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Final Evaluation

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETES

**International Appeal Turkey: MDRTR003 – Turkey Population
Movement
2012-2021**

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Acronyms

ACAPS	The Assessment Capacities Project
AFAD	Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
ASAM	Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants
BOCA	Branch Organizational Capacity Assessment
CBMP	Community Based Migration Programme
CC	Community Centre
CCTE	Conditional Cash Transfer for Education
CEA	Community Engagement and Accountability
CBHFA	Community-Based Hygiene and First Aid
CHF	Swiss Franc
COP	Country Operational Plan
DCPRR	Disaster and Crisis, Prevention, Response and Recovery Unit (IFRC)
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management (Turkey)
DRC	Danish Red Cross
EA	Emergency Appeal
(DC) ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
HiP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan (ECHO)
EMT	Evaluation Management Team
EPoA	Emergency Plan of Action
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net (European Union)
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FRiT	Facility for Refugees in Turkey (European Union)
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GFFO	German Federal Foreign Office
GRC	German Red Cross
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HoD	Head of Delegation
IA	International Appeal
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IM	Information Management
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KII	Key Informant Interview
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MoFLSS	Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services
MoLSP	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoNE	Ministry of National Education
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation

NFIs	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NS	National Society (of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement)
OCAC	Organizational Capacity Assessment and Certification
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PGI	Protection, Gender and Inclusion
PNS	Partner National Society
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PMER	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
PSS	Psycho-Social Support
RC/RC	Red Cross/Red Crescent (movement)
ROE	Regional Office Europe (IFRC)
RFL	Restoring Family Links
RSD	Refugee Status Determination
SUMAF	Technical Assistance to Support the Monitoring of Actions Financed under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey
TGNA	The Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TRCS	Turkish Red Crescent Society
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNHCR	(Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFNS	Well Functional National Society
WFP	World Food Programme
3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan

Executive Summary

The evaluation of the Emergency Appeal MDRTR003 – Turkey Population Movement in response to Syrian crisis (EA) commissioned by the IFRC Turkey Delegation focussed on processes designed and implemented to ensure the relevance, efficiency and coherence of the implementation. Effectiveness had already been covered by earlier evaluations and results were only referenced in passing and when they highlighted systemic or process issues.

Due to COVID-19 movement restrictions the evaluation was conducted remotely with only two methods (desk review and key informant interviews). Despite a more thorough than usual approach to these methods, a lack of access to primary (beneficiary) data has limited opportunities for triangulation and the strength of the findings.

The evaluation found that due to Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) strong relationships with the Turkish authorities at programme location, district, provincial and at central levels, the TRCS through the implementation of the EA which further strengthened its auxiliary role. Further more TRCS is seen as a trusted and reliable partner in the implementation of Government of Turkey protection and migration policies.

The EA has supported a relevant and coherent programme based on accurately identified needs and timely adjusted to changes in refugee population vulnerabilities. The Appeal successfully transitioned from an early disaster management approach to a sophisticated and high quality community-based programme focussing on protection, health and PSS, Livelihood and social cohesion based on the Community Centre model piloted in Sanliurfa.

Although the transition was successful, it could have been more efficient. It took a long time for TRCS financial management systems were aligned with EA requirements. TRCS staff recruitment was slow. Risk management (particularly institutional, programming and contextual risks) in EAs emerged as major area for urgent attention. Even when considering significant steps taken in the right direction recently, the process should be intensified and rolled out across general EA management at all levels.

The EA was found to be adequately coherent with Government , policies and strategies, as was Movement cooperation with no more than usual bilateral support to the national society. Collaboration with the UN as of a technical nature and the links to civil society were established but could have been developed for a (largely invisible) humanitarian diplomacy approach.

Much can be learned from this review for the design and implementation of other EAs in well-developed national societies in middle-income countries with strongly developed government institutions. The EA as a tool for coordinated funding, technical and institutional support in a protracted crisis situation leaves much to be desired, especially given the needs for a more strategic approach, which is now urgently needed to safe-guard the impressive achievements.

1. Introduction

This is the report of the Evaluation of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Emergency Appeal MDRTR003 Turkey Population Movement during the period 2012-2021 (EA).

The EA (also referred to as the 'International Appeal') enabled the IFRC to support the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) in assisting some 2.76 million people in Turkey who have been affected by the Syria crisis and other neighbouring conflicts. Launched in 2012, TRCS activities at the time mainly focused on camps and Turkey-Syria border areas. The Appeal went through several revisions to extend both its duration and scope as the situation deteriorated in the following years with continuing influx of refugees into Turkey from Syria. Activities' focus gradually shifted from provision of relief items mainly to meet refugees' urgent needs towards meeting longer term needs of both refugees and their host communities.

The evaluation was implemented remotely by a team of three consultants Peter Giesen (team leader), Gülşah Dark Kahyaoğlu, responsible for the analysis of Turkish policy and legal context in which the Appeal was implemented and Anna Puntman, responsible for the document review and qualitative aspects of the analysis.

The evaluation took place between 15 April and 15 June 2021, when access to Turkey and communities was severely restricted. This meant that only two methods (desk review and remote key information's interviews) were possible and the team could not verify inputs with beneficiary perspectives and options for triangulation were limited. It was also implemented during major holidays in Turkey and Europe challenging access to key informants. Further details can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.

2. Methods

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, this evaluation was implemented remotely using two methods:

- a desk review of documents, communications and data,
- key informant interviews (KIIs) at headquarters, regional and national levels.

2.1 Matrix

The evaluation matrix (Annex 1) reflects how the desk review and key informant interviews answered the key questions from the ToR. We developed themes which were the entry points for discussions in which each key informant could share the specific information associated with his or her responsibilities and time of EA involvement.

The themes were the basis of the KIIs for which we developed a generic or master interview tool. Making use of this open structure we were able to maximise and modify the lines of inquiry depending on the responsibilities and time of engagement with the EA.

The evaluation criteria and the themes are the basis for the analysis section of this evaluation report and informed the findings sections answering the evaluation

questions, at the end of each of the of analysis three evaluation criteria in Chapter 5 of the report to the extend the limitations (2.4) allowed for it.

2.2 Desk Review

The desk review focussed on four types of documents:

- Emergency Appeal documents
- IFRC technical guidance
- TRCS needs assessments and reports
- Policy, legal and humanitarian and other contextual documents

Appeal documents

The appeal documents were the primary analysis reference. We reviewed these with a view to elaborate the evolution of the Appeal from its inception until the end of 2020 (Chapter 3).

Technical documents and Strategies

IFRC guidance on the technical components of the Appeal (including capacity building) will be referenced to the context (see below).

TRCS documents

TRCS documents reviewed included the TRCS Strategy, evaluations and community feedback reports and served as preparation for the interviews with TRCS key informants.

External documents

As suggested in the ToR, we took note and referred to the EU TF (MADAD)¹ Project evaluation in to add some of its key findings. In addition to the Turkish legal and policy framework and the resulting temporary protection status of the target population of the Appeal, we reviewed humanitarian background documents to gain a better understanding of the policy and legal context within which the EA was implemented.

2.3 Key informant interviews

We interviewed 51 key informants (see Annex 1) from IFRC, TRCS, Participatory National Society, UN representatives, Turkish civil society and Turkish authorities. We adopted a semi-structured approach to the key informant interviews for which we developed a master tool (Annex 2). Given that key informants had different responsibilities and knowledge of various aspects of the Appeal and worked during different timeframes, we adapted our lines of inquiry whilst referencing the generic tool.

Key informant interviews were conducted remotely by Google Meet or Zoom. Recordings were only used to verify missing details in the notes taken. Notes were coded (by organisation name and sequence number) and stored and if used a source in this report only the codes appear in the footnotes. Recordings will be deleted as soon as the report is finalised and approved.

¹ Throughout this document the official name of the fund 'European Union Trust Fund' (EU TF) is used, instead of the commonly used "MADAD".

At least two consultants were present in each interview to ensure a high-quality engagement and note taking. We used an open approach during interviews allowing key informants to reflect on the themes identified when consolidating the ToR key questions.

2.4 Limitations

We did not experience the remote nature of the KIIs as a limitation, despite not having the opportunities to follow up in informal settings. Key informants seemed very focussed, well briefed, open, transparent and willing to share their lessons learned.

The most important limitation of this evaluation was the absence of input from the people who benefitted from the EA due to COVID-19. We compensated this to some extent by analysing TRCS feedback reports, but the value of talking to people in a confidential setting would have eliminated any possible bias in the FGDs and KIIs from the TRCS assessments.

This evaluation had extremely tight deadlines² and the fact that this evaluation was planned during the major holiday season in Turkey and three bank holidays in Geneva and Budapest, also did not support implementation as the evaluation team had to struggled to make up at the end of the process for lost time in mid-May. This may account for some missing for the time lost details in general.

Accounts were not yet closed as approximately CHF 3.8M remained unspent from the total of CHF 84.6 raised at the time of this evaluation. IFRC planned to use the balance for ongoing support of community centre activities through the Country Operational Plan (COP) in 2021-22. In addition we only had the EU-TF project evaluation to verify outcomes and impact (from a beneficiary perspective). This limited our ability to analyse the cost-effectiveness of the efficiency component of the evaluation, reducing it to a review of TRCS financial, human resources and information management systems. The Movement cooperation section could only be analysed with the inputs from EA documents and two partner national society (PNS) representatives, as others were not available.

3. Background

3.1 Turkish Red Crescent Society

The Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) was established in 1868 and was as its Turkish name Kizil (red) Ay (crescent) indicates, the first Red Crescent. TRCS grew into a well-developed and highly internationally respected national society with over 5,000 employees and around 600 branches or representatives across the country. Kizilay volunteers are highly visible in the communities and carry out most of the activities. The TRCS President holds the vice-presidency position on the IFRC governing board.

3.2 Turkey's refugee and migration policy

Turkey currently hosts the world's largest number of refugees, including more than 3.6 million Syrians registered under temporary protection, more than any other country in the world.³ Turkey has also long served as a transit country for immigrants seeking

² The IFRC Syria Appeal review which was of a comparable size and duration was implemented over a period of 4 months, twice as long.

³ UNHCR Global Trends 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019/>

asylum in Europe. The EU Turkey deal signed in 2016 stopped the transit possibilities for many of the Syrians to Europe. This has contributed to Turkey becoming a country of immigration and residence not only for Syrian people but also for other people from the MENA region, Balkan countries, Afghanistan, Iraq or Pakistan.⁴

3.2.1 Temporary Protection

Displaced Syrians have not been granted official refugee status in accordance with Turkey's geographical limitation to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as the refugee status is granted only to persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe, referring to the World War 2 affected populations.

Legislative developments related to migration management in Turkey in accordance with international law, and with the aim of increased harmonization with EU legislation, date back to the early 2000s. With the increase of displaced Syrians entering to Turkey, the government introduced a temporary protection policy in October 2011 for all Syrians, Palestinian refugees, and stateless persons living in Syria who arrived in Turkey to seek refuge. Syrians under temporary protection are entitled to receive temporary identity cards, and ID numbers, and access to essential services.

Temporary protection status is regulated under Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) defining temporary protection as a status that “may be provided to foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.”⁵ There is no limit to the duration of temporary protection.

In 2012, the Ministry of Interior Affairs constituted a directive concerning the admission and accommodation of Syrians, who seek asylum in Turkey, based on three main principles: (1) an open-border policy, (2) respect for non-refoulement and (3) provision of humanitarian assistance in line with international human rights standards. The open-border policy for those fleeing the Syrian conflict from 2011 to 2015 included shelter and immediate humanitarian aid in purpose-built camps. ⁶ The state-led humanitarian agencies—principally the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and the Turkish Red Crescent were the main actors of humanitarian response, working with the support of United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). ⁷

The number of Syrians under temporary protection increased from 150,000 to 500,000 from 2012 to 2013 and by late 2014, there were more than 1.5 million registered Syrians in Turkey⁸, around half of whom live in urban areas. As of 2021, around 3.6

⁴ Kirişçi, K. (2003). Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration, MPI. Retrieved from: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/turkey-transformation-emigration-immigration>

Korfalı, D. K., Üstübcü A., and Clerck H. D. (2017) Turkey: Country and Research Areas Report. MiReKoc Project Reports 2/2014 EUMAGINE. Retrieved from: <https://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Turkey-Country-and-Research-Areas-Report.pdf>

⁵ DGMM website, <https://en.goc.gov.tr/international-protection17>


⁶ Memişoğlu, F., & Ilgit, A. (2016). Syrian refugees in Turkey: multifaceted challenges, diverse players and ambiguous policies. *Mediterranean Politics*, 22(3), 317-338.

⁷ Turkish Red Crescent Society (auxiliary to the government to support authorities for emergency response)

⁸ UNHCR 2018 statistics.

million Syrians are living in Turkey approximately 6% of whom are still residing in the temporary accommodation centres.⁹

In 2014 the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) under the Ministry of Interior in 2014 was established to ensure the implementation of the provisions under the LFIP.



Source: DGMM (2021)

Among these provisions were regulations designed to facilitate Syrians' access to education, healthcare, and the labour market - through work permits in 2016 - to ensure social inclusion.¹⁰ This could be seen as a shift in perception of the nature of the crisis from a temporary to a protracted situation. Restrictions on mobility were imposed due increased security concerns as well as the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, which urged Turkey to take "any necessary measures to prevent sea and land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU," (European Commission, 2018).¹¹

In 2016, Turkey's President announced granting citizenship to Syrians, addressing them in a gathering that "Turkey is also your homeland" (Al Jazeera, 2016).¹² However, reservations were reportedly made on giving citizenship to high skilled and educated Syrians and Iraqis that would serve Turkey's interests and improve their living standards (Reuters, 2016).¹³ It is stated that 110.000 Syrians have been granted citizenship so far, among which there are more than 57.000 children.¹⁴

⁹ DGMM website: <https://en.goc.gov.tr/international-protection17>

¹⁰ Memişoğlu, Fulya (2018a). The Syrian community in Turkey: Perspectives, prospects, and policies. Istanbul: Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM). Retrieved from: http://podem.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/id-PODEM_The-Syrian-Community-in-turkey-EN-DIGITAL-200x270mm.pdf

¹¹ EU (European Union). 2018. Assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey. Conference document. www.consilium.europa.eu/media/34146/turkey-partnership-paper.pdf

¹² Al Jazeera (2016). Erdogan: Syrian refugees could become Turkish citizens. Retrieved from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/erdogan-syrian-refugees-turkish-citizens-160703133739430.html>

¹³ Reuters (2016). Turkey's Erdogan moots plan to grant citizenship to Syrians. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey/turkeys-erdogan-moots-plan-to-grant-citizenship-to-syrians-idUSKCN0ZL155>

¹⁴ See: <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/>

3.2.1 International Protection (non-Syrians)

LFIP, the 2013 Regulation on Temporary Protection, the establishment of the DGMM in 2014, are the main building blocks of the Turkish protection framework. Operating under Turkey's Ministry of Interior Affairs, the DGMM became fully operational in 2015 and is currently the primary responsible for implementing and coordinating asylum issues and refugee status determination (RSD). Legislative discussions relating migration management to international law, (and harmonization with EU legislation), date back to the early 2000s. The LFIP provides three types of international protection status in accordance with Turkey's "geographical limitation" policy on the 1951 Refugee Convention: these are (1) "refugee status," (2) "conditional refugee status," and (3) "subsidiary protection status."



Source: DGMM website, 2021

Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) data show a steady increase in the number of international protection applications to Turkey almost until the end of 2018, when there was a sharp decline in registration of applications (but not necessarily in arrivals), as UNHCR's mandate to register non-Syrians came to an end.¹⁵

3.3 Response

3.3.1 State response

At the outset of the Syrian refugee influx in mid-2011, state-led humanitarian agencies—particularly the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and the Turkish Red Crescent Society¹⁶—were the main humanitarian responders, supported by UNHCR. Initially, the state response focused on the provision of humanitarian assistance in temporary accommodation centres. This changed with a realisation of the protracted nature of the refugee situation and the shift from large numbers to urban areas,¹⁷ opening the debate about social inclusion and access to education, labour market, housing, and increasingly, the need for international support.¹⁸ The DGMM was already responsible for the registration of arrivals including

¹⁵ KII IFRC2

¹⁶ Turkish Red Crescent Society (auxiliary to the government to support authorities for emergency response)

¹⁷ See: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-turkey-refugees-funds-idUSKBN1YI0D0>

¹⁸ Memişoğlu, F. (2018). Assessing the Development-Displacement Nexus in Turkey, ICMPD Working Paper. Retrieved from:

coordinating asylum issues and refugee status determination (RSD), but from 2015 it also began to oversee the overall implementation of the LFIP in urban areas, through its provincial structures.

The LFIP entitles people under international protection and Syrians with temporary protection status, access to medical care. The Ministry of Health (MoH) established a unit, the Department of Migration Health under its Directorate General of Public Health to implement this part of the law and from 2015 Syrians have access to most health services. In 2014, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) started a programme facilitating Syrian children's access to education in temporary education centres and after 2016, to the public education system. The Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MoLSS) issued work permits from 2016, but numbers and job opportunities remain scarce.¹⁹ The Temporary Protection Regulation also entitles Syrians access to social and financial assistance. Local authorities also started to address longer-term needs, mainly through social cohesion and socio-economic empowerment programmes, through foundations.

3.3.2 International response

The United Nations Agencies and International non-governmental organizations active in responding to the needs of Syrians in Turkey were mostly coordinated through a Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan co-led by UNHCR and UNDP. The main agencies delivering services were World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations Children Fund UNICEF, and (UNHCR). Others included United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) the International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the World Bank and Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). UNHCR also provided support to DGMM during its early establishment, including to registration of international protection applicants and referral processes.

International non-governmental organizations such as Danish Refugee Council, Save the Children International, Concern Worldwide, Relief International, World Vision and Qatar Charity provided considerable humanitarian and non-humanitarian support in partnership with local NGOs to support the delivery of services, and cooperate with national authorities at municipal, district, provincial, and central levels. This work was affected by the State of Emergency declared following events in 2016 and the resulting closure of certain international and local and international NGOs, also working in refugee response during that period.²⁰

3.3.3 Civil Society Response

The presence and impact of international and Turkish NGOs providing humanitarian assistance was initially limited due to a lack of access restrictions to the camps.²¹ In the

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Assessing%20the%20Development-Displacement%20Nexus%20in%20Turkey_FINAL.PDF

¹⁹ Memişoğlu, F. (2018b). Assessing the Development-Displacement Nexus in Turkey, ICMPD Working Paper. Retrieved from:

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Assessing%20the%20Development-Displacement%20Nexus%20in%20Turkey_FINAL.PDF

²⁰ Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development, Turkey country report, TUSEV (2016), <https://www.tusev.org.tr/usrfiles/images/MM2016TurkeyReport.pdf>

²¹ Çorabatır, M. and Hassa, F. (2013). Sivil toplum örgütlerinin Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mülteciler için yaptıkları çalışmalar ile ilgili rapor [Report on the Activities of Non-Governmental Organisations for Syrian Refugees

4. Appeal Evolution

The EA and its revisions requested a total of 122 million CHF²⁴ to contribute to meeting the needs of 2.76 million people in Turkey. The last reported funding gap was CHF 18.9 million.²⁵

4.1 Events preceding the launch of the Emergency Appeal

The outbreak of violence in Syria initially displaced a group of 252 people arriving on 29 April 2011 at Cilvegözü border gate in district of Yayladağı, Hatay²⁶. Very soon the number of people seeking protection across the border in Turkey had grown to approximately five thousand²⁷. Turkish authorities immediately made provisions in a camp in Hatay and declared an 'open door' policy, granting temporarily protection status to those arriving from Syria. This status gave access to humanitarian support and basic services such as education and health.

Initially people were accommodated in camps with high quality shelter and water and sanitation solutions, hot meals, non-food items and later vouchers, as well as security inside and in the immediate vicinity of the camps.^{28 29} The camps were under the supervision and coordination by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD).³⁰ AFAD officials planned new camps, registration, and coordination with other relevant authorities, including Ministry of Foreign Affairs, health and education.³¹ AFAD officials interviewed for this evaluation mentioned that TRCS played a crucial auxiliary role in the camps providing food initially and e-card based conditional cash for the supermarkets in the camps. TRCS shared its (international) experience and cultural awareness, obtained through its active participation in the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, with the Government agencies.³²

TRCS soon started to provide food (hot meals) and NFIs (with WFP support) to a growing number of people from Syria seeking protection. The number of people continued to grow and reached 110,649 in November 2012.

4.3 Emergency Appeal

As the influx of Syrians grew exponentially, the TRCS required additional resources and an Emergency Appeal (EA) was launched in November 2012 by IFRC.³³ TRCS proposed to provide winterisation, emergency shelter, food (see above) and non-food relief items, and hygiene materials to 170,000 beneficiaries in 14 camps and 1 temporary processing centre for a period of 6 months. It also requested support for building up contingency stocks for 50,000 additional people. The total cost of this first intervention was CHF 32.3 million.

²⁴ Revision n° 7 issued: 20 December 2019

²⁵ Operation Update n° 15 Date of issue: 22 October 2020

²⁶ https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.afetacil.gov_tr_Ingilizce_Site_haber_ing_haber_detay.pdf

²⁷ KII IFRC 7

²⁸ Revised Emergency Appeal 28 May 2013

²⁹ KII TRCS 13

³⁰ AFAD transferred to the Ministry of Interior Affairs when the Prime Ministry was abolished.

³¹ Emergency Appeal operations update n°1 – 21 December 2012

³² KII Officials 4

³³ Emergency Appeal 09 November 2012

As the number of arrivals continued to grow to 225,000 and five additional camps were established, the Appeal was revised upwards to CHF 44,2 million in May 2013³⁴. At this point in time the focus changed from winterization to mid-term relief (non-food items through e-cards, supported by WFP). The appeal also supported TRCS scaling up its capacity by recruiting and training new staff and volunteers.

Table 1: Emergency Phase Overview (source IFRC)

November 2012 – November 2016		
<i>Turkey started to receive large number of refugees from Syria shortly after the outbreak of the crisis in 2011. The total number of Syrian refugees accommodated in 14 camps was already over 100,000 in late 2012. An Emergency Appeal (EA) was launched to assist 170,000 people in Turkey displaced by the Syria and other neighbouring crises for six months. TRCS activities at the time mainly focused on camps and Turkey-Syria border areas. The Appeal went through several revisions to extend both its duration and scope as the situation deteriorated in the following years with continuing influx of refugees into Turkey from Syria. By the end of 2016, the number of camps increased to 23 and the number of refugees within camps to over 250,000, with more than 2,5 million residing in urban areas. TRCS activities' focus shifted towards supporting refugees living in urban areas and their host communities.</i>		
Key sectors	Summary	Areas of operation
Relief (Food and household items)	Relief distribution including food, household items and hot meal distribution as well as contingency stocking in case of deterioration of the situation and a potential new influx from Syria into Turkey	Camps and urban areas in Turkey – Syria border areas
Shelter	Shelter support and contingency shelter measures	Camps and Turkey–Syria border areas
Psychosocial support (PSS)	Provision of PSS to children at camps and provision of comprehensive PSS to refugee and host community members living in urban areas - including psychological counselling, social services orientation and child-friendly activities	Camps and urban areas
Sanitation and hygiene promotion	Setting up of sanitation facilities, distribution of hygiene items, and hygiene promotion	Camps and urban areas, through community centres
Outreach	Information dissemination to refugees on services available (including registration) and messages on first aid	Urban areas, through community centres
Health	Supporting refugee and host communities through health promotion activities	Urban areas, through community centres
Social cohesion	Supporting refugee and host communities with capacity building including language courses and vocational trainings as well as activities aiming at building up social integration and reducing stigmatization	Urban areas through community centres
Education support	Supporting refugee children for their education needs with learning materials in their own language	Urban areas
CEA	Volunteering from refugees for community centre activities particularly for translation and supporting community outreach activities including Community-Based Hygiene and First Aid (CBHFA).	Urban areas
National Society (NS) Capacity Building	Supporting the NS through technical expertise	

By 2013 there were 19 temporary accommodation centres and 17 camps, whilst 5 more were being prepared. The authorities and the TRCS struggled to keep up with the rapid increase in the number of new arrivals of people from Syria in the camps and TRCS recognised that people were increasingly seeking shelter in rented accommodation in

³⁴ Revised Emergency Appeal 28 May 2013

urban areas. This prompted a second revision of the Appeal in November 2013³⁵ to extend and increase the same activities until June 2014 in 23 camps. Additional emergency food needs of up to 12,000 new arrivals in Sanliurfa required urgent action. Sanliurfa would later become the location of the first pilot community centre.

At the time of the launch of the emergency appeal, the IFRC had a dormant registration in the country. A physical presence was not deemed necessary at the time as the TRCS did not feel it required technical support for the implementation of the EA. The IFRC however raised concerns over the National Society's reporting capacity, carried forward from an earlier (earthquake) EA³⁶. The perception was that the TRCS systems did not allow for differentiating Appeal expenditure from other sources, for instance. To discuss this an IFRC reporting delegate visited to review the TRCS reporting systems, after which TRCS and IFRC agreed to integrate an IFRC Reporting and Communication delegate in the National Society³⁷. The focus was initially on strengthening EA reporting, but he also participated in programming issues, such as needs assessments, monitoring visits and providing disaster management training.³⁸ The position was backed stopped by the IFRC Europe Zone Office (Country Cluster for Eastern Europe and Central Asia)³⁹ and the arrangements were formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)⁴⁰.

4.4 Transition

In April 2014, a new Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was created within the Ministry of Interior to increase the Turkish government's management and coordination capacities at the Provincial level. It took over the responsibility from AFAD in 2018, while AFAD remained responsible for the coordination of cross-border humanitarian activities in Syria and elsewhere⁴¹. The TRCS started to focus on needs outside the camps, requiring a revision of the Appeal in June 2014⁴².

IFRC was initially seeking CHF 32.3 million, which was revised down to CHF 41 million following the first needs assessment, which identified urgent needs for psychosocial support and orientation (information) services for an estimated 30,000 Syrian people living in urban areas outside camps. The operational budget also included a pilot community centre in Sanliurfa.

Needs assessments, programme changes and the community centre pilot, signified a new understanding of vulnerability⁴³. People seeking protection formally had access to social, economic and health services but faced obstacles to have full access, such as a stagnating economy, language barriers in the education system, overstretched health services were, and housing cost inflation. The shift from camps to urban areas also inspired a shift from a disaster management to a protection-oriented approach. It was

³⁵ Revised Emergency Appeal 18 November 2013

³⁶ <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/turkey-van-earthquake-revised-emergency-appeal-no-mdrtr002-final-report>

³⁷ KII IFRC 14, 12, 11, 7

³⁸ Emergency Appeal 09 November 2012 and KII IFRC 9, 11

³⁹ Revised International Appeal 5 June 2015

⁴⁰ Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°9 – 22 November 2016

⁴¹ KII Officials (AFAD)

⁴² Revised Emergency Appeal 30 June 2014

⁴³ KII TRCS01

becoming clear that the crisis was becoming protracted, even if this was not explicitly recognised in the EA documents until mid-2014.⁴⁴

4.5 Community Centre Programme

These developments shifted the Community Migration programme to focus on protection, resilience (livelihoods), social inclusion, health and PSS. In January 2015, the TRCS launched the Community Centre Project, where services are provided to people seeking protection and host communities.

TRCS institutional capacity required further investments to implement the Community-based Migration Programme (as it was now called)⁴⁵ but attempts to scale up recruitment and the cumbersome financial transaction and reporting system slowed down implementation. Further challenges came from the dive of the Turkish Lira exchange rate which created a 30% budget surplus.

Programmatically, the new approach started in earnest with the pilot community centre in Eyyubiye (city of Sanliurfa) which opened its doors in January 2015⁴⁶. Plans to assist host communities and address socio-economic, education, and health needs in four major urban areas emerged in June 2015⁴⁷ and in February 2016, TRCS operated three community centres and began to address protection needs including information on registration and services, psychosocial support and child friendly spaces, and the promotion of social cohesion through language and culture classes and healthy lifestyle promotion. Emergency needs such as for food and non-food items (NFI) support continued but now mainly outside the camps⁴⁸. By November 2016, the programme was extended to 5 community centres⁴⁹.

The Appeal was now labelled International Appeal (IA)⁵⁰, signifying a recognition of the protracted nature of the crisis and the need to move away from the concept of 'emergency'⁵¹. It also paved the way for a substantial (regional) EU FRiT grant (EU-TF)⁵², which boosted Appeal income with CHF 10 million in 2017 and a total CHF 35 million budget for the Turkey component until end of 2019⁵³, the largest contribution to the EA.

With this support, the TRCS grew its programme to include ten community centres, six of them supported by the IA, three community centres supported bilaterally by German Red Cross, and one community centre (in Bursa) supported by the Norwegian Red Cross (bilateral). TRCS planned to open an additional six community centres until the end of 2017⁵⁴. By August 2018, TRCS was running 15 community centres, 11 of them supported by the IFRC⁵⁵. Although the Emergency (International) Appeal continued, IFRC and TRCS

⁴⁴ First explicit mention 'expectation of protracted crisis' Revised Appeal 30 June 2014 | 'Longer-term support' in May 2013, first Revision: *"With little chances of a change in the escalation of the Syrian crisis in the near future, the humanitarian organizations' operations are turning towards a longer term support both in the camps and outside the camps."*

⁴⁵ Some key informants referred to the programme as the 'MADAD project', indicating the main donor

⁴⁶ Emergency Appeal operations update n°7 – 7 April 2015

⁴⁷ Revised International Appeal 5 June 2015

⁴⁸ Emergency Appeal operations update n°8 – 26 February 2016

⁴⁹ Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°9 – 22 November 2016

⁵⁰ for the sake of consistency, the abbreviation EA, will continue throughout the remainder of the document

⁵¹ Revised Plan of Action 30 March 2017

⁵² The fund responded to the Syrian crisis in five neighbouring countries, and was coordinated by the Danish Red Cross and the Turkey component was channelled through the EA .


⁵³ Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°11 – 22 September 2017

⁵⁴ Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°11 – 22 September 2017

⁵⁵ Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°12 – 9 August 2018

also launched a multi-year country plan in 2018. Within this framework and the financial support from the Appeal the TRCS Community Migration Programme continued to grow to 16 community centres, 14 of which supported by the Appeal, providing protection services to 2.76 million beneficiaries⁵⁶. The Emergency (International) Appeal will close in June 2021, with any remaining funding carried forward to new funding modalities under a Country Operational Plan. The EA transition strategy is based on a transfer of services to Government facilities.

Fig.2 TRCS Community Centre Locations



TRCS changed its focus from service delivery to addressing the population’s needs at a more strategic level as evidenced by revisions from 2015. This strategic approach, should have meant the end of the emergency appeals and the introduction of a Country Operational Plan (COP, as this would have allowed for assessments of broader institutional capacities needed to implement a new programmatic approach.⁵⁷

However, there is a perception in the IFRC that COPs do not attract the funding needed to address the population’s needs. Instead the EA received the new label ‘International Appeal’, but procedures and tools remained unchanged. Although risk and capacity assessments for the new approach lacked a coherent strategy, the evidence suggests that funding was not going to be a problem (see EU-TF and ECHO HiP information in the next section of the report).

EA funded activities continued to be coordinated in the field with AFAD and DGMM⁵⁸. The technical aspects of the programme include referrals to facilities under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MoLSP)⁵⁹ for referrals, including protection cases and related social activities, vocational training and employment issues such as work permits. The Istanbul Sultanbeyli community centre also hosted a Health Centre run by the Ministry of Health which also refers people to Ministry of Health facilities. Child protection related issues (such as attendance data for the UNICEF supported child

⁵⁶ Revised International Appeal 20 December 2019

⁵⁷ The COP is first introduced in 2019, but reportedly not implemented in 2020 due to COVID 19 restrictions. In 2021 all IFRC supported project/programmes are integrated in the COP when closing the EA.

⁵⁸ Revised Plan of Action December 2018

⁵⁹ Separated now from the Ministry of Family and Social Policy

Protection component of the Appeal are coordinated with the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and the Ministry of Family and Social Services (MoFSS)⁶⁰.

Table 2: Protection and Resilience Phase (source IFRC)

December 2016 – June 2021		
<i>During this second phase of the Appeal, activities` focus gradually shifted from provision of relief items mainly to meet urgent needs towards meeting longer term needs of both refugees and their host communities. The set-up of various Community Centres in Turkey`s most populated provinces where majority of the refugee communities reside has helped offering complex services in various sectors including protection, livelihoods, health, education, PSS and social cohesion. All of these activities were funded through EU Trust Fund (EU-TF) during this period.</i>		
Relief (Food and non-food items)	Distribution of hygiene and baby kits among refugees living in urban areas ⁶¹ , distribution of food and non-food items as well as hot meals in urban areas, food and non-food items contingency stocking for urban areas	Urban areas
Protection	Provision of relevant support and services through case management based on individual needs	Urban areas
Livelihoods	Provision of language and vocational training, job counselling, skill assessments and job referral services, entrepreneurship training and support, agricultural support in crop production and livestock management for refugee and host communities	Urban areas
Social cohesion	Supporting refugee and host communities with activities aiming at building up social integration and cohesion	Urban areas
Health	Supporting refugee and host communities with healthy lifestyle, hygiene promotion, first aid, preventive health care promotion and health education	Urban areas
PSS	Provision of comprehensive PSS to displaced refugee adult people and children	Urban areas
Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGI)	Providing protection services including case management access to legal Rights and counselling (ECHO funded Protection Project); Responding to requests for Restoring Family Links (RFL); Disseminating information to access registration, essential services and; Providing platforms and environments for greater social interaction to build peaceful co-existence among communities	Urban areas

From 2016 the EA is managed by the IFRC Programme Coordinator ‘integrated’ in the TRCS management structures. The delegate provided support to the TRCS in coordination, donor relations and resource mobilization, advocacy, operational implementation, monitoring and reporting. The TRCS also utilised the services of the IFRC Logistics Management (Procurement Unit) for acquiring food and NFI for distribution purposes.⁶² By end-March 2018, the in-country Integrated Programme Coordinator was joined by a Head of Country Office, and a Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) delegate. Other staff include delegates for Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGI); Finance and Administration; Information Management (IM), and

⁶⁰ In January 2016, the Turkish authorities announced the Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary protection granting all beneficiaries of temporary protection (Syrians, stateless persons and Palestinians from Syria).

⁶¹ In 2020 during COVID 19 pandemic host population also been supported with hygiene and baby kits, and PPE

⁶² Revised International Appeal 30 March 2017

Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (PMER), together with a national finance officer.⁶³

Other IFRC non-EA funded programmes include the Cash support: the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) providing cash to 1.7 million displaced people in Turkey. The programme funded by ECHO was initially implemented by WFP and from April 2020 by TRCS and IFRC, in partnership with the Ministry of Family and Social Services. The Appeal funded Community Centres provide a safety net for people not covered by ESSN⁶⁴. ESSN was designed initially to reach 1 million (out of the 3.1 million) of the most vulnerable people displaced at that time, 2.8 million of whom were Syrians.

⁶³ Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°12 – 9 August 2018

⁶⁴ In September 2016, the European Union launched its largest ever humanitarian programme using direct cash transfers to cover the everyday needs of most vulnerable refugee families living in Turkey. The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), financed with EUR 348 million by the EU and its Member States under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, is the first social assistance scheme of its kind to reach out to one million refugees across the country.

5. Analysis

This chapter discusses the findings of the evaluation's methodologies. The structure has been agreed with the IFRC and follows the logic of the key questions posed in the ToR. The subheadings are the themes around which ToR key questions were consolidated:

- Relevance: needs assessments and adaptation of the Appeal to changes and in the context 5.1
- Efficiency: Institutional and technical support including capacity building and the way risks were identified, monitored and mitigated in section are discussed in section 5.2
- Coherence: with Government policies and legislation, Movement frameworks and other partners (including the UN, and civil society in Turkey) is discussed in section 5.3

5.1 Relevance

This section of the report examines the following themes derived from the ToR key questions as agreed during inception:

- Context Adaptation/Change
- Emergency Needs and vulnerabilities
- Longer term needs and vulnerabilities
- Risks
- Emergency Appeals in protracted crisis

5.1.1 Context Adaptation and Change

The EA was implemented in relatively stable political context⁶⁵, under the coordination leadership of the Turkish authorities. Political events had very little, if any, bearing on EA implementation. TRCS was granted full operational access as the auxiliary to the public authorities and participated at all levels in policy design and implementation.

TRCS coped well with the first influx of hundreds of thousands of people seeking protection in Turkey, first with a disaster response approach in the camps where high-quality shelter, food and other services ensured a dignified existence.⁶⁶

As the population started to move away from the camps and settled in urban centres, mainly in search of employment, the EA supported TRCS programming transitioning in three ways:

1. camps to urban programming
2. introducing a resilience strategy through livelihoods programming
3. prioritising protection activities (including psychosocial support) to improve access to Government services
4. focus on social cohesion

The EU-TF supported this transition together with other support (from the German and Norwegian Red Cross in particular), which ensured resources required to start the TRCS

⁶⁵ The attempt of a political coup in July 2016 reportedly did not have a significant impact on the implementation of the EA

⁶⁶ KIIs IFRC 1,9,11 KIIs TRCS 1,7,10 KII Officials

community centre programme. Although the transition was not without its challenges (see Efficiency section of this report), programme development responded well to changes in the needs and vulnerabilities of the population.

At the end of the EA, a second transition is now imminent, but strategies designed to continue the services provided with EA support, are still under development and funding remains unclear. Even if the second transition is supported by the DGMMs strategy, in the development of which the TRCS participated, a lack of clarity of direction and funding is risking the continuation of essential services.

In any protracted crisis change is a constant and the way that the EA supported the TRCS needed to be adapted accordingly. We have explored three types of contextual changes:

1. the needs of the population,
2. Government policies,
3. Government institutional arrangements.

How ambiguous policies can undermine resilience

The evaluation identified policy constraints with a negative impact on EA social and economic resilience objectives.⁶⁷ Ambiguities in the implementation of temporary protection policies, lengthy procedures and costs reportedly discouraged employers to hire Syrians.⁶⁸ Limited job opportunities related to the national economic situation and the fear of losing cash support⁶⁹ have encouraged Syrians to engage to seek their livelihood in informal employment. This undermines economic security and given that most of informal employment is in vulnerable economic sectors, which suffer disproportionately from overall economic decline and COVID-19 restrictions. This may have a tendency to undermine the feasibility of some of longer-term achievements of EA resilience objectives.⁷⁰

In addressing these issues and promoting policy development on the protracted refugee situation, further investments in humanitarian diplomacy surface as an emerging area where TRCS and IFRC could play a more active role. TRCS acquired significant expertise in migration management from the EA and has been influential in contributing to the decision-making processes at the central level⁷¹. Turkey's National Strategy on Harmonization and the National Action Plan 2018-2023⁷² mentions TRCS as one of the stakeholders involved in information dissemination on social assistance for refugees and referral processes and proposes capacity development for community centres. TRCS provided inputs in preparing the National Plan and regularly participates in high-level migration committee meetings with national authorities, including the Presidency.⁷³ The channel, which has already been established through TRCS, could further strengthen the civil society-public sector coordination on refugee response at local and international levels.

⁶⁷ KII Others 2

⁶⁸ KII Others 2

⁶⁹ KII TRCS 7

⁷⁰ KII TRCS 7

⁷¹ KII Officials 3

⁷² <https://www.goc.gov.tr/uyum-strateji-belgesi-ve-ulusal-eylem-planı>

⁷³ KII Officials 3

5.1.2 Emergency Needs

Our analysis of early operational documents (revised Emergency Plans of Action (EPoA) and Operational Updates) show low granular and generic data. Needs were assessed with AFAD in the beginning of the crisis and once refugees started moving to cities at the provincial and district level. Some key informants⁷⁴ suggested that poor data quality was reportedly the main reason for the fact that EA updates only identified needs in generic terms, with inconsistencies in specification of numbers and locations.^{75 76}

Needs in the early stages were listed as shelter, health, food, and non-food and under AFAD's coordination the TRCS focussed on immediate food and non-food needs in the camps. WFP supported the TRCS implemented food component through a cash for food e-card modality.

When the population started to move away from the camps, TRCS focussed initially on five districts, where eligible families (30,000) were selected based on vulnerability criteria agreed between the TRCS and the Turkish authorities.

There is not much evidence of early attempts to obtain feedback from beneficiaries as part of needs assessments. A lack of feedback from beneficiaries wasted considerable quantities of in-kind food (Turkish bread). Importantly, this was taken as a learning opportunity and encouraged the transition from in-kind (bread) to conditional cash for food (e-cards) in the camps.⁷⁷

5.1.3 Longer Term needs

There is significant evidence that TRCS conducted and used needs assessments, satisfaction surveys and regular focus group discussions for monitoring and adaptation of the programme in particular after the transition.

This was rather ad hoc initially (possibly due to poor data quality), but a more systematic focus on vulnerability started with a shift in focus to include mid- and longer long-term support needs as early as in 2013.⁷⁸ From that point onwards, TRCS continuously assessed the needs of vulnerable people and collected vulnerability data in coordination with relevant authorities (MoNE, MoH, MoFLS). In July 2015, the TRCS commissioned an external needs assessment, which informed the design of the first pilot community centre in Sanliurfa.⁷⁹ This study included a relatively strong focus on the needs of children, paving the way for the UNICEF-supported CTE programme, which had a cash and a protection component.⁸⁰ Other TRCS community centres were established in areas with the largest number of people seeking protection, using official data. Initially the centres followed the piloted model, but services were adapted to local needs and capacities identified through regular engagement with the visitors of the centre and the beneficiaries of the outreach activities.⁸¹ Needs assessments were further institutionalised and rolled out in urban areas accommodating high numbers of

⁷⁴ KII Others 2, KII IFRC 2,3,9,15

⁷⁵ Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°9 – 22 November 2016

⁷⁶ Revised International Appeal 5 June 2015

⁷⁷ KII Officials AFAD

⁷⁸ Revised Emergency Appeal 28 May 2013

⁷⁹ Turkish Red Crescent Community Centre Project Needs Assessment Report – Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies-July 2015

⁸⁰ KII UN 2

⁸¹ Feedback reports from eight Community Centres (2016-2018)

migrants. Five initial rapid needs assessments were performed by the end of May 2016 in Istanbul-1 (Sultanbeyli), Istanbul-2 (European side), Konya, Ankara and Kilis.⁸²

Apart from beneficiary feedback, government policies played an important role evolving the approach of the activities in the community centres. For instance, the livelihoods approach was initially designed around vocational training activities and language training, focussing on social cohesion or 'integration'.⁸³ This did not sit well with the Turkish policy to promote a labour market-oriented approach, in order to address the need for sustainable solutions to position of the migrants from Syria.⁸⁴ This prompted the TRCS to change its livelihoods approach from basic vocational activities to focussing on skill development for employability by preparing people for the labour market.⁸⁵ When it became clear that initial barriers (work permits were initially difficult to obtain and prohibitively expensive) prevented access to the formal labour market, TRCS responded by promoting entrepreneurship, offering training and partnering with specialist organisations.

Some protection needs are often attributed to a lack of access to employment opportunities and social services. By Turkish legislation on foreigners and international protection, enforced from 2013, people seeking temporary protection have access to health care and formal education. However, the implementation of this policy was hampered by costs and language challenges. The flexibility, associated by the EA modality, provided the TRCS to timely respond in the community centres by offering language classes and information dissemination about rights as well as legal aid as soon as these needs were identified.

It may seem like a paradox or even incoherent that officials were seeking sustainable solutions for people under temporary protection, but it does demonstrate the dynamic nature and debates that took place between AFAD and DGMM on the one hand and the Ministries of Labour, Health and Education on the other. The TRCS demonstrated high levels of engagement with these policies, but key informants report that large numbers of Syrian refugees still lack access to labour, medical care and social cohesion services. They also report 'inadequate' advocacy⁸⁶ on these topics, suggesting the need to review TRCS efforts (through humanitarian diplomacy) addressing policy level and strategic challenges to meeting the longer terms needs of people seeking protection in Turkey.

5.1.4 Assumptions and Risks

Financial risk management systems, strategies and tools are well developed and reside mainly in the financial management and audit functions of the EA,⁸⁷ but details do not appear in any of the public EA documents. The first reference to risk was in EA documents Plan of Action June 2015.⁸⁸ The Operational Update format was updated with the risk matrix in 2016.

Risks are not presented in a way that demonstrates a systematic, inclusive and participatory approach, to identification, monitoring or mitigation, neither within the IFRC nor TRCS, between them or with other stakeholders. Risks identified show a lack of scenario planning and strategy. Risks are not categorised and include a mix of

⁸² Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°9 – 22 November 2016

⁸³ Emergency Appeal operations update n°7 – 7 April 2015

⁸⁴ KII Other 1, 3

⁸⁵ KII UN1

⁸⁶ KII Others 3

⁸⁷ See section 5.2.2 of this report

⁸⁸ Revised Plan of Action 5 June 2015

contextual and institutional risks, including overworked staff, political instability, earthquakes, unspecified government policies, stigmatisation, lack of registration, increase in the number of people seeking protection and at the same time dismissing this scenario. Later economic decline, high rents and other risks to people seeking protection are listed, but the anticipated impact on the EA funded programming is left unanalysed, lacks details and a coherent mitigation strategy. Risk is addressed more elaborately in the appeals including mitigation from 2019.

Besides these contextual risks, there were also unidentified TRCS institutional risks⁸⁹, including cumbersome cash transfer modalities and slow staff recruitment not suited to emergency work⁹⁰. However, there is widespread consensus that the reason was the slow recruitment of staff including social workers and case workers, who needed to be vetted extensively in accordance with TRCS human resource policy and Turkish labour and protection legislation.

IFRC at the corporate level, started to invest in strengthening risk identification and management and this gathered momentum after reviews such as the evaluation of the Syria appeals, which revealed significant challenges in approach and system in EAs.⁹¹ The evidence suggests that IFRCs approach has matured somewhat since then, but it seems this work has not yet reached EA design.⁹² Although the design includes technical capacity building components⁹³, we have not found evidence that suggests a recognition of an incorporation of assessed institutional capacities (e.g. OCAC).

The way the ECHO HiP Protection grant was managed provides an important learning opportunity of what can happen if institutional risks remain un-identified in an EA.

A number of sources identified a range of reasons for the ECHO HiP de-commitment of €2.8m,⁹⁴ including the collapse of the exchange rate of the Turkish Lira against the Euro causing a budget surplus. Despite this, documents and key informants⁹⁵ indicated by under-achievement of targets at the beginning of the project due to a number of unidentified or unmitigated risks, in particular late recruitment of staff, delays in establishing outreach activities, relying on existing programmes, and higher workloads than anticipated, causing low staff retention rates. The donor also identified weaknesses in the beneficiary feedback mechanism which suffered from COVID-19 related challenges (face to face modalities).⁹⁶ At the end of the project, targets were exceeded, due to the budget surplus created by exchange rate fluctuations,

These issues point at institutional capacity limitations in human resource and programme management and resulted in lower performance against planned targets and 20 per cent under-spending of the budget. Some of this could be in part attributed to the late ECHO clarification of expenditure guidelines. ECHO also requested data, which reportedly were not previously agreed at the beginning of the programme, which contributed to challenges for TRCS reporting.⁹⁷ Despite TRCS attempts to address the challenges, including adding human resources to build and support the teams, and providing vehicles to enable more outreach work and IFRC support for TRCS

⁸⁹ focussing on the systems discussed in section 5.2

⁹⁰ KII IFRC 1,3,8,12,14,17,18. KII TRCS 2,6,10,11

⁹¹ HumanitarianStrategy Consult: Review of the IFRC Syria Appeal –June 2019

⁹² KII IFRC 5

⁹³ related to technical aspects of programme implementations (protection, livelihoods, cash, health, PSS etc.

⁹⁴ KII Other 1

⁹⁵ Decision Paper De-commitment of ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91008 (Pledge No. M1712071)

File N 2017/00906, KII IFRC 14

⁹⁶ KII Others 1

⁹⁷ KII IFRC 1, KII TRCS 12

recruitment and secondment of staff for the project, ⁹⁸ ECHO decided to de-commit €2.8m.

The EA's approach to risk identification, monitoring and management still lacks risk categorisation, a mitigation strategy and risk ranking or transfer strategies.⁹⁹ An improvement strategy could start with a breakdown of risk categories; implement (informal) regular risk updates with the team and discuss mitigations. There needs to be much more of a management conversation about risks before staff can be expected to become more confident about discussing risks. Finally, we found important horizontal learning opportunities from the way risk is approached within the ESSN project.¹⁰⁰

Learning and Findings

1. The evidence shows that the EA-supported services were generally relevant to the context (with one or two exceptions during the earliest phase of the EA). Needs, as expressed by women and men, were assessed increasingly during the second phase of the EA, and our analysis confirm the EU-TF evaluation findings of successful project adaptation based on the CEA assessments in the community centres. ¹⁰¹
2. TRCS used needs assessments to gain a new understanding of vulnerability, when the population started to move away from the camps and settled in urban areas. These do not indicate that the needs of the population changed as a result from leaving the camps and settling in urban areas. The literature suggests that people came to Turkey for protection. As they realised that they could not return to Syria in the foreseeable future, they increasingly saw the camps as an unsustainable solution as they had no access to the labour market. The EA rightly developed a livelihood component, but initially this lacked an employability focus.
3. Host communities participated in the advisory committees where they had opportunities to communicate needs which informed the design of social cohesion activities in the community centres. Host community needs may have changed during the course of the EA, but probably as much from economic decline¹⁰² as from the growing number of refugees (the Turkish economy shrank by 7.5% and inflation rates have fluctuated between 8.9% and 16.3% over the course of the EA 2012-2020).
4. The EA supported the transition from a relief-based to a protection-based (recovery) approach. This was in part facilitated by the EAs and allowed for assessing longer-term needs and the technical capacities required to address these. However, key underlying institutional risks remained unidentified and constrained the implementation of the transition. Scaling up capacity for change from a relief to a protection approach has proven to be mainly challenged by institutional inefficiencies discussed in the next section of the report.

⁹⁸ Decision Paper – Decommitment of Funds – ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91008

⁹⁹ Emergency Appeal Operation Update n°13 – 5 November 2019

¹⁰⁰ KII IFRC 16

¹⁰¹ Final Evaluation, Endline and Learning for Danish Red Cross' EU-TF Programme Final Synthesis Report (December 2020) p.73

¹⁰² <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/TUR/turkey/gdp-growth-rate>

5. Evidence from documents and KIIs show that risks were not or poorly assessed until after the transition to the protection approach (second phase of the EA) and that that risks assessments remained inadequate for the duration of the EA.
6. The extent to which needs and assessments of risks, in particular programming, institutional and contextual risks, meet IFRC commitments does not yet seem to match ECHO expectations. Other donors are currently also increasingly tightening their risk identification requirements and IFRC needs to intensify its EA approach to risk identification, monitoring and mitigation.
7. The degree to which the learning can be applied to other (similar) programmes is open for further debate as the Turkish policy and legal environment has been such an important driver of how needs can be best addressed by a national society.

5.2 Efficiency

5.2.1 Strategy

Although protracted scenarios started to emerge as early as 2013, the earliest documented reference to the need for a longer-term strategy dates back to early 2016. The statement that ‘comprehensive longer-term strategy that prepares the society for the potential permanency of parts of the displaced Syrian people’¹⁰³ is also further evidence that the IFRC recognised the protracted nature of the crisis. It took until 2020 before an Operational Strategy was first articulated as a section of the EA. This strategy focuses mainly on the current programme and how to overcome logistical challenges associated with COVID-19. IFRC searched for funding opportunities to support transition the community centre activities into the Country Operational Plans. Recognising that COPs do not attract EA levels of funding means that activities will need to be adapted to lower levels of funding. TRCS is currently developing a pilot for a future model CC in order to continue services (outside the scope of this evaluation).¹⁰⁴

Late articulation of operational strategies leaves the movement strongly embedded in Government strategies and policies. This might be in keeping with an auxiliary role, but key informants confirmed that Government institutional, policy and legal frameworks dictate the strategic direction for programme development resourced by the funding obtained through the EA.¹⁰⁵ Although the TRCS made significant achievements within the limitations and opportunities afforded by its technical auxiliary role, principled engagement with Government strategic planning (e.g. through a deliberate and articulated humanitarian diplomacy approach) may have strengthened its hand in negotiations with the authorities and achieved greater EA impact.

5.2.2 Systems

This section contains the analysis of the feedback obtained in relation to the functioning of IFRC and TRCS systems.

¹⁰³ Emergency Appeal operations update n°8 – 26 February 2016

¹⁰⁴ IFRC Evaluation SC inputs on draft report

¹⁰⁵ KII Officials 1,2,3,4

Information management and PMER

When the EA was launched, the TRCS Planning Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting (PMER) capacity and systems for it were not in place¹⁰⁶ and needed to be developed. Assessments and monitoring data collected early during the EA were reportedly of poor quality and required significant investments for EA reporting for which TRCS had only limited PMER capacity.¹⁰⁷

An IFRC Reporting and Communication delegate was integrated in the TRCS structures to support this, and initially focussed on aligning TRCS reporting with IFRC tools and systems. The delegate became occasionally involved in monitoring and needs assessments in the field, reportedly because he was the only IFRC delegate in the country.¹⁰⁸ Another key informant mentioned that this greatly contributed to building trust between IFRC and TRCS.¹⁰⁹

IFRC deployed a second Information Management Delegate, to IFRC Ankara in June 2018 to support the TRCS team to manage reporting on the new EU-TF and ECHO HiP grants. This was a late deployment as logframes had already been agreed and the fact that the IM-PMER team delegate was not involved in developing the logframes lead to (reporting) challenges down the line.¹¹⁰¹¹¹ The TRCS PMER team evolved during the Appeal to 3 Information Management officers, 2 M&E officers, 1 PMER team leader and 1 planning officer.¹¹²

EU-TF reporting was a complex process, with the Danish Red Cross (DRC) in the lead and coordinating the regional fund (includes components in Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey) on behalf of the Movement. The Turkish component of EU-TF has its own reporting requirements, adding to the complexity.¹¹³

Financial Management

As already alluded to above, TRCS EA financial reporting capacity was not strongly developed when the Appeal was launched. Specific challenges were related to the working advance modality for which IFRC conducts spot checks and audits. However TRCS in order to be compliant with national accountancy regulations, needs to verify each expenditure individually. The EU-TF also requires full annual audits for which each single TRCS expenditure needs to be documented. In order to ensure implementation continuity IFRC absorbs the risk by entering expenditure in its books while TRCS report up to 80% of the advance before IFRC transfers the next tranche.

Further delays in reporting operational updates occurred during the IFRC attempts to reconcile TRSC financial reports. Transitioning from Excel to Access introduced further challenges (see section 5.2.4 of this report). It has taken considerable time for the TRCS and IFRC financial management systems to become aligned. Non-alignment was not identified as a risk in EA documents or in donor (ECHO HiP) proposals.

¹⁰⁶ No PMER department at TRSC until 2014.

¹⁰⁷ KII IFRC 11, KII TRCS 7, 12

¹⁰⁸ KII IFRC 7

¹⁰⁹ KII IFRC 9, 11

¹¹⁰ KII IFRC 2,

¹¹¹ To note that the project was developed with technical assistance of the PMER team in the regional office.

¹¹² KII TRCS 12

¹¹³ KII PNS 1, KII Other 2

Human Resource Management

The EA facilitated an impressive expansion of the TRCS technical capacities to ensure programme implementation, management and support capacities. Training runs right through the entire 9 years of the EA and greatly facilitate the transition from a disaster management to a protection-oriented approach.

Recruiting and training more than 400 staff to implement complex protection programmes in 16 community centres in compliance with technical requirements and labour and protection legislation has been a massive undertaking and could not have happened without the dedication from all parts of the TRCS.

Recruitment can be time consuming in the TRCS. It can take up to between 2 to 4 months and includes preparation of job descriptions, job advertising, preliminary interviews, final interviews for shortlisted candidates and hiring and orientation. The TRCS only has one (senior) HR officer working for the community-based migration programme at HQ and none at the level of the community centres. Contracting also requires sign off by TRCS senior managers who can be elusive in their availability.

For social and case workers it is mandatory by national labour law to undertake background scans, and security checks taking up to 25 days. TRCS also identified a lack of qualified candidates and were unable to retain a number of recruits after they were trained. Among the reasons given was a lack of job security, resulting from project-based contracts and ambiguous internal reports on funding availability.

Although the need for scaling up the protection component for the ECHO HiP grant was recognised early, we have not found that the capacity to do so was assessed.¹¹⁴ The TRCS HR department has no regular communication and engagement with the IFRC and we have not found evidence that the IFRC has identified recruitment as a risk to EA implementation. However, IFRC reports that a three-month project start-up phase should have been enough to recruit the required capacity.¹¹⁵

TRCS HR department mitigated recruitment risks through:

1. Procuring recruitment services from the private sector. Under the EA, many translators, case, and social workers were reportedly hired on third party contracts.
2. Poor staff retention rates were mitigated by offering training psychological support to case and social workers who are exposed to sometimes extremely high levels of stress and psychological challenging situations in the community centres.
3. Many of the TRCS volunteers working in the community centres are Syrians, there are few local ones (under the migration programme) who can find communication with the Turkish protection work force challenging. TRCS has offered language classes to the volunteers to help address this.

When TRCS continued to face challenges to recruit the required staff, IFRC, in agreement with ECHO, hired staff and seconded them to TRCS. Other than these measures, TRCS has no strategic roadmap or formulation to address the human

¹¹⁴ Community Centre Project - Mid-term Evaluation Report – 7 September 2015

¹¹⁵ IFRC Evaluation Management Team comments on draft report

resource management challenges, which nevertheless are reported to the TRCS leadership.¹¹⁶

At Geneva level, the discussions about the role of the IFRC in supporting national societies during acute and protracted crisis is still ongoing and so are the discussion about appropriate tools. What has become yet again become evident is that EA's are functional as fundraising tools, but do not provide a framework for engaging at the institutional level. This has exposed the IFRC and TRCS at unidentified and unmitigated risks. We have not found reports of negative impact on the people seeking protection in Turkey, but we have obtained evidence that suggests that donors are openly displaying hesitation when it comes to EA funding for these reasons.^{117 118}

Despite the need for improvements in the way that risk is approached, the EA overall was an appropriate tool at the time it was conceived. Turkey was facing a huge influx and migration crisis and the TRCS response required international resources to fulfil its auxiliary role in the camps.

Findings:

1. The EA raised 104m CHF (requested 122m CHF with an 18m shortfall). At the time of writing accounts were not yet closed so final (audited) expenditure is not yet known. IFRC has obtained agreements that allow for any remaining funds to be carried forward into the post-EA timeframe through the Country Operational Plan (COP) for the community centre programme.
2. Due to exchange rate fluctuations, the budget for the ECHO project increased by a considerable amount in Turkish Lira (national salaries, procurement), annulling any funding gaps to the extent that a budget surplus was generated. The evidence shows that not all resources obtained for the response according to agreed plans, targets, budgets and timeframes, as a substantial committed amount could not be implemented. For the Appeal, the expenditure is around 97% of total funding.
3. We have not found any evidence in documents or during key informant interviews that suggests that results achieved did not justify the costs or could have been achieved with fewer resources. The Appeal reached 2.76 million people over a period of 8 years, and the average cost per person reached is around 3.77 CHF. However, staff recruitment and retention problems have created implementation challenges which might have led to programming inefficiencies.
4. The EU-TF evaluation reports modest outcomes in terms of integration and social cohesion.¹¹⁹ The EU-TF evaluation also reported an increase in reported job prospects (21%) and household income (29%).¹²⁰ Although this needs to be offset against a 27% inflation¹²¹ over 2019-2020, these reports suggest modest

¹¹⁶ KII TRCS 10

¹¹⁷ KIIs PNS 1,2

¹¹⁸ EA funding ratio was 85 per cent, which was deemed adequate given the budget surplus created by the reduction of the value of the Turkish Lira against the Euro.

¹¹⁹ Final Evaluation, Endline and Learning for Danish Red Cross' EU-TF Programme Final Synthesis Report (December 2020) p.74

¹²⁰ Final Evaluation, Endline and Learning for Danish Red Cross' EU-TF Programme Final Synthesis Report (December 2020) p.68

¹²¹ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/277044/inflation-rate-in-turkey/>

positive outcomes, especially when combined with 78% of women (and 64% of men) reporting improved social inclusion as a result from the EA supported programme. The extent to which this can be attributed to strategic allocation of resources remains unclear, as we have no evidence that would confirm this.

5. The evidence suggest that organizational systems and strengths are developed mainly in technical areas planned under the EA. TRCS technical capacity to implement livelihoods and protection services have greatly benefited from the capacity strengthening components of the EA, but that information management, financial reporting and especially human resource management need to strengthened to maximise EA impact.
6. IFRC reports having benefitted from the EA with the creation of the Migration Programme unit. However, TRCS key informants point out that its regular programme has not sufficient benefitted from the learning that took place in this unit.

5.3 Coherence

This section of the report explores partnerships within the EA with Movement and external partners, including the UN and Turkish Government partners in order to analyse how these strengthened the EA.

5.3.1 Movement Cooperation

During the early stages of the EA, it was anticipated that it would strengthen TRCS participation in Movement cooperation generally, but also specific initiatives such as the Syria Movement Advisory Platform¹²².

The EA was launched on a general understanding that TRCS had the technical capacity to implement a service delivery programme in the camps, in accordance with its auxiliary role and within the Turkish Government policy and legal frameworks. Referring to IFRC concerns of reporting issues manifest during an earlier earthquake appeal¹²³, the IFRC Regional Office Europe (ROE), requested the integration of a Communications and Reporting delegate to support TRCS in planning, external communications, reporting, capacity building and resource mobilization.¹²⁴ ICRC signed separate MoUs with TRC on programmes not directly related to EA supported activities.

The TRCS activities covered by the Appeal were initially¹²⁵ supported through at least three mechanisms:

1. Partner National Societies contributing to the IFRC. Early contributors included American Red Cross Kuwait Red Crescent Society, Red Cross of Monaco, Swedish Red Cross and Swiss Red Cross.
2. Donors contributing directly to the Appeal: Estonia Government, European Commission-DG ECHO, (also through the Swiss Government another allocation

¹²² End Of Mission Report – Javier Ormeno ANNEX 2

¹²³ KII IFRC 9,14

¹²⁴ Revised Emergency Appeal 28 May 2013

¹²⁵ Emergency Appeal operations update n°3 – 9 May 2013

was registered) and the (Canadian Red Cross Society through the Canadian Government.

3. Bilateral contributions by the German Red Cross, Bulgarian Red Cross, British Red Cross, Swedish Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, IOM, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP and UNHCR.¹²⁶

Movement cooperation within the EA took on a new dynamic with the EU-TF funding opportunity. EU-TF is a regional fund, with four of the five countries supported by the IFRCs regional Middle East and North Africa office in Beirut. The EU decided to manage its Turkish EU-TF component through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT)¹²⁷, in order to ensure coordination within the EU-Turkey deal.¹²⁸ The Turkey component of €35m was channelled through the EA.

An example of good practise is the pragmatic approach taken when the EU-TF funding opportunity arose, with each Movement partner playing to its strengths. The IFRC and the EU agreed that it would be better to avoid to coordinate reporting across the two Regional Offices and requested the Danish Red Cross to host the overall grant management and coordination with other Participatory National Societies (PNS) and IFRC as country leads.¹²⁹ The DRCs strategic relationship with the EU also played an important role in this decision. EU-TF is channelled through the EA and the IFRC reports back to DRC based on the agreed budgets and indicators. One report is sent to EU-TF team and another using the same data is to FRiT team. This construction seemed to have worked to all partners satisfaction, which is a great achievement considering the complexities, compounded by a very large budget surplus due to a steep decrease of the Turkish Lira against the Euro¹³⁰.

Bilateral contributions included German Red Cross (GRC) grants from 2014 for three community centres. These which from 2019 was earmarked to address psychosocial support (PSS) and health needs. The GRC national back-donor (GFFO) policies and considerations are the main reason for bilateral support. Interestingly GFFO does not regard the community centres as an 'emergency activity' and hence prefers not to channel through an EA modality.¹³¹

5.3.2 Turkish National Authorities

Turkish authorities have taken the responsibility by law to coordinate the overall response to meet the needs of the people who looked for protection from the violence in Syria. National-level coordination structures are based in Ankara where policies and strategies are developed for the provincial, district and municipal implementation. TRCS co lead the cash working group with WFP and participated regularly at the Ankara and Provincial livelihoods, and basic needs working groups and technical coordination meetings.

TRCS works at all levels as an auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field and increasingly so on policy and strategy as exemplified by TRCS involvement of

¹²⁶ Emergency Appeal operations update n°1 – 21 December 2012

¹²⁷ The term 'refugees' puts the TRCS at odds with the Turkish legal and policy framework (see Chapter 3)

¹²⁸ KII EU delegate

¹²⁹ KII PNS 1

¹³⁰ KII PNS 1

¹³¹ KII PNS 2

the strategic alignment of the temporary protection programmes with the regular national protection framework.¹³²

During the early stages of the EA, AFAD led the response in the camps. After it became clear that people and programmes more and more shifted to urban centres, AFAD handed over its role to the DGMM.¹³³ TRCS worked closely with provincial authorities and used official data to determine the locations for the community centres.

As the community centre programme evolved, cooperation's with the Ministries of Education (child protection), Ministry of Labour (livelihoods) and Health (PSS) intensified to appropriate levels in accordance with the TRCS auxiliary role. Cooperation with municipal authorities focussed on targeting outreach activities such as for the UNICEF supported CTTE programme.

MoNE and MoH Officials demonstrated high levels of awareness of EA supported activities and funding arrangements through regular reports from TRCS. IFRC reportedly had very limited direct engagement with the MoNE and the MoH on EA supported activities¹³⁴ especially compared to communication with the Ministry of Labour and Social Security about the ESSN programme.

TRCS is also one of the DGMM primary partners¹³⁵ and engagement is at various levels including case monitoring and referrals, joint programme national and international partnerships, central and provincial-level coordination and national strategy development. Although disputed by some, key informants reported that data (as far these existed) were not always being shared fully with the TRCS.¹³⁶ Registration (by border immigration officers) was initially working well, when only a relatively small number of Syrians entered Turkey. When the numbers started to grow exponentially registration systems were overwhelmed and both government and TRCS information management systems were unable to keep up.¹³⁷ Key informants reported that data sharing between TRCS and various government departments have drastically improved over time as the community centre programme gained momentum¹³⁸.

5.3.3 Cooperation with UN

The UN agencies mandated to coordinate large scale people movements (UNHCR, OCHA) played a monitoring and advisory role to the relevant Turkish Government departments (DGGM and AFAD respectively) and participated in the coordination meetings on this basis.

As already mentioned above, the Turkish authorities ensure the coordination of the response to people seeking protection in their country. EA cooperation with the UN was therefore of a technical nature. UNHCR donated funds for winterization of the camps. WFP in cooperation with the Turkish Red Crescent provided e-card food assistance. UNICEF initially supported the child friendly spaces in the community centres in 14 camps. From 2018 is started to provide technical and financial support to the TRCS

¹³³ KII Officials

¹³⁴ KII Officials

¹³⁵ KII Officials

¹³⁶ KII IFRC 7,9,11

¹³⁷ KII Officials and IFRC 7

¹³⁸ KII with MoNe

Conditional Cash Transfers for Education¹³⁹ and UNDP provided additional assistance to support the livelihoods transition in the community centres mainly funded through EU-TF.¹⁴⁰ UNFPA and IOM cooperate bilaterally with Turkish Red Crescent.¹⁴¹

The IFRC also chairs the EU-TF steering committee which includes technical partners and donors, providing strategic guidance to the community centre programme.

5.3.4 Cooperation with others

While TRCS coordinated at field and provincial levels, we have not found many examples of cooperation with Turkish civil society (see section 2.4 for possible reasons). However, the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) warrants particular note. ASAM has a long-standing track record in refugee advocacy and extensive nation-wide network established in 1995. It currently has 46 offices in 41 provinces and works closely with government authorities DGMM and as an implementing partner of UNHCR.

ASAM provides social, legal and psychosocial support; runs multi-service support centres, provides training to TRCS case workers and implements activities to facilitate refugee integration and social cohesion mainstreaming. ASAM received (TRCS) referrals from the camps during the early stages of the EA, working outside the camps. After TRCS opened its first community centres, ASAM started to refer protection cases. It actively participated at provincial level coordination meetings, to ensure that its referral was aligned with TRCS. ASAMs participation on the Community Centre steering committee ensures important host community and civil society inputs at the operational level.¹⁴²

Findings:

1. The EA provided a supportive platform for effective coordination within the Movement, auxiliary collaboration and partnership with others. As far we have been able to assess (only two KIIs with PNS were possible) Movement cooperation was well coordinated keeping in mind the strength of the TRCS.
2. We have found no evidence that suggests any duplication or gaps with or from other interventions of relevant humanitarian organizations and governmental initiatives which have similar objectives. This may well be attributed to the strong coordination by AFAD and DGMM. The TRCS played a key auxiliary role in technical and policy coordination both at capital and provincial level. This reportedly has strengthened its capacities and its standing as a reliable and competent partner of the public authorities.
3. Technical partnerships were designed to add value to the strengths of the national society (e.g. WFP in food, and various UN agencies in livelihoods and protection).
4. Donor relationships were mixed and the main lesson learned here is the need for strengthening the risk approach as outlined.

¹³⁹ KII UN2

¹⁴⁰ KII UN3


¹⁴¹ Emergency Appeal operations update n°4 – 15 July 2013

¹⁴² KII Others

6. Conclusions and Recommendations


6.1 Relevance

The EA has made significant financial contributions to TRCS programmes that were relevant and well adapted to the context. EA provided the resources and the flexibility needed for timely and adequate adaptation of the programming to the changing needs of the people seeking protection.

 No immediate action required	Recommendation 1: Any changes to the EA formats and processes should consider implications on flexible programming and reporting in emergency situations to preserve one of its most valuable attributes.
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As is to be expected, very early emergency interventions were based on crude analysis (number of people and outputs required). This inevitably led to some inappropriate inputs (food aid), which was taken as a learning opportunity by the TRCS and AFAD, when the programme was adapted to allow beneficiaries to obtain food that was more appropriate.

The EA assessments identified longer term needs early and supported the TRCS to transition successfully its activities and partnerships from a service delivery to a protection-oriented approach.

 No immediate action required	Recommendation 2: The transition from a service delivery (disaster management) approach to a protection and resilience-oriented approach in Turkey, should be considered and presented as a model in the Movement.
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
6.2 Efficiency

The relevance of the programming cannot exclusively be attributed to the EA. TRCS found its operational strategies to manage the transition in the strong auxiliary partnerships, Government policies and the strength of the national institutions.


These circumstances are not always prevalent in emergency situations and especially not in protracted crises. The question for the IFRC is what its role is after the EA. This discussion could have been had earlier and included a broader discussion about two strategic issues: risk management and institutional capacities. Well functioning information management, financial and human resource systems facilitate efficient implementation of EAs when they are embedded in focussed and agile polices and structures.

In the absence of a longer-term operational strategy and systematic review of the TRCS institutional capacity to implement, the EA remained primarily a fundraising document, that provided TRCS with coordinated international resources and technical support. Our analysis supports the perception that the TCRS did not need radical change in order to implement the EA. However, the evidence also shows that institutional challenges, particularly in reporting, risk identification and human resource management needed to be addressed in order to ensure the implementation of all funding committed to the EA. It is not easy to attribute the efficiency of the EA to the technical support extended by the EA, as there is no counterfactual that suggests that the TRCS could have done without. Without being able to verify this on the ground, it is conceivable that the TCRS, if it would have had direct access to international funding, would have been able to implement the programme in accordance with international standards and with the same efficiency.

The IFRC should address the issue of strategic support to National Societies operating in protracted crises with much more purpose. The importance of a lack of institutional capacity assessments and systematic approach to risk identification is evidenced by TRCS information and financial management and especially human resource management challenges. For it to have operational relevance, the IFRC Country Plan would need to focus on two aspects: programmatic sustainability and institutional consolidation, or exit. This is critical to the Movement, as long as strategic level coordination is required to deliver according to the Red Cross Movement’s principles.

 <p>Action required</p>	<p>Recommendation 3:</p> <p>EAs should include more systematic assessments of national societies’ institutional capacities for more efficient implementation. This should include the use of OCACs, BOCAs and WFNS tools and analysis, in order to ensure that insitutional capacities, particularly HR and financial management capaicities will allow for efficient implementation.</p>
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We also found evidence that a lack of focus on insitutional capacities and insitutional and contextual risks has had a negative effect on the efficient implementation of the EA. Cumbersome staff recruitment and financial management policies and practices were identified as risks to the implementation of seizable EA components, but did not find the traction at senior management levels required to mitigate them.


 <p>Immediate action required</p>	<p>Recommendation 4:</p> <p>EAs need to be strengthened by improving the ways programming and contextual risks are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. identified, 2. categorised, 3. monitored, 4. shared, 5. transferred and 6. managed <p>in EA design, revisions and operational updates with greater urgency. A comprehensive training programme for all IFRC staff needs to rolled out at all levels. Although some of these actions are already underway, resources have to be found to intensify and scale up and include staff managing EA deisgn and implmentation.</p>
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6.3 Coherence

The EA funded programme was strongly coherent with national policies and legislation. Collaboration with the Turkish National Authorities was exemplary at all levels. The EA has contributed to a TRCS who is perceived by the authorities as a reliable and effective auxiliary partner. Trust has developed to the extent that the TRCS is now being invited to participate in the development of national protection policies and strategies. Access to Government data was initially poor, but improved markedly during the implementation of the EA.

Cooperation between the IFRC secretariat and the TRCS has developed strongly during the implementation of the EA. The IFRC would have probably preferred to have more technical inputs, but we have found no evidence that the community-based migration programme needed it. Instead TRCS prioritised technical bilateral collaboration with Movement partners, the UN, the private sector and the National Authorities.

Cooperation with UN agencies was at the technical level and as with other technical partnerships were well managed with respect to each other's mandate and responsibility. Now the EA has ended, discussions about the sustainability of the community centres are gaining traction. TRCS will continue the implementation of CC in the coming period with limited funding.

 Action required	Recommendation 5: IFRC should include an exit (or hand over) strategy section in any EA that has been revised for more than 3 years in order to facilitate: <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The sustainability of EA results,2. Vulnerable people are ensured of continued access to needs-based services,3. Partnerships are organised around future funding modalities and delivery models4. Staff can be reassured about future employment opportunities.5. National Societies acquired capacities are not lost.
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Annex 1: Evaluation Matrix

Relevance				
<i>Themes</i>	<i>Reference doc</i>	<i>Assessment Docs</i>	<i>KII</i>	<i>Analysis (focus is on process)</i>
Context Adaptation/ Change	IFRC Appeal Docs	ACAPS, HNO, UN 3RP plan, AFAD, Government docs, if relevant email coms.	Key informants involved in drafting the Appeals (IFRC, TRCS) Key informants involved in implementation and management of the Appeal (TRCS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How were the needs of people under temporary protection assessed? How were they involved in these needs assessments and project implementation and monitoring? How did the Appeal evolve around changing needs?
Risks	All IFRC Appeal Docs	ACAPS, HNO, Government docs if relevant email coms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICRC PNS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did the Appeal identify inherent risks? How systematically did IFRC monitor and report these risks internally and externally?
Vulnerability/ Needs	All IFRC Appeal Docs	ACAPS, HNO, Government docs if relevant email coms.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent was the IFRC or TRCS able to ensure and verify to reach vulnerable people?
Longer term needs	Appeal docs form after 2016	ECHO endline evaluation EU-TF evaluation SUMAF		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How were longer terms needs take into account in the design of the Appeal? When did this start to happen (timely)? Was this appropriate?
EA in protracted crisis	Appeal Revisions IFRC backgrounders on COP	Documented Turkey experiences		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How were Appeal revisions justified? How were Appeal revisions managed? What can be learned from this? Compare Turkey experience with those EAs in other countries (e.g Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan)
Lessons learned				Analysis – conclusions recommendations
Camps – Urban	All Appeal documents 2016-2018		All key informants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How did the shift from camp to urban settlement, change the needs of the population? How did the Appeal address these changing needs? What can be learned from this?

Relief – Recovery	All Appeal documents 2016-2018			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What did this means in terms of programming? • Was this shift needs based? If so how? • What can be learned from this, specifically for other Appeals focussing on protracted refugee situations?
Similar programmes	All Appeal documents	Other similar programmes	IFRC PNS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent was this Appeal ‘unique’ • What learning can be applied in other programmes?
Involvement of Host communities		ECHO end-line evaluation EU-TF evaluation SUMAF	IFRC TRCS Turkish authorities and Civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the needs of the host communities change as a result of the influx of people seeking temporary protection? • How were the needs of host communities assessed? • How were they involved in these needs assessments, project design and monitoring? • What can be learned from this?

Efficiency				
<i>Issue</i>	<i>Reference doc</i>	<i>Assessment Docs</i>	<i>KII</i>	<i>Analysis</i>
Appeal Funding ratio	Appeal docs	Request Revision drafts	Who drafted these appeal docs?	How did funding shortfalls impact on Appeal revisions, modifications and adaptations?
Activities link to Strategy	Activity reports Operational updates	Strategy (IFRC Country Strategy and TRCSS strategy)	IFRC and TRCSS strategy responsible	How did activities link to IFRC/TRCS strategies?
Systems		Overview of IFRC Turkey systems	IFRC Director of Finance/ Resources?	How did HR, staff care, IT, supply chain, finance, admin, security systems perform? What can be learned from this?
National Society Development	Capacity needs assessment documentation (baseline)	National Society Development Plans	NSD delegate and TRCSS counterpart	How has the Appeal strengthened TRCS's : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Technical capacities 2. Needs Assessment Capacities 3. PMER <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How has the Appeal strengthened TRCS's impact and relevance in the country?.
Cooperation with -Public authorities	Government policies and TRCSS docs	Turkish Policy Context on each of these issues		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How did the Appeal coordinate with Turkish policies in <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Needs and vulnerability assessments - Implementation and technical issues - Results and Risk Monitoring

Coherence and complementarity				
<i>Issue</i>	<i>Reference doc</i>	<i>Assessment Docs</i>	<i>KII</i>	<i>Analysis</i>
Movement Cooperation	Movement Cooperation Tools	MoUs and any relevant docs, meeting minutes etc particularly focussing on transition.	HoD and snowball	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How was Movement cooperation in Appeal development agreed? -IFRC and TRCS -IFRC and PNSs, -IFRC and ICRC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What went well and what can be learned?
Cooperation with UN and others	IFRC country policy			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the nature of collaboration / coordination with UN agencies? - Needs and vulnerability assessments - Implementation and technical issues - Results and Risk Monitoring <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What other partnerships outside the movement played a role n the design and implementation of the Appeal -EU -International NGOs -Local NGOs -Other

Annex 2: Key Informants

Name	Position	Organization
Shafiquzzaman Rabbani	Programme Coordinator, Migration	IFRC Turkey
Kamil Erdem Guler	Programme Coordinator, CBMP	TRCS
Serdar Günel	Head of Movement Relations and Partnerships	TRCS
Nazli Merve Erkan	Protection Team Leader	TRCS
Ceyda Dumlupinar Guntay	Livelihoods Team Leader	TRCS
Damla Calik	Protection Manager	TRCS
Cihan Arsu	Livelihoods Manager	TRCS
Rusen Cetinkaya	Deputy Programme Coordinator	TRCS
Ece Ceren Dogar	Partnerships Manager, Community Based Migration Programs	TRCS
Mine Akdogan	Health & PSS Team Leader	TRCS
Tina Breum Mariegaard	EU-TF Manager	Danish RC
Elkhan Rahimov	Head of Country Cluster / Deputy Regional Director	IFRC ROE
Beril Karaoglan Katz	Protection Manager	EU ECHO
Klaudia JANKOWSKA	IM delegate	IFRC Turkey
Alberto Monguzzi	Disaster Management Coordinator	IFRC ROE
Dorottya Patko	PMER Manager	IFRC ROE
Alessandro Budai		EU Delegation Ankara
Mahfujur Rahman	Finance and Administration Delegate	IFRC Turkey
Ruben Cano	Head of Delegation	IFRC Turkey
Christine South	Senior Adviser, Monitoring & Evaluation	IFRC Geneva
Cristina Estrada	Operational Support Lead	IFRC Geneva
Sayeeda Farhana	CEA delegate	IFRC Turkey
Jonathan Brass	ESSN Operations Manager	IFRC Turkey
Javier Ormeño	Former Reporting and Communications Delegate	IFRC Turkey
Kristina Szalai	Partnerships and Resource Development Senior Officer	IFRC ROE
Helena Loh	Former PMER Delegate	IFRC Turkey
Timea KRAMCSAK	Former Finance Delegate	IFRC ROE
Seval Guzelkilinc	Head of DCCPRRDCCPRR	IFRC ROE

Eszter Matyeka	DREF Senior Officer	IFRC Geneva
Danielle Eadie and	ESSN Risk	IFRC Ankara
Veronika Farkas	Risk Management Officer	IFRC ROE
Papa SeydouSeydou Barry	Regional Finance and Admin Manager	IFRC ROE
Kattal Fatih Aydiner	Migration Health Center Officer	MoH
Hanen Ciftdogan	Programme Coordinator	ASAM
Asli Velieceoglu		UNHCR
Dilara Ekici	Child Protection Officer	UNICEF
Ezgi Arslan	Geçim Kaynakları Sektör Yöneticisi	UNDP
Kaan Saner	Director of International Policies and Partnerships	TRCS
Selim Mengü	Human Resource Management	TRCS
Bayram Selvi	Director of Migration Services	TRCS
Ece Akcay	Representative	MoNE
Erdal Yulu	Protection Coordinator	Danish Refugee Council
Steven de Vriendt	EU-TF programme manager	EU delegation Ankara
Musa Andac	M&E Officer	TRCS
Joris D'have	Regional Programme Coordinator	German RC
Metehan Özcan	Labour Expert	MoFLSS
Eren Demirci	Labour Expert	MoFLSS
Bulent Ozturk	Kizilaykart Deputy Programme Coordinator	TRCS
Ali Rıza Beşkat	Head of Harmonization and Communication Department,	DGMM
Esranur Arıkanoğlu	Harmonization and Communication Expert	DGMM
Erkan Doğanay	Head of Emergency Management Centre	AFAD

Annex 3: Master Interview Tool

This tool will be adapted to key informants' responsibilities and experience in relation to the Appeal and irrelevant questions will be eliminated. Copies of the adapted tools will be shared with the EMT as soon as we have key informants' backgrounds.

Code:	Date:
Interviewer:	Interviewee:
Note taker:	Role:
	Organisation:
	Location:
<p>We are carrying out an evaluation to assess IFRC's performance in supporting TRCS and help inform future IFRC support for TRCS programming in Turkey and elsewhere. You have been selected because of your role as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involved in Appeal design /revision (IFRC) • Appeal supported programme implementation/management (IFRC) • (Strategic) Leadership (TRCS) • Appeal supported programme implementation/management (TRCS) • Partner/coordination (UN)/official (external/ICRC) <p>This KII/ FGD should not take longer than 1 hour. Are you willing to participate in the research?</p> <p>Verbal consent: Yes/ No</p>	
<p>Introduction/ background:</p> <p>What is your position?</p> <p>How would you describe your responsibility re TRCS/ IFRC appeal?</p>	
<p>When were you working on the Appeal?</p> <p>How did you engage with needs assessments?</p> <p>(How did needs change in the transition from camps to urban settlements?)</p> <p>(How did this transition change to a recovery oriented approach?)</p> <p>(How were people seeking temporary protection involved in needs assessments?).</p> <p>(How were people seeking temporary protection involved in programme adaptation?)</p> <p>(How were host communities involved in needs assessments?).</p> <p>(How were host communities involved in programme adaption?)</p> <p>What did this mean for the programmatic approach?</p> <p>How successful was this adaptation?</p> <p>What can be learned from this?</p> <p>To what extent can this learning be applied in a different context?</p>	<p><i>These questions are mainly for technical staff</i></p>

Efficiency	<i>These questions are for Movement Cooperation, PMER, Finance and HR staff</i>
<p>How was Movement Cooperation organised?</p> <p>What tools were used?</p> <p>How effective was Movement Cooperation?</p> <p>How were activities linked to strategy?</p> <p>How did HR, financial and information management systems perform?</p> <p>What worked well?</p> <p>How could movement cooperation/systems be improved?</p>	
Coherence and Complementarity	<i>Questions to partners and their RCRC counterparts</i>
<p>Cooperation with UN</p> <p>How would you describe the partnership with TRCS/UN? What role did the IFRC play in this partnership?</p> <p>How active did the IFRC/TRCS/UN participate in (coordination) meetings?</p> <p>What other collaborative efforts do you know of/did you participate in? <prompt for humanitarian diplomacy></p> <p>Can you give concrete examples of how this improved efficiency/saved resources?</p>	
<p>Cooperation with Government</p> <p>How were Appeal funded activities coordinated? <project cycle: needs assessments, project design, monitoring and evaluation></p> <p>How well did the TRCS / IFRC comply with Government policies/ legislation? How were issue resolved?</p> <p><prompt for humanitarian diplomacy></p>	
WE HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH US?	THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!

Annex 4: Terms of Reference


Terms of Reference (TOR) for: **Final Evaluation – International Appeal Turkey: Population Movement**

1. Summary

- 1.1. Purpose:** The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) seeks to evaluate the relevance/appropriateness, efficiency and coherence of the actions implemented under the International Appeal Turkey: MDRTR003 – Turkey Population Movement from November 2012 to June 2021, by building upon and integrating findings from primary data collection and analysis conducted under the scope of already completed assessments, studies and evaluations.
- 1.2. Audience:** Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), IFRC, other Red Cross and Red Crescent (RC/RC) Movement actors, donors, other stakeholders and partners involved in and contributing to the operation. The findings, recommendations and lessons learned will be specifically used by TRCS and IFRC for planning and response preparedness for similar operations in the future.
- 1.3. Commissioners:** This evaluation is being commissioned by the IFRC Turkey Delegation jointly with IFRC Regional Office for Europe in compliance with IFRC Evaluation Policy for final evaluations.
- 1.4. Reports to:** The consultants (Team Leader, and a second Evaluator) will report to the Evaluation Management Team (EMT).
- 1.5. Duration:** This consultancy will be for approximately eight weeks (40 working days).
- 1.6. Timeframe:** 15 April – 15 June 2021
- 1.7. Location:** The evaluation will take place in IFRC Turkey Delegation located in Ankara, Turkey and 16 Community Centres in 15 locations (Istanbul (Bagcilar and Sultanbeyli), Ankara, Sanliurfa, Kahramanmaraş, Konya, Bursa, Kocaeli, Izmir, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Hatay, Kilis, Mardin and Kayseri) if COVID-19 related restrictions allow in-country presence. Desk review of key documents and interviews with stakeholders can be alternatively conducted online/remotely with the support of the IFRC Turkey delegation.
- 1.8. Application requirements:** The consultancy for this final evaluation requires understanding of the International RC/RC Movement and experience of evaluating programmes that i) are large in scale, ii) saw the transition from relief to recovery in the context of protracted crisis especially displacement and migration iii) included a variety of sectors such as Shelter, Livelihoods and Basic Needs, Health, Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Protection, and Social Cohesion, iv) incorporated cross-cutting subjects of community engagement and accountability (CEA), gender, inclusion and information management. The major focus of the evaluation is expected to be on learning for the future programming.

2. Background

The following timeline provides an overview for the International Appeal for Turkey Population Movement including some key milestones during its implementation period of more than eight years. Key sectors together with summary of interventions and areas of operation are provided in a separate table following the timeline.



The appeal can be conceptualised into two main phases: a first phase focusing on the provision of emergency support mainly to refugees living in camps, aiming to meet urgent needs; and a second phase focusing on the shift from relief to recovery, aiming to address longer-term needs of refugees and host communities residing in urban areas. The table below outlines the sectors, activities, and areas of operation through the different phases:

Phase 1: November 2012 – November 2016		
<i>Turkey started to receive large number of refugees from Syria shortly after the outbreak of the crisis in 2011. The total number of Syrian refugees accommodated in 14 camps were already over 100,000 in late 2012. An Emergency Appeal (EA) was launched to assist 170,000 people in Turkey displaced by the Syria and other neighbouring crises for six months. TRCS activities at the time mainly focused on camps and Turkey-Syria border areas. The Appeal went through several revisions to extend both its duration and scope as the situation deteriorated in the following years with continuing influx of refugees into Turkey from Syria. By the end of 2016, the number of camps increased to 23 and the number of refugees within camps to over 250,000, with more than 2,5 million residing in urban areas. TRCS activities' focus shifted towards supporting refugees living in urban areas and their host communities.</i>		
Key sectors	Summary	Areas of operation
Relief (Food and household items)	Relief distribution including food, household items and hot meal distribution as well as contingency stocking in case of deterioration of the situation and a potential new influx from Syria into Turkey	Camps and urban areas in Turkey – Syria border areas
Shelter	Shelter support and contingency shelter measures	Camps and Turkey–Syria border areas
Psychosocial support (PSS)	Provision of PSS to children at camps and provision of comprehensive PSS to refugee and host community members living in urban areas - including psychological counselling, social services orientation and child-friendly activities	Camps and urban areas
Sanitation and hygiene promotion	Setting up of sanitation facilities, distribution of hygiene items, and hygiene promotion	Camps and urban areas, through community centres
Outreach	Information dissemination to refugees on	Urban areas, through

	services available (including registration) and messages on first aid	community centres
Health	Supporting refugee and host communities through health promotion activities	Urban areas, through community centres
Social cohesion	Supporting refugee and host communities with capacity building including language courses and vocational trainings as well as activities aiming at building up social integration and reducing stigmatization	Urban areas through community centres
Education support	Supporting refugee children for their education needs with learning materials in their own language	Urban areas
CEA	Volunteering from refugees for community centre activities particularly for translation and supporting community outreach activities including Community-Based Hygiene and First Aid (CBHFA).	Urban areas
National Society (NS) Capacity Building	Supporting the NS through technical expertise as well as human and material resources	NA
Phase 2: December 2016 – June 2021		
<i>During this second phase of the Appeal, activities` focus gradually shifted from provision of relief items mainly to meet refugees` urgent needs towards meeting longer term needs of both refugees and their host communities. The set-up of various Community Centres in Turkey`s most populated provinces where majority of the refugee communities reside has helped offering complex services in various sectors including livelihoods, health, education, PSS and social cohesion. All of these activities were funded through EU Trust Fund (EU-TF) during this period.</i>		
Relief (Food and non-food items)	Distribution of hygiene and baby kits at camps, distribution of food and non-food items as well as hot meals in urban areas, food and non-food items contingency stocking for urban areas	Urban areas
Education support	Construction of a prefabricated school to meet the educational needs of displaced Syrian refugee children	Urban areas
Protection	Provision of relevant support and services through case management based on individual needs	Urban areas
Livelihoods	Provision of language and vocational training, job counselling, skill assessments and job referral services, entrepreneurship training and support, agricultural support in crop production and livestock management for refugee and host communities	Urban areas
Social cohesion	Supporting refugee and host communities with activities aiming at building up social integration and cohesion	Urban areas
Health	Supporting refugee and host communities with healthy lifestyle, hygiene promotion, first aid, preventive health care promotion and health education	Urban areas
PSS	Provision of comprehensive PSS to displaced refugee adult people and children	Urban areas
Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGI)	Providing protection services and access to legal rights; Responding to requests for Restoring Family Links (RFL); Disseminating information to access registration, essential	Urban areas

	services and legal counsel; Providing platforms and environments for greater social interaction to build peaceful co-existence among communities; Improving programming and service delivery through service user feedback and engagement	
NS Capacity Building	Access to human resources and material resources such as warehouses, forklifts and vehicles to meet the needs of the operation; Provision of induction and technical trainings for NS operational and field staff; Strengthening TRCS capacity to respond to protection needs through well-established coordination with the government and NGOs; Strengthening TRCS capacity and ability to reach out to most vulnerable groups within refugee and host communities in Turkey to respond to their needs with appropriate services.	NA

3. Evaluation Purpose & Scope

3.1. Purpose (overall objective)

The purpose of this evaluation is to evaluate the relevance/appropriateness, efficiency and coherence of the actions implemented under the International Appeal MDRTR003 Turkey: Population Movement.

The key objectives of this exercise are to:

- Evaluate the relevance/appropriateness of the activities especially in the earlier stages, and focusing more in depth on the shift from emergency relief in camps to longer-term recovery support in urban areas, to see how effective, efficient and coherent the transition materialized, and how relevant/appropriate the adaptation was to changing needs and context;
- Assess the efficiency of the operational model, and whether resources could have been used more effectively;
- Identifying the extent of coherence, coordination and complementarity with other interventions and the wider humanitarian community in Turkey;
- Document good practices for future programming and wider organisational learning.

The following key monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) milestones have been carried out during the implementation of the Appeal. The evaluation consultants are expected to take note of and build upon the findings gathered through these studies, especially those related to primary data collection and analysis including surveys and focus group discussions (FGDs) with assisted people, and add value by evaluating additional areas and sectors not covered in the below evaluations:

- Final Evaluation, Endline and Learning (FEEL), which covered all EU-TF funded activities from the beginning of 2017 to end-2020¹⁴³ (Livelihoods, Health and PSS, Social Cohesion and NS Capacity Building)¹⁴⁴. This study was conducted in the second half of 2020 and the report was published at the end of 2020. The study evaluated i) the programme's contribution towards achieving its higher level objectives of improved well-being, resilience and peaceful co-existence among (vulnerable) refugee and host communities, ii) effectiveness in strengthening self-reliance and resilience, improving health and psychosocial wellbeing, and strengthening the capacity of the NS, and iii) investigated the changes that occurred and the learning that can be taken from it.

¹⁴³ Although the FEEL study was conducted in 2020, the EU-TF project was extended until end-February 2021.

¹⁴⁴ CEA Assessment, Results Oriented Monitoring and Mid-Term Review for the EU-TF-funded Action conducted in 2018 were covered in the FEEL.

- Endline Study, for the ECHO-funded Protection activities for the period January 2018 – March 2020. The report of this study was published early 2020 towards the end of the Action;
- SUMAF¹⁴⁵ monitoring missions conducted in 2019 and 2020, which have mainly focused on monitoring the effectiveness of the EU-TF activities and the extent that outcome and output indicators were achieved.

3.2. Scope.

Timeframe: November 2012 – June 2021¹⁴⁶ (with a focus on the earlier stages of the Appeal, considering that December 2016 – December 2020 period have been covered by the FEEL for the EU-TF funded activities, and the Endline Study for the ECHO-funded activities)

Geography: Turkey, all major operational points.

Programmes: Livelihoods, Health, PSS, Social Cohesion and Protection sectors have been covered for December 2016 – December 2020 period as part of EU-TF Evaluation and the Endline Study for the ECHO-funded Protection action. This evaluation is expected to focus on the earlier stages of the Appeal together with transition from covering emergency needs to covering longer term needs.

The scope of this evaluation has been chosen based on complementarity to the evaluations conducted to date. The evaluation scope might be re-designed and slightly adjusted during the inception period, following the initial desk review.

4. Evaluation Criteria and Key Questions

This evaluation will focus on the following criteria:

Relevance and appropriateness of the operation and programmes in relation to the changing needs and context:

- To what extent was relief provided appropriate to the context, based on assessed risks, vulnerabilities and expressed needs of both women and men, and was of a quality and scale that meets RC commitments and expectations?
- How did the response adapt to changes in need, capacities and context?
- To what extent has the response been linked to longer term programmes/recovery, taking into consideration longer-term needs?
- Were the changes under the Appeal (and how they evolved) justified and timely? How could this change be improved; how could some programmes have been better managed?
- How much was the emergency response tool (EA) relevant and appropriate for a protracted crisis context?
- How did the process of transitioning from emergency response to longer term planning, i.e. Country Operation Plan (COP) go? How much were the respective activities adapted from EA to the COP?
- What are the lessons learnt on the transition from the emergency response tools into the longer term planning approach?
- What are the lessons learnt for similar programmes transitioning from relief to recovery; from camps to urban contexts?
- What are the recommendations for similar programmes working in a protracted refugee situation?
- What lessons can be drawn from involving host communities in the response?

Efficiency of the interventions in delivering quality services in a timely and cost-efficient manner:

- How much money was spent and how did this impact the response? Were the resources obtained for the response used and monitored according to agreed plans, targets, budgets and timeframes?
- Have resources been used efficiently? Have activities supporting the strategy been cost-effective? In general, do the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results be attained with fewer resources?

¹⁴⁵ Technical Assistance to Support the Monitoring Actions Financed under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (Facility)

¹⁴⁶ Although the Appeal will continue until end-June 2021, the actual activities were completed by end-February 2021.

- Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes?
- What organizational systems/strengths can we build on, and what further improvements to be done? (HR, staff care, IT, supply chain, finance, admin, security, etc.)
- How much impact could we create on the capacity strengthening components planned under the Appeal?

Coherence and complementarity of the interventions with those of the Turkish Government and other I/NGOs:

- What is the degree of alignment, coherence, coordination and complementarity (added value) of the intervention (design and implementation strategy) with other interventions of relevant humanitarian organizations and governmental initiatives which have similar objectives, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps?
- What have been good practices, challenges and lessons learnt in coordination:
 - Within the Movement, both between NSs and between the NS, IFRC and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
 - Between the Movement and other actors, both in-country and global actors (i.e. UN, etc);
 - Between the Movement and the government response mechanisms.

The criteria and questions of this evaluation have been chosen based on complementarity to the evaluations conducted to date. The evaluation criteria and questions might be adjusted throughout the inception phase, in consultation and collaboration between the consultants and the EMT.

5. Evaluation Methodology

The Evaluation team will be expected to develop a detailed methodology for this evaluation in the inception report, which needs to be approved by the EMT. The EMT consists of the IFRC Programme Coordinator for Turkey, who will ensure coordination with: IFRC Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (PMER) Delegate and / or Officer in Turkey, IFRC Regional Office in Budapest (PMER and DCC), TRCS' Community-Based Migration Programme team as well as other representatives from the TRCS. The EMT will ensure coordination between the IFRC Regional Office in Budapest, the IFRC Delegation in country and representatives from the implementing NS. The EMT will support the Evaluation Team with establishing contact with relevant stakeholders in the implementing NS, and with developing modalities to ensure remote and, if feasible, on-site access for conducting the evaluation. The EMT is tasked with reviewing and approving the deliverables listed in Section 6 Deliverables.

The methodology is expected to include review and analysis of key documents and key informant interviews.

- Desk review: Conducting a desk review of documentation, including the Appeal, Plan of Action, proposals, operation updates, revisions, pledge-based reports, M&E data available on indicator tracking tables (ITTs), final reports to backdonors, beneficiary satisfaction surveys and internal assessments. This work can be done remotely.
- Key informant interviews: The Evaluation team needs to interview a sufficient number of persons having been involved in the operation to have a solid overview of the different phases. This includes persons from IFRC and TRCS. Most of the involved persons have left the operation and it could be challenging to reach out to those who were part of the operation in the earlier years of the Appeal. However, online interviews can be arranged where possible with the support from the Programme staff. A list of possible interviewees will be shared upon selection. This work can be done remotely via online meetings as needed.

FGDs and surveys/interviews with beneficiaries were already conducted as part of the EU-TF Evaluation and the Endline Study for the ECHO-funded Protection action for the 2017 – 2020 period. Related findings can be directly incorporated from these reports as relevant to ensure no duplication of efforts.

Possible constraints/challenges foreseen

Beneficiary interviews and FGDs are missing for some activities including Basic Needs, Shelter and Education Support. However, conducting these will be challenging at this point considering it might not be possible to reach many of the assisted people from the earlier years of the programme when most of these activities were conducted. Desk review of Operational Updates for the relevant periods can be carried out to compensate for this but the Evaluation team can also suggest other methodologies as appropriate.

6. Deliverables

- **Inception report.** An inception report demonstrating a clear understanding of the ToR with a realistic plan of work for the evaluation is required. The inception report should include the proposed methodologies, a data collection plan for desk review and key informant interviews together with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, and a reporting plan with identified deliverables,
- **Draft report.** The consultant/s will produce a draft report in English and Turkish which will be reviewed by the EMT. The consultant/s will be given feedback within 10 working days to incorporate into the final report.
- **Debriefing:** Debriefing to the EMT and the operation team to discuss the initial findings, conclusions and recommendations, before submission of the final report.
- **Final report.** A Final report will be submitted within 10 days after receiving the feedback from the draft report. Final evaluation report is expected to be no more than 50 pages (excluding executive summary and annexes) which highlights key findings, conclusions and recommendations. Final report will be submitted in English and Turkish.

7. Proposed Timeline (or Schedule)

Time Schedule	Activities	Deliverables
<i>Week 1</i>	1. Desk review: Initial review of intervention documentation, and related primary/secondary resources for the evaluation. 2. Development of draft inception report, and data collection/analysis plan and schedule, draft methodology, and data collection tools.	1. Draft inception report, data collection/analysis plan and schedule, draft methodology, and data collection tools
<i>Week 2</i>	1. Comments by IFRC and TRCS to the inception report	
<i>Week 3</i>	1. Comments by IFRC and TRCS to the inception report 2. Finalising inception report	1. Final inception report
<i>Week 4</i>	1. Detailed desk review of intervention documentation, and related primary/secondary resources including the EU-TF Evaluation and the ECHO Endline Study completed for certain activities implemented under the Appeal. 2. Key informant interviews	
<i>Week 5</i>	1. Detailed desk review of intervention documentation, and related primary/secondary resources including the EU-TF Evaluation and the ECHO Endline Study completed for certain activities implemented under the Appeal. 2. Key informant interviews	
<i>Week 6</i>	1. Prepare draft evaluation report.	1. Draft version of the evaluation report

Week 7	1. Debriefing to discuss the initial findings, conclusions, and recommendations before revision and final approval of the final report.	1. Debriefing session
Week 8	1. Address feedback with revisions in report where appropriate. 2. Revise and submit final evaluation report.	1. Final draft of the evaluation report

8. Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards

The Evaluation Team should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the Evaluation Team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable process outlined in the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#). The **IFRC Evaluation Standards** are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technically accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven **Fundamental Principles of the RC/RC**: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at: www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

9. Evaluators & Qualifications

The evaluation team will consist of 2 members: a Team Leader, and a second Evaluator. The Evaluators are expected to provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations. The Evaluation team will coordinate directly with the EMT.

The Team Leader should meet the following requirements:

Required:

- 10 years of experience in humanitarian response mechanisms, specifically relief and recovery interventions especially in protracted crises with five years in leading evaluations in humanitarian programmes for medium-to-large scale programmes within a migration or displacement context;
- Very good understanding of the RC/RC Movement and types of humanitarian response;
- Previous experience in coordination, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian programmes;
- Experience in the evaluation of both urban and camp programs and/or post disaster recovery programming and evaluation;

- Knowledge of activities generally conducted by humanitarian organizations in the sectors of Shelter, Livelihoods and Basic Needs, Health and PSS, WASH, Social Cohesion, PGI and CEA;
- Experience in participatory approaches to evaluations;
- Excellent English writing and presentation skills in English, with relevant writing samples of similar evaluation reports.

Desirable:

- Field experience in the evaluation of humanitarian or development programs with prior experience of evaluating RC/RC programmes;
- Turkish, Arabic and/or Farsi are considered an asset.

The same apply for the second Evaluator, though experience in leading evaluations and knowledge on RC/R Movement are only desirable.

IFRC Evaluation Management Response Template

IFRC Management Response to Recommendations for the MDRTR003 Turkey Population Movement International Appeal

Background information:

- **Date and duration of evaluation:** 15 April - 15 June 2021
- **Evaluator/s:** Peter Giesen (team leader), Gülşah Dark Kahyaoğlu, responsible for the analysis of Turkish policy and legal context in which the Appeal was implemented and Anna Puntman, responsible for the document review and qualitative aspects of the analysis.
- **Background Information:** The evaluation was conducted remotely, based on a desk review and KIIs. Findings from earlier evaluations, in particular the MADAD evaluation, were considered.

Summary of Management Response:

The evaluation management team would like to thank the evaluation team for their efforts to evaluate the international appeal in a complex environment, and given several limitations such as restricted access to people benefiting from the activities and a short time-frame for the evaluation. Acknowledging these limitations, the evaluation management team would like to note the lack of in-depth and quality analysis as well as project data. Little data is analyzed throughout the document, not even when the efficiency of the EA appeal is addressed. The evaluation team has explained no project data that could have helped to gain a better understanding of the relevance, efficiency and coherence of the EA was found. We understand the constraints imposed by COVID for this evaluation, but enough secondary information and data was made available to facilitate a more robust analysis.

Recommendation 1: Any changes to the EA formats and processes should consider implications on flexible programming and reporting in emergency situations to preserve one of its most valuable attributes.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility

<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p>The evaluation teams agrees with this recommendation. The implication of EA formats and processes was not only on the programming, but also on the data collection, information management and reporting, as the sections, indicators and targets identified at the beginning became / transformed into different sectors or became irrelevant with the format changes. It was too difficult to transform into the new template, therefore we had to produce a tailored template for this EA for this operation.</p>	<p>No immediate action required. Initiatives to revise the EA and EPoA formats and processes are already underway.</p>	<p>Rollout expected 2021 Q4.</p>	<p><i>Working group</i></p>
<p>Comments: Complementary to this it would have also been good to analyse and mention why surge tools were not utilized at the initial phases like in other EA operations. For the recommendation of flexibility in reporting it would have needed further specification - does this refer to flexibility in templates/formats, deadlines, donor reporting requirements? Flexibility in deadlines is something that is already present; as for templates and formats, it is not a realistic expectation that our formats would remain the same over a span of 9 years.</p>				
<p>Recommendation 2: The transition from a service delivery (disaster management) approach to a protection and resilience-oriented approach in Turkey, should be considered and presented as a model in the Movement.</p>				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p>This recommendation is accepted. The evaluation management team agrees that the model which integrates multiple sectors (livelihoods, social cohesion, health, protection etc) could be replicated for other contexts and potentially be linked with the humanitarian service point discussion.</p>	<p>Consolidate the lessons learned and good practice from this appeal (focusing on MADAD)</p> <p>Share good practices with Geneva and Budapest to further disseminate the learning</p>	<p><i>December 2021</i></p>	<p><i>IFRC Turkey</i></p> <p><i>Migration team</i></p>

Comments: <i>n/a</i>				
Recommendation 3. EAs should include more systematic assessments of national societies' institutional capacities for more efficient implementation. This should include the use of OCACs, BOCA and WFNS tools and analysis, in order to ensure that insitutional capacities, particularly HR and financial management capaicities will allow for effiicient implementation.				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p>The recommendation is partially accepted however the evaluation management team would like to emphasize the following points (which was not integrated in the revised evaluation report):</p> <p>Institutional elements are being taken care by NS Development agenda and cannot wait for an emergency or disaster, while emergency appeals are by its nature more focused on specific humanitarian needs. An emergency appeal always has a smaller capacity element in there (due to its nature, and also reluctance from donors).</p> <p>OCAC, BOCA or WFNS are long term approaches that require a strong buy-in from the National Society to even take place and that normally need a long term approach (years) to yield results.</p> <p>Whenever possible, results of OCAC and BOCA are used for designing implementations.</p>	Continue conducting systematic assessments on institutional capacity as part of the regular NSD initiatives	<i>Ongoing</i>	<i>NSD</i>

Comments: More analysis would have been expected, as this EA had 9 years of timeframe, i.e. how many staff have been recruited throughout the implementation timeframe, how many HR staff have been involved into the recruitment phase, how many different profiles have been recruited, what was the staff turnover rate. Likewise, secondary data (external audits, internal audits, donor reviews, etc) could have been mentioned as, in fact, the outcome of most of these exercises indicate that the capacity and the performance of Turkish RC and IFRC in this appeal has been quite positive. This would have allowed more targeted recommendations instead of general statements that the systems were “not suited”. We have major learnings from 9 years of experience and implementation timeframe. These are related with certain competencies developed in TRC structures, how Migration Programme unit has been developed as a result of this journey, how the NS and IFRC were able to address the emergency response needs but still were able to see the medium and longer term needs and adapt the contextual changes into the EA implementation, and how well the funding requirements adapted to contextual changes. Another point that could have been addressed on the capacity development aspect, is how the capacity within NS developed throughout the EA.

Recommendation 4. EAs need to be strengthened by improving the ways programming and contextual risks are:

1. identified,
2. categorised,
3. monitored,
4. shared,
5. transferred and
6. managed

in EA design, revisions and operational updates with greater urgency. A comprehensive training programme for all IFRC staff needs to be rolled out at all levels. Although some of these actions are already underway, resources have to be found to intensify and scale up and include staff managing EA design and implementation.

Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility
<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted	The evaluation management team believes that risk has been included in the EA, with consideration of	Standard template and guidance documents for risk assessment	<i>Ongoing</i>	<i>OIAI Geneva</i>

<input type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<p>the risks that can hamper and affect the implementation of planned activities under the EA. We acknowledge that risks need to be taken into consideration but sometimes this is more difficult in practice due to lack of resources or capacity. Often, we do undertake risk assessment, but it tends to be informal and not planned and documented and is based on discussion. Furthermore, since the launch of this appeal, IFRC's risk processes have been enhanced and are now fully embedding in the newly designed processes in EA activities specifically.</p>	<p>management in the earlier stages of emergency appeals to be developed, including a risk assessment and risk register template. Note that IFRC has designed a standard risk register template and risk categories that this will align with.</p> <p>Set out a process for the regular review and update of risks during any EA, as well as guidance on escalating risks of concern.</p>		
Comments:				
<p>Recommendation 5. IFRC should include an exit (or hand over) strategy section in any EA that has been revised for more than 3 years in order to facilitate:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The sustainability of EA results, 2. Vulnerable people are ensured of continued access to needs-based services, 3. Partnerships are organised around future funding modalities and delivery models 4. Staff can be reassured about future employment opportunities. 5. National Societies acquired capacities are not lost 				
Management Response	Decision Rationale	Action/s to be taken	Timeframe	Responsibility

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partially accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected 	<p>We acknowledge the need for exit strategies for long-term appeals for protracted crisis. This point is particularly important in the context of migration/population movement as the needs rarely cease to exist when the operation is over, even after 3 years. However, we would like to reiterate the feedback given to the final report:</p> <p>First of all, IFRC Turkey office was proactive and forward looking in identifying the funding opportunities, donors, project proposal possibilities, transition of respective activities into the Country Operational Planning.</p> <p>Secondly, TRCS continues the implementation of most the activities in 2021 and 2022 with support from other actors such as UNICEF, UNHCR, World Bank, IFRC, German Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, etc., therefore and exit strategy is not required, at least not within the next 2 years.</p> <p>Thirdly, before the appeal ended, TRC started to working on a concept to address the issue of continuity and sustainability as well as the future expansion of the community centers. The concept developed promotes shifting the focus from being “service providers” to “enablers”.</p>	<p>For longer appeals in protracted crisis, immediate measures for exit strategies need to be developed and integrated into the regular revisions. On a regional level, efforts have already been ongoing to include a exit strategy section whenever possible into the appeal revisions.</p>	<p><i>Ongoing</i></p>	<p><i>DCPRR together with all delegations and regional offices</i></p>
<p>Comments:</p>				