



International Federation  
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

# **Evaluation of the Food Insecurity Emergency Appeal for Zimbabwe**

**Emergency Appeal No. MDRZW006**

**Final Report**

*Prepared by*

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ART	Anti-retroviral Therapy
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CHF	Swiss Franc
CPU	Civil Protection Unit
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DA	District Administrator
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDF	District Development Fund
DREF	Disaster Relief and Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EA	Emergency Appeal
EHA	Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance
EHU	Environmental Health Unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
MAMID	Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoHCC	Ministry of Health and Child Care
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NSART	Nutritional Support for ART
NVAC	National Vulnerability Assessment Committee
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PHHE	Participatory Health and Hygiene Education
PISI	Police Internal Security and Intelligence Unit
PMER	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
PNS	Partner National Society
RIASCO	Regional Inter-Agency Standing Committee Office
STA	Seasonal Targeted Assistance
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
ZIMVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
ZRCS	Zimbabwe Red Cross Society

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Zimbabwe is one of the four countries in Southern Africa in which the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched food insecurity emergency appeals (EAs) following the poor harvests in the last two years up to the 2011/2012 agricultural season. The EAs were to support the countries' national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to save lives and protect livelihoods, whilst contributing to building resilience and recovery for the affected populations.

The country has been experiencing chronic food insecurity for the past decade. Although there was an improvement with the harvest of 2010/2011 season, which resulted in about 12% (1.026 million) of the population being food insecure during the peak hunger period of January-March 2012, the situation worsened in the 2012/2013 season. During the 2012/2013 consumption year, there were 1.6 million rural people (19%) in need of food assistance.

The food insecurity EA for Zimbabwe targeted 2,000 households in three wards in Nkayi District, Matebeleland North Province. It had an approved budget of CHF1,290,342 and was to last for nine months from January to September 2013. The EA operations comprised an emergency food assistance and three resilience-related components aimed at reducing food and nutrition insecurity, providing safe and clean water for domestic use and livestock and improved hygiene practices and community resilience through disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities.

The IFRC commissioned an evaluation of the 2012/2013 food insecurity emergency appeal for Zimbabwe which was conducted during the period 11 December 2013 to 25 January 2014. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess timeliness of the launch of the EA; preparedness and early actions of the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society (ZRCS); appropriateness of twin-track strategy and relevance of outcomes, activities and level of funding; engagement of in-country Partner National Societies (PNS); areas of improvement; level of commitment of ZRCS and partners to continue engaging in long-term food security and resilience; ZRCS's relative advantage and niche in relation to other stakeholders; lessons and recommendations for future EAs in Zimbabwe.

The methodology comprised a light, rapid and participatory perception study based on qualitative data collected from key informants and focus group discussions with beneficiaries, supported by quantitative data from secondary sources.

### **Findings**

The main findings of the evaluation were as follows:

- (i) While the early warning systems were effective in informing ZRCS and IFRC about the food insecurity situation in good time, the response was slow, mainly due to the need for consultations among Movement partners and the lengthy approval processes.
- (ii) The IFRC country office supported ZRCS in resource mobilisation, development of the EA document and coordination.
- (iii) The selection of targeted wards and households was done in a participatory manner and to the satisfaction of all stakeholders.
- (iv) All the stakeholders at the district and ward level found the strategy appropriate for the food insecurity, water and sanitation situation that prevailed in the wards prior to the launch of the appeal.
- (v) ZRCS and the IFRC country office coordinated and worked well with national and regional partners during the planning of the EA and with district and ward level partners in selecting target wards and households and implementation of interventions.

- (vi) All the targeted 2,000 households received three baskets of reduced food rations between February and May 2013. Similarly, all other components were partially implemented due to inadequate resources.
- (vii) The efficiency of the EA was low and deviated from the planned budget. The direct cost of benefits received by the vulnerable communities was 50.1% of expenditure, while the total cost of delivering this relief was 49.9% of expenditure.
- (viii) ZRCS is viewed as a well-funded NGO, needing no collaboration. This has made it difficult to partner with other national agencies as well as mobilise resources, especially from the private sector.
- (x) The approaches in borehole rehabilitation and maintenance and creation of a nutrition garden fund were good examples of sustainable exit strategies. However, the other components did not have effective exit strategies.
- (xi) There was a marked improvement in the food security situation, access to safe and clean drinking water and dietary diversity and income from sale of vegetables for the target households. However, the impact of latrines on sanitation was largely at individual household rather than community level since this intervention only covered 12% of households with no latrines.

### **Conclusions**

The conclusions of this evaluation cover mainly the evaluation issues identified in the Terms of Reference (ToR). In arriving at these conclusions, the evaluator used the following criteria:

- (a) Highly satisfactory (according to plan or exceeding the plan);
  - (b) Satisfactory (not necessarily according to plan but, on balance, adapting to revolving context, with more positive than negative aspects); and
  - (c) Unsatisfactory (not sufficiently according to plan, not taking account of the evolving context; a few positive aspects, but outweighed by negative aspects).
- (i) The response to the food insecurity situation was **unsatisfactorily** slow, leading to the late launch of the appeal due to the lengthy consultative and approval processes within the Movement.
  - (ii) The twin-track strategy was **appropriate**, but the EA tried to do too much with limited resources and time. ZRCS should have focused on food distribution and borehole rehabilitation as these two components reinforced each other.
  - (iii) While the activities were all partially implemented, overall implementation was considered satisfactory. However, the financial performance during implementation was **low and unsatisfactory** as the value of relief was almost equal to the cost of delivering it.
  - (iv) Coordination efforts within the Movement were **satisfactory**, while coordination between ZRCS and other stakeholders at national, provincial and district level were **highly participatory and satisfactory**.
  - (v) The exit strategy was **satisfactory** for the borehole rehabilitation and nutrition garden components but **unsatisfactory** for all other interventions.
  - (vi) There was a marked positive impact on the food security situation, dietary diversity and access to safe drinking water for the targeted households but limited community impact on sanitation due to the small number of latrines. On balance, the impact of the EA was **satisfactory**.

## **Lessons Learned**

Based on stakeholder suggestions and conclusions by the evaluator, the following *lessons learned* were identified:

- (i) The early warning systems that are available to the ZRCS through the local ward, district and national level structures are adequate to prepare food and nutrition insecurity EAs in time to accommodate the necessary consultations and approval processes. This would allow the EA interventions to be synchronized with the agricultural season, thereby facilitating the incorporation of resilience and livelihood interventions.
- (ii) The involvement of in-county partner institutions in planning EAs facilitates information sharing, ownership and quick decision making among Movement partners. This would reduce delays in the launch of appeals.
- (iii) The involvement of Government and community-based institutions in the implementation of resilience activities provides a built-in exit strategy for sustainability of interventions following the cessation of an EA. The example from the borehole rehabilitation and nutrition garden components and creation of community funds illustrate this point.
- (iv) Continuous communication with and provision of feedback to stakeholders has been a normal practice by ZRCS. In addition to reporting to authorities, provision of feedback to local traditional leaders and the target communities is necessary.

## **Recommendations**

- (i) ZRCS and the IFRC country office should provide adequate information to Movement partners in order to pre-empt most of the questions that cause delays in decision making and launching of EAs. Similarly, in-country PNS should be involved in planning EAs.
- (ii) The IFRC country office and ZRCS should ensure that the cost of delivering relief is not disproportionately higher than that in the approved budgets by applying, wherever possible, a pro-rated reduction in the corresponding costs for lowly supported EAs.
- (iii) IFRC and the national societies should focus relief efforts in areas where they have previously had development-oriented projects or *vice versa* in order for relief efforts to reinforce development interventions.
- (iv) While ZRCS should focus on acute emergency or life threatening situations, wherever possible, this should be supported by resilience interventions with minimal requirements for external support for sustainability, by partnering with agencies that have comparative advantage in livelihood interventions.
- (v) Nutrition interventions such as vegetable gardens should be supported by studies to profile the causes of malnutrition in any given locality rather than using a one size fits all approach.
- (vi) ZRCS should use both vulnerability results at district and from local ward level structures to target pockets of need which would otherwise be ignored by WFP.
- (vii) Where food markets are functional, national societies should use cash transfers and local private sector merchants to provide food relief to vulnerable households, thereby giving them the power to choose what to purchase, while promoting local economies.
- (viii) The future food and nutrition strategy for the Southern Africa region should be two-pronged, building the communities' resilience through increased food production, while maintaining a social safety net with targeted seasonal food assistance for welfare cases. Therefore, national societies should consider combining emergency food assistance with development of individual household assets, including water conservation structures in agricultural fields and construction of grain storage facilities, among others.

# **1. INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1 Background**

In the last two years up to the 2012/2013 agricultural season, Southern Africa, notably Angola, Malawi, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, experienced food insecurity. This was mainly due to poor harvests caused by erratic and unevenly distributed rainfall. In response to this food crisis, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched emergency appeals (EAs) in each of the four countries to support the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' response to save lives and protect livelihoods, whilst contributing to building resilience and recovery for the affected populations. The food insecurity situation was worsened by a number of other factors, including economic decline, chronic and extreme poverty, and most significantly the impact of the HIV and AIDS pandemic.

Zimbabwe has been experiencing chronic food insecurity for the past decade. Although there was an improvement with the harvest of the 2010/2011 season, which resulted in about 12% (1.026 million) of the population being food insecure during the peak hunger period of January-March 2012 (Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) 2011), the situation became worse. During the 2012/2013 consumption year, there were 1.6 million rural people (19%) in need of food assistance (ZIMVAC 2012).

The food insecurity EA for Zimbabwe was targeted at three wards (3, 4 and 20) in Nkayi District, Matebeleland North Province. It had an approved budget of CHF1,290,342 and was to last for nine months from January to September 2013. The EA operations comprised one emergency food assistance and three resilience-related components with the following outcomes:

- (i) Immediate food needs of 2,000 households (10,000 beneficiaries) in Nkayi District of Matebeleland North Province met for four months;
- (ii) Reduced food insecurity among 2,000 affected rural households through inputs support and training;
- (iii) Access to safe and clean water for domestic and livestock consumption and improved hygiene practices and access to basic sanitation facilities for 10,000 beneficiaries in Nkayi district is increased; and
- (iv) Community resilience is strengthened through disaster risk reduction activities focusing on early warning systems and, enhanced coping mechanisms/strategies.

The IFRC commissioned an evaluation of the 2012/2013 food insecurity emergency appeal in Zimbabwe which was conducted during the period 11 December 2013 to 25 January 2014. This report describes the results of the evaluation.

## **1.2 Objectives of the Evaluation**

The objectives of the evaluation of the Food Insecurity Emergency Appeal for Zimbabwe are described in the Terms of Reference (see Annex 2) and were to:

- (i) Identify lessons related to the timely launch of the Zimbabwe Emergency Appeal;
- (ii) Assess how and why the twin-track approach was integrated into the planning phase;
- (iii) Assess the relevance of the outcomes, activities and the level of funding sought versus the funding received;
- (iv) Assess the preparedness and early action activities of the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society (ZRCS) and their engagement towards the Emergency Appeals and their surge capacity (did the operations provide sufficient back up in finance, monitoring and evaluation?);
- (v) Review the engagement of the in-country Participating National Societies (PNS) during the emergency phase;

- (vi) Identify the field gaps where Movement cooperation work in the field could have been improved and what sort of support would be recommended for future operations;
- (vii) Measure the level of commitment of the ZRCS to continue engaging in longer-term food security and resilience together with Government, UN, other stakeholders and/or local partnerships;
- (viii) Identify ZRCS's relative advantage and niche in relation to other stakeholders such as WFP; and
- (ix) Provide lessons and recommendations for future Emergency Appeals in Zimbabwe.

The evaluation would address questions related to the following issues:

- (i) Appropriateness of the preparedness and early action activities undertaken by the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society and its stakeholders;
- (ii) Suitability of the strategic approach chosen to address the food insecurity;
- (iii) Coordination mechanisms among the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, IFRC and the PNS during operations;
- (iv) Perceptions of the IFRC and ZRCS response by authorities and in-country partners during the operations;
- (v) Exit strategy put in place at the end of the interventions;
- (vi) Lessons learnt and best practices; and
- (vii) Future food security strategy for Southern Africa.

The report has been structured to respond to these questions.

### **1.3 Methodology**

The evaluation was primarily a perception study based on qualitative data, supported by quantitative data from secondary sources. The methodology was light, rapid, qualitative and participatory in nature. The data were collected from desk research, key informant interviews with representatives of stakeholders and partners and focus group discussions with selected beneficiaries in Nkayi District. The desk research comprised a review of the Zimbabwe Red Cross Act (Chapter 17:08), the ZRCS turn-around strategic plan, emergency appeal documents for 2012 and 2013, operation updates and the draft final report for the 2012 appeal. The stakeholders and partners comprised those at the national, provincial and district levels (see Annex 1 for list of contacts).

Interview guidelines (checklists) were used for the key informant interviews and focus group discussions (see Annex 2).

Due to the limited time available for fieldwork, the evaluation relied on qualitative data from a purposively selected sample. The selected beneficiaries did not meet the rigorous requirements of a representative sample but covered all the three wards. However, the spread of the communities, in conjunction with information from key informants from the wards, district and national levels and the reports, were considered adequate to give a general perception of the situation before, during and after the implementation of the EA.

## 2. ASSESSMENT OF EARLY ACTIONS AND PREPAREDNESS

### 2.1 Early Warning, Actions and Preparedness

In Zimbabwe, the early warning system on food and nutrition security and related community welfare operates at different levels, from ward, district, provincial and national levels. ZRCS has structures at all these levels. Starting at ward level, the local traditional leaders, councillors and ZRCS volunteers conveyed information on the food security situation to the district structures on a regular basis. The relevant district structure is the Drought Relief Committee (DRC), a sub-committee of the Civil Protection Unit (CPU), which is chaired by the District Administrator (DA), with membership from all ministry departments, other public institutions, NGOs and ZRCS representatives in the district. The DA reports to the provincial administrator, who in turn reports to the national level local government structures. Similarly, the ZRCS district and provincial structures convey information gathered through their ward and district levels and participate in the DRFs at all levels. ZRCS is a permanent member of the Civil Protection Unit at national level. Both the DRC and CPU meet monthly under normal circumstances but may meet more frequently during crises.

In addition to the local government structures, there are two other processes that provide early warning information on the food insecurity situation. The Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development (MAMID), together with development partners, conduct two crop and livestock assessments to determine potential harvests from the standing crops and livestock between **February and April each year**. This is followed by a rural livelihoods assessment by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) **around May of each year**. The ZIMVAC report is the official document on rural food insecurity which is used by Government and all aid agencies as a basis for planning responses, including emergency appeals by the ZRCS and IFRC. Additional information is made available through the **technical cluster partner meetings** with development agencies, NGOs and UN agencies working in various areas, including those in food and nutrition security, water, sanitation and health, to which both ZRCS and IFRC are members. These meet monthly.

Indications for the need for this appeal were known well in advance, based on the early warning systems described above. However, the EA was issued late in December 2012. EAs have a long lead time from the time the national society raises the need for intervention to the time decisions are made at the IFRC country, regional, zonal and headquarter levels. At each of these stages questions seeking clarification on various aspects of prospective appeals may be raised. During the period preceding the Nkayi EA, ZRCS was in the process of recovering from a governance and leadership challenge. This challenge had resulted in a loss of confidence among partners and contributed to the hesitancy in setting up the early actions and the subsequent launch of the EA.

It is apparent that the main challenge leading to the lateness of the appeal was not so much the lack of early warning information, but was largely influenced by the approval processes described above. **The delays could be partly addressed by ZRCS and the IFRC country office providing all the information that would be of interest to the partners in order to pre-empt most of the questions that cause delays in decision-making. This includes providing partners with contextual information specific to Zimbabwe which may not be easy to obtain in other countries. As the situation is generally known even from unofficial sources, it is possible to start preparing for the appeal early on, albeit informally in order to ensure timeliness of events.**

The evaluator believes that, while **the early warning systems were effective in informing ZRCS and IFRC about the food insecurity situation in good time, the response was slow**. However, the reasons for this delay were understandable.

## **2.2 Assistance Provided by the IFRC Country Office and PNS during Early Action Stages**

Although the IFRC country office has a small complement of staff, they worked together with ZRCS in preparing the EA proposal, while the finance personnel collaborated in budget consolidation. Once the appeal was ready, the IFRC country office was responsible for submitting it to the regional office for onward transmission to the Africa zone office and subsequently to Geneva Headquarters. The country office Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation and Planning (PMER) officer advised and supported ZRCS in designing the M&E framework and reporting tools. Similarly, the logistics unit provided support both at the planning and implementation stages, including managing the tendering process for food items and provision of a truck for the duration of the appeal in Nkayi District.

Other areas of support included facilitation of access to technical support from international partners through the technical cluster meetings covering food security, water and sanitation (WATSAN) and health, among others. ZCRS indicated that they could independently access this assistance as they are a member of the clusters in their own right. There were two resident technical delegates from in-country PNS, namely Finland and Norway. However, they did not participate in the preparation of this EA. One of the in-country delegates indicated that there had not been enough notice of the EA. This short-coming seems to have been addressed in the 2013/2014 appeal for Gwanda by involving the in-country PNS delegates in the planning.

The evaluator believes that **IFRC provided enough support to the ZRCS during the planning and launch of the EA.**

## **3. ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS OF STRATEGIC APPROACH AND TARGETING**

The EA used a **twin-track strategic approach** which focused on an emergency response and a development approach. There were four components, with the first focusing on emergency food and basic needs distribution to food insecure households, while the last three were aimed at building the resilience of communities.

In discussions with all stakeholders in Nkayi District, including members of the DRC, traditional leaders and beneficiaries, there was general consensus that the food insecurity situation in the three wards was dire, with households surviving on negative coping mechanisms such as having one meal per day, gold panning and fetching water from distant and polluted open sources. Therefore, the first component of the EA was relevant and appropriate as a strategy.

Normally, in the twin-track strategy the emergency response would be combined with *medium-long term development approaches*. While the remaining three components are developmental in nature, the implementation period of up to nine months was very short. In reality the implementation was for about four months.

The original design for the second component included distribution of agricultural inputs (small grain seeds, fertilizers and maize seed) and tools. This part had to be abandoned due to the late launch of the appeal. By the time implementation started, it would have been too late to have used these inputs since the agricultural season had started at least a month earlier. Similarly, while the plan to distribute small grain seeds is in agreement with Government policy, this might not have worked as there was no small grain seed on the market. For example, out of 200 tonnes of seed distributed in Nkayi for the 2013/2014 season, there was no small grain seed. Discussions with a representative of a major seed company indicated that the seed companies had tried to stock seed in the past but offtake was too low. They pointed out that it would be difficult to develop a market for small grain seed as farmers

had a tendency to store and use seed from previous seasons. The beneficiary training in seed selection and preservation was, therefore, not carried out. However, **the distribution of vegetable seed packs was appropriate as it took place in May, which is the traditional vegetable production season.**

The vegetables would contribute to dietary diversity for the households. However, the impact of nutrition gardens in alleviating malnutrition among the beneficiary households was doubtful, given the very high rates (40%) of stunting in Nkayi District. Some stakeholders, notably the CPU and FAO, have questioned the value of nutrition gardens to address malnutrition. For example, FAO argue that malnutrition in children, as measured through rates of stunting, is a very complex problem which may be caused by many factors, including inadequate intake of nutritious food, poor health and care practices, among other factors. As a result, it is difficult to prescribe one intervention such as nutrition gardens and hope that this would solve the problem of malnutrition. It would be necessary to **first profile the causes of malnutrition and determine whether the communities had prior experience of nutrition gardens**, before designing an appropriate response. Therefore, the intervention in the Nkayi appeal to promote nutrition gardens may not have been adequate to tackle the problem of malnutrition, although it would have made a **positive contribution to dietary diversity and incomes from sale of surplus production.**

While the communities had sources of water from rivers and other open sources, these were not safe and clean, putting the people at risk of infection. This was especially so given the widespread practice of **open defecation** and the resultant poor health and hygiene would exacerbate the effect of food insecurity. In addition, household members and their livestock had to travel long distances to fetch water. Therefore, it made sense for the EA to include rehabilitation of boreholes for 50% of the beneficiary communities as this was complementary to food distribution and general food security. However, support for the building of latrines for selected beneficiaries and training of 20 volunteers in participatory health and hygiene education (PHHE), though well meaning, might have overstretched the available financial resources and time. Nkayi District is part of Matebeleland North Province, which has the highest proportion (70%) of households practising open defecation (ZIMVAC, 2013). According to the 2012 census, the three wards have a total of 2,064 households, 72.5% (1,496) of which had no latrines. The 180 latrines would cover 12% of the households with no latrines. While this would make a **difference at individual household level**, it would not make much impact on the **sanitation situation at community level.**

Given the level of funding, the EA tried to do too many interventions with very little resources in a very short space of time. **The last three components of the EA had aspects of resilience and could have been rationalised in the planning**, especially the second and fourth components. This is supported by the fact that the fourth component of the appeal, disaster risk reduction activities to train communities to focus on early warning systems and enhanced coping mechanisms and strategies, was **partially integrated into the livelihoods component** covering vegetable gardening, production and nutrition management.

The question that has been raised is whether ZRCS should be involved in both humanitarian emergency and livelihood responses. The ZRCS **turn-around strategy** includes food security and livelihoods, among other programmatic areas, but does not give details on how this will be achieved. **It makes sense for ZRCS to be involved in livelihoods and development activities, in addition to emergency food aid.** The main issue is one of capacity rather than whether they should do both. Livelihood and development interventions take much longer than the emergency food aid. Secondly, **ZRCS would need to partner with institutions with adequate capacity in the area of livelihoods development, such as community-based organisations (CBOs), government extension agencies and FAO.** This would allow the government departments and CBOs to continue with the livelihood programmes once the emergency interventions come to an end.

There is a realisation among most humanitarian aid agencies that there is growing donor fatigue towards food aid and distribution of free agricultural inputs to vulnerable households. Both WFP and Government are in the process of making this change to promoting conditional food aid where able-bodied beneficiaries have to work for food through the various food-for-work/assets interventions. The development of assets is limited to community rather than individual household assets. Government and development partners have realised that there are about 12% of the rural population that can be classified as social welfare cases that will always need some social safety net and cannot benefit from any agricultural and production-based intervention. This has implications on the selection and registration of beneficiaries.

The selection of beneficiary wards was made by the District Drought Relief Committee (DDRC) to avoid geographical duplication of interventions by aid agencies. At the local ward level, beneficiaries were selected by traditional leaders in consultation with ZRCS and the community using vulnerability criteria such as poverty, women- and child-headed households and households with ill people or people living with HIV. The **food distribution was correctly targeted at all vulnerable households**. However, when it came to targeting for toilets, the traditional leaders selected households that were able to secure local building materials such as bricks, in addition to vulnerability and being located in open spaces where people could not practise open defecation. The **targeting for vegetable gardens was for all 2,000 beneficiary households** but they had to be organised into groups of 20, with each group being required to have prepared a garden before they could be given the inputs. In one of the wards (Ward 4) visited during the evaluation, the agricultural extension worker reported that some groups had failed to prepare their gardens and, therefore, could not be given seed. Some communities also decided not to use borehole water for irrigating gardens, preferring to reserve the water for domestic use and livestock.

In general, the **selection of wards and targeting of beneficiaries was done appropriately**.

## **4. ASSESSMENT OF THE COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY APPEAL**

### **4.1 Coordination**

Coordination during implementation took place at the district level between ZRCS and the local partners and between ZRCS, the IFRC country office and the regional office.

At the district level, ZRCS had been supporting conservation agriculture training in one of the targeted wards in Nkayi (Ward 20) which has had chronic food insecurity. They were, therefore, able to utilize existing volunteer structures for the implementation of the appeal. The other two wards (3 and 4) had not had any dealings with ZRCS in the past. The selection of the wards was done by the District DRC, in the presence of ZRCS (Acting Secretary General, Food Security Officer and Matebeleland Provincial Programme Officer) and IFRC (Regional and Country Representatives). The joint ZRCS and IFRC team also visited the targeted communities to verify the situation before the EA was launched. This coordination role was intended to avoid duplication of effort among agencies that were active in Nkayi District since WFP and the Government were providing assistance to nine other wards in the district.

The technical expertise in the various components of the emergency appeal was provided by local partners such as the Department of Social Welfare and traditional leaders in selecting the beneficiaries, MAMID's extension department (Agritex) in training on conservation agriculture and nutrition gardens; Ministry of Health and Child Care's Environmental Health Unit (EHU) provided support in the construction and use of toilets; while the District Development Fund (DDF) supported

the borehole rehabilitation and repairs. **The use of local institutional partners was commendable as it ensured sustainability of interventions on termination of EA activities.**

In general, the IFRC country office supported ZRCS in resource mobilisation, development of the EA document and coordination. The specific support in implementation included the following:

- (i) Developed, together with the ZRCS PMER officer, the monitoring framework and follow-up tools;
- (ii) Compiled the 14-day, 30-day and six-month updates and final report for sharing with the Movement partners;
- (iii) Acted as focal point for WFP, capturing lessons learnt using WFP tools such as the exit strategy, and pre- and post-distribution data collection methodologies;
- (iv) Provided logistical support for procurement and distribution of food; and
- (v) Provided a truck for use by the Project Officer in Nkayi District for the duration of the implementation period.

A point that is worth noting is that, in all these support activities, the country office was responding to the stated needs of the ZRCS. There had been plans for the IFRC regional office to provide an operational manager to support the Nkayi appeal but this did not happen due to the short notice. Therefore, the role of the regional office was limited to planning.

During the planning and implementation of the Nkayi appeal, the only in-country PNS were Finland and Norway. They did not have a role to play in field activities. The Movement's Emergency Steering Committee comprising representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the IFRC country office and ZRCS received reports from the Operation Manager of ZRCS and advised on implementation, when necessary.

The evaluator believes that the coordination of the appeal among the Movement partners and other national stakeholders was **appropriate and effective**.

## **4.2 Implementation Process**

### **4.2.1 Distribution of supplementary food baskets**

The outcome of this component of the EA was: *Immediate food needs of 2,000 households (10,000 beneficiaries) in Nkayi district of Matebeleland North Province is met for four months, while the output was: Supplementary food baskets are distributed to 10,000 vulnerable people for four months.* This would be achieved through the following related contributory activities: conducting rapid emergency needs and capacity assessments, development of targeting strategy and registration system, preparation of a monthly distribution and uploading plan, procurement of 420 tonnes of maize, 32 tonnes of oil and 72 tonnes of pulses, notification of communities on dates and times of distributions, training of 20 volunteers on food distribution and monitoring; evaluation of distribution activities and distribution of monthly food packs for four months. The implementation status of these activities is summarised in Table 1.

Following the mapping of vulnerability by ZRCS headquarters using the ZIMVAC (2012) report, rapid emergency needs and capacity assessments were conducted in Nkayi District by ZRCS and IFRC staff. Information was collected from the DA, other members of the District DRC and traditional leaders, resulting in the selection of Wards 3, 4 and 20. This was followed by the development of a beneficiary targeting strategy and registration system through a consultative process involving key stakeholders at district level. These processes ensured that **the most vulnerable districts were selected and correct households were targeted.**

**Table 1. Implementation status of component 1 activities**

<b>Outcome and Output</b>	<b>Planned activities</b>	<b>Planned targets</b>	<b>Quantities achieved</b>
<p>Outcome 1: Immediate food needs of 2,000 households (10,000 beneficiaries) in Nkayi district of Matebeleland North Province is met for four months.</p> <p>Output 1.1 Supplementary food baskets are distributed to 10,000 people (2,000 households) for four months</p>	Conduct emergency needs and capacity assessments	One district emergency assessment	One district emergency assessment
	Develop beneficiary targeting strategy and registration system	One targeting strategy and registration system	One targeting strategy and registration system
	Prepare monthly food distribution and uploading plan	Four monthly food distribution and uploading plans prepared	Four monthly food distribution and uploading plans prepared
	Procure maize, oil and pulses	420 tonnes of maize, 32 tonnes of vegetable oil and 72 tonnes of beans procured	180 tonnes of maize meal, 12 tonnes of vegetable oil and 12 tonnes of beans procured
	Train 20 volunteers on food distribution	20 volunteers trained on food distribution and M&E	20 volunteers trained in food distribution and M&E
	Notify communities of distribution dates and time	Notify communities every time (4) there is forthcoming distribution of food	Communities notified of three distributions
	Conduct four monthly distributions of food baskets to 2,000 households	Conduct four monthly distributions of 50 kg maize, 10 kg of pulses and 3.6 litres of vegetable oil and 1 bar of soap to 2,000 households	Three monthly distributions of 30 kg of mealie meal, 2 kg of beans, 2 litres of vegetable oil and 1 bar of soap to 2,000 households

A total of 2,000 households (10,000 people) were provided with a food basket and a bar of laundry soap. However, only three out of the four planned distributions took place in February, March and May 2013. The April distribution could not take place due to scheduling clashes caused by local political activities related to the national elections in early April and the need for the Secretary General of ZRCS and the IFRC country representative to monitor the distributions, which they could not do in late April. The other issue was that the food basket had to be reduced from that recommended by SPHERE (2012) of 50 kg cereal, 10 kg of pulses and 3.6 litres of vegetable oil per household per month due to inadequate resources. The households were given 30 kg of mealie meal, 2 kg of beans, 2 litres of vegetable oil and one bar of laundry soap. Due to shortages of grain, beneficiaries were given maize meal instead – they appreciated this change as it meant a saving of about \$1 for grinding the maize. In discussions with WFP, they indicated that they were to reduce the basket in the 2013/2014 seasonal targeted assistance (STA) due to inadequate stocks. However, reductions would not be below 50% as this would then make the whole operation uneconomic, given the benefit. Therefore, the approach taken by ZRCS to reduce the food basket during the Nkayi EA was within accepted limits, albeit retrospectively.

#### 4.2.2 Food security, nutrition and livelihoods

The outcome for this component was: *Reduced food insecurity among 2,000 affected rural households through inputs support and trainings*, while the output was: *Productive assets/inputs, through the distribution of seeds and tools, for primary production and training are provided in accordance with the seasonal calendar*. This would be achieved through the following activities:

- (i) Carry out continuous and detailed assessment of food security, nutrition and livelihoods;
- (ii) Distribute small grain seeds, fertilizers and maize seed to 2,000 households;
- (iii) Distribute tools (each farm will receive four watering cans, two levelling rakes, two hoes and two wheelbarrows);
- (iv) Train 100 lead farmers (selected from the beneficiaries) to cascade crop production, climate change and adaptation and market linkage training to 2,000 farmers at a ratio of 1 lead farmer to 20 rural farmers;
- (v) Train beneficiaries in seed selection and preservation through 100 lead farmers;
- (vi) Distribute vegetable seed packs to garden beneficiaries in 100 households; and
- (vii) Develop and implement tracking system and monitor progress for the targeted farmers.

**The agricultural inputs and tools could not be distributed due to the lateness of the appeal as well as the low response in funding.** Similarly, training in seed selection and preservation was not done as it would have been tied to crop production. By the time the appeal was launched, it was too late to plant as the agricultural season was too advanced. However, the lead farmers were trained and they, in turn, trained the beneficiaries using their own materials. Vegetable seed packs and training on vegetable production were provided in April/May to all beneficiary households in groups of 20, except that some groups, for example in Ward 4, had not prepared their gardens and, therefore, did not get seed. Although the EA reports stated that 100 community nutrition gardens had been established, about 50 gardens were actually established. This was because some communities could not prepare gardens, a necessary condition to receive seed. Other communities opted not to use the borehole water for watering gardens, fearing that the water would not be adequate to sustain domestic, livestock and vegetable gardens. ZRCS asked Agritex to help implement this activity.

**The groups that got seed produced enough vegetables for own consumption, with some surplus for sale to meet basic household needs and contribute to a fund for borehole maintenance and purchase of vegetable seeds for use in the future.**

#### 4.2.3 Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion

The outcome of this component was: *Access to safe and clean water for domestic and livestock consumption and improved hygiene practices and access to basic sanitation facilities for 10,000 beneficiaries in Nkayi District is increased*; while the outputs were: *10,000 people have access to safe water, increased access to water for livestock and increased knowledge in hygiene*. These outputs would be achieved through the following activities:

- (i) Continuous assessments of water, sanitation, and hygiene situation;
- (ii) 50 boreholes rehabilitated with water troughs constructed at each borehole;
- (iii) 20 volunteers trained in participatory health and hygiene education;
- (iv) 400 household latrines constructed in selected vulnerable communities; and
- (v) Community level cascading of participatory health hygiene education.

**Assessment of water, sanitation and hygiene situation was conducted, while only 20 out of the 50 boreholes were rehabilitated and 180 out of the 400 latrines were constructed.** The low level of financial support for the appeal was the reason for reducing the planned targets. However, the 20 volunteers were successfully trained in participatory health and hygiene education (PHHE) by the Ministry of Health and Child Care, after which they cascaded the training to all the beneficiary households for six months up to September 2013. **The performance on WATSAN interventions,**

especially the borehole rehabilitation, was satisfactory, given the low level of funding.

#### 4.2.4 Disaster risk reduction

The outcome of this fourth component was: Community resilience is strengthened through disaster risk reduction activities focusing on early warning systems and, enhanced coping mechanisms/strategies; while the output was: Affected communities are better prepared to respond to food insecurity problems resulting from weather induced emergencies. This would be achieved through the following activities: train 2,000 households in early warning systems; train 2,000 households in climate change awareness and adaptation; and develop one district level contingency plan and 40 community-based early warning systems.

**This component was partially implemented by integrating some DRR activities into the livelihood training activities under components 2 and 3. The district level contingency plan and community-based early warning systems could not be implemented due to inadequate resources.**

#### 4.3 Financial Performance

The budgeted cost of the EA was CHF1,290,342. Five Partner National Societies (American Red Cross Society, British Red Cross Society, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Red Cross of Monaco and the Swedish Red Cross) contributed a total of CHF432,175 which was 33.5% of the budget. The Disaster Relief and Emergency Fund (DREF) contributed a start-up loan of CHF120,000, which, as per existing regulations, was deducted from the project when the EA responses exceeded 150% of the loan. The low response to the EA had a significant negative impact on the implementation of the EA as discussed above.

Total expenditure on the EA was CHF427,428. The expenditure on different line items is shown in Table 2.

**Table 2. Expenditure on Emergency Appeal**

Area of expenditure	Amount, CHF	% of total expenditure
Relief items for beneficiaries (food, seeds and plants and water, sanitation and hygiene)	183,541	42.9
Logistics and transport (distribution, monitoring, transport and vehicle costs)	25,252	5.9
Personnel (international, national and national society staff and volunteers)	126,432	29.6
Consultants and professional fees	53	-
Workshops and training	5,498	1.3
General expenditure (travel, information and public relations, office costs, communications, finance charges, other general expenses, and shared office and service costs)	58,343	13.6
Indirect costs (Programme and services support recovery)	25,943	6.1
Pledge specific costs (ear marking and reporting fees)	2,366	0.6
<b>Total expenditure</b>	<b>427,428</b>	<b>100</b>

The direct cost of benefits received by the vulnerable communities was CHF214,291 (50.1% of expenditure), while the total cost of delivering this relief was CHF213,137 (49.9%). A review of the approved budget indicated that the direct costs of benefits to the communities would have been about 67%. Due to prior commitments on some staff contracts, it was not possible to reduce the staff costs to be in line with the level of funded activities on a *pro-rata* basis. This had the effect of making the EA operations inefficient. Some PNS representatives have raised concern on the high cost of delivering relief, arguing that EA funds should not be used to offset organizational costs. In future, the **IFRC**

**country office and ZRCS should only issue EA staff contracts following confirmation of levels of funding to ensure that the cost of delivering relief matches the approved budget on a *pro-rata* basis, except where fixed costs precludes attainment of this condition.**

## **5. PARTNERSHIPS AND IMAGE OF THE ZIMBABWE RED CROSS SOCIETY**

At the national level, ZRCS has a very good working relationship with the government, particularly the Ministry of Defence which is responsible for administering the Zimbabwe Red Cross Act (Chapter 17:08). The government appreciates the mandate of ZRCS, its neutrality and non-discrimination as it undertakes its work to alleviate human suffering. The government's attitude is one of wanting to facilitate the work of ZRCS by opening doors with the various ministries and agencies whenever this may be necessary. Although ZRCS has a seat on the CPU, senior staff in the Department of Civil Protection reported that they were not aware that ZRCS had been involved in food relief in Nkayi District. ZRCS had assumed that the local government structures at district and provincial level would report to the national level on such activities. **In future, it may be a good practice for ZRCS to report on their activities to the national level as local government reports from the district and provinces may not have enough detail on a specific agency's work.**

With other actors at the national level, ZRCS participates in information exchange platforms such as the FAO-convened Agriculture Coordination and Information Forum monthly meeting of all public institutions, NGOs and donors involved in food security and agriculture and membership of technical clusters such as those dealing with water and sanitation, nutrition and health. Similarly, ZRCS and IFRC have partnered with WFP as implementing partners in the Nutritional Support for ART (Anti-retroviral therapy) clients (NSART) in Bindura and Zvimba Districts of Mashonaland West and Central respectively. This relationship helped the IFRC country office and ZRCS to access WFP tools for use in Nkayi District.

The members of the DRC in Nkayi indicated that ZRCS was viewed positively by all stakeholders. They noted that even at the local level, traditional leaders who provided support on the ground would have communicated any negative issues to the authorities if anything had been amiss. However, there was one exception where staff of the ZRCS were reported to have conducted monitoring visits to the communities, especially to check on progress in the construction of toilets and gardens, without the participation of some committee members. ZRCS had a good explanation for this in that they had one vehicle which was being used to ferry building materials, garden inputs, and DDF personnel for doing borehole rehabilitation, leaving no room in the vehicle for carrying other stakeholders who did not have transport of their own. In addition, ZRCS produced monthly reports for the DA's office, RDC, Social Services and DDF but not for other stakeholders at the district who would have liked to be kept informed of progress. ZRCS had been under the impression that the DA's office would share the report with all other stakeholders, hence the omission. Therefore, **reporting should not only reach district authorities but local ward leaders and communities.**

**Partnership with agencies that had a specific role at the district and ward levels during implementation of the EA was generally satisfactory.** For example, the Department of Social Welfare and traditional leaders participated in the selection of beneficiaries, local volunteers that had been trained by ZRCS and traditional leaders participated in food distributions, DDF participated in the identification, rehabilitation and training of borehole committees, Agritex trained volunteers and beneficiary households in conservation agriculture and construction and management of nutrition gardens, while the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare's Environmental Health Unit provided volunteers with participatory health and hygiene education for dissemination to beneficiary households.

Private sector involvement was through the participation of the District Business Association in the DRC. Although the tender process for providing food was open to local traders, they did not have enough capacity to deliver the large quantities of food required. However, they could supply some latrine building materials (galvanized roofing sheets) to community members to supplement those that had been provided by ZRCS through the EA.

ZRCS management noted that potential partner perceptions about the national society and the Movement in general are that they are well-resourced and, therefore, not in need of partnership. In addition, the public views ZRCS as an NGO rather than an independent auxiliary to Government. Lately, ZRCS has been working on improving the visibility of the national society and its image, including appointment of a Zimbabwean musician, Alick Macheso, as a brand ambassador. This has resulted in improved understanding of its role by the public. It has been difficult to mobilise resources in-country given these perceptions, for example, private sector involvement has been little. **ZRCS is now appealing to local donors, especially the private sector, to support it as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).** Hopefully, this would see more local participation in future EAs as opposed to the case now where virtually all responses come from PNS.

In developing a community resilience approach, it will be **necessary for ZRCS to focus on implementing humanitarian assistance such as food distribution but partnering with other agencies with comparative advantage in livelihoods interventions.** These include relevant Government departments (Agritex, DDF, Ministry of Health and Child Care), NGOs and CBOs, with technical backstopping from international development partners such as FAO. However, to be effective, Government departments would need to be well resourced to play their role well. The private sector will have a role to play by supplying affordable inputs and markets for agricultural produce and other non-agricultural products from the communities.

## 6. EXIT STRATEGY

An exit strategy is necessary to prepare beneficiaries and local partners on how they would sustain the gains they would have achieved on cessation of the EA interventions. This is best reviewed against each of the EA components.

### 6.1 Distribution of Supplementary Food Baskets

The food distribution component was designed to last four months, ending in April 2013. The intention was to cover the peak of the hunger period, ending at the time the green harvest was expected. Households were then expected to make do with food from their own production, assuming a successful agricultural season. As it turned out, the rainfall situation in the 2012/2013 agricultural season was worse than the previous season, with most community members, especially in Ward 20, not able to plant any crops. At the time of the evaluation, the beneficiaries were hoping that ZRCS would mount another food distribution exercise as they considered the food insecurity to be worse than at the time of the EA in 2013.

It is apparent that the “exit strategy” here was heavily dependent on the probability of a good rainy season, which did not materialise. The distribution of food might be inadvertently creating a dependence syndrome among the beneficiaries. This has hitherto applied to all seasonal targeted assistance (STA) in Zimbabwe, although official Government policy is moving towards conditional assistance where able-bodied beneficiaries would be expected to participate in food for work/assets programmes before they can be given food. **While Government thinking is currently limited to developing community assets such as small dams and community woodlots, it may be worth considering combining this with development of individual household assets, especially those that would promote livelihoods.** This would include water conservation structures in agricultural

fields and construction of grain storage facilities, among others. Such an approach has been used successfully elsewhere in Africa, for example Kenya. This would use food assistance to reinforce livelihoods and resilience efforts. Conditional seasonal targeted assistance is better than the current system in that it restores the dignity and the power to choose to the beneficiaries, especially if combined with provision of unrestricted cash transfers rather than a pre-determined food basket.

## 6.2 Food Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods

In the original EA design, ZRCS would have distributed small grain seeds, fertilizers and maize seed and productive tools in order to boost crop production, assuming reasonable rains. However, both of these developments did not materialize. The agricultural inputs could not be distributed due to the lateness of the appeal as well as the low response in funding. Focus was then placed on training beneficiaries in conservation agriculture, climate change and adaptation and market linkages through lead farmers as well as promotion of small grain production in future seasons. In the absence of inputs, the training was theoretical at best, while small grain seed selection and preservation and distribution of tools could not take place. Even if the appeal had been in synchrony with the agricultural season, it might not have been possible to distribute small grain seed as there was none on the market.

Vegetable (tomato, onion, cabbage, kale, rape and okra) and sugar bean seeds were distributed in April/May for use in community nutrition gardens. This was supported by training of volunteers and beneficiaries in crop production, market linkages and nutrition gardening. The training was conducted by the local Agritex extension workers, ensuring sustainability of practices on cessation of the EA support. **This was an appropriate exit strategy.**

## 6.3 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

The water and sanitation component was aimed at improving access to safe water for beneficiaries and their livestock and increased knowledge of hygiene. This was to be achieved by rehabilitating 50 boreholes and fitting them with water troughs for watering livestock, training of volunteers in participatory health and hygiene education and constructing 400 household latrines. Due to shortage of resources, only 20 boreholes were rehabilitated, while 180 latrines were built. DDF rehabilitated the boreholes and trained Water Point Committees and local pump minders to be responsible for maintenance of the boreholes, while local volunteer builders constructed the latrines. The Water Point Committees were encouraged to set up a fund by making monthly contributions of up to \$1 to pay the pump minders for repairs when necessary, as well as prepare for replacement of the major parts when this falls due. Pump minders charged \$30-50 for repairs. DDF had estimated that the parts that had been procured through the EA at a cost of about USD1,000 would last about five years on average, before needing replacement. However, not all committees set up a fund as some preferred to collect the money from community members to meet the cost of repairs every time the borehole broke down. **The use of a local public institution (DDF), community-based organisations (Water Point Committees and pump minders), local builders and creation of a fund for maintenance was an example of a good exit strategy as it resulted in the strengthening of local communities and empowerment of beneficiaries.**

The training of volunteers on participatory health and hygiene education by the Ministry of Health and Child Care personnel was followed by a cascading of the training by volunteers to beneficiaries. This would ensure that the knowledge and skills would be resident in the communities, ensuring sustainability. **However, the training on the use of latrines had apparently not been completed satisfactorily before the EA operations ended. Out of the many latrines that were viewed during the evaluation, only one had a facility for washing hands after use of the toilet, while the rest had none.** Although the beneficiaries were aware of the need for hand washing, they did not

seem to know how to set up the facility. Changes in attitudes, behaviours and practice take time and would require follow-up by government and ZRCS branches post EA change.

An exit strategy based on volunteers who receive a token allowance during EA activities could create an expectation which would militate against continuation of activities once the EA ceases. ZRCS should consider non-material ways of keeping the volunteers motivated, such as recognition and citation at community gatherings.

## 6.4 Disaster Risk Reduction

As discussed earlier, this component was partially implemented by integrating some activities into the food security, nutrition and livelihoods component. This component would have been better built into all the other components as a cross-cutting issue. The idea of a district level contingency plan and an early warning system, with built-in community-level response mechanisms, would be worth pursuing as part of a wider DRR strategy, probably coordinated at national level. It would be expecting too much for such an activity to be implemented through an emergency appeal.

**From the foregoing, it is clear that ZRCS and its Movement partners need to develop a long-term DRR and food and nutrition security strategy.** This would include clarity on the appropriate components of emergency appeals and livelihoods and how to integrate them. **It is imperative that as ZRCS and its Movement partners pursue their mandate to alleviate human suffering, they do this in a way that helps to maintain the dignity and power of choice of the beneficiaries.** Therefore, the plan to use cash transfers in the current EA in Gwanda is commendable, although in future ZRCS may consider building in a conditionality that would promote development of community and productive assets for individual households.

## 7. IMPACT OF EMERGENCY APPEAL

### 7.1 Impact on Food and Nutrition Security

The needs and capacity assessments that were conducted in November and December 2012 prior to the food distributions showed that the selected households were facing food insecurity, as evidenced by negative coping mechanisms. These included gold panning, skipping meals and disposal of livestock. It was also reported that a large number of children dropped out of school in order to engage in income generating activities to contribute to household livelihood.

All stakeholders at the district level, including members of the Drought Relief Committee, ZRCS governance structures and volunteers, traditional leaders and beneficiaries, agreed that **the food distribution had significantly improved the beneficiaries' food security situation.** This was in spite of the reduced food basket. **The post-distribution monitoring reports indicated an increase in dietary diversity, the number of meals per day, an increase in school attendance and an improvement in the nutritional condition of children visiting health centres for growth monitoring.** Unfortunately, the improvement was transient as the subsequent harvest season yielded little due to poor rains, leaving the beneficiaries in a worse predicament.

**The nutrition gardens increased the supply of green vegetables for own consumption by the beneficiary households, with some groups producing surplus for sale.** One of the groups in Ward 4 had reserved part of the money they raised from selling surplus vegetables to use for buying vegetable seed in the following year. Although many groups used the gardens during the dry season, a few had also grown early maize under irrigation during the rainy season, thereby augmenting their food security from green mealies.

## 7.2 Impact on Water and Sanitation

The rehabilitation of the boreholes made a significant difference to the availability of clean and safe water for both domestic use and livestock and for watering vegetables in the newly established nutrition gardens. Beneficiaries appreciated the fact that they no longer needed to travel long distances to fetch water, while the water was much cleaner and safer than what they previously fetched from polluted open water sources. **The construction of water troughs at the boreholes and protective structures around the borehole enabled beneficiary communities to water their livestock.** Due to the **strengthening of the Community Water point Committees and the pump minders**, the impact of this intervention was still being felt at the time of the evaluation. Most of the boreholes were still functioning.

**Although only 180 households got latrines, the individual beneficiaries appreciated the difference that this made to their hygiene and the reduced pollution to their open water sources.** However, due to the small number of latrines and given the high proportion of households practising open defecation, the impact of the latrines on community sanitation was negligible.

## 7.3 Impact on the Resilience of Communities to Climate-Induced Food Insecurity Emergencies

Due to the lateness of the appeal and the inability to provide productive agricultural inputs and tools, and the fact that the DRR-related activities were partially implemented due to lack of resources, the impact of the training on climate change and adaptation was limited. This is because there was no practical application of the training by the beneficiaries. However, many beneficiaries reported that they had **planted their fields this season using conservation agriculture methods**, something they ascribed to training through the EA and previous interventions in the district.

## 7.4 Community Response to Disasters

Communities in the three wards have demonstrated that they can manage the maintenance of their boreholes. However, there is still a long way to go before they can take charge of their food security issues.

## 8. FUTURE FOOD SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

The ZIMVAC (2013) report identified **shortage of domestic and productive water as the main development challenge**. As a result, the main development priorities cited by most (74.4%) households that participated in the ZIMVAC survey were **irrigation development and borehole rehabilitation, followed by improved water and sanitation**. This was confirmed in interviews with the various stakeholders at national and district level, including the beneficiaries. They identified drought as the major cause of poor agricultural performance and the resultant food insecurity. Therefore, any long-term strategy for Zimbabwe and the Southern African region must take the adverse changes in weather patterns into account.

The following were suggested as potential solutions to the chronic food insecurity:

- (i) Investment in **dam construction and development of irrigation schemes** so that communities are not dependent on rain fed agriculture;
- (ii) Promotion of **water conservation and conservation agriculture** as mechanisms to adapt to climate change;
- (iii) Promotion of small grain production in drier areas, provided the issues of food preference by the people and availability of seed are addressed;

- (iv) Focus on livestock production, including small livestock such as poultry and goats which are easy to dispose of and are largely owned by women; and
- (v) Any production-related projects should be supported with **market linkages**.

Therefore, the main food security strategy would concentrate on building the communities' resilience through increased food production. With the increasing donor fatigue towards food assistance, the move is towards promotion of livelihoods through **increased production and promotion of market linkages**. There will still be a need to continue with food assistance for welfare cases, which are about 12% of the rural population even in good seasons, and for the rest of the population during years of serious food shortages. However, for the able-bodied population, any food assistance must be used to reinforce resilience efforts through food for assets programmes, including development of productive assets at individual household level such as grain storage and water conservation facilities.

The main challenge of integrating food relief efforts into development of livelihoods and resilience is that one has a very short time-frame, while development requires medium-long term to be effective. **One way around this would be for ZRCS and its partners to focus relief efforts in areas where they have previously had development-oriented projects. Alternatively, future development projects could be located in areas where emergency appeal activities had been previously implemented. This would allow relief efforts to reinforce development interventions by utilizing existing local structures, partnerships and experiences on what works.**

A strategy that combines relief with resilience would require that national societies and their partners collaborate with other actors that have the requisite capacities. This would include WFP in areas of cash transfers and conditional seasonal targeted food assistance, FAO and Government extension services in conservation agriculture and climate change adaptation technologies and NGOs in promotion of market linkages, among others.

Government and WFP use the vulnerability assessment results to select beneficiary districts based on the average food insecurity situation rather than the situation at ward level. **Therefore, while still using the broader vulnerability results, national societies can make use of local ward level and district structures to target pockets of need which would otherwise be ignored by WFP. However, such efforts would need to be complementary to and be coordinated with WFP and other relief agencies operating in any given area to avoid duplication of efforts.**

Although national societies can justify their involvement in alleviating human suffering by providing emergency food assistance to vulnerable communities, there are some areas where they may be stronger compared to WFP and other relief agencies. These include conflict situations, response to man-made and natural disasters and community-based health and first aid interventions. However, this should not preclude their involvement in strengthening community resilience.

## **9. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

### **9.1 Conclusions**

The conclusions of this evaluation are presented for the evaluation issues identified in the Terms of Reference (ToR). In arriving at these conclusions, the evaluator used the following criteria:

- (a) Highly satisfactory (according to plan or exceeding the plan);
- (b) Satisfactory (not necessarily according to plan but, on balance, adapting to revolving context, with more positive than negative aspects); and
- (c) Unsatisfactory (not sufficiently according to plan, not taking account of the evolving context; a few positive aspects, but outweighed by negative aspects).

- (i) **The early warning systems were effective in informing ZRCS and IFRC about the food insecurity situation in good time, but the response was unsatisfactorily slow.** The reasons for the delayed launch of the EA included management of loss of confidence in the national society by donors, the necessary consultations among the Movement partners and the lengthy approval processes from the IFRC country office, region, zone and Geneva Headquarters.
- (ii) Although the twin-track strategy was appropriate, the EA tried to do too much with limited resources and within a limited amount of time. **ZRCS should have focused on food distribution and borehole rehabilitation as these two components reinforced each other.** The resilience and disaster risk reduction interventions should have been left out as they needed more time for repeated training and practice to change attitudes and habits. Overall, the strategy was *appropriate*.
- (iii) The activities were all partially implemented compared to the plan due to lack of funding and the short duration. Due to the low funding level and contractual obligations related to staffing, **the financial efficiency achieved in the implementation of the EA was unsatisfactorily low.** The direct cost of benefits received by the vulnerable communities was almost equal (50.1%) to the cost of delivering this relief (49.9%).
- (iv) **Coordination efforts between ZRCS and the IFRC in-country and between ZRCS and other stakeholders at national, provincial and district level were highly participatory and satisfactory.** However, communication and feedback to some national and district entities could do with some improvement.
- (v) In common with the general practice in seasonal targeted assistance, the exit strategy for the food distribution component was based on the expectation of a good harvest at the end of the peak hunger period. The borehole rehabilitation and nutrition gardens utilised local Government institutions, community-based organisations as well as empowered targeted households. This was an **appropriate** exit strategy which ensured sustainability of interventions.
- (vi) **The food distribution had significantly improved the beneficiaries' food security situation,** while most community members reported that they had used conservation agriculture practices for the current crop. This was a *satisfactory* outcome.
- (vii) **The nutrition gardens satisfactorily improved dietary diversity and incomes for the 50 households** that participated. However, the impact of nutrition gardens on malnutrition was doubtful, given the complex nature of the causes of malnutrition
- (viii) The rehabilitation of the **boreholes made a significant difference to the availability of clean and safe water for both domestic use and livestock and for watering vegetables** in the newly established nutrition gardens. Due to the **strengthening of the community-based Community Water point Committees and the pump minders,** the impact of this intervention was still being felt at the time of the evaluation and was likely to continue. This was a highly *satisfactory* outcome.
- (ix) While the 180 households that got latrines appreciated the difference that this made to their hygiene, **the impact of the latrines on sanitation of the targeted community was negligible** since this only covered 12% of households with no latrines.

## 9.2 Lessons Learned

Based on stakeholder suggestions and conclusions by the evaluator, several *lessons learned* can be drawn as follows:

- (v) The early warning systems that are available to the ZRCS through the local ward, district and national level structures are adequate to prepare food and nutrition insecurity EAs in time to accommodate the necessary consultations and approval processes. This would allow the EA interventions to be synchronized with the agricultural season, thereby facilitating the incorporation of resilience and livelihood interventions.
- (vi) The involvement of in-county partner institutions in planning EAs facilitates information sharing, ownership and quick decision making among Movement partners. This would reduce delays in the launch of appeals.
- (vii) The involvement of Government and community-based institutions provides a built-in exit strategy which ensures sustainability of interventions following the cessation of an EA. The example from the borehole rehabilitation and nutrition garden components illustrate this point.
- (viii) Continuous communication with and provision of feedback to stakeholders has been a normal practice by ZRCS. In addition to reporting to authorities, provision of feedback to local traditional leaders and the target communities is necessary.

## 9.3 Recommendations

- (i) The main cause of the delay in launching the EA was not lack of early warning information, but the necessary consultative and lengthy approval processes. ZRCS and the IFRC country office could partly address this by providing all the information that would be of interest to the partners in order to pre-empt most of the questions that cause delays in decision making. This includes providing partners with contextual information specific to Zimbabwe, starting the planning for EAs early using informal sources of information pending release of official data and involving in-county partner national societies in planning EAs.
- (ii) The cost of delivering relief to vulnerable communities is normally carefully considered during the budget approval process. However, in the event that the EA is not well funded, attempts should be made to ensure that the cost of delivering relief is not disproportionately higher than that in the approved budget by applying a pro-rated reduction in the corresponding costs.
- (iii) The main challenge of integrating emergency food relief efforts into livelihoods and resilience interventions is the difference in timeframes. One way around this would be for IFRC and the national societies to focus relief efforts in areas where they have previously had development-oriented projects. Alternatively, future development projects could be located in areas where emergency appeal activities had been previously implemented. This would allow relief efforts to reinforce development interventions by utilizing existing local structures, partnerships and experiences on what works.
- (iv) The borehole rehabilitation component was a good example of an intervention that reinforced emergency food distribution in that it could be used for meeting immediate water needs, while providing a basis for food production through nutrition gardens. Therefore, while focus should be on acute emergency or life threatening situations, wherever possible, this should be supported by resilience interventions with minimal requirements for external support for sustainability.

- (v) The causes of malnutrition are complex and include inadequate intake of nutritious food, poor health and care practices. Therefore, nutrition interventions such as nutrition gardens and provision of supplements should be supported by studies to profile the causes of malnutrition in any given locality rather than using a one size fits all approach.
- (vi) Government and WFP use the vulnerability assessment results to select beneficiary districts based on the average food insecurity situation rather than the situation at ward level. Therefore, while still using the broader vulnerability results, ZRCS should also use local ward and district level structures to target pockets of need which would otherwise be ignored by WFP. However, such efforts would need to be complementary to and be coordinated with WFP and other relief agencies operating in any given area to avoid duplication of efforts.
- (vii) Where food markets are functional, national societies should use cash transfers to provide food relief to vulnerable households, restoring their dignity by giving them the power to choose what to purchase. The local private sector merchants could participate in supplying reasonably priced food to the beneficiaries empowered through cash transfers, thereby contributing to the development of local economies.
- (viii) Resilience building activities are based on behavioural changes and, therefore, should be implemented over the medium-long term. However, ZRCS does not have adequate capacity to implement resilience interventions in food and nutrition security. Therefore, it should focus on emergency food relief, while partnering with other agencies with comparative advantage in livelihoods interventions such as government departments, NGOS, CBOS and international development partners such as FAO. This would allow the government departments and CBOs to continue with the livelihood programmes once the emergency interventions come to an end.
- (ix) Official Government policy is moving towards conditional seasonal targeted food assistance where able-bodied beneficiaries would be expected to participate in food for work/assets programmes before they can be given food. While Government thinking is currently limited to developing community assets such as small dams and community woodlots, ZRCS should consider combining this with development of individual household assets, including water conservation structures in agricultural fields and construction of grain storage facilities, among others.
- (x) The future food and nutrition strategy for the Southern Africa region should be two-pronged. The strategy should concentrate on building the communities' resilience through increased food production, while maintaining a social safety net with targeted seasonal food assistance for the welfare cases that are incapable of engaging in production due to poor health, age and other reasons. For the able-bodied population, any food assistance should be used to reinforce resilience efforts through food-for-assets programmes, including development of productive assets at individual household level.

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## **ANNEXES**

### **Annex 1. List of Stakeholders Consulted**

#### **National Level (Harare)**

Oforbuike Nwobodo, Country Representative, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Maxwell Phiri, Secretary General, Zimbabwe Red Cross Society (ZRCS)

Rumbidzai Matewe, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, IFRC Country Office, Zimbabwe

Julita Manyere, Senior Finance and Admin Officer, IFRC Country Office, Zimbabwe

Cecil Maposa, Logistics and Warehouse Officer, IFRC Country Office, Zimbabwe

Karikoga Kutadzaushe, Operations Manager, ZRCS

Kaisa Rouvinen, Regional Health Delegate, Finnish Red Cross

Morris Machawira, Finance and Admin Manager, Acting Sec General, ZRCS

Andrew O Smith, DRM Officer, Danish Red Cross

Marshal Makuvare, Food Security and Livelihood Programme Officer, ZRCS

Elzat Mamutalieva, IFRC Interim Operations Manager

Miss Sibusisiwe Ndlovu, Deputy Director, Department of Civil Protection, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing

Lameck Besera, Research Officer, Department of Civil Protection, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing

Patrick Machaya, Deputy Secretary, Policy, Public Relations and International Affairs, Ministry of Defence

Sayaka Maeda, Programme Officer, World Food Programme (WFP)

Arthur Pagiwa, Health and Nutrition Unit, WFP

Marta Fontan, WFP

Andrew Odera, Vulnerability and Markets Evaluation Unit, WFP

Gift Magaya, Vulnerability and Markets Evaluation Unit, WFP

JeanClaude Urvoy, Head of Operations, FAO

Andrea Russo, Programmes Support Officer, FAO

Douglas Magunda, M&E Officer, FAO

Delilah Takawira, Nutrition Officer, FAO

#### **Provincial Level (Matebeleland North and Bulawayo)**

Mrs Valo, Manager, Zimbabwe Red Cross Society

Thulani Sibanda, Provincial/District Project Officer, Zimbabwe Red Cross Society

#### **Nkayi District**

F Muchokore, Assistant District Administrator, Local Government

J Ncube, District Development Fund (DDF)

J J Sibanda, Environmental Health Officer, Ministry of Health and Child Care

T Mpofo, Division of Livestock and Production Development

M Nyakutsikwa, Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development

T Ndimande, District Agricultural Extension Officer, Agritex

T Ndlovu, Zimbabwe Prison Services

B Nyathi, Police Internal Security and Intelligence (PISI) Unit

I Makambwa, Department of Social Services

A Jobi, Zimbabwe Prison Services

B Zharare, President's Office

P Ncube, Chairman, Nkayi District, Zimbabwe Red Cross Society

**Nkayi District – Ward 3**

E Magama, Agricultural Extension Worker, Agritex  
10 Kraal heads (3 female), Setshanke Area  
150 community members, including beneficiaries

**Nkayi District – Ward 4**

Mr Dube, Local Builder and beneficiary, Hojeni Village  
Beneficiaries (5) and Volunteers (3), Hojeni Village  
Cynthia Dube, Agricultural Extension Worker, Agritex Mapani Village,  
50 community members, including beneficiaries, Mapani Village

**Nkayi District – Ward 20**

L Tshuma, Kraal head, Eguqeni Area  
Mrs J Nyoni, Kraal head, Eguqeni Area  
9 Beneficiaries, Guqa Village  
M Ncube, Kraal head, Matshuzula Village  
8 Beneficiaries, Matshuzula Village  
12 Beneficiaries, Zinyangeni Rural Centre

## **Annex 2. Terms of Reference for an Evaluation of the Food Insecurity Emergency Appeal for Zimbabwe**

### **Introduction and Objectives**

Based on the response to the food crisis in Southern Africa region, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched four appeals to support the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies response for saving lives and protecting livelihoods whilst contributing to building resilience and recovery to the affected population.

During the last two years, erratic rainfall with uneven distribution has been the main factor that led to poor harvests in the southern Africa region, including Malawi Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Angola. Other parts of the region were also affected. The food insecurity situation was worsened by a number of other factors, including economic decline, chronic and extreme poverty, and most significantly the impact of the growing HIV and AIDS pandemic. HIV and AIDS are intimately related to food insecurity and poverty in a cyclical relationship. HIV and AIDS impact negatively on agricultural productivity and increases dependency ratios, resulting in increased food insecurity. Reduced access to and utilization of food in turn leads to increased poverty. People may adopt coping strategies which increase their exposure to HIV and AIDS; a lack of food decreases resistance and increases the impact of opportunistic infections for those already living with HIV - the circle goes on.

Zimbabwe is experiencing chronic food insecurity. The trends in food insecurity over the year's show that the situation has been worsening year to year with 2012/2013 having 1.6 million rural households (19%) in need of food assistance. According to the 2013 Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) report produced in May, the 2013/ 2014 consumption year is projected to have 2.2 million people, representing 25% of rural households that are to be food insecure at the peak of the hunger period in March 2014. This is a 32% increase compared with the immediate previous year.

In 2012, in Malawi it is estimated that 1.63 million people were food insecure and require support, while in Lesotho, following the failure of two successive crop seasons due to flooding and adverse weather, maize production fell by 77 per cent compared to the 2010/11 season; Angola was equally experiencing the worst drought in recent memory; with 1,833,900 people affected, of whom 533,000 are children under 5 years. In Mozambique, the areas for concern included southern and central regions of the country.

The national societies in southern Africa work closely with other humanitarian organisations and UN agencies, such as FAO, WFP, OCHA and national governments in coordinate actions, carrying out assessments through the National VAC and participating in dissemination forums for crop forecast. The IFRC closely monitored the situation, liaising with other agencies like WFP and FAO and other humanitarian actors in the region through the regional inter-agency standing committee office (RIACSO).

Protecting livelihoods and building resilience has been at the heart of the operations in helping communities who have been affected by chronic and cyclical crisis. In most of the countries the focus for the emergency outcome was relief and recovery: food relief, health (with a focus on software) and food security activities in Malawi; food aid, seed distribution, technical support for farmers DRR and Community based preparedness in Lesotho; food aid livelihoods and water and sanitation in Zimbabwe, and relief, food aid, health and resilience activities including risk reduction in Angola.

Due to timing and resource constraints, this evaluation will focus initially only on Zimbabwe in 2013, and with a focus on the three remaining countries based on additional resources.

The objectives of the Zimbabwe evaluation are the following:

1. Identify lessons related to the timely launch of the Zimbabwe Emergency Appeal;
2. Twin-track – how and why was twin-track integrated in the planning phase?
3. The relevance of the outcome and activities and of the level of funding sought versus funding received.
4. Assess the preparedness and early action activities of the Zimbabwe Red Cross (ZRCS) and their engagement towards the Emergency Appeals and their surge capacity (did the operations provide sufficient back up in finance, monitoring and evaluation)
5. Review the engagement of the Participating National Societies (PNS) in country during the emergency phase.
6. Identify the field gaps where Movement cooperation work in the field could have been improved and what sort of support would be recommended for future operations
7. Measure the level of commitment of the ZRCS to continue engaging in longer-term food security and resilience together with Government, UN, other stakeholders and / or local partnerships.
8. Identify ZRCS's relative advantage and niche in relation to other stakeholders like WFP
9. Provide lessons and recommendations for future Emergency Appeals in Zimbabwe.

**The evaluation will provide feedback around the following key questions:**

**DREF, Early Warning, Early Action and Preparedness**

- What advocacy, preparedness and early action activities were undertaken by ZRCS and other stakeholders, and were they appropriate?
- Was the coordination mechanism with the ZRCS and PNS appropriate? Were they linked to past or existing food security programmes, longer-term development or strategic plans?
- To what extent did these mechanisms lead to, or support preparedness and resilience initiatives at regional and national levels?
- Has the IFRC been able to identify technical expertise (agronomy, horticulture, market-gardening, adapted livestock) specific to the region? Was any training been done In ZRCS?

**Strategy**

- Was the strategic approach chosen for the food insecurity suitable for the crisis, to respond to this crisis? Was the twin-track approach adopted for this crisis? If yes, why? (emergency response strategy with medium to long term development approaches)
- Did the strategic approach take into consideration the ZRCS strategic plans to assess the sustainability of longer term resilience?
- What kinds of community based activities were included to build resilience and income generation?

**Coordination**

- How did the regional coordination mechanisms work for the interaction between the ZRCS, IFRC and the PNS during the operations?
- How can coordination improve the capacities of the ZRCS?
- Could a different lead role approach (PNS/National Society) facilitated tackling the food insecurity crisis with in view a better resource management whether human, funding, logistics, transport and communications?
- How can the resilience approach lead to actual changes on the ground in terms of coordination and collaboration between the authorities, Movement partners and development partners in food security?

## **Resilience Building**

Since the “R” word is now a global approach recognized as a priority among humanitarian organizations, something the Movement partners have also been supporting through capacity building, how can the Red Cross Red Crescent actually contribute to longer term community based resilience building?

## **Partnership**

- How has the image of the Red Cross Red Crescent response been perceived by the authorities and other partners during the food insecurity operations?
- How does WFP, FAO, UNICEF and other partners view their working relationship with the ZRCS?
- What can be done to facilitate a community resilience approach when developing new partnerships and possibly involve the private sector in planning and programming, especially regarding pricing, access to markets and food (food merchants and supermarkets) and financial institutions (cash transfer).

## **Exit Strategy**

- Was an exit strategy integrated or put in place at the end of the food security interventions?
- Have discussions taken place with the ZRCS?
  - Did ZRCS revise their longer-term plan of action in order to integrated longer term food security/livelihood activities? Are the activities already part of their plan of actions? If not, why not?
  - Are ZRCS satisfied with their longer-term DRR and livelihoods programming?
  - Were the activities adapted and would the ZRCS encourage the same outcomes and outputs in the case of addressing another food emergency crisis?
  - After this operation, does ZRCS feel they have contributed with the right response to help communities during the food security in their respective countries? Are there other initiatives or actions they feel should have been included?

## **Lessons learnt, Best Practices and Learning**

- What are key lessons learnt and best practices in tackling food insecurity resilience building programming? (from emergency to mid-longer term)
- What are key lessons learnt and best practices in resilience building activities?
- How to apply the best practices in Southern Africa region in longer-term, small scale community based support to agriculture, irrigation, integrated farming, natural fertilizer production and live-stock practices?
- How to guide communities to return to the promotion of local food production and decrease food dependency.

## **Future Food Security Strategy for Southern Africa**

Throughout the meetings with various stakeholders and donors, the consultant is asked to consult on the future direction that the IFRC should take:

- What direction should the IFRC’s Food Security Strategy take to address the chronic food security crisis in Southern Africa?
- Should the Strategy focus on partnerships with WFP? Should it establish and draw on regional experts in cash?
- Should IFRC target as less dense populations which are largely ignored by WFP?
- Should IFRC focus on basic, behavioural causes of malnutrition through a Community-based Health and First Aid (CBHFA) type approach?

### **Staffing and Methodology**

The evaluation team will be led by an external consultant and will be supported by an IFRC food security expert and an IFRC monitoring and evaluation specialist. The team will carry out this short one week visit to Zimbabwe only. (The remaining three countries: Malawi, Lesotho and Angola will be done at a later stage).

The methodology will be both light and rapid to generate useful lessons learnt on the various applications of IFRC internal processes; reviewing the relevance of timing and expenses. Desk research will be conducted in advance, as well as preparatory meetings to – among other things - identify key stakeholders and partners (WFP, Partner National Societies, UNICEF, OCHA, including the participation at the planning stage of beneficiaries) to be interviewed. The team will adopt a participatory approach, undertaking outreach and communications activities throughout to ensure effective uptake and lesson learning.

### **Reporting management line**

The focal person and reporting line manager responsible for this evaluation is **Mos. Melanie Ogle, Africa Zone DM ([melanie.ogle@ifrc.org](mailto:melanie.ogle@ifrc.org))** and **Mr. Joy Singhal, Operation Coordinator in Southern Africa Region ([joy.singhal@ifrc.org](mailto:joy.singhal@ifrc.org))**

### **Timing**

Field visits: Mission to the region – interview and visit period	
<b>Field Missions</b> to Zimbabwe,	
<b>Gaborone:</b> Presentation of findings to the Regional Representative and Operations Coordinator in Gaborone.	
<b>Submission of Evaluation Paper:</b> the Regional Representative, Director of Zone, Secretariat and Southern Africa based Movement partners and supporting PNS.	

### **Management and Reporting**

The review and report is intended as lessons learned and a guiding document for future emergencies with a strong disaster risk reduction, capacity building, resilience and food security approach bringing in new and old food growing techniques.

### **Annex 3. Data Collection Tools – Interview Guidelines**

#### **Preparedness - Early Warning and Early Actions (IFRC Country Office, ZRCS and PNS)**

- What preparedness and early action activities were undertaken by ZRCS, IFRC and other stakeholders (e.g. advocacy)?
- How timely and appropriate were these actions?
- How were these actions coordinated among the IFRC country office, ZCRS and Partner National Societies (PNS) in-country and out-country?
- How well did the coordination mechanism link to past or existing food security programmes, longer-term development or strategic plans?
- To what extent did these mechanisms lead to, or support preparedness and resilience initiatives at regional and national levels?
- Did ZRCS have a need for technical expertise (agronomy, horticulture, market-gardening, water and sanitation, disaster preparedness) in order to implement the appeal?
- If yes, how was this met?
- What role did the IFRC country office play in securing technical expertise?

#### **Strategy and Implementation (IFRC Country Office, ZRCS HQ and provincial/district structures, PNS and Civil Protection Unit, Agritex, local leaders and beneficiaries)**

- How suitable was the twin-track strategic approach (emergency response strategy with medium to long term development approaches) chosen to respond to the food insecurity crisis? Give reasons.
- Did the strategic approach take into consideration the ZRCS strategic plans to assess the sustainability of longer term resilience?
- How appropriate was the beneficiary targeting and registration strategy?
- How well were the preparations for and actual food and input distribution conducted: awareness, training of volunteers, community participation, timeliness?
- What kinds of community-based activities were included to build resilience and income generation?
- In general, how can the IFRC contribute to longer term community-based resilience building?

#### **Coordination (IFRC Country Office, ZRCS and PNS)**

- How did the regional coordination mechanisms work for the interaction between the ZRCS, IFRC and the PNS during the operations?
- How can coordination improve the capacities of the ZRCS?
- Could a different lead role between IFRC, PNS and National Society have facilitated tackling of the food insecurity crisis with a view to improve resource management whether human, funding, logistics, transport and communications?
- How can the resilience approach lead to actual changes on the ground in terms of coordination and collaboration between the authorities, movement partners and development partners in food security?

#### **Partnership (IFRC Country Office, ZRCS, PNS and Civil Protection Unit, OCHA, WFP, FAO, Agritex, Ministry of Health and Child Care, Local Government and Traditional Leaders)**

- How has the image of the Red Cross Red Crescent response been perceived by the authorities and other partners during the food insecurity operations?

- How do OCHA, WFP, FAO and other international partners view their working relationship with IFRC and ZRCS?
- To what extent were the local partners (CPU, Ministry of Health and Child Care, local Government, provincial and district ZRCS structures, Agritex) involved in the planning and execution of the appeal?
- What can be done to facilitate a community resilience approach when developing new partnerships and possibly involve the private sector in planning and programming, especially regarding pricing, access to markets and food (food merchants and supermarkets) and financial institutions (cash transfer)?

**Exit Strategy (IFRC Country Office, ZRCS, PNS, CPU, Agritex, Local Government structures, Traditional Leaders)**

- Was an exit strategy integrated or put in place at the end of the food security interventions?
- Did ZRCS and partners revise their longer-term plan of action in order to integrated longer term food security/livelihood activities? Are the activities already part of their plan of actions? If not, why not?
- Are ZRCS and partners satisfied with their longer-term DRR and livelihoods programming?
- Would ZRCS and partners encourage the same outcomes and outputs in the case of addressing another food emergency crisis?
- After this operation, does ZRCS and its partners feel they have contributed with the right response to help communities during the food insecurity in Nkayi District?
- What other initiatives or actions should ZRCS have included?

**Impact of Emergency Appeal (IFRC Country Office, ZRCS, PNS, CPU, Agritex, Ministry of Health and Child Care Local Government Structures, Traditional Leaders, Beneficiaries)**

- What impact did the appeal have on food and nutrition security in the district's three wards (number of meals per day, dietary diversity, child malnutrition etc.)?
- What difference did the appeal make to the water and sanitation situation in the district?
- What difference did the appeal make to the resilience of the communities to climate induced food insecurity emergencies?
- What can communities do at local level in response to disasters?

**Lessons Learnt, Best Practices and Learning (IFRC Country Office, ZRCS, PNS and Civil Protection Unit, WFP, FAO, Agritex, Min of Health and Child Care, Provincial and District Structures of ZRCS, Local Leaders)**

- What are the key lessons learnt and best practices in tackling food insecurity and resilience building programming? (from emergency to mid-longer term)
- What are key lessons learnt and best practices in resilience building activities?
- How can the identified best practices apply in the Southern African region in the longer-term with respect to small scale community based support to agriculture, irrigation, integrated farming, natural fertilizer production and live-stock practices?
- How can the communities be guided to return to the promotion of local food production and decrease food dependency?

**Future Food Security Strategy for Southern Africa (IFRC Country Office, ZRCS, PNS)**

- What direction should the IFRC's Food Security Strategy take to address the chronic food security crisis in Southern Africa?

- Should the strategy focus on partnerships with WFP? Should it establish and draw on regional experts in cash?
- Should IFRC target less dense populations which are largely ignored by WFP?
- Should IFRC focus on basic, behavioural causes of malnutrition through a community-based Health and First Aid (CBHFA) type approach?