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# Summative Evaluation

of the relief and recovery response to  
the Pakistan Monsoon Floods 2010  
MDRPK006

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## Evaluation Report

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commissioned by  
the International Federation  
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

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Ben Mountfield  
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
## Terminology and acronyms

BCA	Beneficiary Communications and Accountability	PHAST	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
CBHFA	Community Based Health and First Aid	POA	Plan of Action
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund	PRCS	Pakistan Red Crescent Society
DM	Disaster Management	RC/RC	Red Cross and Red Crescent
ERU	Emergency Response unit	SARD	South Asia Regional Delegation – responsible for support to longer term programmes
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team	SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
IRP	Integrated Recovery Plan – with a goal of resilience – funded through the Emergency Appeal	TPAT	Transition Planning and Assistance Team – brought a recovery perspective and supported assessment and analysis. Not responsible for operations or planning.
ICBDRR	Integrated Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction – the successor to the IRP, funded through long-term processes.	VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons	VC	Village Committee
OD	Organisational Development <i>or</i> Owner Driven (housing)		

See also table 1 for abbreviations used for source materials.

# Summary timeline for the floods operation

Figure 1: operation timeline



## Executive Summary

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This evaluation is described in the comprehensive terms of reference as a summative process, and it builds on a substantial documentation base including some nine separate sectoral or technical evaluations. However, the key stakeholders, Pakistan Red Crescent at the headquarters and provincial HQ levels, and the Federation at the country and zone levels, all expressed a desire for a formative process from which lessons could be identified and applied in the future. The resulting report tries to answer the 50-odd detailed questions in the TOR, and meet these summative expectations, while also seeking to understand the root causes of any shortcomings in the operation.

At the current time, PRCS is coming out of an extended period in which it has been operating in 'emergency mode', and it is engaged in a healthy, self-reflective process, with a revised and more relevant strategy, some new ways of working, and a plan to revise its constitutional base. PRCS is stronger than it was before the floods operation, and is very well respected within Pakistan.

The relief operations began quite swiftly, and international support was also mobilised quickly. Over the first months, PRCS report reaching a total of 4.3 million people with assistance of different types, and of these, some 1.3 million were supported through multilateral contributions channelled through IFRC. Federation surge capacity was mobilised: a FACT team, a number of ERUs, a Transition Planning and Assistance Team (TPAT, who undertook a more detailed assessment of immediate and medium-term needs) and members of the RDRT. PRCS coped well with managing this significant influx.

However, the effective deployment of surge capacity only postponed the problems of adequate staffing for the operation, it did not cure them. PRCS made commitments to scale up its staffing, but these were not met. And IFRC really struggled to find enough delegates of sufficient calibre to stay for long enough to meet the demands of the response. As a result of shortages in both houses, the operation suffered.

Recovery thinking started early. The first recovery coordinator arrived before the departure of the FACT team, and the analysis developed during the early months was captured in the Recovery Strategy and in the TPAT assessment reports. These were recommending work in new ways and through new models, and a pilot project was developed in Thatta to explore these and learn.

However, as the recovery programme took shape, the resource constraints began to take their toll, especially at the leadership level. Coordination was undermined. Donor earmarking, rather than needs, drove the planning, which lacked overall coherence and a strong critical path. As a result, the programme design was weak and the hoped-for integration never became a reality. The VCA exercises, which were central to the design, were under-resourced and too slow: the sector programmes jumped the gun, and began to implement in an independent manner.

In this atmosphere, other aspects also fell by the wayside. The analytical base for the programme was not well documented. If there was understanding within the Federation of the real practical challenges of programming at the district level, it was limited: or at least it was not reflected in plans. The gender analysis started well but was diluted when key staff left. A strong start in beneficiary accountability was reduced over time to a weak complaints procedure. The basis for monitoring was weak, and the monitoring itself was a challenge. The participatory approaches, which had been intended to be the core of the programme, were adopted only piecemeal: on the whole, the operation was run in a traditional, top-down manner.

The reasons for this are, of course, undocumented. In the final analysis, it seems to come down to inconsistent leadership and weak oversight of the programme from the Federation, largely as a result of rapid changes and frequent gaps in key positions. With many demands and a complex operation in a challenging environment, it seems that there was never sufficient time off from fire fighting to look strategically at the programme and ensure that it was robust, coherent, integrated and on track.

As a result, there is no way to measure the degree to which the programme may have contributed to building resilience. This is a huge shame: this could have been the perfect testing ground for some of the new ideas emerging on this topic over the last three or four years. These ideas were not included in the programme thinking, and the monitoring framework was not robust enough to capture changes.

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From the perspective of efficiency and effectiveness, again it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions because the data is weak. In this case it is a combination of the weak monitoring and the financial systems, which struggle to differentiate between relief, early recovery and IRP interventions, and the fact that beneficiary numbers are very different for different types of interventions. In addition, detailed beneficiary information is not readily available.

Although the programme design was compromised and the integration never took off, that does not mean the programme components were not individually successful. The health component had never felt constrained by the IRP and provided valuable services to a large number of affected people over a wide area. The shelter component provided houses of a very high quality to people who had lost theirs. The livelihoods component provided cash grants – a new approach for PRCS at this scale – to affected households that allowed them to restart their livelihoods.

To effectively provide a response over a wide area, the operation started off using operational hubs, initially based around ERU deployments, and then moved to having field offices responsible for coordination and programme management. While these were effective on certain levels, on the IFRC side, this geographic management structure seems poorly aligned with budgets and decision making, which remained organised vertically by sector.

Specific problems arose in one of the hubs, in Punjab. There were already practical constraints relating to access issues, to which were added some managerial issues in the Provincial HQ. It was found that the SOPs had not been followed: as a result the beneficiary selection processes had to be repeated, work was delayed and some aspects were cancelled. Through this challenging time it seems that PRCS National HQ and IFRC worked effectively together, and found ways of managing sensitive issues of integrity and principle. There are opportunities to learn from this, to formalise some of these processes and further increase transparency.

Across the board, the PRCS systems seem to be reasonably effective between emergencies. Efficiency is another matter: the systems are paper-based, and as the workload builds up, it is easy for a file to become delayed as it passes up the chain collecting signatures prior to reaching the appropriate level for action. In times of disaster, people work harder and faster: a commendable response but an incomplete one. Matters could be significantly improved by increased delegation of authority from the centre, but the system as a whole needs to be reviewed and alternatives – probably alternatives that do not revolve around paper files – explored.

IFRC systems were similarly challenged, but in different ways. New SOPs had been developed within the AP Zone, and these seem to have led to some confusion about roles and responsibilities in the relief phase, especially between the delegation, the operations team, and the Zone office. Likewise, as the transition to recovery and longer-term programming took over from relief and early recovery, the expected role of SARD was not clear.

It has been noted that the planning was weak. Levels of ambition were inappropriately high, driven in part by donor expectations and in part because the discussions about PRCS capacity were not sufficiently frank, open and direct. In particular, the shelter targets were unrealistic and were subject to multiple revisions over time. The planned timeframe within the DRR component was similarly unrealistic: as noted, this was a major factor in the collapse of the integrated approach. That said, the planning was never really integrated: the IRP logframe was constructed after the event and contains no linkages between sectors, which in practice operated independently, and occasionally in ways that undermined each other. The sectoral, vertical nature of almost all Federation tools is a major constraint here, and work needs to be done to review these, as they will continue to exert a negative influence on future efforts to deliver integrated responses, and on the whole effort to develop and strengthen resilience.

The monitoring systems were weak and incomplete, and met neither IFRC standards nor good practice. Neither the Federation nor PRCS had complete ownership of the monitoring system. Indicators were absent or poorly defined, and the monitoring system was designed to meet reporting requirements – which it did, just – rather than provide effective management information. Oversight of these, and other aspects of programme design, were inadequate at national and zone level. As a result, the reporting was also fairly weak, and the final revision of the Appeal, which appeared to publish revised targets right at the end of the programme, sent a very confused message to the outside world.

External coordination was not a strength of the programme, with inappropriate guidance in circulation about engagement with clusters and similar forums. Internal coordination started off very weak, but fortunately improved over time.

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The exit planning was substantial with regards to reflection and evaluation processes, but less robust in programmatic terms. There were some challenges associated with the critical path for this evaluation, and about findings ways to ensure the engagement and inclusion of support functions. Combined, the detailed evaluation processes have produced a huge number of technical recommendations, documented elsewhere. Creating mechanisms to manage all of these will be a significant challenge, but a necessary one.

In essence then: a huge programme that suffered from problems that appear to be endemic in the Federation for large, post-tsunami responses. The weaknesses and challenges documented in this report need to be seen in this light, and in the understanding that this was a programme which generated high levels of satisfaction amongst targeted beneficiaries, which at a sectoral level had many substantial successes, and from which PRCS emerged stronger than before; now able to work in areas that are inaccessible to NGOs.

The final section of the report goes into detail about the root causes for many of these challenges, which are mostly identified as being institutional and IFRC focussed, rather than being located at the national level. The evaluations' recommendations seek to be forward-looking and constructive, to build on the hopes and expectations of the stakeholders to the process.

On a positive note, it is worth repeating that despite the setbacks and challenges, PRCS have come out of this major response both stronger and more reflective than before, with substantive change evident at the HQ and the Provincial levels. These changes provide PRCS with new opportunities, in terms of quality programming, strengthening institutional capacity and better connecting the branches with the HQ: it will fall to their leadership to seize them, and their partners within the Movement to support them as they do so.

## Acknowledgements

An evaluation report for a programme of this scale and duration will inevitably contain errors, and will represent events and decisions from only one of many possible perspectives. In the heat of the emergency response, operational priorities took precedence over documenting decisions, and three years have passed and staff have rotated: in places the evidence base is understandably thin. Despite the extensive review process, there will remain errors, and due to space considerations it has not been possible to include every perspective. These errors are the sole responsibility of the consultant, and not of the many people who contributed to the process: this report represents his independent opinion.

This has been a fascinating and demanding process, and in many ways a rather humbling one. Thanks are due to PRCS and IFRC, for opening their respective 'kitchens' to a remarkable degree and allowing the consultant inside to see what was cooking.

Thanks are particularly due to the M&E team in the IFRC delegation, for designing a comprehensive and multi-faceted evaluation process, and supporting it with an intimidating library of documentation, and for repeatedly and patiently re-arranged meetings over the ten days of study in Islamabad.

For PRCS, thanks are due for bearing with the consultant, even when a process that they hoped would be formative began at one point to resemble an audit in terms of its demands for data.

Also to all those who patiently completed Unit Histories, which substituted for and complemented the many semi-structured interviews that took place, and for all the interviewees, including those who worked late into the afternoon during Ramazan, and also those who gave up their weekends to be interviewed at length.

## Section 1: Introduction

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### The context of the floods response

#### A selective history

The Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) came into existence in 1947. It has adapted, grown and changed over the years, and at the beginning of this century its main areas of focus were providing facility-based health services and responding to emergencies. Its administrative structure models the federal nature of the country, with a headquarters in Islamabad and provincial branches<sup>1</sup> around the country. The provincial branches, which are not mentioned in the PRCS Act, are effectively constitutionally independent, and they reach out through a number of district branches to communities and people across Pakistan. The majority of district branches are voluntary; many do not have their own facilities. Ten years ago, PRCS had a small body of supportive partners through the Red Cross Movement, and there was a long-standing presence of ICRC in some parts of the country.

In 2005, a serious earthquake struck parts of northern Pakistan killing around 73,000 people and making around 3.5 million homeless. A major international relief effort was launched, including a Federation Appeal that reached 167m CHF, and which was only finally closed in late 2011. This period saw the development of long-term partnerships between PRCS and some PNS partners, which began working closely with district branches in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in sectors such as community-based DRR and primary health care including psychosocial support,

That year, 2005, can be seen as the start of a run of fairly major disasters in Pakistan. In the same year there was a snow and floods response, and in 2007 there was a response to a cyclone and associated floods. 2008 saw an earthquake in Baluchistan, and there was an IDP crisis in 2009, which saw large numbers of people displaced from their homes in KP. 2010 saw two further cyclone and flood responses prior to the massive monsoon flooding that year, which prompted the Appeal and the subsequent operation, evaluated in this report. This was further complicated by additional flooding events in 2011 and 2012.

This recent history is important for two reasons: it is necessary to help contextualise the decisions taken during the response, and because it helps us to understand the constraints and opportunities of PRCS in 2010, and also at the current time.

We can consider that PRCS have been in a largely reactive 'disaster mode' for an extended period, with associated impact on longer-term programmes, planning and strategy. At the same time, it's clear that much has already been learned through the response to these successive disasters, and that PRCS has benefitted in terms of an enhanced profile and level of acceptance within Pakistan.

Together, these factors appear to have contributed to PRCS' recent review of strategy – in the middle of a five-year strategic plan – and the plan to review and revise the constitution.

#### The monsoon flooding of 2010

In the third quarter of 2010, Pakistan experienced the worst monsoon floods in its history. Starting in the north of the country in July, the flooding spread south along rivers and waterways and over several weeks affected large parts of the country, killing a reported 1,985 people and injuring 2,946. In the mountainous areas the destructive floodwaters swept downhill, sweeping away land and infrastructure. As the water reached the plains it slowed, depositing huge amounts of sand onto previously fertile farmland, and further south still, the waters slowed to a standstill, leaving some areas remaining inundated for months.

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<sup>1</sup> Specifically, there are five provincial branches, one regional branch in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), the Federal Capital Territory of Islamabad Branch, and the State Branch of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Source: PRCS website.

Following a DREF allocation at the end of July, a preliminary emergency appeal was launched on 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2010, ahead of the main appeal on 19<sup>th</sup> August. Three revisions of this appeal have been published, the most recent on 15<sup>th</sup> May 2013.

IFRC surge capacity was mobilised to support the operation: a FACT team was deployed at the start of August, around the same time as several ERUs. A total of ten ERUs were mobilised over the following weeks, and several staff rotations were made<sup>2</sup>. Surge capacity from KL and elsewhere was drawn upon to field a detailed assessment team and fill other positions<sup>3</sup>. Members of the RDRT were then deployed to provide additional support in Sindh province.

Early recovery efforts began swiftly and the preparatory steps were subsequently described in the five TPAT reports, the Recovery Framework (in November 2010) and the Implementation Framework for the Flood Recovery Activities (in May 2011), later described as the Integrated Recovery Plan (IRP). The description of the implementation framework work was further explained in the Appeal revision of August 2012 at which time the appeal was extended from 24 to 36 months.

During the operational period two more monsoon flooding events occurred: both serious but neither on the huge scale of the 2010 situation. In 2011 the flooding largely affected different areas and there was a separate Appeal. The monsoon floods of 2012 occurred in areas previously affected in 2010, and the response was covered using funds already available within the Appeal, with some additional resources arranged in country. It is worth noting that while the Federation provided significant support to PRCS during the flooding, this was by no means their only source of funding. Funding came to PRCS from a range of local and international sources. Some Red Cross/Red Crescent partners chose to support relief efforts in a bilateral manner, and a good number worked bilaterally in recovery programming.

### **The structure, capacity and strategic direction of PRCS**

At the time of the flooding, the PRCS was guided by its draft strategic plan 2015, which identified key operational priorities under two broad headings.

The first concerned building additional operational capacity in emergency response, and related both to institutional capacity and developing resilience in vulnerable and at-risk communities. The second concerns the further development of community-based programming, and this encompasses curative and preventative health services, blood services, HIV and AIDS, first aid, and water and sanitation projects.

At this time the strategic plan also aimed to develop the youth and volunteer corps, strengthen the national society's organisational base, develop its HR structures and systems, and enhance its image and visibility. Finally it aims to increase financial sustainability and develop local fundraising capacity.

At the end of the Floods Operation, PRCS has reviewed both the plan as a whole, and the order of the priorities within it, and the resulting plan appears to better reflect the ambitions of the PRCS, their capacity, and the needs they aim to address than its predecessor. The details are available elsewhere, but in essence, PRCS has elevated sustainability to the highest institutional priority, while shifting the operational focus somewhat. The DM department will expand to include capacities in shelter, livelihoods and cash grants, while Health will review the existing BHUs based on needs and location, and may close the HIV / AIDS programme. PRCS have adopted the Integrated Community Based Risk Reduction approach as a standard integrated programme, based in part on learning from the Integrated Recovery Programme funded through this Appeal.

The practical complexities and realities of PRCS were not well understood by Federation staff planning the operation. They may have been understood within the main delegation, and they were understood by the PNS, but they were not taken on board. The operational plans imply unstated and inaccurate assumptions about PRCS structure, capacity and systems, especially at the branch level.

<sup>2</sup> This number includes the American RC Relief cell, based in the HQ.

<sup>3</sup> Including the consultant, in the role of Recovery Coordinator, for one month in September 2010

## The response of PRCS and Movement Partners

The relief phase was characterised by appropriate responses, delivered in a mostly timely manner at scale. PRCS coped well with the large number of RC/RC Movement and other supporters, and accommodated and coordinated a large number of additional delegates deployed first as surge capacity and later as core staff. FACT team, ten ERUs, a Transition Planning and Assistance Team (TPAT) and an RDRT team were mobilised.

The shelter team provided emergency shelter quickly, and focused on the forthcoming winter season in the mountainous north, also distributing large numbers of shelter toolkits to support people's self-recovery. They then moved on to the provision of appropriate longer-term shelter through an owner-driven model within the framework of an integrated-multi sector recovery programme.

In the livelihoods sector, the initial emphasis was on providing farmers with the inputs they needed to restart production, despite the huge quantities of infertile sand and silt that had been deposited by the receding floodwaters and the damage to assets. The team went on, within the IRP, to provide cash grants to households on the basis of a business plan to restore or diversify their livelihood base.

The watsan team also undertook both relief and recovery, including both hardware components, such as the provision of clean water and later, latrines, and software through the PHAST and the school-based CHAST activities.

Health coverage was very broad throughout the response period, building effectively on PRCS substantial foundation across five provinces. Activities included the provision of health services, community based approaches, and psychosocial support.

This was the first time that PRCS had used cash at scale, and the implementation ran into a few challenges as a result of the choice of the GPO as implementing partner<sup>4</sup>, which slowed down, but did not prevent, delivery of cash grants for shelter and livelihoods in many locations across three provinces.

It was also the first time that PRCS had engaged with beneficiary communication in this manner, utilising radio, TV, face-to-face work, noticeboards and feedback mechanisms. Again, there were challenges along the way but much has been learned and beneficiary communication and accountability (BCA) has been adopted into the core activities of the PRCS.

The initial deployment of surge capacity was largely done through field hubs, which had a focus on logistics and relief: over time, their activity changed and they were complemented by field offices in the three provinces where the IRP operated.

Complementary activities were supported by the ICRC and PNS in the relief period, and PNS have continued to provide support to community based activities across a range of sectors. The geographic scope of PNS support – previously focused largely on KP as a result of the 2005 earthquake – has increased dramatically.

Finally, the national society has embraced many opportunities for learning and development, and has emerged from the response stronger, with improved public reputation, and perhaps also with a better understanding of its own capacity, and a clear vision of the way it wants to take that forward and develop in the future.

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<sup>4</sup> Ironically, the choice of the GPO was a major factor in PRCS having the confidence to proceed with a cash-based programme at this scale.

## Evaluation methodology

### Expectations

There are two distinct groups of stakeholders to this evaluation process, and while their expectations are described in similar terms, their needs are actually rather different.

PRCS' recent history is described briefly above. From their perspective, the evaluation must recognise both the history and the current direction and the opportunities it presents, and – while identifying shortcomings – it should seek to make constructive recommendations that align with the revised strategic direction and are realistic in terms of capacity and context.

From IFRC perspective, the evaluation seeks to meet their public obligation to accountability, while identifying lessons learned that relate specifically to their relationship with PRCS, and also lessons that might be applied more widely when responding to massive disasters in the future.

### Evaluation purpose

The TOR describe the evaluation as 'summative' and as 'desk based'. Neither term is entirely precise. The process was also described as a meta-evaluation, which is true to a degree.

The main focus of a summative evaluation is accountability<sup>5</sup>. Accordingly, the TOR ask the consultant to consider the planning, the processes and their outcomes against a number of questions organised under seven headings derived from the DAC criteria<sup>6</sup>. Yet the overwhelming opinion of managers and technical staff in both PRCS and IFRC was that they wanted the evaluation to be an opportunity for learning: that is, a formative process. Towards this end, both PRCS and IFRC were open with the consultant about the challenges they had faced, and responded constructively when these were reflected back at them in the debriefing sessions in Islamabad and KL.

A formidable quantity of documentary evidence was provided to the consultant, including seven separate technical summative reviews<sup>7</sup>, each of which took place in the final months of the operation. Each evaluation was asked to address the same seven broad areas as this evaluation, and, when combined, they provide a reasonably good overview of the operation, although they take very different approaches to methodology and reporting.

Most of these sectoral evaluations had a substantial field-based component, which provides this consultant with a large evidence base, both qualitative and quantitative, albeit one that is not really open to statistical analysis (see below). Fortunately, the weaknesses in quantitative data collection and interpretation are largely offset by the **consistency of the qualitative findings** across the different reviews, as well as the **case studies** and **examples** they provide. There was no expectation for this consultant to travel to the field – hence the description of a 'desk-based' process. But the evidence for the findings below was collected in the field, and then challenged, tested, and in most cases successfully triangulated through interviews undertaken in Islamabad, and by comparisons between different written sources.

It would perhaps have been possible to address the 50-odd detailed questions in the TOR by extracting findings from these recent reviews, adding them to the existing findings of the real-time evaluations, the relief review and the mid term review, and seasoning the mixture with a comparison of the endline survey with its baseline counterpart. However, this would not have satisfied the expectations of either PRCS or IFRC.

The goal of the IRP – the focus of the last two years – is increased **resilience** of flood-affected communities, and the model chosen to deliver it was one of **integrated, needs-based** programming. It is implicit in resilience programming that the **programmatic whole is greater than sum of the sectoral parts**.

To meet the expectations of the stakeholders, the evaluation process must recognise and emulate this. It needs to consider the whole programme rather than the components, and place it firmly in

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, the IFRC evaluation guidance, and the recently published ALNAP guide to evaluation of humanitarian action. (Details in Annex 3).

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

<sup>7</sup> At the time of writing, a couple of these were still only available in draft, pending feedback from IFRC and PRCS.

the context of the true capacities of the actors, their longer-term strategic plans, and the challenging context of Pakistan during the worst disaster in living memory. Many – but not all – of the detailed questions in the TOR scope *are* addressed in section 2 of this report, often by reference to the findings of the sectoral evaluations. But in accordance with the expectations of the stakeholders, this evaluation report aims a little higher: to understand not just what went well and what didn't, but to attempt to explore the root causes, to repeatedly ask the question 'why?'

The report finds that the answers to these questions are often systemic, and thus also applicable to other disasters in Pakistan and beyond. Of course, for that to happen, it is not enough to identify lessons 'learned' – the root causes must be acknowledged, and behaviours, structures and processes have to be changed. This part of the analysis forms the basis of section 3.

## Evidence base

A substantial, almost overwhelming, amount of documentation was provided for this evaluation, most of which is listed in Annex 2. In addition to considering its breadth, consistency and gaps, we need to also to form judgements about its utility. In particular, the quantitative findings within this library need to be handled with care. In some documents, data is used without reference to context, sampling methodology or confidence levels and intervals; inappropriate analysis is undertaken on non-representative sub-sets of data; and in some instances correlations are enthusiastically interpreted as causal relationships.

Some of the documents have been developed by the Federation in varying degrees of collaboration with PRCS, and some have been produced by external consultants contracted by the Federation: very little is directly sourced from PRCS. Many internal documents lack an author's name, revision details or a date. With the exception of web-published documents, there is little material available from the first half of the operation, when staff turnover within the delegation / operation was at its highest. The summary below is in approximately chronological order, and doesn't include the Federation Appeal documents and reporting which is readily available on the website.

**Table 1: key source material used in the evaluation process; abbreviations used in references**

Ref	Source
POA-F	Plan of Action (produced at the time of the departure of the FACT team), early Sept 2010
POA-D	POA (as prepared for the Doha meeting), October 2010
TPAT	The Synthesis Report of the Transition Planning and Assistance Team, October 2010
RTE	Real Time Evaluation, 20 Jan 2011, Cynthia Burton
ERF	Evaluation of the Relief Phase, 13 April 2011, Dr. Niaz Murtaza
Thatta	Final Report on the Thatta Pilot Project
MTR	Mid Term Review of the IRP, Gert Venghaus, March/April 2012
BLEL	Baseline – Endline comparison (draft 3), 4 September. Final version still pending.
NLLL	National Level Lessons Learned Workshop report, June 26, 2013
UH-sector	Unit History (mostly July 2013, various authors)
SE-sector	Sectoral Evaluation various dates in 2013
TOR-SFE	Terms of Reference for this summative final evaluation process
KII	Key informant Interview – the individual source will not be identified.

The FACT sitreps are available, but they did not produce a formal assessment report: what has survived is the lengthy but disconnected **POA** that was delivered as they departed. This was effectively rejected by the Zone office<sup>8</sup> and was promptly to be re-written in the field in the correct

<sup>8</sup> It was a long weekend in KL, and the POA handed over by the FACT team was not in the agreed POA format. It was re-written over three days by newly arrived delegates and counterparts, informed by additional secondary information. While this felt an artificial process at the time, with hindsight it provided a solid understanding of the FACT team's thinking to the TPAT team and other newly arrived technical delegates: very useful in the absence of a handover.

format. This **'FACT' POA** was replaced by a second more detailed and focused revision, written by the nascent Operations Team, informed by the findings of the TPAT mission, prior to the Doha donor's meeting.

The early external formative reviews (the two **RTEs**<sup>9</sup> and the **evaluation of the relief phase**) are valuable sources of information: they relate to a specific point in time, and they contain concrete recommendations. A formal management response was produced for some of these evaluations by IFRC; within PRCS they are considered in management meetings and actions minuted.

The **VCAs** undertaken to provide a basis for planning the IRP are not a very useful source of data: there were too many problems especially with the quantitative components for them to be given much weight. However, the qualitative analysis appears to be basically sound.

One interesting early component was the **Thatta pilot** designed to explore the transitional shelter design, and the cash transfer processes. Unfortunately when the project location was chosen, it appears that accessibility was prioritised over comparability. While valuable lessons were clearly learned through the process, the documentation is not preserved and some did not translate successfully to the programme areas. The final report of the pilot project was delayed to the point of being retrospective.

The last of these formative, learning processes was the **mid-term review**. With hindsight, the analysis looks sound but the process was clearly unsuccessful: the report was not well received and the recommendations may have had less traction than they might have done. The suggestion in some quarters that it was undertaken too late to influence programming decisions seems not to be borne out by the timeline: other factors appear to have been at play.

There then follows a rather extended gap, during which reflective practices took a back seat to implementation. At the end of this period there is a positive flurry of evaluative activity. The processes leading up to and including the final evaluation are more comprehensive than is usually found in Federation Appeals, but are certainly appropriate to the scale and breadth of the operation. The M&E exit strategy includes several interesting components:

- Unit Histories<sup>10</sup>, produced within the technical, regional and administrative teams to a common format. Several coordinators commented that these had been a useful internal reflective exercise for their teams: the written outputs added value and provided focus to some of the individual key informant interviews. The Unit Histories are subjective perspectives written with the benefit of hindsight (and in some cases with low levels of institutional memory), and are utilised as such.
- Sector/service specific evaluations. Given the weaknesses in operational integration, these sector specific evaluations were an appropriate intervention (although a geographic multi-sector approach might also have been effective). While the various TOR have much in common with each other, and with the TOR for this exercise, the quality and utility of these evaluations is quite mixed. At the time of writing first and second drafts of this report, several of the sector level reviews were only available in draft form.
- A multi-sector end-line survey of beneficiaries, representative of the target population<sup>11</sup>. A process to compare the findings of this survey with a similar baseline survey undertaken in September 2011, and analyse the changes, was underway at the time of writing: the first two drafts of this report were not robust, although some of this early analysis found its way into the sectoral reviews. A third draft was produced in September 2013 – too late to be included in this evaluation report.

It was intended that support services complete the unit history and focused evaluation processes in parallel with the technical sectors. This did not materialise, although budgets were available and attempts were made to develop TORs. In particular, the finance and logistics functions would have benefited from both the reflective exercise and independent evaluation, and this evaluation process is left considerably weaker by their absence.

<sup>9</sup> The first is the RTE of the relief operation; the second relates to the RDRT deployment.

<sup>10</sup> This is a new approach for the Federation, and was triggered by a suggestion in the IFRC Evaluation Guidelines, although it is not explicitly described in that source. Highly recommended for future evaluation processes.

<sup>11</sup> With 95% accuracy and a 5.5 point confidence interval.

Table 2: IRP exit-phase, sector-specific reviews and associated documents

Component / Sector	Date	Status	Notes
Health	August 2013	Final	External ( <i>in this table, 'external' refers to the Team Leader</i> )
Shelter	June 2013	Final	External. Draws on the 1 <sup>st</sup> draft endline report (which was not a robust source)
Livelihoods	March 2013	Final	Internal. Looking at immediate impact. Surveyed 4% of assisted HH
PHAST	25 July 2013	Draft	Internal.
KAP	April 2013	Final	Internal. Has its own survey data, representative sample.
DRR	June 2013	Final	External.
BCA	24 July 2013	Final	Internal (SARD)
Branch Dev't	July 2013	Draft	Internal
IRP endline	April 2013	Draft 3	Internal. Not technically robust at 2 <sup>nd</sup> draft. 3 <sup>rd</sup> draft not considered in detail for this evaluation.
Finance			Proposed but not undertaken.
Logistics			Proposed but not undertaken

In addition to the written documentation, the consultant interviewed some 40 key stakeholders in KL, Pakistan and elsewhere either face to face or by Skype. These interviews were undertaken following a preliminary document review, and after the development of an analytical tool to identify issues and associate them with elements of the TOR, key documents and stakeholders. The interviews had three purposes:

- to identify new areas for exploration;
- to triangulate issues arising from other sources, and
- to test and validate (or nullify) developing hypotheses.

In the section of this report on observations, a number of sources come up repeatedly. For brevity, these will be referred to [in square brackets] using the reference in table 1, above. A complete list of documentary sources can be found as Annex 3.

### Constraints, challenges and sources of bias

This consultant was deployed to Pakistan as part of the surge deployment<sup>12</sup> by IFRC during the early part of the response. He had the role of Recovery Coordinator throughout September 2010, coordinated the re-writing of the POA-F and managed the TPAT team leader during this time – although he left before the TPAT mission was completed. He was transparent about this engagement during the selection process. This certainly influenced his understanding of the initial assessment period, and there were clear differences of perception between him and the current delegation leadership on some aspects of this time.

The evaluation process, despite being restricted to Islamabad, was quite seriously constrained by time. Some face-to-face interviews were cancelled at short notice, several proved impossible to organise at all. Most stakeholders were seen only once: in most cases, no time was available for follow-up interviews to explore or triangulate issues that had emerged in the meantime. From the Federation side, there was limited access to senior managers in KL and Islamabad, due to staff being away on other business, or having moved on.

<sup>12</sup> He was also deployed to Haiti in similar circumstances, and was contracted to reflect on IFRC Recovery Surge Capacity by the Senior Recovery Coordinator in Geneva:  
[https://www-secure.ifrc.org/DMISII/Pages/03\\_response/0323\\_recovery/FERST/Recovery%20Surge%20-%20Learning%20from%20Pakistan.pdf](https://www-secure.ifrc.org/DMISII/Pages/03_response/0323_recovery/FERST/Recovery%20Surge%20-%20Learning%20from%20Pakistan.pdf)

## Introduction

Other constraints include the documentary gaps from the early phase of the operation, and some misconceptions that may have arisen from them, which have found their way into later documentation and become part of the accepted history.

Although a very consistent picture emerged of the detailed issues explored in Section 2 of this report, it would have been very helpful to be able to explore the higher-level causal factors in more time and detail. These factors began to emerge later in the process, and because they do not have a direct and substantial evidence base, they are likely to be more contentious and nuanced.

Although efforts can be made to identify personal bias and interests, the consultant cannot control for bias or errors in the source material. In some cases such factors are clear, and such documents (or the quantitative parts of such documents, in many cases) have been treated with caution: additional, Independent triangulation has been sought.

Documents that have been through a rigorous process of review (such as the external evaluations) are treated as sources of higher quality and validity, as are those few documents that seek to identify their own sources of bias and error in a transparent manner.

## Process

A draft evaluation report was submitted to three key groups of stakeholders on 9 August 2013:

- PRCS, through the DM department
- IFRC Islamabad, through the Programme Coordinator
- IFRC KL, through the Operations Coordinator

These three stakeholders were then asked to:

- circulate the report to relevant stakeholders, including all those who were involved or contributed to the evaluation process;
- solicit corrections on matters of accuracy, while ensuring that these are supported by documentary evidence as far as possible (the findings of the report are already triangulated to a good degree, so additional evidence will be required);
- if necessary, arrange follow-up interviews between individuals and the consultant by skype or telephone, should other perspectives need to be presented in this manner;
- compile the feedback from their stakeholder group into a single document each (three feedback documents in total);
- return this feedback document to the consultant by 28<sup>th</sup> August.

Over 250 comments were received from the various stakeholders. Many were statements of opinion, agreement or disagreement, or requests for textual changes to ensure clarity. Some requested changes to the report but were not supported by additional evidence.

The stakeholder feedback was slightly delayed, but more importantly, several of the supporting review documents were still incomplete at the time of writing, particularly the next version of the comparison of the IRP base- and end-lines.

A second, limited review exercise was carried out in late September and early October to provide an opportunity for reflection on the finance sections of the report, and to provide updated and complete beneficiary data which had not been previously available.

However, not all requested information was forthcoming, and in the light of external deadlines, this report has been finalised ahead of these supporting documents.

## Section 2: Observations and findings on the operation

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*The observations in this section are based on secondary information generated through other evaluative processes, discussed above, on other documented sources, and on interviews with key informants. Efforts have been made to triangulate observations, generally using perspectives from PRCS as well as IFRC.*

*This section has been kept as short as possible, so as not to duplicate work already completed: however, to answer the comprehensive questions in section 4.2 of the TOR a certain amount of detail is required, and where necessary examples have been given to illustrate points.*

*In the following section conclusions start to be drawn about the **causes** of the issues that are identified here.*

*Section 2 includes chapters on the following topics:*

- *Relevance and Appropriateness*
- *Efficiency*
- *Effectiveness*
- *Coverage*
- *Impact*
- *Coherence*
- *Sustainability and Connectedness*

## Relevance and Appropriateness

### Detailed questions from the TOR section 4.2.1:

- Did the interventions implemented during the different phases of the appeal respond to the needs of the flood-affected populations?
- What mechanisms promoting participation of beneficiaries and stakeholders during assessments, planning/ designed, implementation, monitoring and evaluation were employed? How were the needs of women and groups with special needs addressed?
- How timely was the sequencing in early recovery, recovery planning and field implementation? How effective was the pilot project for the IRP in testing implementation methods to facilitate rapid scale-up?
- How was the connectedness between the relief, early recovery and recovery phases in the implementation of the activities? In what ways did the programme integration approach improve this, if any?
- Accountability to Beneficiaries: How were systems for feedback from the assisted population developed and improved over time and did they lead to an improvement in the quality of recovery support being provided? How beneficiary feedback was processed and responded to, and were programmes adjusted as a result? What lessons can be drawn related to two way beneficiary communications?
- Have Federation mechanisms and tools adequately been used to promote good practice (e.g. Code of Conduct, Sphere, BPI, emergency assessment tools, VCA etc)?

### Were needs met?

The needs were accurately identified in the early days through the PRCS, FACT, and TPAT assessment processes, although it was not possible to quantify them with much accuracy due to the scale of the operation and the continually changing situation. [RTE, TPAT, KII]

Several key informants made the point that the TPAT reports and the Recovery Strategy set the bar very high in terms of expectations of the quality of programming; some suggested that this was too high, given the new programming areas, the capacity and history of PRCS, and the scale of the response. Although the bar was certainly high, evidence suggests that it was both aspirational and appropriate. That is, the expectations were fully justified in terms of the policies of IFRC and accepted standards such as Sphere<sup>13</sup> and good practice internationally, and the purpose of documenting them was to provide senior managers with a framework against which to advocate for high quality programming.

That said, it is not clear that the Recovery Framework was ever jointly owned by PRCS as well as IFRC, and it the senior management and leadership of the IFRC do not appear to have advocated much on the mission-critical issues that were identified quite early on. A clear gap in these early assessment processes is the accurate quantification of PRCS capacity at different levels and in different locations, and this gap was not filled until much later in the operation.

### Immediate short-term needs

In the areas of operation, the short-term needs of the affected population were properly identified and – within the areas targeted by PRCS – met.

Under the Federation Appeal some 1.8m beneficiaries received services and support of various kinds during the relief operations. This figure has been calculated conservatively to avoid double counting, using the footprint of the widest reaching component, food and non-food distributions, and assuming that all those who received other forms of support were captured in this group. The true figure is therefore probably slightly higher.

The PRCS report a total reach of 4.3m people for the relief response, including the multilateral support through IFRC, combining support provided from all their partners and donors. This is also calculated based on their widest reaching distribution programme, food aid. A detailed breakdown of beneficiary locations was provided on request, along with the source donors, but the quantity of food

<sup>13</sup> The reference here is to the Common Standards and the Protection Principles at the start of the Sphere Handbook, rather than the four chapters of technical standards.

distributed was not made clear, or how long it might be expected to last an effected household. It is not clear, therefore, when a beneficiary is considered to have been 'reached'.

Within the health sector response, greater emphasis may to have been placed on the chronic (poverty related) rather than the acute (flood related) needs. Additional resources were mobilised in the form of mobile health units in underserved areas, but the nature of the activity was still firmly in line with PRCS normal practice. It was decided early on that the activities and services provided in the relief and recovery 'phases'<sup>14</sup> would actually be the same, and anticipated that the balance of needs within these services would change as the emergency evolved. So the health component of the POA-D has a single section titled 'relief to recovery', as did the livelihoods and branch development sections.

### Medium and longer-term needs

The medium to long-term needs were also quite accurately identified very early on, although again it was not possible to quantify the **scale** of the need at this time. This needs analysis, captured in the Recovery Strategy and TPAT sectoral and synthesis reports were intended to feed into the design of early recovery programming, and later on, what became the Integrated Recovery Programme.

These early analyses were quite speculative. The floods were still working their way south down the country, and there was much that was not known. Six months passed between this time and the formal start of the recovery programming. Little evidence has survived of additional research or analysis during this time.

#### Finding 1.

The nature of the immediate needs was accurately identified, although quantifying the scale of the problem took time: the response was appropriate and timely in most sectors. Medium term needs assessment was also qualitatively accurate, although responses were smaller and slower. Detailed understanding of PRCS capacity was limited.

### Participation of the affected population

There is little evidence of the programme encouraging the participation of the affected population during the relief activities [ERF, RTE] after the initial assessment activities.

In recovery work, beneficiaries did not know why they had been selected, and the selection criteria were not known: it seems that they were not consistently shared below the VC level [SE-Shelter, SE-Livelihoods].

Beneficiary participation really began with the Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (VCA) processes from January 2011, some six months after the start of the operation. Levels of participation varied between provinces: in Sindh, it appears that many of the affected population had not yet returned to their homes and villages. The VCA exercises again appear to have accurately identified many of the issues and concerns of the flood-affected population, but to have significantly over-estimated the numbers of people affected in each village, especially in Sindh – where the programme had to be expanded into new areas to meet targets. There are a number of reasons why this happened, which are explored below in the section on effectiveness.

The Thatta Pilot was a model programme, and as such levels of participation were high. This pilot led to a change in house design: an important outcome, although it is not clear if this was the result of inputs from the beneficiaries, the Provincial Branch, or both. See below, page 21.

The most substantial piece of participation was the creation of the Village Committees (VC). This was done well in KP and Sindh, but in Punjab the SOPs were not followed and the VCs appear to have been appointed rather than truly representative, and irregularities soon emerged: in time, the VCs were disbanded and the programme management was taken over by the PRCS National HQ [KII, IFRC docs]. The PRCS HQ is not normally operational, but the Executive Committee can authorise such actions in the interest of the NS.

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<sup>14</sup> The term 'phases' is not helpful as the two sets of activities can occur in parallel early in the response. The distinction is more to do with the purpose of the activity, rather than the timeline. However, this was the language of the POA and it is reproduced here deliberately.

The roles played by the village committees varied. They were generally involved in beneficiary selection and local planning, and some had a limited monitoring role. [KII, SE-DRR].

There was no overarching strategy for participatory M&E or exit planning that worked across the programme sectors, and the VC timeframe was short: it seems likely that the majority of VCs will fold once programme support ceases. The Sector Evaluation in DRR found that they had not registered with the local authority, which would have been an important step to sustainability.

**Finding 2.**

The VCA provided valuable qualitative information but misleading quantitative information. Participatory processes did not live up to their early promise.

### Selecting programme areas and targeting beneficiaries

Programme areas and beneficiaries were reportedly selected through a multi-stage process that began quite early [KII, UH-various, NLLL]. However, the process by which these areas were identified has not been preserved.

In the early weeks of the response, the needs far outstripped the ability to supply. Provincial Branch capacity was supplemented by the deployment of relief and logistics ERUs closer to the affected areas, and later, in Sindh, by the deployment of RDRT members. For relief activities we can consider a combination of demand and capacity to be the major drivers.

For the longer-term work, districts were selected for early recovery based on the degree of needs – the most affected districts were agreed in national level coordination.

Once target districts had been agreed, a long-list of union councils (UCs) were identified on the basis secondary data, and rapid VCA exercises carried out in each.

A meeting took place in Islamabad on 14<sup>th</sup> February 2011 to prioritise these UCs and two were selected in each priority district. In each village within the UCs a Village Committee (VC) was created to help to steer programme design, beneficiary selection, implementation and monitoring.

The exception to this was the extended health programme, which already had a more substantial field infrastructure, which was then supplemented this with mobile health units. This operated across 24 districts from the start.

Three issues arose directly from this process:

- In locations where a VCA was carried out, but no programme was launched, it seems inevitable that expectations were raised amongst the population, that will not have been met
- Although robust SOPs were developed, these were implemented quite differently in different locations. Good practice for VCA was not in evidence, and in Punjab the SOPs were not followed and the VCs had to be disbanded and the beneficiary selection process restarted.
- In the extended health programme, overall coverage increased in these additional areas, but the opportunities for integrated programming were lost.

**Finding 3.**

Mechanisms for identifying programme areas and targeting beneficiaries were generally appropriate. However, carrying out VCA in areas that will not benefit from programmes is poor practice: it raises expectations, and risks damaging the reputation of PRCS.

**Finding 4.**

Good SOPs were produced for VCA and VC formation, but they were not consistently applied, leading to problems in implementation within Punjab.

## Timeliness, and the Thatta pilot

### Relief operations and the first few months

Relief operations by PRCS began promptly and Federation support was also quickly organised, despite the delegation being well below optimum staffing levels (during the monsoon season). KL support was critical to this swift mobilisation. The early deployment of the TPAT team was a distinct advantage, bringing recovery thinking and extending the limited assessment capacity, although the TPAT TOR were a source of much debate and their role was perhaps not well communicated or understood in some quarters: many appeared to think that they were a replacement FACT team sent to write the POA. [RTE, KII]<sup>15</sup>

The synthesis report of the TPAT places much emphasis on context, local capacity, gender analysis and Do No Harm thinking. These early deployments helped to open the door for the work in new sectors (livelihoods) and through new ways (cash transfers) and in better dialogue with the affected population (BCA). This raft of new ways of working is challenged in the MTR as being 'too much too soon', but from the perspective of 2013, these are areas in which the PRCS is justly proud of its achievements. [TPAT, RTE, MTR, NLLL]

As noted above, the VCAs were undertaken too early, at least in Sindh province, and the reports were utilised late.

### Thatta

Much of the documentation surrounding the Thatta pilot project has not survived, although the purpose is clear: it was intended to be a quick pilot to test out the owner driven housing model in a flood-affected community, to test and develop the cash SOPs, and to test out the agreed shelter design with a real community.

The start was very timely, but the location was inappropriate. The documentation of the pilot project was late, and the pilot itself took three times longer than the three months planned. [Thatta, KII, MTR]

Thatta was a well-resourced pilot project in a reasonably accessible location. The levels of participation in processes seem to have been higher than in the main programme delivery areas. One important and positive outcome from Thatta was the revision of the house design: the initial design was based on the existing shelter conditions of most of the affected populations, and was cheap and fast to erect, but it would not have been flood resistant and was rejected. The replacement design was almost at the other end of the scale and was amongst the best quality of houses built after the floods [KII].

A negative outcome from Thatta might be described as a false sense of security about the operational realities as the programme scaled up and rolled out, as the pilot either did not identify, or failed to effectively communicate these challenges. The MTR explicitly states that many of the lessons of Thatta were not applied elsewhere. It was also suggested that PRCS staff were not sufficiently involved in the design of the IRP, and that this contributed to the slow approval of the IRP itself [KII, UH]

#### Finding 5.

The programme began with some high quality, thoughtful and timely interventions including the deployment of the TPAT team and the Thatta pilot projects. This momentum was not maintained and the IRP suffered as a result.

#### Finding 6.

The Thatta pilot was a good initiative, but the site selected was not sufficiently representative of the main programme areas, the project took too long, and the lessons of the pilot were not learned or consistently applied elsewhere.

<sup>15</sup> See also [https://www-secure.ifrc.org/DMISII/Pages/03\\_response/0323\\_recovery/ FERST/ Recovery%20Surge%20-%20Learning%20from%20Pakistan.pdf](https://www-secure.ifrc.org/DMISII/Pages/03_response/0323_recovery/ FERST/ Recovery%20Surge%20-%20Learning%20from%20Pakistan.pdf)

## From relief to recovery

The early recovery planning is mixed. The agriculture support and the transitional shelter appear to be solid, although little substantive evidence survives. However, the planning for what later became the IRP seems to be less solid. The pieces do not fit together well, and the critical path between them is not articulated and is not communicated. There is a gap of six months between the preliminary work on the TPAT and the Recovery Strategy, and the start of formal recovery programming. It is not clear what additional learning and analysis took place during this time, or what level of leadership was available to guide the planning process, to drive the integration of the various components, and ensure an achievable set of objectives and coherence with PRCS thinking. There were significant staff rotations during this period while longer-term posts were recruited.

## Health programming out of step with other sectors

Almost from the start of the operation, health programming was out-of-step with other aspects of the response. In some ways this created positive outcomes: the health programme was able to reach huge numbers of people across many more areas of operation. But it caused problems for overall integration and impacted upon effectiveness. [SE-Health, KII, NLLL]

Within PRCS, Health has a separate reporting line, directly to the SG. This appears to be a legacy from PRCS' history and illustrates the central role of the sector in PRCS' profile. It was explained that during an emergency response, health components of the response will be coordinated through the office of Director Operations – but it was not clear how this would be done, or if it was realised.

As illustrated in the timeline, the health programme maintained separate arrangements from the other programme components. Nominally, these came to an end in Dec 2011, though in practice they did not. In essence, the health department moved its existing programmes in flood-affected areas into the Appeal in 2010, and moved them back to the DOP in 2012 and 2013. Although there was certainly an effort to increase the **scale up** during the flooding period, there is little evidence that the **nature** of the health programming changed much. [KII, SE-Health]

It should have been possible to integrate the community-based aspects of the health programme in those areas that were common. There is little evidence that this happened.

At the end of the operation in 2013, the National Headquarters structure is changed in some significant ways, including the creation of the new role of ASG. However, the reporting line of the health department remains an anomaly.

### Finding 7.

Health programming was not well integrated into either the relief operations or the IRP, and this situation is effectively unchanged in 2013.

## Recovery Programming

The IRP was launched at an appropriate time in the overall response, but too little time was allowed for the complex processes of owner-driven housing, or the community-based participatory approaches in other sectors. This lesson was supposed to be 'learned' after the Indian Ocean tsunami, and is clearly articulated in the Recovery Strategy and the TPAT Synthesis report, but seems not to have influenced the overall timeline of the Appeal and the IRP. The multiple impacts of the artificial timeline for the Appeal are explored in section 3.

It is suggested in the MTR that PRCS – at the suggestion of IFRC – had taken on too many new sectors at once, and that a huge emergency response is not a good time to be experimenting. It is certainly true that this was ambitious, but with hindsight it appears to have paid off, in terms of the breadth and appropriateness of the programming, and the influence it has had on PRCS reputation and future strategy. Where there were problems, they seem to have been caused by understaffing and other factors, rather than the simple fact of 'new programming areas'. [MTR, KII, SE-Livelihoods, NLLL, PRCS strategy revision process and documents]

## Accountability to beneficiaries

The Beneficiary Communication and Accountability (BCA) programme was intended to act as a service function to programme sectors, supporting two-way communication with the flood-affected population: beneficiaries and others alike. Enhanced accountability is one of the intended outcomes of these actions.

The planned BCA component included a wide range of activities, including television and radio broadcasts, coverage in the print media, community level noticeboards and meetings, and a feedback mechanism.

Staff turnover and individual preferences on the side of the Federation, and concerns expressed by PRCS about reputational risk associated with live broadcasts meant that the balance between these components varied significantly over time.

Key informants to the evaluation process generally referred to this feedback mechanism as a 'complaints mechanism': it provided beneficiaries with a direct route to PRCS senior management, bypassing the potential cause of the issue or concern, and thus allowing an objective appraisal of the issue and appropriate action to be taken.

However, many of the issues raised were not issues of integrity but practical issues that needed to be addressed at a programme level. The routing of the complaints side-lined the Provincial Branches and meant that there was a bottleneck, a slow response time, and little transparency for the person raising the issue about progress and action. A feedback mechanism became a grievance or complaints procedure, and the HQ and BCA teams were seen as 'policemen' [KII]. There may be value in considering a twin track approach, with one track for 'local' issues about programme implementation, and another for 'sensitive' issues of targeting or integrity.

Examples of logs of suggestions and complaints, by SMS, postcard and face-to-face, were made available, although the logs themselves were introduced quite late in the IRP.

Prior good practice exists in this area from Pakistan and elsewhere, which could have been adopted with the IRP. The key constraints identified with the BCA component was that it was not well understood within PRCS, and consequently under-resourced.

### Finding 8.

BCA started well, but over time it was reduced to a feedback mechanism, which has become a complaints mechanism. However, BCA has now been adopted by PRCS in their revised strategy, and presents a concrete opportunity for the future.

## Promoting good practice: response options analysis.

Once humanitarian needs have been identified, agencies may choose to respond in a wide variety of ways. The phrase 'response options analysis' relates to the process by which the best response is selected, considering a range of factors appropriate to the context and the desired outcomes. The factors will include timeliness, cost, culture, the mandate of the humanitarian actor and their partners, capacity and competence, the capacities of the affected community, government policy, and more.<sup>16</sup>

Approaches to response option analysis vary, and the specific tools that are used are not important. However, the process is critical, and it is good practice to document this process and the selected response option and include this analysis in the programme proposal or planning document.

It would be normal to use a response option process, for example, to identify the best provider for a CTP process – or at least to identify the shortlist. The IRP used a tender process for this, which may have contributed to the poor outcome (see below).

The TPAT technical reports present a 'menu' of possible activities for the programme planners to consider, and they provide some contextual information to support that decision making process. It is worth noting that this menu was developed on the basis of field assessment and detailed structured discussion with affected populations. However, the justifications for the decisions

<sup>16</sup> See Sphere Core Standards 3 and 4, and the IFRC Recovery Guidance Annex 12

subsequently taken are not documented, and without access to the reasoning, it is hard to make judgements, several years later, about their appropriateness.<sup>17</sup>

**Finding 9.**

More consistent use and documentation of response option analysis would improve the quality of the selected activities and provide a strong basis for accountability.

**Promoting good practice: gender**

There is very little attention paid to gender in the documents provided, with the exception of the early documentation on Recovery and the TPAT report.<sup>18</sup>

PRCS had an Assistant Director for gender at the time of the floods, and a 'department' was built from around 20 volunteers, who were on the whole highly educated and very well selected. They were charged with mainstreaming gender analysis and thinking, and they also became the focal point for BCA. This arrangement came to an end when the AD left and the role was not replaced, although several of the volunteers found other roles and were available for interview.

It is simply not possible to undertake effective programming in Pakistan without a conscious and thoughtful analysis of gender dynamics in the various different parts of the country – recognising that the variation even between neighbouring districts in the same province can be remarkable. Programme managers need the time, the tools, and sufficient understanding of context to undertake a sensitive analysis that recognises the different roles, opportunities and expectations of men, women, boys, girls, and older people. They must then apply this analysis to decision making in needs assessment, programme design, implementation and monitoring.

It seems that on the whole, gender analysis was not prioritised by PRCS, and was not emphasised by IFRC [IFRC Appeal documents and Logframe, UH-Livelihoods]. There remains a tendency to reduce gender to 'gender balance' [KII] (although effective representation of women is not, for example, a realistic expectation for a village committee in Kohistan), or to worry about potential 'women's programmes' that might seek to empower women and cause reputational risk to PRCS (although these were never suggested). Perhaps as a result of these concerns, some real opportunities were missed in programming, targeting and communications.<sup>19</sup>

Even in the health sector, where gender disaggregated data collection is the norm, no such information is provided within the IFRC standard reporting: this information was reportedly not received from PRCS.

It appears that the gender discussion has been reduced to a clash of principles and priorities. On the one hand: targeting the most vulnerable – a group that certainly includes many women. On the other hand: working in a context-sensitive manner in an effort to *Do No Harm*. In parts of Pakistan during this operation, the former has lost out to the latter, on the grounds that if PRCS loses its access to these villages – and it is the only organisation with such access in some places – then all opportunities are lost [KII]. This concern is real, but a well-designed programme should easily avoid it. The *status quo* comes with its own risk: that we fail to recognise, understand and meet needs.

Having stated that there was no systematic analysis of gender that cuts across the programme, we must also recognise that there were some examples of progressive practice. From Sindh province, we see a gathering awareness of the issues and the opportunities they present within the Shelter sector [SE-shelter, UH-shelter]. In KP, where the challenges are greater, we see the active use of female community health workers to access women in very traditional communities, delivering core Red Crescent messages around health, hygiene, and risk reduction.

It would be encouraging to see PRCS restore its gender capacity and create opportunities for internal 'gender champions' to work across the organisation to support behaviour change in this important area.

<sup>17</sup> See the RTE, recommendation #8.

<sup>18</sup> See in particular TPAT synthesis pages 23 and 24, for some sensible recommendations

<sup>19</sup> This is particularly surprising given PRCS' previous involvement in the development of gender-sensitive DM guidelines by the AP Zone.

**Finding 10.**

The apparent gap around gender analysis and associated gender-sensitive approaches is a serious concern in the context of Pakistan, especially given the appropriately high priority placed on it in early planning documents.

**Promoting good practice: dealing with integrity and corruption issues**

It is inevitable in a large operation such as this that issues of integrity will emerge. Rather than explore each issue in isolation, it is more valuable to ask questions such as:

- Are the expectations on staff and volunteers clear: are the Fundamental Principles and the Code of Conduct (both that of IFRC and PRCS) widely disseminated and understood?
- Are the systems effective in minimising the opportunities for fraud, nepotism, extortion or other issues? Are these systems common to IFRC and PRCS?
- Have efforts been made to raise the 'costs' of corruption and reduce the potential profits?
- Are the consequences of such behaviours clear to all staff and volunteers?
- When issues arise, how are they dealt with?

The evaluation process did not attempt to investigate these questions in detail, but some basic perceptions have emerged and are worth documenting.

A number of irregularities came to light during the implementation process, including the selection of Village Committees (and subsequently of beneficiaries) in Punjab province.

There was a tendency within IFRC and PRCS staff to try to deal with these issues locally (at least initially) rather than escalate them up the management line. This suggests that there may have been other issues that did not see the light of day at the HQ level.

Where issues did reach the attention of Islamabad, action was taken that was proportionate to the scale of the problem. The cooperation between PRCS and IFRC appears to have been quite good on these, sensitive, issues.

However, there are no documented processes to jointly tackle such issues once either party has identified one. A commonly agreed, shared process to address issues of concern would help to strengthen the trust and the relationship, as well as promoting a sense of common ownership and responsibility for the results.

There is also an observed tendency to deal with such problems 'internally'. That is to say, staff members who have broken rules (and possibly the law) may be fired, but are unlikely to be reported to the authorities. The case studies are not shared as an example to others, but are rather dealt with quietly and discretely where possible. There is an understandable desire not to attract negative press coverage, or to expose individual members of staff to risk, but also a missed opportunity to present RC/RC as a transparent organisation that tackles corruption head on.

**Finding 11.**

When issues of integrity or corruption arose, they were generally dealt with in a professional and appropriate manner. However, more could be done to use these unfortunate situations constructively and transparently, and an agreed joint process would be a good starting point.

**Promoting good practice: BPI / Do No Harm**

The Better Programming Initiative (BPI) is an IFRC toolkit, which borrows heavily from work that is known generally as 'Do No Harm' in the humanitarian sector. Although the delegation appear not to be aware of it, it remains a Federation tool<sup>20</sup>. It considers a range of issues and factors that are also well described in the Humanitarian Charter, the Protection Principles and the Core Standards of the Sphere Handbook. In essence, it requires two foundations to be in place:

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/preparing-for-disaster/disaster-preparedness-tools/better-programming-initiative/>

- a detailed understanding of the context, which is then brought to bear on any proposed interventions, by asking the question 'what if...' in a consistent and rigorous manner, and
- a monitoring system that actively seeks out issues that may or may not have been identified in the process above, and feeds that information into decision-making processes

As noted elsewhere, neither of these foundations is effectively in place.

**Finding 12.**

Opportunities to pursue accepted good practice in programming were not taken consistently, and there was insufficient direction provided by the operation leadership.

## Efficiency

### Detailed questions from the TOR section 4.2.2:

- Were the financial, human, physical and information resources available utilised efficiently? (e.g. were inputs used in the best way to achieve outcomes and in a cost-effective manner. If not, why not?)
- Was the assistance provided in a timely manner to meet beneficiary and community needs? Did the integration approach adopted affect the timeliness of delivery. If so, how?
- Were the appropriate human resources (skills, experience and seniority) available to the operation in key areas of management, coordination, technical programme design and implementation from IFRC and PRCS?
- To what degree did the integrated approach adopted in the IRP strengthen the efficiency of the operation, if any?

### Efficient use of resources: financial, physical and information

#### Financial resources – overall financial evidence

The evidence base required to address these aspects of the evaluation is weak or non-existent.

In the early stages of the response, the coding of expenditure was unorthodox, with expenditure being applied proportionally across all pledges: insufficient attention was paid to donor earmarking and insufficient protection applied to precious un-earmarked funds. There was a negative impact on relationships with several donors, and funds had to be returned to at least one major donor. Much work had to be re-done, at considerable cost. [KII]

Terms of reference were drawn up for a cost-benefit analysis of the operation against the detailed financial structure: 50 sub-activities across 15 projects. This level of analysis was not carried out, and requests for a less detailed breakdown were met only in part.

The information provided makes assumptions in terms of splitting the activities by timeframe, rather than by intent. This proposal from the delegation finance unit was accepted as reasonable, as manual separation would have been arduous – although some of the early recovery expenditure was re-allocated manually to the appropriate period.

However, the breakdown into direct or operational, indirect or support costs has been much more challenging. A partial breakdown was provided, but despite repeated requests at delegation and zone level, IFRC have not been able to provide a documented justification for the means used, and have been inconsistent in applying it to the expenditure data provided.

In email correspondence, the delegation stated that, for example, staffing costs associated with the finance function are considered to be support costs, whereas staffing costs associated with watsan would be considered direct costs. This is entirely reasonable, and would have been a useful basis for analysis, except that it was also explicitly stated that this breakdown only applies to expenditure described as 'recovery'. In the relief period – itself an arbitrary category - all expenditure is considered to be direct costs, and the requests for a parallel breakdown of this information were flatly refused. Support was not forthcoming from the delegation leadership or the Zone's finance function. This anomaly, which is not backed up by policy or guidance documents, makes any kind of comparison impossible.

Instead, it is only possible to make a crude breakdown based on the limited information provided. In this breakdown, only expenditure that is directed towards beneficiaries (that is, direct expenditure on commodities, services and cash grants) is considered direct expenditure. All other expenditure is considered indirect.

The summary table is shown below: percentages relate to the time period and sum horizontally.

**Table 3: direct and indirect costs – simple breakdown calculated from data provided**

Time period	Direct operational costs /million CHF	Indirect operational costs /million CHF	Total /million CHF
<b>August 2010 - December 2011</b>	<b>35.1</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>45.2</b>
Relief	(78%)	(22%)	
<b>Jan 2012 - May 2013</b>	<b>14.3</b>	<b>24.3</b>	<b>38.6</b>
Early Recovery and Recovery	(37%)	(63%)	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>49.4</b> (59%)	<b>34.4</b> (41%)	<b>83.8</b>

For completeness, it is appropriate to compare this to the breakdown provided by the delegation's finance coordinator, for which no justification has been provided.

**Table 4: direct and indirect costs – breakdown provided by IFRC**

Time period	Direct operational costs /million CHF	Indirect operational costs /million CHF	Total /million CHF
<b>August 2010 - December 2011</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>45.2</b>
Relief	(100%)		
<b>Jan 2012 - May 2013</b>	<b>29.6</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>38.6</b>
Early Recovery and Recovery	(77%)	(23%)	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>74.8</b> (89%)	<b>9.0</b> (11%)	<b>83.8</b>

This summary analysis tells us little about the efficiency of the operation, but it does suggest that some work needs to be done on standard indicators to measure the cost-efficiency of an operation.

It is not a surprise that relief interventions spend more on commodities than recovery actions. Community engagement processes require higher overheads, and indeed, some valuable activities with proven benefits are made up entirely of indirect costs, according to the crude definition forced upon us. Health and hygiene promotion activities, community mobilisation, much disaster risk reduction, vocational training: all activities that are inappropriately excluded from the analysis in Table 3 because the correct information was not provided to the evaluation.

### Financial information: costs per beneficiary

We can try to calculate a total cost per beneficiary, based the information available. Again, this is a challenging operation, since it is difficult to reconcile the beneficiary numbers across the various programme sectors, and we have no agreed way to allocate indirect costs across programmes.

The beneficiary numbers are provided by the delegation (429,000 in health in early recovery, and about 85,000 people through the other activities) and are deliberately cautious to avoid double counting.

Table 5: overall per capita costs based on summary data

Time period	Minimum beneficiary numbers	Expenditure /million CHF	Cost per beneficiary / CHF	Cost per household (7)
August 2010 - December 2011 Relief	1.5 million	45.2	25.1	211
Jan 2012 - May 2013 All early recovery and recovery	514,000	38.6	75.1	526

These recovery expenditures seem quite reasonable, but they mask a huge range of activities and are not very helpful on their own. Looking at the inputs alone, the cost of a treated mosquito net is less than CHF 10, while the shelters provided in the IRP cost around CHF 1300 each. We need a means to allocate the indirect expenditure across the four main programme areas: health, shelter, water and sanitation, and livelihoods. Allocating them in the same proportion as the direct expenditures produces a result that is heavily skewed towards shelter, while using beneficiary numbers skews the figures heavily towards health. Neither approach is appropriate.

The most sensible rough estimation is provided by allocating the indirect costs equally across these four sectors. Table 6 adopts a commodity based approach (in line with the financial information): the number of health beneficiary HH is drawn from the Health review p22 and assumes one LLITN net per household, although the total range of services included is clearly much wider than this.<sup>21</sup> Other beneficiary numbers come from the data shown in Table 10 below.

Table 6: sectoral per capita costs based on summary data

Sector	Beneficiary Households	Direct expenditure /CHF	Share of indirect expenditure /CHF	Total /CHF	Approximate cost per household /CHF
Health	38,614	1,537,457	6,076,426	7,613,883	197
Shelter	2,522	6,559,522	6,076,426	12,635,948	5,010
Water and Sanitation	4,648	2,226,430	6,076,426	8,302,856	1,786
Livelihoods	4,412	3,027,187	6,076,426	9,103,613	2,063

It is worth repeating that there are some **very unsatisfactory assumptions** built into the table above, and it should not be taken out of context. For example, the approach taken to reporting is (quite correctly) to err on the side of caution, and report only the subcomponent with the widest coverage, to avoid possible duplication. It was suggested this was inappropriate for the cost per beneficiary calculation and the components should be summed within a sector, although a more accurate approach would be to undertake the analysis at the level of subcomponents.

Despite the weaknesses in the data and the process, it is worth noting that the costs per household calculated above do not appear disproportionately high.

Donors are increasingly looking to humanitarian agencies to demonstrate value for money. While measures such as costs per beneficiary are undoubtedly crude and arguably inappropriate, they are probably here to stay. Given the challenges associated with generating these figures, and the lack of confidence associated with them, IFRC should consider developing a standard mechanism to undertake this analysis.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> An alternate figure was proposed which looks at OPD and CBHFA – this would be more like 430,000 people, or around 61,000 ‘household equivalents’. This was not used as the approaches are too different to be comparable.

<sup>22</sup> The consultant was directed towards the document *IFRC Costing Principles*, but the purpose of this document is different and it does not provide sufficient guidance for this purpose.

### Financial resources – logistics evidence

Additional evidence on efficiency can be derived from analysis of the procurement of goods and services. Again, a detailed technical review of logistics was proposed for the operation and it certainly would have yielded valuable learning opportunities, as well as an evidence base to explore other programmatic aspects. Ideally such a review, undertaken by an appropriate external technical expert, would have been completed in time to feed into the summative evaluation, in the same manner and timeframe as the technical reviews undertaken from a sector perspective.

This review opportunity may have been misunderstood, but it appears to have been rejected by the logistics function either at the delegation level or in the zone, or both, although the grounds for this rejection have not been documented and were not made clear. It was not possible to fill this considerable gap during the summative evaluation process [KII, email]

Certain statements can nonetheless be made. The choice of a cash grant approach for livelihoods and shelter recovery is likely – on the basis of detailed evidence and analysis from other programmes and a review of available information – to have been more cost effective than distributing commodities, as well as empowering the recipients and promoting choice and ownership. And beneficiaries were able to save money themselves through purchasing materials and transport jointly [SE-Shelter].

However, the design and implementation of the beneficiary database was not an efficient use of resources (financial or human): it never achieved its primary purpose for management of shelter payment orders, and never fulfilled its potential as a cross-sector monitoring tool (shelter and livelihoods).

PRCS have expressed concerns about the high costs of IFRC logistics, and they cite two examples as evidence: the cost of warehousing and internal transport. These are worth exploring in a little more detail, as they tell quite different stories.

In essence, the concerns about the IFRC warehouses are valid. A warehouse was found for IFRC by an agent, and a contract was signed in which the agent received a monthly fee for full services provided<sup>23</sup>. The warehouses were quite expensive, which may have been acceptable in the emergency phase. However the contract was maintained for a considerable period, and the agent's service fees were also paid for this extended period. This was not an efficient use of funds in the medium to longer term. [KII, emails, logistics records]. However the fault does not lie exclusively with IFRC: PRCS wrote to IFRC in March 2011 asking for the contract to be extended for a further 5 years. IFRC compromised with a shorter extension.

The concerns about transport, however, do not seem to stand up to scrutiny. IFRC have a framework contract with a transport company, which includes guaranteed availability of vehicles within a certain time. It is more expensive than renting a single truck on an *ad hoc* basis for a single journey, but it comes with confidence and the capacity to scale up rapidly, and critically, the transporter takes responsibility for the goods in transit [KII, email]. Comparing apples with oranges tells us little about the quality of decision making, and risks undermining serious discussion about efficiency, standards, and roles and responsibilities.

PRCS also raised concerns about the procurement of CGI sheets for the shelter programme, which were found to be of poor quality after delivery, and they were consigned to be destroyed. While there is no doubt that this was a serious problem, in which money and time were both lost, it is not one in which blame is easily or helpfully placed on any RC/RC party. When the technical logistics review is undertaken, this issue should be included.

### Financial resources – other sources of evidence

The previous evaluations and the technical reviews provide an additional source of secondary data on efficiency. Despite having a common structure to their TOR, the reports are varied in structure, and several do not address these issues directly – making the information harder to access than might be expected.

The reports identify lots of minor examples that are not worth repeating at this level, but there are also some useful generalisations and highlights:

<sup>23</sup> a 3PL arrangement: third party logistics. This is not normal Federation practice.

- Where SOPs were not properly followed, and actions had to be repeated (volunteer or village committee identification, support and training, for example), either money was less well spent, or time was lost, or in extreme cases work was cancelled, and needs went unmet.
- Building conditionality into cash grant systems is expensive. The additional expenditure on monitoring, and managing multiple tranches might be better spent in other ways. Fewer tranches and reduced conditionality would have been cheaper and swifter, with little change in likely outcomes. Unconditional cash grants could also be considered in the relief actions.
- Weak processes for cash transfers from PRCS HQ to Provinces and District Branches meant that large amounts of money were tied up within the system. In a laudable effort not to become part of the problem, IFRC advanced record amounts of money to PRCS. However, at the district branch level, people complained that the money was not available for programming, and implementation suffered. [KII, NLLL]
- Financial authority levels have been recently overhauled, but are still extremely low even for normal, non-emergency activities, and are not delegated. During emergencies, the SG has an authorisation level equivalent to only USD 3000, above which commitments are referred to the Chairman, muddying the distinction between governance and management responsibilities. Since requests must pass up the management chain in physical files, and can get held up at any stage pending signature, the process was tangibly slow and inefficient at the time of the evaluation. During emergency responses, it must be crippling. [KII]
- Poor communication and weak decision-making contributed to inefficiency. For example some 37,500 shelter tool kits were distributed during the operation. At one point, it was suggested that these were inappropriate, because they contained a machete. It costs around \$400 remove the machetes from 1000 kits, even before the costs of disposal are considered. These 'safer' kits are mostly still in the shed: the vast majority of kits distributed still contained the machete. Fortunately, no negative reaction or experiences were reported. [KII, Federation logistics records].

### Physical resources

PRCS contingency plans for the current monsoon flood season state that stocks should be held for some 3,000 households in 15 DM Cells across the country. The contingency plans themselves are for some 34,850 households, so this level of stock appears appropriate.

It was suggested in KII but not triangulated that the PRCS are often reluctant to release stocks until they have guaranteed replacements.

### Information management

Much data was collected by the assessment teams and valuable analysis was undertaken. The recovery strategy was produced to guide the operation, based in part on PRCS priorities, in part on good practice, and in part on the developing analysis of the TPAT. Sadly, much of this seems to have been lost along the way. This included analysis on PRCS capacity and recommendations arising from the 2005 earthquake, efforts to make integration between programme activities a concrete reality, inclusion of cross-cutting issues and themes such as BPI and gender analysis [TPAT, KII, UH-various, NLLL]

Another example is the apparent loss of the diagram from the Recovery Strategy and the Revised Appeal of 15 November 2010 explaining the relation between the Federation-wide POA and the Emergency Appeal itself. Over time, the POA evolved to reflect simply the Appeal, and tools to better coordinate the actions and support of all partners were dropped. See Figure 5 on page 51.

### Documenting decision taking

With the exception of limited references in material published on the IFRC website such as the regular reports, there is little documentation available to illustrate how decisions were taken, or that meaningful monitoring was the norm. It is not clear that monitoring data was seen as a source of management information. This is further discussed in section 3.

Both PRCS and IFRC document decision taking when these decisions occur during formal meetings, which are minuted and can be followed up. Decisions taken outside of regular formal meetings are not recorded.

No evidence was found of the use of 'decision logs' – which are excellent practice for accountability, and particularly helpful in situations of rapid staff turnover. One log was started in livelihoods, but it was not maintained after the first entry.<sup>24</sup>

Happily, where an audit trail is required – in procurement, for example – the paper trail is much more substantial.

#### **Finding 13.**

Overall, the evidence base for determining the efficiency of the operation is weak. There are some areas where cost savings could clearly have been made. Much more effort could have been made to provide meaningful and disaggregated information to the evaluation by the delegation's finance department. The means to calculate standard measures for cost-efficiency are not available; neither are tools to calculate costs per capita by sector.

### **Human resources**

The term 'human resources' is generally used by PRCS to mean 'personnel' or 'headcount', rather than to refer to the broader human resource management function. Both aspects have been critical to the efficiency of the operation, and both need to be discussed. The operation has been understaffed almost from the start, in both IFRC and PRCS terms. In many cases, delegates (in particular) have not demonstrated the technical or social skills they should have. And the HR management function has been weak in both houses. [KII, RTE, RTE-RDRT, ERF, MTR]

### **Availability and quality of delegates**

The operation has struggled from the beginning to recruit appropriate delegates. This has been true at the technical level and at the management level. The surge mechanisms generally worked well, but surge is simply supposed to bridge a gap, and this bridge was lacking anything substantial at the far end.

Critical positions, including Head of Delegation, Head of Ops, Recovery Coordinator and many technical roles each saw rapid turnover of people at different times, and many of them had substantial gaps in between. This weakened the continuity, undermined the paper trail, and was highly confusing for both PRCS counterparts and IFRC national staff.

In addition, the turnover in senior roles appears to have led to an inconsistent approach with in terms of critical engagement with PRCS. There appears to be agreement now on the priority issues on which IFRC should engage PRCS to encourage growth and development, but there is no evidence that this was consistently done during the operational period.

When delegates were in place, too many of them were inexperienced (including ERU team leaders), and in part at least because of overall staffing levels, the leadership, management and support structures were inadequate. As a result, capacity building and skills sharing between IFRC and PRCS was less than it might have been. Without strong guidance, some delegates appear to have taken decisions without a proper understanding of the context, despite the ready availability of Pakistani colleagues. As one key informant put it: '*we have had too many creative delegates here*'.

<sup>24</sup> A decision log is a simple table kept as a live document, either in the notebook or the computer of a manager: it records every decision taken with a time and date. It should include a note on how the decision was communicated, to whom, and briefly the factors that influenced the decision. It requires discipline to maintain, but provides excellent levels of accountability.

### Availability and quality of PRCS staff

PRCS have an almost infinite supply of highly qualified people available, should they choose to recruit them. The staff (and volunteers, at HQ) they have on board usually have high qualifications and good technical experience.

However, the absolute number of such staff was inadequate for the operation. A staffing plan of 430 posts was agreed fairly early but never realised: at the peak the staffing was around 300. Each new appointment has to be individually approved by the governance, although hiring and firing is clearly a management function: it appears that many did not gain approval. The Federation attempted a workaround with staff on loan, but this fell foul of the auditors due to the lack of a formal Status Agreement. Eventually, it was possible to compromise with some 'embedded' staff [KII, UH-Recovery]. This has not, of course, solved the core issue.

### PRCS structure

The structure was not appropriate to operational management. Many people had several roles, some may have had several reporting lines as a result. The overall structure, especially as it relates to the Health components, were unclear. 'Traditional' health activities reported through the Director Health to the SG, and 'emergency' health activities reported through the Director Operations. Note that many of the health interventions were actually 'traditional' activities (quite understandably) relocated into the operation for the duration of the emergency.

Finally, PRCS had access to additional experienced and qualified people through the Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT). There was considerable reluctance within PRCS to embrace RDRT deployment in the early weeks of the response. RDRT was not deployed as a team, but as a group of individuals, in which capacity they provided valuable support.

### Human Resource Management

In the Federation, there are clear processes and procedures for HR management: recruitment, deployment, briefing, management and supervision, performance, handover and debrief. PRCS is working towards such processes, and the situation is very different in different parts of the country.<sup>25</sup>

It is clear that the recruitment and briefing of delegates was not adequate. Effective management and supervision of delegates was also compromised.

An independent analysis of the numbers of appraisals was not possible, but the delegation reported that around 50% of delegates had undergone an appraisal. If this is a reasonable proxy indicator for all aspects of quality HR management, this supports EOM reports and KII that indicate that supervision and guidance were generally weak.

Within PRCS, there are different – and less clear<sup>26</sup> – expectations around personnel management. It is perhaps not yet appropriate to judge PRCS management practices against international standards, but it is appropriate to recommend international standards to PRCS for consideration. In this light, the *People in Aid* guidance is excellent.<sup>27</sup>

### Human Resources as a 'constraint'

During the KIIs (and in some of the previous evaluations) human resources were frequently identified as a constraint to operational efficiency and effectiveness. From the perspective of those trying to deliver the programme, this is an understandable position. People make excuses for it: '*many delegates are tied up in the Haiti operation*', and '*the PNS keep their best people for the bilateral operations*'.

The problems of recruitment, training, support and retention of high quality delegates with both technical and interpersonal competence are systemic. They are raised in almost every evaluation of operations at scale. Piecemeal tweaks to existing systems will not solve these problems: they need

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<sup>25</sup> The evaluation of the 2005 Earthquake highlights this need, and this is quoted in the Recovery Strategy of November 2010 (p17) as an area needing priority attention for the floods response.

<sup>26</sup> Parts of the draft HR manual have been provided and they are very substantial. The sections of the manual relevant to this discussion have been requested, but have not yet been provided.

<sup>27</sup> People in Aid: [www.peopleinaid.org](http://www.peopleinaid.org)

to be addressed across the whole of the RC/RC membership. While this is clearly far beyond the scope of this evaluation, it cannot be ignored, nor simply be accepted as a given.

The challenges of human resource availability and management are considered in more detail in section 3 of this report.

**Finding 14.**

Overall, the operation was understaffed: the planned organogram was probably insufficient for the operational needs, and it was never realized. This is true of PRCS and IFRC alike, and it was a major contributing factor to the various issues highlighted through this evaluation process.

## Systems and Procedures

IFRC has policies and standards, which apply in emergency responses and longer-term programmes internationally. PRCS has its own internal standards and procedures, and is working towards achieving the characteristics of a well-functioning national society and international compliance in several sectors.

Since PRCS is 'working towards', there is some expectation that IFRC will need to build its local systems in a flexible manner to accommodate PRCS' current capacity, while maintaining internal standards and working to support PRCS development.

As noted above, IFRC systems were not always observed, in terms of reporting lines, authorisation levels, project and people management functions. The alignment between PRCS and IFRC structures was not good, especially in terms of counterparts for watsan, shelter and livelihoods, and in terms of the reporting lines for the health functions. The alignment of systems for finance appears to have improved over the course of the Appeal, and the same can be said for logistics although there remains much to be done in that regard.

Internally, PRCS has very low levels of delegated authority, and the concept of decentralisation is only slowly gaining ground. The finance department at HQ has no direct contact with district branches, which have traditionally had no independent budgets. Instead, the HQ has created operational DM Cells, which answer to the HQ – a pragmatic solution for the short term, but in effect a parallel structure which does not support longer-term capacity strengthening.

Issues requiring sign-off in financial or decision-making terms are contained in a physical file, which travels up the management chain from desk to desk, sometimes pausing for extended periods along the way. This results in slow decision taking at the best of times, which in turn hinders planning and generates reactive consequences. In practice, many normal, operational decisions have to be taken or authorised by the Chairman, which blurs the lines between governance and management.

During a large-scale emergency response, such processes can become a hindrance rather than an inconvenience.

PRCS strategy has evolved in recent months, in recognition of the successes and opportunities presented by the needs-based and integrated approaches. The changes proposed are both relevant and appropriate.

PRCS also has a structural and constitutional issue, in that its Provincial Branches are effectively independent of the headquarters, with their own constitutions and governing boards. A proposal is on the table to address this and unify the PRCS, and if successful (and these processes can be challenging) this would provide an excellent basis to improve communication and the flow of resources around the Society. It could also provide the opportunity to decentralise some authority to the district branches, bring the DM Cells into better alignment, and clarify the roles and responsibilities of the management and the governance functions,

**Finding 15.**

PRCS internal systems are currently inappropriate for emergency response at this scale: centralized, reactive and prone to being slow. Opportunities exist to review and streamline them, decentralising more authority to technical managers.

## Timeliness of assistance

In general, the relief assistance was provided in a very timely manner, and at considerable scale. PRCS provincial branches used their own resources for the initial response and additional support soon followed from the HQ, via the IFRC and other sources.

The Recovery Strategy and the TPAT synthesis report provide a clear framework for the provision of assistance across differently affected parts of the country. The distinction they make is into three areas:

- The mountainous area which suffered highly destructive flash floods in the river valleys
- The plains areas to the north, in which rivers changed course, infrastructure was washed away, flood waters rose, dropped large amounts of sand, and then water levels dropped fairly quickly.
- The plains areas downstream, where water levels rose, and water remained for many weeks.

This early documentation makes further points: these areas do not follow simple administrative boundaries (they are **not** simply KP, Punjab and Sindh, respectively), and they will require different types of responses *over different timeframes*. This awareness does not appear to have been applied to the practical planning of the response.

For example, the VCAs were carried out at the same time across the country. In KP, Punjab, and perhaps parts of Sindh, they could have been carried out earlier. In other parts of Sindh (and perhaps parts of Punjab), people had not yet returned to their villages and the VCA was premature.

## Integration and efficiency

To what degree did programme integration contribute to efficiency? There is an implied assumption here that there was sufficient programme integration to show an impact. Sadly, with the exception illustrated by the sardonic observation in a KII that *'integration means travelling in the same car'*, it seems rather that the opposite is true: the absence of integration increased programme costs and reduced speed and quality.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate this:

- There were two parallel components building latrines, often in the same location: one in shelter and one in watsan. Two standards, two designs, two planning processes, two quite different construction modalities. [KII, SE-Shelter, SE-Watsan, Logframe]
- The actions for community health and hygiene promotion were not integrated. Separate tools, separate volunteers, two processes and timeframes – but hugely overlapping syllabuses. Likewise, community-based mobilisation in DRR was not integrated to these core areas. [KII, SE-Watsan, SE-Health, Logframe]
- Separate processes existed across all sectors for beneficiary identification: duplication of efforts [KII], [UH-various, KII, emails].
- Different processes for similar PRCS programmes supported by the PNS and the IFRC. This increased the demands on PRCS to manage and report in different ways. Early efforts begun through the Recovery Strategy and the Appeal of November 2010 to create a Federation-Wide approach appear to have fallen aside.

There is no agreed definition of 'integration' applied in the operation. In fact, the word is used to mean a number of things: coordination, working in the same area, and working in complementary and mutually supportive ways. The early reviews of the programme may have contributed to this confusion as they also conflate various meanings.

This begs the question, what would integration have looked like, had it happened? When programme activities are coordinated (between locations, between sectors) this brings with it an increase in efficiency and perhaps also an increase in effectiveness. From the agency perspective there are savings, and perhaps also in terms of time and expectations from the perspectives of the affected population. Programme integration needs this coordination as a foundation, but it needs more. In a truly integrated programme, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. The timing of the individual components is supportive of a higher-level critical path. The linkages between geographic locations or structural levels are explicitly developed and encouraged. The sectoral components


actually support and augment each other, and gaps are minimised. If coordination leads to increased efficiency, then the additional outcome of integration is enhanced resilience.

Since integration requires a holistic approach to meeting needs, the degree of sectoral overlap at the beneficiary level provides an indicator of an essential precursor to integration, although not of integration itself. This can be explored by looking across the four districts where watsan, livelihoods and shelter components were delivered, plus the two districts where the shelter component was not implemented but watsan and livelihoods were. The number of beneficiaries receiving inputs from only a single programme is an indicator of that the precursor for integration was probably absent.<sup>28</sup>

Note that in Sindh, 25 new villages were taken on but without the prospect of full integration, while in KP the shelter programme was never planned and in Punjab the shelter project in Layyah had to be dropped.

The monitoring processes are not able to provide the actual numbers of beneficiaries who received inputs from the different sectors. However, the endline survey does suggest the proportions in each category from its representative sample, and these are shown below (assume 95% confidence level and a confidence interval of 5.5 in the source data).

**Figure 2: proportions of beneficiary households in 3 key sectors across all IRP programme areas**



The challenges of integration are explored in more detail in section 3 of this report.

**Finding 16.**

The programme was not sufficiently integrated or coordinated to be able to meaningfully explore any resultant efficiency savings.

<sup>28</sup> The assessments do not suggest in any way that beneficiary needs fell into neat compartments, with some people only requiring watsan and others only requiring shelter or livelihoods. The reality is that when a household was severely affected by the flooding, it was affected across most or all of the sectors.

## Effectiveness

### Detailed questions from the TOR section 4.2.3:

- What was the decision making process related to operational leadership of the programming? What were some examples of decisions which optimised programme effectiveness and ones that hindered?
- How effective were the operation's processes in planning, monitoring and quality management (e.g. internal reviews and other quality assurance mechanisms). Were regular reviews held at different stages of the operation? If yes, were key findings used for further inform planning and decisions?
- What strategies were used to ensure quality, timely and relevant delivery of assistance to the flood affected population? Did the integrated programming approach adopted improve the quality of assistance provided?
- What major problems and constraints were faced during the implementation of the operation and how were these dealt with throughout the operation?
- Did the appeal meet its intended immediate objectives through the different phases of implementation? If not, why not?

## Decision making

### Observations on the decision making process.

Effective decision-making was hampered in both the PRCS and IFRC houses.

Within PRCS, the hindering factors were the centralised decision-making processes, and the communication and organisational challenges between the HQ and the Provincial Branches. The PRCS systems are slow but effective during normal operations – but they were not relaxed or revised for emergency response and this became a constraint [KII, NLLL]. It is not clear that agreements signed at the HQ level are binding on PRCS branches under current arrangements.

Within IFRC, the new SOPs for disaster management in the zone had just been agreed, and this disaster was the first test of them. This was the first response with the host NS placed in the lead operational role, and the first in which the responsibilities of Geneva, the Zone, Region and Delegation had been revised. Especially in the first year, communications between the Operations Team and the Delegation were a challenge and reporting lines were not always respected. High staff turnover, inexperienced delegates and gaps in critical positions reduced institutional memory and undermined contextualised decision-making, encouraging a 'bubble' mentality pretty much from the start of the operation [KII, SOPs.]

In both houses, low staffing levels and high workload compounded these challenges. The lack of counterpart individuals and in some cases departments in PRCS, and the different organisational structures between IFRC and PRCS also contributed. There is a sense of chicken-and-egg relating to staffing levels and structure: that these could perhaps be sorted out once things calmed down – which, of course, never happened.

Despite these significant constraints within the systems, it is worth placing on the record the remarkable and consistent efforts made by individuals to make timely and appropriate decisions and ensure effective and appropriate responses.

### Examples of decisions that optimised programme effectiveness

- The concept and timing of the Thatta pilot
- Switch to *Paka* houses – no need to rebuild again after floods in 2012 (but see also page 49)
- Change from two tranches to one in livelihoods CTP
- The design of the exit phase and the transition to ICBDRR (but see also page 57)
- Creation of an in-country grant management role

### Examples of decisions that hindered programme effectiveness

- The location of the Thatta pilot
- The resourcing, preparation and timing of the VCA

- The choice of the GPO as the cash delivery mechanism. They did not have the capacity to deliver in rural areas. In addition, it is culturally expected that on receipt of a remittance, perhaps from an absent family member, the recipient will normally 'tip' the postman to thank him for the delivery: not an ideal scenario for CTP.<sup>29</sup>
- Holding on to the 5000 HH target and the late appeal revision (see page 41)
- The design of the database used by shelter and livelihoods (see page 63)
- IFRC budgets held by coordinators (in vertical silos) and implementation delivered in the field (in geographic, integrated offices) – it appears the same issues may have applied to management lines and decision making

There are also decisions in which the jury remains hung. PRCS were highly reluctant to allow direct transfers to branches from IFRC. This certainly contributed to slower movement of funds, but it also contributed to higher levels of accountability.

**Finding 17.**

Effective decision-making was hampered by a number of factors including staffing levels, existing systems, new SOPs, and weaknesses in IFRC management and leadership.

### IFRC roles and responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities in emergency response between the National Societies, the Zone, SARD and the delegations were revised shortly before the Pakistan floods began: this is the first operation in which they were tested.

The process was not without challenges, and again, these were probably influenced by the low staffing levels and perhaps also by weak leadership. During the early days, the operation was perceived as reporting directly to the Zone and bypassing the delegation, which in turn was perceived as being too hands-off. To place this in context, the Zone was providing much of the surge capacity that was driving the operation.

Later on the delegation was strengthened and the operation was absorbed into it: at this time those on the ground perceived KL as being too involved. Some KII used terms like 'micro-managing' to describe this time.

It's not clear if the new SOPs were really fit for purpose at this time. This was certainly a far bigger operation than might have been chosen for piloting, if a choice had been available. Perhaps they were, but were not completely and universally adopted? They have since been reviewed in the light of experience, and there is an appropriate ambition to repeat this on an annual basis.

Whether they were fit for purpose or not, the differences of perspective and expectations between the stakeholders suggest that communication could have been improved, and that roles and responsibilities were not clear to all parties.

The start of a sudden onset disaster is – by definition – a distinct moment in time, and the reporting lines and responsibilities will change abruptly. The end of such an event is much less distinct, and the exit plan could perhaps have included the gradual re-engagement by the South Asia Regional Delegation office.

As the operation progressed and the IRP (which appropriately takes a very developmental perspective) was launched, one might have expected an increased engagement from the SARD office, which is responsible for the regular programmes and the annual DOP. This does not appear to have been the case, and the Zone office seems to have retained an exclusive line of communication.

<sup>29</sup> Reviewers of the draft report strongly suggested that some of the problems with the GPO were anticipated, but that the GPO was the only potential partner that would have provided the PRCS with the confidence needed to go ahead with this approach.

**Finding 18.**

The new DMU SOPs, that placed the National Society in the lead role, and redefined responsibilities for the Zone, the regional office and the delegation, had been recently introduced at the time of the operation. They were untested, and may not have been fully embraced or observed by all the stakeholders to the operation. The SARD office has not been involved in the planning or implementation of the recovery operations.

## Quality management

The timeline on page 5 shows the various evaluation, review and research processes undertaken throughout the operation in red, and assessment processes in brown.

Recommendations were made as an output of most of these processes. In the majority of cases, a formal IFRC management response exists stating which of these recommendations were accepted in whole or in part. In PRCS a different process is reported: evaluations are discussed within the management team and actions are minuted.

However, there is no overall log or monitoring tool to track progress against these recommendations, individually or shared between the two institutions. The Federation (in KL) did review all the evaluative processes and produce a summary list: it is incomplete and internal, and has not been updated for some time. This consultant produced, as a separate output, a summarised and annotated list of well over 200 such previous recommendations, in addition to adding 24 of his own.

Monitoring processes are not, typically, seen as a source of management information on which to base decisions. (See also below, Figure 4 on page 48). Monitoring is mechanistic and geared towards meeting reporting requirements. In IFRC, the Monitoring Tracking Tool (MTT) was brought in to improve this, and it did consolidate the various indicators, but without adapting them.

For example, the Shelter Review identified that beneficiaries of the shelter programme had, on occasion, had to sell livestock in order to meet their contributions to the house construction. This is an alarming finding: sale of productive assets is recognised as a distress coping strategy. Did they have surplus? Were they extending the shelter beyond the basic model? Was this commonplace? We simply don't know.

Likewise, problems were found in some watsan projects, regarding the connection between the latrine and the septic tank. Despite being noted for a year, action was only taken on a few individual cases, not across the board.

The M&E exit plan is an excellent concept and was well resourced financially. It could have enjoyed stronger support from the leadership to ensure a more complete picture, particularly HR, finance and logistics. It would have benefited from stronger technical inputs, including involving the consultant for the summative evaluation earlier, in the design of the whole package to ensure integration and complementarity. The formats of most of the sectoral evaluations are very different, and synthesis is very challenging. The existing end-line survey has some technical issues with the analysis that can easily be overcome, but is seriously undermined by having been undertaken in dry May against a baseline undertaken in rainy September. Fortunately, if swift action is taken it could be repeated.

Monitoring and evaluation processes are looked at in detail in section 3.

**Finding 19.**

Processes for effective quality management were not robust during the implementation phase. In contrast, the exit plan is a much more robust piece of M&E planning, and with modifications could serve as a model for other large operations.

## Integration and effectiveness

The issues that impacted upon efficiency outlined above (Integration and efficiency, page 35) have had similar impacts on effectiveness. Where parallel systems exist, it is harder to communicate with beneficiaries and there is greater potential for confusion and dissatisfaction [NLLL].

The different programme activities were infrequently targeted at the same group (see Figure 2). Each programme selected its own beneficiaries, usually before the VC was fully operational. [KII, email, UH-various, SE-various]. In some cases, interventions will have been complementary and mutually supportive. In most cases, this has not been the case.

There is no evidence that thought was given during the implementation of the IRP to the complementarity of interventions at the household level, or the balance of household and community level interventions. The loss of the community grants (which began life in the livelihoods project, migrated to DRR as risk mitigation projects, and eventually failed to materialise) will have reduced the effectiveness and/or sustainability of other interventions, as justified by the programme's logic model.

#### **Finding 20.**

The overall goal of the programme – increased resilience – actually requires programme activities to be effectively integrated. The weakness of such integration in practice must compromise this goal. However, the weak monitoring arrangements do not allow this to be measured directly or by proxy.

### **Managing constraints**

The major 'constraints' to the operation [according to KII, RTE, MTR and other sources] included:

- physical access, especially in the rainy season/winter or as a result of security concerns;
- the pressure to spend money quickly;
- availability of appropriate numbers of high quality delegates (IFRC) and staff (PRCS);
- access to visas for internationals;
- slow decision making, low authorisation levels within PRCS;
- weak leadership, gaps in key roles, and staff turnover within IFRC;
- shortages of counterparts and mis-aligned structures, of IFRC and PRCS; and
- communication problems across and between both houses

However, only the first of these is actually a constraint in the sense that it is completely out of the control of the programme.

The programme has produced some excellent outputs for flood-affected households and communities, despite these 'constraints'. However, there is no evidence that the root causes of these problems have been identified, and little concrete action appears to have been taken to address them. This is the theme of section 3 of this report: no more will be said here.

### **Meeting objectives**

#### **Relief and early recovery objectives**

The question of whether objectives have been met should be directly addressed by standard IFRC reporting. For example, the following table based on the IFRC Appeal revision of May 2013 (and reproduced in the TOR) relates to the relief and early recovery actions and shows that targets were largely met at this time:

Table 7: targets and achievements for the relief and early recovery activities

Sector	Target families (POA)	Target families (Appeal)	Achievements (families reached)
Food (relief)	150,000	180,000	181,277
Non-food items (relief)	75,000	75,000	103,195
Shelter (winterised transitional shelter, relief)		6,500	6,393
Shelter (relief)	75,000	75,000	83,209 tents: 15,273 tarpaulins: 160,497 shelter toolkits: 37,498
Health and care (relief)	130,000 19 districts	130,000 26 districts	159,784
Health and care (early recovery)	130,000 19 districts	130,000 26 districts	124,709
Water and sanitation (relief and early recovery)	30,000	30,000	safe drinking water : 31,300 1402 latrines: 4,005 hygiene promotion: 12,994 water supply schemes: 578
Livelihoods (winter vegetable seeds, relief)	55,000	2,000	2,000
Livelihoods (early recovery)	15,000	31,232	31,172

With the exception of the livelihoods work, the relief and early recovery targets from the initial POA were carried into the Appeal documentation largely intact.

### The Appeal Revision of May 2013.

The most recent revision of the Appeal was published in May 2013, at the effective end of the operation – although it was the subject of discussion between the country delegation and the zone for almost a year. On first reading it appears to contain a set of revised targets, which would have been much better described as under a heading that made it clear they were actually expected results.<sup>30</sup>

Although the narrative is clear about the revision, appearing to change the targets to comply with the actuals at the last moment does not promote transparency at the headline level: every target will achieve 100%. One key informant described this as *‘moving the goalposts’*.

The table below uses the data from the Appeal revision to present the achievements in a more realistic format: the percentage scores have been added.

<sup>30</sup> The changes can be found on p3 of the revised Appeal, under the heading “Revision of Appeal targets”

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**Table 8: IRP targets and achievements**

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Achievement</b>	<b>Performance</b>
<b>Shelter</b>			
Permanent Shelter beneficiary families	10,000	2,530	25%
<b>WatSan</b>			
Latrines beneficiaries families	4,500	3,220	72%
WatSan Committees	140	101	72%
Water supply Schemes	25	12	48%
Hand Pumps	130	135	104%
PHAST Groups	150	105	70%
PHAST Sessions	1,794	1,794	100%
CHAST Schools	45	30	67%
<b>Livelihoods</b>			
Income Generating Activities (IGAs) beneficiaries	5,000	4,412	88%
<b>Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)</b>			
Village Committees	39	64	164%
Micro Mitigation Projects (MMPs)	43	6	14%
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Campaigns (Villages)	39	19	49%
<b>Health and Care</b>			
Basic Health Unit (BHU)/ Mobile Health Unit (MHUs)	24	22	92%
CBHFA Master Trainers	25	16	64%
CBHFA Coaches	200	160	80%
CBHFA Volunteers	2,754	1,575	57%
First Aid Trainings for Village Health Committees	137	76	55%
Epidemic Control and Nutrition Training for Coaches	200	121	61%
Long-lasting Insecticide Treated Nets (LLITNs)	67,900	50,212	74%
BP5 High Energy Biscuit bars (units)	166,500	82,896	50%
Delivery/ Reproductive Health Kits	54	66	122%
Psychosocial Support (PSS) Master Trainers	25	25	100%
PSS Coaches	200	157	79%
PSS Volunteers	2,813	959	34%
PSS Trainings for volunteers	275	100	36%

There are a couple of areas of this table that warrant further analysis: the shelter and DRR components. In each, the performance has been significantly less than anticipated in the Appeal. In the case of shelter, the targets have been migrating southwards almost from the start of the operation, as the following table illustrates.

### **Moving targets in the shelter programme**

It has proved quite difficult to unpick the evolution of the various shelter targets over time. At the same time as the numerical part of the target has changed, so – at least in some cases – has the nature or the design of the shelter proposed.

Table 9: changes in shelter targets

Date	Source	Target number	Shelter Type	Unit cost / CHF	Notes
Aug 2010	Ops Update #4	10,000	Cash grants for owner-driven restoration of T-shelter		
		35,000	Shelter kits and clean-up kits		
Aug 2010	Ops Update #5	45,000	Restoration – means not specified		Figure remains constant to Ops Update #10
Oct 2010	Ops Update #10	65,000	T-shelter and owner driven repairs		
Oct 2010	POA p 18	60,000	Owner-driven reconstruction	275	POA was written in Sept, published in October
Nov 2010	Appeal p 16	40,000	Restoration of houses through cash grants 'Katcha' house design	585	Described in budget as 'transitional'. '
April 2011	Ops Update #11	40,000	Switch to 'Paka' house	750	11,500 target is a 'first phase minimum based on confirmed funding'
		11,500			
		10,000			
Aug 2012	Appeal p 17	5,000		1,300	June/July 2012 (KII) Decision: capacity
Feb 2013	Ops Update #15	5,000			
May 2013	Appeal p3	2,530		1,300	Decision: time constraints + challenges in Punjab

**Notes:**

*The challenges in Punjab identified in the final row relate to a decision to support around 1,500 'most vulnerable' households in Layyah with properties outside the protective village dyke. This was rendered impossible to deliver as a result of a government decision that all houses should be within the dykes; it was too late to begin a new project, with new beneficiaries, in this area.*

It is interesting to note that the targets set in the very early days – while still very ambitious compared to the actual performance – were far more realistic than those being quoted by October 2010. It seems that the lessons from the 2005 Earthquake in Pakistan, and the Indian Ocean tsunami, have still not been absorbed.

**Low performance in DRR**

The DRR component of the programme has not performed well: it has not met targets and it has delivered slowly. This is particularly important because the whole integrated programme relied on some CBDRR elements as foundation for their components [NLLL].

It's not clear why the DRR component in particular performed so weakly. Staffing levels were an issue, but that was also true in other components. The VCA exercises were essential for effective planning and integration. They were slow, so other components began implementation independently. And they were inaccurate, so the planning figures across all sectors were seriously compromised.

The causes of the weak VCA are outlined below, as this needs to be addressed in the new ICBDRR programme being developed.

**Finding 21.**

The shelter targets were over-ambitious from the start of the programme, despite considerable experience within the Zone in recent years.

**Finding 22.**

Changing targets in the final months of an Appeal to reflect actuals is not consistent with transparent reporting, regardless of the content of the narrative. Appeals should report against original targets as well as revised targets, as a normal practice.

**VCA processes within the IRP**

As noted above, the VCA was undertaken in a larger number of UCs than there was an intention to deliver programming in. This is not good practice: other, lighter processes, with less risk of raising expectations, should be used for selecting programme locations prior to the VCA.

VCA will typically produce a community plan that focuses on risk mitigation. Other similar processes could have been chosen: PHAST, PASSA, CBHFA – but this would simply replace one problem with another. Rather than place a programme sector at the heart of the programme, the programme logic suggests placing the community at the centre, deploying a multi-sectoral community mobilisation team to deliver this preliminary work, and calling upon technical specialists to support component projects once the needs have been prioritised.

One reviewer of the draft suggested that this approach had been suggested during the early planning, but it was not realised, and each sector used their own tools and went in their own direction.

The SOPs for the VCA process and the creation of the VC were appropriate, but were not applied consistently in all places. Other programme sectors may not have understood the limitations of the VCA process.

The shelter evaluation identifies four reasons why the VCA was poor:

- Low levels of training and experience in the VCA staff
- Limited local knowledge: staff were brought in from outside rather than trained *in situ*
- Unfavourable conditions - flood water still standing, preventing access – although this was only true in the southern parts
- Non-availability of inhabitants – largely due to the standing floodwater and displacement from the flooding

Other reasons were proposed by key informants:

- VCA did not work through the local mechanisms such as DCO coordination
- Many of the trained VCA practitioners had left: low wages, high training, better offers.
- As a result, there was no DM focal person in KP and in Sindh they had only recently arrived.
- Branches may not have released their VCA-trained volunteers for the purpose
- The time allocated was too short for a full VCA. (Note that the need to allocate enough time for these processes is clearly outlined in the TPAT and Recovery Strategy documents)
- The VCA process only included the DM staff, so lost the emphasis on its multi-sectoral, integrated purpose.

**Finding 23.**

Performance in DRR was especially weak and targets were consistently missed. In the case of the VCA, this had a significant impact on other programme sectors and the programme as a whole. There are associated risks for the new ICBDRR programme.

## Coverage

### Detailed questions from the TOR section 4.2.4:

- Indication of response proportionality to needs, inclusion and exclusion bias, if any, in the different phases of the programme and within specific sectoral interventions.

Overall coverage during the relief activities is presented and discussed in the section on Relevance and Appropriateness on page 18, above. The RTE suggests that coverage was skewed towards KP, on the basis of % needs – most likely in response to PRCS history, perceived capacity, and the north-to-south evolution of the disaster.

### Recovery needs

The TPAT synthesis report made an effort to prioritise the most affected areas, but did not suggest a prioritisation of the needs or make suggestions about an appropriate scale for the response, (wisely) advocating a balanced and integrated approach based on locally determined priorities<sup>31</sup>.

This approach was spelled out in more detail in the Recovery Strategy (p20).


However, in practice, and driven largely by the vertical planning tools of the Federation, the individual sectors presented budgets based in part upon early needs assessments, but largely driven by sectoral earmarking. There is no evidence of a cross-sectoral planning meeting in which the appropriate balance of these technical sectors could be determined. These existing budgets then constrained any community-led planning at the village or UC level.

### Proportionality

The limited financial data provided does not allow a complete breakdown by technical sector, as it is difficult to allocate indirect expenditure for the later periods, and there is no information provided about indirect expenditure at all for the relief activities.

The following analysis is based on the expenditure figures provided. It shows each element of direct expenditure – that is, on items that directly reach beneficiaries. As noted in the section on efficiency above, this masks the true levels of expenditure in some programme sectors.

Figure 3: comparative breakdown of direct expenditure in relief and recovery



Direct expenditure: relief activities  
 August 2010 - December 2011  
 35.1m of 45.2m CHF total for the period

Direct expenditure: early recovery and recovery activities  
 January 2012 - May 2013  
 14.3m of 38.6m CHF total for the period

<sup>31</sup> With one exception, in the shelter report, which appears to have slipped through the editor's net.

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Another way to consider this is to look at beneficiary or output numbers by sector, and this is attempted in the table below. It must be recognised that there is a difference between community level approaches (provision of services, mobilisation and education programmes, risk mitigation) and household level approaches. The following table attempts to provide this breakdown, although it remains incomplete (see highlights).

Table 10: early recovery and recovery outputs by activity and district

District	BHU	MHU	CBHFA	PS	Winterised shelter	IRP OD Shelter	Shelter toolkits	Latrines (Sh)	Latrines (W/S)	PHAST	CHAST	Water supply	Livelihoods	VCA	VC/VO	MMP	DRR Campaign
	#	#	coaches	volunteers	HH	HH	HH	#	#	groups	schools	schemes/pumps	HH	#	#	#	village
Larkana	1	1	8	x					271					2			
Shikarpur	0	1	8	x		473	485	0	173	18	2	19	954	2	20		2
Kamber Shadad Kot	0	1	8	x		1405	1405	0	331	33	6	11	1382	2	19		2
Thatta	1		8	x										3			
Jacobabad	1		8	x										2			
Khairpur														2			
Dadu														2			
<b>Sindh</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1890</b>	<b>1890</b>	<b>1401</b>	<b>504</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>2336</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>
Muzaffargarh	1			x		642	642	595	1192	20	7	53	447	2	8		
Layyah	1			x		2	2					52		2	7		
Rajanpur	1													2			
Rahim Yar Khan	1													2			
Dera Ghazi Khan	1																
<b>Punjab</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>595</b>	<b>1192</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Swat	1		9	x	3000		3043							2			
Kohistan	1		4	x	2134		4100		750	13	4	4	497	2	5	3	
Charsada	4								716			16	740	2			
Shangla			9	x	259		1759		1215	20	5	8		2	5	2	10
<b>KP</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5211</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8902</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2681</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>1237</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>
Gilgit	1		9	x													
Skardu	1		4	x													
Ghizer			5	x													
Diamer			4	x													
<b>GB</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Jhal Magsi	1																
Sibi	1		2	x													
Dera Murad Jamali	1																
Loralai			7	x													
Jaffarabad			14	x													
<b>Balochistan</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>6393</b>	<b>2522</b>	<b>12436</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>4648</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>4412</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>53</b>

This table demonstrates the markedly different geographical coverage in the health sector, and shows the problems in Layyah, Punjab, where construction had to cease because of changes in government policy.

Coverage within each district is not shown: in most IRP districts the work was focused on two Union Councils, each including several villages: a small proportion of the total district. No mapping of the total coverage in each district (by all humanitarian actors) has been provided, so it is not possible to place this work in the broader context. No evidence of duplication has been found, although it was reported in KII that as a result of the time lapse between the VCA and implementation, in some cases, other actors had already started work and PRCS plans had to be modified.

#### **Finding 24.**

Coverage is reasonably good within the Union Councils targeted by the IRP, although it is misleading to imply this as 'district level' coverage, as some PRCS and Federation reporting does. Understandably, coverage in the IRP is much lower than coverage during the relief operations, as this is a high-input recovery programme focusing on a smaller proportion of the affected population.

### **Inclusion and exclusion**

The TPAT report highlights the risk of exclusion, suggesting that as the early recovery programmes develop, the focus of the targeting could expand to include a special focus on marginalised and especially vulnerable people within communities.

This is in recognition that there is always a risk that community-led processes for targeting will produce a result that reflects any community prejudice against minority groups or individuals. Effective controls are always needed to mitigate against this risk.

It is known that the Village Committees operated in quite different ways in the three provinces of the IRP, despite having common SOPs. In Punjab, the VCs had to be disbanded, following investigation of allegations of inappropriate targeting, and because of time constraints, a different targeting approach was adopted.

#### **Errors of inclusion**

The Punjab allegations related to errors of inclusion: beneficiaries were selected inappropriately. Elsewhere, however, in most of the sectoral programmes, beneficiary selection followed a multi-stage process. An initial beneficiary list provided by the VC was reviewed by programme staff and reduced to a priority group. Such processes generally work to reduce errors of inclusion, by considering proxy and direct indicators of need and vulnerability.

#### **Errors of exclusion**

Such processes do not protect against errors of exclusion. If certain households have been excluded from the list at the first stage because of social pressures, it is very unlikely that they will be included as the list is reduced.

From the information provided in the various sector programmes, it is not clear that additional processes were put in place to address this. Email correspondence from PRCS states that *'every sectoral intervention has its own criteria of beneficiary selection that takes very much account for this aspect'*, but it does not provide supporting evidence, although it does note that various activities were undertaken by BCA to publicise beneficiary lists via noticeboards etc.

It therefore seems likely that errors of exclusion occurred during the development of beneficiary lists.

#### **Finding 25.**

On the basis of the evidence provided, errors of inclusion are unlikely to have been serious, either in the relief activities or recovery work. Errors of exclusion cannot be ruled out; indeed it seems likely that they occurred during the IRP.

## Impact

### Detailed questions from the TOR section 4.2.5:

- What unexpected positive or negative, intended or unintended consequences arose for different stakeholders in the three phases of the operation, and why?
- To what extent did the appeal, and its support by donors, achieve the expected objectives outlined in the Plan of Action of October 2010 and the Implementation Framework for PRCS - IFRC Flood Recovery Activities of April 2011?
- What are some of the main successes and opportunities that came out of the appeal operation? To what extent is the intervention supporting the target communities' own problem-solving and decision-making to address their local needs? What might be the positive and negative consequences or changes in the communities as result of the support being provided?

### A focus on positive, intended outcomes for programme recipients

With the exception of the complaints mechanism, the focus of the programme managers and the M&E system is almost entirely on positive, intended consequences for intended beneficiaries. The individual technical reviews have a fairly similar focus. This provides a very incomplete picture.

The table below identifies eight possible types of consequences, of which only one is really recognised in the programme documentation provided. This apparent lack of awareness is a serious weakness.

Figure 4: eight different types of outcome

	Intended Outcomes		Unintended Outcomes	
Positive Outcomes	For targeted beneficiaries <i>Attention is focussed on this area</i>	For non-beneficiaries	For targeted beneficiaries	For non-beneficiaries
Negative outcomes	For targeted beneficiaries	For non-beneficiaries	For targeted beneficiaries	For non-beneficiaries

That's not to suggest that the monitoring system is not capable of picking up these diverse types of result, simply that it is not designed to do so, despite this being an explicit expectation of the Federation's M&E guidance.

The end-line survey, livelihoods review and the watsan KAP survey do look at a sample of non-beneficiaries, comprising some 25% of the total interviews. This is not sufficient to form representative sample, and the questionnaire simply uses them as a control group against which to demonstrate (positive, intended) outcomes of the programme for the target group. For more information of the weaknesses of the baseline-endline process, see the paragraphs on The evidence base for enhanced resilience on page 55, and the paragraph on M&E in Section 3 on page 66.

In order to incorporate Do No Harm or BPI thinking into programmes, detailed scenario planning and consideration needs to be given to all of these areas, and where negative outcomes are deemed to be possible, the monitoring system should include indicators that track them and thresholds to trigger action where necessary. These are an essential component of the risk analysis, and they are not in place.

In the absence of such an M&E system, and constrained by the 'meta' nature of the evaluation process, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive answer to this question.

The complaints mechanism provides an opportunity for flood-affected people to communicate directly with the senior management of PRCS. See also Accountability to beneficiaries on page 23.

**Finding 26.**

The emphasis on positive, intended outcomes for targeted beneficiaries provides an incomplete and potentially misleading picture and undermines effective decision-making.

**Potential unintended outcomes for shelter beneficiaries**

The shelter team **have** considered a set of possible outcomes for their beneficiaries, and have included this thinking in their planning. This is a helpful example of good practice, and the chosen approach is seen in the team as the 'least worst' outcome. It is acknowledged that there are associated risks.

The initial plan for shelter provision was to provide what is described as '*katcha*' houses. These are lightweight, low value shelters with mud bricks, similar to (or in some cases better than) the houses that were washed away in the flooding. They are made from local materials and can be built using relatively unskilled local labour.

Following the pilot project in Thatta, Provincial Branch feedback was very strongly in support of a more substantial house, and the design was reviewed to use '*paka*' construction: burned mud blocks and a substantial flat roof, on which household assets can be stored during floods. These are the houses that were built and they proved flood-resistant in the 2012 floods; the *katcha* alternatives would not have fared as well.

Some of the houses are built on land owned by the local landlord: the tenants work as labourers on his land in a sharecropping or paid-labour basis, especially in Sindh and Punjab. They will usually have been in this relationship over several generations.

Switching from low-cost *katcha* to higher-value *paka* houses has produced some additional complications. Since the tenants do not have title to the land, and their occupancy rights (if rights exist) would be very difficult to enforce against powerful landlords. In most cases, the programme has built only a few houses on each piece of property, but in Sindh, some of the landlords own large tracts of land and the programme may have built as many as 80 (KII) houses on the land of a single person.

To ensure a right of abode, the IRP has developed a contract between the landlord and the tenant, guaranteeing free occupancy in the property for 5 years.

In summary, the issues are:

- Is it appropriate to provide large numbers of high value inputs to a landlord whose relationship with his tenants is often described as 'feudal'?
- What is the risk that landlords will start to charge rent for these properties, which are so much higher quality and safer than previous dwellings?
- What protection do the tenants have after the five-year period, and indeed, during it?

The challenging questions remain on the table as the programme closes. While little can be done at this stage to change outcomes (and there is no suggestion implied here that the wrong decision was made), there would be value in undertaking a light follow-up review in several years time, to explore the answers to these questions, to inform future shelter programming in Pakistan.

**Finding 27.**

The medium-term situation of the housing beneficiaries is uncertain, in terms of potential rent payments or future occupancy rights. This was recognised by the shelter team, and a light review in the future would provide valuable opportunities for learning for future programmes.

**Successes and opportunities**

It is in the nature of summative evaluations to focus on challenges, problems, and things that might be improved. The 50 'nitty gritty' questions of the TOR do not help much here. But there is much to celebrate in this operation, as this section hopes to illustrate.

## Operational Successes

The surge capacity: FACT, ERUs and TPAT, plus the many people deployed from the Zone, and the RDRT all contributed to a successful start and an impressive scale-up.

In the relief phase, the scale and scope of food and non-food support was impressive, and the emergency shelter must have made a significant impact on the lives of those displaced by the flooding, especially those facing a harsh winter in the mountains to the north of the country.

The wide range of the primary health service provision is also impressive, delivered through static and mobile health units, supporting and complementing government provision.

The word 'early' in the phrase 'early recovery' was a reality, not just a title.

PRCS have adopted a more deliberate needs-based approach for this operation, which has now become a standard for PRCS and will be embedded in its strategy. Once things got underway, there was also effective joint planning at the provincial level, which should also become a norm for PRCS programming. SOPs have been developed, tested and applied within PRCS, and will need to be reviewed presently in the light of recent experiences.

The IRP project succeeded in strengthening the physical capacity of district-level PRCS operations in the target districts through support to both Branch Offices and DM Cells. The volunteer management capacity was also enhanced, with materials rolled out in local languages, new volunteers recruited and trained, and the creation of a national volunteer database. The IRP also supported the development and delivery of a self-assessed *district capacities survey* that was administered across all districts in two provinces, providing comprehensive information on existing capacities, and common baseline for branch development planning across PRCS.

PRCS HQ's robust responses to issues of integrity when they arose at the provincial level also set a good precedent, and provide a foundation for further work in this area.

Over time, the IRP supported the development of an enhanced culture of programme accountability, and the development of BCA and M&E systems and capacity within PRCS.

As a concrete outcome of the IRP: houses for people, of a quality they cannot have imagined; houses that failed to be washed away when floods returned the next year. Many people have access to safe water and sanitation where they had none before, and many people have had their livelihoods restored and enhanced. And through these activities, PRCS has gained confidence in the use of CTP, which will be valuable in future responses at any scale.

Finally, the public perception of PRCS has improved, and PRCS has acceptance in areas where NGOs have been denied access – a significant achievement and a real opportunity for the future.

## Future opportunities for PRCS

These include:

- Gaining legal status for the Federation, in the context of enhanced national law on disaster response and a re-positioned role for PRCS as auxiliary to government.
- A revised and relevant strategy for PRCS that embraces needs-based targeting, participatory approaches, decentralisation. This process, of course, is already well underway.
- Providing a fully resourced core structure for PRCS with in-house technical capacity in all core areas.
- Constitutional change and unification – well beyond the scope of these TOR, but an exciting opportunity nonetheless, including the opportunity to clarify the distinction between management and governance roles.
- Systems development: in finance and logistics, but also in management systems and the use of IT, in monitoring and evaluation, in reporting.
- More openness to surge capacity – especially RDRT. Also, to strengthen the existing opportunity to contribute to RDRT by deploying staff to other countries, gaining experience and exposure.
- Considering 'internal' surge capacity, including deployments from the HQ, but more importantly between districts and provinces.
- Lastly, an extended opportunity for reflection, for self assessment, internally and with trusted partners.

## Coherence


### Detailed questions from the TOR section 4.2.6:

- Was there effective coordination with other members of the Movement / other actors including the IASC cluster system for different sector activities?
- How appropriate and effective were the inputs of partner organizations in the implementation of the operation?
- What are the lessons to be learnt for an improved Federation wide recovery planning at the start of operations and the integrated programming delivery approach followed?
- Where the interventions implemented in line with the most relevant strategic documents; the PRCS the IFRC and the Pakistan authorities?
- Were the interventions implemented in consultation, collaboration and complementary to government and other organisations responses?

### Coordination – Movement

At the start of the operation, strenuous efforts were made to build a common approach and a joint programme between Movement partners [TPAT, Recovery Framework, EOM reports]. Such efforts need resources, the operation was understaffed; the efforts were not sustained. Poor dynamics between the delegation and the operations team [EOM reports, emails] compounded this.

Figure 5: Federation-wide POA



A useful diagram appeared (in slightly different forms) in the Recovery Framework and the early appeal documents<sup>32</sup>, which shows the efforts being made to build a Federation-wide approach, and demonstrates learning from other operations in the Zone and elsewhere.

At this time it was intended that the POA would be a Federation-Wide document, which the PNS could use as a basis for bilateral programming. The Federation Appeal would represent the sub-set of this that would be implemented using multilateral funds.<sup>33</sup> This did not come to pass: the POA and the Emergency Appeal described the same activities, and the IFRC role in coordinating PNS activities was very limited.

To achieve this would have required a single, coherent document to describe the IRP and share with PNS, and this was never produced, and it would have required a greater investment into leadership and coordination, which was not prioritised.

It is not clear, from the organogram, where responsibility for Movement Coordination would have rested in Islamabad. It is clear that existing staff had little spare capacity. Early in the operation, coordination between Movement Partners was at a particularly low ebb: things were reportedly back on track by Feb 2013.

In the field the roles were much clearer. Coordination was the responsibility of the field representative and the PRCS Provincial Branch. Meeting minutes and records exist that demonstrate fairly effective coordination. When PNS were invited to a focus group, they did not raise any concerns about this aspect.

<sup>32</sup> Revised Emergency Appeal, 15 November 2010, p13

<sup>33</sup> See also the Operations update #12, 23 December 2010, pages 3 and 4.

**Finding 28.**

Movement coordination in large operations needs to be properly resourced. In an operation of this scale, especially with the expectations of a common PRCS approach with coordinated support from IFRC and PNS, this requires dedicated staff and an agreed and functional in-country coordination mechanism.

**Coordination – external**

Coordination with external partners is mixed.<sup>34</sup>

The main coordination partner of PRCS is the government, through the NDMA. The main focus of IFRC-led coordination was the IASC/cluster system. It's not clear how well these two systems interacted externally, or the degree to which information was shared internally.

The IFRC is hidebound in its external coordination efforts by a document that lays out the ground-rules for such coordination in Pakistan<sup>35</sup>. It states, amongst other things, that IFRC representatives can only attend cluster meetings as observers, that they should provide nothing in writing to such meetings, and should qualify their statements heavily. It explicitly states that assessment information should not be shared. The stated justifications for this approach include that

- that the UN is a 'political' organisation, and IFRC must maintain independence
- that IFRC is not directly implementing, and PRCS already report to NDMA

While the political sensitivities of Pakistan are real, this approach is rather extreme. The HCT meeting is UN convened, but the clusters are 'owned' by IASC (not the UN), and globally IFRC is a standing invitee of the IASC, not an observer. Refusing to share assessment information and analysis, and participating in clusters to gain information without contributing, is counterproductive and isolating.

Good practice in this area is clearly described in the Sphere Handbook, Core Standard 2. The whole standard is relevant, but it is worth quoting one Key Indicator in particular:

*Share assessment information with the relevant coordination groups in a timely manner and in a format that can be readily used by other humanitarian agencies*

The genesis of this internal guidance document (which is not dated and has no acknowledged author, though it appears to have been produced during the operation) is not known. It would be interesting to know if it had been cleared or approved by the Zone. One KI suggested that this approach was prompted by concerns in Geneva, although no evidence was provided to support this.

Fortunately, the programmatic teams appear to have adopted as pragmatic an approach as possible within the constraints of this guidance.

**Finding 29.**

The country-level guidance on external coordination is not consistent with good practice.

**Strategic alignment**

There is a strong alignment of PRCS policy and strategy to the Federation strategy 2020, and to the Government's strategy both in Disaster Management and in the health sector.

There is some discussion within PRCS that in the health sector, the current approach is substituting for weak health provision rather than complementing it. This is recognised in the ongoing review of the strategy.

**Finding 30.**

The flood operations were well aligned with Government and Federation strategy and policy.

<sup>34</sup> See RTE recommendation #39

<sup>35</sup> Position paper on working with external partners in Pakistan

### **Complementarity with other humanitarian actors**

Given the methodology of the review process and the nature of the reviews that feed it, it is not easy to have a confident perspective on the degree to which overall needs were met and any resulting gaps in provision. The overall impression gained is that PRCS' interventions were well aligned with the approaches of others, and of significantly higher quality than many. This is particularly true in the shelter sector.

**Finding 31.**

The PRCS programmes were of higher quality than many other actors, especially in shelter.

## Sustainability and connectedness

### Detailed questions from the TOR section 4.2.7:

- To what extent are the recovery programme activities and DRR activities at the end of the appeal expected to strengthen the resilience of the targeted affected populations? To what degree are these activities sustainable? Indication of degree of attribution.
- Did the integrated planning and design translate into adequate and effective integration across the different programmes? What were the discernible programme gains from this integration?
- To what extent did the programme take into account longer term development aspects of the communities being assisted?
- What actions were undertaken to wind-up the appeal and contribute to smooth exit as the appeal is closes? What is the likely sustainability of the different components?
- How has the relief and recovery operation strengthened the capacity of PRCS? How is PRCS developing itself as the result of the intervention and how is PRCS improving the capacity to plan, implement, monitor, report on and evaluate Movement supported programmes? Is the enhanced capacity because of the operation going to be sustainable?

### Integration: did integrated planning produce integrated responses?

In short: no, it didn't.

Integrated planning was not the norm, and as a result, integrated responses rarely happened. See Figure 2: proportions of beneficiary households in 3 key sectors. As noted, the health responses were not integrated from the start. A quick glance at the logframe will show that each section is written in isolation: they are very different in style, in depth, in approach, and the potential inter-sector linkages identified in the Recovery Strategy are nowhere to be seen. The logframe was never really used as a working document: it was constructed late. Prior to this managers used independent sectoral plans and the POA, only.

Planning for the IRP, for example, was undertaken in Islamabad, but had to be re-done at the Provincial level. At this point, integrated planning became a more realistic expectation, but the sense from KIIs with people whose responsibilities were both technical and geographic suggested that it never became a reality. This is discussed in more detail in section 3.

In some cases, the planning in one sector actively undermined result in another sector. For example, the decision that OD shelter beneficiaries should contribute financially was taken without any measurement of household economy. As a result, according to the shelter review (page 19), many beneficiaries had to sell productive assets like livestock, at the same time as the livelihoods programme was providing cash grants for such assets. Programmes that include an owner-driven shelter component would normally include some analysis and support to financial planning at the household level that would help to avoid these sorts of situations.

#### Finding 32.

IRP planning was not integrated, but undertaken in sectoral isolation, which resulted in lost opportunities and in some cases negative consequences for beneficiaries.

#### Finding 33.

The owner-driven shelter programme was making assumptions about household capacity that were not backed up by assessment. An HEA-type household level analysis and some support to financial planning would have been appropriate interventions, and would have supported integrated shelter and livelihood planning.

## Resilience

Resilience is a concept that has been much researched and discussed during the period of the Appeal, and our understanding of it is much improved since the time the initial planning was undertaken. The planning process needs to be seen in this historical context.

### The role of resilience in the logic model of the IRP

The logic model of the IRP is not well developed. The logical framework (April 2012) states that the goal is:

*to contribute to the ability of households and communities to cope with, to recover from emergencies and to build community resilience.*

In the light of this goal, one might envisage a logic model that builds on a process: working to identify community and PRCS capacities and strengths in target areas; identify hazards, risks and opportunities; define needs; build community structures to address these and to monitor outcomes; and consider a thoughtful exit strategy that leaves the community more resilient and PRCS more established.

Instead we have a traditionally vertical logic model, in which each technical sector presents its standard programmes, constrained by predetermined budgets. Bolted on to this model, but not really integrated with it, are some additional elements: humanitarian diplomacy, BCA, and some strengthening of PRCS, although this last largely at the level of assets and infrastructure. A branch development delegate was appointed, but not as part of a clear IRP plan.

There are no identified linkages between the vertical sectors at all, and it is not clear how the sectors are supposed to contribute to the goal – even assuming that they were all directed at the same groups of beneficiaries, which, of course, they were not. Again, this is a missed opportunity: the Recovery Framework specifically identifies opportunities for cross-sector linkages in a helpful matrix on page 24.

Perhaps this should not be a surprise. Almost without exception, the tools in the IFRC toolkit are geared towards sectoral, vertical approaches. In this environment, climbing out of the silo requires vision, space and time to think strategically. The operation never had a level of staffing and leadership that allowed this.

### The evidence base for enhanced resilience

The best opportunity to find evidence of enhanced resilience ought to be the comparison of the baseline and end-line surveys, of which the only second draft was available at the time of writing: it was acknowledged that substantial further revision was needed.<sup>36</sup> These surveys explore the situation of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries before the operation in September 2011 and again in April 2013.

These surveys (and the early drafts of the endline report) have some serious systemic errors that render much of the data invalid. Since these are used as secondary data, for example, in the livelihoods, watsan and shelter reviews (all since finalised), the findings of each of these reviews also needs to be treated with real caution. These systemic errors are outlined in more detail in section 3 on page 66, below, but they include

- The sampling frame, and the absence of quoted confidence levels and confidence intervals (margins of error), and the lack of application of these to apparent improvements
- The weak and inconsistent definition of a household, across the whole programme and within different sectors
- Confusion between reference and baseline data
- Seasonal differences between a wet-season baseline and a dry-season end-line.

In addition, the programme has not tried to explore what is meant by the term 'resilience' in the target communities and villages, although this could have been examined through the VCA, and

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<sup>36</sup> As noted above, a third draft of the endline report, which runs to 100 pages, was produced in September 2013 but was not considered in detail for this evaluation process. The comments here are specific to the second draft, but several of them relate to the methodology and cannot be easily addressed.

through community level engagement, the VCs, or even through the end-line survey. As a result, we do not have any indicators – we do not know what it is we should be measuring.

Some aspects of the programme took longer-term, community level development aspects of the target villages into account: elements of the DRR programme (although few of the micro-mitigation projects were realised) and some of the watsan infrastructure.

#### **Finding 34.**

It is not possible to say if the target communities have experienced increased resilience, or to what degree the IRP may have contributed to it, since resilience was never defined and indicators never identified – even though resilience was the goal of the programme. This is a serious weakness in a programme of such scale.

Note that this finding fundamentally disagrees with the perspective expressed in the unit history produced by the Recovery team.

## **Exit planning**

### **Exiting from services and project components**

There are perhaps three approaches to exit planning that have been adopted within the floods operation.

In the first, assets are replaced, restored or improved. This approach was used in shelter, livelihoods, and water systems. Assuming that necessary external systems such as markets have also recovered, it is completely acceptable to hand over the assets and exit the programme.

In the second approach, entirely new systems or behaviours are promoted. These programme elements include CBHFA, PHAST and CBDRR, and perhaps also the VCs in some circumstances. These take time and careful management to become self-sustaining. The watsan and health evaluations both identify this as a potential issue for the future, as the programme has been of quite short duration.

In the third approach, a non-sustainable service is developed, perhaps to fill a gap in existing provision or a need created by the emergency situation, and this service is sustained for the period of the response. Closing these kinds of projects, such as BHUs, is difficult. If the need no longer exists, the service can be closed; where the need persists it must be sustained. The normal approach is to arrange a handover to the government providers, and this has been the approach adopted.

### **Maintaining continuity**

Programmatic exit: was described by an influential key informant with the phrase: *'exit, but no strategy'*. This may not be entirely fair, but it's clear that as a result of poor communications and late sign-off, skilled and experienced staff have been released, and have found work with other organisations. Which is good for them, but will not be so good for the ICBDRR.

### **The M&E exit strategy**

The M&E exit strategy is uncharacteristically thorough, but highly appropriate to an operation of this size. It includes the following components, which are explained in more detail in the introduction in the section on evidence base from page 13.

- Unit histories,
- Sector specific evaluations
- The end-line questionnaire and subsequent analysis.
- The lessons-learned workshops undertaken at provincial and national HQs.

This approach clearly represents good (and unusual) practice for a large-scale Federation-supported operation. Although the outputs of some parts of the process are less than ideal, they could readily have been improved by the following actions:

- Involve the lead consultant (for the summative evaluation) from the start of the M&E exit process, including cross-sectoral document review and analysis, the development of the TOR and the output formats, and the design of the baseline-endline process.
- Include all technical departments and support services in the Unit History process. No Unit Histories have been received from logistics, finance, or HR for example.
- Strengthen the PRCS voice in the process, through a more robust parallel Unit History process. This would need prior agreement with PRCS, but would provide a more balanced picture.
- Involve the users of the information in the design of the surveys, strengthen the field-testing of the products, and test the data analysis tools before taking the survey to scale. This would, for example, have avoided the reference-baseline problems in the current survey.
- Carry out the end-line survey at the same time of year as the baseline. Without this, data on diarrhoea, malaria and market prices (for example) simply cannot be used to form conclusions. It is not possible to adjust or correct for this, as the second draft suggests. A suggestion to undertake a swift follow-up survey in September 2013 was not adopted.
- Strengthen and maintain the critical path for the evaluation process

**Finding 35.**

The exit planning is solid, and the M&E exit is much more thorough than normal, although there are aspects that would benefit from review.

### The transition to regular programming

The revised Appeal of 15 May 2013 includes a request to carry some 4m CHF of Appeal funds forward into the annual appeal activities, and use this to begin work on the 'continuation' of the IRP. This is currently described as an Integrated Community-Based Risk Reduction Programme. The view from SARD is that this is not a continuation of the current programme: this is at odds with the view in the delegation at the time of the review. It is about strengthening resilience, rather than restoring it, and as such no longer includes a shelter component. However, it is conceptually very similar and certainly builds on experiences from the last couple of years.

The IRP suffered from challenges as a result of placing the DRR programme at the centre of the logic model, rather than the community themselves and the overall goal of enhanced resilience (which is a much greater concept than risk reduction). These challenges are described on page 44. ICBRR risks creating a repeat of this situation, and although some of the project documentation avoids this risk, the programme title replicates it.

A truly integrated and community-based programme to strengthen resilience would require an integrated toolkit (developed from the existing tools used in the IRP and throughout the Federation). It would be led by a community mobilisation team, and would include DRR – alongside water provision, sanitation, community infrastructure and livelihoods – as possible components to be chosen from a 'menu' on the basis of community priorities.

In addition to integrated tools for community mobilisation and empowerment at the start of the project, it should be possible to train a common body of volunteers to deliver a common curriculum that includes hygiene promotion, health education and risk reduction activities. It would take a proactive approach to BCA from the start.

Such a programme would be better described as Participatory Community-Based Resilience Strengthening. It would require a different approach to planning and objective setting, and a degree of flexibility in resourcing.

**Finding 36.**

There are some gaps in the plan for transition to regular programming, especially around retention of trained and experienced staff. The new ICBDRR programme risks inheriting some of the problems of the IRP if it retains DRR at its centre, and if it uses an unmodified VCA as its approach.

### Capacity strengthening for PRCS

Although there is a section of the logical framework dedicated to capacity building, it is mostly focused on the development of branch infrastructure and assets.

The general perspective gained through KII is that PRCS have emerged stronger and more effective as a result of the floods operations, and that substantial development has taken place in key support services over the last few years. There are some concrete indicators to support this: for example, PRCS is developing sectoral budgets at the provincial level for the first time.

Again, this aspect would certainly have benefited from increased engagement from SARD, earlier in the programme lifespan.

It should be noted that after the 2005 earthquake and the resulting programmes especially with PNS support, it was also felt that substantial capacity had been built. With hindsight, this capacity seems highly concentrated within a few district branches in KP, and did not translate to wider institutional capacity. In the absence of a standard model for PRCS district branches, the operational model adopted by most PNS tended to supplement, rather than build, capacity, as programme outputs took precedence over sustainability.

As noted above, the operational approach during the floods response was to build DM cells – which report directly to the HQ – rather than building on the limited but existing branch capacity.

These shortcomings appears to have been recognised by PRCS HQ – and also by the Provincial HQ – and progress is reported towards a standardised approach for PNS working, and a standard model for branch development.

### Strategy and leadership

PRCS have undergone a strategy revision process, in the middle of the current strategic plan 2010-2015. This appears to be in response to internal lesson learning and reflection around the operations of the last few years.

This revision includes a requirement for PNS to work through the HQ and not directly with branches.

### Logistics

The Appeal included a structured proposal to develop PRCS' logistics capacity, primarily through the recruitment of a logistics development delegate. Although two individuals held this role, each mission was cut short and there are no obvious outputs.

Informal capacity building has continued through normal counterpart relationships. PRCS created a separate logistics department in April 2011 headed by a Deputy Director, although this department does not yet include the procurement function: a decision was taken by the PRCS leadership to keep procurement as a separate function under the SG. Since this time, progress has been made in establishing common systems across PRCS. The foundations for meaningful logistics development are now in place, and this is a stated ambition of PRCS.

### Finance

The finance function is also in the process of internal development, and this has been supported through counterpart relationships. No formal finance development support is in place.

**Finding 37.**

PRCS has emerged from this huge response stronger than before. Substantial opportunities now exist for building on existing operational capacity in key support services and sectors, through deliberate and jointly planned development activities.

## Section 3: Causes and findings

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*As noted in the introduction, the emphasis of the TOR is on accountability: what worked well, and what did not. The main areas of focus are outlined in section 4: Evaluation Objectives, Criteria and Key Questions: containing around 50 questions and sub-questions. While some of these are fairly standard, though many arise from particular areas of concern or interest specific to this operation. The previous section attempts to answer these questions through examples drawn from the large body of existing documentary evidence, supported and triangulated by interviews with key informants.*

*However, the expectations of key informants to the evaluation process, from PRCS and from IFRC, across senior management roles, technical sectors and support services, was that the evaluation would provide the means to learn and do things better. That is, a formative, as well as a summative process.*

*Addressing the 'nitty gritty' questions in the TOR provides a list of such opportunities for learning, as the previous section illustrates. But such a list is unlikely to be very useful unless the specific circumstances of the 2010 floods are repeated. More interesting, and more useful, is a consideration of the causal factors of these challenges and opportunities for learning. If these can be addressed, then the challenges can perhaps be avoided in the future.*

*Key informants to the evaluation process were quick to identify the constraints it faced – many of which have already been touched upon. This section starts by considering these 'constraints' and asking the question: to what degree are these **really** external factors over which we have no control?*

## Constraints

The following broad areas were identified by key informants as critical constraints to the operation:

- Access to affected communities: security concerns and physical access to remote areas especially in the winter or rainy seasons
- Recruiting sufficient, appropriately skilled delegates and national staff, and gaining visas for the internationals.
- Processes, systems and tools
- Time constraints

Of these, only physical access is a real, external constraint. The others are worth considering, along with other, associated issues, in the light of the practical challenges faced by the relief and especially the recovery operations.

## People

### People: recruitment issues

#### PRCS

PRCS had no real issues with quality, but struggled particularly with the numbers of staff available. There is an excellent supply of highly skilled people available in Pakistan – although not all will be willing to work in challenging and remote areas. There was an initial reluctance to accept the deployment of RDRT, but this was overcome, with positive results. There was no formal mechanism for developing or utilising internal surge capacity.

PRCS own commitments to a higher headcount were never met. Staff appointments have to be signed off at the level of the Chairman, and there were apparently concerns about the sustainability of so many new positions – although Pakistani law does allow short-term contracts. There was a particular gap in recruiting women. The problems were not so much to do with taking on new ways of working, but in ensuring that they were properly resourced.

As a result, there was a *de facto* strategy to make do with existing staffing, an approach that comes with a risk to existing work – including ongoing relief work. Many PRCS staff members were wearing several hats at once, and in some sectors, the technical capacity was not available in house, so this approach could not succeed, and it came with an associated risk of stress and burnout.

This in turn caused issues for delegates, with many not having a counterpart, resulting in missed opportunities for capacity building, and reduced accountability for PRCS as work was being led by delegates and IFRC national staff.

As noted previously, the HR systems were also a challenge, with low authorization levels and a blurring of the distinction between management and governance roles.

#### **Finding 38.**

PRCS recruitment practices resulted in missed targets in recruitment and an understaffed operation, in addition to lost opportunities for building capacity through counterpart relationships.

#### IFRC

IFRC struggled to meet the demands for experienced delegates with strong cultural awareness and a willingness to work in Pakistan – often in rural locations – for 1-2 years.

This is not the only operation to have had this problem. Blame was placed on the Haiti operation, which certainly pulled in large numbers of delegates, but the Haiti operation had the same problems – even before the Pakistan operation began.

It was also suggested that PNS 'retain' their most experienced delegates for bilateral programmes. Again, this is a suggestion that has been made before: it remains extremely difficult to substantiate.

It appears that surge capacity was effective. Between KL, Geneva and the PNS, a reasonable body of experienced people were deployed very quickly. There were some issues: the FACT team could have been larger, there could have been a second rotation, and their documentation was very weak. The assessment and analysis role of the TPAT was confused with the more operational and coordination role of the FACT mission. Some of the ERU teams had inexperienced leadership, and the FACT team deployed some of them to the wrong places. More could have been done to coordinate effectively with PRCS on the ground. And the RDRT was deployed later than it might have been. But despite these shortcomings, surge capacity proved to be largely fit for purpose.

However, surge is only intended to fill a short-term gap while the core team is brought in to support the operations. And this core team proved to be harder to recruit than expected. Surge is a bridge, and there was not enough of a foundation on the far end.

This problem was identified early on. The RTE recommends:

*Commission a recruitment/HR specialist to conduct a study of the barriers to recruitment of key positions in IFRC-supported emergency operations and make recommendations on adjustments required to current recruitment systems and procedures to attract a larger pool of appropriately skilled and qualified personnel. This includes consideration of alternative models already in place, or under development, within and outside of the RC/RC Movement for both surge and regular deployments.*

**RTE recommendation #19**

Meanwhile, the delegation was suffering from similar problems, with rapid turnover in key roles, long periods in which people were acting, and many people over-loaded.

#### **Finding 39.**

IFRC struggled to identify appropriate delegates in sufficient numbers to maintain the delegation and the operation at adequate levels, in both technical and management functions. The negative consequences that resulted from this staffing shortfall were probably the most significant factor in overall weak operational performance.

## **People: concerns about attitude and quality**

### **IFRC**

In addition to the concerns about the numbers of delegates available to the operation, there are parallel – and linked – concerns about the quality of delegates. Too many of the delegates appointed were on their first mission, including quite a few in coordination roles.

In some cases there were issues with the technical skillset, and the degree of ‘fit’ between the individual and the role they had been appointed to. But more frequently, the problems were (and remain) associated with ‘people skills’. From the perspective of the host National Society, these are just as important as technical competence.

Many decisions were taken during the operation, which, with hindsight, demonstrate a weak understanding of context. These will be explored below in a separate paragraph. The question here is how such decisions get taken, in an operation with an active and informed National Society in the lead role, and a good number of highly experienced Pakistani staff within the delegation. Are delegates not seeking the opinions of local colleagues? Do those colleagues not feel confident to speak up? Or they are not being heard?<sup>37</sup>

Opportunities were perhaps available to the operational leadership to use highly skilled nationals to fill some of the gaps in delegate roles, but were not taken. This opportunity would have come with its own challenges, of course.

Aside from this, there are also problems associated with the functioning of the team. Delegates and senior national staff with poor inter-personal skills can have a dramatic impact on team dynamics, and conflicts over departmental territory or ego detract from a sense of shared responsibility for programme outcomes.

<sup>37</sup> This observation is also not new: see RTE recommendation #13.

These problems started early and persisted throughout the relief, recovery and early recovery activities.

In part, this is also a problem of management and supervision of these relatively inexperienced delegates, and in part a problem of management and oversight of the programme as a whole: its objectives, logic model, coherence. However, if the management team is itself understaffed and suffering from high turnover, problems like these are inevitable.

#### **Finding 40.**

The global processes by which delegates are recruited and trained are still not delivering delegates with the correct skills and competencies in sufficient numbers, despite this being identified in almost all major evaluation processes within IFRC in recent years.

## **People: getting visas for international staff**

### **IFRC**

The Federation is working towards legal status in Pakistan, and has been for many years<sup>38</sup>. This is a challenging problem and there are many stakeholders to the process within the Movement and external to it. It is not clear that all have been working together to resolve this problem.

Having legal status might not solve the problems in gaining visas, but it would support effective dialogue on the issue.

It is tempting to see the continued challenges in this area as a breakdown of humanitarian diplomacy. It is clear that for PRCS to have a meaningful contingency plan for such massive disasters in the future, this needs to be resolved urgently. The opportunities presented by the work around a national disaster response law should be prioritised.

#### **Finding 41.**

The Federation's lack of legal status in Pakistan is a priority issue and should be a matter of concern, advocacy and action for all Movement partners in country.

## **Time**

### **Three year deadline**

Time has been a huge constraint in the IRP, albeit a constraint that is largely self-inflicted. The current time pressure is largely driven by the decision to close the appeal after 3 years.

The lessons are available from Sri Lanka, from Aceh, from Maldives, from Haiti: This kind of programming cannot be implemented in 18-24 months. We know that behaviour change takes several years to take root. Setting up, validating, empowering, and training a VC takes many months, even before programming can start.

*"The revised plan of action has extended the operational timeframe from 18 to 24 months. Based on the TPAT findings and the enormity of the tasks ahead, it seems unrealistic to assume that this would be sufficient to complete the delivery of the proposed recovery interventions... Realistically, a minimum of three to five years would be required to successfully rebuild the lives of the affected population."* **TPAT synthesis report.**

It is noted that the guidance available from Geneva, albeit it still in draft form from 2010, states that Emergency Appeals should be for a maximum of 12 months, with a possible extension of 12 months more in exceptional circumstances.<sup>39</sup> Any further extensions would require donor approval. This is clearly inconsistent with recovery programming and with evaluation findings over recent years,

<sup>38</sup> See RTE recommendation #14

<sup>39</sup> Emergency Appeal management & reporting procedures and guidelines, working draft.

especially for large and well-funded programmes. It increases pressure to spend, and decreases pressures on quality.

Consider the M&E exit process. In many ways this is excellent practice. But it is flawed in certain aspects, and one of the main factors is a shortage of time, which caused the end-line survey to be completed in May rather than waiting for September, and thus undermined the validity of many of the results. Several of the sectoral review reports are only available in draft at the time of writing; the Health review in particular was delayed with respect to the summative, meta-evaluation process.<sup>40</sup>

### Timeliness and planning

As the IRP programme is being phased out, PRCS is laying off trained and experienced staff at the Provincial and District Branch level. In a couple of months, the new ICBDRR programme will be looking for staff with exactly these skills and experience.

The Thatta pilot was a great idea, despite being in the wrong place and moving at one third of the planned speed. But then the momentum was lost, and the 'lessons learned' report was too late to influence programming. Lessons cannot be described as learned until they have been consistently applied to programmes.

Poor communications (which will be discussed below) and weak procedures make programmes slower, and force people to make reactive instead of pro-active decisions. These often cause a re-prioritisation in the short term, and this can impact negatively on planned activities.

Most importantly, reducing the timeframe makes it much less likely that programme managers will employ truly participatory approaches. This is one of the many reasons the VCA was ineffective – time allocated to each VCA was too short.

In the extreme, this has meant that a decision has been taken to fast-track new projects – without integrated components or effective community representation, or even not to start new projects at all, as there was insufficient time left. This is a far cry from needs-based programming.

#### Finding 42.

It is well established that recovery programming takes time to implement. Integrated, community-based programming, whether post-disaster recovery or developmental, also takes time. Behaviour change takes time. Programme plans and timeframes should be built around community capacities and needs and programmatic realities rather than internal expediency.

#### Finding 43.

Federation internal guidance on timelines for Emergency Appeals is inconsistent with high quality recovery programmes, especially when funding constraints are not acute. No transition mechanism exists to take Appeal funds and apply them to recovery programmes over a realistic timeframe.

## Context

Weak contextualisation appears to be an outcome of the challenges of delegate recruitment highlighted above. It is worth bringing together some examples from different parts of section 2 to illustrate that this is a consistent problem

- Lack of recognition of PRCS existing capacity, especially the experiences from the 2005 earthquake
- Deployment of (especially Health) ERUs to inappropriate locations on the basis of cursory assessment
- The choice of Thatta as the location of the pilot project: close to services, easy to monitor, but not a good model for the programme areas

<sup>40</sup> The draft findings of the health review were presented in a meeting in Islamabad that immediately followed the presentation of the draft findings of this evaluation.

- The choice of the GPO, which did not have the capacity at the grass roots level to deliver, plus cultural expectations of tips to the postmen.
- Unrealistic levels of ambition, especially in permanent shelter
- Confusion about the term “household”, which was clarified but not effectively implemented, resulting in inappropriate package sizes and targeting, and confusing (see M&E, below)
- Numbers of tranches of payments in both shelter and livelihoods components
- Too much emphasis on written word: noticeboards, sms and postcards to communicate messages and provide feedback.
- The design of the database, which assumed that all beneficiary identification and entry selection would be completed quickly, and before any other stage was started, and focuses on financial controls while missing opportunities as an MIS
- Lack of awareness of the Karachi marketplace within IFRC, leading to slower and sometimes less efficient procurement. *‘We used what our hand had reached’*.
- Expectation that people would contribute in kind (ok) and in cash (not ok) towards their shelter, over which they have no long-term rights. As a direct result of this contribution, people sold productive assets such as livestock. This was predictable, but the research wasn’t done and the impact of these sales is not known.
- Two different latrine standards in one location leading to problems with beneficiaries’ expectations

Again, it is worth recognising that there was good work done at the start of the operation to develop and document an understanding of the context, and that some of the points above were explicitly addressed or identified as potential issues. This was lost during the period of critical staff changes and rapid handover. The separation between the ‘operation’ and the ‘delegation’, and the absence of SARD from the discussions may both have been contributing factors.

**Finding 44.**

Effective programme design and implementation relies heavily on decision-makers having access to and applying, a good understanding of the context of the disaster-affected area and the country. The host National Society, the national staff in the operation, and those involved in longer-term support and development work are all good sources of this context.

## Management

### Good practice in managing people, programmes and projects

There are six areas to this that warrant examination, and they apply both to PRCS and to IFRC in different measures and at different times during the operation. Much of the narrative below is directed at the Federation, as the expectations are much clearer: the PRCS HR manual was requested but it was not shared, so the baseline of expectations is much less clear. However, the six areas remain relevant to both houses. The six areas are:

- People management
- Showing leadership
- Managing resources and budgets
- Managing project outcomes
- Managing time
- Managing information and learning

### Managing people well, and having good people management systems

In addition to finding the right people, they need to be properly supported and managed. According to IFRC norms and policies, this means having pre-deployment training, an induction, a formal job description, management supervision, effective and open communication between members of the

team, regular performance appraisals, mentoring, coaching and support; and at the end of the contract, a handover with the replacement and an exit debrief at the appropriate levels. These components are not optional in the emergency phase, and should certainly be in place after the first couple of months of a major operation.

This is not an area of strength in the 2010 Floods Operation. While all Federation delegates had job descriptions, the other aspects of people management were not solid. Again, the management team needs to be complete and in place consistently, and managers need adequate time to put these systems in place and maintain them.

### Leadership

The persistent dilemma of coordination / implementation / leadership continues to plague the Federation, and no more so than during large emergency responses. It is too easy to focus on the implementation and dabble in coordination, hoping the leadership aspect is no longer essential if the National Society is leading the operations. This is simply not true: leadership is a critical role for IFRC at these times, and this does not need to conflict with the operational lead role of the NS. This begs the question: to what degree are HODs really equipped and supported to do this?

### Managing resources and budgets

Federation has reasonably good systems and processes for managing finances, although other aspects of project management are less well integrated. However, many of the delegates were unfamiliar with budget-holder responsibilities, and the functionality of the finance system, and some used parallel systems to try to track expenditure.

The financial system is organised vertically, and budgets were held by technical coordinators. However, implementation was organised geographically, and the programme was supposed to be integrated. Reporting lines caused some confusion.

Risk management was formalised late in the operation, with the first IRP risk matrix being developed only in July 2012. This is odd, since the POA contains a reasonable analysis of the risks, which did not translate into the IRP documentation.

### Managing projects

With the partial exception of the engineers, in watsan and shelter, there is little evidence of good project management within the operation.

Expenditures were booked against pledges in an inappropriate manner, with consequent damage to donor relations. Financial information was not readily available in digestible formats. The monitoring system was not designed to produce management information that could be used to inform decision-making, it was designed to meet minimum reporting requirements and it barely managed that. The cash grants database was never used to control payments as it was intended, and the design did not allow it to function as an MIS: indeed, data was still being added retrospectively at the time of the evaluation, although it is not clear for what purpose or how it will be used. Joined up, operational planning with PRCS only took place, at the Provincial level and below, once the weaknesses of the higher level planning became apparent.

Indeed, several key informants described that the monitoring function had been ceded to PRCS: 'given away', as it 'belonged with implementation'. It does indeed 'belong' with implementation, but responsibility for programme outcomes remains shared, and the monitoring framework should support management decision-making in both houses.

Management guidance was needed to pull the IRP together into a single integrated approach with a coherent and consistent logical framework with appropriate indicators and clear targets, shared and agreed with PRCS. Indeed, there is no single, complete, coherent programme document that describes the IRP. It is not clear if this is a result of prioritisation or resource constraints or both.

### Managing time

In part because of the artificial closing date, in part because of unrealistic targets and poorly contextualised planning, and in part because of weak project management systems, many components of the programme fell behind schedule and ended up under-achieving. Again, the

problem seems to be one of resources: especially resources for management tasks such as oversight, prioritisation and ensuring accountability.

### Managing information and learning

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Recovery Framework was not used to guide and steer the development of the IRP. Many of the issues of concern in this evaluation are already identified within the Framework: appropriate staffing; counterparts; practical approaches to programme integration; issues of cross cutting concern such as gender and Do No Harm. Likewise the findings of the TPAT synthesis, although the technical programmatic aspects clearly did inform the IRP activities. The MTR states that much of the learning from the Thatta pilot was not implemented. And where evaluations have generate recommendations that are accepted by PRCS and IFRC, there are no consistent processes to track their implementation.

Much of the criticism above is directed at IFRC. However, there is also work also to be done on many of these issues in the PRCS camp. It is more challenging to address these issues in the report, in part because of the nature of the key informant discussions with PRCS, and in part because the expectations are less clear. The full HR manual was requested, for example, but only the Code of Conduct annex was provided. That said, discussions with people at Assistant Director to Director level suggest that there is a trend in the right direction and some initiatives are being discussed

#### Finding 45.

Federation procedures and norms were inconsistently followed, and as a result the floods response (and particularly the IRP) suffered from weaknesses in the management of resources, people, knowledge and projects.

### Monitoring and Evaluation

Although the issues raised here are specific to this operation, they are included in Section 3 as they are a systemic problem throughout IFRC<sup>41</sup>.

#### Monitoring as a management responsibility

Monitoring is a management responsibility. It needs to be the responsibility of programme managers, with the M&E people providing technical support. The outcome of a monitoring system is management information, which is used to take decisions to make programme outcomes better. It is not for feeding donors, except as a bi-product.

Pragmatically, monitoring in this context must be a shared responsibility between IFRC and PRCS.

Standard tools, such as those described in the Federations M&E guidance, have not been used.

#### Looking beyond positive intended outcomes for targeted beneficiaries

Need to look beyond positive, intended outcomes for targeted beneficiaries. Outcomes can be positive or negative. They can be intended or unintended. And they can affect our beneficiaries, other disaster-affected people, and non-affected. Our monitoring **must** capture this, because this is a critical part of the context, because we don't want to cause harm, and because we want to know about multiplier effects.

#### M&E is a technical function

In some cases, there is confusion between the **reference** value and the **baseline** value. For example, the baseline survey asks people what kind of house they live in. But it's not clear if the question relates to the time of the survey, or the time before the floods: either is quite possible. Equally, it does not ask about ownership of that property. Had neighbours taken them in, were they renting somewhere, living under a tarpaulin, homeless? The survey question is not specific, and so different enumerators in different areas will inevitably produce different results. Since the baseline is not

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<sup>41</sup> RTE recommendation #35.

reliable, comparisons between the baseline and the endline have no validity, but the reports cheerfully continue to use such comparisons as evidence.

More broadly, it is not wise to undertake quantitative analysis unless there is an in-house or bought-in competence in statistics. Some of the reviews use data generated by the endline or other surveys in completely inappropriate ways.

Consider two of the sectoral reviews, both of which present their sampling frame within the reports. In each case, we can consider an imaginary question, which appears to illustrate an increase of 12.5% from baseline score to endline score.

**Table 11: sample sizes and confidence**

Watsan KAP Review		Livelihoods Review	
Population	16301	Population	4444
Sample	385	Sample	150
Confidence level	95% (stated)	Confidence level	95% (assumed)
Confidence interval	4.9%	Confidence interval	7.9%
Example: 32.5% of respondents answer 'yes' to a baseline survey question			
We can say with 95% confidence that the true baseline figure in the whole population is between 27.6% and 37.4%		We can say with 95% confidence that the true baseline figure in the whole population is between 24.6% and 40.4%	
Now we ask the same question in the endline survey and 45% of the respondents say 'yes',			
We cannot simply say that there is a 12.5% increase. But we can say, with 95% confidence, that the new figure in the whole population is between 40.1% and 49.9%. The increase is somewhere between 2.7% and 22.3%.		We cannot demonstrate an increase at all. But we can say, with 95% confidence, that the new figure in the whole population is between 37.1% and 52.9%. Since the two ranges overlap, the actual baseline figure could be higher than the actual endline figure.	

This is not to suggest that the watsan KAP is *better than* the Livelihoods review. It's just that they have different sample sizes and different populations, and any findings need to be interpreted in this light.

Two common problems persist in the documents that form the evidence base for this evaluation.

The first is assuming that calculations on sub-populations have the same levels of confidence as calculations on the whole group. They do not. Sub-populations are (by definition) smaller, and will require a higher proportion to be sampled to achieve the same degree of confidence in the results.

The second persistent error is attributing causality to an observation, when the data only suggests a correlation. It is not acceptable to say that an observed improvement in outcomes is caused by the interventions unless there is significant additional evidence to support that causality.

As noted, the first two drafts of the baseline-endline survey, reviewed by this consultant, presented quite extreme examples of these and other weaknesses. Feedback was provided, and the final report is awaited with interest.

### **It's essential to be clear about indicators and the terms that define them**

For example, the definition of a 'household' as the group of people that cook together (that 'eat from the same pot') has been transplanted from operations elsewhere and is not effectively tested across all the different cultural groups of Pakistan. The word 'household' is usually translated into local languages by a word that actually means 'family' – which in turn can mean extended family, nuclear family, people who sleep in the same building, or within the same perimeter wall. Indeed, some of the Federation documentation uses the terms 'household' and 'family' interchangeably. Without a clear definition and agreed and tested translations in all local languages, data collected at the 'household' level is not useful. As an example, household sizes of 26 have been recorded in some parts of the country, yet these were treated as a single household for the distribution of assets.

### Responding to evaluations.

There is no point doing evaluations unless they will be acted upon. A system needs to be in place to formally respond to recommendations, accepting them in whole or in part, or rejecting them, allocating responsibility to appropriate managers, setting milestones and tracking subsequent actions.

#### **Finding 46.**

The balance of capacities within the IFRC PMER function is heavily weighted towards the R – reporting. Technical expertise in monitoring was weak in the operation, and this appears to be also true within the Zone and across the institution.

#### **Finding 47.**

The primary purpose of programme monitoring is to provide managers with information to direct the programme to achieve the best possible outcomes for the affected population. In common with many RC/RC programmes, monitoring in the IRP did not serve this function.

#### **Finding 48.**

Some of the processes that make up the M&E exit should be considered good practice, and with some adaptations could be applied elsewhere to identify and consolidate real learning opportunities from major responses. Work needs to be done to ensure the critical path is robust, and that the eventual number of recommendations is manageable, and that a process exists to take them forward.

## Integration

### “We were not ready”

The Mid Term Review suggests that the IFRC and PRCS were not ready for integrated programming: that it was new, difficult, not well understood.

In fact integrated programming has been around for years, although there is not much good guidance available on it: until recently, most published guidance tended to be sectoral. Recent work on recovery and that led by DRR on resilience are the main exceptions, although – to be fair – some of this was published about half way through the IRP. The guidance is aspirational, and there is a gap between those aspirations and the tools required to deliver them.

Integration and resilience are closely inter-related. Both are more than the sum of their parts. Measuring the parts alone does not provide a measure of resilience.

We do know that integrated responses produce better outcomes for affected people, and we already implement with this in mind: we don't build permanent shelters without latrines; we don't provide clean water without complementary hygiene education; in health, we try to treat causes as well as symptoms. Yet our programming tools have mostly been developed either in isolation, or with the 'host' technical department automatically assuming centre stage, as if by right.

### Integration as compromise

Integration means a degree of compromise. When this was suggested to technical staff in key informant interviews, most interviewees would agree, at least in principle. However, when it comes to harsh realities, people often become defensive of what they see as their programmatic territory. This was true of PRCS and IFRC alike – the separate KAP survey in watsan, for example, rather than integrating it into the endline survey.

For example, it is far more effective (and less confusing for the population) to train a single group of community volunteers than have three or four separate troops. This means a single methodology, and a combined curriculum, that includes aspects of health promotion, hygiene promotion, risk reduction, whatever is needed in that environment. And this requires compromise on the part of the technical specialists and their precious toolkits.

It requires firm leadership and clear guidance to ensure that the 'integration' survives in future programmes: to manage the 'compromise' required. As documented in section 2 above, it did not really survive in the IRP – with a few honourable exceptions.

The IRP correctly placed 'resilience' – a **concept** - at the top of the logframe, but it put DRR – a **sector** – at the centre of the programme. This, together with the slow implementation of key DRR components such as the creation of the VCs, appears to have been the factor that broke integration in the IRP.

#### **Finding 49.**

To achieve true programme integration requires a modest degree of technical compromise in pursuit of the greater good. This in turn requires a degree of leadership and guidance that was not readily available to the IRP.

### **Are the tools fit for purpose?**

The Federation is awash with community-based toolkits: PHAST, VCA, CBDRR, CBHFA, PASSA. Each of these community-based tools starts with participatory assessment of community needs, capacities and ambitions, and work through a number of stages and end up with a programme. They have a huge amount in common. Yet if you apply them in identical communities, PHAST will come up with a hygiene promotion project, CBDRR with a mitigation project, and so on.

On inspection, almost none of the Federation's tools promote an integrated response, as the table below illustrates.

**Table 12: Federation tools**

<b>IFRC tools that promote integrated responses</b>	<b>IFRC tools that are sectoral by nature</b>
FACT	ERUs
RDRT	PHAST, CHAST, PASSA, VCA, CBDRR, CBHFA etc
24 hour and 72 hour assessment formats	POA and DOP
Recovery Guidance	Logframe and M&E tools
	Emergency Appeal
	Reporting frameworks
	Chart of accounts and finance system
	Technical advisers

Designing, implementing and reporting on a truly integrated programme is a real challenge, when the toolkit directs managers towards thinking in silos at almost every stage of the process.

#### **Finding 50.**

Few of the Federation tools support the development or implementation of integrated programmes, and indeed they may actively discourage such approaches.

### **What would an integrated programme look like?**

A truly integrated programme would put community needs at the centre of the logic model, and community mobilisation at the centre of the structure.

Most of the staff would be generalists, not technical specialists. Once capacities and priorities have been clarified, the technical specialists can be called in to validate and finalise the project design. Since there are likely to be a number of integrated components, leadership is required to identify

areas of complementarity, develop a meaningful critical path between the components, and design and communicate the exit strategy.

Community volunteers would be needed for mobilisation and education purposes, and these would be polyvalent. To avoid an overload, the training curriculum could be modular, spread out over an extended period of time, and adapted to local conditions and seasonality.

The logframe for such a programme would relate to processes rather than pre-determined outcomes, measuring progress against the targets agreed with the community. Budgeting is more challenging than in vertical projects, and flexibility needs to be built in. Earmarking might be possible in terms of geography, but not in terms of sector.

## Communication

Many of the communication challenges experienced within the operation are related to the issue of contextualisation. Communication was challenging:

- between IFRC and PRCS, especially concerning sensitive issues, and issues of capacity and expectations;
- between IFRC and ICRC, over a number of issues;
- between management and technical teams within PRCS; between those from different professional backgrounds; and between PRCS HQ and Provinces;
- between the operations team and the delegation, in the first months, especially around reporting lines, roles and responsibilities;
- between the Zone and the delegation, in the middle period of the operation, during which concerns arose about 'micro-management';
- between Movement partners in general, around issues of coordination.

When people in different 'groups' communicate, they bring cultural expectations with them. Understanding the perspective of the other parties to the communication requires a degree of sensitivity. It's very easy – and often misguided – to assume that communication is effective, and that the cultural differences are not significant.

## Communication and capacity building

There is one particular area where open and honest communication is essential as a foundation on which to move forward, and that is capacity building.

There needs to be a common understanding of existing capacity, so that targets can be set and a strategy to achieve them developed. If the National Society, for whatever reasons, overstates its operational capacity, that has two impacts: it undermines trust (as the degree true capacity is likely to be known informally), and it removes the common basis for development work. Likewise, if the Federation overstates its capacity for coordination, leadership or advocacy, this will have a similar effect.

Creating a safe environment where open and honest conversations can be had about expectations and capacity is not easy, but it is worthwhile. Such an environment is in the process of being built in Pakistan, although there is still some way to go.

### **Finding 51.**

There is an improved climate for discussions about PRCS capacity, and performance gaps, which will contribute towards effective capacity building, but greater openness is needed for these discussions to be really effective. Effective tools for institutional capacity assessment do not yet exist in the Movement.

## Section 4: Recommendations

<b>Recommendations: PRCS</b>		<b>Links to findings</b>
1	Review the structure of the PRCS operational departments to strengthen the possibility of effective coordination between health and other operations, especially in emergency response	7, 32
2	Review the systems in use within PRCS relating to decision-making, authority levels, and resource transfers, to maximise efficiency for emergency response, while maintaining appropriate levels of oversight. Be open to the idea of considerable delegation of responsibility.	14, 15 17, 38
<b>Recommendations: IFRC delegation</b>		<b>Links to findings</b>
3	Revise the approach to external coordination to bring it into line with good practice, while recognising the challenges of the Pakistan environment and protecting the independence of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.	29
4	Formally review existing management processes as they relate to emergency and longer-term programming. Consider HR, programme design, monitoring, risk management, logistics and finance. Ensure that the processes are effective, outputs are appropriate, and that they deliver meaningful and timely management information. Consider whether capacity is actually available to deliver them.	3, 6, 8, 9, 10 11, 12, 13, 14 17, 19, 21, 26 32, 33, 34, 36 42, 43, 45, 46
<b>Recommendations: PRCS and IFRC country delegation jointly</b>		<b>Links to findings</b>
5	Develop a common system within IFRC and PRCS to consider recommendations from evaluation and reflective processes, and have these as a standing item for meetings at a senior management level. Where recommendations are accepted in whole or in part, assign responsibility for leadership, set milestones, and track progress against them.	5
6	Jointly review and seek to improve recruitment practices across the two institutions, and seek closer parity between them. Ensure proper levels of staffing in all core sectors including new areas of work. Work towards a one-to-one counterpart relationship for critical roles. Strengthen briefings on context, security, and institutional capacity. Formalise systems for learning and development. Maintain handovers and appraisals even during emergency response.	14, 15 17, 18 36, 38 39
7	Develop (with support from APZ) a joint plan to address the issue of IFRC's legal status, including a stakeholder analysis to identify key obstructions and key allies in the process, and identify milestones leading towards the goal.	41
8	Ensure the existence of a safe space for open conversations about all forms of capacity, and reasonable expectations and appropriate roles for both institutions, at the senior management level. Build on current momentum and growing trust to develop PRCS' capacity in logistics and finance, and strengthen real and sustainable capacity at district branch level	37, 51
9	Make a plan now for a future review of the situation of the shelter beneficiaries, with a focus on those with larger landlords, to learn and apply lessons for future responses	27
10	Review the SOPs, relief manual, and other guidance, with regard to the selection of geographic locations for relief and for recovery responses.	2, 3
11	Review the SOPs, relief manual, and other guidance, to ensure appropriate attention is given to context and stakeholder analysis, response option analysis, BCA, gender analysis and do no harm thinking.	2, 8, 9 10, 12

## Recommendations

12	Agree and define key indicators during pre-disaster planning, and collect baseline information against them in representative flood prone areas before the next major flooding event. Where possible, link these indicators with those developed for recommendation 15.	1, 2, 10 19, 34 44
13	Undertake preparatory work between the shelter and livelihoods technical teams, to ensure the tools are in place to undertake a sufficient household economy analysis to support cash-based programming in the future.	10, 19 33, 34
14	Within the ICBRR, review the nature of the integration from the perspectives of coordination, inter-sector complementarity and linkages, and wider linkages for the target communities, to ensure that the goal of increased resilience is achievable	7, 49
15	Review the monitoring tools being designed for the new ICBRR programme in the light of the weaknesses in the IRP, to ensure IFRC standards are met. Seek to be able to demonstrate increased resilience.	10, 26 32, 33 34, 36

**Recommendations: IFRC AP Zone****Links to findings**

16	Strengthen mechanisms for quality control within the DMU, at the point of sign-off and as a continuous monitoring process. Develop specific indicators for quality, and assign thresholds or targets for them.	44, 45
17	At the annual review of the APZ SOPs consider the appropriateness, clarity and levels of understanding of roles and responsibilities of Geneva, the Zone, the Regions and the Country delegations in the light of the findings of this and other global and country-level review processes.	18
18	Improve the staffing levels of major operations, especially senior and leadership positions. Do not be constrained by resources available within the Zone. Get the balance of surge and longer-term posts right, sooner. Monitor progress against this.	14, 17 39, 40
19	Within major operations, ensure that movement coordination is properly resourced and given sufficient priority. Show leadership in this area at the country and APZ levels.	28, 29
20	Review the Pakistan M&E exit plan and consider which aspects of it could be mainstreamed for moderate and major responses within the Zone. Seek to improve the critical path and produce a manageable number of recommendations.	35, 46, 48
21	Using the experiences of Pakistan and combining with other recovery programmes in the Zone, review the existing participatory toolkits and develop a single, community centred model. Linkages with Resilience work in Geneva may be appropriate here.	50
22	Develop a standard model to track costs per beneficiary and use this across a number of programmes to develop a baseline. Costs will need to be cross-referenced with a separate impact indicator for the results to have real meaning.	13

**Recommendations: IFRC Secretariat****Links to findings**

23	Undertake a comprehensive review with key stakeholders, PNS and others, to address the issues of finding sufficient substantive (non-surge) staff with the correct competencies for large-scale operations, both technical and managerial. Look outside the traditional box to source these staff.	39, 40
24	Revise the general appeal guidelines to allow sensible timeframes for Recovery operations to work in line with recovery principles.	42, 43

Note: a complete list of the combined recommendations of the RTE, the MTR, and the nine sectoral / thematic evaluations has been produced, with a light commentary. Since this list runs to almost twenty pages, it has been submitted as a separate document rather than as an annex.

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

### Floods 2010 (MDRPK006), Summative Final Independent Evaluation<sup>42</sup>,

#### Terms of Reference

##### 1. Summary

**Purpose** – This summative evaluation of the relief and recovery phases of the PRCS/IFRC 2010 Pakistan Monsoon Floods Operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Punjab and Sindh provinces aims to determine the progress against the stated objectives of the appeal. It will encompass an overall assessment of the relevance and fulfillment of these objectives, the developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability/ connectedness of the relief and recovery approaches adopted in support of the beneficiaries targeted.

The summative evaluation will contribute to the learning processes for the Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and their donors, regarding the design, delivery and exit of the recovery assistance as part of responding to disasters in Pakistan.

The summative evaluation will be mainly based on a desk study of the available documentation of the planning, progress monitoring and interim reviews and evaluations of the implementation of the Appeal. The process will be augmented by interviews with key informants both currently working on the programme and staff previously assigned in key positions. Field visits could be included if deemed necessary. Where the timeframe of the evaluation is too limited to sufficiently assess certain elements or parts of the appeal needed to guarantee adequate accountability or transparency, the evaluator can recommend follow up if deemed necessary.

**Audience:** PRCS, IFRC and other Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) stakeholders.

**Commissioned by:** IFRC Asia Pacific Zone Office in Kuala Lumpur.

**Reports:** The evaluator will report to the IFRC AP Zone Disaster Management Unit and the Head of Delegation in Pakistan. A senior officer of IFRC and a senior officer of PRCS will jointly support the evaluator to accomplish their tasks during the evaluation

**Duration:** 30 working days

**Timeframe:** The summative evaluation desk study is envisaged in the period of June-July 2013, serving as the key consolidating evaluation tool to gauge the overall outcome of the Pakistan Monsoon Floods Appeal MDRPK006.

**Location:** Islamabad, Pakistan, with travel to two provincial/ field offices - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Sindh, and field site visits where deemed necessary and possible (security permitting).

##### 2. Background

In August 2010, Pakistan encountered the worst monsoon floods in the history of the country and the region. The first spell of uncharacteristic monsoon rains hit parts of the southern-western province of Balochistan in the third week of July 2010, followed by a second spell of severe rains over Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in the last week of July 2010 that continued until early August. These rains caused unprecedented flooding of major, secondary and tertiary rivers in KP, Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan provinces. Within a period of one and a half months, 78 districts out of Pakistan's 141 districts were affected. Termed as a 'slow evolving tsunami' by the UN Secretary General, the magnitude of the 2010 floods was considerably higher both in scale and destruction in comparison to other major disasters around the world, affecting ten times more people than the Indian ocean Tsunami of 2004 and 6 times more people than the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. The effects of the floods were felt across the country from Gilgit Baltistan (GB) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) in the north, through to KP and Punjab provinces in the centre, to Sindh and Balochistan in the south. The government's National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) recorded a figure of 1,985 deaths and 2,946 people injured by the floods<sup>43</sup>. More than 20 million people representing 12 per cent of Pakistan's population of 170 million were affected by the floods<sup>44</sup>. Substantial destruction affected over 2.1 million hectares of cultivated land with infrastructure severely damaged. Besides severe damage to the housing sector, livestock were affected too, impacting the existing livelihood patterns of already marginalized communities. Likewise, health and education facilities were destroyed or damaged in many parts of the country.

##### **Appeal history:**

<sup>42</sup> **Summative:** evaluations occur at the end of implementation to assess effectiveness and impact. Utilizing interim evaluations reports, lessons learnt reports, overall progress monitoring data and interviews with key stakeholders as the main inputs informing the summative evaluation.

**Final:** evaluations are summative in purpose at completion of implementation

**External or independent:** conducted by evaluator/s outside of implementing team, lending degree of objectivity, often technical expertise.

<sup>43</sup> These figures have not changed since November 2010.

<sup>44</sup> Source: NDMA situation report as of 24 October and Pakistan response as of 30 September 2010.

- Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF): CHF 250,000 (USD 239,406 or EUR 183,589) was allocated on 30 July 2010 to support the National Society's response to the emergency.
- A preliminary emergency appeal was launched on 2 August 2010 for CHF 17,008,050 (USD 16,333,000 or EUR 12,514,600) for nine months to assist 175,000 beneficiaries.
- An emergency appeal was launched on 19 August 2010 for CHF 75,852,261 (USD 72.5 million or EUR 56.3 million) for 18 months to assist 130,000 flood-affected families (910,000 beneficiaries).
- A revised emergency appeal was launched on 15 November 2010 for CHF 130,673,677 (USD 133.8 million or EUR 97.9 million) to assist 130,000 families (910,000 people) for 24 months.
- A second revision of the emergency appeal was launched on 3 August 2012 seeking CHF 92.6 million to assist 130,000 families (910,000 people) for 36 months.
- A third revision of the appeal is to be launched in March/April 2013.

The appeal spans the period from 19 August 2010 and ends on 31<sup>st</sup> July 2013.

The latest appeal revision also included the support to communities affected by the flooding which occurred in 2012. This was a managerial decision following the urgency to act, and within a context that the Pakistani authorities' were seeking support, but did not endorse new international appeal launches. The sudden torrential rains at the end of August 2012 caused devastation again in large parts of the country and also hit areas where the IRP is being implemented. An amount of 1.6m CHF of the available funds under this appeal was allocated for the intervention to assist 20,000 families (140,000 persons).

**Programme Brief Overview:**

PRCS/IFRC has reached at least 227,028 families (1,589,196 people) across five provinces most affected by the floods with various interventions during the relief and early recovery phase.

The timeframes for each stage of the appeal implementation are as follows:

Appeal phase/ stage	Timeframe
2010 Floods Relief	August 2010 – April 2011
2010 Floods Early Recovery	November 2010 – March 2011
2010 IRP (including evaluations)	April 2011 – July 2013
2012 floods response	August 2012 – January 2013

The IFRC/PRCS monsoon floods relief and early recovery operation covered the following; relief distributions (food and non-food), shelter, health and care, water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion, livelihoods, disaster preparedness and risk reduction, beneficiary communications and organizational development. During the relief and early recovery phases, the IFRC country office received surge capacity in the form of personnel from the zone office to assist PRCS in the areas of logistics, shelter, communications and reporting. The arrival of IFRC disaster response tools from August to December 2010, including a field assessment and coordination team (FACT), six ERUs specializing in logistics, relief and basic health (in addition to ERU technical and financial support in water and sanitation), and two deployments of regional disaster response teams (RDRT), reinforced the capacities of PRCS in assessment and delivery of emergency and relief assistance, allowing the operation to meet many of its ambitious targets. A transitional planning and assessment team, assisted the delegation from 8<sup>th</sup> August to 8<sup>th</sup> September 2010 in preparing planning documents for the donor conference held in Doha in October 2010. In the relief and recovery phases, the following were conducted; Real Time Evaluation, ERU evaluation, Relief phase Evaluation, IRP mid-term review<sup>45</sup>, IRP baseline assessments.

**Summary of achievements - Relief and early recovery phases<sup>2</sup>**

Sector	Targets (families planned)	Achievements (families reached)
Food (relief)	180,000	181,277
Non-food items (relief) <sup>3</sup>	75,000	103,195
Shelter (winterised transitional shelter during relief phase)	6,500	6,393
Shelter (relief)	75,000	83,209 with: 15,273 tents 160,497 tarpaulins 37,498 shelter toolkits

<sup>45</sup> **Mid-term Evaluation:** occurs mid-way during programme implementation to review and improve performance.

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Targets (families planned)</b>	<b>Achievements (families reached)</b>
Health and care (relief)	130,000	129,635 <sup>46</sup>
Health and care (early recovery)	130,000	173,353 <sup>47</sup>
Water and sanitation (relief and early recovery)	30,000	31,300 with safe drinking water 4,005 with 1,402 latrines 12,994 with hygiene promotion 578 with water supply schemes
Livelihoods (winter vegetable seeds during relief phase)	2,000	2,000
Livelihoods (early recovery)	31,232	31,172

The recovery phase was implemented under the title of Integrated Recovery Programme (IRP) in six flood-affected districts<sup>48</sup> in KP, Punjab and Sindh provinces (with continuation of health activities in two additional provinces of Baluchistan and Gilgit Baltistan (GB)). A *vulnerability capacity assessment (VCA)* was conducted from Dec 2010 - Jan 2011 as a starting point for drafting an implementation plan for an integrated recovery programme (IRP) covering 39 revenue villages in six districts of the three provinces. The IRP focused not only on beneficiaries, but included building longer term community resilience of flood affected communities.

The implementation plan for the IRP was approved in April 2011 by the PRCS, with a base-line survey conducted in Sept 2011, and implementation of the IRP interventions began to show results in the selected communities in the last quarter of the same year with the establishment of village committees and beneficiary selection for shelter, livelihoods and WatSan components. A mid-term review of the recovery phase was conducted in March/April 2012.

The implementation of the recovery had to overcome a series of challenges, which included flaws in the VCA, irregularities in the village committees in some locations, handover of implementation responsibilities from the Punjab Branch to the National Headquarters, slow money transfer by the financial service providers, deteriorating security, availability of sufficient HR capacity, etc. Monsoon rains and flooding in 2011 and 2012 also affected the progress of the implementation.

### 3. Purpose and Scope

#### 3.1 Purpose

The purpose of this summative evaluation desk review of the entire Pakistan Monsoon Floods 2010 Operations is to make an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of the completed programme, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability/ connectedness. The evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of all stakeholders and donors. The learning from this review will be used to improve the design and delivery of future recovery interventions of the PRCS, IFRC, and other Movement partners in Pakistan.

This independent summative evaluation desk study will be guided by the IFRC Evaluation Framework standards<sup>49</sup> and OECD-DEC<sup>50</sup> guidance, covering the programme stages of design through implementation, exit and results. This summative evaluation forms part of the accountability and transparency requirements per IFRC guidelines.

#### 3.2 Scope

The following key components are envisaged to be included in the evaluation:

- a) Review achievements in the fields of:
  - Relief interventions
  - Early Recovery
  - Integrated Recovery Programming
  - Community Resilience building
  - Gender Mainstreaming (programme delivery mechanisms and inclusion in the design of activities)
- b) Review achievement of intended impact and sustainability/ connectedness<sup>51</sup>, through:

<sup>46</sup> Emergency Health time-frame Sept – Dec 2010

<sup>47</sup> Early Recovery Health time-frame Jan-Dec 2011

<sup>48</sup> Shangla and Kohistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Muzaffargarh and Layyah (Punjab), Shikarpur and Kumber Shehdad Kot (Sindh)

<sup>49</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>

<sup>50</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Committee

- Review of existing information, including follow-on from the Real Time Evaluation, ERU evaluation, Evaluation of the Relief phase, IRP mid-term review<sup>52</sup>, IRP baseline and end-lines assessments..
  - Review IRP Programme Unit standard reporting, progress and monitoring and tracking tools
  - Key informant interviews.
- c) Lessons learnt workshops, publications, cases studies and historic descriptions concerning the Appeal .
- d) Efficiency and cost-effectiveness analysis based on the financial reporting.

The summative evaluation desk study will encompass all geographical areas where activities have been undertaken and will cover all technical sectors of intervention, including health, WatSan, shelter, livelihoods, beneficiary communications and accountability (BCA) and branch development and capacity building support provided to the PRCS at national, provincial and district levels.

#### 4. Evaluation Objectives, Criteria and Key Questions

##### 4.1 Objectives

- I. To examine the extent to which the operation has achieved its goal, objectives and expected results including the planning, the management of the implementation and integration of the programs.
- II. To uphold the accountability and transparency of the IFRC and compliance with its standards.
- III. Articulate lessons and recommend good practice to inform the future delivery of relief and recovery programming of the PRCS and the wider RCRC Movement as a whole.
- IV. Recommend any further reviews, assessment or investigations required, if deemed necessary to enhance the evaluation of the Appeal.

##### 4.2 Evaluation criteria

###### 4.2.1 Relevance and Appropriateness

- Did the interventions implemented during the different phases of the appeal respond to the needs of the flood affected populations?
- What mechanisms promoting participation of beneficiaries and stakeholders during assessments, planning/ designed, implementation, monitoring and evaluation were employed? How were the needs of women and groups with special needs addressed?
- How timely was the sequencing in early recovery, recovery planning and field implementation? How effective was the pilot project for the IRP in testing implementation methods to facilitate rapid scale-up?
- How was the connectedness between the relief, early recovery and recovery phases in the implementation of the activities? In what ways did the programme integration approach improve this, if any?
- Accountability to Beneficiaries: How were systems for feedback from the assisted population developed and improved over time and did they lead to an improvement in the quality of recovery support being provided? How beneficiary feedback was processed and responded to, and were programmes adjusted as a result? What lessons can be drawn related to two way beneficiary communications?
- Have Federation mechanisms and tools adequately been used to promote good practice (e.g. Code of Conduct, Sphere, BPI, emergency assessment tools, VCA etc)?

###### 4.2.2 Efficiency

- Were the financial, human, physical and information resources available utilised efficiently? (E.g. were inputs used in the best way to achieve outcomes and in a cost-effective manner. If not, why not?)
- Was the assistance provided in a timely manner to meet beneficiary and community needs? Did the integration approach adopted affect the timeliness of delivery. If so, how?
- Were the appropriate human resources (skills, experience and seniority) available to the operation in key areas of management, coordination, technical programme design and implementation from IFRC and PRCS?
- To what degree did the integrated approach adopted in the IRP strengthen the efficiency of the operation, if any?

###### 4.2.3 Effectiveness

- What was the decision making process related to operational leadership of the programming? What were some examples of decisions which optimised programme effectiveness and ones that hindered?
- How effective were the operation's processes in planning, monitoring and quality management (e.g. internal reviews and other quality assurance mechanisms). Were regular reviews held at different stages of the operation? If yes, were key findings used for further inform planning and decisions?

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<sup>51</sup> **Sustainability:** whether benefits of an intervention are likely to continue once donor input has been withdrawn (long-term interventions). **Connectedness** – need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency are implemented in a way that takes longer-term and inter-connected factors into account.

<sup>52</sup> **Mid-term Evaluation:** occurs mid-way during programme implementation to review and improve performance.

- What strategies were used to ensure quality, timely and relevant delivery of assistance to the flood affected population? Did the integrated programming approach adopted improve the quality of assistance provided?
- What major problems and constraints were faced during the implementation of the operation and how were these dealt with throughout the operation?
- Did the appeal meet its intended immediate objectives through the different phases of implementation? If not, why not?

#### 4.2.4. Coverage

- Indication of response proportionality to needs, inclusion and exclusion bias, if any, in the different phases of the programme and within specific sectoral interventions.

#### 4.2.5 Impact

- What unexpected positive or negative, intended or unintended consequences arose for different stakeholders in the three phases of the operation, and why?
- To what extent did the appeal, and its support by donors, achieve the expected objectives outlined in the Plan of Action of October 2010 and the Implementation Framework for PRCS - IFRC Flood Recovery Activities of April 2011?
- What are some of the main successes and opportunities that came out of the appeal operation? To what extent is the intervention supporting the target communities' own problem-solving and decision-making to address their local needs? What might be the positive and negative consequences or changes in the communities as result of the support being provided?

#### 4.2.6 Coherence

- Was there effective coordination with other members of the Movement / other actors including the IASC cluster system for different sector activities?
- How appropriate and effective were the inputs of partner organizations in the implementation of the operation?
- What are the lessons to be learnt for an improved Federation wide recovery planning at the start of operations and the integrated programming delivery approach followed?
- Where the interventions implemented in line with the most relevant strategic documents; the PRCS the IFRC and the Pakistan authorities?<sup>53</sup>
- Were the interventions implemented in consultation, collaboration and complementary to government and other organisations responses?

#### 4.2.7 Sustainability / Connectedness

- To what extent are the recovery programme activities and DRR activities at the end of the appeal expected to strengthen the resilience of the targeted affected populations? To what degree are these activities sustainable? Indication of degree of attribution.
- Did the integrated planning and design translate into adequate and effective integration across the different programmes? What were the discernible programme gains from this integration?
- To what extent did the programme take into account longer term development aspects of the communities being assisted?
- What actions were undertaken to wind-up the appeal and contribute to smooth exit as the appeal is closes? What is the likely sustainability of the different components?
- How has the relief and recovery operation strengthened the capacity of PRCS? How is PRCS developing itself as the result of the intervention and how is PRCS improving the capacity to plan, implement, monitor, report on and evaluate Movement supported programmes? Is the enhanced capacity because of the operation going to be sustainable?

## 5. Methodology

The review will use a triangulation of the following methodologies:

### I. Desk review and secondary data review of key documents:

- a. These include assessments, plans, log frames, completed reviews, sector evaluations, progress reports, mission reports and other relevant documents prepared by the PRCS and IFRC, and other secondary data produced by other RCRC and external partners involved in the provision of assistance to the flood affected population.

### II. Key informant interviews / group interviews as appropriate. These will include:

- a. Key PRCS staff / volunteers;
- b. Relevant current and previous IFRC staff of the 2010 flood response based in Islamabad, Kuala Lumpur and now elsewhere;
- c. Other RCRC partners;

<sup>53</sup> The documents will be provided by the IFRC delegation and PRCS.

- d. Key external stakeholders supporting the flood recovery process.

## 6. Deliverables (or outputs)

The following outputs are expected from the review team:

- a) An inception report to demonstrate a clear understanding and realistic plan of work for the evaluation, checking that the evaluation plan is in agreement with the TOR as well as the evaluation manager and other stakeholders.
- b) A brief summary of the weekly (and other) coordination meetings with the support team to the evaluator.
- b) Debriefing: to share the broad findings of the review team in a presentation at the end of the evaluation period with PRCS, IFRC and selected Movement partners, providing an opportunity for feedback and observations dialogue.
- c) Draft report: The results of the review will be presented in a draft report for comment by the PRCS and the IFRC. The content of the written report should be coherently structured with a logical flow. Data and information should be presented, analysed, and interpreted systematically, with a clear line of evidence supporting the conclusions and recommendations. IFRC, PRCS and Stakeholders will be given an opportunity of 3 weeks to review the draft evaluation document for accuracy and to provide feedback. The evaluation commissioners have a responsibility not to breach the integrity of the reports, which should accurately reflect the findings and conclusions determined by the evaluator/s, and should not be revised without the evaluator's consent. Evaluators should consider feedback, and verify and address any inaccuracies and discrepancies in the revision of the evaluation report. Conflict of interests and differing opinions within the evaluation team should be clearly noted in the report. With regards to differences of opinion expressed by an evaluation participant or stakeholder, it is left to the discretion of the evaluator/s as to whether and how to address in any revision of the report.
- d) Final report: This report should be no longer than 50 pages in a readable and visual format, with an executive summary of no more than five pages. All additional materials will be provided as annexes to the report. All information and analysis should be gender disaggregated to the extent possible. The final report should be delivered within three weeks after having received the feedback on the draft

In the interest of transparency, accountability, confidence building and organisational learning, the summative evaluation document is intended to be made public on the IFRC web-site for reference by donors and other stakeholders.

## 7. Proposed Timeline

The evaluation team will be recruited as soon as possible. The review will start in the second part of June 2013 and the main activities will be finalized before the end of July 2013. The final report should be ready in August 2013.

Draft outline of schedule / Time Task Location:

- 3 days preparation studies visit to Kuala Lumpur
- 19 days Document study, interviews Islamabad, report compilation report writing
- 5 days travelling and meeting with PRCS and IFRC
- 1 day presentation of draft report and debriefings in Islamabad/Kuala Lumpur
- 2 days Compilation of final report

## 8. Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards

The reviewers should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the review is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the review team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation:

<http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>.

The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

- i) *Utility*: Evaluations must be useful and used.
- ii) *Feasibility*: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
- iii) *Ethics & Legality*: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
- iv) *Impartiality and Independence*: Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
- v) *Transparency*: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
- vi) *Accuracy*: Evaluations should be technically accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
- vii) *Participation*: Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.

viii) *Collaboration*: Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: **Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary service, Unity and Universality.**

Further information can be obtained about these principles at: [www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp)

#### 9. Evaluator and evaluation process support

The evaluation will be commissioned to an experienced, independent consultant with a proven record in evaluating relief and recovery (team leader). The evaluator will be supported by a Senior Officer appointed by PRCS and a Senior Officer appointed by IFRC to facilitate the process and ensure the availability of the relevant information and guidance to ensure the effectiveness of the evaluation and input of correct data and information. The Evaluator and the supporting Senior Officers will meet at least once a week during the evaluation to discuss progress of the process, to organize the arrangements for interviews and to assist to put the available data and documentation in its perspective.

The officers concerned should between them have the following skills and experience:

- Have a background in disaster response, including recovery and risk reduction;
- Be familiar with carrying out operational reviews/ evaluations;
- Have experience of working at community level gathering beneficiary feedback through a variety of methodologies (including gender vulnerability expertise);
- Sensitive to the complexities and constraints associated with IFRC/NS mandate
- Possess analytical and communication skills
- Knowledge and experience of working in Pakistan would be a distinct advantage.

#### 6. PROPOSED ROLES OF THE KEY PARTICIPANTS IN EVALUATION

<b>Zone/Region PMER</b>	Recruitment of the external evaluator Orientation of the key team members Assessment of the quality of the evaluation and report
<b>IFRC PMER</b>	Drafting the TOR Oversee the monitoring and evaluation process Provide all the basic documents and information to the evaluation team Schedule internal and external interviews and invite key stakeholders to participate in the evaluation process Be the focal point for the evaluation team. Input on inception and draft reports
<b>IFRC Management</b>	Approval of TOR and ensure availability of staff at NHQ and branches Assist with the processing of NOC for international staff. Inputs and approval of the inception and draft reports Approval of budget for the evaluation
<b>PRCS NHQ/PHQ Management</b>	Approval of the TOR Approve and ensure interviews with PRCS staff. Comment on inception and draft reports
<b>IFRC Administration and logistics</b>	Flights booking for evaluation team Transport arrangements for evaluation team Accommodation arrangement for evaluation team

#### 8. PROPOSED BUDGET

- The detailed budget will be provided with the inception report and all cost covered under the MDRPK006 budget.

## Annex 2: the evidence base for the evaluation findings

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### Documents

The following documents were provided by IFRC for the evaluation

Document Name	Date issued	Author
Summative Evaluation TOR		
Consultants Inception Report		

### Federation Appeals and associated documents

DREF operation	30/07/2010	IFRC
Preliminary emergency appeal	02/08/2010	IFRC
Revised preliminary emergency appeal	19/08/2010	IFRC
Revised emergency appeal	15/11/2010	IFRC
Revised emergency appeal	03/08/2012	IFRC
Revised emergency appeal	15/05/2013	IFRC
Three-month consolidated report	10/11/2010	IFRC
Six-months consolidated report	21/02/2010	IFRC
One year Operations update	30/08/2011	IFRC
Two-year consolidated report	20/12/2012	IFRC
Operations updates #1 to 15, August 2010 to Feb 2013	various	IFRC
Final Report, Pakistan: Floods 2011	31/08/2012	IFRC
PRCS monitoring report – floods 2012	07/11/2012	IFRC
Report Sindh – floods 2012	08/11/2012	IFRC
Report Balochistan – floods 2012	09/11/2012	IFRC
Report Punjab – floods 2012	10/11/2012	IFRC
USAID pledge-based report Floods 2012	02/06/2013	IFRC

### Programme Description

Pakistan Monsoon Floods 2010: Plan of Action (Recovery)	13/10/2010	IFRC
Recovery framework	20/11/2010	IFRC
Recovery Framework - one page description	24/10/2010	IFRC
Integrated Recovery Programming for the Monsoon Floods 2010. Draft Proposal For Discussion	15/10/2010	IFRC
Implementation framework for PRCS-IFRC Flood Recovery Activities 2011-2012	01/04/2011	IFRC
Recovery Team 2010 Floods		IFRC
SOP for IRP (cash grants for LH and Shelter)	01/07/2011	IFRC
MoU with GPO		PRCS
Revised IRP Logframe	20/12/2012	IFRC
Integrated Recovery Programme Design	26/08/2011	IFRC
IRP Review, Exit Strategy and Future Strategy for Pakistan	01/03/2013	IFRC
PRCS Plan of Action 2013-2015	12/01/2013	PRCS
PRCS Strategy 2015 (final draft)	04/11/2010	PRCS
Review of Strategy 2015: Synthesis & Realignment	01-03/10/2012	PRCS

**Pakistan monsoon floods summative evaluation 2010-2013**

**Annex 2: evidence base**

<b>Document Name</b>	<b>Date issued</b>	<b>Author</b>
IFRC PK Coordination background Floods 2010	01/06/2012	Surein PEIRIS , IFRC
<b>Programme Budget</b>		
PRCS NHQ Recovery Budget-2011	2011	IFRC
KPK budget 2011	2011	IFRC
Sindh budget 2011	2011	IFRC
Punjab budget 2011	2011	IFRC
Financial overview report	30/04/2013	IFRC
Project financial report	2013	IFRC
Cost Analysis Report MDRPK006 Aug2010-May2013	23/07/2013	IFRC
<b>M&amp;E Documents - Assessment</b>		
FACT	01/08/2010	IFRC
TPAT		IFRC
TPAT Synthesis Final-covered w Annex	11/01/2011	
TPAT IFRC Assessment Report Health	11/01/2011	
TPAT IFRC Assessment Report Livelihoods	11/01/2011	
TPAT IFRC Assessment Report Shelter	11/01/2011	
<b>M&amp;E documents - VCA</b>		
Sindh reports	24/02/2011	IFRC
Punjab reports	09/03/2011	
KPK reports	09/03/2011	
<b>M&amp;E documents – evaluations and reviews</b>		
Real time evaluation 1 RDRT deployment to Pakistan Floods operation, 2010-2011, Final Report	20/01/2011	Cynthia Burton
Management Response to the Real Time Evaluation (RTE) of the IFRC Pakistan Floods Operation 2010	20/01/2011	IFRC
Real time evaluation 2 RDRT deployment to Pakistan Floods operation, 2010-2011, Final Report	13/04/2011	Juan Gálvez Consultant
FrenchCross+NorCross ERU and BHU and their relationship to the management of disaster response and IFRC global disaster response tools	17/02/2011	External Evaluators Anthony Kergosien Peter Rees-Gildea
A PRCS/IFRC joint pilot monitoring and evaluation mission report (final draft)	01/03/2011	IFRC/PRCS
IRP Baseline survey report	29/11/2011	IFRC
WATSAN KAP baseline reports (province-wise)		
Pakistan Floods 2010: Evaluation of the Relief Phase of the Red Cross Red Crescent Monsoon Flash Floods Operation	29/11/2011	Dr. Niaz Murtaza
Pakistan Floods 2010: Management Response to Evaluation of the Relief Phase of the Red Cross Red Crescent Monsoon Flash Floods Operation	01/01/2012	IFRC
THATTA (Sindh) PILOT PROJECT FINAL REPORT: Lessons learned for scale up.	05/01/2012	IFRC/PRCS
Mid-Term Review PRCS-IFRC 2010 Monsoon Flood Operation (Recovery)	17/06/2012	Gert Venghaus Dr. Muhammad Khalid,

**Pakistan monsoon floods summative evaluation 2010-2013**

**Annex 2: evidence base**

<b>Document Name</b>	<b>Date issued</b>	<b>Author</b>
		Muhammad Atif Khan
Management Response to the Mid-Term Review of the PRCS-IFRC 2010 Monsoon Flood (Recovery Phase)	07/03/2013	IFRC
Letter to donors: Mid term review	01/04/2013	IFRC
<b>M&amp;E documents: Thematic evaluations</b>		
Information that Saves Lives: Providing Humanitarian Information to Flood-Affected People in Pakistan, Baseline Study, Singh & Punjab, November-December 2010	01/01/2011	CDAC Pakistan
Agriculture Input Support Program (Seed and Fertilizer Distributed for Early Recovery Program). Final Report	01/12/2011	Dr. Mohammed Ayub,
Experiences with Cash Transfer for the owner driven shelter program	28/12/2012	Felix de Vries, IFRC
Humanitarian Diplomacy in Action. Pakistan: Case Study		Surein Peiris, IFRC
Beneficiary Communication and Accountability. Lessons learned and recommendations: Indonesia   Haiti   Pakistan	08/06/2012	IFRC
<b>M&amp;E Documents: Sectoral evaluations</b>		
Livelihoods	01/03/2013	IFRC, Ann-MarieMcCabe
WatSan (KAP+HP+Latrines) _Draft (excel tables included)		
Sindh		Bernice Chiam
KP		Sophia Ahmed
Punjab		Faisal Khan
Summary for three provinces		Henk Schipper & Faisal Khan
WatSan (Phast)		Warren Fryer
DRR - Village Committees: FINAL	18.06.2013	Raza Ul Haq
Health		Dr. Niaz Murtaza
Shelter-DRAFT		Mir Quasmi
BCA- Final	25.06.2013	Louise Taylor
Branch development- DRAFT	05.07.2013	Michael Higginson
Finance (draft report)		Roba Bashir
PRCS Punjab IRP Report 2011-2013		Muhammad Abaid Ullah Khan
<b>M&amp;E documents – endline</b>		
Endline evaluation (draft) (excel tables included)	14.07.2013	Evgeny Kuznetsov / Rabia Butt
<b>M&amp;E documents: Summative evaluation</b>		
PMER methodology		
MDRPK006 Exit Monitoring & Evaluation Strategy CONCEPT PAPER	01/03/2013	IFRC
COVER NOTE for the MDRPK006 Exit Monitoring & Evaluation Strategy	01/03/2013	IFRC
M&E matrix	18/06/2013	IFRC

Document Name	Date issued	Author
<b>M&amp;E documents – lessons learned</b>		
Monsoon Floods 2010 Water and Sanitation Response Lessons Learnt Workshop Report	27-28 June 2013	PRCS/IFRC
Sindh Province report	3-5 April	PRCS/IFRC
KPK Province report	28-29 March 2013	PRCS/IFRC
Punjab Province report	4 June 2013	PRCS/IFRC
National workshop report	workshop was June 26	PRCS/IFRC
<b>M&amp;E documents: unit histories</b>		
Livelihoods (including success stories)	02.07.2013	Ann-Marie McCabe & Irshad Mallah
WatSan	02.07.2013	Henk Schipper
DM	17.07.2013	Qaswar ABBAS
Health		Jamal Bilal
Shelter	15.07.2013	Basharat Ullah Khan
BCA (including success stories)	14.07.2013	Nadia Butt/ Hina Sardar (BCA)
Humanitarian diplomacy	18.07.2013	Sumitha Martin
Communications	18.07.2013	Sumitha Martin
Programme management	02.07.2013	Jaap Timmer
PMER	17.07.2013	Rabia Butt (PMER Officer)
Field office Punjab	16.07.2013	Kamran Ali Kashif (Field Officer)
Field office KP	16.07.2013	Philippe Hayes (Head of Office)
Field office Sindh	02.07.2013	Ahmed Sikder (Head of Office)
PRCS SINDH	09.07.2013	Shafqat Ali Bhutto (BCA)
PRCS SINDH	09.07.2013	Dr Ramzan Samejo (Health)
PRCS SINDH	09.07.2013	Syed Shafqat Ali (Shelter)
Field office Larkana (Sindh)	02.07.2013	Miajanur Rahman
Finance	12.07.2013	Roba Bashir
<b>EOM and handover reports</b>		
Various ( x 12)		
<b>MMT Reports</b>		
2012 x 8		
2013 x 5		
<b>General documents</b>		
2010 Floods timeline	30/01/2013	Michael Higgingson
Floods Timeline summary	24/12/2012	Michael Higgingson
IRP timeline 2011-2013	26/06/2013	Jaap Timmer

## Annex 2: evidence base

Document Name	Date issued	Author
The response of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to the 2010 floods in Pakistan. Case study	28/03/2012	Michael Annear
Critical path for IRP: Critical path or Red Tape?	27/09/2012	Jaap Timmer
Pakistan: A birds eye view of the outcomes and projections for ending the appeal.	25/12/2012	Jaap Timmer

**Movement Coordination**

Pakistan delegation organogram	01/01/2012	IFRC
Pakistan delegation organogram	01/04/2013	IFRC
Movement coordination meeting minutes HQ x 9		
Movement coordination meeting minutes Sindh x 21		
Movement coordination meeting minutes KP x 6		
Movement coordination meeting minutes Punjab x 2		

**Audit**

MDRPK006 financial audit 2010	01.07.2013
MDRPK006 financial audit 2011	01.07.2013
Status of implementation of audit recommendations- Audit report February 2012 (Feb 2013)	01.07.2013

This list is, however, incomplete, as various documents were also provided directly to the consultant by key informants and have not yet been included in this table.

**Key informant interviews and focus groups**

A total of 40 key informant interviews and 2 focus group discussions were carried out during the evaluation process, including most of the reference sources identified in annex 4.

## Annex 3: Expectations and norms

This is a summative evaluation. In essence, this makes it about accountability: did the response meet the objectives it set for itself; was it aligned with international norms and standards; did it observe IFRC and PRCS policies and strategies; did it meet expectations and needs of the affected population?

In order for the report as a whole to be able to provide comprehensive and transparent answers to these questions, this annex attempts to locate and outline the benchmarks against which achievements can be measured.

This is intended to be a sufficient list, rather than an exhaustive one. Parts of it are definitive: the Sphere Standards and the IFRC Policies are what they are, and in most cases only a reference is made. Other parts of it, driven by guidance rather than policy, are slightly more subjective: what follows below is a brief description of accepted good practice.

### General references

The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

IFRC Principles and Rules for Disaster Response

Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response (the Sphere Standards)

### Needs assessment

IFRC Guidelines for assessment in emergencies (March 2008)

IFRC Recovery Guidance section 4

Sphere: Core Standard 3 (p61)

*The current IFRC guidance on needs assessment is scattered around several documents and the core manual (which is shared with ICRC) is in need of revision. The tools presented are not realistic and in practice are never used.*

### Response Option analysis

IFRC Recovery Guidance section 4

Sphere: Core Standard 4 (p65)

*Response options analysis is simply the means of making and recording objective decisions about the best way to respond to identified needs. It involves creating a menu of options, scoring them against a set of agreed criteria, and documenting the decision. It incorporates aspects of context and risk analysis.*

### Targeting and prioritisation

IFRC Recovery Guidance section 4

Sphere: Core Standard 4 (p65)

*Guidance on targeting is weak, especially guidance on geographic targeting. Common*

*strategies, such as focusing on the 'most affected districts' can exclude areas of high need within less-affected districts, in which RC capacity may be considerable and a response would be appropriate.*

*The language used is also confusing, as it conflates the selection of operational areas with the targeting of individual or households.*

### Design.

IFRC Recovery Guidance section 4

Sphere: Core Standard 4 (p65)

IFRC project/programme monitoring and evaluation guide (considering the design of monitoring systems during project design)

IFRC Guidelines for cash-based programming

IFRC Project/programme planning

IFRC Practical Guide to gender sensitive approaches for disaster management

### Management information – indicator tracking

IFRC M&E guide, and especially two excellent tools: the M&E plan (Annex 8) and the indicator tracking table (Annex 16).

Sphere Standards common standard 5

*It is important that project managers can track three different kinds of indicators in real time:*

- *Indicators that illustrate changes in context, environment, risk, etc, which inform the assumptions made in the programme design*
- *Indicators of process, progress against targets, timeliness, compliance*
- *Indicators of results for the affected population – beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike – at the levels of output and outcome*

## Reflective practice

Sphere: Core Standard 5

*There is some guidance on this also in the IFRC M&E guide and in other IFRC materials. It is not an area of strength in the guidance.*

## Doing No Harm, protection principles

*The standard IFRC approach to this, the **Better Programming initiative**, seems to have fallen out of the PPP toolkit but is still available on FedNet. It is based on the 'industry standard' approaches known as **Do No Harm**. The approach is entirely consistent with the Fundamental Principles, and should be more widely used.*

*In essence, this requires a detailed stakeholder analysis and a comprehensive risk analysis to be combined, and the question asked: if we do X, what will the outcomes be?*

Sphere Humanitarian Charter, clause 9 (p23-24)

Sphere Protection Principles 1-4 (p25-47)

## Technical standards in each sector

IFRC sector specific guidance.

Sphere: minimum standards in water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; and health action.

## Early recovery and recovery programming

*See the UNDP Guidance Note on Early Recovery, and the IFRC Recovery Guidance as core sources.*

## Local, institutional and capacity

*Understanding and building on available capacity is critical to early recovery thinking,*

*but the guidance available to undertake meaningful capacity assessment is weak.*

*Where there are differences of opinion about the capacity of a partner, the lack of an agreed baseline undermines efforts to strengthen and build that capacity.*

## Strategy and policy

*Recovery programming should be aligned with the strategy and policy of the host government and all stakeholders. Where (as in Pakistan) the alignment was less strong (in some areas such as cash programming, BCA) then active steps need to be taken to recognise this and bring strategy into alignment.*

## Participation and ownership

*IFRC has excellent guidance available at the sector level, and especially within toolkits such as VCA.*

## Integration, coordination and resilience

*It is recognised that guidance in this area is developing.*

*IFRC Recovery Guidance sets out explicit ways in which to strengthen programme integration, in the sense of the positive interactions between programme sectors.*

*The on-going work on **Resilience** lays out the benefits of doing so, and outlines some of the areas that need to be considered beyond the inter-sector linkages.*

## Cross-cutting themes

Sphere Handbook: p14-17

## Gender

IFRC: a practical guide to gender sensitive approaches for disaster management.

## Annex 4: Contributors and key informants

The following list includes all those people who were interviewed as part of the evaluation process, and a few who contributed key documents to the process or who took part in focus groups.

Name	Organisation	Role
<b>PRCS HQ</b>		
Dr Mahboob Sardar	PRCS	Secretary General
Muhammad Ateeb Siddiqui	PRCS	Deputy SG
Ghulam Muhammad Awan	PRCS	Director Operations
Syed Wajid Ali Shah	PRCS	Director Finance
Dr Kamran Mushtaq Rashid	PRCS	acting Director Health & Training
Dr Shaista	PRCS	Asst Director Health
Asima Naseem	PRCS	Asst Director DRR
Abdul Baseer	PRCS	Asst Director DP
Asfia Firdaus	PRCS	Asst Director Planning & Reporting
Ghulam Moin-ud-din	PRCS	Asst Director Logistics
Muhammad Rafiq	PRCS	Deputy Director, WATSAN
Dawar Adnan Shams	PRCS	Deputy Director Youth and Vounteerism
Shoaib Iqbal	PRCS	Deputy Director Finance
Niaz Muhammed	PRCS	Senior Watsan Liaison Officer
Zubair Khan	PRCS	IRP Liaison Manager, Shelter Focal point
Nadia Butt	PRCS	BCA officer
Abaid Ullah Khan	PRCS	DD DM / Ops Manager IRP Punjab
Sheraz Ahmad	PRCS	AD PSP / Livelihood
<b>PRCS Provincial Branches</b>		
Kanwar Waseem	PRCS	Secretary PHQ Sindh
Syed Ali Hassan	PRCS	Secretary PHQ KPK
Maj (R) Durrani	PRCS	Secretary PHQ Balochistan
Mr. Ghulam Abbas	PRCS	Secretary PHQ Gilgit – Baltistan
<b>IFRC Zone and SARD</b>		
Jagan Chapagain	IFRC	Director, Asia Pacific
Al Panico	IFRC	Head of Operations
Mat Schraeder	IFRC	Operations Manager
Karen Poon	IFRC	Operatons Manager
Patrick Elliott	IFRC	Shelter Coordinator
Nigel Ede	IFRC	Recovery Delegate
Clarence Sim	IFRC	Planning and Reporting Officer
Sharil Dewa	IFRC	Team Leader, RM, PMER
John Gwynn	IFRC	OD Coordinator
Enkas Chau	IFRC	SARD, acting HORD
Will Rogers	IFRC	Beneficiary Communications Delegate
<b>IFRC Islamabad</b>		
Karen H. Bjornestad	IFRC	HOD
Michael Higgison	IFRC	Senior Advisor
Jaap Timmer	IFRC	Programme Coordinator

## Annex 4: contributors and key informants

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Role</b>
Sacha Bouter	IFRC	PMER Coordinator
Sebastien Hogan	IFRC	Security Coordinator
Hicham Diab	IFRC	Logistics Coordinator
Roba Bashir	IFRC	Finance and Grants Coordinator
Sumitha Martin	IFRC	Humanitarian Diplomacy and Movement Coordination Delegate
Ina Bluemel	IFRC	FACT health (replacement)
Henk Schipper	IFRC	Watsan coordinator
Marc Fumeaux	IFRC	TPAT team leader, report author
Basharat Ullah Khan	IFRC	Construction and Shelter Coordinator
Qaswar Abbas	IFRC	DRM Coordinator
Syed Ali Akhtar	IFRC	Senior Field Security Officer
Syed Jamal Shah	IFRC	Health Coordinator
Faisal Khan	IFRC	Senior Officer, Watsan
Sophia Ahmed	IFRC	Senior Hygiene Promotion Officer
Sadia Jamil	IFRC	Livelihoods Assistant
Sikder M. Ahmed	IFRC	Head of Field Office Sindh
Ann-Marie McCabe	IFRC	Livelihoods Delegate, report author
Sanjeev Hada	IFRC	Shelter Delegate
Zehra Rizvi	IFRC	Cash grants delegate, report author (Thatta)
Amanda Scothern	IFRC	Branch Development Delegate
<b>IFRC Field</b>		
Philip Hayes	IFRC	Head of Field Office
Ahmed Sikder	IFRC	Head of Field Office
Mijan Ur Rehman	IFRC	Field Delegate, Larkana
Kamran Ali Kashif	IFRC	Manager, Field Office
<b>Movement Partners</b>		
Enza Mancuso	ICRC	Cooperation Coordinator
Rafiqul Islam	PNS	BRCS Country Representative
Hans Bochove	PNS	DRK Head of Office
Douglas MacDonald	PNS	Country Representative, CRCS
Jan Eddy De Waegemaeker	PNS	Country Coordinator, DRCS
Olaf Rosset	PNS	Programme Advisor, NRCS
Heike Kemper	PNS	HOD, SRC
Abdullah Abbasi	PNS	Deputy Representative, Kizilay
Abdellah Nagi	PNS	Country Representative, QRC
Dr. Khalid Latif Qureshi	PNS	Country Director, UAE RC
Alireza Aghaei	PNS	Country Representative, Iran RC
<b>Independents</b>		
Gert Venghaus	Independent	Consultant
Dr. Niaz Murtaza	Independent	Consultant: report author
Peter Rees-Gildea	Independent	Consultant
Cynthia Burton	Independent	Consultant, report author