Operational Meta-Analysis
2020-2023
Contents

- Emergency Appeal Trends
- Meta-Analysis - Methodology
- Recurring themes – 13 years
- 2023 Meta-Analysis findings
- Ongoing initiatives
Emergency Appeals in the last 20 years...

- **% EA Funding Received**
  - 2003: 77%
  - 2004: 105%
  - 2005: 61%

- **Avg EA Value (Secretariat FR)**
  - 2003: 27,333,532 CHF
  - 2004: 17,769,385 CHF
  - 2005: 59,385,133 CHF
  - 2006: 47,922,222 CHF
  - Average EA Value:
    - 2003-2005: 24
    - 2006-2020: 33
  - Linear trend line:
    - 2003: 0 CHF
    - 2005: 33 CHF
    - 2010: 9 CHF
    - 2015: 18 CHF
    - 2020: 25 CHF

- **# of EA (per year)**
  - 2000: 24
  - 2005: 33
  - 2010: 9
  - 2015: 18

Average EA Value (Secretariat FR)
Consolidating Four Meta-Analyses

67 operations
13 years of learning
202 Cumulative findings

FULL DATASET
2020-23 Meta-Analysis

16 Operations
>1,000 pages read and tagged

Global perspective covering operations in all regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, Crisis</td>
<td>Bahamas, Hurricane Dorian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus, pop mov’t</td>
<td>Southern Africa, Cholera</td>
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<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>DRC, Volcano</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea, EVD</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Tigray crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras, Eta/Iota</td>
<td>Turkiye, Earthquake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine Crisis</td>
<td>Malawi, TS Ana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC, EVD</td>
<td>Nepal, earthquake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, pop mov’t</td>
<td>Uganda, EVD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32% Africa
14% Americas
12% AP
22% Europe
20% Global
### Analytical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership &amp; Decision-making</td>
<td>IFRC Movement Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agenda for Renewal and NWoW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis and Planning</td>
<td>Risk management and BCP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Response and recovery planning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pre-disaster agreements and preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Coordination with the Movement (ICRC + PNS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordination within IFRC</td>
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<td>Coordination with external agencies and NGO’s</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordination with authorities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Cash transfer programming</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information management</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rapid response (surge + ERU)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality programming</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IFRC Emergency response procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy and Strategy</td>
<td>RC Auxiliary role, mandate, and law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations support</td>
<td>Safety and security management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operations monitoring, evaluation, reporting, and learning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Finance, admin, policy, and corporate service emergency procedures</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Logistics, procurement, and supply chain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>HR, staff and volunteer management and duty of care</td>
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<td>Media and communications</td>
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<td>Resource mobilization</td>
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- **Qualitative research design** where Evaluations (RTE + Final), surge end of mission reports, and other learning documents were tagged against the analytical framework. Timeframe under examination for the latest analysis was from **March 2020 – May 2023**.

- Themes identified through tags at sub-category level, resulting in **67 individual findings**

  - **11 Recommendations**
  - **45 Challenges**
  - **11 Best Practices**

- Each challenge vetted with sector/unit leads to **identify any initiatives in place already** to rectify them.
ALL META-ANALYSES

Common findings
Recurring themes - past 13 years

Nine recurring themes highlighted in all meta-analyses

• Need to **strength our corporate service processes** in emergencies and **build our pool** of deployable CS professionals

• **Minimal understanding** of IFRC systems, emergency response procedures, and corporate service procedures **amongst the Membership**, which undermines response efficiency and people’s confidence and raises institutional risk.

• Delays in recruitment inevitably lead to the ‘**pain box’ in the transition from surge.**

• **IFRC decision-making authority is unclear** between the country, region, and Geneva-levels, **blurring the lines** of accountability and responsibility
Recurring themes - past 13 years

• Need to **enhance our assessment and analytical capacity** within IFRC and Membership, **building stronger links** to operational planning and decision-making

• **Our collective weakness in operations monitoring** undermines our ability to demonstrate our impact, raise resources, and ensure quality delivery

• **High level visits** continue to challenge capacity and operations flow, while value added is not always evident

• **Weak volunteer management systems** threaten operations and put volunteers at undue risk

• **Unsolicited or sub-standard IKD’s** continue to be sent in the early stages of large-scale crises. This **violation of the Principles and Rules** clogs relief pipelines, imposes massive costs, and can risk the Movement's reputation.
“I am satisfied [with my mission] but **these chronic issues need solutions** b/c the tangible rewards feel nominal in comparison to the challenges that have been identified time and time again. Otherwise I’m afraid I’d be less compelled to deploy again if we’re just spinning our wheels making the same mistakes over and over again.”

- Delegate from a NS deployed in 2022
META-ANALYSIS (2020-23)

Main findings
Top Challenges – 2023 Meta-Analysis

Nearly all of the top five challenges are all recurring themes from past 13 years...

1. Lack of proper assessment and analysis, linked to operational planning
2. Minimal Understanding of IFRC systems and procedures amongst Membership
3. High turnover of surge staff, weak handovers, and short missions
4. Weak operations monitoring
5. Lack of deployable corporate service profiles

*Ranked by frequency
“Duty of care” was the most frequently reported challenge between 2020 and 2023

1. **Burnout:** RR personnel—IFRC and Membership—face **high levels of stress** on response with non-standard access to **PSS and burnout prevention**. While some NS' have strong PSS and duty of care setups, the IFRC and some of its Membership have little in place, exposing their staff to high levels of risk and burnout.

2. **Financial Liability:** Undue personal and financial liability transferred to IFRC and NS RR staff while on mission, including delegates being required to utilize their **personal finances** to cover essential mission costs or assuming **personal liability** for enormous working advances (>CHF 10k). As some are unable to assume such liability, this widens the gap between those sent from the **global north and south**

3. **Equipment:** Delegates continue to be deployed--from the IFRC in particular--**without being provided with adequate equipment**, which forces them to use their own personal equipment on mission and/or risk their readiness and wellbeing on response
Ranked by frequency

1. **Best Practice:** Although secondary consideration of HNS interests and limited engagement in programme design remain in operations, a **cultural shift has occurred in line with the Agenda for Renewal**, which has put HNS at the center of response and Movement Partners working in support of the HNS response plan.

2. **Challenge:** IFRC decision-making authority is unclear between the country, region, and Geneva-levels, **blurring the lines** of accountability and responsibility.

3. **Recommendation:** Need to ensure **physical collocation** with the HNS and Membership as priority in emergency operations as well as proximity to the crisis.

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**Important NSD initiatives to watch out for...**

1. Upcoming approval and dissemination of the **NSDiE Framework**
2. Revival of **NSDiE surge** training and reactivation of **NSDiE pool** and rapid response roster
3. Sharing **emerging evidence and learnings** of NSD in emergencies and their linkage to longer-term NSD priorities
4. Inclusion of clear and essential NSD elements into the **revised Managing IFRC Operations training**
Ranked by frequency

1. **Challenge**: Although improvements have been made, lack of proper assessment and analysis, linked to operational planning and decision-making, undermines response.

2. **Challenge**: Limited funding overviews from Partners and delayed commitments from donors undermines operational planning.

3. **Best Practice**: Structured and predictable operations planning cycles continue to demonstrate their effectiveness in response and Movement/Membership coordination.

4. **Best Practice**: Anticipatory action continues to demonstrate its impact and effectiveness in addressing humanitarian need and improving learning.

5. **Challenge**: Delays in the resolution of alleged code of conduct/PSEA cases and concerns raised to the Integrity Line undermines trust.
Ranked by frequency

1. **Challenge:** While remote deployments have associated cost savings, generally they are considered more challenging and less effective.

2. **Challenge:** Continued challenges in managing vertical information flow within the IFRC structures, which negatively impacts internal coordination between all levels.

3. **Challenge:** There remains considerable disagreement--within both the IFRC and Membership--of IFRC's focus in operations. While some NS have repeated that they do not want the "IFRC to act like another implementing PNS", others are clear that the humanitarian imperative, at times, requires the IFRC to adopt an implementing role. These opposing views cause confusion amongst the IFRC and Membership, which slows response.
Top Findings – Operations

*The top three ranked findings by frequency* were outlined already in slide 11: (1) High surge turnover; (2) lack of deployable corporate service profiles; and (3) Membership lack of understanding of IFRC systems.

**Ranked by frequency**

4. **Challenge:** Challenges—perceived or actual—remain in the *soft and hard competencies of surge members*, including lacking cultural sensitivity, disparate technical skills, and low experience-levels, which *impacts operations* and erodes trust in the tools.

5. **Challenge:** Refusal of surge *(see next slide)*

6. **Recommendation:** Cash interventions should not be mounted *at the exclusion of other relief modalities*, particularly considering the *timeframes required to mount them* (~2 months) and *high dependence on Government partnership* and data access.
**Novel finding:** Trend amongst NS of aversion or outright refusal to deploy some of the global tools (surge [Global + Regional] and ERU) due to:

1. Legacy negative perceptions of their effectiveness,
2. Inapplicability in certain contexts,
3. Costs (actual or perceived), and/or
4. Post-departure fallout (actual or perceived)

**Occurred in Uganda, Greece, Honduras, Ukraine, Southern Africa, Syria, and Turkiye.**
Ranked by frequency

1. **Challenge:** Weakness in operations monitoring and data collection undermines our ability to demonstrate our impact, raise resources, and ensure quality delivery to affected populations.

2. **Challenge:** Highly specific earmarking (sectoral, timeframe, and geographic) continues to **undermine the localization agenda** by cementing donor-driven response, risking implementation quality to meet tight deadlines, and limiting NS' abilities to programme against their priorities in the short-, medium-, and longer-terms.

3. **Challenge:** Despite continued calls for such, there are **no clear Corporate Service Emergency Standard Operating Procedures** to facilitate adaptative administrative procedures in times of crisis, which greatly affects the efficiency of IFRC response.

4. **Challenge:** Slow disbursement timelines or delays in funds transfer to National Societies continue, limiting the quality and impact of our interventions.
1. **Recommendation:** The trust that Government and the people have in the Red Cross greatly affects the working areas of the NS and their access to funding. Lack of recognition of the RC auxiliary role or pre-agreements excludes HNS' from a response, which can impact the wider RCRC and thus emphasizes the importance of auxiliary to Government negotiations pre-crisis.

2. **Challenge:** Lack of legal status for IFRC complicates operations with the impact often underestimated for the IFRC and Membership
META-ANALYSIS (2020-23)
Initiatives ongoing to rectify challenges
## What are we doing about it?

### Challenges: Top Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Action (ongoing/planned)</th>
<th>Unit Engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment, analysis, and planning</td>
<td>Assessment Toolkit &amp; Accelerating IM programme (planned), institutionalize DEEP (ongoing); Guidance for humanitarian scenarios (ongoing); Strengthening remote sensing analysis capacity (planned);</td>
<td>IM, Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of IFRC systems by Membership</td>
<td>Surge Learning + IFRC Learning Platform - 'Induction to IFRC Operations’, ‘Managing IFRC operations’, and ‘Your Guide to Project Financial Management’ (complete); Job aids in the Operational Toolbox (complete)</td>
<td>Surge Learning + CS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High turnover of RR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak operations monitoring</td>
<td>Training material updated (planned); PMER Co to be hired (planned); standardization of indicator bank and improved data collection process (ongoing)</td>
<td>PMER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of deployable CS profiles</td>
<td>ForeSee: Stand-by list of corporate services staff (ongoing); enhance NS CS surge rosters (ongoing)</td>
<td>USG NSDOC, Surge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsolicited IKD’s</td>
<td>Standard mobtable message discourages unsolicited IKD’s (completed); Continued advocacy early in emergencies against unsolicited donations (standard)</td>
<td>GHSSCM, DCC, SPRM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Challenges: Burnout Prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Action (ongoing/planned)</th>
<th>Unit Engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Burnout prevention and duty of care | • **IFRC PSP Team**: 12 counsellors in all Regions; 2 free sessions for all IFRC staff w/ remaining sessions covered by AXA insurance (completed);   
  • **IFRC PS Center**: extensive materials and trainings (completed) - [https://pscentre.org/](https://pscentre.org/)   
  • **Burnout Prevention Program Development** (planned)   
  • **MHPSS**: online training for managers on how to take care of staff and volunteers (ongoing)                                                                                                                      | OHSW         |
|                                 | **But more can be done in operations**: Buddy Talks, Peer Support, Briefing/Debriefing sessions, selfcare routine. No definition of Duty of Care exists at the IFRC.                                                                 |              |
### What are we doing about it?

**Challenges:** Leadership + Analysis and Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Action (ongoing/planned)</th>
<th>Unit Engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IFRC decision-making levels</td>
<td>Revision of the Emergency Response Framework (planned)</td>
<td>DREF, IM &amp; Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited partner funding overviews</td>
<td>Enhancement and operationalization of Fed-wide data collection in emergencies (ongoing)</td>
<td>PMER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution of PSEA/Code of Conduct cases</td>
<td>Awareness raising of integrity line, investigations processes, and fraud/SEAH prevention (planned); establish an investigations roster (ongoing); embedding assurance teams in larger responses (ongoing)</td>
<td>OIAI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**What are we doing about it?**

**Challenges: Coordination + Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Action (ongoing/planned)</th>
<th>Unit Engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remote deployments</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical info flow</td>
<td>Revision of the Emergency Response Framework (planned)</td>
<td>DREF, IM &amp; Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR competencies</td>
<td>&quot;Induction to IFRC Operations&quot; module on cultural awareness (completed)</td>
<td>Surge Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal of surge</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## What are we doing about it?

### Challenges: Operations support + Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Action (ongoing/planned)</th>
<th>Unit Engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earmarking undermining localization</td>
<td>Advocacy to partners on flexible funding (ongoing); Availability of key messages for SPRM (completed); Negotiations between Partners and IFRC on best possible outcome for earmarking (ongoing standard practice)</td>
<td>SPRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS Emergency Procedures</td>
<td><strong>ForeSee</strong>: Note 7a (HR - ongoing); SCM 3 (procurement - ongoing); review of control frameworks in HR, Finance and Supply Chain Management (planned); develop a &quot;No Regrets&quot; Policy for emergencies (planned)</td>
<td>HR, GHSSCM, Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds transfer to NS</td>
<td><strong>ForeSee</strong>: Framework agreement to be signed, which is activated through a one-page Activation Form (ongoing)</td>
<td>Foresee, Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal status</td>
<td>Increasing countries with status agreements (ongoing); Ops Readiness for HoD to include options to overcome challenges of not having a status agreement (planned)</td>
<td>Legal, DCC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Email:
Jamie.lesueur@ifrc.org
HEOps

Miki.tsukamoto@ifrc.org
Coordinator, M&E
ANNEX - 2023 DCWG
Deep-dive sessions looking at core Meta-Analysis findings
**DCWG Deep Dive**

**Challenge:** Although improvements have been made, lack of proper assessment and analysis, linked to operational planning and decision-making, undermines response.

**Action Points**

1. Ensure emergency needs assessments are included within our minimum requirements for quality operations, including integrating the requirement to conduct a needs assessment into the job descriptions for operations leadership as well as the KPI's for quality operations.

2. 'Build the narrative' around the necessity for planning functions in large-scale operations, emphasizing the link between analysis, forecasting, and informed leadership decision-making. Learn from good practices ongoing amongst the Membership—i.e. Italian RC, MDA, AmCross.

3. Continue to work through existing initiatives and TWG to ensure strong capacity-building within the National Societies on needs assessments. This should include developing and referencing the incentives and benefits of conducting needs assessments in terms of positioning, planning, and quality response.

4. Work with Movement partners, including through the DCWG sub-group for Membership Coordination in Emergencies, SMCC, and New Way of Working to identify and overcome the barriers to conducting common/coordinated/joint needs analyses in Federation-wide and Movement operations—including data sharing between Movement components.
Action Points

1. **Decentralize** the Induction to IFRC Operations training to IFRC RO and NS

2. **Work on a guidance**—“minimum procedures for Dummies”. Should be easy to access and disseminate and be linked to the Toolbox.

3. Produce an **analysis of the compositions of RR pools** by sector, region, Movement component, etc. to better understand the breadth and depth of our global surge pool.

4. Reach consensus on the **minimum deployment length** (i.e. 60 days) for RR missions.

5. Build more opportunities for **developing missions**, especially remote and to IFRC Operations.

6. Ensure handovers are **mandatory** for RR personnel.
DCWG Deep Dive

**Challenge:** Trend amongst NS of **aversion or outright refusal to deploy global tools** (surge [Global + Regional] and ERU)

**Action Points**

1. Finding is **more relevant to ERU** than rapid response personnel as deployment frequency is increasing in this time period.

2. Some ERUs in current shape and form are **not always needed** – we need to be more modular and the ERU TWGs should define this modularity.

3. Need to define the **expertise required** to articulate the types of support to be mobilized (ERU/Rapid Response)

4. **Educate senior management** in NS’ and IFRC on the Global Tools (ERUs and Rapid response)

5. Decisions on rapid response mobilization needs to be based on **needs and analysis of capacities in country**. **Before requesting surge support**, look at capacities in-country to support the response.
DCWG Deep Dive

Challenge: Unsolicited or sub-standard IKD’s continue to be sent in the early stages of large-scale crises. This violation of the Principles and Rules clogs relief pipelines, imposes massive costs, and can risk the Movement's reputation

Action Points

1. Reach out to the humanitarian community to explore opportunities for collaboration and joint educational messaging before and during crises to key stakeholders (governments, media, public, community groups)

2. Build on what has already taken place in the guidelines for SMCC mini-Summit/Joint Statement and develop standard messaging for NS to include in development of communications strategies for emergency appeals

3. Develop SOPs to equip NS in 1) managing offers of U-IKD and their related political/public pressure and 2) manage U-IKD when they are sent regardless.

4. Include notions on the management of U-IKD in the next revision of the Sphere standards

5. Ask the Governing Board to issue a statement calling for compliance with the Principles and Rules on U-IKD, reminding partners that the operational costs of U-IKD will be transferred back to the NS

6. Request that a side event be held at the next International Conference (2024) to create a space for discussions between Movement partners and governments.