



DREF LESSONS LEARNED REPORT - TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FLOOD RESPONSE (MDRRTT002)

10 May 2023

Contents

List of Acronyms	2
Background	3
Objectives	3
Methodology	3
.....	4
Limitations	4
Findings	4
Initial Response	5
Assessments	5
Distributions	6
Internal/External Coordination and Communications.....	6
Health, Water and Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)	7
Key Lessons Learned and Recommendations	8
Conclusion	14
Annex 1- List of Participants.....	15
Annex 2- Responses from Head Heart Feet.....	16
Annex 3- Communications Checklist.....	17
Annex 4- Example of Information Dissemination Plan.....	18

List of Acronyms

CEA	Community Engagement and Accountability
CERT	Community Emergency Response Teams
CHF	Swiss Francs
CVA	Cash and Voucher Assistance
DM	Disaster Management
DMU	Disaster Management Units
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
MNS	Ministry of National Security
MoH	Ministry of Health
NEOC	National Emergency Operations Center
NS	National Society
ODPM	Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management
PMER	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
RFQ	Request for Quotation
TTCG	Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard
TTDF	Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force
TTTRCS	Trinidad & Tobago Red Cros Society
WatSan	Water and Sanitation

Background

On 25 November 2022, the Trinidad and Tobago Meteorological Service issued an Adverse Weather Alert #1 which went into effect from 26 November and remained in place until 28 November. On 26 November 2022, Trinidad began to experience severe rainfall which in its aftermath left twelve administrative districts affected. Several communities had already experienced weeks of concentrated rainfall and at least five water courses were flagged for concern with the Caroni River bursting its banks. At the beginning of the emergency approximately 100,000 people were reported to be affected and remained at risk from further potential rains.

On 3 December 2022, the Trinidad, and Tobago Red Cross Society (TTRCS) submitted a Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) application through the IFRC GO platform and on 12 December 2022 the DREF was launched for a period of four months. A total of CHF 133,688 was requested to provide support in the areas of Shelter and Basic Household items, Multi-Purpose Cash, Health, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene and Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA), and NS strengthening. A total of 1,250 people were targeted by the DREF during the response.

On 26 April 2023, a Lessons Learned workshop was conducted with the Trinidad and Tobago Red Cross Society and other government partners in keeping with the reporting requirements of the DREF facility. 13 persons attended the workshop, 8 males and 5 females (see Appendix 1 for List of Participants).

Objectives

1. To identify the gaps that exists in the organization's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for flood response as compared to the realities that occur from inception of the early warning through to the recovery phase.
2. Identify internal coordination challenges and limitations with recommendations to improve.
3. Highlight strengths, weaknesses, and specific improvement in the following sectors:
 - a. *Public Communications*
 - b. *Initial Response*
 - c. *Assessments*
 - d. *Distribution of Relief*
 - e. *Cash Programme*
 - f. *Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion Education*
 - g. *Health Outreach*
4. Evaluate the effectiveness of coordination between local and national state actors such as the Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government, the Disaster Management Units (DMUs) and Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM).

Methodology

The workshop was facilitated by a team from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), consisting of the IFRC Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (PMER) Officer and the Disaster Preparedness Intern. Because there were participants from multiple agencies, the "overall response" was analysed, and discussions were not exclusive to the DREF, however each agency's contribution was considered in response to persons in need as well as in relation to each other. Prior to the Lessons Learned exercise, a document review was conducted which included the standard operating procedures of the TTRCS, the DREF application, DREF Operation report as well as a review of the TTRCS Facebook page and news articles.



Figure 1- Facilitator guiding participants through the ranking.



Figure 2- Participants from TTRCS and Government agencies populating timeline.

Ranking Exercise- at the start and end of the workshop, participants were asked to rank on a 3-point scale their perceived **level of preparedness¹ to respond** as well as **how effective²** they thought the operation was overall. These questions were posed both at the beginning and at the end of the workshop to determine whether perceptions had changed after reviewing the components of the operation.

Historical Timeline- This activity was used to identify key points in the timeline from the point of the

Alert to the end of the operation, to determine the response from the various actors, identifying what went well and what did not go so well or affected the delivery of services. The sequence of events was also considered against the Standard operating procedures of the TTRCs and the other agencies.

Modified World Café- Based on the TTRCS Request for Quotations (RFQ) and the discussions from the Historical Profile, key areas for further discussion were identified. These included Communications and Coordination (both internal and external), Assessments, Distributions (Food, Non-Food items and Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA)), Health Hygiene and Water and Sanitation (WatSan). In this exercise participants were asked to review each category in pairs, and answer what went well? What were the challenges? How did we work around the challenges? And how can we improve this in the future?



Figure 3- Head, Heart, Feet.

Plenary Discussion- This was to sum up the day, the overall highlights from the discussions and to gauge people's perceptions after unpacking some of the key areas.

Head Heart Feet- During this evaluation activity, participants were asked to share **what they thought about the session** (head), **how they felt about the session** (heart) and **what they were going to walk away with from the session** (feet).

Limitations

The workshop did not include volunteers from the TTRCS who made up part of the response, representatives from the branches as well as other government ministries primarily the Ministry of Health (MOH) as well as the Ministry National Security (MNS). Additionally, there were no representatives from the private sector or community leaders who played a key role in the response.

Findings

During the workshop it was evident that the Trinidad and Tobago Red Cross, the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM), the Ministry of Local Government and the other agencies involved in the operation had a good working relationship. It was apparent also that the workshop had provided an opportunity for these agencies to learn more about each other, how they work and their key areas of focus. Additionally, the government representatives, were able to learn more about the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund from the IFRC and the Red Cross Movement. Finally, it was clear that all agencies shared the common goal of protecting and saving lives, livelihoods, and property. Throughout the

¹ 1-Not prepared, 2-somewhat prepared, 3-very prepared.

² 1-Not effective, 2-somewhat effective, 3-very effective.

discussions, several opportunities for better collaboration and coordination were highlighted as well as a need for continued dialogue, sharing and using of key data. The overall findings are discussed below.

Initial Response

Prior to the initial response, only government agencies such as the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM) and the Ministry of Local Government are privy to an impending Alert before it is issued. In the case of the Red Cross, the National Society is only aware of a potential emergency when an alert is published. In the historical timeline session, it was noted that at the time of the alert, there was nothing happening at the TTRCS apart from monitoring. When crossed checked with the Flooding and Preparedness SOP “the DM Committee shall assemble at the National Headquarters or via web meeting to discuss the pending hazard” and depending on the severity the committee could activate the Emergency Operations Centre. There is an opportunity at this point for some key action to be taken by the National Society on social media or communication with counterparts in other agencies.

Once the rains began, all agencies including Ministry of Local Government through the CERTs set out to conduct “confirmations” of flooding in the various areas and communicated primarily using the Disaster Management Unit (DMU) WhatsApp group. Further discussion revealed that these confirmations were not deliberately coordinated, however the confirmations themselves were useful in determining areas that were affected. The NEOC was activated in part soon after however never met as a whole.

At the start of the response the focus was on distributing hot meals, search, and rescue as well as distribution of non-food items such as mattresses, and hygiene kits. This was followed by the distribution of cleaning supplies. Support was also given to the response by the private sector who provided meals, hampers, and boats for transporting teams through the flood water. The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) and Coast Guard (TTCG) also assisted with water distribution.

It was noted that in some communities there was significant challenge in getting people to go to shelters particularly elderly persons or those with livestock and in one case the community shelter had also flooded out. It was recommended by the TTRCS that the barriers to moving to the shelters be studied further to find a solution to ensure the preservation of life.

Under section 02. Policies in both the Flood preparedness and Response and Assessment SOPs, part D. *“TTRC personnel and volunteers will obtain and wear proper safety clothing and equipment as appropriate for their job assignment.”* While this normally refers to Red Cross gear such as vests or shirts with the emblems, boots if needed it was noted that the teams neither government nor Red Cross were adequately attired to walk through flood waters during the search and rescue.

Assessments

Overall, participants particularly on the government side felt that the assessment process went smooth. They were all also satisfied that, the persons who received support from the National Society and government agencies met the respective criteria and were in need.

It was noted that by using the criteria for selection as outlined in the Assessment SOP³ the National Society was able to capture persons who may fall outside the government catchment, such as migrants, squatters, females, some persons with disabilities and or other vulnerable groups, therefore complimenting the government response.

The TTRCS did indicate that their assessment process while effective to those assessed, was ineffective in reaching a wider number of persons. This was due to limited capacity at the National Society who was unable to mobilize available volunteers in a timely manner due to their own internal processes. To activate volunteers, a notice must first be issued, and persons must respond to the call and are then selected. This created a delay in getting volunteers on the ground. While this system may be useful in ensuring that an

³ Assessment SOP, 2022 version 1.0, Trinidad and Tobago Red Cross Society.

emergency is not inundated with volunteers or the right specialization is selected, it does highlight that the system impedes the National Society response time and capacity specifically in the initial response/assessment phase. Additionally, volunteers in the database while plentiful may not have been available to support the operation due to regular schedule/obligations such as work or school. TTRCS also emphasized that insufficient people were trained to conduct assessments in emergency settings which also hampered the assessment process.

Conversely, the Ministry of Local Government had more than adequate “boots on the ground” to conduct the assessments through their Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and the number of assessors available met the corresponding demand. Both agencies felt that they had covered the properties that needed to be assessed.

All agencies used the Survey 123 platform to upload data which was accessible to relevant persons. Prior to the November floods, the Ministry of Local Government had completed assessments after a flooding incident in October 2022, this data was not accessible or available for use by the TTRCS and could have assisted during the assessment phase particularly when identifying families in need. Despite this, the National Society target for persons to be reached was met.

Distributions

Distributions commenced very early in the operation and was well coordinated. The government distributions happened at the same time as the assessments when it came to non-food items such as mattresses. Participants noted the threat of fraud or multiple persons from the same family attempting to access the resources being distributed, but all participants believed that their responders were aware of the potential for dishonesty at the community level.

Cash and voucher assistance took a little longer because it was the distribution of money. The TTRCS indicated that they had issues identifying whether people were from the same family or whether there were multiple households sometimes on the same compound not easily visible to the volunteers. It was evident that the Ministry of Local Government in their assessments had GPS locations for the various households while TTRCS said that their devices did not support that feature at the time. Both agencies need to ensure that the data is shared or if it is available to all to ensure that they use this data to get the best access to the communities. Additionally, it was noted during both the distributions and assessments that the presence of community focal points aided responders in determining which families constituted a household and where there were potential cases of fraud.

Internal/External Coordination and Communications

In the case of this emergency, participants felt that coordination among external actors went smoothly however there was still room for improvement. As mentioned above, Disaster Management Units share a WhatsApp group which they use to communicate with each other, share flood and damage updates with photos as well as response activities in the various communities. Apart from this, there were individual calls being made to departments internally, inter-agency communications and externally with focal points in the communities. The widespread nature of the flooding in fourteen administrative districts, in the case of the November emergency, therefore required a more centralized convening of the communication to ensure that everyone was informed, and resources were being deployed in an efficient manner. To achieve this regular update or convening at the NEOC level would have been useful.

It was noted that sometimes resources may have been deployed in one area and would have to be re-deployed to other areas as the assessments or updates on the damage came in. Coordination clearly was necessary at every step of the operation but was strongest at the initial response phase when all agencies and the private sector and community focal points worked together to get aid to persons in need and conduct search and rescue. During the assessments however, while there were shared mechanisms such as the survey platform and multiple actors at times in the same communities, each one had their own criteria, data needs, forms, data collectors and systems which were uncoordinated. Similarly with

distributions of the Cash and Voucher, small grants from the Ministry of Social Development and residual relief items from the Ministry of Local Government were not coordinated and it was noted that the government response seemed to taper off before the end of 2022 and the Christmas Holidays.

Communications particularly at the community level was also flagged as a challenge. Public perception of the response proved to be problematic in some areas such as the Bamboo community where residents complained to responders about issues prior to the flooding. This affected their initial entry into the community as the residents blamed the devastation on a lack of intervention beforehand. Participants at the workshop acknowledged however, that in terms of preparation there was a limit to what could be done in Bamboo since this community was built on a flood plain.

On the TTRCS side there seems to be a need for more communications both on the field to engage the community as well as internally and with external actors and on social media. This was indicated on several occasions during the workshop. A review of the Communications SOP for the TTRCS revealed a very skeletal document which does not provide any real guidance on how communications and information will be managed during an emergency, nor is there reference to a communications plan. This SOP should take into consideration all the communication needs inside the TTRCS, all stakeholders with which the National Society is engaged, the various media for communication, the purpose of the information, audience, frequency and how the information should be channelled along the timeline of an emergency operation. Apart from media and social media the communication SOP should consider reporting obligations to ensure accountability and transparency (see Annex 3 for IFRC Communications Checklist). In terms of reporting in the case of the Ministry of Local Government, the system for reporting was not as formal with the Disaster Coordinator reporting verbally to the Permanent Secretary who updated the Minister.

Health, Water and Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

WASH related activities took place early in the response with the distribution of water, hygiene kits, cleaning kits and the cleaning of houses and septic tanks. All agencies were on board to support these activities. On the government side there were some challenges getting the Public Health department in the Ministry of Local Government to clean septic tanks that had spilled over into soil and into houses because of the flooding. Participants from the Borough corporations indicated that to manage this they continuously followed up with the public health department of the Municipal Corporation to ensure that this public health situation was under control. Questions were raised during the discussion as to whether the Ministry of Health participated in this research or messaging and that they should be consulted.

In January and February of 2023, the Red Cross Deployed a Health surge to support the operation. This officer focused on creating key health messaging based on the research as to how people interact around flood waters such as bathing or swimming. The research also found that there was a common occurrence of mould spores post flooding contributing to respiratory illnesses. The purpose of the messaging designed by the health focal point and the TTRCS therefore, was to alert persons to the dangers associated with flood water and provide guidance on how to safeguard themselves and their families. This messaging, however, was not used in the DREF but will form part of the preparedness activities and other emergency operations. At the workshop, both the ODPM and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development indicated an interest to learn more about this research and messaging.

Between 10 and 20 March, health activities including blood and sugar and blood pressure testing were rolled out in Mayaro, Sangre Grande and Penal and by the end of March all TTRCS field work ended. It was noted during the workshop that the same Local Government staff were unaware of both the health research as well as the health and was outreach. The participants agreed that these were useful activities and that even they would be interested in participating or using the messaging for their own work.

The table below provides a summary of the strengths of the operation or what worked well, the main challenges and the work arounds to those challenges as well as major key lessons or recommendations. Those items with an asterisk (*) are suggested for inclusion in the SOPs of the TTRCS.

Key Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Key Component	Best Practices/What went well	Challenges/Issues	Work Around	Recommendations/Opportunities for improvement
Initial Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existing SOPs in place (TTRCS) ✓ All agencies had sufficient items in storage. ✓ Private sector support was useful in the initial response phase (hot meals/transport) ✓ Use of WhatsApp group for DMUs ✓ Shelters set up in communities under threat. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ No action taken by NS during time of alert. ✓ Slow volunteer mobilization process ✓ NEOC was partially activated. ✓ Holidays such as Christmas slowed the response activities/demand. ✓ Community frustration with government affected reception to responders. ✓ Challenges moving some community members to shelters. ✓ One shelter was flooded out (Bamboo) ✓ Emergency responders were not properly attired to enter flood waters that could be contaminated with sewage and other dangerous materials. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Red Cross looks at barriers to behaviour change re: shelter as well as engaging with flood water 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ *The time of first alert is a critical time where some preparatory activity can be done, whether it is a meeting internally or putting volunteers on standby or reaching out to community contacts. ✓ All agencies should be present at NEOC meetings to ensure proper coordination and deployment of resources. ✓ More public messaging on the role of agencies during a disaster. ✓ *Create SOP for management of volunteers including when and how to use/manage them in emergencies. ✓ *Ensure gender balance in response. ✓ Factor in potential downtimes like religious holidays into response plan. ✓ Provide training in disaster response to NS staff and volunteers including training in PMER in emergencies. ✓ *Better/requisite attire for flood response. ✓ Continued integration of private sector contributions into initial emergency response as this stakeholder fills several gaps.
Assessments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Use of criteria for selection (TTRCS). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Insufficient support (manpower) at TTRCS to conduct assessments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Covered as many households as possible. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Joint Assessment -Combined used of CERT by TTRCS and Ministry of Local

Key Component	Best Practices/What went well	Challenges/Issues	Work Around	Recommendations/Opportunities for improvement
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Able to identify those most in need (NS and Government). ✓ The new digital tool was done in collaboration with Local Government and Ministry of Social Development this included a photo, address, and GPS pin. for house location. ✓ TTRCS captures the most vulnerable not reached by government. ✓ TTRCS collection of disaggregated data ✓ Use of CERTs for assessments (Government) ✓ Use of Survey 123 platform for data collection and storage ✓ Pre-Existing data from previous operation (MORDLG) ✓ TTRCS staff and Ministry staff able to identify persons who may manipulate the system. ✓ Short interval between assessment and distribution ✓ Vulnerability data collected from TTRCS was shared with the Ministry. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Slow to mobilize volunteers due to internal processes (TTRCS). ✓ Ministry data not used/accessed by TTRCS. ✓ Difficulties with identifying households on the same compound. ✓ Recipients could not access grants/aid post assessment such as CVA without a valid ID. The ID renewal process included a police report and a statement from election boundaries commission. ✓ Fraudulent activities such as multiple self-registrations by individuals (to the Ministry of Social Development online system. This slowed the validation process. ✓ The ministry of Local Government currently does not ask questions about disability however it is a requirement by the Ministry of Social Development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Relied on community leaders to identify households and reduce incidents of fraud. ✓ Focused on reaching people in need. 	<p>Government, building on existing relationships.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓*Create MOU for use of CERTs ✓ Train staff and volunteers to conduct assessments. ✓ Use of pre-existing data for response/assessments and distribution ✓ Sharing of assessment criteria among agencies to determine how data could be used and data gaps. ✓ Ensure follow up on reviewing the assessment forms for both the government agencies and the TTRCS to see where there is overlap and where there are data needs unique to the agency. This may or may not lead to a single assessment form. ✓ Ensure collection of disaggregated data (all agencies). ✓*Include data guidelines in SOPs including gathering, storage, protection, and use. ✓ Ensure data is accessed by relevant personnel to influence decision making. ✓ Cross sharing of household data to reduce duplication of efforts and to ensure a more comprehensive response. ✓ Use of GPS tracking for recording household data

Key Component	Best Practices/What went well	Challenges/Issues	Work Around	Recommendations/Opportunities for improvement
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Use of photo taken at assessment in lieu of identification which may have been lost during floods. ✓ Public sensitization on use of self-assessment system (for Ministry of Social Development).
<p>Distributions</p> <p>Distributions (continued)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Support from the private sector complimented the inter-agency process. ✓ The coordination/replenishment of supplies was efficient. ✓ Enough aid and supplies were available for distribution. ✓ Relief was distributed with assessments at the same time (Ministry). ✓ Quick time between assessments and distributions (All agencies). ✓ Timely procurement of items. ✓ Contact of beneficiaries beforehand. ✓ IDA/DANA informed distribution. ✓ Support from TTDF and TTCG to distribute relief items. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Difficult to access some communities due to water level. ✓ Safety for staff, volunteers and community members was an issue. ✓ Noted that there were excessive supplies in some cases e.g., Mattresses. ✓ Pre-positioned stock has a life span. ✓ Responders aborted food distribution in one community due to overwhelm from residents. ✓ There was a gender disparity between emergencies responders. ✓ Lack of attention to menstrual health and hygiene in response. ✓ Long wait to collect items such as sandbags from the government. ✓ Delays in accessing affected populations due to prolonged water in the streets. ✓ Late distribution of grants by Ministry of Social Development following assessment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Bringing in more/ capable transport ✓ Cleaning kits were distributed in lieu lack of hygiene kit availability. ✓ Develop menstrual health and hygiene training in the context of emergencies. ✓ Aborting distribution when there was an issue of safety. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Have all persons come to a collection point. ✓ More sites to distribute sandbags in advance of an event. ✓ Set a time for persons to come for pick up or call if they cannot make it at the s time. ✓ Pre-positioning of stock ✓ Better privacy during collections especially for card distribution ✓ *Ensure police presence at distribution sites/communities that are high-risk ✓ *Ensure gender balance among responders ✓ *Include education on menstrual hygiene management in emergencies for responders/volunteers. ✓ Include education on Menstrual hygiene in emergency response for other partners to increase awareness. ✓ More follow with community members after distributions. Include question about overall satisfaction with the response. Joint Distribution between agencies and using the CERTs.

Key Component	Best Practices/What went well	Challenges/Issues	Work Around	Recommendations/Opportunities for improvement
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ This varied according to the access to the communities due to water levels, the extent of the damage. ✓ People would come after the distribution time when the responders were packing to leave. ✓ It is not always clear to TTRCS the link between persons in communities to households. ✓ Political interference re: Member of Parliament taking hampers to distribute through their office. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ *Community and national communication on the distribution and its neutrality. Red Cross to emphasize its principles in the context of Assessments and the Distribution of Aid.
Communication and Coordination (Internal and External)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ There was constant communication among the responding agencies. ✓ Good understanding of community needs among agencies and where to divide responsibilities. ✓ There was evidence of coordination particularly in the Initial response phase and to a lesser extent in the assessment phase. Recovery efforts varied according to the Ministries. ✓ Good flow of communication from community, through DMUs to the Ministry (Local Government) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Lack of Final Situation Reports being publicized to show the progress/ results from the operation. ✓ Noted that the Government agencies did not have as intensive a reporting mechanism as does the TTRCS. ✓ No physical EOC meeting to outline National Plan of Action ✓ Poor coordination with smaller groups in communities and donors. ✓ TTRCS felt that their communications department should have been more proactive. ✓ Needed media communication to highlight the response. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Used data from DMUs for daily reports. ✓ In person calls with focal points and regional coordinators to ensure continued coordination ✓ Used multiple data collection forms and reporting methods to coordinate response. ✓ TTRCS is mapping the focal points in the flood 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ A deliberate National Report. ✓ Continued cross sharing and coordination of work being done by all agencies in peace time to better maximize and deploy resources based on individual strengths/capacities. ✓ Communications plan and comms presence on the field. Plan should be multi-tiered and include other agencies as well as communications with volunteers. ✓ Use quiet/recovery period to review and revise communication strategies. ✓ More timely updates at the NEOC level ✓ More field work from the TTRCS Comms ✓ More posting on social media related to disaster activities (also linked to communication plan)

Key Component	Best Practices/What went well	Challenges/Issues	Work Around	Recommendations/Opportunities for improvement
Communication and Coordination (continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Efficient use of resources with some room for improvement ✓ Government support for the response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Limited C.E.A in the communities. ✓ Noted some political disruption in one regional corporation area. ✓ It was evident that the agencies were not fully aware of the scope of Red Cross work in the community and vice versa e.g., the Hygiene research and promotional materials. ✓ Insufficient field coverage by TTRCS Comms ✓ It was evident to the facilitators that the Government response ended informally as opposed to the DREF which had a particular end date. 	<p>prone communities to be able to send and receive messages more effectively.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Consider using a communication information Dissemination plan (See example Annex 4).
Health, Hygiene and WatSan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Cleaning kits readily available ✓ Power washing of yards and houses ✓ Cesspit cleaning (went well) ✓ Distribution of hot meals, health kits and cleaning kits ✓ Persons who were affected received cleaning kits. ✓ Provided basic testing to communities e.g., diabetes, blood pressure. ✓ Good participation by community by engaging the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Lack of communication between partners in Ministry of Rural Development Sometimes a delay for the public health department to attend to a cesspit due to a lack of communication between departments. ✓ Organizational capacity to respond to disaster e.g., lack of emergency response training particularly in health and WatSan. ✓ Lack of manpower, e.g., volunteers as well as drivers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Followed up with public health department to ensure cesspits were cleaned/frequent reminders. ✓ DREF support provided through Health Officer, and she developed guidelines to train volunteers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Coordination to ensure resources are allocated better. ✓ ODPM to provide supplies. ✓ Better follow up.

Key Component	Best Practices/What went well	Challenges/Issues	Work Around	Recommendations/Opportunities for improvement
	<p>DMU/village councils/TTDF and TTCG</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Provided education on proper health and hygiene techniques. ✓ Sufficient health related resources for distributions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Lack of manpower and vehicles for search and rescue. ✓ No/Limited personal hygiene kits and no menstrual hygiene kits. ✓ Burnt out of staff at the TTRCS due to limited to manpower. ✓ Hygiene kits were only available after the initial response. ✓ Low availability of water trucks ✓ Sometimes trucks example sanitation trucks may not be operational during a disaster. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Mapping of focal points to access the vulnerable in flooded communities. ✓ Provided other items needed at the time when there was a shortage of hygiene kits. 	

*Recommended for inclusion in SOPs

Following the discussions of the Modified World Café, participants were asked to rank again their perception of the level of preparedness as well as their perception of their level of effectiveness. At the beginning of the workshop most participants believed that they were prepared while three participants believed they were very prepared. Only 1 participant believed that they were unprepared. Following the workshop, the perception of preparedness remained the same.



Figure 4- Ranking Exercise Before and After.

When asked about the level of effectiveness, most participants believed that it was “somewhat effective” with four participants believing that it was “very effective.” At the end of the discussions, 3 persons changed their ranking to “very prepared” indicating that the discussions had provided a more positive overview of the response.

Conclusion

Overall, this operation was successful in reaching persons in need with relevant goods and services in an efficient and effective manner. Collaboration with governmental agencies such as the ODPM, Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of National Security as well as with the private sector was a strong driving force behind this success. The workshop provided a space for key stakeholders to learn more about each other’s way of working and priorities and about the DREF facility of the IFRC. The workshop also highlighted several opportunities for collaboration and continued dialogue including reviewing assessment criteria jointly, sharing and accessing of data on households, training in disaster response and data collection, sharing the use of CERTs for assessments, supporting each other for distributions both for efficiency and safety, improving accountability through sharing of reports and updates and improving communications internally, inter-agency and with the public.

Annex 1- List of Participants

Participants List		
Name	Position	Organization
Jerry David	Senior Disaster Management Coordinator	Ministry of Local Government
Terrance Maxime	Disaster Management Coordinator	Tunapuna/Piarco Regional Corporation
Amarnath Seepersad	Disaster Management Coordinator	Mayaro/Rio Claro Regional Corporation
Shaina Khan	Regional Coordinator	ODPM
Stephen Enile	Field Officer	Penal/Debe Regional Corporation
Jill De Bourg	President	TTRCS
Stephan Kishore	Crisis Management Coordinator	TTRCS
Julio Pereira	Community Liaison and Logistics Officer	TTRCS
Alejandra Mendez	Community Liaison and M&E Officer	TTRCS
Derek Hutchinson	Procurement and Programme Support Officer	TTRCS
Cherelle Boneo	Project Finance Assistant	TTRCS
Saara Ali-Browne (Facilitator)	Officer, PMER	IFRC
Shivanie Mahase (Support)	Intern	IFRC
Horace Glaze (Online)	Disaster Management Coordinator	IFRC
Carysse Baird (Online)	Community Liaison & Volunteer Engagement Officer	TTRCS Tobago Branch

Annex 2- Responses from Head Heart Feet

Head- What I thought about today...

This was a good experience.

There is a lot of room for improvement.

A very productive day achieved all our expectations, very effective use of time.

Work together

I think today was very helpful in terms of learning each position from each organization.

Today was very informative a better understanding of what the different organizations do.

How do I feel about today?.....

I felt that the TTRCS has built a stronger relationship with the other organizations in this this training.

That working closer together can improve the delivery of aid.

Happy, accomplished, satisfied.

I have been enlightened.

Happy about learning outcomes of workshop.

Confident

What I will walk away with....

A better understanding of DREFs and closer stakeholder relations

Knowledge

Better understanding

Commitment to improve stakeholder relations.

Better understanding of DREF

A clearer approach to adapting SOPs, training requirements for staff and volunteers

Annex 3- Communications Checklist

- Preparedness Work
 - Social – sharing infographics, images, info on being prepared, and watch/warning announcements.
 - Build media relationships.
 - Build connections with government, other NGOs.
 - Prepare country key messages based on regional messages for hurricane season preparedness.
 - Set up/prepare templates for key messages and news releases for post disaster.
- First 12-24h after a disaster
 - Gather information to add to/create key messages and other tools with spokespeople.
 - Connect with IFRC Regional Communications – for support and to provide information.
 - Prep spokespeople and prepare for media interviews.
 - Gather content quickly for a quick social media update (video/photo) with initial information and b- roll for media.
 - Assess the communications capacity in-country.
 - Social media – posts, but also deal with comments, questions, requests for assistance etc.
- 24-48h after a disaster
 - Do a social media/media scan to see what some of the key issues/themes are.
 - Gather initial photos or video clips (mobile quality is fine) from the ground (what is the situation, what are the needs, Red Cross efforts, etc.)
 - Start gathering quotes for potential stories or for a News Release/web update.
 - Continue to share back key information with regional communications team.
 - Take a minute in a team meeting to go over social media guidelines quickly and your role with the wider team.
 - Key messages/Reactive Lines. Frontline messaging updates
 - Create posters/handouts.
- 48-72h after a disaster
 - Environment scan for reputational risks or other issues
 - Start building editorial plan.
 - Continue liaising with IFRC communications, sharing updates for messaging, and coordinating media from the ground.
- Later weeks
 - Continue to find new angles for content (stories of people being assisted by Red Cross, recovery, volunteers' stories, etc.) and to keep media engaged.
 - Support high-level visits
 - Continue to liaise with IFRC communications to share updates on messaging.
 - Continue to monitor the environment for potential reputation risks or other issues.
 - Consider releases/reports at one-month, three-month, six-month, one year.

