directly related to the disaster's impact and chronic poverty, worsened by the disaster. A clear distinction should be made between a response to relief needs, and the response to social protection or developmental needs. However the two responses should be linked in order to have an effective intervention on resilience and risk reduction³¹.

The RCRC approach in 2010-2011 remained unclear about the objectives of livelihood activities. Some programs clearly aimed at livelihood protection. They proposed activities to protect beneficiaries who were directly affected by the earthquake or indirectly, for instance by hosting displaced family members or friends. The programs aimed to replace productive assets and to counter harmful coping strategies such as de-capitalization, unsafe labor practices, child labor, prostitution, etc. This was the case for the Danish Red Cross program for host family support (co-funded by ARC) which aimed at "mitigating economic pressure resulting from the earthquake on the hosting communities and the displaced"³², as well as the Kore Famni Fonkoze Program (co-funded by ARC) which focused on "supporting disaster relief and livelihood recovery for Fonkoze clients affected by the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti"³³. Other PNS were implementing programs of livelihood promotion, which aimed more to improve resilience and alleviate poverty. This was the case of the SRC program in the South that aimed at improving food security through the promotion of agriculture activities. In the project justification, it appears clearly that the project aimed to reduce vulnerability to disaster and food insecurity rather than directly addressing incurred losses from the earthquake. Nevertheless this project was presented as a post-earthquake response. In 2012, livelihood interventions are envisaged as part of the transition from recovery to development and are integrated as part of DRR strategies or as part of the Integrated Neighborhood Approach. However, there is a discrepancy between this longer-term approach aimed at linking recovery and development and the type of activities that are planned and/or implemented (see following section Relevance of Program Design).

4.1.2 Relevance of Program Design

4.1.2.1 Needs Assessment Process

According to the project documents, the intervention design was based on a solid participatory needs assessment. The assessment was in most cases done through focus groups discussions, interviews, visits, and through a Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (VCA)³⁴.

³¹ For further discussion on this topic, see Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, *Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response, A Synthesis of Initial Findings*, Ian Christophos, July 2006, page 62

³² American Red Cross, Evaluation of Danish Red Cross Host Family Support Program South Department, Haiti, Alexandra Galperin and Carol Ward, November 2011, page 27

³³ American Red Cross, *Impact Evaluation of the Kore Famni Fonkoze Program*, Delphine Thizy, December 2011, page 10

³⁴ IFRC, *What is VCA, An introduction to vulnerability and capacity assessment*, 2006, page 20 and 21

Figure 3 What a Vulnerability Capacity Assessment is?

VCA is an investigation that uses various participatory tools in order to understand the level of people's exposure to (and capacity to resist) natural hazards at the grassroots level.

It is an integral part (but not the only part) of disaster preparedness and can contribute to the creation of community-based disaster preparedness programs at the rural and urban grassroots level.

As part of the process, it allows people to identify and understand the risk they consider should have priority, even if these are not natural hazards.

It is a tool which enables local priorities to be identified and leads to the design of actions that contribute to disaster reduction – as well as the design and development of programs in each of the International Federation's priority areas that are mutually supportive and responsive to the needs identified by people at the grassroots level.

This methodology provided a strong knowledge about beneficiaries' perception of their needs, and therefore allowed for a need-based programming.

Nevertheless, the problem with using only this needs assessment methodology is that in the Haitian context of high concentration of humanitarian interventions, beneficiaries tend

to request programs/activities that they expect the organization to provide based on their knowledge of this organization or examples from other institutions. This leads to intervention standardization and hampers innovative approaches. More problematic is the fact that these tools do not take into consideration the "outside world" and the economic realities of the context and it is therefore left to the PNS to integrate or not this dimension (which was done by some of them who had more experience and expertise but not by all as it was not part of the system). In the field of livelihood, what one can consider as a need (e.g. vocational training for certification of existing skills) might not match the market needs or address the obstacle hindering access to sustainable livelihood.

It is interesting to see that only few PNSs have done an in-depth analysis of the economic context of where the intervention is set to take place in order to tailor their programs not only to the perceived needs of beneficiaries but also to local market needs. FRC, SRC and ARC carried-out such assessment, which can be attributed to prior experience of their livelihood delegates and their awareness about such need. FRC has commissioned two analyses for its program in Croix-des-Bouquets in order to better understand the opportunities and challenges of the construction sector and transportation sector³⁵. These reports were based on a value-chain approach developed by Entrepreneurs du Monde (EDM). In addition FRC has conducted an in-depth livelihoods assessment in Delmas 9 in order to strategically plan livelihoods activities for the INA project³⁶. This has contributed to avoiding the usual pitfalls of programs involving the construction sector, which often only target the vocational training aspect without looking at issues like quality certification or access to market and marketing strategies. Similarly ARC has conducted a market analysis of the area where the INA program is taking place³⁷, identifying key sectors of activity and their respective obstacles, which will inform ARC's livelihood program strategy. Furthermore, ARC used a participatory assessment approach by which the population of Campeche was engaged in the design of solutions for the problems identified³⁸. SRC has also been able to do a thorough

³⁵ French Red Cross, *Diagnostic Stratégique Des Filières Entrepreneuriales A Fort Potentiel De Creation d'Emploi « Construction »*, EDM, April 2012 and *Diagnostic Stratégique Des Filières Entrepreneuriales A Fort Potentiel De Creation d'Emploi « Transport »*, EDM, May 2012

³⁶ Such livelihoods assessment included: (i) socio-economic profiling of households in the area, (ii) economic mapping/market assessment, (iii) sector analysis (sectors with high growth/development potential).

³⁷ American Red Cross, *Market Analysis of Carrefour Feuilles*, Finbarr Sweeney and William Michel, June 2012

³⁸ In ARC process, the responses to the assessment were validated by working groups of the Campeche population and they were encouraged to provide solutions to the problems they were facing.

community diagnostic as well as a review of economic activities with high potential as it decided to allocate sufficient time prior to the design of its intervention³⁹.

Apart from these three PNSs, others have not been able or willing to dedicate more time and resources for an in-depth analysis of the economic context. After few months working with communities on production unit, ItRC realized that the data collected by its partners in the community where insufficient and that the program was lacking on solid information about potential market. As a result it is now launching a market assessment to understand how the productive capacity created by the project can be used. In addition, insufficient coordination with other stakeholders (public or private sector) has not allowed RCRC members to build on needs assessments done by others. RCRC has not clearly linked its recovery interventions with longer-term development programs, and did not take into consideration the national plans and strategies such as the Haiti Economic Recovery and Roadmap⁴⁰. The overall approach of RCRC members remains relatively isolated from the rest of the economic sector, with very limited links with the private sector. The only evidence of partnership with private sector is the partnership between FRC and ECSSAS for recycling project. The working relation between IFRC and a recycling company can not be formalized through a partnership contract due to the complexities of the Movement bureaucracy.

4.1.2.2 Activities Relevance

To assess activities relevance, one should analyze whether they are relevant for beneficiaries but also if they are adequate in order to achieve expected results and fulfill program objectives. The relevance of livelihood activities depends on several criteria:


- Targeted population vulnerability, capacities and skills;
- Livelihood cycle at micro (individual), meso (community) and macro (regional, national) levels;
- Framework of intervention (experience, timing, capacity of the implementing agency).

Activities during the recovery phase should contribute to protecting existing livelihood, restore what was lost due to the disaster and strengthen the beneficiaries' ability to restart their former activity. Longer-term activities (training, changes in business, micro-credit) are not adapted for this period when beneficiaries are still vulnerable and are still trying to recover from the disaster (for instance trying to reimburse debt contracted during the immediate disaster aftermath). The figure below shows the livelihood cycle and what activities are usually implemented during each phase.

³⁹ Once the community assessment/diagnostic had been completed, 3,5 months were allocated for further research and analysis and project design, before launching the project.

⁴⁰ Presidential Commission on Competitiveness — Groupe de Travail Sur La Compétitivité, *Haiti Economic Recovery & Roadmap*, August 2010

Figure 4 LRRD and Livelihood Cycle



In some cases programs have mixed livelihood promotion activities (mostly vocational training and business training) with livelihood protection programs (cash grants). The logic behind this was to help beneficiaries to “make good use” of their cash grants and to encourage them to invest in sustainable activities, for instance in case of cash grants distributed in the framework of relocation programs (and thus not directly considered as livelihood interventions).

The first issue is that the time required for development-type activities is much longer than that of a recovery phase. During the latter therefore the support provided is inadequate vis-à-vis the needs and can therefore not reach its objective. The second problem is that such vocational and business training encourages risk-taking behavior such as investing in new, possibly unproven activities during a phase where the individual needs to restore his or her human, financial and social capital. Finally because such trainings are not based on an in-depth analysis of the economic context, there is a risk that it encourages community members to go into already saturated sectors such as informal trade⁴¹.

Similarly, for some livelihood promotion programs designed by RCRC members, some activities are not coherent with the overall approach. The interventions are usually designed to move away from dependency and “hand-out approach”, encouraging in stead sustainable livelihood and capacity and resilience building of beneficiaries. However in several programs these interventions include recovery-type activities such as cash grants or asset provision. Distinct livelihood phases should be sequenced, coordinated and linked, following the LRRD approach. Mixing different interventions such as providing in-kind donations while at the same time promoting sustainable livelihood through access to finance can be counterproductive as it sends mixed signals to the community about the prolongation of the recovery phase during which beneficiaries receive assistance. To reduce this risk, organizations need to build long-term relationships with communities to be able to raise their awareness and understanding about differences between activities taking place during

⁴¹ See Section Impact

the recovery phase and those of the development phase. This requires more time and flexibility to be able to take sufficient steps to ensure good understanding from beneficiaries⁴².

Generally, RCRC livelihood delegates have a development approach to livelihood, considering that in their intervention area, the recovery phase is over and therefore they start designing livelihood promotion programs. Meanwhile their headquarters and donors are mostly focused on humanitarian assistance still using earthquake recovery funds and therefore have other expectations in terms of expected results, vulnerability criteria and type of activities to implement. This fundamental conflict is at the source of several inconsistencies observed during this evaluation and questions the RCRC's overall involvement in livelihood promotion (see section Institutional Relevance/ Appropriateness)

4.1.3 Beneficiaries' Perception of Program Relevance/ Appropriateness

Employment and income-generating activities have been ranked as top priorities in several Vulnerability Capacity Assessments carried-out by RCRC as early as the summer of 2010⁴³. This shows that even during the relief and recovery phase, the earthquake-affected population was already well on the way to recover their livelihood and the means to support themselves and their family without depending on aid. Those who lost their businesses during the earthquake requested assistance to re-establish their activities but the request for livelihood support and employment opportunities extended beyond those whose livelihood were directly impacted. Considering the scale of the humanitarian assistance after the earthquake and the lack of public investment during the years and decades before the disaster, many understandably seized on the relief and recovery interventions to ask for support. RCRC members that did not incorporate the loss-of-livelihood as selection criteria for their interventions, even during the recovery phase, unwittingly provided for these unaffected groups as well. (see section Coverage of Affected Population)

The perception among beneficiaries regarding relevance is largely positive⁴⁴. This confirms that the interventions were designed based on communities' inputs provided during the VCA and the focus groups or in the case of SRC an extended period of community diagnostic as well as 5 Focus Groups and more than 80 interviews in June 2012. However this perception of relevance varies between livelihood protection and livelihood promotion programs. Activities such as training and capacity building are considered relevant. This perception however decreases when the activities are not accompanied by concrete financial or in-kind support. The GRC/AutRC project in Léogâne for youth entrepreneurship development illustrates this issue. For beneficiaries of this project, who had already done a first cycle of training on the subject, the project's inability to provide seed capital for business startups is considered an obstacle to the achievement of the objective. This in turns affects their perception of the training. Trainees estimate that without capital they will not be able to use their new skills.

There are two conclusions to be drawn from the issue. Both conclusions are relevant and not mutually exclusive. First of all, one could consider that the described beneficiary mentality is the consequence of more than two and half years of relief and recovery interventions which have

⁴² ARC took the first step to achieve this good understanding by carrying out its Participatory Assessment and engaging with communities in a consistent and continuous manner.

⁴³ IFRC Secretariat implemented a VCA in 2010 and it showed the importance given to employment and income generating activities

⁴⁴ According to the evaluation reports of programs already implemented and according to the focus groups and interviews carried-out during the field visits.

created a dependency among the populace and a tendency to request more support and handouts from aid organizations. Conversely this could be a sign that the project activities are not relevant or do not address the real issue and obstacles that are hindering young people's access to income generating activities or employment. Given the restricted access to finance in Haiti and the quasi inexistence of microfinance products for start-ups, complaints from these beneficiaries is relevant and could highlight a weakness in the program.

4.1.4 Institutional Relevance/ Appropriateness

As demonstrated above, there is little doubt on the relevance of livelihood interventions in Haiti, considering that, since the earthquake, this is an area that is largely neglected by humanitarian stakeholders. Nonetheless, the question of whether or not RCRC should be involved in such programs remains. In the following sections we will evaluate the efficiency of RCRC's involvement in livelihood. Before engaging in this exercise it is important to understand whether such interventions are relevant and whether they are aligned with RCRC's strategy, mission and vision.

4.1.4.1 Alignment with Strategy 2020

The Strategy 2020⁴⁵ document marks an important change for IFRC as livelihood are now included as a central objective. In the Strategy 2010⁴⁶ document the word livelihood never appeared in the document. The "Strategic Aim One" of Strategy 2020 is to "Save lives, protect livelihood, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises"⁴⁷. Livelihood intervention is described as part of disaster response together with other protection-type interventions: "Our recovery assistance aims to prevent further damage and loss, repair essential services, protect health, provide psychosocial support, restore livelihood, and enhance food security"⁴⁸. In this perspective, RCRC's programs of livelihood protection supporting the reestablishment of existing livelihood by providing grants, in-kind donations of assets and other recovery activities, in addition to targeting those who lost their livelihood, in part of entirely, are relevant and directly aligned with the strategy.

The question therefore boils down to understanding whether or not livelihood promotion is part of Strategy 2020. During the evaluation, the justification of livelihood promotion activities was clearly different depending on the interlocutor. Livelihood delegates of RCRC hold different views from other RCRC delegates. For livelihood delegates, livelihood promotion activities are a logical second step for the organization's intervention and are necessary to improve the sustainability of livelihood programs.

For delegates working on other sectors interviewed during the evaluation, livelihood promotion activities are a tool for disaster risk reduction: by alleviating poverty, the Movement aims to reduce vulnerability to disasters. According to these other delegates, livelihood promotion is directly aligned with the organization's Strategic Aim Two: "Enable healthy and safe living", which includes DRR. However, carefully reading the narrative of this second strategic aim, this alignment does not appear so clearly. They seem more focused on preventing disaster and reducing disaster impact through the promotion of "a culture of safety", a reflection on the impact of human activities on climate change and disaster prevalence. Livelihood is only mentioned explicitly as a way to improve nutrition and food security. Thus, the relevance of promotion activities within the framework of

⁴⁵ IFRC, *Strategy 2020 Saving lives, changing minds*, 2010

⁴⁶ IFRC, *Strategy 2010, To improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity*, 1999

⁴⁷ IFRC, *Strategy 2020 Saving lives, changing minds*, 2010, page 13

⁴⁸ IFRC, *Strategy 2020 Saving lives, changing minds*, 2010, page 13

Strategy 2020 is questionable. Such interventions can of course be part of a strategy to build resilience to disaster. In this case however activities should be better tailored to take into account prevention and protection against calamities, and not only aim at income improvement. Agricultural projects are more aligned with this DRR objective as they aim to change agricultural practices to decrease environmental impact and therefore prevent disasters. Some programs like the NRC program (still in the planning stage) are also targeting better nutrition and food security. The program clearly identified vulnerabilities for agriculture and is planning to work on seed and tool banks as well as household silos. Other programs like the FRC food security program in Croix-des-Bouquets aimed at increasing agricultural production.

The issue of livelihood promotion programs and their alignment with Strategy 2020 is underlined by the importance of the choice of achievement indicators, often focused on increase in income. When resilience objectives are integrated (like for BRC and IFRC), these results are often a minor component of the project both in terms of time and resources dedicated to their achievement, which demonstrates that the resilience approach is not per se at the heart of these livelihood promotion projects.

4.1.4.2 Alignment with RCRC Vision and Principles

Beyond the question of the alignment of livelihood programs within the new IFRC strategy, the relevance of these interventions for the Movement should also be evaluated against its vision and principles. IFRC's vision is: *"To inspire, encourage, facilitate and promote at all times all forms of humanitarian activities by National Societies, with a view to preventing and alleviating human suffering, and thereby contributing to the maintenance and promotion of human dignity and peace in the world"*⁴⁹. It clearly identifies IFRC as a humanitarian actor as opposed to a development actor and reinforces the conclusion that livelihood promotion activities – clearly part of development phase – are not directly part of IFRC's mission.

While this analysis could be questioned – with a wider interpretation of the prevention and alleviation of human suffering – another critical issue needs to be addressed in order to draw conclusions on the relevance of IFRC's work on livelihood programs: the criterion of vulnerability. IFRC defines vulnerability as: *"the resources available to individuals, households and communities to cope with a threat or to resist the impact of a hazard. Such resources can be physical or material, but they can also be found in the way a community is organized or in the skills or attributes of individuals and/or organizations in the community"*⁵⁰. While this criterion is not clearly mentioned as a fundamental principle or value, it is underlined in all RCRC's interventions, for instance as a key selection criteria for targeting beneficiaries. When RCRC members implement livelihood protection programs, vulnerability is one of the section criteria: those who have been affected by the disaster and are thus vulnerable to future threats because of their current conditions. When implementing livelihood promotion programs, vulnerability is not the key selection criterion. Livelihood promotion involves a certain level of capacity and the ability (material and psychological) for the beneficiary to be dedicated to this activity. Most of the vulnerable populations rarely have the time and resources to invest in livelihood promotion activities. Their aversion to risk – a consequence of

⁴⁹ IFRC, *Constitution*, revised version 2007, Article 4, page 2

⁵⁰ <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster/what-is-vulnerability/>

their vulnerability and the struggle to hang on to what they still have – is hindering and delaying behavior changes that are necessary for livelihood promotion⁵¹.

As Figure 5 Livelihood Intervention and Wealth Pyramid shows, livelihood interventions are a trade-off between vulnerability and efficiency. The most efficient livelihood activities (low investment and high leverage) are those targeting the top of the pyramid. When targeting the most vulnerable population, an organization needs to dedicate more resources while at the same time disposing of less leverage. This dilemma often leads to inadequacies between the programs and their expected results in terms of vulnerability reduction. As highlighted in 4.1.2.2 Activities Relevance, expectations from headquarters or donors lead to changes in the selection criteria in order to increase the focus on vulnerable populations, and the reach (number of beneficiaries) of livelihood promotion projects. The above reflects that RCRC has not yet approved the consequences of working on livelihood promotion – and more generally during the development phase. The involvement in this new area of work requires an in-depth understanding and acceptance of the differences between livelihood recovery and livelihood promotion to avoid mixing both approaches and jeopardizing their success.

Figure 5 Livelihood Intervention and Wealth Pyramid



4.2 Effectiveness

The effectiveness criterion “measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness”⁵². Considering that in the majority of cases, the activities were still under implementation or that implementation had not yet started, the evaluation considers the activities have the capacity to achieve their objectives, and analyses the obstacles that might hinder these achievements.

⁵¹ An example of this risk aversion is the lack of trust of vulnerable populations for outside institutions to keep their savings. Instead they use traditional strategies (saving in livestock, or in cash in the house). In this case a positive behavior changes could be the use of MUSO groups for saving

⁵² ALNAP, *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, an ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies*, March 2006, page 21

4.2.1 Achievement of Objectives

4.2.1.1 Quantifiable Indicators of Achievements

The first step in assessing achievements is to identify the quantifiable indicators that were originally selected and to measure to which extent the targeted achievement level has been reached. In the case of RCRC programs, this assessment is difficult because of the nature of those indicators. The first issue is the lack of clarity of the selected indicators and the difficulty in quantifying them. For instance several projects (German Red Cross in Léogâne, French Red Cross in Croix-Des-Bouquets) are using an increase in agriculture yield as a measurement for program outcome, but without having the means to assess this progress (absence of a baseline, absence of control mechanisms to measure agriculture yield). As a result, achievements are mostly evaluated based on beneficiaries' perception, which can often leads to an opportunistic bias (and expectations for additional support).

Moreover, RCRC members have difficulties setting up quantifiable achievement targets, which leads to two different scenarios: the absence of quantifiable targets or unrealistic targets. In the first case (BRC, GRC/AutRC) the target is only expressed in general terms such as “decrease”, “increase”, or “% of population” without mentioning a specific quantifiable objective. The rationale behind this vagueness is the difficulty in evaluating what can be achieved in the given timeframe and therefore it is less risky not to commit to any quantifiable target. The challenge of this approach is that without quantifiable objectives, it is impossible to evaluate whether the program is on track or whether the program is successful given that all results are relative. Similarly, some RCRC members (like IFRC Secretariat) established only output indicators but no achievement indicators, which leads to the same result of not having appropriate targets to assess the program against. In the case of ItRC, there are no indicators for the livelihood component as it is considered as a minor part of the “Village Haitian Solferino” program. In this case, there is no way to understand whether the activities are successful or not and the accountability principle can not be implemented.

In the second case (FRC, SRC), achievement indicators are identified and quantified, but they are too ambitious considering the scope of the program. For instance with its fourteen-month project for food security in Croix-Des-Bouquets, FRC aimed to increase by 10% agriculture productivity for 15,820 people. To achieve this, three factors were assumed to lead to an increase in yields: access to irrigation (rehabilitation of canals), access to improved seeds, improved agricultural technique. However considering the timing of the project and the fact that improved access to irrigation was only going to be achieved toward the end of the project, the target of 15,820 people improving their production by 10% seem out of proportion compared to the inputs provided.

4.2.1.2 Adequacy of Program Design with Objectives

While indicators of achievements are often unclear or too ambitious, RCRC program effectiveness is also negatively affected by their design and the inadequacy of project activities, timing and capacities compared to the ambitious expectations. To take the same example of the FRC project in Croix-Des-Bouquets (see above section 4.2.1.1 Quantifiable Indicators of Achievements), the root cause for the low productivity was not analyzed in depth and therefore activities were not fully aligned with the needs. According to the discussions held with the beneficiaries, the two main obstacles for better productivity were the absence of irrigation and workforce availability (i.e. availability of funds to pay them) to prepare the land before planting. While the project addressed the irrigation issue, it did not include activities on workforce availability or funding and its focus on seeds

distribution and training on agricultural technique turned out to be insufficient to achieve the desired results.

The inadequacy of program duration relative to the expected objectives is an even more acute issue of RCRC programs. Even during the design phase, most programs were planned to have an average duration of 18 to 24 months. This duration was further reduced due to implementation delays and in some cases, like the GRC/AutRC program in Léogâne, the timeframe was contracted to less than eight months. The reasons for such short program durations are diverse but the main ones are: donor funding timeframe and PNSs' plan to downsize or exit earthquake response programs. The question of donor funding duration is directly related to the lack of alignment between the livelihood promotion timeframe and the duration of humanitarian response funding. While this discrepancy is clearly recognized by RCRC livelihood delegates, the absence of a clear position on the part of RCRC members on this issue leads to ineffective project design that count on behavioral changes to improve livelihood (e.g. changes in agricultural technique, changes in business management practice, etc.). These behavioral changes cannot be expected to take place within the program timeframe. One could even argue that some activities are counter-productive, as the target population does not get sufficient support and follow-up to sustain changes and might therefore conclude that those behavioral changes are not necessary.

Furthermore, RCRC program effectiveness is affected by shortages in internal capacities for livelihood programs and by a relative lack of awareness within the RCRC movement and PNSs about livelihood programming. Current livelihood delegates in RCRC bring together an interesting array of experts of the sector (some delegates have microfinance expertise, others a community-based livelihood approach, and some business development experience), but they remain isolated in their organization and do not have any counterpart or support within their organization or at headquarters level. The only source of support is the IFRC Livelihood Resource Centre⁵³ that was established in November 2010 through an agreement signed by SRC and IFRC, with the aim of “increasing awareness and use of effective livelihood programming strategies to enhance community capacity and individuals’ skills and practices”. Its mission is ambitious as it aims to be a “community-based experts network oriented towards providing expertise, consolidating policy and strategic approaches, creating and sharing knowledge, capacity strengthening and technical assistance regarding livelihood programming”. However, it remains under-resourced considering its mission challenges and has yet to become a point of reference for RCRC livelihood delegates operating in Haiti. Without stronger support from headquarters or in their respective missions, delegates can only seek support to the Technical Movement Coordination livelihood delegate, as well as through IFRC Livelihood Committee meetings, which are organized on a monthly basis by TMC, as well as with specific activities for capacity building (such as the Workshop on Sustainable Livelihood organized in March 2012). They also benefit from informal relations with other INGOs with whom they can exchange and share experience, but the level of good practices exchange and lessons learning exercise remain very limited. The lack of awareness within RCRC on livelihood strategies and programming can have a negative impact on effectiveness, for instance by providing a program framework (target group, budget, timeframe, type of donors, expected indicators of results) that might be inadequate for such interventions. For most livelihood delegates, this lack of

⁵³ www.livelihoodcenter.org

capacity and awareness at management level and in headquarters has been a significant obstacle to program effectiveness, and has notably impacted their timeliness.

4.2.2 Programs Timeliness

Several project evaluations point to the fact that programs timeliness is a key factor for effectiveness. For instance two evaluations of ARC-funded programs⁵⁴ supporting host families and communities showed that any program targeting those populations needed to take place within the first 2-3 months to compensate for negative coping strategies (such as de-capitalization). The evaluation of the ARC-funded program “Kore Famni Fonkoze” implemented by the microfinance organization Fonkoze highlighted the difference of impact between the activities that reached the affected populations within 2-3 months and those for host families that took place a few months later. In the case of delayed intervention, negative coping strategies were already in place and the longer-term impact on business recovery and livelihood was more significant.

Overall, most delegates recognize that their interventions have been affected by delays. Those delays have had different origins:

- Limited capacity. RCRC experience on livelihood was limited to some cash based programs – for instance with the Tsunami Response Program implemented by ARC. But most of RCRC members had not an extensive experience of livelihood promotion interventions prior to their involvement in Haiti. As a result, the network of competences, methodologies, knowledge of the Haitian context were limited. Furthermore, livelihood delegates’ positions remained difficult to fill and remained vacant for several months. In addition, contract durations are not appropriate for livelihood interventions as delegates are usually in place for 8 to 12 months. Therefore there is a relatively high turnover (not specific to livelihood positions but more to post-disaster interventions), which affects programming and creates further delays. The ItRC delegate recognizes the tension between wanting to propose changes to the program of its partner (knowing that she is only there for 12 months) and at the same time feeling that it is difficult to do so after only 2 months in the position.
- Other program prioritization. For several RCRC members, the focus was on shelter, and livelihood programs were often considered as less of a priority for the response. In the IFRC Secretariat, some voices were raised as early as 2010 to call for more livelihood interventions, arguing that this would support shelter response and help address issues in camps. But in the absence of a shared awareness and vision on livelihood programming, the implementation of activities was continuously postponed. As a result, several national Societies are now trying to complete their livelihood activities in a short timeframe before closing their post-earthquake response mission. This is for instance the case with GRC/AutRC and BRC whose delegates are struggling to maintain good quality of outputs and a coherent approach despite the time and resources available.
- Structures inadequacy for human resources management and decision-making processes (see below Section 4.3.1 Structures Adequacy)

⁵⁴ Refer to American Red Cross, Evaluation of Danish Red Cross Host Family Support Program South Department, Haiti, Alexandra Galperin and Carol Ward, November 2011, page 27 American Red Cross, *Impact Evaluation of the Kore Famni Fonkoze Program*, Delphine Thizy, December 2011

4.3 Efficiency

The efficiency criterion: “measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.”⁵⁵ Considering the diversity of RCRC members considered in this assessment, the efficiency analysis is based on implementation models and evaluation of program structures, rather than an audit-like in-depth review of budget lines and cost structures.

4.3.1 Structures Adequacy

4.3.1.1 Human Resources

As highlighted in Section 4.2.2 Programs Timeliness, some decision-making processes in RCRC are not well adapted for livelihood promotion projects. First of all, the human resources structure is not aligned with the specific needs for such interventions. Contract durations are too short (see above Section 4.2.2 Programs Timeliness) and not coherent with longer project cycles. Delegates have similar rotations as their peers from the humanitarian response, which hinders project implementation by creating gaps in timing. In addition to its impact on program effectiveness and timeliness, this human resources structure also negatively impacts program efficiency by increasing management costs. Compared to similar functions in NGOs specialized in livelihood promotion, RCRC’s costs for retaining livelihood delegates are higher.

Furthermore, delegates do not always have the experience and backgrounds suited for dealing with urban livelihood issues – which is a general issue in livelihood interventions in Haiti. While they have a good and sufficient generalist background in livelihoods, they tend to lack specialized technical knowledge. In the absence of technical expertise at the headquarters level (see above Section 4.2.1.2 Adequacy of Program Design with Objectives) increased dependency from partners who do have those skills impacts the delegates’ ability to guide and monitor the partners. This is essential for instance in order to understand strategic decisions proposed by partners or to assess the proposed training material.

In line with the Movement’s statutes, RCRC members need to work through the national Society: the Haitian Red Cross. This has an influence among other things on the administrative aspect of programs and the human resources management in particular, as local contracts need to be signed by HRC. In the case of SRC in Léogâne, the partnership with HRC is complicated by the fact that there is no longer a branch in the city and as a consequence HRC’s participation in conflict prevention and mitigation, community mobilization and knowledge management in the area is reduced. Furthermore, HRC’s limited resources for its HR department affects the recruitment process of the new livelihood program as it creates delays. Nevertheless, this partnership is considered essential for community mobilization as well as to manage conflicts and risks.

4.3.1.2 Decision Making Process

The decision making process is tailored to be efficient in emergency situations where one has to provide a response in a short timeframe, using mostly one’s own resources and the National Society. But the earthquake response structure put in place by RCRC is not adapted for long-term

⁵⁵ ALNAP, *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, an ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies*, March 2006, page 21

programs requiring different technical partnerships with local organizations and potentially private sector.

Decision making processes have affected intervention timeliness but also their efficiency. The relatively low level of capacity on livelihood issues within RCRC members' senior management led to a degree of risk-aversion in the movement towards livelihood projects. Senior management feared potential liabilities, and a risk to the organization's reputation. The consequence was that project proposals and partnership contracts needed to go through a long revision process. For instance, it took more than 6 months for the IFRC Secretariat to get approval to sign a partnership contract, because it had to be reviewed at the Panama regional office as well as in headquarters in Geneva. These delays also highlighted the inadequacy of RCRC systems (and specifically of the IFRC Secretariat) to implement more development-type projects.

After the post-earthquake relief phase many Societies are hampered by an inadequate cost structure and organizational architecture that are not well adapted to their current operations, slowing the transition toward rehabilitation and development. For instance, the evaluation of the SRC project in Gaillard (Jacmel area) shows that 50% of the budget went to human resources and running costs⁵⁶ (respectively 35% and 15%), while not covering training activities (2,8%) nor volunteers compensation (6,4%). While that evaluation report labeled the budget ratio directly allocated for beneficiaries support as "interesting", it is still fairly high compared to other livelihood projects implemented by other international organizations. Several Societies have a plan to reduce their costs by reducing the size of their staff and operations, but this will take time to impact program efficiency.

As a result, direct implementation by RCRC, even using volunteers, cannot be considered the most efficient option. For this reason and also because of their awareness about their lack of specialized technical capacities, and the limits of their programs' sustainability, a majority of RCRC members have started implementing livelihood programs with local partners.

4.3.2 Partnership Model⁵⁷

To address the limits mentioned in the above Section 4.3.1.2 Decision Making Process, RCRC members have (in the case of GRC/AutRC, FRC, ARC, SRC, IFRC and BRC) established or are currently establishing (in the case of IFRC) partnerships with local or international organizations specialized in Business Development Services or vocational trainings (for instance with KNFP, Haiti Tech), microfinance (with Fonkoze and Entrepreneurs du Monde), agriculture extension services (BRAC and SUCO), construction-technical services (Swiss Red Cross, Centre Compétence Reconstruction), or DRR (CRS for ravine rehabilitation).

4.3.2.1 Partnership Efficiency

Implementation through partnerships with specialized organizations (mostly locals except BRAC and Entrepreneurs du Monde) is at first glance more efficient than direct implementation by RCRC. The first reason is purely financial: human resources and costs structures of those partners are lower than those of RCRC members'. But the main efficiency gain comes from "economies of scale" and the fact that those partners have developed similar projects in the past and are implementing

⁵⁶ Spanish Red Cross, *Evaluation Finale du Projet Amélioration de la principale activité génératrice de revenus de mille familles dans les communautés les plus vulnérables de Gaillard, touchées par des différentes catastrophes*, Cécile Bérut, May 2012, page 30

⁵⁷ The partnership model section does not cover partnerships with the Haitian Red Cross, which will be covered in Section 4.4.2 Coordination and Section 4.6.3 Relationship with Haitian Red Cross

similar activities in parallel. When creating a BDS framework for instance, KNFP is not doing it specifically for RCRC's beneficiaries but for a larger public. This has an impact on cost per beneficiary but the "value for money" indicator is also higher as the organization can integrate learning from previous projects and experience to improve results with beneficiaries. Working with local partners is an important factor for efficiency as well. First of all local partners' running costs and human resources costs are lower but also because they have a better understanding of the Haitian context and more specifically of the pre-earthquake Haitian context and its obstacles to sustainable livelihood development.

Considering RCRC's requirements and PNSs' tight schedule for implementation, partnerships tend to be signed with a small group of organizations. For instance KNFP has an existing partnership or is about to sign a contract with 3 RCRC members (IFRC, BRC, FRC). This has been considered an important potential for increased efficiency by the Movement, which has started to develop common reporting requirements (template and frequency) to avoid duplication of work. This is a very positive sign of combined efforts for better program efficiency. However it should not preclude the potential risks of focusing on a limited number of partners (see below Section 4.5.2.2 Impacts on Livelihood Development Programs and Haitian Civil Society).

4.3.2.2 Partnership or Sub-Contracting

Partnership is a core value of IFRC: "As members of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and, guided by its statutes, we cooperate with governments, and with other organizations in line with the Fundamental Principles, without compromising our emblems and the independence, impartiality and neutrality that they represent"⁵⁸. However, while partnerships between National Societies and other RCRC members is well codified by IFRC, external alliances are not as well organized although *Strategy 2020* calls for "greater openness and flexibility in partnerships and collaboration with others outside the Movement".

Looking at existing alliances and their modalities, one can legitimately ask whether they are partnerships or cases of sub-contracting. Organizations that are partners share the same objectives and divide project implementation work, management and budgets in a complementary fashion according to their respective resources, strengths and weaknesses. With sub-contracting, one organization designs a project, and decides to sub-contract one or several, often predefined, activities for another organization to implement according to specifications given by the lead organization.

In a majority of cases, the relation between RCRC and its "partners" corresponds more to the sub-contracting model, whereby the "partner" is not part of program design and is contracted according to strict terms defining expected outputs, results and budgets provided accordingly. Reporting requirements are the evidence of this unbalanced relationship where accountability is only in one way. "Partners" are asked to report to their RCRC counterpart to show achievements and how funds were used. There is no evidence that any RCRC members report back to its "partners" on how they have been implementing their component. This sub-contracting relationship is also visible in budget allocations where only direct implementation costs are allocated to the "partner" with no or limited sharing of the project management budget to enable the organization to be more active in the partnership. This unbalanced relationship has been

⁵⁸ IFRC, *Strategy 2020*, page 5

heavily criticized by other local development organizations that lament the lack of empowerment and real partnerships in post-earthquake response programs (see below Section 4.5.2.2 Relationship with Haitian Red Cross). Only ARC recognizes openly that it is implementing its INA program subcontracting activities to other organizations (as it did in other programs in Haiti). ARC mentioned its willingness to share information about the process with its “subcontractors”, however if we look at the past experience during the Kore Famni Fonkoze program, it remains limited. The case of ItRC is also interesting to mention as the organization plays the role of donor for its partner, whereby it was not involved in the design of the activities and was only engaged by the partner for funds. The result is that ItRC has limited control on project implementation.

Accordingly, the question of RCRC’s added value for those projects needs to be raised. In projects where, either for capacity reasons, or because of tight timeframes, RCRC members decide to “sub-contract” a large part of the implementation to a “partner” organization, RCRC role is often to design project guidelines, intervention methodology as well as achievement indicators and then to review monitoring and evaluation reports. In those cases, RCRC could be seen as a donor, setting program objectives, targets, and subsequently monitoring achievements through reporting. When, provocatively, the question of RCRC’s added value is asked, most livelihood delegates mention the community approach of the movement and its strong volunteer base as well as the ability of the RCRC to work in those vulnerable areas where said development partners are not used to working. (for further development on this issue see below Section Coverage of Affected Population). Wielding the argument of RCRC’s community approach and volunteer base directly questions the partnerships between PNSs and the IFRC Secretariat on the one hand and the Haitian Red Cross on the other. (see below Section 4.6.3 Relationship with Haitian Red Cross). PNSs and the IFRC Secretariat’s ability to attract, train and retain volunteers is closely related to HRC’s visibility and its volunteer framework. Similarly the community approach based on local branches and their solid anchoring in the local context are dependent on HRC’s presence and role. They can therefore only be put to HRC’s credit and not seen as an added value of PNS and IFRC Secretariat in their own “partnership” with other organizations. The “partners”’ opinion on RCRC’s added value to the relationship varies according to the RCRC members they have dealt with, and depending on the type of project that was implemented. But one common added value “partners” agreed upon is the Movement’ ability to attract funds and their relative openness to innovation.

4.4 Coverage/Coordination

The criterion of coverage responds to “The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are”⁵⁹. The criterion is specific to humanitarian aid and does not usually apply to development aid. However it can be used to analyze the characteristics of targeted populations and to understand the criteria used to select beneficiaries. The criterion of coordination has been included even though it is not a formal DAC criterion. It is nonetheless useful to understand to which extent the programs have been looking at potential leverage or efficiency opportunities that could emerge from good coordination with other agencies or interventions.

⁵⁹ ALNAP, *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, an ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies*, March 2006, page 21

4.4.1 Coverage of Affected Population

The assessment of a program's coverage is closely related to the objectives of interventions:

- Whether the intervention targets the most vulnerable populations and maximizes the number of affected people reached;
- Whether the objective is to offer populations opportunities to leverage their efforts and investments and benefiting from a potential multiplier effect.

4.4.1.1 Challenges of Beneficiaries' Selection Process


In the aftermath of the earthquake people's frustration about the lack of rapid implementation of relief and recovery programs rendered beneficiaries selection a particular challenge. The selection criteria, whether based on overall vulnerability or based on earthquake-affected households, have led to several violent incidents. Insufficient knowledge of community dynamics and a lack of awareness regarding the issue of conflict-sensitivity are to be blamed. As presented in the project evaluation of FRC's response to the earthquake⁶⁰, the selection of beneficiaries for the cash for work program became a source of tension that led to FRC's withdrawal from the area. These challenges were also encountered by other RCRC members (for instance BRC) and reflect shortcomings of the overall humanitarian response and inadequate understanding of conflict dynamics rather than a specific weakness within the organization. The lesson has been partially learned as RCRC members have intensified community engagement and broadened participation in the selection of beneficiaries with the creation of livelihood committees. However, it remains unclear whether the selection of committee members was approached in a conflict-sensitive manner. Potential risks could emerge from the makeup of the committees or the community's perception of the role of the members. Another response to this challenge has been to increase the number of livelihood interventions at the community level to ensure community buy-in for RCRC initiatives. The latter, potentially seen as a pro-active conflict management measure, can be questionable in terms of sustainability as these activities often rely more on RCRC funding support as opposed to aiming to create a sustainable new source of income.

4.4.1.2 Challenges of Vulnerability Criteria for Sustainable Livelihood

As the Figure 6 Vulnerability Criteria and Livelihood Programming presented below shows, the level of poverty or vulnerability of households influences the type of livelihood programs that can be implemented as well as the appropriate timeframes. The most vulnerable populations need first and foremost to secure their basic needs through livelihood provisioning before being able to engage in longer-term livelihood promotion activities.

⁶⁰ French Red Cross, *Evaluation finale du Projet D'amélioration Des Conditions De Vie Des Populations Sinistrees Par Le Seisme Du 12 Janvier 2010 En Haiti*, Bernard Crenn, Arnaud Ghizzi, September 2011, page 30

Figure 6 Vulnerability Criteria and Livelihood Programming



Source: Drinkwater and Rusinow, 1999 after Frankenburger 1997

The dichotomy between population vulnerability and livelihood improvement is commonly known among humanitarian professionals. Specific interventions have been designed to cater to specific vulnerability levels. The interventions are evaluated on the different levels of 'capital' that are being addressed: human, finance, environment, etc. In the humanitarian aid sector, awareness about the tension between vulnerability and livelihood needs to be improved still. RCRC members are no exception. As stated in the Section 4.1.4.2 Alignment with RCRC Vision and Principles, the Movement's vision is still focused on the most vulnerable populations without making a distinction between disaster-affected people and other vulnerable groups. Those who were affected by a disaster should not be directly targeted for livelihood improvement interventions. RCRC ignores this tension, which creates impossible situations for livelihood delegates who are trying to implement long-term livelihood improvement activities while still showing that their target group is focused on vulnerable populations. Program effectiveness is affected, as means deployed are inadequate to uplift the targeted vulnerable population.

4.4.1.3 Challenges and Risks of RCRC Targeting

The main risk in targeting vulnerable populations for livelihood promotion programs is engaging them in a long-term process for which they are not ready, or not able to invest time, resources, capital, etc. The evaluator encountered a telling example during a field visit. The issue arose between GRC/AutRC livelihood delegates and farmer beneficiaries about financial compensation for training time. The beneficiaries, who had not yet attended the training sessions that were about to start, were arguing that it was difficult for them to dedicate time for training on new

agricultural practices. Time spent on training meant less time earning income their families relied on. Their argument could be relegated to aid dependency, which is very present in Léogâne due to the large presence of humanitarian actors in the earthquake immediate aftermath. One should however consider the possibility that those beneficiaries needed a different type of assistance: to reinforce their ability to provide daily subsistence to their household first before taking the risk to invest time and capital (in this case agricultural land) for a potential future improvement in income.

The decision to remain focused on most vulnerable populations for livelihood promotion programs creates a significant challenge for the establishment of partnerships. Because of the unbalanced relationship between RCRC and its “partners”, considered more as subcontractors (see above Section 4.3.2.2 Partnership or Sub-Contracting), the organization often accepts certain terms of references and project design, fully aware that the proposed activities are not suited to the targeted group. This is particularly the case for BDS partners implementing training and business support. Employing the usual methodologies but with a much shorter timeframe (often 50 to 75% shorter) than their usual programs does not work for vulnerable populations who require more tailored support and more time to acquire skills. The partners admit that they do not expect a high success rate for these particular beneficiaries but rarely challenge RCRC members.

- 4.4.1.4** *In other cases, for instance when the partner is an international organization and therefore less dependent on RCRC to raise funds, the tension between livelihood promotion and vulnerability criteria has been an obstacle to the establishment of partnerships. The most significant example is the long discussion between FRC and EDM for the livelihoods component of the project in Croix-Des-Bouquets. An overall discussion had taken place between the two parties agreeing on activities and overall objectives, based on which FRC submitted a proposal to DG ECHO. At the moment the partnership was set to be formalized FRC presented its indicators, including vulnerability criteria and quantitative indicators of achievements. FRC management, as well as DG ECHO, were asking to include vulnerability criteria in the beneficiary selection as well as a quantifiable objective of job creation among vulnerable groups. For EDM job creation by new entrepreneurs supported by the program might be a result of their support but not a pre-condition for support. They argued that such conditionality could put entrepreneurs at risk if there was no business case for such mandated hiring. FRC and EDM recognized that the discussions for the partnership were difficult because of the different background of the organizations. FRC maintains a short-term rehabilitation point of view and EDM acts on long-term development goals. The two visions are mutually exclusive, or at least contradictory. Despite these difficulties, FRC highlighted the positive impact of the partnership on their program and strategy as it forced them to take other criteria into consideration, and to adapt their approach to ensure sustainability and empowerment of businesses and beneficiaries. EDM’s strategy, clear vision and relative financial independency helped to enable this positive outcome, which allowed them to strongly reassert their principles and not to accept demands from FRC contrary to their strategy and beneficiaries’ long-term livelihood improvement. Nevertheless, it is important to understand how what RCRC members can have a potential*

Some potential negative impacts have been identified and should be further analyzed and monitored. While remittances – because of their scope and the limited data available – have had a clear impact on market distortion and inflation, cash grants and short-term livelihood programs could also have contributed to some extent to this phenomena. This is not unique to RCRC interventions but considering the size of the cash donations for camp residents, it is possible that

programs have such negative impacts in the neighborhood where they take place. So far there has been no in-depth analysis of the correlation between the rent inflation in Port-au-Prince and the grant provided to camp residents to move to new houses, nor for the impact of cash injections (cash grants, cash for work, etc.) on food prices. Similarly the evaluation report for the support program for host families mentioned 10% inflation from April to October 2010 without being able to attribute it either to cash grants or to seasonal fluctuation. Considering the scope of intervention from RCRC and other humanitarian aid actors, this absence of monitoring of potential macro-economic impacts is harmful as it is difficult to react and modify interventions to avoid negative outcomes.

The second risk is market saturation for *petit commerce* considering all the programs promoting this activity as a new source of livelihood. Almost all RCRC members have been supporting the establishment of *petit commerce* as a livelihood restoration strategy, without considering other income generating activities such as small industry, food transformation activities, productive activities. The reasons behind this choice – or rather absence of choice – are multiple:

- The first and main one is the offer-driven approach that most RCRC members took, asking beneficiaries what activities they would like to invest in. Considering the environment and the tendency to replicate what is known, most beneficiaries declared that they wanted support to start *petit commerce*. This was for instance the case for GRC/AutRC project with young potential entrepreneurs, where among 40 business projects 37 were related to small trade activities or services (hairdressing, internet café, etc.)
- The second reason was the lack of time to carryout a more in-depth analysis of the market to understand opportunities and limits of different income generating activities. When doing so, ARC and FRC analyzed the saturation and risk of *petit commerce* sector and elaborated strategies for either diversifying the offer according to the demand (ARC strategy for its INA program) or investing in productive area with high potential (FRC strategy in Croix-Des-Bouquets with the selection of construction and carpentry workshops).

Because of this strategy, an increasing number of people are getting involved in *petit commerce*. For instance in the framework of IFRC Secretariat relocation process, the monitoring forms are designed to encourage beneficiaries to create their own small trade business. The first form filled when the beneficiary receives the first installment of cash grant asks what kind of *petit commerce* he or she will establish without ever mentioning the possibility to establish another type of activity, such as production. Though it does not prove a direct causality between IFRC Secretariat's approach, it is remarkable to see that while only one third of beneficiaries declared having a *petit commerce* before the relocation process, 97% of them declared having on in the final monitoring form. In the absence of technical support to evaluate market potential for these activities, there is a real risk of saturation and negative impact on the market organization.

4.4.2 Coordination

The issue of coordination can be looked at from two different perspectives: coordination within RCRC between livelihood interventions and other sectors and coordination between RCRC and external stakeholders for better results, impact sustainability and efficiency.

4.4.2.1 Integrated Approach

For RCRC members, ‘livelihoods’ is rarely envisaged as a stand-alone sector but rather as “integrated” in other programs. Only the SRC program in Léogâne consider livelihoods as an independent program, where the livelihood improvement objectives are central to the intervention – even though dimensions of disaster risk reduction and food security are included. For other members, livelihoods are envisaged as follows:

- As part of the Integrated Neighborhood Approach, RCRC members have programs that aim to create new business opportunities in the area and to reinforce solidarity in the communities for improved resilience (for instance BRC activities to create MUSO⁶¹, or ARC planning to integrate livelihoods to its other interventions within the INA framework);
- ‘Livelihoods’ is “integrated” into a larger program for disaster risk management (e.g. for NRC in Jacmel area), or related to other sectors’ activities (like recycling with WASH for IFRC, or food security for FRC in Croix-des-Bouquets, WASH for FRC in Delmas 9 and the INA approach as well as FRC in the long-term camps with ECHO);
- ‘Livelihoods’ is integrated into a recovery program like for GRC/AutRC, that integrated livelihood into a larger program on WASH, DRR and Shelter as a transition after the relief phase. Similarly ItRC has integrated its livelihood component to a shelter program for permanent housing.

At first glance coordination between livelihood and other sectors of RCRC work is good. However, looked at in detail the coordination and integration often appears more superficial. In the INA framework, the integration has so far been limited to the fact that all sectors are working in parallel in the same neighborhood and that those separate components report to the same management. But apart from the integration of WASH and livelihoods around the topic of waste management, there is little evidence that INA really looks at synergies between different parts of its interventions. However, considering that most INA programs are only starting (apart for BRC’s), one can hope that these synergies will be explored more in depth in the future in order to increase program impact and sustainability. In the absence of such integration, there is a risk of conveying a jumbled message to communities with on the livelihood side RCRC is promoting local entrepreneurship and other activities such as shelter, health, WASH, etc. still using an “aid framework”. A clear example of this would be the brick manufacturing that IFRC is still running within its premises and without any business case or competitive advantage instead of working with Haitian entrepreneurs selling bricks at commercial rates.

Similarly when ‘livelihoods’ is integrated into other programs, it often appears rather as a tool to obtain acceptance from the local population than as part of an integrated overall approach⁶². Increased attention from DDR programs for livelihood projects seems to reflect the frustration of beneficiaries who took part in DRR trainings, awareness-raising activities and who complain that their main concern is related to unemployment and sustainable livelihood.

The limits of integration between livelihoods and other sectors can be explained twofold:

- First of all, in relief and rehabilitation programs there is rarely enough time to explore synergies and integration possibilities. The example of GRC/AutRC speaks volumes: on the

⁶¹ MUSO (mutuelles de solidarité) are grassroots structures to collect savings and issue small loans to their members

⁶² This seems to be the case of some relocation programs implemented by IFRC Secretariat but these activities were not considered in the scope of this assessment and would require further research.

one hand the livelihood program is offering capacity building and certification to construction workers. The GRC/AutRC shelter program however is not using those construction capacities because the two programs have different timeframes that are not compatible – the shelter program could not wait for the conclusion of the mason training to implement their activities. In addition the techniques learnt during the training did not correspond to what was needed by the shelter program, which further show the lack of integration between activities;

- Secondly, the lack of internal capacity and awareness within RCRC, and especially at management level is an important obstacle for identifying these synergies.

4.4.2.2 Risk of Working in Isolation

As highlighted in different parts of this report (See above Section 4.3.2.1 Partnership Efficiency and 4.2.1.2 Adequacy of Program Design with Objectives), the coordination between the different RCRC members on livelihood issues has been increasing with the TMC livelihood delegate providing input as well as through individual initiatives from RCRC livelihood delegates. However, the coordination level outside of the Movement remains very low. For instance only few delegates regularly attend the Livelihood Working Committee (TMC livelihood delegate, ARC, FRC and IFRC), though they then share the learning and information with the rest of the group during the monthly RCRC livelihood meetings. This was a strategy put in place when 45 RCRC members were working in Haiti, but it could be relevant now to extend PNSs participation to increase their integration to the rest of the livelihood sector – other than through informal contacts with other INGOs. This lack of coordination between INGOs is not exclusive to RCRC members and has been analysed in several evaluations of the post-earthquake response⁶³. It is essential for an organization that is spearheading one module of the intervention, i.e. livelihoods, to coordinate with other, more experienced actors in the field, and to contribute its own expertise on community approach and vulnerability. Nevertheless, there are some informal contacts with INGOs working on livelihoods issues for coordination and experience sharing.

As described in the above Section 4.3.2.2 Partnership or Sub-Contracting the relationships with local NGOs are rather more like contractor and sub-contractor than a coordination among peers. Again, this hierarchical approach is not unique to RCRC. The absence of coordination between international NGOs and Haitian NGOs is heavily criticized by local organizations working on development and livelihood issues. This highlights the risks of new stakeholders working in isolation without integrating learning of grassroots organizations accumulated from past experiences. (see more in-depth analysis in below Section 4.5.2.2 Impacts on Livelihood Development Programs and Haitian Civil Society)

The main risk of not coordinating with other NGOs, whether local or international, is the creation of an opportunistic market for livelihood projects in communities. This has already started in some areas of Port-au-Prince or Léogâne, where beneficiaries compare the benefits of different projects before applying. Some beneficiaries (like in the example of GRC/AutRC in the above Section 4.4.1.3 Challenges and Risks of RCRC Targeting) expect the same conditions in all projects, especially concerning seed capital, in-kind donations or participation to trainings, workshops or committees. In the

⁶³ Refer for instance to the RTE carried out by URD and GPPI in August 2010 in Haiti, François Grünewald and Andrea Binder, *Evaluation en temps réel en Haïti, 3 mois après le tremblement de terre*, 31 Août 2010

absence of a coordinated approach, defining a kind of “Code of Conduct” for livelihood activities, NGOs are vulnerable to opportunistic behavior that can jeopardize their program achievements and sustainability.

The issue of coordination with non-aid actors is also critical. There is currently very little coordination between RCRC members and local, regional or nation authorities on livelihood programs and strategies. Only SRC extensively consulted authorities for the design and validation of its intervention in Léogâne⁶⁴. The only anecdotal evidence of coordination taking place was in Croix-Des-Bouquets. For FRC school transportation project the school coordination committee needed to be registered with the municipality and therefore coordinated with the authorities that facilitated the process. This however was more an issue of support from local authorities rather than a real coordination effort to align RCRC strategy with local, regional and national authorities.

Similarly, the opportunities for synergies with the private sector were not explored by RCRC. Even for their initiatives to improve beneficiaries’ employability (vocational trainings, certification, etc.) PNSs and IFRC did not coordinate with private sector actors to understand barriers to employment and in stead uncritically relied on beneficiaries’ perceptions and demands⁶⁵. This has been the case for a majority of INGOs working on this issue. This strategy is starting to show counter-productive results by increasing the number of skilled people who cannot find employment in the market because they were active in sectors where those skills and certifications are not in demand. Some beneficiaries raised the issue with IFRC mentioning that the key impediment to finding a job was the lack of relationships with the private sector (in form of cronyism for instance) and the lack of trust between private sector companies and workers from marginalized neighborhoods.

The absence of coordination between RCRC with the private sector can be partially explained by the inadequacy of RCRC structures and processes (see above Section 4.3.1.2 Decision Making Process). For instance in the recycling program implemented by IFRC, there is no formalized relationship with the waste collection company mostly because of institutional difficulties to set-up such an agreement, which leads to vulnerability of the whole waste recycling activity. The partnership between FRC and ECSSA for similar activities in Delmas 9 (INA project) and in long-term camps (with ECHO) shows that this blockage can be overcome by those PNSs with more administrative flexibility.

4.5 Impact

The criterion of impact “looks at the wider effects of the project – social, economic, technical, environmental – on individuals, gender- and age-groups, communities and institutions. Impacts can be intended and unintended, positive and negative, macro (sector) and micro (household)”⁶⁶. Considering that a majority of programs considered for this evaluation were still in the first phase of their implementation or had not yet started, the impact assessment is based on the few project

⁶⁴ For the design of its Livelihood Project in Leogane, the Spanish Red Cross has consulted the MARNDR (Ministère de Agriculture, Ressources Natureles et Développement Rural) through the SDDO (Subdirection Departementale de l’Oest) and the BAC (Bureau Agricole Communal) repeatedly and taken into account both: the “Politique de Développement Agricole 2010-2025”, the “Plan de Développement Agricole de la Troisième Section de Leogane” and the vulgarisation methods proposed on the “Plan Directeur de Vulgarisation Agricole (2011-2016)”.

⁶⁵ During the review process, ARC mentioned their awareness of this risk and limitation to their work and their plan to address the problem during the INA project, for instance through value chain analysis.

⁶⁶ ALNAP, *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, an ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies*, March 2006, page 56

evaluations made available to the consultant and on hypotheses based on program design and discussions with stakeholders.

4.5.1 Livelihood Impacts

4.5.1.1 Limited Program Impacts due to Program Design

As highlighted in the above Section 4.2.1.2 Adequacy of Program Design with Objectives, the potential for impacts is reduced by the nature of the activities proposed to achieve these results.

Table 2 Outcome of the Rating Change Exercise with young entrepreneurs in Léogâne⁶⁷

Key Changes	Key Factors of Change
- More dependency from parents (18%)	- Training on entrepreneurship (29%)
- More positive ideas (15%)	- Meeting new people (15%)
- Better knowledge for expenses management (14%)	- Livelihood workshop (11%)
- Increased professional capacities (11%)	- Unemployment of household supporter (11%)
- Less income available (11%)	

The beneficiaries interviewed in the GRC/AutRC program for young entrepreneurship in Léogâne highlighted the benefits from the training that they were provided with and the opportunity for them to meet with new people, and develop new ideas. However they also pointed out that they were not expecting a significant impact on their income and livelihood from this project due to the absence of financial support to start their activities. Although the program still has two more training sessions and coaching modules on offer (one for the beneficiaries' business plan and one on financing, risk and action plan⁶⁸), the potential for direct impact is limited because the project does not address one of the key constraints for young entrepreneurs: unavailability of investment or loans for start-up businesses. There are currently no microfinance funds offering seeding capital or loans to young entrepreneurs without previous business experience and who are not working in production/manufacturing activities (secondary sector). 92% of the beneficiaries were proposing a *petit commerce* or small services business. Therefore, one can consider that the potential impact of this project can be attributed more to building social capital, self-esteem and confidence than to income improvement as called for in the logical framework. In response, GRC/AutRC has decided to provide an in-kind payment of 1,000EUR to the participant of the last training cycle⁶⁹ to purchase their furniture and initial stock of items in order to launch their small business. However this remains limited and not directly tied-up with the needs and specificities of each business. This case study highlights the necessity to take a comprehensive approach tackling all obstacles to livelihood protection and development and not to limit the intervention to one aspect. The reason for this weakness is again the inadequacy of the program framework (type of donors, timeframe, capacities) with the expected impacts and the absence of strong coordination with other development actors.

4.5.1.2 RCRC Theory Of Change

Most RCRC members mention an increase in household resilience toward disasters or life events (disease, death of family member, economic crisis, etc.) as the main expected impact of their

⁶⁷ The exercise asked participants to rate recent changes in their life. As a result some changes are not directly related to the Youth Entrepreneurs program impact

⁶⁸ The action plan will be a process by which the young entrepreneur implements his/her business, it includes finding necessary seed capital and potential loans.

⁶⁹ After each cycle there is a selection based on a test and on the viability of the project proposed. For the last cycle 15 participants will be selected

livelihood strategy, in line with the *Strategy 2020* of IFRC. The theory of change behind RCRC livelihood intervention – as expressed by livelihood delegates or presented in project documents – is mostly based on the micro-economic level (individuals) and a meso-economic level (community, neighborhood). The macro-economic level (region or country) is not taken into account in the elaborated strategy. Arguably this is a consequence of the lack of coordination with authorities as well as a shortfall in the long-term vision for livelihood development.

The theory of change underlying most interventions is that by improving beneficiaries' access to employment individuals and communities will increase their resilience. This can be through skills development, business development for self-employment, promoting behavioral changes for disaster risk reduction, fostering social capital within communities through the establishment of livelihood committees, and self-help groups for saving and credit. While it is a well-articulated theory of change, its main limitation is that it does not take into account external factors such as markets, commodities prices and the political and regulatory environment. Considering Haiti's chronic development challenges related to weak infrastructures, low foreign and local investment, and a non-conducive environment related to political instability and lack of clear legislation, this strategy suffers from a lack of integration and a broader approach regarding the root causes of household vulnerability.

4.5.1.3 *Monitoring and Evaluation Framework*

Impact monitoring and evaluation is a challenging exercise for livelihood restoration and development, especially for programs with a short duration as is the case for most RCRC interventions. Considering these timeframes and implementation delays, baselines have only occasionally been implemented. A large proportion of monitoring activities rely on reporting done by implementing partners which is mostly limited to the output level to analyze activity implementation, occasionally extending the analysis to activity outcomes. RCRC members also monitor activities implemented by their partners but in the absence of specialized technical competencies, it remains difficult to have a meaningful analysis of activities implementation and to provide advice, for instance to review business assessments done by credit committees of EDM or Zafen. There is also a question of time and resources constraints. For the IFRC Secretariat for instance there are only two delegates working on livelihood interventions. With several partners working on monitoring, in addition to the general management work⁷⁰, little time is left for direct monitoring or in-depth analysis of partners' reporting.

The majority of project evaluations that took place and that were shared with the evaluator⁷¹ mention the necessity of having an impact assessment at a later stage in time. Due to the short project timeframe, impact is impossible to identify or quantify. Despite the ambition to use Haiti livelihood projects as a pilot for the organization, RCRC members have not put the necessary means and capacities in place to support the project's professed importance. It remains unclear for instance how learning from the Haiti intervention and program evaluations will be integrated into organizational strategy and livelihood methodologies. The present evaluation can be considered as a first step to such institutional learning.

⁷⁰ Based on the analysis presented in the above Section 4.3.1.2 Decision Making Process, one can estimate that a majority of livelihood delegate's time is dedicated to management issues and procedures.

⁷¹ See in Annex 5 **List of Documents Reviewed** the list of evaluations available

4.5.2 Unintended Potential Negative Impacts

4.5.2.1 Impacts on Haitian Market

Some potential negative impacts have been identified and should be further analyzed and monitored. While remittances – because of their scope and the limited data available – have had a clear impact on market distortion and inflation, cash grants and short-term livelihood programs could also have contributed to some extent to this phenomena. This is not unique to RCRC interventions but considering the size of the cash donations for camp residents, it is possible that programs have such negative impacts in the neighborhood where they take place. So far there has been no in-depth analysis of the correlation between the rent inflation in Port-au-Prince and the grant provided to camp residents to move to new houses⁷², nor for the impact of cash injections (cash grants, cash for work, etc.) on food prices. Similarly the evaluation report for the support program for host families⁷³ mentioned 10% inflation from April to October 2010 without being able to attribute it either to cash grants or to seasonal fluctuation. Considering the scope of intervention from RCRC and other humanitarian aid actors, this absence of monitoring of potential macro-economic impacts is harmful as it is difficult to react and modify interventions to avoid negative outcomes.

The second risk is market saturation for *petit commerce* considering all the programs promoting this activity as a new source of livelihood. Almost all RCRC members have been supporting the establishment of *petit commerce* as a livelihood restoration strategy, without considering other income generating activities such as small industry, food transformation activities, productive activities. The reasons behind this choice – or rather absence of choice – are multiple:

- The first and main one is the offer-driven approach that most RCRC members took, asking beneficiaries what activities they would like to invest in. Considering the environment and the tendency to replicate what is known, most beneficiaries declared that they wanted support to start *petit commerce*. This was for instance the case for GRC/AutRC project with young potential entrepreneurs, where among 40 business projects 37 were related to small trade activities or services (hairdressing, internet café, etc.)
- The second reason was the lack of time to carryout a more in-depth analysis of the market to understand opportunities and limits of different income generating activities. When doing so, ARC and FRC analyzed the saturation and risk of *petit commerce* sector and elaborated strategies for either diversifying the offer according to the demand (ARC strategy for its INA program) or investing in productive area with high potential (FRC strategy in Croix-Des-Bouquets with the selection of construction and carpentry workshops).

Because of this strategy, an increasing number of people are getting involved in *petit commerce*. For instance in the framework of IFRC Secretariat relocation process, the monitoring forms are designed to encourage beneficiaries to create their own small trade business. The first form filled when the beneficiary receives the first installment of cash grant asks what kind of *petit commerce* he or she will establish without ever mentioning the possibility to establish another type of activity,

⁷²The unique analysis done remained superficial by only comparing the chronology of rent inflation with the starting date of the rental grants. But this was not an in-depth analysis and the triggers for this significant inflation remained to be assessed.

⁷³American Red Cross, Evaluation of Danish Red Cross Host Family Support Program South Department, Haiti, Alexandra Galperin and Carol Ward, November 2011, page 27

such as production. Though it does not prove a direct causality between IFRC Secretariat's approach, it is remarkable to see that while only one third of beneficiaries declared having a *petit* commerce before the relocation process, 97% of them declared having on in the final monitoring form⁷⁴. In the absence of technical support to evaluate market potential for these activities, there is a real risk of saturation and negative impact on the market organization.

4.5.2.2 Impacts on Livelihood Development Programs and Haitian Civil Society

In the absence of dialogue between RCRC members – and more generally among humanitarian aid actors of the post-earthquake response and long-term development actors⁷⁵, the latter are very critical of humanitarian organizations' involvement in livelihood promotion. The criticism underlines the potential negative impact short-term livelihood promotion programs can have on long-term livelihood development objectives. The first risk to highlight is related to human resource availability. Considering the salary and benefit packages of large-scale organizations working in relief and rehabilitation, there is an important impact on the local labor market and the ability for development organizations – especially grassroots ones – to attract and retain competent and experienced staff. Similarly, with the shortage of potential and reliable partners and the budget and scale opportunities for those local partners, some development organizations have lost their partners, that preferred to focus their capacities on humanitarian aid, considering the financial opportunities. According to international organizations working long-term in Haiti or national organizations, large financial flows in the first two years of the post-earthquake response have disorganized the aid sector in Haiti by increasing competition for funds and hindering collaboration opportunities.

The second issue is more critical as short-term livelihood programs have negatively impacted existing empowerment and community mobilization in affected areas. For instance, development programs were confronted with an increased demand for livelihood provisioning activities, in-kind donations or cash grants. The microfinance sector had to mobilize efforts to convince its clients of the necessity to keep the sector alive by repaying loans and interests to ensure that after the end of relief and rehabilitation, microfinance institutions (MFI) will still be there and able to provide financing to economic activities. While acknowledging the specific needs of people in post-earthquake circumstances, MFIs like Fonkoze refused to abandon interest rates, as they are a critical factor for long-term sustainability. Similarly organizations working with rural communities on livestock financing have gone through difficulties when relief NGOs have distributed livestock without asking for contribution.

Finally some members of the Haitian civil society have pointed to the potential longer-term impact of post-earthquake relief interventions. One of the concerns is the disruption of efforts toward behavioral changes, and modernization of agriculture and livestock activities. Because of their short-term duration, many projects providing livestock to communities or promoting changes in agriculture technique do not include a follow-up period. Thus, when the beneficiary is confronted with a technical issue – with new livestock and vaccination, or with a new plant disease or parasites – he or she does not have the capacity to address the problem, and loses the investment. Several organizations also highlighted a potential negative environmental impact of short-term livelihood

⁷⁴ These statistics were established based on a random selection of files for beneficiaries who went through the full monitoring process. This sample cannot be considered representative, however it shows an interesting trend, and therefore was considered worth sharing in this evaluation.

⁷⁵ For more details please refer to above Section **Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable. Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.**

activities: increased pressure on water resources related to home gardening, impact of livestock on erosion when there are no specific areas dedicated to grazing, and finally the impact of an increase of food-related trade on charcoal consumption in the absence of alternative solution promotion.

In addition, there is a growing concern of destabilization of communities and risks to social capital. The constant migrations since the earthquake have impacted neighborhoods and villages, and endangered solidarity mechanisms. Conversely, the more recent competition for “projects” and inclusion on beneficiary list has deepened this phenomenon by increasing competition and envy. Considering Haiti’s history of conflict, there is a risk at the macro level. There is a similar risk to the meso and micro level when indigenous or informal solidarity mechanisms are no longer working, which might jeopardize development projects as well as long-term development itself. Microfinance institutions like Fonkoze have for instance decided that they could no longer do urban solidarity group lending, which translated into vulnerable groups encountering difficulties accessing financing. Where solidarity groups were considered as a reliable loan collateral, this is no longer the case and in the absence of alternative collaterals, vulnerable populations’ access to funding is decreasing.

4.5.2.3 Potential Impact on Migration Dynamics

The question of a potential negative impact of livelihood programs on migration dynamics is an important one. However it would clearly require more in-depth data collection and analysis to draw significant and irrefutable conclusions. Considering how little this risk is acknowledged, it still seems relevant for this report.

12th January earthquake is often considered as one of the first major urban disasters to which humanitarian aid had to respond, with all the challenges and opportunities for innovation that come with interventions on such a big scale. As highlighted in the Joint Evaluation from Care and Save the Children⁷⁶ and the OCHA Real Time Evaluation of July 2010, the coverage of rural provinces was insufficient, despite the vast migration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) moving away from affected areas and toward their rural areas of origin or where they had relatives⁷⁷. With NGOs and other aid stakeholders focusing on Port-Au-Prince, these IDPs quickly returned to the capital (already 40% of them by March 2010). There is no available data about immigration to Port-au-Prince but looking at informal housing and increased pressure on infrastructure, it is clear that population movements toward the capital are increasing. The risk of multiplying urban livelihood programs could be the lure of non-existent or insufficient job opportunities (either through employment or self-employment) for all and to reinforce existing migration flows.

The disconnect between urban and rural economies seems to be on the increase in Haiti, despite a high percentage of the Haitian economy relying on agriculture. Recent climatic events (hurricanes, droughts) combined with international commodity speculation have raised food prices in Haiti. According to a World Bank Report on Food Prices⁷⁸, cereal prices have increased by 17% in the last 12 months. In response to this risk of a new food security crisis in Haiti, RCRC has not launched any major food security activities in rural areas. The IFRC Secretariat’s response is to create small urban gardens in schools and in neighborhoods focusing on the most vulnerable ones. This reflects the absence of a comprehensive strategy linking rural and urban development challenges and

⁷⁶ CARE, Save the Children, *An Independent Joint Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake Humanitarian Response*, October 2010, page 19

⁷⁷ This migration was estimated to be around 500,000 people in the first weeks (MINUSTAH data)

⁷⁸ World Bank, *Food Prices Watch*, August 2012, page 5

opportunities. Similarly when RCRC members are involved in agricultural activities in rural settings, they do not actively work on linkages between rural production and urban consumption.

4.6 Sustainability

The criterion of sustainability measures “whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.”⁷⁹ This criterion is not strictly speaking for humanitarian assistance evaluations. It is for instance not mentioned in the ALNAP evaluation guide. However considering the ambition of RCRC to have a sustainable impact, it was considered important to include in this evaluation, especially considering that a growing majority of programs are in the field of development rather than humanitarian aid.

4.6.1 Livelihood Recovery and Promoting Sustainability

4.6.1.1 Shortcomings for Sustainable Livelihood Recovery or Promotion

As highlighted in previous sections on Adequacy of Program Design with Objectives and Limited Program Impacts due to Program Design, a lot of problems related to impact and sustainability are rooted in program conception. To sustain achievements in the field of human capital improvement, the proposed activities –short trainings without appropriate coaching afterwards– were insufficient. Changes in behavior remain too superficial and fragile to be maintained once the intervention and support end. This was clearly highlighted during the field visit to the FRC agricultural project in Croix-Des-Bouquets. Beneficiaries explained that for them the main achievement was the rehabilitation of irrigation canals – which was still under implementation at the time of the focus group. When asked how they would maintain it once the program ended, they mentioned they would do it through the newly-created water committee. However, when asked why the canal had not been maintained before, they explained that there had not been any available funds to do so. Therefore they had been unable to invest time to keep the infrastructure in working condition. In the absence of a business model or maintenance plan and contribution from the community, there is uncertainty about the ability of the water committee to guarantee sustainability of the infrastructure.

4.6.1.2 Sustainability of Livelihood

The debate on the definition of “livelihood” within RCRC members illustrates the tension between short-term objectives for the relief and rehabilitation phase and sustainable livelihood promotion. Initially the cash grants provided for the relocation program were considered a livelihoods intervention. When confronted with the issue of sustainability and long-term impact, the program was redefined and the word “livelihood” struck from the documentation. This exemplifies the need for awareness building among other departments about Livelihoods and its different phases. Instead it would have been more relevant and consistent to consider these activities as livelihood recovery interventions and to link them with livelihood promotion activities to ensure better sustainability.

NGOs “benefited” from the pressure created by the media and images in the immediate aftermath – which led to remarkable donation flows, but are now under pressure over these same images

⁷⁹ OECD DAC Criteria <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprograms/dacriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

with tents presented as evidence of aid ineffectiveness. This leads to growing pressure from the government, the international public and Haitian civil society to show rapid achievements. The earlier example of the long discussions between EDM and FRC about target numbers for job creation for each supported entrepreneur are symptomatic of the increasing risk of needing quantifiable and visible achievements in a short timeframe. For EDM, imposing a target of job creation on an entrepreneur or an activity⁸⁰ presents a real risk to that business and its sustainability. In this case short-term achievements (number of jobs created) could hinder long-term livelihood sustainability. Similarly, partners have raised concerns regarding the short duration of business development support and coaching proposed within RCRC programs and the potential risk for entrepreneurs to start a business – especially if financed by a loan – under these conditions. Organizations like EDM and Fonkoze refused to take the responsibility to push entrepreneurs to take a loan just to fit the program timeframe as they believed these beneficiaries were not yet ready to do so. In this case the tension between showing quantifiable program results and sustainability of livelihood improvement was critical and illustrated the need to be mindful of the timeframe within which the intervention takes place and the underlying logic that dictates different actions at different times. Nevertheless, all livelihood delegates are aware of these limits and shortcomings. For those programs that are still in the first phase of their implementation and that have the “luxury of time” and flexible funding (INA program of IFRC Secretariat and ARC), particular attention is given to the issue, and attempts are made to work more with development actors (development NGOs, civil society organizations working on agricultural development, etc.) to integrate the sustainability dimension from the onset.

4.6.1.3 Impact on Resilience

Considering the emphasis on resilience within RCRC and its importance in *Strategy 2020*⁸¹, one struggles to understand the weak integration in programs of sustainability of livelihood restoration

⁸⁰ FRC tried to impose targeted employment creation for the transportation business in Croix-des-Bouquets. Originally FRC plan was to create 12 jobs, when the business model was based on 4. The final negotiation led to the optimization of job creation and 8 new employments.

⁸¹ Refer to above Section 0

The beneficiaries interviewed in the GRC/AutRC program for young entrepreneurship in Léogâne highlighted the benefits from the training that they were provided with and the opportunity for them to meet with new people, and develop new ideas. However they also pointed out that they were not expecting a significant impact on their income and livelihood from this project due to the absence of financial support to start their activities. Although the program still has two more training sessions and coaching modules on offer (one for the beneficiaries’ business plan and one on financing, risk and action plan), the potential for direct impact is limited because the project does not address one of the key constraints for young entrepreneurs: unavailability of investment or loans for start-up businesses. There are currently no microfinance funds offering seeding capital or loans to young entrepreneurs without previous business experience and who are not working in production/manufacturing activities (secondary sector). 92% of the beneficiaries were proposing a *petit commerce* or small services business. Therefore, one can consider that the potential impact of this project can be attributed more to building social capital, self-esteem and confidence than to income improvement as called for in the logical framework. In response, GRC/AutRC has decided to provide an in-kind payment of 1,000EUR to the participant of the last training cycle to purchase their furniture and initial stock of items in order to launch their small business. However this

and improvement. Even protection and livelihood restoration initiatives, such as cash grants, and cash for work, rarely included long-term protection mechanisms. Considering its capacity, experience and focus on resilience, the RCRC missed an opportunity to propose improved support to beneficiaries of cash grants and cash for work to increase long-term resilience. Mechanisms such as saving accounts or groups, assets protection and insurance, and reinforcement of the social fabric through local governance reinforcement were rarely envisaged. RCRC members only integrate these activities (BRC with the MUSO establishment, SRC considering MUSO promotion, ARC engaging into community microfinance models) when they engage in livelihood development.

In some cases RCRC livelihood programs involuntarily expose beneficiaries to risk: by promoting microfinance products with vulnerable populations who should be targeted by protection projects or by promoting economic activities without analyzing market opportunities and risks (see above analysis in Section 4.5.2.1 Impacts on Haitian Market).

4.6.2 Program Sustainability

4.6.2.1 Exit Strategy

A common point for all RCRC livelihood interventions is the absence of an exit strategy from the start of program design. This translates some difficulties for RCRC members to identify clearly the length of their presence in Haiti – because of uncertainty regarding funding available – and therefore struggle to understand whether a follow-up program could take place to sustain and deepen the achievements of their current activities. This lack of an exit strategy is also indicative of the weakness of the LRRD approach in RCRC and more generally in post-earthquake Haiti, and the fact that for humanitarian aid donors, exit strategies are not given enough attention. In its ECHO proposal for Croix-Des-Bouquets⁸², the FRC mentions that its exit strategy – based on the assumption that development actors will take over – is being developed but that the project's implementation through existing structures limits the risks of dependency. At the time of the project visit, the exit strategy was still unclear – apart from the component implemented with EDM where the organization will follow-up after its investment with some coaching opportunities for the entrepreneur. For other beneficiaries and activities, there was no real follow-up or exit strategy planned. In other cases where programs are still under development, like the ARC INA program, the exit strategy remains a question mark, as no obvious answer is available. In the case of ARC, the fact that the Society has decided to focus on key sectors such as health and DRR increases the

remains limited and not directly tied-up with the needs and specificities of each business. This case study highlights the necessity to take a comprehensive approach tackling all obstacles to livelihood protection and development and not to limit the intervention to one aspect. The reason for this weakness is again the inadequacy of the program framework (type of donors, timeframe, capacities) with the expected impacts and the absence of strong coordination with other development actors.

RCRC Theory Of Change and 4.1.4.1 Alignment with Strategy 2020

⁸² French Red Cross, *Proposal Program de renforcement des moyens de subsistance alimentaire et économique des populations victimes du séisme sur leurs zones de vie*, October 2011, page 34

uncertainty regarding long term planning and the inclusion of an exit strategy as the Livelihoods component is no longer a priority.

Possibly underlying the overall absence of exit strategies is the assumption that HRC would take over livelihood activities when other Societies withdraw from Haiti. This is still one of the working hypotheses of BRC for its exit strategy with the Zafen investment fund⁸³. The limit of this plan is that there was no prior engagement with HRC to discuss whether they had the capacity and the willingness to manage such a fund, and whether it fits with their priorities (see below Section 4.6.3. Relationship with Haitian Red Cross).

4.6.2.2 Partners' Empowerment

One of the exit strategies envisaged by RCRC is that partner organizations will take over once the program ends. This is the spirit of FRC's exit strategy statement in the ECHO proposal (see above Section 4.6.2.1 Exit Strategy), which imagines development stakeholders taking over. This could be seen as a sound strategy and a logical exit for RCRC once the relief and rehabilitation phase is over. The limiting factor is not in the strategy formulation but more in its application. There is no evidence that RCRC has discussed this future transfer with its partners. Similarly while the Movement identifies certain shortcomings especially in terms of project management, reporting and monitoring/evaluation, it does not plan for any capacity building activities to reinforce its partners.

4.6.3 Relationship with Haitian Red Cross

4.6.3.1 Haitian Red Cross and Livelihood

The RCRC approach is based on the complementarity between National Societies and the rest of the Movement, whereby PNSs and the Secretariat support National Societies during a humanitarian response and transfer the programs to the National Societies when they withdraw from the country. Without entering into detail regarding the coordination between IFRC and HRC for the overall post-earthquake response, it is important to understand the role of the National Society in RCRC's livelihood program strategy and approach. In the case of HRC, livelihood interventions are considered an aspect of DRR and inextricably linked to resilience. As a result there is no livelihood delegate in place and no specific strategy for this sector. The organization does not yet have significant experience or capacity for livelihood interventions and its leadership remains uncertain about the need to get involved in this area of work. Nonetheless, its overall strategy⁸⁴ plans for community-based "livelihood micro-projects"⁸⁵, which should be implemented as part of larger integrated community-support programs as well as for business development support (management training, vocational training) to improve livelihoods and increase the resilience of populations.

Livelihood interventions are considered a significant innovation – and as such are presented under the section "innovative components"⁸⁶ of the strategy. This inclusion of livelihoods in the HRC strategy reflects a direct translation of *Strategy 2020* and of the integration of livelihood within resilience and DRR. Alas, this decision was not based on an in-depth understanding of the

⁸³ When transferring an investment fund to another stakeholder, RCRC would guarantee its sustainability, ensuring that the fund can be revolving to finance new entrepreneurs. This possibility is considered in the agreement with Zafen as one of the exit strategies. The second strategy would be to donate the fund to Zafen.

⁸⁴ Haitian Red Cross, *Plan d'action gestion des risques et desastres 2012-2015*, December 2011 (under review)

⁸⁵ The strategy plans that each project will not exceed USD 5,000. Idem, page 14

⁸⁶ Idem, page 28

livelihood interventions cycle (see above Figure 4 LRRD and Livelihood Cycle) The organization lacks capacity and awareness about approaches to livelihood interventions and its challenges. Therefore the different activities proposed in the strategy document often lack coherence and face the same pitfalls as other RCRC livelihood strategies mixing DRR needs⁸⁷ with livelihood improvement strategies⁸⁸ (see above Section 4.1.4.1 Alignment with Strategy 2020).

4.6.3.2 Issue of Coordination with the Haitian Red Cross

The level of coordination between the Haitian Red Cross and other RCRC members is insufficient in many respects. While PNSs mentioned good knowledge of communities and community approach as IFRC's strength and added value in the partnership, these strengths are mostly related to HRC's network of local branches and volunteers. However, RCRC members have not established strong partnership with HRC to implement livelihood interventions⁸⁹ - apart for the current initiative of ARC in the North where HRC was involved from the assessment, proposal design and planning phase and the program Kote Trankil implemented with IFRC. There are several reasons for this. First of all livelihood was not one of HRC's priorities until the development of the 2012-2015 strategy. Secondly, HRC did not and still does not have the capacity to implement livelihood projects and could not provide RCRC with the technical skills and know-how that their own capacity limitations required. In IFRC's strategy, partnerships with National Societies should reinforce its technical capacities and strengthen its interventions and their sustainability. In this case, to establish a meaningful partnership with HRC, PNSs and IFRC Secretariat would have required more internal technical capacities, and the ability to transfer them to HRC. In addition, as livelihood interventions were constantly delayed, there was no longer sufficient time to develop a fruitful collaboration benefiting both organizations. Nevertheless, considering that HRC's current strategy includes livelihood intervention, there is a clear need for more knowledge transfers to the National Societies and a more systematic lessons learning sharing in this direction. This evaluation can be considered as a first step but should be complemented with other initiatives.

5 Key Lessons Learned⁹⁰

Livelihood recovery and improvement in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and other disasters such as Hurricane Sandy will take many more years. As resilience becomes a high priority for IFRC with livelihood an important part of this strategy, it is important to draw lessons from the Haitian experience. This is even more critical considering that these programs were often pilot programs for the IFRC and have therefore paid the price of innovation as they were put through a dry run. The shortcomings of the programs should be seen as an opportunity to learn for future livelihood interventions in Haiti and similar post-disaster contexts. The lessons that can be drawn from this experience are as follows⁹¹:

⁸⁷ With for instance specific projects for reduction of vulnerability towards climatic events for farmers or small business (by a reflection on location, insurance, etc.)

⁸⁸ With business development support and vocational training to create new employment opportunities.

⁸⁹ This is currently changing for instance with ARC's initiative in the North where HRC was involved from the assessment, proposal design and planning phase

⁹⁰ When considering the lessons learned from IFRC Livelihood Programs, an identified lesson is understood as an observation or conclusion that can be applied to improve performance and shared with and by others. It can apply to the organization or to other programs taking place in similar circumstances

⁹¹ These lessons are not ordered by level of importance

Clarity of livelihood interventions

Livelihood interventions should be designed within a clear strategy proposing a well-defined journey for beneficiaries from livelihood provision, through livelihood restoration to livelihood development. During this process, activities should be tailored to take into account beneficiaries' vulnerability and to making sure that the program reinforces their resilience and does not expose them to new risks. Ambiguity in the definition and sequencing of the interventions can be harmful for the beneficiaries, and also impacts project effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

Importance of intervention timeliness

Timeliness is critical for post-disaster livelihood intervention to avoid damaging coping strategies (de-capitalization of business and/or household assets, sale of assets and acquisition of new debts to informal lenders) and a general aggravation of the household situation. This can be not only in terms of financial capital but also social, human and environmental capital. Different livelihood phases need to be timed and sequenced in the right order. If the relief and recovery phases come too late, they become counter-productive and weaken long-term development interventions.

Need for flexibility and adaptation to circumstances

In an instable post-disaster environment, organizations need to be able to react with flexibility and adapt to new circumstances emerging from sudden migration flows, new economic opportunities or threats and emerging needs. Unrestricted funding is a critical success factor for this flexibility and organizations' ability to adapt. A capability and willingness to listen to other stakeholders is an important step toward understanding new circumstances.

Direct implementation of livelihood improvement programs by IFRC could be made more efficient

Within the current structures, human resources and decision-making processes, direct implementation of livelihood promotion programs by IFRC is not efficient. The approach considerably impacts intervention timeliness and cost efficiency. Direct implementation should be limited to livelihood provisioning and recovery activities, where IFRC's capacities and procedures for rapid deployment and large-scale interventions have a clear added value.

Necessity to identify strong partners and to establish a sustainable and balanced collaboration

IFRC needs to identify strong partners, with good knowledge of the local environment and specific technical capacities. The partnership established with these partners should be based on a balanced collaboration where each organization is measured on the same level of accountability vis-à-vis the other partner but also to the public. Intervention design and strategy should be created and elaborated in a collaborative fashion where each partner brings its expertise and added value. Capacity building of the partner organization should be considered as an integral part of the collaboration. This type of relationship is more sustainable than the simple sub-contracting approach. In the framework of disaster preparedness, IFRC and particularly national societies need to identify these potential partnerships to be ready for disasters or crisis.

Improve protection mechanisms to improve beneficiaries' resilience during relief and recovery phase

During relief and recovery phases, it is critical to put in place livelihood protection mechanisms. Instruments such as saving groups, micro-insurance schemes, assets protection strategies, etc. can improve households' recovery and therefore help make the impact of the humanitarian aid intervention sustainable. Experience shows that households have a natural tendency to engage in the aforementioned strategies⁹² but they are rarely aware or able to thoroughly analyze the safest options and therefore expose themselves to new risks⁹³.

Need for an exit strategy

Exit strategies need to be planned for the intervention design phase and cannot be postponed until the end of the program. This strategy is not only important for sustainability issues, but is also essential in supporting beneficiaries in their livelihood development and resilience.

Necessity of a better LRRD approach and coordination with external stakeholders

Considering the limits of IFRC's scope and intervention, coordination with external stakeholders such as authorities, civil society, and development actors is critical for program relevance, sustainability, impact and efficiency. In this perspective a LRRD approach needs to be envisaged from the start of a post-disaster intervention to improve program impact.

A holistic and integrated approach is required

"Livelihoods" can no longer be considered as an independent sector working in isolation from other interventions. Stakeholder engagement has shown that vulnerable populations consider livelihood as a key priority in a post-disaster context. Therefore the issue needs to be integrated into other relief interventions such as shelter, WASH, food security, etc. The approach towards disaster response needs to take into account every dimension and ensure that all activities work towards the same theory of change, and send the same message to beneficiaries about long-term recovery and the need for community empowerment and contribution.

6 Recommendations

The following table represents the main recommendations for the Federation stakeholders for future livelihood interventions. They are presented by subject and not in order of priority. The priority levels are established as follows:

- High: urgent action required, within 1 to 3 months
- Medium: action required within 3 to 8 months
- Low: action required within 6 to 18 months

6.1 Recommendations to IFRC

Table 3 Recommendations to IFRC

	Thematic	Recommendation	Priority
1	Strategy	Establish a clear strategy for livelihood Identify strengths and weaknesses of the Federation to decide	High

⁹² In all programs including cash grants, beneficiaries declared to have made savings or to have bought livestock (which in rural areas is considered as saving strategy).

⁹³ For instance in the case of livestock investment, if no support is provided there is a risk that the investment is lost because of lack of capacity (for vaccination for example)

		where it should position itself for livelihood interventions. Provide strategic positioning to translate the Strategic Aims presented in <i>Strategy 2020</i> into clearer objectives.	
2	Strategy	Limit direct implementation for livelihood provisioning and recovery programs Use partnership models for livelihood promotion as a way to increase implementation efficiency.	High
2	Capacity Building	Build internal operational capacity for identification and leveraging of livelihood opportunities during relief and recovery phases Identify key sectors of interventions where livelihood opportunities are numerous and can be identified. Pilot capacity building programs to establish clear methodologies to leverage livelihood opportunities.	Medium
3	Capacity Building	Build IFRC leadership's awareness on livelihood interventions Launch a program for leadership training on livelihood interventions to ensure a better understanding of opportunities, challenges and risks of these programs.	High
4	Partnership	Establish clear guidelines for external partnerships Based on IFRC values and principles, draw clear guidelines for partnerships with development sector organizations, for instance with microfinance institutions/funds. These guidelines should reaffirm values and principles but also establish criteria for collaboration and mutual learning and accountability.	Medium
5	Partnership	Partner with development aid organizations and livelihood protection experts to establish good practices for relief and recovery livelihood interventions Launch a joint reflection on livelihood interventions in relief and recovery phases to draw best practices on how to promote a better LRRD approach for livelihood programs	Medium
6	Learning and Accountability	Empower the Livelihood Resource Centre Provide resources and capacities to the Centre in order for it to play a support role with on-site interventions, but also to play a central role in program evaluation and institutional learning	Medium
7	Learning and Accountability	Establish procedures for strategic decisions on livelihood interventions Support decision-making processes for RCRC members to decide whether they have capacity and can offer added value to implement livelihood interventions in a given context.	High

6.2 Recommendations to Technical Movement Coordination

Table 4 Recommendations to Technical Movement Coordination

	Thematic	Recommendation	Priority
1	Learning and accountability	Launch an in-depth study on <i>petit commerce</i> in collaboration with other livelihood stakeholders and authorities Considering the potential risks of the recent large investments on <i>petit commerce</i> , establish a working group with other livelihood stakeholders and Haitian authorities to look into the trends of the sector. Launch a study to evaluate recent developments, analyze risks and opportunities and establish guidelines for support to <i>petit commerce</i> .	Medium
2	Learning and accountability	Establish a common M&E framework for RCRC members Raise awareness among RCRC members about the necessity for a common M&E framework for livelihood activities. Once the idea is accepted, launch a working group to identify key indicators, data collection methodologies and evaluation policy. A common M&E framework would facilitate coordination between livelihood programs but also ensure that synergies can be identified and supported. It would also allow for the identification of best practices and pitfalls. It can be aligned with the Federation-wide	High

		reporting mechanism	
3	Learning and accountability	Promote accountability toward beneficiaries and other stakeholders Identify methodologies to increase accountability toward beneficiaries and other stakeholders and promote them within IFRC.	Low
4	Learning and accountability	Improve ownership of RCRC members on evaluation Ensure that all steps in a federation-wide evaluation are involving all concerned RCRC members in a participatory way. This should include the preparation of ToRs, inception report review (for methodology review), schedule and not be limited only to final report review	Medium
5	Partnership	Identify private sector partners Look at existing initiatives with the private sector in Haiti. Raise awareness among the RCRC and private sector about potential mutual benefits of integrated approach.	Low
6	Partnership	Support the coordination initiatives towards partners Identify potential synergies and coordination possibilities for RCRC members sharing the same partners (in continuity with what is currently done for the reporting framework with Zafen and KNFP).	Medium
7	Capacity building	Support IFRC leadership for livelihood strategy formulation Raise awareness among IFRC leadership about the necessity to have a coordinated livelihood strategy within the Movement. Support the formulation of this strategy with technical capacity. In parallel, work with HRC leadership for a clarification of their livelihood strategy and for them to focus on livelihood protection initiatives.	High
8	Capacity building	Build RCRC capacity on livelihood protection mechanism Work with resilience experts and DRR delegates to identify best practices that can reinforce and sustain livelihood recovery and improve beneficiaries' resilience. Explore potential for micro-insurance for vulnerable populations.	Medium
9	Capacity building	Draw best practices from existing experiences in Haiti Using the livelihood working group and existing evaluations of livelihood programs, identify best practices in Haiti. Organize talks or raising awareness visits about these activities/programs to improve RCRC capacity but also network.	Medium

6.3 Recommendations to IFRC Secretariat

Table 5 Recommendations to IFRC Secretariat

	Thematic	Recommendation	Priority
1	Learning and accountability	Evaluation of livelihood protection activities Launch an in-depth review of all livelihood protection activities carried out in Haiti, in particular for the cash grants provided in the camp relocation program. This review should follow DAC criteria but it should also look at impact on inflation, long-term livelihood recovery and labor market.	Medium
2	Strategy	Define and disseminate the livelihood strategy for the INA project Finalize the theory of change and livelihood intervention strategy underlying the INA program in collaboration with external stakeholders. Once approved, disseminate this strategy document to all stakeholders, internally in the IFRC Secretariat but also to authorities, partners and communities.	High
3	Strategy	Revise the approach towards <i>petit commerce</i> Change from an offer driven to a demand driven strategy. Stop systematic promotion of <i>petit commerce</i> within the camp relocation program as the sole strategy for livelihood restoration and improvement. Raise beneficiaries' awareness about the limit	High

		of this sector of activity and need to be demand driven.	
4	Strategy	Prepare an exit strategy for the INA program In collaboration with partners and other livelihood development stakeholders, establish a clear exit strategy for the INA program.	Medium/High
5	Partnership	Integrate a capacity building dimension to partnerships Identify together with partners how both organizations can benefit from each other's capacity and how to transfer them based on the existing partnership framework.	Medium
6	Structure	Adapt human resources and decision-making structure to long term interventions Identify blockages and sources of delays in the processes to streamlined procedures and improve efficiency of decision making structure and human resources.	High

6.4 Recommendations to HRC

Table 6 Recommendations to HRC

	Thematic	Recommendation	Priority
1	Strategy	Review the current strategy for livelihood Considering the capacity and lack of experience in livelihood, as well as HRC's strengths, focus livelihood activities on protection and resilience capacities. Exclude risky activities for beneficiaries (such as new business creation, credit, etc.) and focus on protection-oriented measures such as saving.	High
2	Strategy	Focus on financial literacy Build volunteer and household capacity on financial management, household finance and basic livelihood protection mechanisms.	Medium
3	Capacity building	Build HRC's leadership capacity on livelihood Establish a clear capacity building program for HRC's leadership including branch managers about the livelihood cycle, opportunities, challenges and risk.	High
4	Capacity building	Identify best practices of linkages between DRR and livelihood Through the Federation and other organizations' experiences look at best practices in terms of DRR and livelihood protection and resilience.	Medium
5	Learning and accountability	Learn from the NRC program in Jacmel Province Use the DRR livelihood program in Jacmel as a pilot and establish a clear monitoring and evaluation framework focused on learning opportunities to draw lessons learned from this first program. In the partnership with NRC, maximize capacity building opportunities for local branches but also for the national level and leadership.	High
6	Partnership	Start implementing only through partners Identify partners with relevant and recognized technical expertise and experience who are ready to implement activities. Establish a collaboration in which both organizations have learning opportunities and build each other's capacities.	Medium

6.5 Recommendations to PNSs⁹⁴

Table 7 Recommendations to PNSs

	Thematic	Recommendation	Priority
1	Strategy	Formalize PNS livelihood strategy and theory of change In collaboration with partners and stakeholders, elaborate a livelihood strategy and theory of change for each PNS and then	High

⁹⁴ The evaluator is aware that for a number of PNS these recommendations will not be relevant as their program is already under implementation and has only a short duration that does not allow changes and flexibility

		<p>disseminate it within PNS and to external stakeholders, including authorities.</p> <p>This strategic planning aims to identify whether PNS should be involved in livelihood protection or improvement activities. The relevant resources should be aligned with the strategic plan and a fundraising plan should be prepared to support the strategy.</p> <p>In the absence of significant investment for capacity building and process changes, PNS should focus on livelihood protection activities.</p>	
2	Strategy	<p>Coordinate a strategic plan at IFRC level</p> <p>Once each PNS has a clear strategic plan, all plans should be put together for alignment but also to foster and understand potential synergies.</p>	Medium
3	Partnership	<p>Prepare an exit strategy for livelihood program</p> <p>In collaboration with partners and other livelihood development stakeholders, establish a clear exit strategy for livelihood programs. If a program under design does not have well-defined exit strategy, its implementation should be reconsidered.</p>	Medium/High
4	Partnership	<p>Integrate a capacity building dimension to partnerships</p> <p>Identify together with partners how both organizations can benefit from each other's capacity and how to transfer them based on the existing partnership framework.</p>	Medium
5	Partnership	<p>Increase development aid stakeholders' involvement with under-served areas and vulnerable populations</p> <p>Promote collaboration with development aid stakeholders to encourage them and provide incentives to work in under-served areas and with vulnerable populations.</p>	Medium/Low
6	Learning and accountability	<p>Review logical framework and indicators</p> <p>Review existing logical framework and indicators and update them for more realistic objectives taking into consideration program delays, limited timeframes and capacity.</p>	High
7	Learning and accountability	<p>Evaluate program impact</p> <p>Evaluate results and impact of all projects currently implemented at PNS level. Once a year, organize a workshop with other PNSs to draw common lessons learned from program evaluations.</p>	Medium
8	Structure	<p>Adapt human resources and decision-making structure to long term interventions</p> <p>Identify blockages and sources of delays in the processes to streamlined procedures and improve efficiency of decision-making structure and human resources.</p>	High

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
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8 Annex

1. Terms of Reference



Terms of Reference:

Federation wide Livelihood program Evaluation (Impact assessment)

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in Haiti is seeking a consultant to design and evaluate current livelihoods program of the IFRC (including the membership and Haitian Red Cross working in Haiti) and come out with strong programmatic recommendation to further inform IFRC¹ livelihood programme strategies in Haiti.

Context

In response to the 12 January 2010 earthquake, the IFRC is contributing significantly to rebuilding Haiti through a range of recovery programme sectors, such as shelter, watsan, relief, health and livelihoods in partnership with Haitian Red Cross (HRC) and partner national societies (PNS) active in Haiti. Currently, livelihoods is one the main demands and needs from urban and rural communities alike; sustainable sources of income and income generating activities are one of the main reasons displaced persons have given for still living in camps. In May 2012, just over 430,000 remain in camps throughout earthquake affected areas. Since Jan 2010 the IFRC provided various livelihoods support to communities through programmes such as cash for work and cash transfer to support earthquake victims that were still living in tents, informal or temporary settlements.

Currently 9 National Societies (PNS) are implementing livelihoods program as per their capacity but for many, livelihoods is not priority program. Most PNSs are involved in cash transfer and cash grant programmes which they note are not sustainable and may not have enough impact.

The purpose of the cash for work and cash transfer was to provide a basic living support to beneficiaries to “fill the gap” after earthquake. After two years of livelihoods interventions with communities, IFRC appears to be lacking strong and comprehensive interventions for sustainable living; as many members, are still in planning process there is an opportunity to improve upon current approaches.

The Secretariat and PNS recognize the need a development evaluation to assess the current outcomes and probable impact of livelihoods program implemented by Red Cross actors in Haiti. In addition to assessing relevance of such programmes and outcomes per community needs, they also need to be assessed for producing sustainable results.

Objectives of the Evaluation

1. To assess current progress on outcomes (at the level of households and communities) of livelihood interventions: what changes took place at community or family level through livelihood program intervention. Assessment to be made on the basis of primary data collection and also on the basis of comparing baseline and current data where available
2. Assess the community needs and demand and how PNSs can best address these needs. Provide practical applicable step by step implementation recommendations in the form of strategies as to the best way to facilitate sustainable livelihoods outcomes in Haiti for the target population.
3. Assess the livelihood program intervention outcomes and potential for impact at community level based on current design as well as implementation practices, against the plan of each member National Society with their given capacity, interest and resources.
4. Suggest how data collection can be modified in order to improve opportunities to assess effectiveness in the future. In particular, look for opportunities for quasi-experimental assessment to compare the results of the different forms of livelihoods intervention currently employed.

This proposed evaluation will provide current status of outcomes and potential impact at the community level of livelihoods interventions by the IFRC.

¹ IFRC refers to the IFRC Secretariat and National Societies; whereas Secretariat refers to only IFRC Secretariat staff from field, zonal or Geneva offices.



International Federation
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Evaluation criteria:

It is anticipated that the evaluation will provide insight into the following areas of inquiry:

- **Relevance/Appropriateness**

The extent to which the livelihoods activities have been suited to the priorities and policies of the target community.

The consultant is expected to consider the following questions in measuring relevance/appropriateness:

- To what extent are the objectives of the livelihoods programme still valid?
- Are the activities and outputs of the livelihoods programme consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
- Are the activities and outputs of the livelihoods programme consistent with the intended impacts and effects?

- **Efficiency**

This measures the outputs in relation to the inputs. Efficiency is regarded as an economic term which signifies that the interventions use the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results. Efficiency looks at the extent that results have been delivered in the least costly manner possible. The consultant is expected to compare alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted in doing this to consider the following questions:

- Were activities cost-efficient?
- Were objectives achieved on time?
- Was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?

- **Effectiveness**

To what extent are the interventions likely to achieve its intended results. Were activities done in a timely manner?

The consultant is expected to consider the following questions in measuring effectiveness.

- Are the livelihoods objectives likely to be achieved?
- To what extent were the livelihoods objectives achieved.
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of these objectives?

- **Accountability**

To what extent to were beneficiaries involved in the planning, design and implementation of the project/ Extent to which there was meaningful participation of beneficiaries/project participants

- **Sustainability/connectedness**

Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Are the benefits of these interventions likely to continue once donor input has been withdrawn.

- What are the major factors which would influence the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the programme or project?

- **Impact**

These are the positive and negative changes produced by the intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The examination should be concerned with both intended and unintended results and must also include the positive and negative impact of external factors, such as changes in terms of trade and financial conditions

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The consultant is expected to consider the following questions in measuring impact:

- What has happened as a result of the programme or project?
- What real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries?
- How many people have been affected?

Methodology, outcomes and reporting

The selected consultant will be expected to develop methodology for this evaluation.

Expected activities will include (though not limited to).

- Desk review of documentation held by the IFRC and PNSs for livelihoods program.
- One to one interview and focus groups discussion with PNSs and stakeholder of livelihoods programme in the country;
- Site visits too see on going livelihoods program, interview beneficiaries and other important stakeholders
- Conduct desk review about livelihoods program intervention from PNSs in the country.
- Half day debriefing workshop with IFRC.
- Final report with recommendations.

Outcome:

It is expected that the evaluator will present her/his initial findings in a debrief meeting with Head of Technical Movement Coordination, Livelihood Movement Coordinator and national Society representatives. The evaluator will produce a report that addresses the purpose and objectives of the evaluation and includes:

- The appropriateness, efficiency, accountability sustainability, relevance and effectiveness of the approach and processes adopted by the PNSs in Haiti to intervene livelihood program at community level, including technical, coordination and community engagement activities.
- Recommendations to programs implementation which meets community needs in coming time in Haiti.

Reporting

A report will be submitted within one week after the completion of the evaluation process to the Livelihood Movement Coordinator IFRC.. The report should follow the following headings:

- 1. Executive summary
- 2. Abbreviations/acronyms
- 3. Introduction
- 4. Literature review
- 5. Review aims and objectives
- 6. Methodology
- 7. Findings
- 8. Recommendations
- 9. Conclusion
- 10. Appendices\

**Time Frame:**

The Evaluation will take place in July 2012, total work for consultancy is not more than 25 working days. Including final report submission

Activities	Duration (in days)
Situation analysis, preparation and desk review	04
Data collection	12
Facilitation workshop	01
Report writing (in 2 steps)	06
Travel days	02
Total	25

Budget & Daily Rates:

The total cost of the evaluation approximate \$18500, The consultant daily rates in between \$450 to \$550 base on her/his knowledge and experience, IFRC will cover other cost such as return travel cost to Haiti from home of country, full board arrangement at base camp and local business related expenses during the evaluation period. The payment schedule will be a) 30% of agreed amount will be paid at agreement time and b) 70% remaining will be paid after the receiving final approved evaluation report.

Evaluation Quality and Ethical standards:

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organisational learning and accountability.

Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Evaluation Framework accompanying the TOR.

The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

- **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
- **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in sensible, cost effective manner.
- **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
- **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
- **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
- **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
- **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
- **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at:

www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

Livelihoods Evaluation for IFRC Haiti

**Requirements for Consultant:**

The consultant should meet the following requirements:

- Academic background in international development, Business management economics, and social development, and research on livelihoods in a development or relief context.
- More than 5 years of evaluation experience, specially for development program and assessment studies.
- Familiarity with quasi-experimental research designs.
- Experience in participatory approaches to evaluations,
- The ability to design/utilise appropriate evaluation tools with knowledge of data gathering techniques and demonstrated ability to understand and analyze collected data.
- Strong experience in the technical aspects of livelihoods programmes, but broader understanding of urban and rural set up of livelihoods programmes. Preference for someone with gender or youth focused programme evaluation experience.
- Experience working in both emergency and longer-term contexts.
- Understanding of low-capacity environments, with experience in supporting capacity-building efforts for different programme stakeholders.
- Previous work experience in Haiti is an asset.
- Fluency in French and English. Knowledge of Creole is an asset.

Application procedure:

Applications are to be submitted by 30th May 2012, to Kamlesh Vyas, livelihood Movement coordinator, Kamlesh.VYAS@ifrc.org, the submission includes

- Curriculum vitae (CV) with three professional references (names and full contact information)
- Availability for the work
- Daily rate
- One sample of recent evaluation writing (a report or similar) relevant to livelihood program.

2. Evaluation Questions

Table 8 Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Criteria	Evaluation Question	Detailed Evaluation Question	Data Collection Methodology
Relevance	Are the objectives of livelihood programs relevant to the context and challenges?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How were the livelihood programs' objectives set-up? - Are these objectives aligned with national/regional objectives and strategies? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desk review Interview with PNSs Review of national livelihood strategy documents
	To what extent are the objectives of livelihood programs still valid?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How are these objectives reviewed? - Did the M&E framework allow the team to adapt the project to the changing circumstances? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview with PNSs
	Are the activities and outputs aligned with the livelihood programs relevant?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Are activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives? - Are the activities and outputs of the livelihood programs consistent with the intended impacts and effects? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desk review of project documents Beneficiaries' interviews and focus groups
	Are these interventions based on an adequate analysis of need?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Are the assumptions on the link between livelihood/resettlement, livelihood/DRR and livelihood/food security, livelihood/shelter valid? - Are the assumptions guiding projects valid and based on solid needs assessment? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus groups - Interviews with PNSs staff
	How are these programs relevant to the overall RCRC partners' strategies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is it relevant and efficient for RCRC partners to invest in a livelihood recovery/improvement strategy? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with PNSs head of delegation
	How do sources of funding influence project design?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Do funding sources influence project duration? - Do they influence project design? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Interview with donors and PNSs' head of delegation or HQ
Effectiveness	Are the livelihood objectives likely to be achieved?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Are the activities likely to produce expected results? - What could be the obstacles to achieving objectives? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with PNSs - Monitoring reports - SWOT analysis
	How can progress and difficulties in post-earthquake situation be characterised for social impact, financial impact and economic impact?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How did the beneficiaries' social, financial and economic situation evolve during the projects? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus groups - Participatory exercise rating changes
	What are the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of these objectives?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How does the capacity level impact objectives achievement? - What other factors influence objectives achievement? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SWOT analysis with PNSs
	Are the program activities implemented according to plan?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Are the deliverables on time? - Are all outputs delivered? - Are there any security issues related to loan disbursement in these circumstances (for beneficiaries or PNSs' staff) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Focus groups - SWOT analysis - Review of monitoring reports
Efficiency	Are programs cost-efficient?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Are programs implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Review of project documents
	Are partnerships an efficient implementation methodology?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How are partnerships structured? - Do PNSs have the capacity to monitor partners? - Is it efficient for PNSs to get involved in livelihood? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of project documents - Interview with partners - Interview with PNSs
Accountability	Do beneficiaries have suggestions/criticisms concerning the objectives, design or implementation of livelihood programs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What is the feedback from beneficiaries? - How was beneficiaries' feedback collected during the project implementation? - Was the feedback taken into consideration for corrective measures on project design? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of existing monitoring reports with beneficiaries' feedback - Focus groups with beneficiaries
	How do beneficiaries perceive RCRC partners interventions in comparison to other post-earthquake interventions that they are aware of? Are these perceptions focused on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What has been the impact of these interventions on PNSs' image and reputation - Do beneficiaries perceive these programs as innovative? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus groups with beneficiaries

	social or financial benefits (or drawbacks)?		
Coverage/ Connectedness	To what extent is the vulnerability aspect taken into account for beneficiaries' selection?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What are the shortcomings and successes of the beneficiaries' selection process? - How do non-beneficiaries perceive the beneficiaries' selection? - What trade-off is done between vulnerability factors and leverage potential? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of beneficiary selection process - Interview with PNSs - Focus group with non-beneficiaries
	How do PNS coordinate with other programs to cover other needs of their beneficiaries?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How effective is the integration of livelihood with other issues? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Interview with other NGOs working in the same area
	Was the program appropriately linked and coordinated with other activities aiming at the same objective?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has there been any coordination with other livelihood restoration projects? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Interview or round table with other NGOs working in target areas
Sustainability	How sustainable were the outcomes of the programs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Will these outcomes be sustained once the funding stops? - How financially sustainable would be the household supported by these programs? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus groups - Interview of PNSs
	What are the main factors that affect, either positively or negatively the sustainability of program outcomes?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SWOT analysis
	What exit strategies were incorporated into program design? Were such strategies implemented and to what extent did they contribute to sustainability?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How was the linkage between these programs and longer-term strategies? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of project documents - Interview with PNSs
Impact	How are impacts envisaged?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At what level are the "improved living conditions"? - How is this level established? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Documentation review
	Are the programs achieving their intended outcomes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What instruments were put in place to measure outcomes achievements? - What is beneficiaries' recovery level? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Review of monitoring reports and instruments - Focus groups
	Were there any important unintended outcomes either positive or negative	What unexpected impacts have been achieved?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Focus groups
	What are the main reasons that determined whether intended outcomes were or were not achieved? Which are under PNSs control and which not?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What was the influence of other agencies' program on the outcomes identified? - How is the psychological situation of the beneficiaries taken into account? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with PNSs - Interview/round table with other NGOs
	To what extent are beneficiaries in a different situation than other people sharing similar characteristics and living in the same geographical area?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What has been the project impact on beneficiaries' dependency from assistance? - Are interventions contributing to a faster and more sustainable recovery? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus groups with non-beneficiaries - Documentation review

3. Evaluation Schedule

Table 9 Evaluation Schedule

Date	Timing	Description
Monday 8 th October	1'00PM	Arrival
Monday 8 th October	2'00 to 5'30PM	Finalisation of inception report and planning
Tuesday 9 th October	8'30 to 10'45AM	Meeting on DRM aspect and Haitian Red Cross integration
Tuesday 9 th October	10'45 to 11'30AM	Meeting on IFRC INA program
Tuesday 9 th October	11'30 to 12'45PM	Meeting with Spanish Red Cross
Tuesday 9 th October	2'00 to 4'15PM	IFRC Livelihood Technical Coordination Meeting
Wednesday 10 th	8'00AM to 12'00PM	Document review + Planning

October		
Wednesday 10 th October	2'00PM to 4'30PM	Meeting with IFRC INA Livelihood Program
Thursday 11 th October	8'00AM to 5'00PM	Field visit with French Red Cross
Thursday 11 th October	6'00PM to 8'00PM	Meeting with BRAC
Friday 12 th October	10'00AM to 11'15AM	Meeting with Netherlands Red Cross
Friday 12 th October	11'30AM to 12'45PM	Meeting with Caritas
Friday 12 th October	2'00PM to 3'00PM	Meeting with IFRC INA Livelihood Program
Friday 12 th October	3'00PM to 4'30PM	Meeting with British Red Cross Livelihood Delegate
Friday 12 th October	6'00PM	Meeting with KNFP
Saturday 13 th October	9'30 to 11'00 AM	Meeting with Veterimed
Sunday 14 th October	4'30 to 6'30 PM	Meeting with Entrepreneurs du Monde
Monday 15 th October	8'30 AM to 4'30 PM	Field visit with the German Red Cross
Tuesday 16 th October	9'00 AM to 10'30 AM	Meeting with the Canadian Red Cross
Tuesday 16 th October	10'30 AM to 12'00 PM	Meeting with the Haitian Red Cross
Tuesday 16 th October	2'00 to 5'00PM	Meeting with the American Red Cross
Wednesday 17 th October	9'00 to 10'00AM	Meeting with IFRC INA livelihood program
Wednesday 17 th October	10'00 AM to 11'00 AM	Meeting with IFRC INA
Wednesday 17 th October	11'00 to 12'00AM	Meeting with IFRC Country Director
Thursday 18 th October	8'00 to 11'30AM	Debriefing
Wednesday 24 th October	8'00 to 8'30PM	Phone call meeting with Fonkoze

4. List of Persons Interviewed

Table 1 Table of Persons Interviewed

Name	Institution	Title
Kamlesh Vyas	IFRC Secretariat	TMC Livelihood Delegate
Mununuri Musori	IFRC Secretariat	TMC Monitoring and Evaluation Delegate
Chantal Pitaud	HRC	DRM Delegate
Garibaldy Santiago	HRC	Livelihood Officer
Sandra Romero	IFRC Secretariat	Livelihood Delegate for INA
Luis Sanchez	IFRC Secretariat	TMC DRM Delegate
Marco Laprietra	HRC	DRM Delegate to HRC
Lidia Afonso Gallegos	SRC	Livelihood Delegate
Sherley Elie	IFRC Secretariat	Livelihood Project Officer
Luce Perez	FRC	Livelihood Delegate
Marie David	FRC	Head of Operations
Charles Elizee Saint Fleur	FRC	Food Security Assistant
Rakibul Bari Khan	BRAC	Country Representative
Ruben Weden	NRC	Livelihood Delegate
Frans Lommers	NRC	Country Manager
Sandra Wicki	GRC/AutRC	Livelihood Delegate
Victorien Donel	GRC/AutRC	Program Manager young entrepreneur
Carl Dessein	GRC/AutRC	Agronomist technical assistant
Jacques Henri Durades	GRC/AutRC	Technical assistant agricultural livelihood
Rose Sandra Timoleon	GRC/AutRC	Technical assistant agricultural livelihood
Josue Cesar	GRC/AutRC	Program Manager agriculture
Jackson Griot	GRC/AutRC	Technical assistant agricultural livelihood
Pierre	GRC/AutRC	M&E officer

Enema Sincelair	Suco	Agriculture extension worker
Jean Pierre Wilner	Suco	Coordinator
Andreas Waser	Caritas Austria	Livelihood Coordinator
Tenzin Manell	BRC	Livelihood Delegate
Lionel Fleuristin	KNFP	Coordinator
Rosanie Moise Germain	Veterimed	Director
Hélène Mauduit	EDM	New Product Development Manager
Isabelle Hachette	CRC	Relocation Delegate
Finbarr Sweeney	ARC	Livelihood Delegate
Achile	ARC	INA Program Assistant
Samuel	ARC	INA Program Assistant
Carine Roenen	Fonkoze	Director

5. List of Documents Reviewed

a. Project documents from PNSs and IFRC

- American Red Cross, *Market Analysis of Carrefour Feuilles*, Finbarr Sweeney and William Michel, June 2012
- Canadian Red Cross, *Logframe CRCS contribution to camp decongestion in Port au Prince*, August 2012
- Canadian Red Cross, *Monitoring and Evaluation Framework CRCS contribution to camp decongestion in Port au Prince*, August 2012
- Canadian Red Cross, *Project document CRCS contribution to camp decongestion in Port au Prince*, August 2012
- Canadian Red Cross, *Formation Monter une petite entreprise*
- French Red Cross, *Proposal Program de renforcement des moyens de subsistance alimentaire et économique des populations victimes du séisme sur leurs zones de vie*, October 2011
- French Red Cross, *Note de synthèse ECHO*, August 2012
- French Red Cross, *Logical Framework Integrated Neighborhood Approach INA Delmas 9 Phase 2*, August 2012
- French Red Cross, *Termes de reference diagnostique relance économique integrated neighborhood approach, Delmas 9, Port-au-Prince*, March-May 2012
- French Red Cross, *Diagnostique en relance économique rapport d'évaluation INA Delmas 9*, Luce Perez, June 2012
- French Red Cross, *Diagnostic Strategique Des Filieres Entrepreneuriales A Fort Potentiel De Creation D'emploi « Construction »*, EDM, April 2012
- French Red Cross, *Diagnostic Strategique Des Filieres Entrepreneuriales A Fort Potentiel De Creation D'emploi « Transports »*, EDM, May 2012
- Spanish Red Cross, *Moyen de subsistance Léogâne*, September 2012
- Spanish Red Cross, *Présentation Appui à la Génération de Revenus des communautés rurales vulnérables du Sud-Est d'Haïti touchées par des différentes catastrophes*, Accenture
- Spanish Red Cross, *Restitution de données Appui à la Génération de Revenus des communautés rurales vulnérables du Sud-Est d'Haïti touchées par des différentes catastrophes*.
- Spanish Red Cross, *Documento de formulación de proyecto, Medios de Subsistencia – Léogâne*, September 2012
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- Spanish Red Cross, *Presupuesto, Medios de Subsistencia – Léogâne*, September 2012
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- British Red Cross, *Logical Framework, Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration Program (URRP)*, September 2012
- British Red Cross, *Gantt Chart, Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration Program (URRP)*, September 2012
- British Red Cross, *Livelihood Budget*, August 2012

- British Red Cross, *Analysis Report D19 Cash Grant Monitoring 2nd Instalment Haiti Recovery Program Zone 3*, June 2012
- British Red Cross, *Monitoring Results Analysis Conditional cash grants 2nd instalment Haiti Recovery Program*, February 2012
- British Red Cross, *Analysis Report D19 Cash Grant Monitoring 2nd Instalment Haiti Recovery Program Zone 5*, June 2012
- German Red Cross, Austrian Red Cross, *Joint Recovery Program Léogâne Livelihood Fact Sheet (as of August 16, 2012)*, August 2012
- German Red Cross, Austrian Red Cross, *Concept Paper For Livelihood*, February 2012
- German Red Cross, Austrian Red Cross, *Livelihood Logframe 2012-2013*, July 2012
- German Red Cross, Austrian Red Cross, *Program de formation et d'accompagnement de formateurs en techniques agricoles basé sur le Djakout Peyizan à l'intention des agriculteurs et agricultrices de la sphère d'intervention de la Croix-Rouge allemande à Léogane/Gressier*, SUCO, July 2012
- IFRC, *INA Programme, Basic Livelihoods training*, September 2012
- IFRC, *INA Programme, Livelihoods components, Update*, July 2012
- IFRC, *INA Programme, Social Capital Programme Logframe*
- KNFP, *Proposition de Project pour la Fédération Internationale de la Croix Rouge*, July 2012
- EDM, *Note succincte recyclage*
- Zafen, *Zafèn SME Investment Fund to support Job Creation, concept note*, May 2011
- IFRC, *TOR Renforcement de capacité pour les petits et moyens entrepreneurs qui se situent à Port-au-Prince, Haïti*
- IFRC, *Solid Waste Collection in Port-au-Prince*

b. Strategic and Action Plans from Haitian Red Cross and PNSs

- Haitian Red Cross, *Plan d'action gestion des risques et désastres 2012-2015*, December 2011
- Spanish Red Cross, *Executive Summary Haiti Earthquake Action Plan 2012-2015 P.A.T.H*
- Netherland Red Cross, *Operational Document (11/ 2011- 11/2014)*, December 2011
- American Red Cross, *Livelihood Programming Framework*

c. Project Evaluations from PNSs

- Spanish Red Cross, *Evaluation Finale du Projet Amélioration de la principale activité génératrice de revenus de mille familles dans les communautés les plus vulnérables de Gaillard, touchées par des différentes catastrophes*, Cécile Béruit, May 2012
- French Red Cross, *Evaluation finale du Projet D'amélioration Des Conditions De Vie Des Populations Sinistrees Par Le Seisme Du 12 Janvier 2010 En Haiti*, Bernard Crenn, Arnaud Ghizzi, September 2011
- American Red Cross, *Impact Evaluation of the Kore Fanmi Fonkoze Program*, Delphine Thizy, December 2011
- American Red Cross, *Evaluation of Danish Red Cross Host Family Support Program South Department, Haiti*, Alexandra Galperin and Carol Ward, November 2011, page 27
- American Red Cross, *Haiti CASF Final Evaluation*, Groupe-Conseil baastel, July 2011

d. Federation Documentation

- International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *Strategy 2020, Saving Lives Changing Minds*, 2010
- International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *Guidelines for Livelihood Programming*, 2011

6. Data Collection Methodology

Participatory Method to Rate Changes⁹⁵

Context: This method is mostly used with illiterate persons.

Objective: This method helps to rate different factors according to relative importance. It could also be used to rate preference in a program.

Material required: Cardboard, colored paper and adhesive colored dots

Animation: 1 person to animate the discussion and 1 person to take notes

How to run the exercise:

1. Introduction

First of all, the animator needs to explain the objective of the exercise and re-state that answers will be anonymous and will not change the beneficiaries' status or rights to future projects.

2. Identification of key changes

On each piece of colored paper or card, a change is drawn (more money, less money, school, hospital, faith in future, etc.). These changes are explained to the group.

Each person is given 3 colored dots to attribute to and place on the main change they experienced in the past 15 months. They have 10 minutes to make this decision individually. They then present it to the group.

3. Identification of key drivers of change

After this, a new set of colored cards is presented to the group. These represent a factor for change (Red Cross projects, other humanitarian assistance, family support, elections, better health, education, etc.)

Each person is given 3 colored dots to place on the main driver of change they can identify. They have 10 minutes to make this decision individually. They then present it to the group.

4. Conclusion and thanks

At the end of the exercise, the animator asks the group what they have learned during this exercise, whether or not there were any surprises. Then he/she concludes by thanking the group for their contribution to the Red Cross' interventions improvement.

⁹⁵ This method is adapted from the methodology used by the Microinsurance Academy in Delhi (India) to design community-based Microinsurance products. <http://www.microinsuranceacademy.org/>