

Internal evaluation of the Mozambique floods Emergency Appeal of February 2013 (Appeal n° MDRMZ010)

Evaluation timeframe: 25 March – 12 April 2013

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Executive summary

After the January 2013 floods in Mozambique, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) supported the Mozambique Red Cross Society (CVM) in the emergency operations in one of the most effected areas: Gaza province. A Preliminary Emergency Appeal was launched and IFRC deployed a Field Assessment Coordination Team (FACT) and three Emergency Response Units (ERU). This internal evaluation seeks to learn from the operation by reviewing the coordination, management and response activities of the IFRC operational structure. It recommends practical interventions to avoid the challenges experienced for the benefit of future operations.

Overall, the IFRC's disaster coordination, management and response activities relative to the humanitarian needs triggered by the floods in Mozambique in 2013 have made a positive contribution to the humanitarian needs in Gaza province. However, challenges were experienced due to the lack of implementation of the operational architecture, in particular because some crucial reporting lines were not followed. The FACT team was of a considerable size, but few team members were in country for the full 4-week deployment. In particular, the Team Leader's departure after 2 weeks has caused a leadership gap. The responsible Regional Office intervened to advise a budget cut, which has caused surprise and confusion for some of the remaining FACT. While the initial FACT assessment was timely, but no evidence was found that this slowed down the operation. The ERUs made a meaningful contribution, although it appears that one of them carried out operations that were not in line with the Plan of Action (PoA) of 13 February and consequently did not address urban sanitation in Chokwe. The CHM ERU and the RDRT staff in the field contested the nature and conduct of the MSM ERU operation. The Disaster and Crisis Management department in Geneva is currently conducting an investigation into this situation. Without assessing whether this ERU adequately addressed the needs of the affected population, it seems that the deployment of this ERU, although justified and relevant, was not managed effectively by IFRC.

The evaluation prompted recommendations to increase the clarity of the operational structure to ensure proper reporting and suggestions on the improvement of consistent management of operations. In addition, specific proposals for FACT and ERU deployment in situations like the Mozambique floods scenario are made. In some areas an improvement of the coordination with external partners is suggested. Finally, a strategic investment in CVM when it comes to repositioning of stocks and its leadership of the Shelter Cluster is recommended.

1. Introduction

One of the key priorities of the Southern Africa Regional Office (SARO) is quality assurance – particularly the strengthening of performance and accountability relating, but not limited to, disaster operations. This will ensure that SARO constantly improves its service delivery to National Societies (NS) and their emergency response to the affected communities. This internal evaluation seeks to review the timeliness and relevance of International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) disaster coordination, management and response activities relative to the humanitarian needs triggered by the floods in Mozambique in 2013. The evaluation specifically seeks to learn lessons in relation to the following areas:

- The timeliness of launching DREF;
- Collaboration with CVM in launching DREF;
- Timeliness of FACT deployment;
- Appropriateness of FACT team composition;
- Relevance and timeliness of ERU deployment;
- Rationale for Plan of Action;
- Timeliness of producing PoA and Emergency Appeal (EA);
- Effectiveness of coordination of PoA among non-Movement stakeholders;
- Coordination between Geneva, AZO and SARO in supporting the response;
- Timeliness and effectiveness of support to victims of the floods.

This internal evaluation will use findings relating to the above points to propose actions that will improve the timeliness and effectiveness of IFRC support to emergency operations in Southern Africa.

2. Background

During the first two months of 2013 heavy rains fell in southern and central Mozambique, causing floods that destructed the infrastructure of some areas and displaced many of the affected. As of 28 February, 186,238 people were displaced due to the floods and 175,693 of those were in Gaza province, including the city and surroundings of the city of Chokwe. The affected population of Chokwe fled their homes to what became an improvised transitional camp some 30 kilometers outside of Chokwe, called Xihaqualane. On January 22 the Government of Mozambique declared an Institutional Red Alert amongst others for Chokwe, meaning that the population is to evacuate.

The Mozambique Red Cross Society (*Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique*, or CVM) responded from the onset of the floods by evacuating families, providing first aid, implementing health campaigns, distributing NFIs, and participating in coordination meetings with the Government and international agencies. A Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF): CHF 300,000 was initially allocated from the IFRC's DREF to support the national society in its initial response. On February 1 2013, IFRC supported the CVM by launching a preliminary emergency appeal on 1 February 2013 for CHF 662,337 in cash, kind or services to support the CVM in giving assistance to 15,000 beneficiaries for 6 months.

In addition, A FACT team was deployed from 30 January to “propose and design a focus and scale for a Red Cross response to support flood victims based on needs assessments and coordination with other agencies”. The FACT team was to assess the needs of the population affected by the floods and to propose a Plan of Action (PoA) for CVM and IFRC to respond to those needs. The PoA was to feed the Revised Emergency Appeal. The initial FACT team comprised of 9 members:

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1. Team Leader (IFRC)
2. Relief delegate (French Red Cross)
3. Logistics delegate (British Red Cross/Spanish Red Cross)
4. Shelter delegate (Australian Red Cross)
5. Emergency health delegate (Spanish Red Cross)
6. WatSan delegate (Netherlands Red Cross)
7. Finance delegate (Finnish Red Cross)
8. Communications delegate (SARO)
9. Reporting delegate (Danish Red Cross)

AZO supplied an Operations Coordinator, coordinating the several flood operations in the Southern Africa Region, who reported to the SARO DMC as well as technically to AZO DMU. SARO contracted an Operations Manager in Maputo, who was, according to her ToR, to “Supervise and guide sector specialists (including FACT and RDRT) on their contribution to achieve the overall objectives of the operation” as well as “Supervise the implementation and monitoring of all activities as laid out in the plan of action, with particular attention to context monitoring and monitoring of achievement of results” – amongst other significant tasks relating to strategic direction to support Mozambique Red Cross in operationalising the appeal, supervision and support to programme staff, management of all aspects of programme implementation and effective representation and advocacy.

Soon after the FACT deployment, a need was identified to deploy three ERU teams, which arrived in Mozambique in early February. One was a Spanish Red Cross logistics ERU initially consisting of 1 logistics delegate. Secondly, two ERUs were deployed. A Community Health Module ERU (CHM) from the Canadian Red Cross was deployed to provide support and activities relevant specifically to community health as elaborated in the Preliminary Emergency Appeal; in addition, a British Red Cross/Swedish Red Cross Mass Sanitation Module (MSM20) ERU was deployed to provide support and activities relevant specifically to sanitation as elaborated in the Preliminary Emergency Appeal. In addition to their support task, both the latter ERUs were supporting the ongoing assessment in gathering and analyzing further emergency health and sanitation related information and data for the development of the FACT Plan of Action for the CVM.

Also, 4 RDRT members (PIROI) were deployed to support in CVM in its WatSan, Health and Relief activities, three arrived on 16 February and one on 10 March.

A Shelter Cluster Team exclusively dedicated to the task of cluster coordination, independent of IFRC and CVM operations, was deployed to work closely in support of the Mozambique Government and CVM to fulfill the mandate as shelter cluster lead agency. These Shelter delegates arrived in Maputo on 15 February.

The Revised Emergency Appeal was launched on 1 March 2013 for CHF 2,044,428 in cash, kind, or services to support the Mozambique Red Cross Society (CVM) to assist 5,700 families in the coming 6 months. This budget includes the ERU deployments, CHF 57,191 in multilateral contributions and CHF 60.908 to cover the cost of shelter cluster coordination. The appeal was 65% covered on 23 April 2013

Evaluation methodology

This evaluation is based on extensive desk research of the available documentation relating to the floods operation, including, but not limited to: the Terms of Reference of the relevant surge tools, the preliminary and revised emergency appeals, the draft Plan of Action, FACT operation updates, FACT field reports and ERU operational updates and some of the FACT and ERU End of Mission documents where available. In addition, the evaluation team had access to selected internal communication between Geneva's Disaster and Crisis Management Department, Africa Zone Office (AZO)'s Disaster Management Unit, SARO and the FACT team. A large number of stakeholders were consulted in telephone or face to face interviews, including relevant IFRC officers, CVM staff at Headquarters and Provincial Secretariat, external partners such as Mozambique's disaster management agency (INGC), local government in Chokwe and humanitarian partners like the UN agencies and IOM. It is important to note that at the time of the evaluation none of the ERU and FACT team members were in Mozambique, and only the Team Leader and the Field Coordinator were spoken to in person. Last but not least, the evaluation team had a group interview with some of the CVM volunteers involved in the operation. The consultations provided the evaluation team with the individual accounts of events, opinions and assessments, based on which the evaluation team could form its own. For a list of consulted stakeholders, see Annex 1.

3. Timeline of events

Date in 2013	Event
1-20 January	Floods hit Mozambique
30 January	DREF loan to Emergency Appeal requested
1 February	Preliminary Appeal launched
30 January - 5 February	Initial FACT deployed
4 February	FACT team, Operations Manager and SARO representatives (DMC and Programme Manager) – hotel meeting to brief about CVM context and advice for small scale appeal.
8 February	Skype call all parties (SARO incl. Operations Coordinator, AZO, FACT and CG) – Operations briefing and repeat briefing about CVM context and advice for small scale appeal.
9 February	ERU deployed
11 February	DREF funding received in Maputo
13 February	Draft FACT PoA shared by TL
14 February	FACT TL end of mission
14 February	ERU to the field
18 February	SARO and FACT meeting revision PoA/Emergency Appeal budget
19 February	Emergency Appeal Operations Update
23 February	Field Coordinator in place
1 March	Revised Emergency Appeal launched
9 March	ERU End of Mission
21 March	Emergency Appeal Operational Update

4. Key players

- Disaster & Crisis Management Department GVA
- DMU AZO
- DMC SARO
- Operations Coordinator (in Gaborone)
- Operations Manager (in Maputo)
- FACT Team (see Annex 2)
- ERU CHM (see Annex 2)
- ERU MSM (see Annex 2)
- ERU logistics (see Annex 2)
- 4 RDRT (see Annex 2)
- AZO Finance Delegate (see Annex 2)
- Fleet Manager (see Annex 2)
- Field Coordinator (from 23 February)
- CVM HQ staff (see Annex 3)
- CVM Provincial Staff (see Annex 3)
- Volunteers Chokwe District

5. Key Findings

a. CVM operational structure and coordination with IFRC

CVM was first responder on site in Xihaqualane and stayed involved in carrying out the operational Emergency Plan of Action in the most affected provinces (Gaza and Zambezia) to assist vulnerable families affected by the floods to recover/improve their pre-disaster living conditions. While CVM as an institution has long experience with flood response and international cooperation, it is currently experiencing the after effects of some serious challenges relating to financial management. This has resulted in the resignation of some key staff members with institutional memory, amongst others the Head of DM. This made it difficult for CVM to take the lead in the operations, especially from headquarters. Staff in the province of Gaza is competent and motivated, but small in number. As a result, much of the field coordination in Chokwe and Xihaqualane fell on CVM a single District staff who was not prepared for this. CVM was creative in its staffing solutions: it engaged some (but possibly not enough) staff from other provinces and borrowed programme staff from other programs for emergency response. Because the latter category was engaged well beyond emergency phase this led to irritation on the part of the PNS that funded this staff.

The coordination between the FACT and CVM was good and experienced as pleasant by CVM. Every FACT member had a CVM counterpart (See Annex 3 – CVM counterparts for IFRC per sector), and CVM had a daily operational meeting (GODE meeting) in which FACT was represented. On the part of the Secretary General, there was a wish to receive more reporting and planning on paper, in addition to the oral presentations made in the GODE meeting (GODE stands for *Grupo Operativo d'Emergencia*).

CVM Management at Provincial level appreciated the FACT and ERU support. Although it was familiar with FACT team, it was at first dismayed that ERUs went straight to the field without reporting in Xai Xai. This was initially experienced as inappropriate, but in hindsight assessed as necessary in an emergency operation. It seems nevertheless that more information/coordination with Provincial management is warranted.

b. IFRC's operational structure

General

The setup and carry out of this operation involved all the layers of IFRC as an organisation, including Headquarters in Geneva, the Africa Zone Office, the Southern Africa Regional Office and the IFRC presence in Mozambique. It also involved specialists from the different sectors, such as DM, finance, and a separate shelter team. In addition, PNS supported surge tools were involved as well as some RDRT staff. Overall, the responsibilities and roles within the different layers and sectors were clear, but between these elements there was less clarity on the extent of responsibility and mandate in this operation.

The theoretical setup of the operational structure and envisaged reporting lines were logical and solid, based on the draft AZO SoPs, FACT and ERU ToRs as well as internal communication. The process of FACT and ERU deployment was timely and, while maybe on the generous side for FACT, the composition of both FACT and the ERUs was well thought through.

However, reporting lines were not taken notice of by everyone involved (Operations Coordinator, FACT Team Leader) either due to technical difficulties, unfamiliarity with the proposed reporting lines or physical (un)availability of officers to report to. In some cases, the lines of reporting were perhaps also not clear: they were not outlined in an official communication, but mentioned in one email from AZO DMU to the SARO Regional Representative, be it with all relevant staff in cc. The only lines stated clearly were those of the FACT Team Leader reporting to Operations Coordinator in the FACT ToRs and those of the ERU Team Leaders to the relevant FACT delegates (and later to the Field Coordinator although only in a short email). This resulted in a lack of information flow to the AZO and the SARO DMUs, and made it hard for them to play an advisory role in an operation they were both geographically and technically responsible for. There is a definite impression that not all stakeholders were fully aware of the expectations of them, and some staff – like the Operations Coordinator and the Operations Manager – were expected to take on a workload that may have been unrealistic to carry out in their specific circumstances.

While the FACT deployment seems to have been efficient at the onset, there was a high turnover of FACT staff, and a leadership gap when the Team Leader left after 2 weeks of deployment. This may have contributed to the ineffective management of operations of one of the ERUs deployed – indirectly the responsibility of the FACT Team Leader. The leadership vacuum may certainly have been a factor in the delay of the update of the Plan of Action and the related Revised Emergency Appeal budget that it is supposed to feed.

The ERU teams arrived on site in a timely manner. However, one of them - the MSM ERU apparently - developed activities that were not in line with the PoA and agreements made with the WASH cluster – and arguably not in line with the needs of the affected population - something which responsible IFRC staff was not able to manage effectively.

Organisation of the AZO/SARO structure

The AZO/SARO senior staff agreed to follow the operational structure proposed in the draft Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs) for the Africa Zone. In principle, this meant that an Operations Coordinator was deployed in the SARO office to coordinate on-going operations, including the one in Mozambique. The FACT team Leader reports to this Coordinator and

hence the latter forms the connection between the FACT/ERU operations and the AZO/SARO. The Coordinator is also budget holder for the Emergency Appeal. The Coordinator reports on technical matters to AZO DMU and is line managed by the SARO DMC. The SARO DMC in turn reports to the SARO Programme Coordinator and he to the Regional Representative. The latter has overall responsibility for the operation. This construction is solid and logical on paper, as it assures the information flow to and from the SARO and AZO offices, while at the same time supporting SARO DMC in emergency response so as to allow him to attend to on-going business. The construction is based on the draft SoPs for the AZO. It is important to note the construction was the first implementation: a pilot. In this light, it is unfortunate that there were no ToRs in place for the Operations Coordinator. This may well have contributed to the minimal role the Operations Coordinator seems to have played in the Mozambique Operation. In practice, reporting lines to her by the FACT Team Leader and from her to SARO DMC were not followed. The Coordinator suffered technical difficulties and, importantly, the SARO DMC was often not in the office to report to. Even so, reporting could have been done via email or telephone, and the next logical reporting line was to the SARO Programme Coordinator.

Deployment of the FACT team

From the interviews with all involved it appears that communication about the deployment of a FACT team involved all relevant players, that is to say: the Geneva Disaster and Crisis Management Unit, the AZO DMU, SARO and CVM. It was agreed quickly that a FACT team was to be deployed, and a draft ToR was shared for input by the Surge Capacity Officer with all parties, including SARO, on January 29. The original ToR suggested a 9 person FACT team with a standard deployment of 4 weeks. The relatively generous FACT composition was guided by the limited capacities in country. A basic FACT team will normally comprise of 5 elements: Team Leader, Relief, WatSan, Health, Communications. In this case a Finance delegate was added because of the current circumstances of CVM. After an explicit request from the AZO DMU a Shelter delegate and Reporting delegate were added to the FACT. The 5-day deployment of the SARO communication officer to the FACT seems to have been logical, seen as she was to be deployed to Maputo to prepare for the visit of IFRC President Konoé.

The FACT team arrived in country from 30 January – 5 February 2013, which seems as quick as can be desired. After the deployment of a finance delegate, it turned out that AZO was also deploying a finance officer to Mozambique to support in the drafting of the appeal budget, guided by the financial situation of CVM. Therefore, the finance delegate left Mozambique after 10 days. This 'double' deployment seems an undesirable situation and could perhaps have been avoided by clear communication on the part of AZO of this intended deployment, preferably during the composition of the FACT Team. As SARO did indicate the intended deployment of a finance delegate, the FACT composition should have taken that into account.

Over the 4-week deployment indicated in the FACT ToR, there was a high turnover of staff. Several FACT team members stayed on the ground (much) shorter than 4 weeks – as can be seen above with the Finance and Communications delegates. The WATSAN Delegate, who was requested to take a coordinating role in the field, departed on 22 February (3 weeks into his deployment). The Health delegate took over as Field Coordinator from this point onwards, and was awarded a contract to this end at the end of his FACT deployment on 23 February. The logistics delegate was in country for 10 days, but was replaced with a new FACT logistics delegate as well as the logistics ERU. Most importantly, however, it was clear from the beginning that the Team Leader was only going to be deployed for 2 weeks, rather than the total 4 of the FACT deployment, which seems to have resulted in a leadership gap in the last 2 weeks of the FACT deployment. Upon her departure, there was an arrangement with the Operations Manager in Maputo to take over the role of Team Leader. While a general supervisory role fitted into the larger framework of the Operations Manager's extensive set of tasks, the role of Team Leader, which involves intensive management of a multi-head FACT

team travelling in and out of Gaza Province, may have been too much to ask. The Operations Manager did receive a briefing from the departing Team Leader and took on the responsibility, but indicated that she was reluctant as her day to day activities did not allow her the time needed to actually manage the FACT activities. In practice, this seems to have resulted in a situation where the Operations Manager did manage the logistics and admin for the FACT, but there was no real day-to-day management of the FACT operation as a whole.

An important issue in the proceedings of the operation was the lack of reporting from the FACT Team Leader to the Operations Coordinator in Botswana. This reporting line is crucial to allow for the information flow and advisory role of the AZO and SARO DMUs in an operation that falls under their area of expertise and responsibility. Although the obligation to report to the Operations Coordinator was clearly stated in the FACT ToR, the Team Leader reported to the Surge Capacity Officer in Geneva instead. This lack of reporting is attributed both by the Team Leader and the Operations Coordinator to technical difficulties, although the Team Leader also mentions that she assumed that her reports to Geneva would be distributed to the relevant stakeholders by the Surge Capacity Officer. In practice, this didn't occur and as a result the information flow to the AZO and the SARO was impeded, and the advisory role they could have played towards the Team Leader was comprised. In practice, there was some email communication between the Team Leader and the SARO Regional Representative, in particular about issues of staff recruitment and the PoA. In addition, the reporting line from the Operations Coordinator to the SARO DMU was also flawed, again due to technical difficulties, but also because the SARO DMU was in the field for other emergency operations.

Generally it appears that too little was documented in writing: no End of Mission report was produced by the FACT Team Leader. There was a Skype debriefing, but AZO was not involved in this. Aside from the fact that the FACT ToR prescribe an End of Mission report, it is also advisable in a case like this, where there was lack of reporting and discussion about the draft PoA, for the Team Leader to do an End of Mission report to capture lessons learnt for future operations in a similar setting. The Evaluation team did have access to some End of Mission statements from other individual FACT members.

Deployment of the ERUs

The need for ERU deployment was identified by the FACT, who consulted CVM on the request for deployment, but not the SARO and AZO. At the latter's request, the CHM is justified after the request for deployment by the FACT Team Leader in an email to relevant stakeholders, including the Operations Coordinator and AZO DMU, on 6 February. CVM was consulted about the deployment in the daily GODE meeting. A request was sent out by the relevant officers in Geneva and the Logistics, CHM and MSM ERUs arrived in Maputo on the 9th of February, which is timely. The ERUs had clear ToRs, outlining their objectives based on the Preliminary Emergency Appeal and indicating their reporting lines. Originally, the ERUs reported to the relevant FACT specialists (Logistics, Health and WatSan). From 27 February onwards, the CHM and MSM ERUs were instructed to report to the Field Coordinator in an email from the Surge Capacity (ERU) officer in Geneva. It seems that the theoretical setup is logical and solid.

However, when it comes to the arrival in the field, it appears that the ERU deployment is not according to plan at all points, and it appears that the IFRC did not effectively manage this situation. The PoA and the ToRs clearly state that, although there are still needs in the transitional camp of Xihaqualane, operations should focus on the cleaning up of Chokwe city, to ensure a safe return of the population – this was also the understanding between the IFRC and the WASH cluster partners who had indicated a need for urban sanitation skills to the FACT WatSan delegate. By the time of ERU deployment to the field, the population was already moving back to their homes in the city, in spite of a government Red Alert still being in place. The CHM and MSM ERUs arrive in Gaza province on 14th February, which appears to be slow relative to their arrival in Maputo on the 9th of that month. Once in the field, the CHM

ERU starts its operations to clean up the hospital in Chokwe city. The MSM ERU decides to stay in the transitional camp in Xihaqualane to build latrines, rather than focus on other elements like cleaning of septic tanks, solid waste disposal, vector control and latrine building in Chokwe. This decision goes against the PoA as well as agreements made with the WASH cluster by the FACT WatSan delegate. The MSM ERU, however, indicates in hindsight that it was not possible to operate in Chokwe due to environmental barriers and that there was a lack of emergency needs in the city. In addition, there is disagreement between the two ERUs, because the CHM ERU complains that MSM ERU is not willing to cooperate and support them, as was agreed with the relevant FACT delegates. Finally, there was controversy on the nature of the activities of the MSM ERU in Xihaqualane itself; when challenged by the CVM WatSan Officer on the location and type of latrines the MSM ERU was building, the former felt she could not get her message across and decided to address the matter via the WASH cluster lead UNICEF, who also took the matter up with the MSM ERU.

It is not possible for the current evaluation to assess the real time needs at the time of the ERU deployment, and a Geneva led investigation into the operations of the MSM ERU operation is currently on-going. It does seem, however, that at the time no adequate IFRC management of the operations was in place to control the ERU deployment and manage its performance in relation to the operational environment. Neither of the ERUs reported daily in the first two weeks as they should have done, which may have led to a lack of information on the side of FACT and in GVA of what was happening in the field. While afterwards both the WatSan delegate and the Health delegate/Field Coordinator challenge the MSM ERU's decision, it appears that at the time when it occurred neither of them were in the field themselves. The Field Coordinator did exchange emails with the MSM team leader to challenge his decision. In the mean time, the CVM WATSAN counterpart challenges the MSM ERU on location and type of latrines. She eventually turns to WATSAN cluster lead UNICEF for support. The MSM ERU does relocate to Chokwe in the last few days of its deployment.

While the deployment of the ERUs was efficient, timely and justified, and even though they had the right skills for the identified needs in the field, the MSM ERU is criticised for choosing to work in the camp (Xihaqualane) instead of in the city (Chokwe), which apparently was against all agreements. While the ERU was tasked with supporting the FACT in its assessment activities, this does not warrant a change of plans against instructions from the FACT delegates. The evaluation was not able to establish whether the WatSan delegate endorsed or challenged the decision to stay in Chokwe, which lack of available documentation in itself is a cause for concern. In addition, all other stakeholders seem to agree that people were leaving the camp and recovery efforts were required in the city. The responsible IFRC staff seem not to have been able to manage this situation effectively. The change of plans seems to have negatively affected the appropriateness of IFRCs relief efforts at minimum with regard to the need in Chokwe as identified by the WASH cluster and the PoA. Especially the apparent lack of control of the FACT over the operations is something of concern for future ERU deployment.

c. The DREF, the Plan of Action and the Emergency Appeal

DREF

More or less immediately after the Government of Mozambique issued an Institutional Red Alert on 22 February, CVM started the process of writing a DREF application with the support of the SARO DMC. The latter went Mozambique shortly thereafter to support the application in person. A DREF application for CHF 300,000 was prepared by CVM/SARO DMC but was never submitted to Geneva as AZO DMU decided to apply for a DREF loan for the emergency appeal; this happened 30 January – 8 days after the government issued the Institutional Red Alert. In addition, the DREF funds only arrived in country 11 February - almost three weeks after the Red Alert. This appears to have been a relatively lengthy process for emergency funds which in theory can be released within hours after an emergency strikes and in this case the emergency could have been anticipated as water

levels had been rising for a while, so the need for DREF funds could have been anticipated and an application could have been prepared even before the Institutional Red Alert 22 January.

According to the “Guidelines for the Use of DREF” allocations can be made as:

- Loans of start-up funding for response to large-scale disasters, for which an emergency appeal has or will be launched;
- Grants to cover the costs of smaller-scale operations for which it is not appropriate to launch an international appeal, known as DREF-supported operations. When a DREF-supported operation evolves into an operation of wider scope which calls for an emergency appeal, the grant will become a loan.

In this case the DREF was a loan to the Emergency Appeal. CVM apparently spent several days guided by the SARO DMC writing a DREF application, which was never used and according to the AZO DMU a DREF application was never needed for this operation. It is of concern if national societies spend time and other resources in an emergency situation on unnecessary activities as a result of advice from the IFRC as may have been the case here.

The guidelines do not clearly state whether the strict requirements for the use of monies from DREF apply only to “DREF-supported operations” or also to DREF loans to emergency appeals. It is therefore difficult for the evaluation team to answer the question whether “DREF was used according to the guidelines”. The guidelines clearly limit the types of activities that can be funded by DREF but in this case where DREF was a loan to the emergency appeal and no separate DREF finance and narrative reports are being compiled it has not been possible to ascertain whether DREF has been used according to the guidelines. We have, however, not seen or heard anything that would indicate that DREF has not been used according to the guidelines.

The PoA and Emergency Appeal

Around 14 February, 2 weeks into the deployment, a draft Plan of Action was produced by the FACT team. This Plan of action was based on the assessments of the different sectors, who had visited Xihaqualane and Chokwe to assess the population’s needs and consult with the local CVM Branch and the relevant humanitarian actors. This draft Plan of Action is to feed the revised emergency appeal and its budget. The Team Leader ends her mission after submission of the draft Plan of Action (PoA).

Discussion arises about the PoA and revised Emergency Appeal. From the onset, SARO had briefed the FACT about need to keep the operation short and of small scale, due to context of CVM. This information was repeated several times, both in the Skype conference call preparing the FACT deployment, individual email contact between FACT Team Leader and the SARO Regional Representative and in briefings with the FACT in Maputo in the early days of their deployment (see under 4. Timeline of events). The briefing was not included in the FACT ToRs. From the consultations for this evaluation it seems that everyone was aware of the CVM context: its current limited capacities to implement longer term projects and the failure to implement the PoA of the operations of 2012, as well as the inability to justify the funding spent in 2012. It was clear to all involved that the SARO had strongly advised to draft a PoA that limited the demands on CVM to implement longer term programs and without burdening the financial management of CVM.

There seems to have been, however, a difference of opinion on how small this small scale operation was to be. FACT proposes a 7 month intervention to restore the basic living conditions of 5,700 of the most vulnerable affected families to pre-emergency conditions,

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while strengthening household and community resilience. Separate logframes are attached for WatSan, Shelter and Health. It proposes the following activities for the relief phase:

“..to assist 5,700 flood affected families (28,500 persons) with NFIs, emergency shelter materials, health and water and sanitation assistance. Health activities and health and hygiene promotion sessions may reach a higher number of indirect beneficiaries as they are implemented in the accommodation camps and during distributions not only of CVM RC/RC relief items but also during distributions provided by other agencies and stakeholders.”

The PoA goes on to outline the recovery activities for the sectors of Health, WatSan, Shelter, Livelihoods and Capacity Building. Some of the proposed plans move well into the recovery phase, especially the proposal to provide 300 families with shelter assistance to restore/improve their houses to pre-disaster conditions by using the “build back better approach” and the proposed deployment of 3 brick making machines, both for own use and as a livelihood generator. Although these proposed activities appear to make a lot of sense given the situation in Chokwe, they increase the cost of the proposed operation significantly. In total, the proposed budget is for 1,5 million CHF, about 10% of the UN budget for this operation. This amount does not include the (in kind) ERU deployments and is hence to be mobilised in its entirety. The FACT team feels that there is enough trust on the side of the donors to be appealing for this amount, based on the willingness of PNSs to deploy ERU teams and a AZO/SARO led teleconference that was held with the PNSs at which soft pledges for support were made. FACT and AZO DMU confirm that they still are of the opinion, based on this teleconference, that the budget should not have been cut.

However, SARO feels that this budget is unrealistic, based on its experience with badly underfunded appeals in the Southern Africa Region. SARO’s interpretation of the above-mentioned teleconference is that there were not enough soft pledges to cover the appeal budget proposed by FACT. It also and feels that the scope of activities proposed goes beyond the (informal) agreements made concerning its explicit request to limit the scope of the operation so as to avoid implementation problems which may result in further reputational damage for CVM. SARO Regional Representative and Programme Manager arrive in Maputo for a regional meeting, and meet with the FACT team on 18 February. At this point, the Team Leader is no longer in the country, seen as she had left on 14 February. During the meeting with FACT, the SARO representatives, with the agreement of the Operations Manager, instruct the FACT to reduce the budget, in essence by including the FACT and ERU deployments and bearing in mind the soft pledges received until now. FACT objects that a change in budget means a change in operations, but does rewrite the budget. Final revised budget amounts to 2.44 Million CHF, but this includes DREF, ERU and FACT, in kind donations, a ECHO soft pledge of approximately 700.000 CHF and hence leaves open an amount of approximately 270.000 to be mobilised. The discussion about the Revised Appeal and the consequent re-assessment of the FACT team (who went back for the field for this) , the rewriting of PoA and budgets (which was handed over by a frustrated Finance Delegate to the Finance Department of Nairobi) seems to have resulted in some delay in launching the Revised Appeal which happened on 1 March 2013. By that time, the situation in the field had changed dramatically, with most of the affected population having left the Xihaqualane Camp and returned to Chokwe city. An updated Plan of Action was never completed while the FACT team was in country, although there appear to be revised versions of the WatSan, Health and Shelter logframes. The appeal was 32% covered on April 9 2013.

Every stakeholder consulted agrees that the Emergency Appeal budget should in principle be based on the assessment of what is needed by technicians (the FACT team). However, a point of contention is to what extent SARO’s more general regional and management considerations, including knowledge of the funding environment and national society capacities, should have been decisive in the final edit of the Emergency Appeal budget. It does seem that the intervention by SARO caused some delay in the production of the revised budget and, arguably, a budget cut implies a cut in (intensity of) activities, which were based

on a technical assessment of the needs in Gaza. Without passing judgement on the essential question of “the humanitarian imperative” vs. “the capacity building of our national member” in a general sense, for this particular case the management concerns are to be taken into account very seriously. In this particular case the national society is in very challenging circumstances with relation to capacities and financial management, especially relating to the previous Emergency Appeal. An Emergency Appeal that bears too heavily on CVM’s limited implementation capacities may result in reputational damage and further reluctance on the part of donors to support future operations. The FACT was aware of this concern. The SARO is eventually the responsible entity for implementation of the Emergency Appeal in the region, and it had expressed from the onset of the FACT deployment its concern about the extent of the operation. It would have been advisable for the FACT team to liaise closer with – at minimum – the Operations Coordinator (who was also budget holder) on the budgeting plans. Considering that the FACT’s reporting line to the Operations Coordinator was not followed, and as the SARO DMC (the next responsible) was not physically available to report to, the operational and budgeting plans were not communicated until the PoA and the budget were finalised. Eventually, the insistence on a cut of the PoA/Emergency Appeal Budget came from the SARO Regional Representative and the Programme Coordinator. At the time of this intervention, the draft budget was already finalised and the Team Leader had ended her mission. This situation appears to have caused confusion with the FACT team members, which is understandable, but given the above circumstances not entirely justified. However, for the future, it seems advisable that in a situation like this, the particular concerns and advice of the responsible Regional Office are formalised as specifically as possible in FACT ToRs. This is not to impede the technical expertise of the FACT, but to ensure that any discussion on the proposed Emergency Appeal budget is more compact and to ensure a successful implementation of the PoA by making use of knowledge of the regional and local knowledge and capacities.

While the cutting of the budget definitely led to a cut in planned activities, another matter is whether the delay in launching the revised Emergency Appeal influenced the on-going operations in February and March. This is hard to establish in hindsight, also because the parties involved are not in a position to answer it. While it would be logical to assume that a delay in PoA and appeal would delay operations, the evaluation team have seen or heard no evidence of that. It seems therefore that operations were carried out as planned, based on the funding flow from the Preliminary Appeal.

d. What challenges did the Federation face in identifying and delivering the appropriate support?

In summary of the above, the different IFRC layers all feel an overall responsibility for (elements of) the operation, which makes it hard to decide who has the final say in operational decisions. Also, some layers did not receive adequate updates for them to perform their respective roles. Additionally, not all reporting lines were followed, at least partly due to challenges relating to IT and communication equipment. Another reason may have been that the reporting lines were not in all cases stated clearly. Some individual staff were overburdened, which affected their performance relative to the expectations of them. All interviewed stakeholders indicated that some of the issues were created by personality issues, which seems to imply that IFRC was challenged from an Human Resource perspective. An issue that was raised by finance is that FACT sectoral budgets were not done according to the standard format, possibly due to lack of briefing. This, in combination with the several revisions of the budget, resulted in a delay on their part in delivering the budget. Finally, there appears to be an issue with accountability, seen as there is no End of Mission report from the FACT Team Leader, and apparently not all of the FACT member appraisals were done. Some individual FACT delegate End of Mission messages were found, but not for all.

e. How was coordination managed both with other Movement actors and with external partners and was this done effectively?

Mozambique Government

The director of INGC, Mozambique's National Disaster Management Agency, reported that, although he has greatly appreciated the support of CVM and IFRC in the past, he had not been made aware of IFRC deployment this year. INGC at headquarters was not involved in the FACT assessment. He also expressed his concern about CVM as a partner, considering its current financial situation. The decentralised office of INGC was unfortunately not in a position to receive the evaluation team and hence their awareness of and collaboration with the FACT and ERU deployment could not be assessed.

Local authorities

The Mayor of Chokwe and the District Administrator expressed enormous appreciation of the CVM/IFRC assistance. They experienced it as working hand in hand and thanked the Movement for its valuable contribution. They expressed their wish for the Movement to stay on longer and requested further in kind support to the cleaning activities in Chokwe.

WASH Cluster

UNICEF, cluster lead for WASH, reports that it had good cooperation with the FACT WatSan delegate, and having indicated to him there was a gap in the cluster for urban sanitation – a skill necessary to ensure the safe return of the displaced to Chokwe city. The FACT WATSAN agrees to deploy an ERU with that skill, and the PoA reflects this, as it proposes most WATSAN activities in town rather than in the camp. Once the MSM ERU arrives, the cluster is surprised and disappointed that they decide to work in the camp nevertheless.

Shelter Cluster

CVM leads the Shelter Cluster in Mozambique. Shelter cluster partners UN HABITAT and IOM both report that CVM did not have capacity/staff in place at the onset of the flooding to take the lead. IOM took over in the field, but when the Shelter delegation arrived he claimed that GVA has instructed him to take cluster lead. This caused a) extra work for IOM (the claim they were called for called for advice 3 times a day) because he had no local knowledge and b) irritation. The technical expertise of all shelter delegates was praised, but not the involvement as lead halfway through a disaster.

f. Has IFRC assistance made a meaningful contribution to assisting the people displaced by floods?

Although IFRC made a meaningful contribution to the assistance of those affected by the floods, there is definitely room for improvement.

The CVM volunteers were of the essence for the response: CVM Provincial/District staff and volunteers were on site from the onset to evacuate those in need and supported the displaced people with the few tents and tarpaulins they had in stock. The volunteers distributed NFIs and provided health and sanitation trainings and kits. The CVM volunteers were also relied upon by other humanitarian partners, such as Samaritan's Purse and Save the Children. One thing that is attributed by the local authorities to the CVM volunteers is that there was no cholera outbreak, due to the health promotion and sanitation activities.

Due to the sudden onset of floods an acute shelter need arose, which was hard for CVM to address immediately due to lack of stock in the CVM warehouses (not enough tents). The deployment of a FACT and ERU team can – for understandable and practical reasons – not be timely enough to address those needs. This fact should be borne in mind when it comes to pre-positioning of stocks for CVM and training of volunteers in rescue activities. An important contribution from this perspective is the deployment of both a FACT and ERU logistics unit, which not only supported the procurement of items needed for this operation, but also prepared the warehouse for the arrival of future stock.

CVM was also not in a position to lead the Shelter cluster as it currently has nobody in place to take on that role. As can be seen above, the deployment of an IFRC shelter delegation, although praised for its expertise, to take the lead in the cluster a few weeks into the operations did not enhance the collaboration with our shelter partners UN HABITAT and IOM.

The FACT team arrived on time and conducted a rapid first assessment. However, it seems to have taken long to produce a PoA that could feed a revised Emergency Appeal, delayed by discussions with the SARO and budgeting difficulties. It also seems that at HQ level the coordination of FACT with the INGC appears to have been almost entirely absent, in spite of the fact that a CVM staff attended all INGC's daily operational updates. FACT did ensure deployment of ERUs in a timely manner, and triggered the deployment of RDRT staff as soon as possible. Also, the FACT team supported the CVM volunteers in their work providing them with training, logistics and distribution support for NFIs.

The ERUs made a meaningful contribution by providing training to volunteers and cleaning up the hospital in Chokwe, and they supported the volunteers in their activities in Health Promotion and distribution of sanitation kits – which was a great contribution to the avoidance of a cholera outbreak in the camp. The MSM ERU spent a significant part of its deployment building the latrines in Xihaqualane camp. However, from several EoM reports and consultations with relevant IFRC staff it appears that the MSM ERU did not address the need for urban sanitation in Chokwe as identified by the WASH cluster and the PoA. It is not possible for the current evaluation to assess the real time needs at the time of the ERU deployment, and a Geneva led investigation into the operations of the MSM ERU operation is currently on-going. It does seem, however, that at the time no adequate IFRC management of the operations was in place to control the ERU deployment and manage its performance in relation to the operational environment.

One practical issue that was registered is that some of the IEC materials distributed to the volunteers were in English, while most Mozambique's volunteers speak very little of that. Depending on the size of the shipment of materials, that could have been expensive and unnecessary. Also, with a large Portuguese speaking community worldwide, IFRC could consider translating its basic materials into Portuguese, if it has not already done so.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

a. Conclusion

Overall, the IFRC's disaster coordination, management and response activities relative to the humanitarian needs triggered by the floods in Mozambique in 2013 have made a positive contribution to the humanitarian needs in Gaza province. The CVM is satisfied on the whole with the support it received. Through IFRC/CVM collaboration, many displaced people have been assisted effectively through distribution of NFIs, in particular shelter and sanitation kits. Awareness was raised on health and sanitation, which must have contributed to improving the affected population's situation and contributed to the overall health situation, including the avoidance of large-scale diarrhoea and a potential cholera outbreak.

However, the IFRC was not able to support the CVM in the evacuation of affected people and in the response to the immediate and acute shelter need that arose at the onset of the floods. This can be attributed to the fact that there were not enough stocks in place in the CVM warehouses for the volunteers to distribute. In addition, there was no Shelter officer in place in CVM, which as a consequence could not lead of the Shelter Cluster in Mozambique. The deployment of an IFRC Shelter delegation, who took over the lead from IOM, was not an ideal solution to that hiatus and led to annoyance on the part of the Shelter cluster partners already operative in the field.

The deployment of the three ERUs was meaningful and contributed much to the logistics of the operation, the sanitation situation in the camp and the cleaning of the hospital in Chokwe. It does appear that the CHM ERU's contribution could have addressed a need clearly identified by the WASH cluster by engaging in urban sanitation in Chokwe, rather than building latrines in Xihaqualane. Its decision to stay in the camp was definitely a decision that was not in line with the PoA. The operation of this ERU, although justified and relevant, was not managed effectively by IFRC.

While the arrival of the FACT seems to be timely, as was the initial needs assessment, there seems to be a long lapse of time between the drafting of the assessment, the first PoA and the revised emergency appeal. The exact reasons for this are not entirely clear, but seem to relate to a reassessment of the needs and the re-drafting of the budget after a binding advice from the SARO. By the time the budget was revised, the situation in the field had changed from that of the first FACT assessment, as most people had returned to their homes. Fortunately, the operations do not appear to be affected by this delay, presumably because there was a funding flow from the Preliminary Emergency Appeal and the DREF allocated to it.

Many FACT staff were not in country for the full 4 weeks of deployment. This resulted in a few replacements and some task shifting between FACT delegates, such as the logistics delegate replacement and the WatSan taking on a (unofficial) field coordination role, causing a high turnover in responsible delegates. In addition, the Team Leader was only deployed for 2 weeks, which caused a leadership gap from her departure onwards. The Operations Manager, who was requested to take on the role of Team Leader in addition to her regular role, was not in a position to do so effectively. A Field Coordinator was only officially installed after 13 days of the Team Leader's departure. The inconsistent availability of FACT staff and the lack of leadership after the departure of the Team Leader may very well have contributed to the independent decisions of one of the ERUs.

There were other issues that affected the operation as a whole. Many layers of the Movement were involved in the operational structure: Geneva, Africa Zone Office, Southern Africa Regional Office, Mozambique Country Office, CVM and PNS backed ERU and RDRT deployment. This appears to be something that is inherent to the structure of the Movement and all the layers have their role to play. In theory, the setup of the operational structure seemed solid and logical, but in practice it was not implemented effectively. Although many of these layers feel an overall responsibility for (parts of) the operation, it was not in all cases

clear who has final responsibility. There was disagreement on the mandate to decide on essential issues like the extent of the PoA and the budget, or operational changes in the field. In addition, the deployment of an AZO DMU Operations Coordinator, in line with the draft AZO Standard Operating Procedures, was a 'pilot'. Not every player in the multilayer setup of this operation was entirely clear on their role and relation to other officers, and not all of them were provided with a ToR. Some players were overburdened. The reporting lines were not observed by all involved, in particular the reporting line from the FACT Team Leader to the Operations Coordinator, while the latter was not only budget holder, but also the main connection with the SARO and AZO. This lack of reporting had consequences for the information flow from the field to the SARO and AZO and prohibited them from playing an advisory role in an operation that they were both geographically and technically responsible for. This may have driven the need for SARO senior management to intervene after the Emergency Appeal budget was proposed, seen as it had not had a chance to advise during the drafting of the PoA and budget.

There are some administrative issues that affect the transparency of the operation. Due to a lack of briefing, FACT delegates used a variety of formats and currencies for the first draft of the FACT budget, which was consequently delayed. Not all the relevant officers provided an end of mission report, in particular the Team Leader's End of Mission Report is missing. Finally, the PoA was not updated after 14 February, until April 10, 2013.

b. Recommendations

- In this operation, the importance of consistent reporting would warrant a clear **document indicating the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines** for all involved in the operation. For Zonal consistency, this document should be in line with the draft SoPs developed by the AZO DMU. It should be shared formally with all parties involved.
- It is crucial that all **reporting lines** are followed to ensure the flow of information to and from the field.
- All officers involved, except the FACT and ERU teams who have team ToRs, should have a clear **individual ToR**, which should also be shared with the officer they report to as well as to their national society counterparts. This goes specifically to 'new' functions like the Operations Coordinator in the case of the Mozambique floods operation.
- Any FACT assessment would involve contextual assessment, but based on the Mozambique Floods operation, it should be stressed that this involves the regional context as understood by the responsible regional office. In special circumstances like the one in the Mozambique, **the advice of the responsible Regional Office on the scale of the PoA and the budget should be formalised (perhaps even in the FACT ToR)** as specifically as possible. This is not to be understood as a binding 'law' to impede the technical expertise of the FACT, but to ensure that any discussion on the proposed Emergency Appeal budget is more efficient and to ensure a successful implementation of the PoA by making use of knowledge of the regional and local knowledge and capacities.
- The entire **FACT Team should be in country for entire duration of deployment** for consistency purposes. It speaks for itself that a FACT should be as compact as possible, people wise and time wise, as big teams often lead to big needs and a high turnover of staff is expensive and causes confusion and inconsistency in the field.

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- All FACT team members should be **briefed on budget guidelines** and follow them, otherwise a delay in budgeting will occur, as did in this case. This can significantly affect the launch of the revised Emergency Appeal.
- To ensure consistency in the field and alleviate the pressure on the local national society branch, a **Field Coordinator** from IFRC or the national society should be in place from the onset of the operation.
- **ERUs should be managed and not treated as independent units.** Once FACT leaves, there should be an alternative management line: either a Field Coordinator or another manager of ERU teams **in the field**. Who this is should be clear from the onset.
- A **national society counterpart for every FACT** works well. Daily **DM meetings at the national society** (in this case GODE meetings) work well, although information should also be formally shared on paper or digitally.
- FACT/ERU and national society should make sure **coordination with the governments Disaster Management Structures** (here the INGC HQ) is managed well. These Structures are ultimately responsible for disaster response operations in their country. A FACT team should not start operating before the government structures are properly informed and involved.
- When conditions allow, the national society should be have NFIs **prepositioned**, in the case of the Mozambique floods a pre-positioning of tarpaulins and tents would have made a great difference to the displaced population.
- Any written materials should be provided in a **language** that volunteers and beneficiaries can understand. Portuguese is spoken by a large section of the world's population, and, if not yet the case, emergency materials should be translated into Portuguese.
- A **Shelter staff/officer** should be put in place in CVM if IFRC wants CVM to keep the lead in the Shelter Cluster. If not, no claim to be cluster lead should be made in an operation that is already on-going. Deployment of international staff for this purpose in the weeks after the onset of a disaster seems inappropriate

Annex 1 – Stakeholders Consulted

Geneva Disaster and Crisis Management Geneva

Amanda McClellan	Emergency Health Officer
Christina Estrada	Senior Officer, Operations Quality Assurance / FACT Team Leader
Pieter de Rijke	Surge Capacity (ERU)
William Carter	Senior Officer, Water, Sanitation and Emergency Health Unit (WatSan/EH)
Dorothy Francis	Surge Capacity (FACT)

FACT and ERU staff

Cristina Estrada	FACT Team Leader
Angel Vicario	FACT Health/Field Coordinator
Michel Becks (only via email)	FACT WATSAN

SARO

Alexander Matheou	Regional Representative
Michael Adekundle Charles	Programme Coordinator
Stanley Ndhlovu	DM Coordinator

AZO

Daniel Bolaños	DM Coordinator
Melanie Ogle	Operations Coordinator

IFRC Mozambique

Cristina Gomez	Operations Manager
Julita Manyere	Finance Officer

CVM

Mr. Americo Ubisse	Secretary General
Ms. Ivete Dengo	Programme Director
Mr. Respeito Chirrinze	Director of Operations
Mr. Joel Tomas	Head of Health and Social , Acting Head of DM
Ms. Amélia Nhumaió	WATSAN Officer
Armando Djedje	Provincial Secretary
Samuel Cumbane	DM Officer
Joaquim Cuna	Health Officer
Amélia Cossa	Chokwe-District
Chokwe authorities	
Jorge Samuel Maringo	Mayor

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Macuácuá	
?	District Administrator

INGC	
Jorge Ribeiro	Director
PNSs	
Pieter Schleicher	Danish Red Cross
Hans	German Red Cross
Sonya	Spanish Red Cross
Wolfram	Belgian Red Cross
Partners	
UN Habitat (Shelter Cluster)	Pasquale Capizzi Head of Programme and Chief Technical Advisor
IOM (Shelter Cluster)	Andrew
UNICEF (WASH cluster lead)	Angelina Xabier Water and Sanitation Specialist



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Annex 2 – FACT Mozambique Floods Contact list

FACT MOZAMBIQUE FLOODS
CONTACT LIST FEB 19, 2013

FACT- team	Name	Sector	NS	Mobile	email	ETA	EoM
	Angel Merino	Health FACT	SPRC	(+258) 820856289	e_anxo@yahoo.fr/fact.health@ifrc.org	31.1	23.2
	Anthony Kerghosen	Relief FACT	IFRC	(+258)820856430	/fact.relief@ifrc.org	07.02	1.3
	Cristina Estrada	Team Leader FACT	IFRC	(+258) 820856382	cristina.estrada@ifrc.org/ fact.teamleader@ifrc.org	1.2	14.2
	Sally Coates	Logistics FACT	BRCs	820856401	scoates@redcross.org.uk/ fact.logistics@ifrc.org	1.2	10.2
	Felix de Vries	Shelter Cluster	IFRC Zone	820856401	felix.devries@ifrc.org	1.2	10.2
	Hanna Butler	Communications	IFRC	(+258) 825483883	butler.hanna@gmail.com	4.2	9.2
	Annette Bokkenhuser	Reporting FACT	Danish RC	(+258) 825483886	fact.reporting@ifrc.org	5.2	2.3
	Cristina Gomez	Operations Manager	IFRC Mz	(+258)828722863	cristina.gomez@ifrc.org	Based in Maputo	
	Francisco Monteiro	Shelter FACT	AustrIRC	(+258) 825483120	franciscovassalomonteiro@gmail.com/ fact.shelter@ifrc.org	3.2	1.3
	Majia-Lisa Fors	Finance FACT	FnRC	(+258) 825483887	mailalisafors@gmail.com/ fact.finance@ifrc.org	2.2	12.2
	Julita Manyere	Finance	IFRC	(+258) 825483887	fact.finance@ifrc.org	11.2	8.3
	Anno Müller	Logistics FACT	GRC	+258 823 191 200	fact.logistics@ifrc.org	9.2	23.2
	Benjamine Budiman	Logistics	SPRC/IFRC	(+258)820 692 841	bbudiman@cruzroja.es	7.2	28.2
	Mateo Gay Palacios	Logistics ERU	SPRC	(+258) 820 856 243	del.mpp@cruzroja.es	9.2	7.3
	Michel Becks	WATSAN FACT	NLRC	(+258) 820856388	mbecksa@redcross.nl/ fact.watsan@ifrc.org	1.2	22.2
	Benson Mjoroge	Logistics/Fleet	IFRC	(+258) 1848 150 011	benenson.mjoroge@ifrc.org	15.2	22.2
	Julien Marcheix	WATSAN RDR	IFRC	(+258) 846 981 334	julien_marcheix@croix-rouge.fr/marcheixju@hotmail.com	16.2	15.3
	David O Weara	Shelter Cluster	AustrIRC	(+258) 864 115 868	coord.mozq@sheltercluster.org	15.2	15.3
	Raul Eay	Shelter Cluster	Canadian RC	(+258) 864 115 850	in-moz@sheltercluster.org	15.2	15.3
	Thomas Margueron	WATSAN RDR	IFRC	(+258) 846 981 016	thomarmargueron@yahoo.com	16.2	15.3



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FACT MOZAMBIQUE FLOODS
CONTACT LIST MARCH 06, 2013

FACT- team	Name	Sector	NS	Mobile	email	ETA	EOM
	Angel Merino	Field Coordinator	SPRC	(+258) 820856289	e_anxo@yahoo.fr/fact.health@ifrc.org	23.02 31.1	25.03
	Cristina Gomez	Operations Manager	IFRC MZ	(+258)828722863	cristina.gomez@ifrc.org	Based in Maputo	
	Marte Gay Palacios	Logistics	SPRC	+258) 820 856 243	del.mgpp@cruzroja.es	9.2	1.04
	Thomas Margueron	RDRT WATTSAN	FRC	(+258) 846 981 016	thomargueron@yahoo.com	16.2	15.3
	David O'Weara	Shelter	AustrRC	(+258) 864 115 868	coord.moz@sheltercluster.org	15.2	15.3
	Raúl Ecay	Shelter	IFRC	(+258) 864 115 850	im-moz@sheltercluster.org	15.2	15.3
	Arturo Garcia	RDRT RELIEF	FRC	(+258) 866425686	gfarturo@gmail.com	16.2	10.3
	Julien Marcheix	RDRT RELIEF	FRC	(+258) 846 981 334	julien_marcheix@croix-rouge.fr/marcheixju@hotmail.com	16.2	15.3

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FRC

16.03 31.03

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Annex 3 – CVM Counterparts for IFRC per sector

IFRC FACT member	Position	CVM counterpart	Position
Christina Estrada	FACT Team Leader	Respeito V Chirrinze	Planning & Operations Dir
Michel Beck	FACT WATSAN Netherlands RC	Amélia Nhumaio	WATSAN NHQ
Angel Merino	FACT Health – Spanish RC	Ernestina Jama	Health Adviser
Saija Fors	FACT Finance – Finnish RC	Felizardo Mucale	Finance Accountant HQ
Anthony Kergosien	FACT Relief	Joel Tomas	Health and Social Service Coordinator
Thijs de Vries Francisco Monteiro	FACT Shelter FACT Shelter	Jeronimo Zandamela	Disaster Management Coordinator
Anna	FACT Communication	José Tomás	Information Officer
	Fact Reporting	Júlio Mondlane /	CVM PMAR
Saija Fors	FACT Logistic	Boavida Chambal	Logistic Coordinator



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Estrutura de Gestão de Emergência SC

Nome	Função	Tarefas adicionais
Joel José Tomás	Chefe de SSS e focal point de DMMP	Gerir os planos de resposta aos desastres da CVM
Ivete Dengo	Directora de Programas	Sistematização de dados sobre danos e necessidades, elaborar e enviar updates à IFRC
Alcinda santos	Assistente do DM	Recolha de dados sobre actividades da CVM nas provincias
Cristina Uamusse e Julio Mondlane	Coordenadora de Vol, Juventude e DDL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Orientação e recolha diária dos resultados da campanha de solidariedade interna• Gestão da preparação de kits familiares de roupa usada e Gestão de voluntários
Abilio José Campos	Técnico de Vol, Juventude e DDL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Porta-voz da CVM em relação à resposta a desastres• Coordenar a imprensa com o Srº José Tomás

Estrutura de Gestão Emergência na província de Gaza

Nome	Função	Tarefas adicionais
Armando Djedje	Secretário Provincial	Representante da CVM no CENOE Xai-Xai e no COE provincial
Samuel Cumbane	Técnico Provincial	Distribuição dos bens de socorro no distrito de Chokwe e Macia, segundo as normas de 'Relief'
Srº Tina ou outra pessoa	Fiel de Armazém	Controlo logístico dos bens e donativos da CVM que chegam e saem no armazém de Chihakelane

Annex 4 – Workplan

Work Plan for the Internal review of Mozambique floods Emergency Appeal of February 2013 (Appeal n° MDRMZ010)

Evaluation Team: Titus Ludzi Makosha, Viggo Aalbaek, Sanne Boswijk (team leader)

1. Introduction

One of the key priorities of the Southern Africa Regional Office (SARO) is quality assurance – particularly the strengthening of performance and accountability relating but not limited to disaster operations. This will ensure that SARO constantly improves its service delivery to National Societies (NSs) and their emergency response to the affected communities.

SARO would like to undertake an Internal review/evaluation of the emergency response focusing on the current floods emergency appeal operation in Mozambique in order to promote learning in the following areas:

- The timeliness of launching DREF
- Collaboration with CVM in launching DREF
- Timeliness of FACT deployment
- Appropriateness of FACT team composition
- Relevance and timeliness of ERU deployment
- Rationale for Plan of Action
- Timeliness of producing PoA and EA
- Effectiveness of coordination of PoA among non-Movement stakeholders
- Coordination between Geneva, Zone and SARO is supporting the response
- Timeliness and effectiveness of support to victims of the floods

The following questions should be guiding in approaching the above areas:

- 1) Was the overall response adequate (qualitatively) and timely;
- 2) Were the FACT and ERU operations adequate (qualitatively) and timely considering the circumstances;
- 3) How did the Plan of Action and the budget relate, which was leading?;
- 4) how did the operation function alongside CVM in the given circumstances?

The internal review/evaluation will use learning from the above points to propose actions that will improve the timeliness and effectiveness of IFRC support to emergency operations in Southern Africa.

The main stakeholders the team will be speaking to are: IFRC (GVA, AZO, SARO), CVM, INGC, Lead agency (WFP) and Cluster Heads.

The likely field visit will be to Gaza (most affected), the main purpose of which is to speak to staff still on the ground, the volunteers involved in the response and – if possible – the displaced population.

2. Proposed work schedule and task allocation

Week 1: 25 – 29 March

- **Monday 25, Tuesday 26 – Team**
Document review and preparation
- **Wednesday 27 March**

Time (JNB/GAB time)	Name	Role
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Internal evaluation of the Mozambique floods Emergency Appeal of February 2013 (Appeal n° MDRMZ010)

10:00 – 10.45	Dorothy Francis	Surge Capacity (FACT)
11:00 – 11:45	Christina Estrada	Senior Officer, Operations Quality Assurance Disaster and Crisis Management Department

14:00 - 14:45	Alexander Matheou	RR
15:00 - 15:45	Michael Charles	Programme Coordinator
16:00 – 16:45	Stanley Ndhlovu	DM Coordinator

MC to make appointments and SB to set up list of questions.

• **Thursday 28 March**

Time (JNB/GAB time)	Name	Role
09:00 – 09:45	TBC	
10.00 – 10:45	TBC	

13.30 - 14:00	Daniel Bolanos	DM Coordinator
14:00 - 14:45	Melanie Ogle	
15:00 - 15:45	Pieter de Rijke	Surge Capacity (ERU)
15:45 – 16:00	William Carter	Senior Officer, Water, Sanitation and Emergency Health Unit (WatSan/EH)

MC to make appointments and SB to set up list of questions.

Week 2: 1-5 April

- Mozambique operation visit (5 days) - **TEAM**

Arrival on Monday 4 April (evening). Departure on Saturday 6 April (late) afternoon.

SARO to book tickets

In-country team to make appointments with relevant stakeholders, SB to set up list of questions.

Week 3: 8-12 April

- Report writing **8-9 April – SB**
- Team review of draft: **10 April – Viggo and Titus**
- Finalization of draft report based on team review: **11 April - SB**
- Final draft to SARO: **12 April - SB**

3. Proposed list of interviewees

SARO

Alexander Matheou, Stanley Ndhlovu, Michael Charles

AZO

Daniel Bolanos, Melanie Ogle

Internal evaluation of the Mozambique floods Emergency Appeal of February 2013 (Appeal n° MDRMZ010)

GVA

Head of FACT (Dorothy)
Head of FACT in country
DM

In Mozambique:

CVM

Americo Ubisse, DM coordinator HQ, DM coordinator branch, volunteers in the field

ERU

If still in country?

FACT

If still in country?

UN

Lead agency (WFP) and cluster heads

INGC

HQ and Local authorities in Gaza

PNSs

Spanish, Danish, German, Belgian RC. Collective meeting.

4. List of documents

- Previous evaluations, if any (MC)
- Emergency Appeal (MC)
- Information Bulletins (MC)
- Operations Updates/situation reports (MC)
- Relevant correspondence within the RC Movement and with external actors
- IFRC's DM general policy and policy documents on FACT and ERU (MC)
- FACT ToR (MC)
- ERU ToR (MC)
- CVM materials on flood operation (MC)
- Contextually relevant documents, as found on Reliefweb (SB)