

Final Evaluation: Regional Population Movement – Afghanistan Preparedness and Response

November 2022 – March 2023

March 2023

Author: Margaret Stansberry, Team Leader

Commissioned by: IFRC Under-Secretary General for National Society Development and Operations Coordination, the IFRC Regional Directors of Asia Pacific, Middle East & North Africa and Europe

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team sincerely thanks the Red Crescent Societies of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan for their time, patience and cooperation throughout the evaluation. We also thank the IFRC country delegations in Iran, Pakistan and Tajikistan for their generous support to the team - especially to the IFRC teams in Pakistan and Tajikistan for the excellent support to the external visits from evaluation team members. Special thanks also go to Seval , Christina, Firdavs and Manzoor Ali for patiently participating in numerous interviews with the ET to help them understand the complex context and operation.

The evaluation would not have been possible without the excellent, high caliber local and regional capacity provided by Ram Krishna Khatri, Khursheda Aknazarova, Muhammed Sohaib, Mohamad Reza Fakoor, and Tahmineh Ansari. In addition to leading the Pakistan data collection, Ram Krishna Khatri also remotely oversaw data collection in Iran - thanks to generous support from British Red Cross in loaning this stellar capacity to the evaluation team from late November through March. We also thank the Canadian Red Cross for their support in enabling Emily Neilson to assist the work of the ET.

Sincere thanks go to the EMT (Miki, Christina, Shao Yii Liew, Nader and Andreas) for their constant guidance, support and patience throughout the process. And to Florent del Pinto for his analysis and strategic input at key points throughout the evaluation.

Our gratitude also goes to all stakeholders including government authorities, United Nations agencies, IFRC colleagues at cluster, regional and Geneva levels as well as volunteers, affected populations and civil society members who dedicated their time to participate in informative discussions and contributed significantly to the findings of the evaluation.

Margaret Stansberry, Ram Krishna Khatri, Emily Neilson and Florent del Pinto.

Contents

Table of Figures	iii
Acronyms	iv
Executive Summary	v
Background	1
Overall Context and Summary of the Operation	1
Iran Context and Summary of the Operation	3
Pakistan Context and Summary of Operation	4
Tajikistan Context and Summary of Operation	6
Evaluation Purpose	7
Methodology	7
Evaluation Constraints and Limitations	8
Key Findings	9
Objective One	9
Overall	9
Iran	10
Pakistan	15
Tajikistan	20
Kyrgyzstan	25
Kazakhstan	27
Objective Two	28
Overall	28
Geneva and Regional Support	28
Iran	32
Pakistan	34
Tajikistan	36
Recommendations	39
Annexes	45
Annex 1: Field Work Schedule	45
Annex 2: Summary Number of Stakeholders Consulted	48
Annex 3: Detailed List of Stakeholders Consulted	49
Annex 4: Technical Reminders	56
Annex 5: Evaluation Matrix	58
Annex 6: Terms of Reference	59
Annex 7: Bibliography	60

Table of Figures

Table 1: Afghanistan Displaced Population to Targeted Countries as of December 2022	1
Table 2: Donors to the Emergency Appeal	2
Table 3: Affected Populations Targeted and Reached by Country with Appeal Resources.....	2
Table 4: Multi-Regional Budget & Expenditures	3
Table 5: Stakeholders Consulted	7
Table 6: Iran Agreement Timeline	11
Table 7: Iran Budget and Expenditures as reported from PFMR on 15 March 2023.....	11
Table 8: Iran RC Key Results	12
Table 9: Pakistan Agreement Timeline.....	15
Table 10: Pakistan Budget & Expenditures	16
Table 11: Affected Populations Reached - Totals - PRCS MHUs	17
Table 12: Pakistan RC Key Results.....	18
Table 13: Pakistan RC Key Capacity-building Results.....	19
Table 14: RCST Agreement Timeline.....	20
Table 15: Tajikistan RCS Fund Balance	21
Table 16: Tajikistan RCS Key Results	21
Table 17: Tajikistan RCS Key Capacity-building Results.....	24
Table 18: IFRC In-Country HR support to PRCS	34
Table 19: IFRC Regional Support to Pakistan.....	34
Table 20: IFRC In-Country & Remote Support to RCST.....	36
Table 21: Europe Region HR Support to Tajikistan Operation	37
Table 22: Number of Stakeholders Consulted by Location & Gender	48

Acronyms

ADB	ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
BGT	BORDER GUARD TROOPS
BRC	BRITISH RED CROSS
CCD	COUNTRY CLUSTER DELEGATION
CEA	COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & ACCOUNTABILITY
CIH	CASH IN HAND
CO	COUNTRY OFFICE
CoES	COMMITTEE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND CIVIL DEFENSE
EA	EMERGENCY APPEAL
EPOA	EMERGENCY PLAN OF ACTION
ET	EVALUATION TEAM
FGD	FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION
FSPS	FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
GRC	GERMAN RED CROSS
IRCS	IRANIAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY
IRC	INITIAL RECEPTION CENTRES
KII	KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW
MHU	MOBILE HEALTH UNIT
MOU	MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
NS	NATIONAL SOCIETY
OS	OPERATIONAL STRATEGY
OU	OPERATIONAL UPDATES
PGI	PROTECTION, GENDER AND INCLUSION
PMER	PLANNING, MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING
POA	PLAN OF ACTION
PRCS	PAKISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY
RCRC	RED CROSS RED CRESCENT
RCSK	RED CRESCENT SOCIETY OF KAZAKHSTAN
RCSKy	RED CRESCENT SOCIETY OF KYRGYZSTAN
RCST	RED CRESCENT SOCIETY OF TAJIKISTAN
TL	TEAM LEADER
UNHCR	UNITED NATIONAL HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

Executive Summary

Context

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan further deteriorated throughout 2021 following the rapid take-over of the country by the Taliban between April and August after the announcement and subsequent withdrawal of US troops. This instability contributed to further population movements out of Afghanistan into Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries resulting in over two million crossing borders out of Afghanistan in 2021 alone. Against this backdrop the IFRC and her members responded.

Operation Overview

The (Multi)-Regional Population Movement Appeal - Afghanistan Preparedness and Response (MDRAFRPM21) was designed to support National Societies across three regions to prepare for, respond to and mitigate the impacts of population movements from Afghanistan.

The regional appeal was issued 25 September 2021 and sought CHF 24.6M for a total period of 16 months, running officially from September 25, 2021 til December 31¹, 2022 to support the needs of up to 160,000 persons. Eleven donors responded with CHF 9.1M providing 37% of the sought resources.

National Societies prepared by increasing dialogue with government partners and other stakeholders, shoring up contingency plans as well as stocks relevant for camp populations and enhancing capacity of staff and volunteers.

Evaluation Features

This is the final evaluation for the IFRC Regional Population Movement - Afghanistan Preparedness and Response operation. The evaluation assessed the progress made towards the strategic and operational objectives across the three main neighboring countries - Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan and to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The evaluation set out to answer two main objectives, using four evaluation criteria:

Obj 1) Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the design of the EPOA/OS as well as the achievements with an emphasis on migration and displacement, National Society preparedness, capacity strengthening and readiness, as well as targeting; and

Obj 2) Assess the extent to which the IFRC and other RCRC support to the NS in preparing for and mounting this response has been relevant, effective and efficient.

This is summative evaluation, examining key results, along with their relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness. Data collection methods employed were primarily qualitative, specifically:

- Secondary data review
- Key informant interviews (KIIs)
- Focus group discussions (FGDs)
- Direct observation

¹ The Appeal was originally issued for 12 months but was later extended to give the National Societies more time to deal with a complex and unstable situation as this was not a standard response with a stationary population.

Findings

Objective 1: *Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the design of the EPOA/OS as well as the achievements with an emphasis on migration and displacement, National Society preparedness, capacity strengthening and readiness, as well as targeting.*

Relevance: Overall, the initial design of the EPOA/OS was found to be largely relevant and appropriate though some opportunities were missed in the three main countries to refine the strategy and targets in April 2022 when an updated OS was released, and the operation extended by three months. A detailed, revised implementation plan should have been in place for each target country. Some interventions were less relevant given the settings within which existing refugees and new arrivals were largely located. In several countries, it was assumed that refugees would go to camp settings when in fact the majority went to settlements and urban areas. These settings generally require a greater use of cash and vouchers to facilitate access to and utilization of existing services rather than the provision of in-kind materials.

Coverage: Each country had mixed results – some targets were exceeded while others were below the target or not implemented. Cash and voucher assistance (CVA) or cash-in-hand (CiH) was found to be among the most relevant of interventions and targets were largely exceeded in the main countries and was the focus of the smaller operations in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Targeting over the course of the operation generally improved but with mixed results.

Tajikistan did well to target existing refugees based on vulnerability criteria when it was finally accepted, at least seven months into the operation, that borders would not open, and an influx was not imminent. Tajikistan missed an opportunity to support host communities which has long been an international best practice with RCST management citing limited resources as the main reason.

Pakistan eventually did well to support host communities with existing refugees and seemingly new arrivals with mobile health units (MHUs), but the rehabilitation of water sources may not have been accessible by the most vulnerable communities. There were mixed opinions as to whether PRCS could have provided CVA to unregistered refugees (and arguably the most vulnerable); PRCS and IFRC are now working on a migration policy in 2023 which is envisioned to include guidance on how best to reach the undocumented.

Iran responded quickly according to their mandate with the provision of in-kind materials but also missed an opportunity to explore the use of cash and vouchers when refugees transferred into urban settlements.

Readiness: In Pakistan and Tajikistan, the experience in migration and displacement and associated technical interventions such as CEA and PGI was enhanced. In Tajikistan, RCST was able to support Afghan refugees for the first time, while PRCS had some limited experience with support provided by British Red Cross (BRC); while in Iran, IRCS had supported an influx more than ten years ago.

Staff interviewed in Pakistan and Tajikistan noted increased awareness of key issues in migration and displacement, though it remains at a theoretical level for many. Some enhanced capacity may not be sustained primarily in terms of human resources but also in terms of knowledge and technical skills. Areas include protection, gender and inclusion (PGI), community engagement and accountability (CEA) and even planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting (PMER). In Iran, IRCS did not include CEA or PGI in any formal or structured way and indicated support from IFRC in key areas would be welcomed. This should be examined in the 2023 country plans for all three countries as these areas should be considered crucial capacity for any response but critical in the case of migration and displacement.

Effectiveness: The auxiliary role of the NS and associated relationships with national authorities in each country played a critical role in allowing NS to access the targeted population. In some countries, new agreements were signed to further enhance the role of the NS in migration and displacement such as RCST with the Tajikistan Border Guard Troops, PRCS and the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, and IRCS with ICRC.

In the Pakistan and Tajikistan, some challenges were noted with the national societies' efforts in procurement, logistics and warehouse management, while all three countries had challenges in monitoring, quality assurance and data management. In two countries, stock management procedures were lacking in some warehouses leading to distribution or near distribution of expired goods; the ET noted delays in procurement due to procedures not being followed and at times a lack of agreement between IFRC and the NS on procurement priorities. Gaps in human resources and competing priorities also influenced operations in all countries, while in two, more time was needed to deliver key services.

Cross-border cooperation amongst and between the National Societies affected by Afghan refugee population movement was anticipated by IFRC but this did not occur. IRCS, PRCS and RCST noted that they did not undertake formal cooperation with each other and with Afghan Red Crescent Society. NS capacity and time constraints, sensitivity of information, and positions of host governments were cited as reasons for the lack of such cooperation during this operation. IRCS has provided support in the past to Afghanistan and Pakistan and while cross-border collaboration and information sharing with Afghanistan was anticipated by IRCS, it also did not happen. Key IFRC country delegations (CD) did collaborate well in this operation beyond the formal coordination facilitated by Geneva.

Overall National Societies did well to support vulnerable Afghans in their country and each NS increased capacity to support refugees, asylum seekers and other undocumented arrivals. Support to refugees is unlikely to continue without additional funding. In some cases, internal NS capacity built during this operation is also unlikely to be sustained without additional investments such as filling on-going gaps in staffing and retaining key positions such as an M&E and PGI focal points with non-project resources.

Objective 2: *Assess the extent to which the IFRC and other RCRC support to the NS in preparing for and mounting this response has been relevant, effective and efficient.*

Overall IFRC support to the NS in preparing for and mounting the response has been highly relevant, effective and mostly efficient. IFRC was bold to facilitate a multi-regional, anticipatory appeal to ensure readiness for a potential population movement; this resulted in new experiences for the NS in serving refugees and the displaced, new agreements with authorities and significant opportunities for learning which can contribute to ongoing future readiness.

Coordination: Internal coordination amongst IFRC at all levels was well appreciated but NS coordination at country levels were mixed; two countries had regular and inclusive meetings while another had only very few gatherings that may not have been inclusive of the membership. Coordination with UN and Government authorities largely went well with IFRC playing a large role in supporting this. It will be important for NS to now sustain these relationships irrespective of on-going migration and displacement operations and for IFRC to continue to develop much needed guidance in preparing for and responding such situations.

Humanitarian Diplomacy: Humanitarian diplomacy was largely limited to some awareness raising of the role of the NS and resource mobilization and these were effective. Advocacy for the undocumented and related protection issues was not apparent with the partial exception of Iran whereby IRCS and IFRC did advocate for support to those crossing borders in ministerial-level meetings. In other countries, several stakeholders implied that more humanitarian diplomacy was not done in part due to the strong position taken by Governments regarding border security and the status of Afghan refugees.

Best Practice Reminders for IFRC and the National Societies – the ET noted three areas where international best practices were not fully followed in this operation and given that the below is largely known by IFRC and her members, it’s a reminder to try and consistently apply these international standards.

BEST PRACTICE REMINDER 1. CONTEXTUALIZED CEA

Contextualized CEA Mechanisms: All components of the CEA system need to be in the language(s) of the populations being served; this includes all IEC materials, complaints mechanisms and their resolution; systems were either non-existent or only partially in the local language limiting refugees ability to engage or limiting the engagement to those that were educated and multi-lingual while excluding others; hot-line and email systems must be staffed by persons with the relevant language skills. NSs could have budgeted for this capacity and IFRC could have given feedback on this during the design of the operation.

Such systems should ideally be in place near the outset of the operation; installing complaints boxes in the final weeks of the operation while better than nothing could be perceived as window-dressing; target populations should be socialized to the systems (which should be multi-faceted) and encouraged to use them.

Affected populations should be part of all aspects of the operation – from needs assessment, through implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Ideally this would mean NS include affected populations as volunteers.

BEST PRACTICE REMINDER 2. SUPPORT TO HOST COMMUNITIES

Support to Host Communities should be an integral part of balanced programming to support harmony and integration. Support to host communities has long been encouraged in IFRC response operations and is part of various policies and guidance documents of the IFRC including [Migration and Displacement](#), [Community Engagement and Accountability](#) and [Better Performance Initiative](#). Such programming also promotes acceptance amongst national authorities and may ease the NS ability to support the most vulnerable including the undocumented.

BEST PRACTICE 3. PROTECTING DIGNITY THROUGH CASH PROGRAMMING

Protecting and enhancing dignity in programming through greater use of cash– as a global best practice, organizations continue to be encouraged to use cash support where markets are accessible and functioning; NFIs in their various forms are becoming less relevant in many situations and are often not a good value for the money when compared to cash. This requires IFRC and NS to become highly efficient in the use of cash to ensure timely support to affected populations.

Following are the recommendations identified by the evaluation team.

Recommendations for IFRC in relative order of priority

1. Afghanistan Crises Migration and Displacement Readiness: As the Afghanistan crisis which prompted this multi-region operation is not over, IFRC should ensure that each country (Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan) updates contingency and country plans with a migration and displacement lens to address the lessons and recommendations contained herein. This should happen within the next three months to help increase readiness for the next population movement crisis. (High)
2. Migration and Displacement: Continue to develop, test and roll out guidance to help IFRC, NS and partners understand how to work in protracted crises and fragile contexts; guidance should include how to contextualize standard tools to these situations including contingency planning for migration & displacement, how to support protection and how to contextualize PGI and CEA; consider checklists that would aid IFRC CO when assessing future plans and budgets; readiness plans for migration and displacement should be holistic and examine needs and capacities on both sides of borders. (High)
3. Humanitarian Diplomacy: Continue to invest in (build capacity, awareness and the application of) humanitarian diplomacy, assisting delegations and National Societies in the development and application of key messages beyond those used for fundraising. This is particularly important in times of migration and displacement when vulnerabilities and risks, protection issues and legal frameworks may not be well understood by donors and practitioners alike. (High)
4. Migration & Displacement: Revisit global tools for migration and displacement and re-examine staffing options for future operations to consider longer-term deployments while expanding the technical requirements to align with migration and displacement needs; continue to improve monitoring and analysis tools including examining the use of triggers for future operations. (High)
5. Operations and PMER: Within EA/OS for multi country/region operations in migration and displacement:
 - a. Ensure indicator definitions are always included in the operational documents and contextualized for each country.
 - b. Require country-level implementation plans with tracking of changes in interventions and targets over time.
 - c. Improve analysis of reports so that challenges in tracking and reporting are caught and addressed quickly. PMER teams would do well to have checklists for analysis that would aid their review of key reporting documents.
 - d. IFRC should revisit the template used for these types of Appeals and Operational Strategies and associated guidance to ensure an efficient, logical flow of information that limits repetition of information and enhances user readability. (Medium)
6. PMER: Given climate change and increased IFRC requirements for real-time or mid-term and final evaluations in big operations, IFRC would do well to maintain rosters of external national evaluators for each presence country. (Medium)

7. Humanitarian Diplomacy and Advocacy in Migration and Displacement: ensure technical assistance and capacity in this area at the lowest level possible given regional and country nuances; ensure key issues affecting the Movement's ability to access and support vulnerable populations are part of on-going country plans. (Medium)

Recommendations for Iranian RC

1. PMER & Technical Capacity: With IFRC CO and RO, enhance capacity, awareness and utilization of PMER, CEA and PGI. (High)
2. Operations & PMER: With IFRC CO and RO, enhance target population-based needs assessments and post-distribution monitoring capacity, awareness and utilization. (High)
3. Cash & Voucher Programming: With IFRC CO, RO, and NS stakeholders in the region, continue exploring opportunities, options and capacities for cash and voucher programming in the country, targeting the most vulnerable and working creatively within the limits of ongoing international sanctions ahead of future disasters and population movement crises . Work is already underway with the IFRC RO Finance and Support Services and this should remain a high priority. (High)
4. Operations: With IFRC, update response SOPs with all associated departments and provinces, articulating various roles and responsibilities across departments (including the Research Division) and incorporating expectations and options for beneficiary needs assessments, post-distribution monitoring, CEA, PGI and cash and voucher programming. SOP updates should include how to enhance communication with provincial branches to the extent possible – accounting for the limitations sanctions continue to have on communications in the country. This should include how to socialize branches to new international operations such as IFRC supported DREFs and Appeals. (Medium)
5. Migration & Displacement: With IFRC, continue the work to develop a migration policy and see how and where the organization's emergency operations procedures and guidelines can be updated or modified to incorporate a greater reference to and understanding of migration, displacement and protection needs and options within the mandate and capacity of the IRCS. This should include a reflection on other policies and guidelines as warranted. (Medium)
6. Human Resources: For IFRC CO and RO to support IRCS well in these recommendations and in light of evaluation findings, re-examine human resource needs in-country to ensure IFRC is sufficiently staffed to support IRCS keeping in mind the challenges in international recruitment due to the impact of international sanctions. (Medium)

Recommendations for Pakistan RC

1. Gender: Continue to work to ensure gender equity in operations; increase the number of female volunteers at the field level; and when conducting assessments and monitoring including PDM, ensure women are consulted at a level equal to their representation in the population targeted. (High)

2. Inclusion: Ensure branches at all levels are part of the design process of future operations affecting them. Ensure a socialization process is conducted at all levels for each new operation/program to ensure buy-in and effective implementation and support. (Medium)
3. Inclusion: Despite the end of this Appeal, encourage branches to continue to work with the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR) at their level and include refugees and the undocumented in on-going service delivery. Enhance the volunteer pool and NS capacity by including Afghan volunteers (and updating policies or procedures as warranted). (Medium)
4. Operations: With IFRC, review warehouse management practices to ensure basic stock management systems are in place across the National Society. (Medium)
5. PMER: Ensure dedicated capacity in PMER at HQ, while working with IFRC to bring on additional capacity at all levels during emergency operations. (Medium)

Recommendations for Red Crescent Society Tajikistan

1. HR: Find ways to sustain staffing in PMER, CEA and PGI (currently a total of 2 persons) regardless of project portfolio. Good progress, in terms of investment in these staff, should be sustained and capitalized upon. (High)
2. National Society Development (NSD): Considering their importance to the auxiliary role of the NS and relevance to implementing partners, enhance investment in all border branches at district levels and include volunteers in the development and roll-out of those plans. IT equipment, communication and continued skill building were recommended by external partners, IFRC and staff/volunteers alike. Capacity building of staff and volunteers at the field and HQ levels should account for turnover as a regular occurrence. (High)
3. Stakeholder Management: With IFRC support, map out the NS role in migration and displacement given the new government infrastructure in place in key border locations. Use the opportunity of upcoming MOU renewals with Authorities to continue to refine and enhance the role of the NS in alignment with their auxiliary role, changing needs, interests and capacities. Maintain regular engagement with stakeholders like UNHCR despite the end of the Appeal and the end of key agreements with UNHCR directly. (High)
4. Inclusion: Despite the end of this appeal, encourage branches to continue to work with the Afghan Diaspora and the Afghan refugees are part of their on-going programming. Enhance the regional and district branch volunteer pool by including Afghan volunteers (and updating associated policies or procedures as warranted). (Medium)
5. Operations: with IFRC, review warehouse management practices to ensure basic stock management systems are in place across the National Society. (Medium)

Background

Overall Context and Summary of the Operation



Graphic 1: Excerpt from IFRC Emergency Appeal.

Background

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan further deteriorated throughout 2021 following the rapid take-over of the country by the Taliban between April and August after the announcement and subsequent withdrawal of US troops. This instability contributed to further population movements out of Afghanistan into Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries. The table below represents Afghanistan population displacement in the countries targeted by this Emergency Appeal as of December 31, 2022, according to UNHCR Operations Data Portal analysis.² To address the deteriorating situation, the IFRC released three DREFs to Iran (August 18, 2021), Tajikistan (26 August 2021) and Pakistan (13 September 2021) totaling CHF 518,190.

Table 1: Afghanistan Displaced Population to Targeted Countries as of December 2022

Country	Total Estimates	Registered Refugees	Undocumented estimate	Arrived in 2021	Notes
Iran	4.5m	750,000	500,000	1M	Total includes 1.370M card/permit or passport holders
Pakistan	3.7m	1,316,257	775,000	600,000	Total includes 2.160M card/permit holders
Tajikistan	6,883	6,883	0	5,710	

² https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan#_ga=2.147331575.1558911771.1677009016-1954678978.1672704695

Overview of Operation


The (Multi)-Regional Population Movement Appeal - Afghanistan Preparedness and Response (MDRAFRPM21) was designed to support National Societies across three regions to prepare for, respond to and mitigate the impacts of population movements across borders as Afghanistan was becoming increasingly unstable between April and September of 2021.

The regional appeal was issued 25 September 2021 and sought CHF 24,600M for a total period of 16 months, running officially from September 25, 2021 til December 31³, 2022 to support the needs of up to 160,000 persons. Eleven donors responded with just over CHF 9.1M providing 37% of the sought resources. The top three donors provided 96% of income received.

Table 2: Donors to the Emergency Appeal

Donors	Amount CHF	By Percentage
Italian Gov't	4,690,037	51%
British RC (via British Gov't)	3,615,000	39%
Canadian RC	478,742	5%
Swedish RC	100,808	1%
Italian RC	94,899	1%
RC of Monaco	52,891	1%
Other	51,595	1%
Japanese RC	40,057	0.4%
Canadian Gov't	28,895	0.3%
Swiss RC	11,076	0.1%
Online	475	0%
TOTAL	9,164,475	100%
<i>off by 100 due to rounding in main IFRC table</i>		

Top Donors to the Emergency Appeal



Graphic 2: Top Donors to the Appeal

Appeal income was primarily allocated based on needs, including predicted population movement and accounted for donor earmarking across the three regions covering up to five countries. Based on a changing context, challenging operational conditions and fewer resources than expected, the IFRC released a revised appeal in June 2022 which extended the timeframe to 31 December 2022 targeting 160,000 people.

Table 3: Affected Populations Targeted and Reached by Country with Appeal Resources⁴

County	Iran	Pakistan	Tajikistan
Persons Targeted	67,500	70,500	20,000
Persons Reached	150,677	62,584	2,850
Percentage Reached	223%	89%	14%
Comments	*vast majority reached via covid screening	*Appears to be double counting between health and WASH coverage	*does not include 4,000 food parcels in host communities as this was previously reported as 1,000 in November 2022 and leadership confirmed these were not done with Appeal resources;

³ The Appeal was originally issued for 12 months but was later extended to give the National Societies more time to deal with a complex and unstable situation as this was not a standard response with a stationary population.

⁴ Despite having an overall target by country, the total number reached was not clearly tracked. The amounts entered are taken from Operations Update No. 4 and the ET worked to eliminate double counting but some still remained due to gaps in all countries in data management and misunderstandings in indicator definitions; this number does not include volunteer and staff capacity-building nor does it include coverage estimates from stockpiling for future responses.

As of 9 February 2023, the following is the budget breakdown and expenditures by region.

Table 4: Multi-Regional Budget & Expenditures

Region	Operations Budget CHF	Percentage allocation by Region	Expenditure as of 09 Feb 2023 - CHF	Budget vs. Actual %
Asia Pacific & Pakistan	2,501,114	28%	1,428,584	57%
Europe & Tajikistan/Central Asia	2,662,639	30%	1,752,686	66%
MENA & Iran	3,771,916	42%	3,570,780	95%
TOTAL	8,935,669	100%	6,752,050	76%

Iran Context and Summary of the Operation

Iran Context

Iran is at risk for multiple hazards including drought, floods, earthquakes, and locust infestations. Iran is one of the most seismically active countries with 77 percent of urban centres at risk. Data shows that earthquakes are increasing in frequency. Economically, Iran is facing challenges due to ongoing international sanctions which has, at times, limited IRCS ability to access sufficient cash resources, materials and has affected communications systems across the country including internet connectivity with branches. The COVID-19 pandemic has also had an impact on key industries. Most recently, Iran has experienced on-going civil unrest starting in September 2022.⁵

Iran shares a 921-kilometre border with Afghanistan and hosts approximately 780,000 registered Afghan refugees. Up to 1 million Afghan refugees have arrived since 2021 and there are estimates of 500,000 undocumented Afghans in the country. Security measures at unofficial crossing points have increased and there is a reported decrease in arrivals. Ninety-four percent of refugees live in urban areas amongst host communities while only four percent live in 20 settlements managed by the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants' Affairs (BAFIA) of the Ministry of Interior.⁶ Between April and June 2022, the Iranian Ministry of Interior began a headcount of all undocumented Afghan nationals in Iran, including new arrivals. According to the Ministry of Interior, approximately 2.2 million undocumented Afghan nationals were registered and received headcount slips.⁷

⁵ OCHA: Iran - <https://www.unocha.org/middle-east-and-north-africa-romena/iran>


⁶ UNHCR: [UNHCR helps nearly one million refugees in Iran, mostly from Afghanistan and Iraq.](#), accessed 22 February 2023.

⁷ UNHCR: Iran - New Arrivals from Afghanistan, November 2022.



12 August 2021
MDRIR006
OT-2021-000112-IRN

Iran - Population Movement from Afghanistan
Disaster Relief Emergency Funds



Graphic 3: Iran Map of Planned Operations

IRCS is an auxiliary to the Iranian public authorities and works in partnership with a range of national and local organizations. The population movement operation was coordinated out of Tehran through the Relief and Rescue Organisation (RARO) who oversees operations in four provincial branches. In terms of preparedness IRCS had identified 13 potential refugee sites and conducted restocking of essential items. Throughout the operation, IRCS has supported new arrivals with a range of relief items including food packages, kitchen sets, blankets, mats etc. IRCS has supported Covid screening for 375,000 persons and engaged in restoring family links for minors separated from their families. In addition to the response and preparedness activities, in late 2022 IRCS also increased procurement of physical rehabilitation equipment as they are the main service provider in the country and have reported an increase in Afghans seeking these services.

Pakistan Context and Summary of Operation

Pakistan Context

Pakistan is prone to numerous hazards. The 2021 Climate Risk Index ranked Pakistan as the 8th most affected country over the past two decades.⁸ In September 2021, Pakistan experienced the worst flooding in a decade with 30 percent of the country affected, including regions hosting large numbers of displaced Afghans. Traditionally, movement between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been common with people

⁸ German Watch: Global Climate Risk Index 2021 - https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021_2.pdf

crossing frequently for cross-border trade, family ties, education, work, or medical treatment. Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees for more than 40 years and today hosts an estimated 1.3M registered refugees along with an estimated 775,000 undocumented Afghans.⁹ Fifty-eight percent of refugees reside in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) while 23% live in Balochistan. The vast majority or 68.5% live in urban areas while 31.5% live in refugee villages.

Pakistan Red Crescent Society

As an auxiliary to public authorities, Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) works in disaster management, health and care, climate change, youth, volunteering and organizational development. With a Headquarters in Islamabad, 7 provincial/state branches and 60 district branches, PRCS has a widespread presence across the country including in hard-to-reach areas such as border regions. With almost 3,000 volunteers, over 650 staff, and 67 branches, the PRCS plays a vital role in emergency management and disaster response across the country.

Summary of Operation in Pakistan



Graphic 4: Pakistan Map of Planned Operations

To support new arrivals and existing refugees as well as host communities, PRCS focused support in five districts in three provinces - Chitral in KP, Khyber and North Waziristan in Merged Areas (MAs), and Qilla Abdullah and Quetta in Balochistan. Services have primarily focused on mobile health care, hygiene promotion, increased access to improved water and cash transfer.

⁹ https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan#_ga=2.147331575.1558911771.1677009016-1954678978.1672704695


Tajikistan Context and Summary of Operation

Tajikistan Context

Tajikistan is highly disaster prone experiencing multiple natural disasters a year including avalanches, landslides, drought, earthquakes and floods. Border conflicts with Kyrgyzstan have flared in recent years amid tensions over resources (water, land, roads etc.) leading to displacement and over 50 deaths in 2021 alone. Tajikistan has been working to end statelessness, assisting 40,000 since 2014 through existing legal frameworks. In January 2020 a new amnesty law came into effect enabling stateless persons who arrived prior to 2016 to eventually apply for citizenship. According to UNHCR, 6,883 Afghan refugees remain in Tajikistan. In 2021, over 5,000 Afghans arrived with many of them, i.e., those families with means, eventually moving on to third countries such as Canada through sponsorship programs. The border with Afghanistan remains closed and while additional arrivals are not anticipated, the humanitarian situation in the neighboring county combined with a porous border could change things.

Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan

The Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) was formed in 1927 and recognized by their Government in 1992 and by the RCRC Movement in 1997. RCST has more than 12,000 members, 950 primary organizations (community-based organizations - like small sub-branches) and more than 11,000 volunteers. In addition to a Headquarters in Dushanbe, RCST has 2 provincial, 2 regional, 16 city, and 49 district branches and has in total 69 branches. RCST works in disaster preparedness and response, community-based first aid, health and care and restoring family links.



Graphic 5: Map of RCST Operations. Created by RCST, 2022.

Summary of Operation in Tajikistan

Initially RCST prepared to support new arrivals in border areas and planned to construct reception centers. As the border never opened, the peak of the influx happened prior to September 2021 and the government relocated arrivals and refugees to targeted towns and cities. Eventually RCST modified their strategy and provided in-kind support and cash transfer to these refugees while continuing to enhance their own readiness and preparedness for future population movements.

Evaluation Purpose

This is the final evaluation for the IFRC Regional Population Movement - Afghanistan Preparedness and Response operation. The purpose is to evaluate the progress made towards the strategic and operational objectives across the three main neighboring countries, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan and to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The evaluation will formulate recommendations to help inform future programming in these countries as well as for similar operations.

The evaluation is to be guided by four primary criteria to answer to two key objectives.

Objective 1: Assess the **relevance/appropriateness** of the design of the EPOA/OS as well as the achievements and their **effectiveness**, with an emphasis on migration, displacement, NS preparedness, capacity strengthening, readiness and targeting.

Objective 2: Assess the extent to which the IFRC and other RCRC support to the NS in preparing for and mounting this response has been **relevant, effective and efficient**.

Methodology

This was a summative evaluation, examining key results, along with their relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness.

Data collection methods employed were primarily qualitative including:

- Secondary data review
- Key informant interviews (KIIs)
- Focus group discussions (FGDs)
- Direct observation

Different types of triangulation were used to analyze data as described in the inception report. Quantitative analysis was also conducted on some secondary data where warranted.

As of 16 March 2023, the ET interviewed 201 persons (39% female, 61% male) via focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs) and group interviews. See Annex 4: Detailed List of Stakeholders Consulted for the full details.

Table 5: Stakeholders Consulted

Stakeholders by Location	male	female	Total
IFRC Cluster, Region and Geneva	8	6	14

Pakistan TOTAL	34	28	62
National Society	18	2	20
IFRC & Members	5	2	7
External Partners	2	1	3
Affected populations	9	23	32
Iran TOTAL	28	13	41
National Society	20	2	
IFRC & Members	4		
External Partners	2		
Affected Populations	2	11	
Tajikistan TOTAL	53	28	81
National Society	18	5	23
IFRC & Members	3	2	5
External Partners	4	1	5
Affected populations	28	20	48
Kazakhstan TOTAL		2	2
National Society		2	
Kyrgyzstan TOTAL		1	1
National Society		1	
Total	123	78	201
%	61%	39%	100%

Evaluation Constraints and Limitations

All evaluations face constraints and limitations. Despite the efforts of the evaluation management team and the evaluators, constraints could not be fully mitigated. Following are the key constraints and limitations that had some impact on the work of the team.

- 1) Scope of the evaluation and associated human resources.

The evaluation covered five countries, three IFRC country offices, one country cluster delegation, three regional offices and Geneva. Well over 200 hundred stakeholders were to be consulted as identified in the initial stakeholder matrix provided by the EMT. While a large evaluation team was not necessary, a dedicated team of three evaluators (nationals or international) from the outset who would be available full-time (40 days each), for the duration of assignment could have mitigated some challenges.

In Iran, given operational constraints, IFRC and IRCS suggested internal candidates to conduct the evaluation; two (one from IFRC/ICRC and one from IRCS) were accepted by the EMT and concurred by the team leader (TL). The two Iran personnel were to be managed by an ET member who was suitable to contact IRCS and IFRC personal given the security restrictions; other ET members were not allowed to contact the colleagues in Iran – not even via email due to prevailing security concerns. This was highly inefficient. Although internal and not an evaluator – the IFRC consultant did have PMER experience and it was felt this would be a suitable solution given the limitations in Iran and the acceptance by IRCS.

In late November/early December the IFRC EMT was able to bring on board external national capacity for both Pakistan and Tajikistan for 2 – 4 weeks which helped immensely. The ET worked to limit bias to the

evaluation by providing coaching and technical reminders for the national evaluators in all three countries, providing all interview guides, giving verbal and written technical reminders and advising on sampling.

2) Competing priorities and stakeholder availability.

The evaluation was launched in late October; field work was to be concluded by the end of November and a final report issued before the end of December. The fiscal year close and the close of the appeal meant NS and IFRC were extremely busy. Additionally, the target countries were concurrently dealing with additional emergencies: Pakistan Floods and political issues in Iran to name but two. Additionally, the Iranian evaluation team members had numerous other priorities to address for both IRCS and IFRC throughout the evaluation period. For various reasons data collection in Iran ran from mid-January to early March 2023. Stakeholders particularly at regional and Geneva levels were also constrained from participating in the review from late November to early January given myriad priorities and holidays. The ET worked to identify the most critical stakeholders for expediency's sake and made numerous follow-ups as needed.

3) Data availability.

The EMT did well to set up a dedicated Teams site for the ET however, information was primarily limited to official data: such as Appeals, the Operational Strategy, and situation updates. Detailed information from countries was lacking for the first month of the review. Pakistan and Tajikistan were eventually able to share some data and analysis but noted they were also constrained by competing priorities and limited human resources. In Iran, the vast majority of data was in Farsi and given that all interviews had to be translated for the ET (and the consultant did an amazing job) – this left limited time to translate other key documents.

Key Findings

Objective One

Objective 1: Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the design of the EPOA/OS as well as the achievements with an emphasis on migration and displacement, National Society preparedness, capacity strengthening and readiness, as well as targeting.

Overall

Relevance: Overall, the initial design of the EPOA/OS was found to be largely relevant and appropriate though some opportunities were missed to refine the strategy and targets in April when an updated OS was released and the operation extended by three months. A detailed, revised implementation plan

should have been in place for each target country. Some interventions were less relevant given the settings within which existing refugees and new arrivals were largely located.

Each country had mixed results – some targets were exceeded while others were well below the target. In some countries, planned interventions were never started. However, cash (CVA or CiH) was found to be among the most relevant of interventions and this target was exceeded in the main countries and was also the focus of the smaller operations in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Targeting over the course of the operation generally improved but with mixed results.

Coverage: Tajikistan did well to target existing refugees based on vulnerability criteria when it was finally accepted, at least seven months into the operation, that borders would not open and an influx was not imminent. Tajikistan missed an opportunity to support host communities as an international best practice but have noted it will be considered in the future. Pakistan did well to support host communities with existing refugees and seemingly new arrivals with MHUs but the enhancement of water sources may not have benefitted the most vulnerable communities. There were mixed opinions as to whether or not PRCS could have targeted unregistered refugees as UNHCR was doing. Iran responded quickly according to their mandate with the provision of in-kind materials but also missed an opportunity to explore the use of cash and vouchers when refugees transferred into urban settlements.

Effectiveness: In each of the main countries of operation the experience in migration and displacement and associated technical interventions such in CEA and PGI was enhanced. Due to the strategic nature of the EPOA, RCST was able to support Afghan refugees for the first time while PRCS was able to scale up its support beyond what it had done in the past. All staff interviewed noted increased awareness of key issues in migration and displacement, though it remains at a theoretical level for many. Some enhanced capacity may not be sustained – such as in PGI and CEA or even PMER in the case of Tajikistan, and this should be examined in the 2023 country plans as crucial capacity for any response but critical in the case of migration and displacement.

The auxiliary role of the NS and associated relationships with national authorities in each country played a critical role in allowing them to access the targeted population and in some countries, new agreements were signed to further enhance the role of the NS in migration and displacement. In the main countries, some challenges were noted in procurement, logistics and warehouse management as well as in monitoring, quality assurance and data management. Gaps in human resources and competing priorities also influenced operations, requiring more time to deliver key services.

Overall NSs did well to support vulnerable Afghans in their country and each NS increased capacity to support refugees, asylum seekers and other undocumented arrivals. However, support and in some cases, capacity is unlikely to be sustained without additional investments.

Iran¹⁰

Relevance and Appropriateness

¹⁰ Iran data collection for this evaluation was led by an IFRC/ICRC PMER consultant who coordinated virtually with one of the ET members. While data collection appears to be comprehensive, objective and well-done, there may be certain aspects of the operation that ET may not have fully understood given challenges in communicating with the Iran and the limited or sporadic internet connections.

Table 6: Iran Agreement Timeline

Agreement	Start	End	Amount CHF	Date Executed	Comments
DREF	7-Aug-21	31-Dec-21	146,200	25 August 2021	
Afghan Appeal	25-Sep-21	30-Sep-22	412,850	14 February 2022	
Amendment	23 June 2022	31 Dec 2022	2,651,580	signed on 23.06.2022	Amended for time and budget.
TOTAL FUNDING CHF			3,210,630		

Design. The design of the Iran Plan of Action was largely based on mandate, secondary data analysis, field observation and Government of Iran requests of IRCS. Like the other countries, a formal needs assessment was not conducted. IRCS was part of a wider humanitarian coordination effort orchestrated by the Government through the Bureau of Aliens and Foreign Immigrants. Affairs (**BAFIA**) which included many international and local stakeholders in order to mobilize and coordinate efforts to support a large influx of Afghans crossing borders. The mission traveled to the three border areas of Khrasan Razavi, Sistan-u-Baluchestan and South Khorasan.

As in other countries, IRCS also missed an opportunity to use their extensive branch network and HQ capacity to conduct assessments after the majority of the initial response concluded by October 2021 and during the March/April 2022 Operations Strategy revision process. Operations Update 1 noted an intent to focus on differing needs of the population by focusing on the most vulnerable, specifically children, babies, pregnant women and the elderly. These categories of vulnerability were also mentioned by several IRCS staff interviewed. However, it is not clear how response interventions were modified to focus on the differing needs of these vulnerable groups or if these groups were targeted at the exclusion or partial exclusion of other groups. Beneficiary data did not capture these demographics. Hygiene kits were reported as 'adapted' but it wasn't clear to stakeholders what this referred to. Women noted a need for menstrual hygiene items and would have preferred this in the kits though cash overall was preferred as discussed further below.

Table 7: Iran Budget and Expenditures as reported from PFMR on 15 March 2023

Budget Category	IRCS Budget	Budget Percentage	Expenditures through 12/31/2022	BVA	Comments and Assumptions
Response sub-total	2,753,630	75%	3,265,630	119%	
Response	2,753,630		516,350		relief line of PFMR
Operational Provisions	0		2,749,280		Not against a budget line and not clear all that it comprises.
Preparedness total	925,474	25%	322,495	35%	
	223,251		216,279		Listed as Programme and support services recovery
TOTAL	3,679,104		3,588,125	98%	

Key Results. IRCS responded very quickly and according to their mandate to support Afghans crossing into the country along the border. IRCS provided food, water, kitchen sets and some family tents. They are one of the very few organizations who have access across the country and in zero border areas and

the capacity to respond quickly. They were also flexible, providing protection support to 100 children found in the border areas without caretakers.

According to the IFRC Project Financial Management Report, IRCS spent 98% of the operations budget by the end of the appeal with roughly 35% spent in preparedness and the balance in response. However, the largest response category of 'Operational Provisions' was unclear and may be a combination of rehabilitation equipment and supply restocking which could be categorized under Preparedness.

Table 8: Iran RC Key Results

Summary Indicator	Target (persons unless noted)	Main Results	% Achieved	Notes
# of people who received emergency shelter and HH items (kitchen sets, carpets)	37,500	15,128	40%	12,400 were reached by 10/2021 and a further 2,728 were reached by 12/2021
# of Households who received food items	7,500	5,150	69%	Indicator confusion was noted in the Ops updates. This indicator was reported as persons reached in Ops Updates 1-3 and by HH in OU#4. It was adjusted here by dividing by 4. This activity was concluded by 12/2021.
# of people who have access to primary health care services	37,500	0	0%	Either the BHUs had no system to collect use-data or the deployment of BHUs was too late to include target population data in final report.
# of basic health units deployed	3	0	0%	OpsUpdate #4 reported this as 3; the three units were ready and on standby but did not deploy as they ultimately were not needed.
# of people provided with drinking water (bottled)	37,500	15,500	41%	15,000 were reached by 10/2021 as reported in OpsUpdate #1. With an additional 500 reach in 12/2022 as reported in OpsUpdate #4
# of people provided with hygiene kits	37,500	12,400	33%	Reached by 10.2021 as reported in OpsUpdate#1

Affected persons interviewed were highly appreciative of the support provided as well as the care and kindness showed by IRCS volunteers as reported by those reached through this evaluation, by settlement managers and by those who gave feedback to IFRC and IRCS staff during field visits.

Affected populations also provided constructive feedback. They suggested additional needs could be met through the provision of things such as sim cards to contact loved ones back in Afghanistan, and cash or transport to visit medical clinics as the close-by one was insufficient. The cultural relevance of the food

preferring dried rice over canned) was noted by affected populations and representatives alike as well as the cost efficiency and effectiveness of cash and vouchers instead of things like hygiene kits.

It should be noted that IRCS responded very promptly, reaching affected populations in zero border areas at the camps – where the provision of relief items was highly relevant. For those that stayed, when they moved on to settlement areas, cash and vouchers would have been more relevant, efficient and effective and could have supported the local markets.



Graphic 6: Afghan diaspora participating in interview.

"Canned food we don't like. The quality and taste do not fit our appetite. It is good if we receive dried rice and flour so that we can cook our own dishes.....Cash and voucher assistance is a suitable option.....here we have banking cards and we can purchase from the local market." Female Afghan refugee/diaspora.

"If I have cash assistance, I can prioritize my needs, for example I can pay my medical expenses." Elderly female Afghan refugee.

IRCS also conducted covid-19 screening (114,000 persons) and PCR-testing of those arriving by air, land and sea (75,000 persons) and vaccinated 242,016 persons though this was partly supported by complimentary resources from ICRC.

Some trainings were also provided to migrants in settlements on the type of disasters, how to mitigate risks at times of disasters, first aid, volunteerism, role and mandate of NS. These were provided by IRCS staff and volunteers in the provinces - often in the Halal houses. It's not clear if these included host communities or if other complimentary services were provided to host communities.

A few things were noted in the Iran Plan of Action that were not conducted (or there was no evidence of such as found by the ET). These included:

- Post-distribution monitoring of the in-kind items;
- Evaluation of shelter support provided;
- Needs assessment, MEAL-related activities, and
- End-of-Operation lessons learned workshop.

PGI and CEA were also found to be lacking. A review of the budget and expenditures indicate that CHF 900 was spent on CEA training but the balance of CHF 9,100 to be spent by the Youth Dept was still to be used.

Additionally, it was noted in various official reports that IRCS modified their plan to allocate resources for rehabilitation equipment. IRCS runs the largest public sector rehabilitation clinics in the country and equipment is in need of modernization. IRCS noted that some refugees and new arrivals had physical rehabilitation needs but there was no mention of how migrants would pay for such services (as they are not free) nor if and how

We received the items (food parcels, household items to cook, hygiene kits) when we were in the camp (in zero border areas). They (IRCS) distributed among families. We did not wait in lines. The relief items were timely and helpful. Female Afghan refugee/diaspora.

The distributed was disciplined. The relief workers were respectful, God is satisfied because they treated us kindly. What we witnessed was only respect with dignity.....we pray for them. Female Afghan refugee/diaspora.



Graphic 7: Afghan female migrants participating in interviews.

undocumented migrants would be able to comfortably avail of such services. Approximately CHF350,000 was allocated and reconciled under this line item. While this is in-line with IRCS capacity and service delivery, the decision could have been bolstered by a needs assessment of Afghan refugees in settlements to help determine the most relevant services given the balance of resources.

Coverage. According to UNHCR, the Iran Government allows refugees to access education, health and livelihood opportunities; 96% of new Afghan arrivals (since 2021) reside in urban areas while 4% reside in camp settings. In April of 2022, the Iranian Ministry of Interior conducted a headcount of all undocumented Afghan nationals, registering 2.2 million.¹¹ Coverage of the operation is difficult to assess as unique persons crossing at various border areas is not reported. IRCS was assigned specific areas and provided prompt service according to their mandate. Persons crossing were not tracked. Many were sent back or went back while others went on to camps and then settlements in urban areas. IOM reported that as many as one million Afghans were sent back in 2021; while UNCHR reported that this number dwindled to below 130 in the first half of 2022. IRCS reached between 33% and 69% of their estimated target of arrivals and diaspora and a much smaller portion of the arrivals overall; however, it must be noted that other agencies were also responding to this crisis in coordination with government authorities.

Effectiveness

On average, IRCS met 48% of their key targets as identified in their Plan of Action and Operations updates. Significant restocking was done which will assist in readiness for the next event. Numerous factors affected the ability to achieve targets including extreme environmental events such as drought, flooding and earthquakes throughout 2021 and 2022 while covid remained a significant factor and ongoing risk. At one point, IRCS was dealing with eight DREFs. International sanctions continue to affect all parts of society and makes it difficult for IFRC to bring in financial resources and impacts the internet connectivity of IRCS throughout the country and with IFRC in MENA. International sanctions also impacted the ability of IFRC to bring in qualified staff to supplement the capacity of the IRCS to support the operation according to IFRC procedures – something which many IRCS staff noted they are largely unfamiliar with given the more than ten-year break in IFRC presence in the country.

IRCS and IFRC Stakeholders interviewed noted a ‘miscoordination’ by other actors in trying to meet the needs of migrants in border areas – not a duplication of efforts but a lack of coordination by these actors with the mandated role of IRCS. This may have also contributed to IRCS reaching fewer targets than planned. Some provincial branch staff also noted communication challenges with IRCS HQ.

Readiness for Future Migration and Displacement. IRCS has supported Afghan refugees in the past and has often been a donor to Afghan Red Crescent providing health care support in Afghanistan. The operation provided an opportunity for IRCS to respond according to their mandate with stocks in the first 72 hours, it also enabled them to restock needed items in preparation for the next crisis and in compliance with National Law. Per their mandate and national law, IRCS is to keep relief stocks for 2% of the population. Prior to this operation, it was reported that some provinces only held between 0.1% and 0.9% of stocks and therefore were not ready for a large disaster including a population influx.

While the operation didn’t report capacity-building results of staff¹² and volunteers, it was noted that IFRC provided technical support in procurement and logistics through a month-long mission designed to help

¹¹ ACAPs. Iran. Afghan Refugees. 20/October/2022. <https://www.acaps.org/country/iran/crisis/afghan-refugees>

¹² The ET consultant noted that there are many files on the operation still in need of translation which could help illuminate the capacity building results of the operation. These will be included in the final version of the report if available.

clear a back-log of transactions, and one two-week mission in PMER and other remote technical support in migration.

The operation also served to highlight the areas in which IFRC and IRCS could work together to refresh the awareness of IRCS in IFRC requirements and build their capacity in things such as CEA, PGI, PMER and donor accountability.

Pakistan

Relevance and Appropriateness

Table 9: Pakistan Agreement Timeline

Agrmt #	Project Agreement	Start	End	Amount CHF	Date Executed	Notes
CLMX03 1445	DREF	13 Sept 2021	31 Jan 2022	83,951.77	27 Sept 2021	
CLMX03 3023	Project Agreement (PA)	13 Sept 2021	30 Sept 2022	265,889	15 Dec 2021	
CLMX03 4756	Amendment #1	13 Sept 2021	30 Sept 2022	965,889	13 April 2022	For money
CLMX03 7347	Amendment # 2	13 Sept 2021	31 Dec 2022		18 Oct 2022	For time
TOTAL FUNDING CHF				1,215,689		

Design. The design of the Pakistan POA/OS was largely based on secondary data and consultations with UN and Government authorities; primary data collection was not possible as the Government of Pakistan has not allowed primary data collection on Afghan refugees since the 1980s and this falls under the remit of the Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees (CAR) which PRCS coordinated well with.¹³ Additional analyses were conducted for key interventions. These included a CVA assessment in coordination with other actors, this included a market assessment, and a feasibility study for the solarized water filtration plant.



Graphic 8: Women's FGD, Chitral, Pakistan. 12 December 2022.

While the design did account for differing needs of the population, the ET found that targeting could have been further enhanced through assessments with branches regarding the placement of some services (e.g., water filtration plant). The MHUs were well targeted with good use from the community and positive feedback. There were some gaps between the design and the implementation. The importance of latrines was well noted in the initial 12-month EPOA, but the ET did not note work in this area. Likewise, the importance of providing cash to leverage skills and small businesses was noted in the analysis but only multi-purpose cash for targeted

¹³ Because refugees are often in host communities, it was assumed that primary data collection for the Regional Afghan Population Movement even of host communities would not be allowed by government.

host families was noted in the initial design and the revised OS.

The initial request from PRCS was quite small relative to the other countries - only CHF 280,000, perhaps in part due to myriad other priorities of PRCS and a turnover in leadership. The interest in supporting refugees increased in time as the options to respond were brainstormed with and strongly encouraged by IFRC.

The water filtration plant in Chitral, due to its location, was largely not accessible by the most vulnerable but was used by nearby residents of the town. The target community of Afghan refugees and their host community was remote and could not easily access this water plant; water was a need highlighted by this community during KIIs and FGDs noting that the dug well (provided by UNCHR many years ago) was insufficient to meet the needs of the community and they regularly sought water from the river (an 'unimproved' water source). Community members and staff further noted that culturally, women could not readily collect water from the filtration plant (as it was located in the center of a market); rather men would have to do this; the female monitors also had a hard time to monitor the water plant. Community members and staff noted that the placement of services should be such that both the target population and host community can easily benefit.

CVA was found to be well targeted among vulnerable communities and done in consultation with CAR, but these targets were not noted in the revised OS.

Overall, the selection of the district Chitral in KP province did not appear to be fully justified as the Chitral border was 'sealed' in 1982 and the GoP has asked the Afghan Gov't to use the KP border and not Chitral. It was reported that Chitral was taken over by Taliban in 2004 but that over a decade Authorities have completely sealed those pockets and Chitral is fully fenced. Some host community members noted that they had never witnessed any new Afghan arrivals and that there were no 'newcomers' in the communities.

"I used to go to the public hospital in town that is 15km from this village and there is no road; I have to give 300PKR (CHF1.21) to (the) Jeep; I felt more discomfort. When we reach the hospital, they do not treat us well....they never give us medicines. But (PRCS) is providing us free medicine (closer to home); this is my fourth visit."

Beneficiary from FGD in Chitral district.

Table 10: Pakistan Budget & Expenditures

Budget Category	Budget Amount CHF	Expenditure thru Dec 2022	BVA to Date	Comments/Assumptions
Total	1,215,689	1,298,198	107%	The slight overspend is late 2022 agreement between IFRC and PRCS to scale up WASH interventions based on available resources; PA is in the process of being adjusted.
Response		940,540		
Preparedness/Capacity Building		371,658		

Key results. The three mobile health units serviced the needs of refugees and host communities alike while CVA was found to be well targeted amongst vulnerable, registered refugees. Although CEA systems appear to have been put in place very late in 2022 and therefore of minimal benefit to the operation. PRCS did well to conduct at least one post-distribution monitoring across the 3 provinces, soliciting feedback from 171 respondents who had received cash during March and April 2022. While it would have been better to have additional mechanisms available for recipients to provide more timely and anonymous



Graphic 9: Pakistan: Review of Stock Management

feedback – the PDM did provide some good data for reflection. Overall recipients were satisfied with amount received with 92% reporting it was good or excellent; eight per cent noted that the amount was fair or poor in helping them meet their needs. In terms of accessibility 53% of respondents noted that the traveled only 1km or less to receive the money, while 26%

reported travelling between 1 and 4km and 21% travelled more than 4km. PRCS is encouraged to increase the number of female monitors and to oversample women during future PDMs; of the 171 respondents, only 19% were women.

PGI awareness-type sessions were reportedly given at MHUs during patient visits. The ET observed one health (and possibly protection) information session. It was very short in length, using complex vocabulary and materials in Urdu were distributed to an elderly population that may not have been literate in any language. While this was only one session - there may be opportunities to rethink key messages for different population groups and how to best to reach them in the future.

Table 11: Affected Populations Reached - Totals - PRCS MHUs

Gender	By Nationality				TOTAL
	Pakistani	%	Afghan	%	
MALE	1,208	38 %	664	44%	1,872
FEMALE	1,941	62 %	835	56%	2,776
TOTAL	3,149		1,499		4,648
PERCENTAGE	68%		32%		100%

A general hotline is reportedly in place, but no written guidance or SOPs are available to aid staff and volunteers in its use according to stakeholders interviewed. General hotline numbers were displayed in flyers (in Punjabi language) and at stands in major locations.

Table 12: Pakistan RC Key Results

Based on revised Operations Strategy as of Dec 2022			
Summary Indicator	Target (persons)	Main Results	% Achieved
CVA (more than one tranche)	70,100	92,750	132%
Multi-purpose Cash (only one tranche)	10,000	13,250	133%
Health promotion	66,000	26,834	41%
Hygiene promotion	6,580	21,469	326%
# Of Water Points	3	3	100%
PGI Awareness sessions delivered at MHUs	66,100	26,834	41%
PGI Information Session	6,580	0	0%

Coverage. In June 2022, UNHCR reported 1.3M registered Afghan refugees, with over half in KP province. However, UNHCR has not registered new arrivals since 2017 and new arrivals now go to host communities. UNHCR did report 117,547 new arrivals between January 2021 and February 2022, with the biggest surge occurring in August 2021 with 35,289 arriving just prior to the launch of the Population Movement Appeal.

PRCS targeted host communities, existing refugees and those communities hosting unofficial arrivals. EUAA reported a total of three million Afghans in Pakistan as of January 2022 with 1.4 as POR cardholders, 840k as ACC and 775k as undocumented.¹⁴ Targeted provinces were relevant but as noted, at Chitral district could have been

better rationalized. Health services could be availed by anyone, including those not registered while CVA could only go to registered refugees. Water points could be availed by anyone but as noted, their location was not overly accessible by Afghans. Information on unregistered Afghan (by province and district) is highly controlled by CAR making it difficult to fully assess coverage of this vulnerable group.

Effectiveness

The Government’s official stance was that refugees would not be allowed to enter yet hundreds were crossing each day according to various reports and PRCS had to operate cautiously. Given their auxiliary role, PRCS was the only agency that could easily access areas where new arrivals were relocating into host communities.

PRCS had limited involvement with Afghan refugees in the past – with some newer staff noting they never worked with them previously while others noted a British Red Cross project. PRCS signed an MOU with CAR in December 2021 and this further bolstered their ability to coordinate and provide targeted services. Overall PRC did well to target existing refugees, host communities and unofficial/unprotected arrivals living in host communities but support may have been more effective if timelier. Funding was available through British Red Cross to support migration and displacement but at the time of discussions PRCS had other priorities and new leadership had come in. Although in the end, PRCS did well to provide support, it could have started one year earlier.

The network of PRCS branches and their credibility among the people contributed to successful service delivery during the population movement operation. PRC met some targets while others were partially met. PRCS missed



Graphic 10: Men’s FGD in Chitral, Pakistan. December 2022

¹⁴ <https://euaa.europa.eu/news-events/euaa-publishes-report-afghan-refugees-pakistan>, accessed 01/10/2023.

the opportunity to revise targets during the March/April 2022 revision when their scope and capacity was clearer. However, immediately following the revision, key parts of the country were inundated by flooding (June – Oct 2022) leaving over 1,700 dead. PRCS responded during this time with a CHF 480,000 DREF followed in late August with a CHF 25M appeal. PRCS HQ capacity was certainly stretched by the two on-going operations. New leadership and significant staff turnover in PRCS HQ also appear to have impacted the results. Operations were still underway at the time of the evaluation and some results may increase in the final weeks of the operation. It was reported that hygiene kits were still planned for distribution in December 2022, but branches met by the ET were unaware of these plans. Considering that PRCS cannot easily target undocumented Afghans with CVA, they could conceivably target them with NFIs but without more documentation of unmet needs it's hard to assess the relevance of hygiene kits in this instance.

Table 13: Pakistan RC Key Capacity-building Results

Summary Indicator	Target (persons)	Result	% Achieved
MHPSS & First Aid training	100	100	100%
CVA training	100	100	100%
First aid training	100	125	125%
Epidemic control training	100	100	100%
Training on PGI/CEA minimum standard	100	100	100%
RFL/Migration training	100	40	40%

Readiness for Future Migration and Displacement. The opportunities provided during the 16-month operation helped further prepare PRCS to support vulnerable and undocumented refugees; some measures were under development even prior to this Appeal. A migration policy is planned for 2023 and will be underpinned by a national migration assessment carried out in 2020 with the assistance of the IFRC. A migration task force has just begun to meet, and this expected to continue into 2023 and beyond. A protection mapping is planned in 2023 and PRCS and IFRC expects this will be used to assist PRCS and the Government to better target services in the future. The Government does not have a national level migration and displacement policy and reportedly has unclear positions on these issues at best. During the course of the operation, PRCS was able to increase capacity of volunteers in myriad topics appropriate for migration and displacement as noted in table 13 above. As of May 2022, PRCS was able to finally hire a well-qualified Deputy Director of Migration which should help keep momentum moving. Dedicated human resources in PMER and data management, however, are still needed.

Tajikistan

Table 14: RCST Agreement Timeline

Agreement #	Project Agreement	Start	End	Amount CHF	Date Executed	Notes
CLMX031248	DREF	08/21/2021	01/31/2022	132,475.00	09/09/2021	348,761 referenced for DREF in EA; released in tranches.
CLMX032447	Amendment #1 EA	08/21/2021	08/20/2022		11/07/2021	Extension timeframe and moving to EA
CLMX034223	Amendment # 2	08/21/2021	10/31/2022	747,128.00	02/24/2022	Extension timeframe and additional funds
CLMX034862	Amendment # 3	08/21/2021	10/31/2022		04/01/2022	Adding EUR bank account
The agreement for the total funding CHF 1,147,202 and extension till the end of December 2022 - as of December - is not yet fully executed.						
TOTAL FUNDING CHF				1,147,201.61		

Relevance and Appropriateness

Design. The Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST), supported by IFRC, did well prior to the appeal and during the initial months to analyze the context in coordination with the Government of Tajikistan, UNHCR and others - leading to an initial appeal strategy based on anticipated needs. RCST signed an MOU with the Border Guard Troops (BGT) in August 2021 to further enhance the mandate of RCST to provide support to population movements at initial crossing points. The design of the initial reception centers (IRCs) along with the shelter technical support provided by IFRC and RCST to Government and international organizations was highly appreciated. The design was largely focused on further anticipated movements of up to 50,000 persons and the temporary support that would be needed. It was reported that more than 16 technical assessments were conducted to meet the anticipated needs. Alternatively, some stakeholders felt the strategy was too ambitious and not in alignment with political and security reality – predicting that the Government would not open the border and in the event of crossings, would only allow military personnel to work in sensitive, border reception areas as people were likely to be detained until security checks were completed.

Eight months into the Appeal and with the border still closed, RCST revised its strategy (April 2022) to focus on the needs of existing refugees. While a primary needs assessment was not conducted, some vulnerability data was available through UNHCR and other stakeholders, including the Afghan Diaspora. During this time, RCST volunteers were also conducting monitoring and assessments for other partners (UN and International NGOs) and appeared to know the context well. The revised strategy was largely based on this contextual awareness and secondary data. The relevance of the design for the revised strategy was mixed: cash was found to be highly relevant given how existing refugees were living (largely in designated districts in flats or apartment blocks); RCST did well to target the most vulnerable in the

design as well as in the implementation of cash. The drawback in the design of the cash assistance was that it was a one-time assistance, and not significant enough to help refugees parlay it into a meaningful local business or self-employment. It did, however, provide highly welcomed, temporary support for debt relief, food and medicines according to recipient feedback.



Graphic 11: Mixed FGD with Afghan refugees in Vadhat, Tajikistan. December 2022.

Table 15: Tajikistan RCS Fund Balance

Budget Category	Budget Amount CHF	Expenditure thru Sept	BVA to Date	Projected balance of NS as of Dec 31,2022	Comments/Assumptions
Total	1,147,202	445,200	39%	703,379.25	Exp. Is inclusive of CHF256,176 in CODA & CHF189,022 in expenses under IFRC review.
~Response	344,347 (30%)				Inclusive of direct support, operational costs, 50% of overhead, 50% of HR
~Preparedness & Capacity Building	802,854 (70%)				Inclusive of physical investments, pre-positioning and training; 50% of overhead; 50% of HR

IFRC CO along with CCD conducted a financial analysis of the budget (response vs. preparedness/capacity-building) and determined that 13% went for response and 59% for preparedness and capacity-building with the balance going to operational support, pre-positioning and direct support. However, the data was re-analyzed by ET by including monies for 'pre-positioning' in 'Preparedness/Capacity-building' and by including 'operational support' in the 'Response' category. The ET also split HR, overhead and indirect costs between two categories leading to an overall budget of 30% for response and 70% for capacity building. This categorization was similar to Pakistan and Iran where data was available.

Table 16: Tajikistan RCS Key Results

Based on revised Operations Strategy			
Summary Indicator	Target (persons)	Main Results	% Achieved
Emergency shelter	20,000	80	0%
Hygiene kits	2,000	1,994 ¹⁵	100%

¹⁵ An additional 460 families or 1840 individuals received hygiene kits via external donors (Mercy Corps) outside of the Appeal.

Food	20,000	0 ¹⁶	0%
Other livelihood support	1,000	0	0%
Cash in Hand	800	1,776 ¹⁷	222%
Hygiene promotion and awareness sessions	4,000	1,300	33%
PGI information sessions	10,000	1,300	13%

In-kind distribution (primarily hygiene kits) was not relevant given functioning markets; host communities were also not included in the revised strategy with RCST citing limited resources. The emphasis on capacity enhancement of RCST was highly relevant but a detailed plan highlighting gaps and interventions at HQ, regional branch and district branch levels could have enhanced or at least further validated the design. Preparing for future, anticipatory needs should be underpinned by updated MOUs with relevant government entities highlighting the expected role of RCST.¹⁸ The revised appeal increased the budget and targets as RCST was still anticipating population movements.

Our kids have nothing. We don't need food, don't give us stuff. Cash helped. We could decide.

Afghan Refugee in Rudeki

Key results. Shelter and related support to the 80 refugees stranded in Shahrituz Island at the Panji Poyon border crossing was found to be relevant and highly appreciated by GoT and external stakeholders. Hygiene kits in towns, districts, and urban areas were not relevant given the context (functioning, accessible markets) and affected populations met in all visited sites noted they were of low quality with some expired materials. According to the Secretary-General, RCST had already received and quickly acted on this feedback. Likewise, food parcels were also found to be not relevant, not appreciated and also of poor quality and quantity; while they were referenced in the Appeal and in subsequent donor reports - it is acknowledged that these were not provided with appeal resources. Cash-in-hand (CiH) was found to be highly relevant and well targeted, however, more households could have been covered if the NFI strategy had not been pursued; this would have aligned with global strategy/international standard of providing cash support in urban settings and not 'stuff' where markets are accessible and functioning.

Coverage

According to interviews with UNHCR, prior to 2021 Tajikistan hosted approximately 5,000 Afghan refugees; between January and early August 2021 an additional 5,705 had crossed into the country following a destabilizing situation in Afghanistan. The Government of Tajikistan closed the border in early August and has yet to re-open it. As of June 30, 2022, UNHCR reported 6,883 registered Afghan refugees remained in the country.¹⁹ Per discussions with UNHCR, around 15 to 20% are believed to be extremely vulnerable or roughly 1,032 to 1,376 persons. Although technically refugees are allowed to work, most people, including a focal point at UNHCR, consider all of the refugees to be vulnerable. Employment

¹⁶ RCST did provide food parcels to 250 families or approximately 1,000 persons; these were reported as results outside of the Appeal – supported by other donors, in Operations Updates (up to No. 3).

¹⁷ Unofficial results as of 21 December 2022.

¹⁸ In October of 2021, the GoT Committee for Emergency Situations and Civil Defense (COES), supported by UNHCR began construction on a 500-person temporary accommodation centre in Balkhi district. UNICEF and Aga Khan Agency for Habitat (AKAH) were also involved. The UNHCR Commission visited the centre in March 2022, and this was handed over fully to COES in September 2022. Another settlement is planned by the GoT who reportedly has a signed contract with ADB though financial transfers had not yet occurred as of early December 2022.

¹⁹ <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan/location/10461>.

opportunities are quite limited due to a weak economy and given that by now, most refugees have depleted resources they came with. Considering the number of highly vulnerable refugees the cash assistance reached, the ET notes that the coverage of CVA was significant and highly relevant.

Effectiveness

RCST did well to start to prepare for and respond early to the crisis (80 persons in Shahrituz Island at the Panji Poyon border crossing). They also did well to have further defined their role by signing a general MOU with the Border Guard Troops (BGT) in support of the Initial Reception Centre (IRC) strategy. The ET found that it was not the auxiliary role that limited their ability to respond but rather the security and political situation that resulted in closed borders which continues as of December 2022. While targets



Graphic 12: Photo of Branch staff in Kulyab City, Khatlon Province after FGD. December 2022.

largely were not met, though the cash-in-hand target was exceeded, this was due to the fact that the influx largely did not happen.

Targets should have been revised during the Operations Strategy revision in April 2022 to align with the current situation; the revised strategy focus could have focused on providing support to existing refugees as well as a more grounded focus on readiness. External stakeholders noted that RCST could have supported existing

refugees more quickly with some suggesting an eight-month gap between initial discussions and actual service delivery. RCST has significant experience in response and the purported gap appears to be influenced in part by the uncertainty of the situation and the need to change the strategy and refocus on existing refugees; however, once a decision was taken to support existing refugees with cash – something which RCST has good experience in via certain banks as the financial service providers (FSPs), the FSPs significantly delayed the process citing (some said erroneously) that refugees could not open bank accounts and banks were not willing to support the process. This led to lengthy discussions with numerous banks until a decision was made by RCST and IFRC to do 'cash-in-hand'; unfortunately, RCST did not have an SOP for this method. At this point IFRC became heavily involved to ensure risk management systems were fully in place; IFRC and RCTS worked together to get an SOP in place that both organizations approved. This took time. Interestingly, UNHCR reported going through the exact same process – with significant involvement by their regional and HQ offices and also taking significant time.

It seems many organisations lack the institutional memory to facilitate CVA in this manner. Considering this is a likely scenario for many countries dealing with refugee flows, particularly when there is insecurity or border tensions, offline procedures should be in-place as a back-up to prevent future delays.



Graphic 13: Bokhtar Branch Rapid Response Team. Tajikistan. December 2022.

The Tajik Government, with the support of UNHCR constructed a transit camp in Balkhi centre, 52km from the border. Given this new infrastructure and the planned, ADB-supported centre in Khatlon province, RCST would do well to update MOUs with COES, MIA and BGT to try and further define the National Society role in population movement situations. COES suggested that RCST could train Government personnel but that only the military would be allowed in sensitive border areas and in the ‘transit’ camps while screenings were conducted.

Coordination. RCST did well to hold regular and operational coordination meetings; however, operations could have been further enhanced through a joint RCST-IFRC logistics/procurement working group following the model implemented with the German Red Cross. The procurement challenges caused significant delays within both RCST and IFRC. An external consultant recently concluded an in-depth assessment of the situation and recommendations are forthcoming. Given this, the ET did not re-examine the logistics issue in depth.

External coordination was a challenge at first, with UNHCR reportedly not playing a leading role. IFRC and RCST did well to push for (and even start holding) regular coordination meetings with UNHCR and others until UNHCR fully stepped into this role. UNHCR was thankful for the IFRC support and encouraged RCST to remain an active and engaged partner.

Overall RCST did well to coordinate with external stakeholders, Government, UN etc. and are encouraged to maintain active relationships and on-going coordination. RCST did not coordinate with ARCS nor other bordering-NS related to the Afghan population movement. However, it is noted that RCST has worked with Kyrgyz Red Crescent during border clashes, sharing information to enable effective response. A draft MOU with ARCS from several years ago was never executed and RCST is considering revising this to further cooperation between the two NS.

Relevance and appropriateness

Table 17: Tajikistan RCS Key Capacity-building Results

Summary Indicator	Target (persons)	Result	% Achieved	Comments
Basic Training in Humanitarian Shelter	60	30	50%	67% male, 17% female

Various Health and Care trainings	60	110	183%	58% male, 42% female
Various PGI awareness sessions	60	133	222%	59% male, 41% female. Recalculated from RCST tables to avoid double counting.
National and local disaster response teams trained and equipped	7	4	57%	2 at regional level (NDRT) and 2 at district level; gender breakdown of teams not provided.

Readiness for future migration and displacement. RCST, supported by IFRC and GRC, did well to further enhance their capacity to respond to future migration and displacement. Staff at all levels have increased awareness of technical issues related to migration and displacement but further trainings could help branch staff and volunteers at regional and district levels move beyond theoretical awareness.

Warehouse, fleet and stock enhancements are planned but are not completed due, in part, to logistics challenges and the need to prioritize beneficiary services, such as the cash distribution which concluded on 23 December 2022. Additionally, with appeal resources, RCST was able to bring on additional human resources in health and new human resources in PMER and PGI. The new staff did really well to try and put systems in place. The PGI focal point was highly knowledgeable, received many trainings and one-on-one technical



Graphic 14: Branch Manager and Volunteers in Rudeki, Tajikistan. December 2022.

support from IFRC and worked hard to design, implement and run CEA systems while also increasing RCST awareness of protection and inclusion matters. The PMER focal point was also highly knowledgeable and skilled but would benefit from IFRC technical support and orientation to key tools to support further data analysis and the development of internal analytical systems. While a PMER training is planned for 2023, additional support in 2022 would have been appreciated. The larger issue for these new important resources in PGI/CEA and PMER is their sustainability. While new staff might be kept on by being transferred to new projects, systems such as the CEA mechanism (including CEA hotline) for Afghan refugees were reportedly being closed by the end of December 2022.

RCST, lacking any significant sources of income, may face challenges in retaining key positions important for readiness for displacement and migration such as PMER, PGI and CEA.

Kyrgyzstan

Relevance and Appropriateness

Context and Design: According to the Kyrgyz State Migration Service, as of August 2021, Kyrgyzstan hosted 73 Afghan refugees. According to UNHCR, by the end of 2021, the State recognized 178 refugees

and 142 were recognized by UNHCR according to their mandate.²⁰ Twenty-one years earlier, the country hosted around 1,500 refugees, though the UN reported only 795 were registered. For many decades Afghan students have been able to attend Kyrgyz schools and universities and many 'mandate refugees' are well integrated into Kyrgyz society. However, with the economic downturn of the past ten years, at least 30% of the population live in poverty and opportunities for migrants and refugees have become scarce. Against this backdrop the Red Crescent Society Kyrgyzstan (RCSKy)²¹ prepared for a potential influx providing information to support to support the development of the Appeal.

RCSKy worked with the Ministry of Emergency Situation of the Kyrgyz Republic as well as UNHCR to coordinate vulnerability criteria and targeting. At the request of the Government, the National Society was able to target ethnic Kyrgyz who had returned and had recently received Kyrgyz ID (similar to a Kyrgyz passport as part of the Government's campaign to end statelessness). This population was not eligible for UNHCR support but still deemed highly vulnerable as they were recent returnees without means and were living in very remote areas.

Key Results: The NS conducted another needs assessment in November 2022; with their own support, RCSKy provided mattresses, blankets and other NFIs to these vulnerable, recent ethnic Kyrgyz returnees; RCSKy also provided phone credits to allow people to contact loved ones remaining in Afghanistan. Though the NS planned to target 13 families with CVA support, as of mid – December they were still waiting for the cash transfer from IFRC²²; the NS noted that the families were aware that support was coming and they were being very patient. As the cash support is only a one-time occurrence, the NS is looking into other ways to support these vulnerable families in a more sustainable way. The Head of DM noted that these recent returnees have unique handicraft skills specific to their ethnicity and they may be able to sell items to the local community. RCSKy will look into opportunities to provide support.

Coverage and Effectiveness: According to various reports, approximately 1,000 to 1,500 Pamir Kyrgyz (ethnic Kyrgyz) live in the Pamir region of northern Afghanistan. In 2021 it was reported that 44 returned to Kyrgyzstan and received citizenship and ID cards in the Alai region of Osh Oblast. This is the region RCSKy targeted for support; considering the average family size is 9.7 (around 7 in little Pamir and 12.5 in big Pamir) it appears that RCSKy targeted all vulnerable ethnic Kyrgyz who returned and therefore we can report coverage was high.

While a full evaluation of the RCS Kyrgyz response was not conducted, the ET found that the NS provided relevant support and coordinated well with Government and UN actors. The NS reported having good support from IFRC in CVA though they suggested the communication and financial transfer could have been timelier.

Readiness for Future Migration and Displacement. In May 2022, RCSKy participated in a Simex²³ with the Ministry of Emergency Situations, UNCHR and other national and international actors to improve readiness for future refugee and border conflict situations. UNHCR readily thanked RCSKy for their coordination and support. While RCSKy reported this as helpful as well as the IFRC CVA technical support, they noted that they have been providing support to small numbers of migrants. In the event of future population movements, they will need more staff, new contracts with suppliers (which will need to be

²⁰ <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/kyrgyzstan.html>.

²¹ The official acronym for Red Crescent Society Kyrgyzstan is RCSK - the same acronym for the Red Crescent Society Kazakhstan. To avoid confusion in this document only, the RC of Kyrgyzstan will be abbreviated as RCSKy.

²² According to the Operations Update 4, RCSKy reported serving 6 families instead of 13; ET is awaiting verification from the Head of DM.

²³ See the UNCHR short You-Tube video on the SIMEX, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c10Inz8YaOY> accessed January 3, 2023.

reviewed regularly given currency fluctuations), stock enhancements such as winterized tents and greater investment at both branch and HQ levels to enhance readiness.

Kazakhstan

Relevance and Appropriateness

Context and Design: As of June 2022, UNHCR reported 711 refugees and asylum seekers from Afghanistan in Kazakhstan;²⁴ additionally, the Government reported over 6,892 stateless persons with UNHCR reporting an additional 666 with undetermined nationality. The RCSK Kazakhstan (RCSK) has been running programs for refugees and asylum seekers since 1995 in partnership with UNHCR. According to their website, in the last ten years alone, they have supported over 3,000 individuals.²⁵

RCSK provided requested information to IFRC during the development of the Appeal noting their long experience in providing quarterly cash and other support to refugees and asylum seekers. Their concept note to IFRC was accepted. Given limited resources, RCSK applied additional vulnerability criteria to the existing list of asylum seekers. They targeted recent graduates, who were Afghan citizens as well as asylum seekers; as students this population was often 'overlooked' as they did not usually qualify for support as they were single males with no families; These persons could not return to Afghanistan and have very limited means as there are few job opportunities anymore.

Key Results: RCSK targeted 35 students but ended up supporting 25. They suggested they could do a second round to the same group as winter was setting in and these people were living in poor conditions. At the time of the interview (mid-December 2022), RCSK were awaiting confirmation from IFRC; they noted that since the systems were in place, cash transfer would only take one day. The amount provided was the same as UNHCR was providing via RCSK and other partners to avoid any discrimination or issues. While a full evaluation was not done, it appeared that RCSK targeted the vulnerable well, did a needs assessment, and coordinated with the Government and UNHCR.

Coverage and Effectiveness

Coverage could have been better if RCSK had been given access to more resources. In terms of efficiency, RCSK felt that if the IFRC support was timelier, they could have responded sooner to more affected persons and provided support for additional quarters.

Readiness for Future Migration and Displacement. In November 2022, RCSK supported by IFRC, held a readiness tabletop exercise inviting all relevant stakeholders including local authorities, social protection, migration police, border representatives, UNHCR, UNICEF and RCSK branches. "We put them all at one table and it worked well" noted the RCSK DM manager. RCSK reported that prior to this they were unaware as to how the Government would respond in refugee influx and border conflict situations as plans were 'confidential'. While authorities didn't release plans, they did share quite a bit verbally during this tabletop exercise; by going through different scenarios, it was enough for RCSK to map out their role vis a vis these other stakeholders. "We were able to identify our place." The RCSK are now clear that they will not always have access but better understand the various options that could play out. This two-day event was facilitated by Nebojsa Medojevic, DCPDR delegate and his support was highly

²⁴ UNHCR, Kazakhstan National Office. Kazakhstan Fact Sheet, August 2022. www.UNHCR.org/centralasia

²⁵ <https://redcross.kz/en/works/assistance-to-refugees-and-asylum-seekers/> accessed on January 3, 2023.

appreciated. RCSK are now writing up a document further clarifying their role in these scenarios to guide them in the future. They will also update their SOPs and share them with authorities for feedback. So, while they still won't have RC law in the country they will have an updated contingency plan for these additional scenarios and a better understanding of their role. To further build on these experiences, they would like to run a SIMEX in 2023 with Authorities, UN etc. similar to what RCSKy did in May of 2022.

To further enhance readiness, RCSK would like to benefit from capacity-building trainings, similar to what Tajikistan RCS received, more experience sharing with neighboring NS and support to bring on more staff in the event of future migration and displacement events.

Objective Two

Overall

Overall IFRC support to the NS in preparing for and mounting the response has been highly relevant, effective and mostly efficient. IFRC was bold to facilitate a multi-regional, anticipatory appeal to ensure readiness for a potential population movement. This resulted in new experiences for the NSs in serving refugees and the displaced, new agreements with authorities and significant opportunities for learning which can contribute to ongoing future readiness. Internal coordination amongst IFRC at all levels was well appreciated but NS internal coordination at country levels were mixed; one country had regular and inclusive meetings while another had only very few gatherings and that was not inclusive of the membership.

Coordination with UN and Government authorities largely went well with IFRC playing a large role in supporting this. It will be important for NS to now sustain these relationships irrespective of on-going migration and displacement operations and for IFRC to continue to develop much needed guidance in preparing for and responding such situations. Humanitarian diplomacy was largely limited to some awareness raising of the role of the NS and resource mobilization. Advocacy for the undocumented and related protection issues was not apparent.

Geneva and Regional Support

Relevance & Appropriateness

IFRC boldly facilitated a multi-regional, anticipatory appeal to ensure readiness for population movement and displacement following the leadership change in Afghanistan. This was found to be highly relevant and appropriate particularly when examining the results that occurred at the country levels, within the NS, with affected populations and in relationships with national authorities and external stakeholders.

IFRC provided significant technical assistance from country, cluster, regional and Geneva levels in support of the Multi-Regional Population Movement -Afghanistan Preparedness and response Appeal. Technical support in the areas of CVA, PGI, CEA, contingency planning, migration and displacement were mentioned most frequently. Other areas of support included in coordination, technical reviews – everything from PMER, to budgets and technical design of plans as well as in support to resource mobilization and partnership management. Support at country level was largely contextualized to the needs (or anticipated needs) but overall, some areas could have benefitted from greater attention such as

logistics, humanitarian diplomacy and organizational development – particularly human resourcing in these areas.

Plans appeared to emphasize camp situations despite Afghan refugees largely residing in urban settings in these regions. 96% of Afghan refugees in Iran are in urban settings, with only four percent residing in 20 refugee settlements across the country;²⁶ in Tajikistan, Afghan refugees are mandated to live in targeted districts which are primarily urban (apartment blocks, apartment buildings); and while Pakistan has refugees in both camps and host communities, undocumented refugees, deemed to be the most vulnerable category of Afghans, live in host communities. The appeal revision in April 2022 was an opportunity to modify the strategy to focus on cash support for refugees (both documented and undocumented), and on-going technical and physical readiness of the NSs rather than the continued distribution of in-kind items including hygiene kits.

The use of the multi-regional appeal was highly praised by most IFRC stakeholders consulted as relevant, appropriate and efficient as a tool to mobilize attention and resources. It gave stakeholders a means to work together and the coordination role played by Geneva was highly appreciated once roles and responsibilities were worked out.

The change in the templates early on in the operation from POA to Operational Strategy (OS) did not seem to be an issue; however, more reflection is needed to determine what is the right instrument to facilitate the design, funding and implementation of operations supporting protracted crises. Some country stakeholders noted that more time for the initial assessment, consultation, design would have been helpful but there is a strict timeline associated with these response instruments. This was particularly true for the initial launch of the EA but it is noted that for the revised OS, countries were given a full month to revisit and update their strategy based on the changing context.

Stakeholders also noted that preparedness activities need more time for implementation and while appreciative of the four-month extension, some felt it still wasn't enough time. The templates used, while praised by some in IFRC, were very challenging for the ET to follow and the regional documents had little ownership by NS at the country level. Information presented in the appeal, the operations strategy and even the operations updates was very inconsistent across the three countries. The lack of indicator definitions for each country and the attempt to harmonize indicators despite varied portfolios led to challenges in data management. IFRC may want to consider a hybrid approach in the future – with a multi-regional appeal highlighting the needs and resources requested, while including each country's operational strategy and plan of action as a separate annex. Including each country under the various headers of the official appeal and operations documents was confusing, highlighted significant gaps and likely led to reader fatigue.

Effectiveness

Two mechanisms were put in place to link the Secretariat at all three levels of this complex, multi-regional operation: one was a joint task force (JTF) held as needed but on average it was monthly; second was a biweekly operations call for IFRC operations staff and their migration and displacement counterparts. There was no mechanism linking secretariate and the three NS on a regular basis save for one or two initial Partners' calls facilitated by Partnerships & Resource Development (PRD). Several IFRC stakeholders

²⁶ ACAPS report from 10/20/2022 accessed 15 January 2023 at <https://www.acaps.org/country/iran/crisis/afghan-refugees#:~:text=Overview,-20%2F10%2F2022&text=Iran%20hosts%20one%20of%20the.laissez%2Dpasser%20live%20in%20Iran.>

really valued the JTF meetings linking all levels, noting it kept IFRC aligned across the multi-regional appeal.

Quarterly coordination across the five National Societies focusing on results to date, challenges and key themes such as auxiliary roles, independence and capacity support of the lowest level of administrative structures may have also been relevant. Coordination at the country level had mixed results with regular or semi-regular coordination in two countries, led by the NS and inclusive of IFRC, ICRC and one PNS present in country; in another country, coordination with membership was inconsistent.

Humanitarian diplomacy was interpreted and addressed differently by IFRC and NS at the country levels with some describing it as work done to mobilize funding from donor governments and others describing it as work to enhance coordination with UN and national authorities. However, there may have been missed opportunities to further advocate for greater NS access to the undocumented²⁷

While humanitarian diplomacy did occur in most countries and at several levels of the operation, additional technical support in this area may have been relevant; however, the appropriate timing of such support needs to be given more consideration – e.g. is it more appropriate to jointly explore ways to ensure the independence of the NS, examine opportunities to enhance the NS auxiliary role and promote the RCRC role in migration and displacement before, during or after a population movement crisis? Arguably it should occur throughout the cycle and not just at the height of a crisis. Complex issues of independence and respect for auxiliary roles should be part of the on-going priorities of the IFRC at country and regional level regardless of the risk profile in a country.

Geneva did well to try and analyze the on-going population movement flows and risks and develop scenarios based on available data to inform their support at country levels using secondary data. At least two NS had access to migration data based on their own monitoring or partnerships with national authorities, but it wasn't clear that this information was used to inform their own programming or shared with Geneva. As this crisis has been many years in the making and is likely to continue for some time, Geneva may want to consider regular monitoring of migration and displacement and include triggers for response as is done in other types of operations.

How did IFRC contribute to readiness for future migration and displacement.

While there were differing opinions on the overall relevance of the anticipatory operation, overall, the ET found that by virtue of the preparedness and response appeal (and subsequent fundraising), the IFRC significantly contributed to the readiness for future migration and displacement in the main countries.²⁸ Despite these crises being on-going for many years (decades in the case of Pakistan), RCST had not supported Afghan refugees prior to this crisis, while PRCS did so minimally and for IRCS – Afghan refugee support had occurred ten years prior. Overall, contingency planning, technical support in CVA, PGI and CEA were highly appreciated by the NS. Technical support (even prior to the operation) in migration and displacement policy considerations and priorities in the case of Pakistan, in shelter in the case of Tajikistan and additional human resources at the NS level greatly contributed to greater awareness and enhanced technical capacity of the NS. By virtue of the operation, NSs are more experienced and more ready (with additional physical infrastructure in place at the field level including stocks).

²⁷ In Pakistan, PRCS noted they could not give CVA to unregistered refugees despite them being the most vulnerable; in Tajikistan, only RCST staff in HQ (i.e., DM Manager) could provide support to arrivals stuck in border areas before being sent back to Afghanistan.

²⁸ This statement refers primarily to Pakistan and Tajikistan and to some extent, Iran. A full review of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was not conducted though it is noted that they had on-going experience dealing with migration and displacement including with Afghan refugees.

At the Geneva level, new tools were created with others prioritized for 2023. The Migration and Displacement PER tool largely led by a staff on loan from British Red Cross for 2 months, shows promise and was partially tested in Pakistan and Tajikistan (at one branch) and should continue to be applied to help NS identify key areas for M&D readiness. It is expected the IFRC will continue to develop guidance and standards for NS on protection options in these settings as the role of Movement in migration and displacement continues to expand. While several stakeholders noted there was a significant lack of operational guidance for the NS in implementing an appeal for migration and displacement, including how to prioritize and carry-out protection activities, this was a good start for with some positive experiences on how to work with refugees and on how to capitalize and partially further contextualize NS capacity in response. IFRC should continue to modify guidance and associated tools to emphasize the difference from traditional response operations.

Gaps were noted in PMER, data management and analysis across the three main NS. This led to challenges in analysis and reporting up the chain with misunderstandings in indicators and some duplication of results; IFRC staff having to spend time on data management at each level (country, region/cluster and Geneva) with gaps still occurring was not efficient nor effective. While not a unique capacity for response, conducting assessments, doing data analysis, informing plans and quality assurance systems in times of migration and displacement requires a different level of capacity. Strengthened IFRC PMER capacity at country and regional levels may have helped.

Efficiency

How efficient was the response support by IFRC at regional and Geneva levels?

The context in each target country was very different as were the capacities and priorities of each of the three regions. Geneva was highly involved in the first six months of the operation and then stepped back perhaps in an attempt to resume a more normal role for Geneva and ensure ownership at the lower levels -though the three Appeal managers at each Region were technically in charge the entire time with Geneva playing a coordination role.

The impact of the Afghanistan crisis in Afghanistan (and concurrent HD issues) required considerable time and attention, particularly from regional leadership; the Ukraine crisis also reportedly diverted considerable focus and resources; while the MENA region along with Geneva were still unable to address some of the impacts sanctions against Iran had on their operational support most notably, financial transfers. With each country dealing with their own versions of complex emergencies and protracted crises within an increasingly fragile context, support at the country level appeared efficient with backstopping as needed by CCDs/Regional offices - however there were some differences noted. Pakistan had a fairly stable footprint during the operation while Tajikistan had quite a number of people on short-term missions during the 16-month operation. Iran seemingly had insufficient dedicated resources both in-country and at the regional level leading to delays in oversight and reporting.

The protracted nature of these types of crises probably requires a different approach to human resources as a typical surge model may not be sufficient to ensure comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of the situation. Overall, all National Societies noted good support from IFRC.

Despite a well-experienced and dedicated team in Pakistan, significant support and oversight to Tajikistan from CCD, and good joint support between IFRC and ICRC in Iran, challenges remained in timely implementation, expenditure reconciliation and timely, clear and accurate reporting across the countries. While several recommendations are noted herein, IFRC may want to consider a joint after-action discussion with key IFRC stakeholders from each level of the operation to brainstorm together what model of support and staffing for future multi-regional appeals could be more efficient and effective. Although

the ET spoke with many stakeholders individually – having a formal AAR could allow for deeper dialogue among key stakeholders, an appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses in the coordination and management structure, and a more realistic brainstorming of an improved structure and associated roles and responsibilities.

Objective 2 by Main Countries of Operation

Iran

Relevance & Appropriateness

IFRC support. IFRC deployed a Head of Delegation in February of 2021 prior to the start of the population movement operation and after a ten-year hiatus of IFRC presence in the country. IRCS warmly welcomed the IFRC in re-opening the office and appreciate the re-establishment of in-person support, enhanced trust, and cooperation. IRCS is a very large organization (actually comprised of many sub-organisations) with a nation-wide presence. The HOD was the only IFRC international staff in-country and eventually was able to mobilize a small team of national staff in key support areas (administration, finance etc.).

Title	% Allocation	FTE	Start	End	No of Months
Humanitarian Diplomacy Advisor MENA region	.50	.19	July 2022	December 2022	6

Graphic 15: IFRC support to IRCS using Appeal Resources

Attempts to hire a finance surge delegate were largely unsuccessful until February of 2023 at which time the delegate will deploy for one year. According to IFRC, only the Humanitarian Diplomacy advisor was on the appeal budget and no in-country international or national staff were charged to the IFRC appeal budget for this operation. This gave IFRC only .19 FTE for the duration of the operation. Both IFRC and IRCS noted that in hindsight more IFRC staff would have been helpful in supporting the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation.

Several IRCS stakeholders interviewed noted they were not as familiar with the IFRC surge policies, procedures and tools and this may have impacted the timeliness of reconciliation, reporting and overall accountability. Other IRCS staff interviewed, noted IFRC has specific procedures in assessments, community engagement and accountability and even monitoring and reporting and that greater awareness and capacity building could have been helpful in this and future operations.

Readiness. The IFRC attempted to emphasize a migration and displacement lens and a balance between community support and readiness in the operation. Much support was provided virtually. Many stakeholders noted that given the unique situation of Iran (sanctions – including the impact on communications systems in the country, including internet connectivity, political unrest, cultural and language barriers) and the stature of the IRCS (extremely large organization, with a massive volunteer base, largely ingrained and complex procurement and accountability procedures) – in-person support could have been a much more effective option over virtual support.

IFRC attempts to recruit – at least a finance delegate – were unsuccessful for some time. Sanctions, money flow issues, internet connectivity issues – and the fear of the unknown by some internationals if they go to work in Iran regarding access to international bank accounts, maintaining connections with family etc. were reported as factors affecting international recruitment.

Efficiency

Response. IFRC regional office support to operation was helpful but limited. One PMER visit for two weeks and one procurement and logistics mission for one month to clear a back log in financial reconciliation were well received but more could have been done. Insufficient PMER support may have contributed to delays in reporting which delayed the overall reporting on the operation as the reports from all countries had to be received and reviewed before Operations Updates could be posted. Factors affecting IRCS response efficiency include multiple disasters (and corresponding DREFs) happening simultaneously, limited human resources familiar with IFRC and international donor operations and accountability requirements and the on-going context challenges previously mentioned.

The ET found that the IRCS provided welcome support to Afghans crossing into the country at the border areas but more could have been done to assess needs in settlements and provide more flexible support such as cash and vouchers.

Effectiveness

Coordination. Coordination in preparation for a potential influx started in April 2021 between the IRCS, ICRC and IFRC. This included analysis of potential scenarios and the roles to be played by the Movement members. The joint contingency plan was finalized by September of 2021 as the operation was starting. All three stakeholder groups noted good coordination and cooperation. This sentiment was echoed locally by German Red Cross (GRC) who noted that the tripartite contingency plan made it easy and practical for GRC to provide support.

IRCS is the lead agency in the country in disaster response (relief, response, and search and rescue) and is a member of the National Crisis Management Committee; there is no disaster management ministry and RCS works in line with other ministries. During the operation IRCS coordinated with BAIA and other government stakeholders who mobilized other international actors such as UN and some INGOs. IRCS maintains an MOU with IOM on coordination and communication. IOM noted some challenges in coordination of the response because their own role and that of the UN is not always clear in Iran during emergencies including migration and displacement. IRCS also noted 'miscoordination' during the operation with UN and other international actors who may not have fully understood the role of or coordinated well with IRCS.

Humanitarian Diplomacy: The IFRC HOD did well to promote humanitarian diplomacy by meeting with 56 out of 82 embassies in-country to communicate the needs of migrants and try to mobilize support. The HOD also presented in different ministerial meetings including with border police to advocate along with IRCS on the needs of migrants. Although there was pressure to not create a 'pull' situation of Afghan migrants into the country, IFRC noted that IRCS did really well to advocate for the needs of migrants who were in camps and settlements.

With additional human resource support in the future, IFRC may be able to help further promote the role of IRCS to UN and other stakeholders to help ensure good understanding of roles and responsibilities and better coordination in the future.

Pakistan

Relevance & Appropriateness

IFRC support. IFRC provided significant support at the country level across many technical areas. IFRC staff noted that the Asia Pacific Regional Office (APRO) was very responsive and that the Geneva coordination meetings were helpful. Despite the hand-holding approach by IFRC CO, the ET noted PRCS gaps in CEA, PGI and monitoring and IFRC at both country and regional level could have done more. The human resources and associated FTE are noted in the table below.

Table 18: IFRC In-Country HR support to PRCS

Title	% Allocation	FTE	Start	End	No of Months
HOD	25	0.25	Sep-21	Dec-22	16
PC	50	0.50	Sep-21	Dec-22	16
Sr.Ofr PMER	25	0.25	Sep-21	Dec-22	16
IT/LOGISTICS/CVA	25	0.25	Sep-21	Dec-22	16
SPO HEALTH	25	0.08	Aug-22	Dec-22	5
HEALTH COORD	25	0.23	Sep-21	Nov-22	15
PROCUREMENT & SECURITY	30	0.30	Sep-21	Dec-22	16
FINANCE MGR	1	0.19	Jul-22	Sep-22	3
PMER MGR	1	0.25	Jan-22	Apr-22	4
S.O. MIGRATION & DISPLACEMENT	1	0.75	Jan-22	Dec-22	12
REPORTING OFC	1	0.06	Mar-22	Mar-22	1
SO NSD	1	0.38	Jul-22	Dec-22	6
DRIVER	1	0.38	Jul-22	Dec-22	6
		3.86		IFRC had an FTE of 3.86 persons supporting the country delegation for the duration of the 16-month appeal.	

Readiness - The IFRC support emphasizing migration and displacement has been instrumental in creating a position/unit within PRCS. A migration policy is planned for 2023. This work was started before the Appeal with a migration assessment in 2020 and on-going technical support. The Appeal provided a real-time opportunity to further showcase the needs, gaps and capacities of the NS and government authorities in migration and displacement. While the culmination of the last three years of effort is quite positive, IFRC will need to continue to prioritize their support to PRCS in this area to maintain momentum.

Table 19: IFRC Regional Support to Pakistan

NO	Title	% Allocation	FTE	Start	End	No. Of months
1	Operations Coordinator	1 Operations Coordinator has dedicated on average approximately 25% of their time weekly throughout 9/2021-12/2022 for this operation.	.19	1/7/2022	30/9/2022	3 full months of salary has been charged to the operation.

1	Regional IM Coordinator	The regional IM Coordinator together with the IM Officer has provided support to the operation per requests	.50	1/10/21 1/5/22	31/12/21 30/9/22	8 months
Total Regional FTE			.69	APRO had an FTE of .69 for the duration of the Appeal.		

Efficiency

Response: Turnover was an issue for both IFRC and PRCS as was timely monitoring. Timely sharing of information from IFRC to PRCS HQ and down to branches and back up the chain also appeared to hamper operations. Procurement and warehouse management was noted as needing more attention and capacity building – as basic stock management processes appeared to be lacking in some areas leading to the distribution of expired medicines.

The support provided by IFRC has been found to increase the readiness of PRCS for future migration and displacement but more is needed. An ambitious 2023 country plan features migration and displacement work prominently with policy, strategy, guidelines in need of further work and roll-out at all levels of PRCS.

The ET found that PRCS has been able to provide important meaningful service to target populations though interventions could have been timelier or prioritized earlier as financial resources were available. Continued work with CAR and with the Government in migration and displacement policy and guidelines ideally will lead to increased ability of PRCS to further target undocumented Afghan arrivals for future support in coordination with UNHCR and other partners.

Effectiveness

Coordination: Coordination with UNHCR took place from the outset of the operation. IFRC helped ensure a good relationship with UNHCR prior with both organizations exchanging data and information. A Refugee Coordination Forum was set up by UNHCR with the NS and IFRC participating. The IFRC and NS were also part of the UNHCR Refugee Protection Sector Working Group Meeting. Coordination among the RCRC family was largely absent. One review meeting to assess POA progress was jointly conducted between PRCS and IFRC under the leadership of the Chairman. Despite this and a few other meetings, PNS felt coordination attention wasn't sufficient to align capacity and interest around the Appeal and planned activities.

At the branch level, effective communication and timely information sharing was a gap from the outset. Branches were not always clear on the plans, decisions or even timing of some Appeal activities.

While cross-border collaboration, as a part of this Appeal, did not occur, PRCS had previously coordinated with IRCS and ARCS. IFRC Pakistan did participate regularly in the Geneva-led IFRC internal coordination meetings and did some additional coordination/discussions with IFRC colleagues in Iran and Afghanistan.

Humanitarian Diplomacy: IFRC and PRCS actively engaged embassies and diplomatic missions to advocate on the need for preparedness for a potential influx from Afghanistan and reminding stakeholders of the role of PRCS. Several rounds of meetings were conducted. PRCS was recognized by the GoP at various levels and by diplomatic missions, ideally setting the stage for future support

and cooperation in support of the displaced. However, more could have been done with Authorities to reinforce the auxiliary and independent role of PRCS as well as their various mandates vis a vis refugees and displaced persons.

Tajikistan

Relevance and appropriateness

IFRC support. Technical support for the operation came from in-country deployments and technical missions from the Country Cluster delegation (CCD) in Bishkek and the Regional Office in Budapest. The human resources and associated FTE are noted in Table 20. IFRC had a full-time equivalent (FTE) of 2.75 persons in or supporting the country delegation for the duration of the 16-month appeal; CCD remote support totaled 0.76 leaving an FTE of 1.99 in-country. Considering only in-country FTE, this equated to one FTE per CHF 576,483 in resources managed by RCST. While an analytical frame is not available, on the surface the in-country human resources appear low; in contrast the 2.75 FTE represents 15 persons (including CCD); just counting in-country support, the 1.99 came in the form of 12 persons which may not have been the most efficient form of support for RCST. Some RCST stakeholders did suggest that they spent significant time briefing new stakeholders each time they arrived. From a technical point of view, RCST staff and management and external stakeholders praised the capacity of IFRC and their ability to work well in the local context.

Table 20: IFRC In-Country & Remote Support to RCST

Title	% Allocation	FTE	Start	End	No of Months
Logistic Deployment	100	0.06	10/21	10/21	1
Security	100	0.06	10/21	10/21	1
Shelter Del	100	0.25	11/21	02/22	4
PMER Officer	100	0.19	01/22	03/22	3
Ops Mgr/CVA	100	0.12	01/22	02/22	2
NSD Del	100	0.31	01/22	05/22	5
Ops Coordinator	100	0.31	03/22	07/22	5
Ops Mgr	100	0.12	03/22	04/22	2
PC Del	100	0.19	04/22	06/22	3
RCCE ²⁹ Sr. Officer	100	0.13	06/22	07/22	2
DM Coordinator	100	0.38	07/22	12/22	6
Health Del	100	0.25	07/22	10/22	4
Health Del	100	0.19	10/22	12/22	3
CVA Del	100	0.19	10/22	12/22	3
Total Country FTE including remote CCO support		2.75	IFRC had an FTE of 2.75 persons in or supporting the country delegation for the duration of the		

²⁹ Risk Communication and Community Engagement, CCO.

16-month appeal; CCD remote support totaled 0.76 leaving an FTE of 1.99 in-country.

Table 21: Europe Region HR Support to Tajikistan Operation

Title	% Allocation	FTE	Start	End	No. of Months
ROE REG COOD, INFO MGT	100	0.25	05/22	8/22	4
OPS COORD 1	100	0.31	8/22	12/22	5
OPS COORD 2	15	0.009	10/22	10/22	1
OPS COORD 3	100	0.19	10/22	12/22	3
		0.76	Total Regional FTE		

Effectiveness and Efficiency of IFRC Support

Effectiveness of IFRC support in coordination. As noted earlier, RCST already had a regular internal coordination mechanism set up with Movement partners which continued throughout the operation. There were purported disagreements at times or differences of opinion between IFRC and ICRC, but they worked well together and respected the myriad points of view. IFRC appeared to be instrumental in promoting proper external coordination by UNHCR and ensuring a role for RCST and IFRC. UNHCR and other stakeholders were very appreciative of the IFRC technical and coordination support at both CCD and country levels; the head of CCD and the Shelter delegate were most often named as being instrumental in this regard.

Effectiveness of IFRC support in humanitarian diplomacy. IFRC appeared to have done well to support key technical approaches and messages amongst UN, key donors and the Government of Tajikistan, further bolstering the strong reputation and role held by RCST. It's difficult for ET to assess if there were missed opportunities. Affected population supported in Shahrituz Island at the Panji Poyon border crossing were reportedly returned to Afghanistan by the Taliban. Refugees shared concerns during the ET visit of forced returns in September with refugees hiding in their homes for weeks at a time out of fear of being sent back. UNHCR issued three advisories (August 2021, February 2022 and August 2022) in an attempt to bar 'forced returns.'³⁰ Could the RCRC family have engaged in humanitarian diplomacy on the issue and still retained its service delivery and access to existing refugees? Were there other opportunities for humanitarian diplomacy such as the ability to access affected populations in sensitive border crossing areas? It's likely best that the issue of returns remained within the HD of UNHCR but there are still opportunities for RCST to further define its role in migration vis a vis the Authorities. The operation did plan for RCST to on-board a disaster law focal point and establish a disaster law unit. A number of sessions on disaster law were planned which included further sensitizing key stakeholders to the auxiliary role and mandate of RCST. According to the financial reports, one disaster law workshop was held to sensitise RCST staff. The full plan was not carried out but could have further augmented the work of HoCCD and

³⁰ <https://www.unhcr.org/asia/news/press/2022/8/6306f7274/unhcr-raises-concerns-over-afghan-refugee-forced-returns-from-tajikistan.html>.

Program Coordinators in advocating to UN, Government and other stakeholders of the important independent and auxiliary role of RCST.

Factors affecting efficiency of the response for both RCST and IFRC. The issue raised most frequently by both IFRC and RCST was logistics; with RCST not always fully following the IFRC procedures resulting in re-tendering and IFRC taking time to review and provide feedback (weeks according to some stakeholders), at times due to disagreements as to the relevance of items for procurement. As mentioned, IFRC did well to engage two external consultants to look at the issues and concerns within both IFRC and RCST and this report was issued in late 2022. RCST reported other operations such as border clashes with Kyrgyzstan and flooding did impact their efficiency to some extent. Some Geneva, regional and country stakeholders felt that the Ukraine conflict had a significant impact in terms of IFRC attention and staffing for the operation and donor funding, however only a few examples were given or noted of limited IFRC attention due to bandwidth issues.

Recommendations

Best Practice Reminders for IFRC and the National Societies – the ET noted three areas where international best practices were not fully followed in this operation and given that the below is largely known by IFRC and her members, it's a reminder to try and consistently apply these international standards.

1) Contextualized CEA mechanisms

- a. All components of the CEA system needs to be in the language(s) of the populations being served; this includes all IEC materials, complaints mechanisms and their resolution; systems were either non-existent or only partially in the local language limiting refugees ability to engage or limiting the engagement to those that were educated and multi-lingual while excluding others; hot-line and email systems must be staffed by persons with the relevant language skills. NSs could have easily budgeted for this capacity and IFRC could have given feedback during the design.
- b. Such systems should ideally be in place near the outset of the operation; installing complaints boxes in the final weeks of the operation while better than nothing could be perceived as window-dressing; target populations should be socialized to the systems (which should be multi-faceted) and encouraged to use them.
- c. Affected populations should be part of all aspects of the operation – from needs assessment, through implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Ideally this would mean NS include affected populations as volunteers.

- 2) Support to Host Communities should be an integral part of balanced Programming to support harmony and integration.** Support to host communities has long been encouraged in IFRC response operations and is part of various policies and guidance documents of the IFRC including [Migration and Displacement](#), [Community Engagement and Accountability](#) and [Better Performance Initiative](#). Such programming also promotes acceptance amongst national authorities and may ease the NS ability to support the most vulnerable including the undocumented.

- 3) Protecting and enhancing dignity in programming through greater use of cash**– as a global best practice, organizations continue to be encouraged to use cash support where markets are accessible and functioning; NFIs in their various forms are becoming less relevant in many situations and are often not a good value for the money when compared to cash. This requires IFRC and NS to become highly efficient in the use of cash to ensure timely support to affected populations.

#	Overall Recommendations for IFRC	Suggested Priority
1	Afghanistan Crises Migration and Displacement Readiness: As the Afghanistan crisis which prompted this multi-region operation is not over, IFRC should ensure that each country (Iran, Pakistan and Tajikistan) updates contingency and country plans with a migration and displacement lens to address the lessons and recommendations contained herein. This should happen within the next three months to help increase readiness for the next population movement crisis.	High
2	Migration and Displacement: continue to develop, test and roll out guidance to help IFRC, NS and partners understand how to work in protracted crises and fragile contexts; guidance should include how to contextualize standard tools to these situations including contingency planning for migration & displacement, how to support protection and how to contextualize PGI and CEA; consider checklists that would aid IFRC CO when assessing future plans and budgets; readiness plans for M&D should be holistic and examine needs and capacities on both sides of borders. This is on-going now but should be emphasized in the 2023 IFRC workplans.	High
3	Humanitarian Diplomacy: Continue to invest in (build capacity, awareness and the application of) humanitarian diplomacy, assisting delegations and National Societies in the development and application of key messages beyond those used for fund-raising. This is particularly important in times of migration and displacement when vulnerabilities, protection issues and legal frameworks may not be well understood by donors and practitioners alike.	High
4	Migration & Displacement: Revisit global tools for migration and displacement and re-examine staffing options for future operations to consider longer-term deployments while expanding the technical requirements to align with M&D needs; continue to improve monitoring and analysis tools including those examining the use of triggers in future operations.	Medium
5	<p>Operations and PMER: Within EA/OS for multi country/regions in migration and displacement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Ensure indicator definitions are always included in the operational documents and contextualized for each country. b. require country-level implementation plans with tracking of changes in interventions and targets over time. c. Improve analysis of reports so that challenges in tracking and reporting are caught early and addressed quickly. PMER teams would do well to have checklists for analysis that would aid their review of key reporting documents. 	Medium

	d. IFRC should revisit the template used for these types of Appeals and Operational Strategies and associated guidance to ensure an efficient, logical flow of information that limits repetition of information and enhances user readability.	
6	Humanitarian Diplomacy and Advocacy in Migration and Displacement: ensure technical assistance and capacity in this area at the lowest level possible given regional and country nuances; ensure key issues affecting the Movement's ability to access and support vulnerable populations are part of on-going country plans.	Medium
7	PMER: Given climate change and increased IFRC requirements for real-time or mid-term and final evaluations in big operations, IFRC would do well to maintain rosters of external national evaluators for each presence country.	Medium

#	Recommendations for Iran	Suggested Priority
1	PMER & Technical Capacity: With IFRC CO and RO, enhance capacity, awareness and utilization of PMER, CEA and PGI.	High
2	Operations & PMER: With IFRC CO and RO, enhance beneficiary-based needs assessments and post-distribution monitoring capacity, awareness and utilization.	High
3	Cash & Voucher Programming: With IFRC CO, RO, and NS stakeholders in the region, continue exploring opportunities, options and capacities for cash and voucher programming in the country, targeting the most vulnerable and working creatively within the limits of ongoing international sanctions ahead of future disasters and population movement crises . Work is already underway with the IFRC RO Finance and Support Services and this should remain a high priority.	High
4	Operations: With IFRC, update response SOPs with all associated departments and provinces, articulating various roles and responsibilities across departments (including the Research Division) and incorporating expectations and options for beneficiary needs assessments, post-distribution monitoring, CEA, PGI and cash and voucher programming. SOP updates should include how to enhance communication with provincial branches to the extent possible – accounting for the limitations sanctions continue to have on communications in the country. This should include how to socialize branches to new international operations such as IFRC supported DREFs and Appeals.	Medium
5	Migration & Displacement: With IFRC, continue the work to develop a migration policy and see how and where the organization's emergency operations procedures and guidelines can be updated or modified to incorporate a greater reference	Medium

	to and understanding of migration, displacement and protection needs and options within the mandate and capacity of the IRCS. This should include a reflection on other policies and guidelines as warranted.	
6	Human Resources: For IFRC CO and RO to support IRCS well in these recommendations and in light of evaluation findings, re-examine human resource needs in-country to ensure IFRC is sufficiently staffed to support IRCS keeping in mind the challenges in international recruitment due to the impact of international sanctions.	Medium

#	Recommendations for Pakistan	Suggested Priority
1	Gender: Continue to work to ensure gender equity in operations; increase the number of female volunteers at the field level; when conducting assessments and monitoring including PDM, ensure women are consulted at a level equal to their representation in the population targeted.	High
2	Inclusion: Ensure branches at all levels are part of the design process of future operations affecting them. Ensure a socialization process is conducted at all levels for each new operation/program to ensure buy-in and effective implementation and support.	Medium
3	Inclusion: Despite the end of this Appeal, encourage branches to continue to work with CAR at their level and include refugees and the undocumented in on-going service delivery. Enhance volunteer pool and NS capacity by including Afghan volunteers (and updating policies or procedures as warranted).	Medium
4	Operations: with IFRC, review warehouse management practices to ensure basic stock management systems are in place across the National Society	Medium
5	PMER: ensure dedicated capacity in PMER at HQ , while working with IFRC to bring on additional capacity at all levels during emergency operations.	Medium

#	Recommendations for Tajikistan	Suggested Priority
1	Human Resource: Find ways to sustain staffing in PMER, CEA and PGI (currently a total of 2 persons) regardless of project portfolio. Good progress should be sustained and capitalized upon.	High
2	NSD: Considering their importance to the auxiliary role of the NS and relevance to implementing partners, enhance investment in all border branches at district levels and include volunteers in the development and roll-out of those plans. IT equipment, communication and continued skill building were recommended by external partners, IFRC and staff/volunteers alike. Capacity-building of staff and volunteers at the field and HQ levels should account for turnover as a regular occurrence.	High
3	Stakeholder Management: With IFRC support, map out NS role in migration and displacement given new infrastructure in place in key border locations. Use the opportunity of upcoming MOU renewals with Authorities to continue to refine and enhance the role of the NS in alignment with auxiliary role, changing needs, interests and capacities. Maintain regular engagement with stakeholders like UNHCR despite the end of the Appeal and the end of key agreements with UNHCR directly.	High
4	Inclusion: Despite the end of this appeal, encourage branches to continue to work with the Afghan Diaspora and the Afghan refugees as part of their on-going programming. Enhance the regional and district branch volunteer pool by including Afghan volunteers (and updating associated policies or procedures as warranted).	Medium
5	Operations: with IFRC, review warehouse management practices to ensure basic stock management systems are in place across the National Society.	Medium

Annexes

Annex 1: Field Work Schedule

Pakistan: 05-15 December 2022		
Date	Activity	Location
03.12.2022	Travel to Islamabad from Nepal	-
04.12.2022	Desk review and interview preparation	Islamabad
05.12.2022	In-country security briefing & interviews with PRCS NHQs staff	IFRC- Pakistan CO
06.12.2022	Travel to KP branch and Interviews	Peshawar
07.12.2022	Interview at provincial HQs- Merged Areas	Peshawar
08.12.2022	Interview with UNHCR & PRCS NHQs	Islamabad
09.12.2022	Travel to Quetta and interview with CAR, UNHCR, and PRCS PHQs	Quetta
10.12.2022	Travel back to Islamabad	
11.12.2022	Transcribe interview notes- Ram & Travel to Chitral- Sohaib	Islamabad, Chitral
12.12.2022	Interview at IFRC CO- Ram & Interviews with field observation at Chitral- Sohaib	Islamabad & Chitral
13.12.2022	Interview at IFRC, ICRC- Ram, Travel back from Chitral- Sohaib	Islamabad
14.12.2022	Interview with GRC & preparation for finding sharing workshop	Islamabad
15.12.2022	Finding sharing workshop	Islamabad
16.12.2022	Fly back to Nepal	

Iran: 25-28 February 2023		
Date	Activity	Location
25.02.2023	Travel to Mashhad, Capital of Khorasan Razavi province	Mashhad
25.02.2023	Interview with the provincial managing director and deputies	Mashhad
26.02.2023	Travel to Torbat Jaam city	Torbat Jaam
26.02.2023	Interview with Torbat Jaam settlement managers	Torbat Jaam
26.02.2023	Interview with 3 Afghan households and diaspora	Torbat Jaam
26.02.2023	Travel by car to Birjand city, the capital of South Khorasan province	-
27.02.2023	Interview with provincial branch managers	Birjand
27.02.2023	Interview with 3 Afghan households	Birjand
27.02.2023	Interview with host community (local donor)	Birjand
28.02.2023	Briefing with the head of the Birjand branch and head of Helal House	Birjand
28.02.2023	Fly back to Tehran	-
2-10.03.2023	Translate and transcribe interview notes, at the office and on weekends, M. Fakoor	Tehran

Tajikistan: 02-09 December 2022		
Date	Activity	Location
02.12.2022	Travel to Tajikistan- Margaret	-
03.12.2022	Orientation, Security briefing, Introductions, work with national consultant on scheduling the meetings. Meeting with DMD team	Dushanbe
04.12.2022	Desk work with national consultant	Dushanbe
05.12.2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Briefing with RCST Secretary General/Deputy Secretary General. ● Visit to Vahdat town and meeting with Afghan refugees, recipients of Multipurpose cash assistance. ● Visit to Rudaki district and meeting with Afghan refugees, recipients of Multipurpose cash assistance. ● Continuation of the meeting with DMD team/EA project staff ● Meeting with Finance and Health Departments. 	Dushanbe Vahdat town Rudaki district
06.12.2022	Visit to RCST branch in Kulyab	Kulyab
07.12.2022	Visit to RCST branch in Bokhtar <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Meeting with UNHCR, RCVC, ● Meeting with ICRC, German Red Cross ● Afghan Diaspora 	Bokhtar
08.12.2022	Meeting with CoES, MIA Findings workshop	Dushanbe
09.12.2022	Departure	

Annex 2: Summary Number of Stakeholders Consulted

Table 22: Number of Stakeholders Consulted by Location & Gender

Stakeholders by Location	male	female	Total
IFRC Cluster, Region and Geneva	8	6	14
Pakistan TOTAL	34	28	62
National Society	18	2	20
IFRC & Members	5	2	7
External Partners	2	1	3
Affected populations	9	23	32
Iran TOTAL	28	13	41
National Society	20	2	
IFRC & Members	4		
External Partners	2		
Affected Populations	2	11	
Tajikistan TOTAL	53	28	81
National Society	18	5	23
IFRC & Members	3	2	5
External Partners	4	1	5
Affected populations	28	20	48
Kazakhstan TOTAL		2	2
National Society		2	
Kyrgyzstan TOTAL		1	1
National Society		1	
Total	123	78	201
%	61%	39%	100%

Annex 3: Detailed List of Stakeholders Consulted

Pakistan					
30 Key Informant Interviews (7 female and 23 male)					
#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Mr. Manzoor Ali	IFRC- Country Delegation	Programme Coordinator	24.11.2022 & 01.12.2022	Virtual
2.	Mr. Majid Qureshi	IFRC- Country Delegation	Finance Manager	25.11.2022	Virtual
3.	Mr. Shams Ul Haq	PRCS- NHQs	Assistant Director- CVA	25.11.2022	Virtual
4.	Ms. Rabel Haider	IFRC- Country Delegation	PMER Manager	25.11.2022	Virtual
5.	Ms. Saba Hussain	PRCS- NHQs	PGI Focal person	25.11.2022	Virtual
6.	Mr. Faisal Khan	PRCS- NHQs	Deputy Director- WASH	05.12.2022	In-person
7.	Mr. Muhammad Abaid Ullah Khan	PRCS- NHQs	Secretary-General	05.12.2022	In-person
8.	Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Khan	PRCS PHQs- KP	Deputy Secretary (Operations)	06.12.2022	In-person
9.	Ms. Komal	PRCS PHQs- KP	Programme Officer	06.12.2022	In-person
10.	Mr. Ali Hassan	PRCS PHQs- KP	Provincial Secretary	06.12.2022	In-person
11.	Dr. Abdul Hadi	PRCS PHQs- Merged Area	Medical Officer	07.12.2022	In-person
12.	Dr. Imran	PRCS PHQs- Merged Area	Medical Officer	07.12.2022	In-person
13.	Dr. Faryaal,	PRCS PHQs- Merged Area	Medical Officer	07.12.2022	In-person
14.	Dr. Aman	PRCS PHQs- Merged Area	Focal Person- Medical Service	07.12.2022	In-person
15.	Mr. Takaaki Miura	UNHCR	Programme CBI Officer	08.12.2022	In-person
16.	Mr. Raza Haider	PRCS NHQs	Deputy Director- Migration & Displacement	08.12.2022	In-person
17.	Mr. Arbab Talib ul Maula	CAR - Baluchistan	Director	09.12.2022	In-person
18.	Ms. Mandana Amiri	UNHCR	Sr. Protection Officer	09.12.2022	In-person

19.	Mr. Irfan Alamgir Khan	PRCS PHQs- Baluchistan	Secretary	09.12.2022	In-person
20.	Dr. Raj	PRCS District Branch- Chitral	Medical Officer	12.12.2022	In-person
21.	Dr. Rida	PRCS District Branch- Chitral	Medical Officer	12.12.2022	In-person
22.	Mr. Ijaz Ur Rehman	Chitral	Branch Secretary	12.12.2022	In-person
23.	Mr. Afzal	-	Afghan Diaspora- CVA Beneficiary	12.12.2022	In-person
24.	Mr. Saleem Ur Rehman	-	CVA Beneficiary	12.12.2022	In-person
25.	Ms. Madiha Zia	IFRC- Country Delegation	Sr. Officer- Migration & Displacement	12.12.2022	In-person
26.	Mr. Javed Mazhar	PRCS-NHQs	Deputy Director- PMER	12.12.2022	In-person
27.	Mr. Peter Ophoff (Piwi)	IFRC- Country Delegation	Head of Delegation	12.12.2022	In-person
28.	Mr. Muhammad Wasif Jan	ICRC	Movement Cooperation Team Leader	13.12.2022	In-person
29.	Mr. Shehryar Khan	PRCS PHQs- KP	Focal Person- DM	13.12.2022	Virtual
30.	Mr. Asif Aman Khan	GRC	Head of Office	14.12.2022	In-person
3 Focus Group Discussions with 32 People (23 female and 9 male)					
#	Group	# of participants	Location	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Aid recipient (Medical service)- Men group- Migrants	9	Chitral	12.12.2022	In-person
2.	Aid recipient (Medical service)- Women Group- Migrants	13	Chitral	12.12.2022	In-person
3.	Aid recipient (Medical service)- Women Group- Host Community	10	Chitral	12.12.2022	In-person

Iran					
13 Key Informant Interviews (1 female and 12 male)					
#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Ms. Mansooreh Bagheri	IRCS	Coordinator, Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting (Former USG for International Affairs and IHL)	18.01.2023	Virtual
2.	Mr. Hassan Esfandiar	IRCS	Advisor to the Regional Director IFRC MENA on Humanitarian Diplomacy (Former DG for International Operations Dept.)	17.01.2023	Virtual
3.	Mr. Ali Sarabi Asiabar	IRCS	USG for HR, Support Services, and Procurement	22.01.2023	In-person
4.	Mr. Mahdi Valipour	IRCS	Head of IRCS Relief and Rescue Organization (retired)	23.01.23	In-person
5.	Mr. Afshin Alikhani	IRCS	DG for Emergency Health Dept	21.01.2023	In-person
6.	Mr. Alireza Mirbahedini	IRCS	Managing Director, Sistan Baluchestan Province	28.01.2023	In-person
7.	Mr. Atta Durrani	IFRC	Head of Delegation	02.01.2023	Virtual
8.	Mr. Kamran Khaki	ICRC	Cooperation Coordinator	01.02.2023	Virtual
9.	Mr. Amir Shafiee	GRC	Assistant	03.01.2023	Virtual
10.	Mr. Irfan Hameed	IOM	Programme Coordinator,	13.02.2023	Virtual
11.	Mr. Sarafi Mohamad	IOM	M&E Knowledge Management and Reporting Officer	13.02.2023	Virtual
12.	Mr. Abbas Mohammadi	IRCS	Head of International Operations	14.03.2023	Virtual
13.	Mr. Mohamad Reza FAKOOR	IFRC Country Delegation	Movement PMER Officer	14.03.2023	Virtual
Interview with Affected Population -13 People (11 female and 2 male)					
#	Group	# of participants	Location	Interview Date	Mode
1	Aid Recipient	1 (Man)	Torbat Jaam settlement	26.02.2023	In-person
2	Aid Recipients	4 (women)	Torbat Jaam settlement	26.02.2023	In-person

3	Aid Recipients	3 (Women)	Birjand city	27.02.2023	In-person
4	Aid Recipients	3 (Women)	Birjand city	27.02.2023	In-person
5	Afghan Diaspora	1 (Woman)	Birjand city	27.02.2023	In-person
6	Host community Representative	1 (Man)	Birjand city	27.02.2023	In-person
3 Focus Group Discussions -15 People (1 female and 14 male)					
#	Group	# of participants	Location	Interview Date	Mode
1	Provincial Branch HQs	5 (4 Men- 1 Woman)	NS Khorasan Razavi Provincial Branch	26.02.2023	In-person
2	Provincial Branch HQs	5 Men	NS South Khorasan Provincial Branch	27.02.2023	In-person
3	Camp Provincial, Branch and Security Officials	5 Men	Torbat Jaam settlement	27.02.2023	In-person

Tajikistan					
27 Key Informant Interviews (8 female and 19 male)					
#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Mr. Abdul Mosawer Bahadori	Ariana Assembly Representation of Afghan Immigrants in the Republic of Tajikistan (Afghan Diaspora)	Director	05.12.2022	In-person
2.	Mr. Jamshed Kamolzoda	Committee for Emergency Situation and Civil Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan	Head of Population and Territory Protection Department, General	06.12.2022	In-person
3.	Mr. Mirzozoda Jomi Jamakhon	Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan	Chief of the citizenship and registration of refugees department, Lieutenant Colonel of police	06.12.2022	In-person
4.	Mr. Jamshed Hasanov	UNICEF Tajikistan	Emergency Officer	08.12.2022	In-person
5.	Ms. Navruza Jalilova	UNHCR Office in Dushanbe	Senior Specialist	08.12.2022	In-person
6.	Mr. Ikrom Soliev	GRC	Head of Office for Central Asia	22.12.2022	Virtual
7.	Ms. Angelika Schopp	ICRC- Country Delegation	Head of the Mission	26.12.2022	Virtual

8.	Mr. Sanjay Mukherjee	IFRC- Country Delegation	Operations Coordinator (Consultant)		Virtual
9.	Mr. Firdavs Faizulloev	IFRC- Country Delegation	DM Coordinator	03.12.2022	In-person
10.	Ms. Rafoat Boltaboeva	IFRC- Country Delegation	Admin and Finance Officer	09.12.2022	In-person
11.	Mr. Bahoduri Kurboniyon	RCST	Secretary General	05.12.2022	In-person
12.	Ms. Dilorom Mirova	RCST	Deputy Secretary General	05.12.2022	In-person
13.	Mr. Shuhrat Sangov	RCST	Head of DM Department	03.12.2022	In-person
14.	Mr. Mustafo Rahmatsho	RCST	Manager Assistant	09.12.2022	In-person
15.	Mr. Faridun Yusufjonov	RCST	PMER Officer	09.12.2022	In-person
16.	Mr. Fitrati Shamsuddin	RCST	Cash Officer / CVA Focal Point	09.12.2022	In-person
17.	Ms. Mahina Niyazova	RCST	CEA & PGI Officer	09.12.2022	In-person
18.	Ms. Zarina Abdullaeva	RCST	Health Assistant	09.12.2022	In-person
19.	Mr. Sodik Askarov	RCST	Head of Logistics Department	09.12.2022	In-person
20.	Mr. Abudlahad Aliev	RCST Branch - Vahdat City	Head of the Branch	05.12.2022	In-person
21.	Mr. Hadyatullo Nurov	RCST Branch - Rudaki District	Head of the Branch	06.12.2022	In-person
22.	Mr. Tojiddin Satorzoda	RCST Branch - Kulob City	Head of the Branch	07.12.2022	In-person
23.	Mr. Komil Khudoydodov	RCST Branch - Kulob City	ERC\DM Coordinator	07.12.2022	In-person
24.	Ms. Malika Nozimova	RCST Branch - Kulob City	Program Coordinator	07.12.2022	In-person
25.	Mr. Abduljabbor Hotamov	RCST Branch - Bokhtar District	Head of the Branch	07.12.2022	In-person
26.	Mr. Islom Muhtojov	RCST Branch - Bokhtar District	ERC\DM Coordinator	07.12.2022	In-person
27.	Ms. Gulizor Karaeva	RCST Branch - Bokhtar District	HR officer	07.12.2022	In-person
7 Focus Group Discussions with 54 People (20 female and 34 male)					
#	Group	# of participants	Location	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Aid Recipient-Migrants	15 People (6 Women, 9 Men)	Vahdat District	05.12.2022	In-person
2.	Aid Recipient-Migrants	11 People (5 Women, 6 Men)	Rudaki District	06.12.2022	In-person
3.	Volunteers	4 People (2 Women, 2 Men)	Vahdat District	05.12.2022	In-person
4.	Volunteers	2 People (2 Women)	Rudaki District	06.12.2022	In-person
5.	Volunteers	10 People (3 Women, 7 Men)	Bokhtar District	07.12.2022	In-person
6.	Volunteers	6 People (2 Women, 4 Men)	Kulob City	07.12.2022	In-person
7.	RCST Staff	6 Men	Vahdat District	05.12.2022	In-person

Kazakhstan					
2 Key Informant Interviews (2 female)					
#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Ms. Kim Olga Olegovna	Red Crescent Society of Kazakhstan	Head of Emergency Department	15.12.2022	Virtual
2.	Ms. Lena Kistaubayeva	Red Crescent Society of Kazakhstan	Project Coordinator	15.12.2022	Virtual
Kyrgyzstan					
1 Key Informant Interview (2 female)					
#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Ms. Guldar Kasymova	Red Crescent Society of Kyrgyzstan	Head of DM Department	22.12.2022	Virtual
2.	Ms. Seval Guzelkilinc	IFRC- Country Delegation	Head of the Country Cluster Office	Multiple meetings: Nov 14, Dec 1, Dec 18	Virtual
Geneva					
7 Key Informant Interviews (4 female, 3 male)					
#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Ms. Marjorie Soto Franco	IFRC	National Society Preparedness officer	02.12.2023	Virtual
2.	Ms. Gabriela Arenas	IFRC	PRD Global Coordinator	01.12.2022	Virtual
3.	Ms. Christina Duschl	IFRC	Senior Officer, Operations Coordination	Multiple meetings	Virtual
4.	Ms. Raquel Fernandez Girbaja	IFRC	Coordinator, Migration and Displacement, Europe	11.01.2023	Virtual
5.	Mr. Nelson Castano	IFRC	Manager Operations Coordination	11.01.2023	Virtual
6.	Mr. Xavier Castellanos	IFRC	USG, NSD, and Operations Coordination	11.01.2023	Virtual
7.	Mr. Ezekiel Simperingham	IFRC	Lead, Migration, and Displacement	12.01.2023	Virtual

Asia Pacific Region					
2 Key Informant Interviews (2 male)					
#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode

1.	Mr. Joy Singhal	IFRC RO	Head of Health, Disaster, Climate, and Crisis	16.12.2022	Virtual
2.	Mr. Alexander Matheou	IFRC RO	Regional Director	08.12.2022	Virtual

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

2 Key Informant Interviews (2 male)

#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode
1.	Mr. Hosam Faysal	IFRC RO	Regional Head of HDCC	10.01.2023	Virtual
2.	Mr. Nader Bin Shamlan	IFRC RO	Operations Coordinator	09.03.2023	Virtual

Europe Region

2 Key Informant Interviews (1 female, 1 male)

#	Name	Organization	Position	Interview Date	Mode
1	Andreas Weissenberg	IFRC	Head of HDCC	24.01.2023	virtual
2.	Birgitte Bischoff-Ebbesen	IFRC	Regional Director Europe	16.03.2023	virtual

Annex 4: Technical Reminders

Use this checklist to help you reduce biases in data collection. Please add to it as well and share with colleagues!

ENSURE YOUR KEY INFORMANTS ARE KEY INFORMANTS

- Good key informants are those persons who were involved in the subject you are evaluating.
- At the start of your questioning, confirm what role they played, when and how often they were involved in something before continuing.

EXAMPLE 1: If you are interviewing a recipient of a NS cash grant program - confirm what they received and when and from what organization; they might even have a beneficiary card or something that shows what they were a part of. Once confirmed, then you can continue with your line of questioning.

EXAMPLE 2: If you are interviewing a DM manager about her role in a project - start by asking *when she joined the organization; when did she become DM manager? What was her role in the operation? When did that start?* Sometimes people took on a relevant role near the end of an operation or very late in the process and therefore cannot tell you what happened in the beginning based on their actual experience, but they may share what they heard other's say; you don't want that - you want to know their direct experience, unless they have evidence of what they heard. Hence, always confirm their role and when it started before jumping into the questions.

BE MINDFUL HOW YOU ASK QUESTIONS

- Ask one question at a time.** Don't ask multiple questions at a time or multiple questions within one question.

DON'T DO THIS. *In thinking about all the interventions the NS implemented, which ones did you like best and why, and which ones were less useful and why?*

DO THIS INSTEAD. *Which services did you receive from the RC? Then ask about one service at a time. When did you receive that? Was it useful for you? If yes, how was it useful for you? If no, why wasn't it useful for you? What else could RC have been done that would have been more useful to you.*

Pause after each question and listen intently!

- Don't use jargon, acronyms, or colloquialisms.**³¹ Keep it simple. Don't use slang or phraseology that may not be universally familiar. You can still ask difficult or complex questions, but you have to communicate clearly by being direct, speaking slowly and not layering multiple ideas or questions into one. This is where good interview guides and advance preparation comes in handy!

³¹ What's a colloquialism? A word or phrase that may be informal, slang or unique to your particular locale or culture and may not be familiar to those you are communicating with. For example, 'What does your NS do during blue sky?' Some disaster responders or westerners might be familiar with this term but it's not likely to be universally understood.



No leading question! Don't suggest the answer in the question and don't give your opinion (but you can provide facts).

DON'T DO THIS. *The IFRC did a great job in providing support. What did you think of it?*

DO THIS INSTEAD. *Did you receive any support from the IFRC in the last three months? If yes, what support? When did this happen? Who provided it? Did you ask for this support? Was it useful to you? In what way? Please describe.*

BE AWARE OF YOUR OWN BIAS

We all have our biases and use subjectivity all the time to help us understand our surroundings.

In carrying out an evaluation, you can reduce the influence of your biases and subjectivity by thinking in advance about biases or preformed opinions you might have about the operation.

You can also reduce biases by asking clear, objective, non-leading questions.

Another way to reduce biases and subjectivity in our analysis is by having respondents confirm what they shared, by using multiple data sources, and through triangulation.

DON'T MAKE ASSUMPTIONS

Don't skip questions even if you think you know the answers. Ask it anyways.

You can say, I read in report x that y happened. Do you agree with that? Why or why not? What additional evidence can you share on that? You can ask why the stakeholder thinks that. And ask for examples of what they are saying.

GET THE EVIDENCE – NOT JUST THE OPINION

Key informants will make statements that may not always be based on fact - they might just be their opinions and they may not be sure how they formed them.

It's the evaluator's job to push and probe (ask more follow up questions) to help get the evidence that validates the key informant's statements. Some validation will come via triangulation, but you can improve the quality of input by asking:

Who, what, where, when etc. to further substantiate what respondents are telling you.

Always for an example of what they are telling you (or even multiple examples).

Annex 5: Evaluation Matrix

[RPM Inception Report Final Draft 17112022.pdf](#)

Annex 6: Terms of Reference

Final [Evaluation](#) TOR for Regional Afghanistan Population Movement MDRAFRPM21

Annex 7: Bibliography

ACAPS. Iran – Afghan Refugees. 20 October 2022. <https://www.acaps.org/country/iran/crisis/afghan-refugees#:~:text=Overview,-20%2F10%2F2022&text=Iran%20hosts%20one%20of%20the,laissez%2Dpasser%20live%20in%20Iran>.

Eckstein, D., et al., Briefing Paper: Global Climate Risk Index 2021. German Watch, Berlin. https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021_2.pdf

European Union Agency for Asylum. EUAA publishes report on Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 20 May 2022. [EUAA publishes report on Afghan refugees in Pakistan | European Union Agency for Asylum \(europa.eu\)](https://europeanunion.europa.eu/eu-aa-publi-shes-report-on-afghan-refugees-in-pakistan)

IFRC. Afghanistan Regional Population Movement Preparedness Appeal – Reflections on Current Gaps and Needs of Responding National Societies. 2021. Unpublished internal IFRC document.

IFRC. Emergency Appeal. Regional Population Movement – Afghanistan: Preparedness & Response. Appeal No: MDRAFRPM21, 25 September 2021.

IFRC. Emergency Plan of Action. Europe and Central Asia: Afghanistan Regional Population Movement: Preparedness and Response. 23 November 2021.

IFRC. Emergency Plan of Action. Iran: Regional Population Movement – Afghanistan: Preparedness and Response. 20 November 2021.

IFRC. Emergency Plan of Action. Pakistan: Population Movement from Afghanistan. 13 September 2021.

IFRC Operations Update #1. Regional Population Movement – Afghanistan: Preparedness and Response. 04/11/2021.

IFRC Operations Update #2. Regional Population Movement – Afghanistan: Preparedness and Response. 10/01/2022.

IFRC Operations Update #3. Regional Population Movement – Afghanistan: Preparedness and Response. 31/12/2022.

IFRC Operations Update #4. Regional Population Movement – Afghanistan: Preparedness and Response. 31/05/2022.

IFRC Operations Update #4. Regional Population Movement – Afghanistan: Preparedness and Response. 31/12/2022.

IFRC. Revised Emergency Appeal. Operational Strategy. Regional Population Movement - Afghanistan: Preparedness and Response. 06 July 2022.

"Kyrgyz Government and UNHCR conducted simulation exercise to enhance emergency preparedness." May 20, 2022. Uploaded by UNHCR Central Asia. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c10lnz8YaOY>

OCHA (2022). Iran - <https://www.unocha.org/middle-east-and-north-africa-romena/iran>

Red Crescent of Kazakhstan. "Assistance to Refugees and Asylum Seekers." <https://redcrescent.kz/en/works/assistance-to-refugees-and-asylum-seekers/> accessed on January 3, 2023

UNHCR 2022. https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan#_ga=2.147331575.1558911771.1677009016-1954678978.1672704695

UNHCR (2022). <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/kyrgyzstan.html>.

UNHCR, Kazakhstan National Office. Kazakhstan Fact Sheet, August 2022. www.UNHCR.org/centralasia

UNHCR (2023). [UNHCR helps nearly one million refugees in Iran, mostly from Afghanistan and Iraq](#)