



# Final Evaluation of the La Soufrière Volcanic Eruption Operation Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT  
Prepared by Dean Pallen, Consultant  
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## 1. Executive Summary

In December 2020, the active volcano La Soufrière in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) began to erupt effusively. This was the fifth eruption since 1718. In April of 2021, the government issued evacuation orders as the alert level reached Red. Soon after mandating the evacuation, on 9 April 2021, La Soufrière erupted explosively. This was followed by successive eruptions that was complicated by a number of serious storms that made efforts to recover from the devastation caused by the eruption even more challenging. The eruption also occurred at a time when the country was in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and a significant spike in the number of Dengue fever cases being treated by the Ministry of Health, Wellness and the Environment.

Three days after the eruption on the 12 of April 2021, a Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF) was approved by the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) for CHF 266,000 to assist 700 families. Subsequently, on 18 April 2021, an Emergency Appeal for CHF 2,000,000 to assist 1,800 families (1,500 families in SVG & 300 families from other affected islands) was launched. The IFRC and St Vincent & the Grenadines Red Cross Society's (SVGRC) committed to providing emergency assistance and recovery support to 5,400 people (1,800 families) affected by the La Soufrière volcanic eruption with a specific focus on Shelter and Essential Household Items (EHI), Livelihood & Basic Needs, Psychosocial support (PSS), Protection, Gender & Inclusion (PGI), and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Fortunately, anticipated impacts as a result of the eruption in Barbados, Grenada and St. Lucia did not occur allowing for the shifting of resources to SVG where they were greatly needed.

According to the National Emergency Management Organisation (NEMO), approximately 24,419 persons from 21 communities were displaced through mandatory evacuation in vulnerable zones surrounding La Soufrière in the island's northern region.<sup>1</sup> While there was considerable damage to property and land, no deaths were recorded.<sup>2</sup> In addition to the eruption, heavy rainfall occurred across the mainland island of Saint Vincent, causing lahar mud and debris flows, that compounded the situation in areas already being affected by the eruptions of La Soufrière. According to media reports, several lahar flows were recorded from all surrounding points of the volcano, damaging homes,

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<sup>1</sup> <https://rosanjose.iom.int/en/news/japan-funds-emergency-shelters-displaced-families-saint-vincent-and-grenadine>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.caribbeanandco.com/active-volcanoes-in-the-caribbean/>

businesses, and infrastructure.<sup>3</sup> People were impacted across the island through the multiple eruptions over a period of several weeks.

The Final Evaluation of the emergency appeal of the La Soufrière response was carried out between 3 April 2023 to 30 August 2023. The fieldwork for the evaluation was carried out between 28 May to 4 June 2023. The evaluation assesses the IFRC and SVGRC initial response to the La Soufrière eruption on 9 April 2021 and activities carried out to 31 December 2022. Specifically, the evaluation assessed the support provided to the impacted population targeted by the Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) and answers questions related to Relevance and Appropriateness, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability. The evaluation also highlights key Lessons Learned to assist the Red Cross in future response and recovery operations with the very particular focus on volcanic eruptions in the Caribbean Region.

### 1.1. Evaluation Findings and Recommendations

The final evaluation concludes that La Soufrière operation can be deemed as largely achieving its intended objectives. Despite its limited financial and organizational resources, SVGRC was able to act as a critical partner in the overall national response to the Soufrière eruption. Its contribution began in the early planning stages and was followed by its involvement in a number of key activities including the evacuation of people from the orange and red zones and transitioning people from the public shelters when it was required into private shelters. Due to the size of the appeal, the number of international staff was limited and therefore there was greater reliance on the capacities of the National Society (NS) staff and volunteers. In the end, the Soufrière operation was limited to more specific actions having strategic importance such as support provided to the Central Water Sewerage Authority (CWSA) to enable it to restore access to water across the country that was disrupted in all areas of the country, not only the orange and red zones. It was concluded that SVGRC support was both strategic and flexible adjusting to requirements as defined by national stakeholders.

It was determined that the limited financial resources of the operation were deployed efficiently and strategically. This was enabled through the long-standing partnerships with government institutions that the National Society has maintained and the strong volunteer base of the National Society that exists across the SVG that was effectively prepared for its involvement in key activities such as the evacuation of people on the eve of the eruption. The evaluation process concluded that the objective to provide emergency assistance and recovery support to 5,400 people (1,800 families) through several different actions was by and large achieved although there were specific activities such as the support to farmers through the livelihoods component that encountered roadblocks.

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<sup>3</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/saint-vincent-and-grenadines/saint-vincent-and-grenadines-volcanic-eruption-update-nemo-cdema>

The operation largely achieved its results based on the stated indicators. There are instances of the operation sometimes surpassing stated or slightly underachieving them due to factors such as lack of funding. However, assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Soufrière response should not only be judged by whether goals related to indicators were reached. Strategic results related to the overall national effort are important as are positive influences on the National Society such as new capacity related to livelihoods, and the use of Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA). One of the objectives of the operation was to bring needed improvements to the day-to-day operation related to administrative and procedural matters.

As of December 2022, the new organizational structure was in place and functioning and directly addressed a number of long-term sustainability needs. This included demonstrating the efficient use of a small staff put in a position to manage the collective financial, administrative and operational responsibilities. As of June 2023, much of what was learned and introduced from the appeal, was still in place, but it was increasingly becoming a struggle to maintain it as divisions between factions in the SVGRC intensified. The evaluation process concluded it is difficult to fully comprehend. What currently is taking place risks having long-term implications on the National Society with some early signs that it is already impacting on the support that is provided to national partners.

From a sustainability standpoint, the evaluation process concluded that while National Society volunteers perform a number of important functions on behalf of the Red Cross (RC), it is also an older group of volunteers, and the National Society should look to increase the pool of younger persons. Other recommendations are made on matters such as extending components of the current IFRC Capacity Building Initiative (CBI) specifically the funding for core staffing positions, reviewing deployment procedures for international staff to support small National Society during events, the establishment of a pro-active youth recruitment strategy, and the development of a long-term volcanic eruption readiness strategy.

## 2. Implementation Context

### 2.1 Economic and Social Considerations

Despite being considered an upper middle-income country, SVG is dealing with critical economic and social challenges. According to United Nations population projections, as of 2020, young people (10 to 24 years old) made up 24 percent of the population.<sup>4</sup> As of 2016, 30 percent of the population in SVG were living in poverty which is slightly higher than the average 23 percent rate for the rest of the Eastern Caribbean.<sup>5</sup> As of 2021, the unemployment rate in SVG stood at 20.4 percent.<sup>6</sup> Agriculture is considered the most important economic activity in particular, banana production. The services sector

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.unicef.org/easterncaribbean/media/2941/file/GenU%20SVG%20Fact%20sheet.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.statista.com/statistics/809000/unemployment-rate-in-st-vincent-and-the-grenadines/>

is growing largely a result of tourism.<sup>7</sup> Despite having higher completion levels of lower secondary school compared to boys (96.4 percent to 88 percent), female participation in the labour force is 54.3 percent compared to 73.7 percent for males.<sup>8</sup> As of 2019, 18 percent of female workers find themselves in vulnerable employment circumstances or working in the informal economy without formalized working relations, safety nets and or social protection. This is, however, lower than males working in circumstances of vulnerable employment that is 23 percent.<sup>9</sup>

In terms of the economic impact of the eruption, according to the **Draft Collated Sectoral Analysis (DDSA)** carried out by the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, Rural transformation, Industry and Labor (MAFFRIL), the estimated value of total damage and loss sustained by the crops, livestock, apiculture, fisheries and forestry sectors is USD \$142,628,402.00.<sup>10</sup>

## 2.2 Environment and Climate Change

In 2021, the United Nations declared that climate change was having devastating impacts throughout SVG in relation to “food security, health, housing, cultural rights and a sustainable environment.”<sup>11</sup> The UN also noted the harm that hurricanes, floods and droughts, were having on SVG but underlined as well the progress being made in a number of other priority areas such as protecting drinking water sources and climate change adaptation.<sup>12</sup> Despite the efforts of farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture to improve food production, climate change as manifested in the form of rising sea levels, temperature rise, soil degradation and increasingly extreme weather events like floods is creating a formidable obstacle to maintaining food production levels.<sup>13</sup>

## 2.3 COVID-19 and Dengue Fever

The impact of the eruption was further exacerbated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and an outbreak of Dengue fever on the main island. According to the World Bank, in 2021, COVID-19 had a

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<https://www.gov.vc/index.php/citizens/economy#:~:text=The%20most%20important%20sector%20of,tourism%20industry%2C%20is%20also%20important.>

<sup>8</sup> <https://genderdata.worldbank.org/countries/st-vincent-and-the-grenadines/>

<sup>9</sup> <https://genderdata.worldbank.org/countries/st-vincent-and-the-grenadines/>

<sup>10</sup> Ferrandis & Thomas

<sup>11</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/saint-vincent-and-grenadines/saint-vincent-and-grenadines-climate-change-risk-multiplier>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>13</sup> <https://climatetracker.org/farmers-in-saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines-face-the-brunt-of-climate-change/>



negative impact of US\$175 million, or 23 percent of the country's gross domestic product.<sup>14</sup> As the IFRC reported, while grappling with the impacts of the eruption, family incomes in the country were being negatively impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>15</sup> According to the IFRC, one year after the eruption, many families were still struggling to re-establish their family income. In the fall of 2020, SVG was contending with the worst outbreak of Dengue since 2012 placing an additional strain on the health care system that was already stretched by the COVID-19 pandemic and the volcanic eruption.<sup>16</sup>

#### 2.4 Volcanoes in the Caribbean

While volcanoes are present across the Caribbean and especially in the eastern Caribbean, the number of actual eruptions is quite small. The British overseas territory of Montserrat was confronted by eruptions in 1995, the first in 350 years that caused considerable economic damage and forced two thirds of the population to leave the island.<sup>17</sup> Again in 1997, there was another eruption this time leading to the death of 19 people.<sup>18</sup> However, both in more recent times and historically, SVG has been the Caribbean Island confronted with the most volcano eruptions. This includes significant eruptions in 1812, 1902, 1979 and 40 years later, in 2021.<sup>19</sup> While all countries of the Eastern Caribbean are accustomed to annual extreme climatic events, the occurrence of volcanic eruptions are a rarity with SVG having a slightly higher level of vulnerability. This contrasts with neighbouring Central America where volcanic eruptions in countries such as Guatemala and Nicaragua are relatively more common.<sup>20</sup>

#### 2.5 Donor and Government Response

The United States government through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs (BHA) announced USD \$3.8 million in emergency assistance. The funds were to be directed to humanitarian partners including the World Food Programme (WFP) that would play an important role with a broad reach, the IFRC and SVGRC, UNICEF, and the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). The Japanese government created an emergency fund of USD \$850,000 to assist

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<sup>14</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/saint-vincent-and-grenadines/saint-vincent-and-grenadines-receives-us40-million-world-bank>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.ifrc.org/press-release/st-vincent-and-grenadines-recovery-efforts-continue-be-crucial-one-year-after>

<sup>16</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/saint-vincent-and-grenadines/st-vincent-and-grenadines-dengue-outbreak-dref-plan-action>

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20256517>

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>19</sup> <https://volcano.si.edu/volcano.cfm?vn=360150>

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-01725-1>

in providing lodging in coordination with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).<sup>21</sup> The World Bank approved a USD \$40 million a “Volcanic Eruption Emergency Fund” that was supplemented by an additional donation of USD \$2 million from a grant from the European Union’s Caribbean Regional Resilience Building Facility. The fund was managed by the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery to support the SVG government and its plans to restore damaged infrastructure and to stimulate economic growth.<sup>22</sup> The Fund was in addition to an initial USD \$20 million that was provided to the government in the immediate aftermath of the eruption as part of the immediate emergency response.<sup>23</sup>

The United Nations Senior Team (UNST), headed by the UN Resident Coordinator, led the UN’s emergency response, as co-chair of the Eastern Caribbean Development Partner’s Group (ECDPG) for Disaster Management.<sup>24</sup> UN agencies assumed leadership roles on different priorities areas related to the eruption. UNICEF led the education and WASH sector responses and co-led the Protection cluster. WFP in coordination with IFRC and SVGRC led the implementation of cash-based interventions, under social protection. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) committed to assisting 4,000 households through a one-year intervention with a budget of USD \$2.5 million to re-establish the livelihoods of impacted farmers, livestock owners and fishers, while strengthening the entire food system of different threats and hazards.<sup>25</sup>

NEMO coordinated the emergency response on behalf of the government, in collaboration with the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), that initiated a regional support operation and provided technical assistance to NEMO on matters such as logistics and planning. As noted, CDEMA also led the DDSA team.<sup>26</sup> A key partner ministry for IFRC and SVGRC and also for WFP was the Ministry of National Mobilisation, Social Development, The Family, Gender Affairs, Youth, Housing and Informal Human Settlement (MoNM)<sup>27</sup> that coordinated efforts to provide cash grants to individuals and families impacted by the eruption. As of October 2021, approximately 19,200 people,

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<sup>21</sup> <https://rosanjose.iom.int/en/news/japan-funds-emergency-shelters-displaced-families-saint-vincent-and-grenadine>

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/11/30/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines-to-receive-us-40-million-from-the-world-bank>

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.unicef.org/media/96701/file/StVincent-Grenadines-Volcano-SitRep-22-April-2021.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.fao.org/3/cb5562en/cb5562en.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.unicef.org/media/96701/file/StVincent-Grenadines-Volcano-SitRep-22-April-2021.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> The Ministry of National Mobilisation, Social Development, Local Government, Gender Affairs, Family Affairs, Housing and Informal Settlement

and USD \$1.9 million had been distributed.<sup>28</sup> In addition to NEMO, key government agencies included The Ministry of National Mobilisation, Social Development, and Youth, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Education and the CWSA.

## 2.6 Donor and Government Coordination

IFRC and SVGRC attended the weekly National Emergency Conference meetings chaired by the Office of the Prime Minister that began immediately in April 2021 after the eruption. These meetings moved to bi-weekly meetings in September 2021, and afterward were held on an ad-hoc basis throughout 2022. Additionally, for both IFRC and SVGRC there was ongoing coordination with the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance of USAID, the key donor of the IFRC and SVGRC operation. As well, the IFRC and SVGRC received the sum of €190,000 from the European Union that was directed to IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund to support national authorities to coordinate and manage temporary shelters.<sup>29</sup> During the operation, there was ongoing coordination with the European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO). Dialogue was maintained with diplomatic missions and donor agencies to ensure ongoing communication, identify funding sources and build consensus regarding the overall eruption response.

## 2.7 Red Cross Movement

The Canadian (CRC) and American Red Cross (AmCross) were part of the overall Red Cross response to the eruption. CRC and the Government of Canada had been working with the SVGRC on the Community Resilience Building Caribbean (CRB) project that targeted several communities and officially ended in March 2022. The IFRC Americas Regional Office (ARO), Port of Spain Country Cluster Delegation (POS CCD), and the French Red Cross/Regional Intervention Platform for the Americas and the Caribbean (PIRAC) were called upon. Through these regional entities, IFRC supported SVGRC to implement and monitor activities. An operations manager from the IFRC POS Delegation was in place until the end of the operation to support the SVGRCS in implementing activities and to continue with capacity building activities. This was expected to include the development and implementation of a viable exit strategy for the National Society that covered reducing staff as required and providing training for staff remaining as part of the core structure. Further work with the SVGRCS leadership to develop a financial sustainability strategy was to be developed in close collaboration with the National Society Development (NSD) team out of the Delegation in Trinidad & Tobago.

## 2.8 Operational Plan

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<sup>28</sup> <https://www.searchlight.vc/news/2021/10/08/wfp-continuing-support-in-svg/#>

<sup>29</sup> [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-mobilises-ec24m-emergency-aid-volcano-ravished-st-vincent-grenadines\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-mobilises-ec24m-emergency-aid-volcano-ravished-st-vincent-grenadines_en)

The overall objective of the La Soufrière operation was to provide **immediate life-saving and longer-term support for recovery to 1,800 households (5,400 people) affected by the eruption** focused in the areas of Shelter (including distribution of household items), Health & Psychosocial Support, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion; Livelihoods and Basic Needs through multi-purpose cash grants; Protection Gender and Inclusion; Disaster Risk Reduction; and National Society capacity strengthening. The operation worked towards the specific objectives outlined in Table 1:

Table 1 - Operational Objectives

<b>Shelter</b>
<b>Outcome 1: Communities in disaster and crisis affected areas restore and strengthen their safety, well-being and longer-term recovery through shelter and settlement solutions</b>
Output 1.1: Shelter and settlements and basic household items assistance is provided to the affected families.
Output 1.2: Technical support, guidance and awareness raising in safe shelter design and settlement planning and improved building techniques are provided to affected households
<b>Livelihoods and Basic Needs</b>
<b>Outcome 1: Communities, especially in disaster and crisis affected areas, restore and strengthen their livelihoods</b>
Output 1.1: Basic needs assistance for livelihoods security including food is provided to the most affected communities
Output 1.2: Household livelihoods security is enhanced through food production, increased productivity and post-harvest management (agriculture-based livelihoods)
Output 1.3: Community awareness activities on livelihoods strengthening and protection are carried out with target communities and public actors.
<b>Health</b>
<b>Outcome 1: The immediate risks to the health of the affected populations are reduced through improved access to medical treatment</b>
Output 1.1: Improved access to health care and emergency health care for the targeted population and communities.
<b>Health</b>
<b>Outcome 2: The psychosocial impacts of the emergency are lessened</b>
Output 2.1: Psychosocial support provided to the target population as well as to RCRC volunteers and staff

<b>Water and Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)</b>
<b>Outcome 1: Immediate reduction in risk of waterborne and water related diseases in targeted communities</b>
Output 1.1: Continuous assessment of water, sanitation, and hygiene situation is carried out in targeted communities
<b>Protection, Gender &amp; Inclusion</b>
<b>Outcome 1: Communities become more peaceful, safe and inclusive through meeting the needs and rights of the most vulnerable.</b>
Output 1.1: Programmes and operations ensure safe and equitable provision of basic services, considering different needs based on gender and other diversity factors.
Output 1.2: Programmes and operations prevent and respond to sexual- and gender-based violence and other forms of violence especially against children.
Output 1.3: Advocacy initiatives contribute to preventing and responding to all forms of violence especially SGBV and against children.
<b>Disaster Risk Reduction</b>
<b>Outcome 1: Communities in high-risk areas are prepared for and able to respond to disaster.</b>
Output 1.1: Communities take active steps to strengthen their preparedness for timely and effective response to disasters
<b>Disaster Risk Reduction</b>
<b>Outcome 2: Communities in disaster and crisis affected areas adopt climate risk informed and environmentally responsible values and practices</b>
Output 2.1: Contributions to climate change mitigation are made by implementing green solutions

## 2.9 Implementation Progress

In the final draft report for the *Saint Vincent and the Grenadines La Soufrière Volcanic Eruption operation*, expected results for each output and outcomes are provided alongside the actual results as recognized by the operation. A breakdown between male and female beneficiaries is also provided. The evaluation process assessed the validity of these results. Nevertheless, the final draft report makes several important observations regarding the operation.

By and large, the final report describes an operation that was somewhat overachieving on expected results with a few exceptions such as activities related to shelter. Overall, the final draft report presents a positive record of the operation that had to be verified from a quantitative standpoint but also in terms of the quality and usefulness of the different actions carried out by the operation and to understand contextual matters such as strategic decisions and their impact on final results. For example, the target of assisting 700 households was not reached due to a request by the Ministry of Social Mobilization, Social Development, Family, Gender Affairs, Youth, Housing and Informal Human Settlement (MoNM) to modify the operational objective to target larger households with more people in residence and therefore a smaller number of households, and those that had not been reached by the WFP/MoNM cash grant programme.

## 2.10 Timeline of the Appeal

- **29 December 2020:** La Soufrière volcano alert level in St. Vincent and the Grenadines was elevated due to effusive volcanic activity.
- **8 April 2021:** the alert level increased to Red, with government authorities issuing immediate evacuation orders.
- **9 April 2021:** La Soufrière erupted for the first time after 40 years, sending an ash plume of 10km into the sky.
- **12 April 2021:** [DREF Operation](#) 1 CHF 266,000 to assist 700 families.
- **18 April 2021:** Emergency Appeal CHF 2,000,000 to assist 1,800 families (1,500 families in SVG & 300 families for other affected islands)
- **2 May 2021:** Operation update No.1 (not finalised based on EPoA superseding it)
- **7 May 2021:** Emergency Plan of Action No. 1
- **18 May 2021:** Operation update No. 2
- **2 December 2021:** 6-month update
- **2 June 2022:** 12-month operation update.
- **15 November 2022:** Draft Final Report (still to be approved and published)
- **April 2023:** Evaluation process commences.
- **August 2023:** Evaluation is completed.

### 3. Evaluation Purpose

According to the Terms of Reference, the purpose of this review is to determine the relevance, efficiency and overall effectiveness of the IFRC/SVGRCS response to the impacts of La Soufrière Volcanic eruption during the operational period of April 2021 to December 2022. The evaluation placed an emphasis on identifying lessons learned and providing recommendations for future interventions by the IFRC which can be integrated into the current response framework. The unique nature of the IFRC/SVGRCS response was expected to generate very specific lessons related to responding to rarely occurring volcanic eruptions but should also generate information that can lead to improvements in future emergency IFRC operations in the Eastern Caribbean.

#### 3.1 Scope of the Evaluation

Specifically, the final evaluation addressed the following issues:

- i) the **relevance and appropriateness** of the humanitarian assistance delivered to people affected based on needs and context.
- ii) the **efficiency and effectiveness** of the IFRC and National Society response.

- iii) the **coverage** in terms of which population groups were included in or excluded from the intervention. This will include the selection process and the extent to which the response considered and addressed the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly children, pregnant women, elderly people, and people with disabilities.
- iv) the **efficiency** of the coordination mechanisms implemented covering both national and international partners.
- v) Sustained benefits from the Operation at the National Society and Community levels.
- vi) Environmental considerations related to the operation.

The final evaluation considered all decisive factors during the operation (i.e., what went well and what did not go well with recommendations for improvement) taking into consideration the context and capacities of the National Society and other Movement components.

**This Final Evaluation took into consideration that the operation was carried out during a “Compounded Disaster” setting** as at the time of the Emergency there was also the COVID-19 global pandemic and a significant outbreak of Dengue fever on SVG. The final evaluation was also required to consider the unique challenges posed by a volcanic eruption that is not common in the Caribbean region, therefore, denying having points of reference both for the operation and the evaluation. The Evaluation was expected to consider lessons learnt from previous operations in the region and whether these were applied to the operation. The timeline to be evaluated in terms of this emergency response is 21 months, from the beginning of the operation (April 2021) through the completion of the most recent interventions (December 2022). However, given the actual field phase of the evaluation occurred in June 2023, six months after the closing of the operation, what could be learned from this additional time are factored into the findings and conclusions of the evaluation.

### 3.2 Evaluation Objective

In coordination with the Evaluation Management Team (EMT) the evaluation questions were reviewed as they were presented in the Terms of Reference (ToR). As was communicated to the EMT, it was felt that the suggested questions provided the basis to cover the issues important to the evaluation and the flexibility to probe in different subject areas. However, given the nature and scope of the assistance provided, relatively limited number of beneficiaries depending on the component and their often, short-term impact, it was sometimes difficult to collect information that fully aligned with the questions. This resulted in some questions being regrouped together or in a few approached from different angles. The evaluation questions can be found in Annex B as part of the Evaluation Matrix. As required the

evaluation followed OECD/DAC evaluation criteria regarding Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability.

## 4. Methodology and Approach

### 4.1 Evaluation Team and Evaluation Framework

To ensure that the methodology applied in this evaluation adheres to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#)<sup>30</sup>, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized, the EMT managed and oversaw the evaluation and work with the evaluator to ensure that **IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation** was upheld. The EMT was comprised of three individuals including the Planning and Monitoring, Reporting, and Evaluation Senior Officer from the IFRC Americas Regional Office, the Planning Monitoring, Reporting, and Evaluation Officer from the Port of Spain Country Cluster Delegation (POSCCD) and the Disaster Coordinator from the Operations Team of the POSCCD.

The evaluator was expected to provide an independent, objective perspective and technical experience to this evaluation. The evaluator acknowledges that there was an expectation that he was to be the primary author of the evaluation report and had not been previously involved in the IFRC/SVGRC response to the impacts of La Soufrière Volcanic Eruption. The evaluator was expected to report on progress or challenges related to the evaluation to the EMT and ensure the EMT received regular debriefings and bring any issues or concerns to its attention.

### 4.2 Time Frame

The Evaluation was carried out over a period of 45 days. Eleven of those days will be spent in the field. The evaluation start date is 3 April 2023, with an agreed end date of 30 September 2023.

## 5. Data Collection Tools

The **evaluation methodology** drew upon the following evaluation tools to collect and analyze information:

### 5.1 Document Review

A desk review was undertaken of operation documents, relevant organizational background and history, and relevant sources of secondary data, such as findings from previous surveys and evaluations.

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>



Document review was ongoing throughout the evaluation process. This includes several assessments and surveys that were carried out related to operational activities. This includes needs assessment reports, and post-distribution monitoring surveys and a final report on Livelihoods activities. Additional documentation could be identified during Key Informant Interviews (KII) with IFRC and SVGRC staff and donors and international agencies. To ensure a full comprehension of the circumstances surrounding the implementation of the operation, secondary research on the Internet on matters such as the response of other donor/development agencies to the La Soufrière volcanic eruption was conducted in the early stages of the evaluation. Secondary research continued to be undertaken throughout the evaluation but on a more focused basis.

## 5.2 Key Informant Interviews (KII)

KII were conducted with a broad range of stakeholders that were identified as both beneficiaries and non-beneficiary stakeholders. SVGRC staff members and volunteers were regarded as possibly being both implementors and the beneficiaries of the efforts of the operation to respond to the needs of the population. In total, 21 KII were completed taking on average an hour to complete. In the end, mostly SVGRC staff and volunteers, IFRC and international staff, and government representatives were interviewed along with beneficiaries. Below is the list from which candidates were drawn to be interviewed:

- Operation Staff both IFRC and National Society staff and volunteers.
- IFRC leadership and technical staff that supported or coordinated efforts with the operation. Of particular interest to the evaluation were PGI, Livelihood and CVA delegates who were all brought in by IFRC to support SVGRC with different programme components and in restructuring the organization's human resource capacity.
- Government agencies that included the Ministry of Education that the operation supported in relation to health and sanitization standards in schools (PPE, sanitizers etc.), individuals associated with the 11 Child Friendly Spaces in collective shelters throughout the emergency response period and the transitioning schools away from serving as temporary shelters and MoNM and its role in leading CVA activity. As well, as staff from the Ministry of Agriculture and NEMO.

## 5.3 Remote Interviews

To make good use of the evaluation's resources and available time, there was an extensive use of remote interviews. The objective was to conduct 12 to 15 interviews remotely as part of the overall objective to complete 18 to 25. Most remote interviews were completed during the two weeks prior to the fieldwork phase. The evaluator worked with the EMT to identify stakeholders highlighted in Annex E who were suitable to interview remotely allowing the evaluator to focus on in-person interviews while in the country. Overall, remote interviews prior to the field mission ensured that the evaluator had a good understanding of different issues before arriving in the country.

#### 5.4 Focus Group Discussions and Selection

Although the FGD were smaller than anticipated, they were critical in understanding different aspects of the operation in very concrete terms through the perspective of project beneficiaries and National Society volunteers. The objective was to conduct a minimum of six FGD but in the end, four were completed. The evaluator worked with IFRC and SVGRC staff to maximize learning through the FGD while respecting practical matters related to the logistics of scheduling the FGD in context where time was limited, there was a national holiday the week that fieldwork was conducted, and other activities had to be carried out. For example, there are communities that were categorized as being part of either red or orange zones.

Highly affected communities were prioritized for FGD activity. As well, as much as possible the group discussions were designed to learn about different aspects of the operation from the perspective of participants who were often both National Society volunteers and individuals who had been displaced. As beneficiaries often benefited in multiple ways including CVA, housing (rental grant recipients and home repair), and livelihoods (fishing, agricultural, micro enterprises, shop, restaurants etc.), it was possible to have very informative FGD sessions.

#### 5.5 Site Visits/Observations

Several site visits were made on the Windward and Leeward sides of Saint Vincent that were conducted in conjunction with interviewing stakeholders. The hope was to visit for example, nearby farm fields of farmers who benefited from the livelihood's component. However, the visits were being made out of season for farming. Some households that benefited from the minor home repairs were visited.

As a point of reference homes built through NEMO's home building initiative were visited. As was noted in the Inception report, much of what the operation carried out such as shelters, or homes that the operation assisted people transition to would have limited value in visiting. In different locations on both sides of Saint Vincent, it was still possible to see aspects of the damage mostly in the form of homes that still haven't been repaired, but were not the responsibility of the operation, and farms and gardens that remain in disuse. The renovated SVGRC headquarters was also toured.

#### 5.6 Lessons Learned Workshop with SVG Stakeholders

At the end of the field mission, a workshop was conducted with National Society staff and volunteers to generate lessons learned. The workshop was attended by 36 people of which 29 were female and largely led by the participants with the evaluator only intervening to ensure the workshop remained on topic. The workshop was divided into two parts. Part A involved reviewing the core activities of the operation and its intended objectives/ outcomes. Part B allowed participants to explore key evaluation questions and identify lessons learned. The objectives of the Lessons Learned Workshop were as follows:

- To better understand the operation from a coordination perspective.
- To triangulate information gathered from both the document review and fieldwork in the communities to answer the key evaluation questions.
- To generate lessons that provide a basis for future discussion and application in other operations.

## 5.7 Virtual presentation of findings to IFRC and SVGRCS personnel

On 3 August 2023, a virtual presentation was made to provide an overview of key findings, conclusions, recommendations and Lessons Learned.

## 5.8 Summary of Data Collection Tools Used

Tools	Expected	Actual
<b>Document Review</b>	To be determined	25 including online sources
<b>Key Informant Interviews</b>	18 to 25	Gov. Representatives: 5 NS Staff and Leadership: 8 IFRC & other Int staff: 7 Donor Agencies: 1 Total: 21
<b>Focus Group Discussions</b>	6 to 10	4 Groups of an average size of 4 people
<b>Site Visits</b>		4
<b>Stakeholder Lessons Learned Workshop</b>	1	(36 participants)

## 6. Matrix for Guiding Evaluation Questions and Data Sources

An Evaluation Matrix can be found in Annex B that identifies the information sources for each evaluation question. The Evaluation Matrix was used to develop interview guides/questionnaires for conducting both KIIs and FGDs. An example of a questionnaire on livelihoods activity for both FGD and KII can be found in Annex D. Questionnaires were tailored to different stakeholder groups. Some questions were consistently included in all questionnaires although the wording may have been modified to ensure they were appropriate for different beneficiary groups such as fishers. Nevertheless, all questions contained in the questionnaires are linked to the evaluation matrix.

Questions for beneficiaries covered topics such as Shelter, CVA and Livelihoods which are core sections of the Evaluation Matrix. It is important to note that although the evaluator was prepared to conduct FGDs with a larger number of beneficiaries, in the end circumstances were such that these groups were smaller. It was concluded that these smaller groups were very instructive as it was an opportunity to understand the perspective of individuals in a more in-depth manner. In ANNEX C, the Information Summary Table is provided that was used to aggregate and synthesis information for different subject matter.

## 7. Evaluation Findings

### 7.1 Relevance

**Relevance and Appropriateness:** The extent the response has achieved the expected results, and relevant and appropriate to the needs of the target groups.

Despite its limited financial and organizational resources, SVGRCS was able to achieve its anticipated objectives on a number of programming components without any concern noted by government

partners. More importantly, the SVGRC was able to fulfill its role as an important partner in the national government's overall effort to coordinate a national response to the Soufrière eruption. The SVGRC defined a clear role for itself through its involvement in the early planning to contain the unwanted impacts of the eruption. Subsequently, SVGRC engaged in several key activities as part of the recovery process. This included playing a leading role in assisting with the evacuation operation specifically coordinating efforts at a community level to ensure people were transported to the yellow and green zones on the island. It also played a role in providing food parcels and vouchers to be cashed at supermarkets, distribution of Non-Food Items (NFI), supporting the transition of displaced people from public shelters to private homes, and other actions in coordination with NEMO including CVA and livelihoods and home repair support.

Due to the size of the appeal, it was decided to limit the number of international staff and to rely on the capacities of the National Society staff including hiring additional national staff members that were brought on early in the operation. The Soufrière operation would limit itself to specific actions that would often have strategic importance such as supporting the closing of shelters to allow schools to reopen. It is important to note that SVGRC support was flexible and would adjust to what national stakeholders required as was the case with the CWSA.

#### Number of targeted people assisted in relation to available capacities and resources.

In coordination with the national government, SVGRC targeted specific segments of the population based on National Society capacity, the appeal's financial resources and the requests of the national government. Given the overall number of people that were affected by the eruption, 13,300 displaced and over 110,600 indirectly impacted,<sup>31</sup> the scope of the people assisted by SVGRC was limited. Resources were a clear consideration. For example, with the housing repair program, it was essential to limit overhead costs and the number of potential houses to be repaired.

#### Aligning with the mandate and capacities of Saint Vincent & the Grenadines Red Cross?

The SVGRC has an established network of volunteers and committees across the country that are in direct contact with communities in terms of understanding local conditions and the profile of community members. A number of these committees have been reinforced through the Canadian sponsored CRB project. At the same time, the SVGRC has established close relations with the national government, in particular NEMO that is dependent on the National Society to act as a bridge into communities both in terms of gathering and sharing information and creating an entry point for NEMO employees. This set of circumstances has developed over the years through several initiatives like the

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
<sup>31</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/saint-vincent-and-grenadines/saint-vincent-and-grenadines-and-surrounding-countries-la-soufriere-volcanic-eruption-emergency-appeal-ndeg-mdrvc005-operations-update-12-months>

CRB to build linkages and capacity. Hence, the La Soufrière operation was able to build on the relations between National Society volunteers and staff and communities in conjunction with those with the national government.

#### Considering the vulnerabilities and capacities of communities and affected population in light of SVGRC capacity.

Through agreements with the national government, the SVGRC focused on providing targeted assistance that most often prioritized the needs of the most vulnerable. Although some National Society volunteers who participated in the Lessons Learned Workshop for this evaluation (see Annex I), questioned if in all circumstances, the most vulnerable were prioritized, it is apparent that efforts were made by the operation to consistently ensure this was the case. However, it was also pointed out by a number of stakeholders that the entire population of Saint Vincent was impacted and deserving of assistance. Targeting the more vulnerable according to RC staff, required flexibility and additional focus and ensuring working relationships with government departments were respected. In Section 13 covering Livelihood activities, the process related to the identification of livelihoods beneficiaries is discussed detailing the effort that was made to prioritize beneficiaries. Similarly, with the distribution of the CVA, distinct criteria were established to target larger families.

There were activities such as assisting with the evacuation where vulnerable groups such as the elderly were prioritized in a context where National Society volunteers were working to assist a broad number of individuals in the orange and red zones seeking refuge in the yellow and green zones (see *Soufrière Volcanic Hazard Management map below*). The CWSA completed an assessment of all water resources of the national network to determine which parts were not functioning. From this it was possible to identify areas where water distribution was needed. This is where the National Society was of assistance as there was a need for water on both the Wayward and Leeward sides of the island. This is included in the yellow and green zones although not the priority areas of the SVGRC. Joint distribution of water and other items was completed by CWSA and the National Society. As water sources needed to be reconstructed by the CWSA, the water provided by the National Society enabled this. From CWSA standpoint, everything that it needed to do in the emergency context was able to do because of the joint approach with the National Society. For the home repair component, the small number of households that were assisted in repairing their homes were identified based on need although one beneficiary that was spoken to was supposed to be part of the repairs carried out by NEMO but insisted on being assisted by the operation.



*La Soufrière Volcanic Hazard Management map for St. Vincent Island (Source: University of West Indies, Seismic Research Centre 2014).*

During the relief phase, NEMO initially requested that SVGRC focus on supporting families through the provision of NFIs and cash support provided to households that had evacuated to the communal shelters. This request subsequently changed with SVGRC being asked to provide support to families to move out of Government managed communal shelters through the provision of rental support to help close these shelters and return them to the Ministry of Education for use as schools. Both the livelihoods support strategy and the CVA operation were guided by studies of potential beneficiaries to identify and assist the people that had been the most impacted by the eruption.

At the time of the 2021 eruption, the President, Vice President and other senior members of the Organisation had experienced the 1979 eruption response. Some of the challenges that stood out for this group from the 1979 volcanic eruption included transportation, overcrowding in the shelters, and difficulties related to the evacuation of the elderly, sick and disabled. As a result, the issues of transportation and the evacuation of the highly vulnerable were prioritized by the SVGRC. This resulted for example, in ensuring that backup plans existed for transporting people into the yellow and green zones through private vehicles that were called upon in a number of circumstances.

#### [Adapting the response to changes in need, capacity, and context.](#)

It is widely recognized that the La Soufrière response was impacted and, in many ways, inhibited by the COVID-19 pandemic which required designing programme activity in line with movement restrictions, social distancing, and limited international travel to name a few constraints. SVGRC greatly increased access to COVID-19 materials, such as facemask, cleaners face shield, temperature guns and sanitizers. **Whenever there was a change in protocol, information was sent out to alert volunteers and staff.** It was an added responsibility, but it was accepted that it was important that COVID-19 protocols were

respected, especially with knowledge of overcrowding in shelters from the 1979 experience. There were exceptional challenges related to mobilizing international delegates that had their arrivals delayed and, in some cases, upon arriving found themselves in quarantine. Some international delegates felt that it could be arbitrary as to why Red Cross delegates were being asked to quarantine while international personal arriving for other organizations, were not.

Volunteers in the orange and red zones played a critical role in the evacuation of people from their communities. National Society volunteers from the orange and red zones also assisted during the initial transition period to shelters and private homes in the yellow and green zones. Soon after, many of these volunteers found themselves living in shelters and private homes as evacuees. Once the eruption occurred and some volunteers became homeless, their focus had to shift. As one National Society volunteer pointed out, given her family responsibilities, she had her own shelter to run. Some of these former volunteers reported that they completely lost contact with the Red Cross in their capacity as volunteers. At some point other volunteers, staff and IFRC delegates would have to ensure that duties such as relief distribution, assisting beneficiaries to sign documents for receipt of NFI goods, assisting with CVA, and assisting with livelihoods.

There were a lot of elderly people that did not want to leave their homes including the parents of SVGRC staff and volunteers. The elderly felt that the eruption would not be that drastic. The 1979 eruption was seen by them as not being as disruptive as people made it out to be. The SVGRC would have to adjust such circumstances throughout the ordeal. People legitimately feared that they would be robbed if they went to live in shelters. They did not want to evacuate. In 1979, there was a lot of theft of animals, and this was also a problem during the La Soufrière eruption in some cases sophisticated operation to steal livestock. So, in 2021, people did not want to leave. At the same time, it was important to prepare people for conditions in the shelters and possibly overcrowding and to provide protective gear for people working in the shelter.

Sometimes people in authority such as those with responsibility at the ports, were confused about what they should allow and not allow to happen for example when SVGRC staff looked to speed matters up. Warehousing was a problem and overall, all the problems were happening in succession of one another. At one point it was determined that a logistic team was needed to distributed food and NFIs. Water was the first priority. Everyone on the main island had their water cut off. The entire water system was covered in ash. PIRAC sent in water and two military water tankers arrived. The CWSA was asked to develop a list of the more critical areas in terms of losing access to water. Trucks were lined up. Truck owners that would normally go to the ports looking for work transporting goods with their trucks, were being hired by SVGRC to transport water from the docks. The trucks would be loaded with water from the ships.

#### [Consideration for Protection, Gender and Inclusion of persons targeted.](#)

PGI was an area of focus during the first nine months of the operation. This included a PGI delegate brought in for two months and a PGI officer employed by the National Society. This allowed the National Society to ramp up its capacity and knowledge related to PGI through training for staff and volunteers and become familiar with minimum PGI standards. Stakeholders recognize that the

integration of the subject matter into the National Society was a challenge at times given the sensitive nature of the subject matter.

This additional capacity allowed SVGRC to engage with the Gender Affairs Unit from MoNM, as well with UNICEF with support being provided for Child Friendly Spaces in collective shelters. Lastly, SVGRC was actively engaged in developing programs and events around the '16 days of Activism' in 2021 and 2022. It is felt by RC staff that the National Society is now seen as an organization that is proactively addressing the topic of PGI in SVG.

In more practical terms, the National Society wanted to determine what could be done in relation to gender inclusion in the shelters. The National Society wanted to see if they could partner with UNICEF on PGI to establish child friendly spaces, in secluded areas where children could not be preyed upon. How are the children going to be fed? Some things were taboo. There was communication between RC and UNICEF and in the end, eleven child friendly spaces were created.

Referring back to 1979, there were people that were lost and there were cases of rape. This is why some people didn't want to go into shelters and wanted to go into private homes. There was a need for proper washrooms for male and females.

From the lessons learned workshop, it was noted by a few individuals that the design of programme for PGI was well thought out. The training for Gender-Based violence (GBV) was good as many persons were coming to the shelters and some form of standards needed to be in place.

One Carib<sup>32</sup> person who was also a National Society volunteer, felt at times throughout her experience as a displaced person there were subtle prejudices by people assisting evacuees. It was never openly mentioned. All in all, the situation was tolerable but at times prejudices would come out such as comments made in passing. No distinction was made between when services were provided by NEMO or the National Society in relation to sensing these prejudices.

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<sup>32</sup> There are two identifiable indigenous groups descended from Kalin-ago (Caribs), numbering in all approximately 3,000, who live at the extreme north-east tip of the island of St Vincent.  
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce54c.html#:~:text=There%20are%20two%20identifiable%20indigenous,ot hers%20as%20'black%20Caribs'>



## 7.2 Effectiveness and Efficiency

### 7.2.1 To what extent has the response achieved its intended immediate results in an effective and efficient manner?

Despite limited human and financial resources, the response to the Soufrière eruption can be deemed to have been carried out in both an effective and efficient manner. Financial resources were deployed efficiently and strategically. Long-standing partnerships with government institutions were leveraged as was the strong volunteer foundation of the National Society that exists across the SVG. Additionally, going back to 2019, SVGRC in coordination with NEMO had fortuitously engaged in activities that assisted in preparing the response to the eruption including the Tradewinds simulation exercise. This was complemented by other concrete practical measures such as properly preparing volunteers in the orange and red zones once it was understood that the eruption was imminent. From the initial involvement in the evacuation through the life of the operation, a number of key results were achieved.

The following is an overview of those achievements.<sup>33</sup>

Key Results of the Soufrière Response April 2021 to December 2022
1. <i>The SVGRC emergency shelter program provided support to 1,128 evacuees with households receiving at least two shelter related items such as kitchen sets and mosquito nets.</i>
2. <i>291 Multipurpose cash grants distributed to households during the emergency phase of the response.</i>
3. <i>230 supermarket vouchers provided to households during the emergency phase.</i>
4. <i>Distribution of relief items providing items such as blankets, water, mosquito nets, tarpaulins, wheelbarrows for 1,713 families.</i>
5. <i>3,338 households were provided cleaning kits.</i>
6. <i>74 families (240 people) supported to relocate out of communal shelters and into transitional rental accommodation (191 grants by IFRC + 201 grants through bi-lateral funds)</i>
7. <i>2,398 hygiene kits provided to households.</i>
8. <i>257 shelter tool kits were distributed.</i>
9. <i>Supported the establishment and provisioning of 11 Child Friendly spaces in communal shelters for 1,018 children.</i>
10. <i>Prepared Psychosocial (PSS) teams to assist with 'Return to Happiness' programme in collaboration with UNICEF and the Ministry of Social Development, and the Department of Child Welfare.</i>
11. <i>Provided 667 PSS kits for children to support them to return to school.</i>
12. <i>Distributed Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) items to over 1,713 families receiving items such as face masks, gloves, and hand sanitizer to ensure a COVID19 safe environment.</i>

<sup>33</sup> Note final approval is still pending.

<i>13. 400 wall mounted sanitizer units installed in classrooms, health clinics and community managed buildings.</i>
<i>14. NS volunteers playing a central role in the evacuation of people from the orange and red zones to safety in the yellow and green zones. 5,062 persons lived in the red zone and 10,577 in the orange. Evacuation orders were issued for these residents.</i>
<i>15. A total of 312 families have been reached by the Livelihood program, which focused on improving income generation for the households involved.</i>
<i>16. 38 households were assisted in making largely minor repairs to houses damaged through the eruption.</i>
<i>17. The provision of water to communities in zones identified by the CWSA as losing access to clean drinking water allowing the CWSA to reestablish the water network.</i>
<i>18. A strong contribution in supporting the overall national response to the eruption fulfilling different roles as they arose throughout the response to the eruption.</i>
<i>19. Creation of a new management structure to permit the NS to operate in a more coherent manner that would allow it.</i>
<i>20. The La Soufrière response can be credited with a number of smaller positive impacts. This includes the practice of tracing 18 people who were reported missing were found who were suffering from dementia or other mental illnesses, the others were elderly or disabled.</i>
<i>21. The effective use of social media platforms such as WhatsApp to prepare local committees and give access to important and timely updates from NEMO the UWI Seismic Research Centre regarding alert levels and other important information to inform decision making.</i>

Overall, these results were achieved through the distribution of financial resources in coordination with volunteer support, staff involvement and coordination with government bodies. There were certainly shortcomings in terms of results. Efforts to expand livelihood support beyond the financial support to allow farmers to transition to more organic production practices were unsuccessful for a myriad of reasons including a distrust of the implementing partner by farmers. There was also a feeling that the focus of the training was not properly suited to their needs where more direct guidance was sought on how to deal with the mounds of ash in their fields. Efforts to provide PGI training was viewed by some stakeholders as poorly timed given the challenges faced by the National Society in responding to the eruption and the act that given the nature of the subject matter of the training, additional preparation was required. In both cases, it was not a question of the importance of these activities but rather their execution.

NS community level volunteers had been prepared that during the evacuation transportation could be a challenge and went about identifying private vehicles that could transport people. This turned out to be critical as in many communities NEMO was unable to provide the agreed to public transportation down to the yellow and green zones the evening prior to the eruption. However, at one point, SVGRC planning, and preparation moved into different circumstances where other actors such as government departments and NGOs were also involved in decision making and, in some cases, competing for the same resources found in places like supermarkets that were being provided to evacuees. The lessons learned workshop with National Society staff and volunteers highlighted that during the first weeks after the eruption, the situation in the yellow and green zones was chaotic. They highlighted for example, that there were too many messages being directed at the public from different organizations

while communication between organizations was poor. Finding people who had been displaced and were in the shelter system, could be a logistical challenge.

While preparations did take place, according to stakeholders, there were situations such as with the lack of water in some locations where it was understood that there would be shortages. The National Society did its best to adapt to these circumstances and eventually, some stability was established.

Over the course of this operation, there would be internal challenges within the National Society as it adjusted to changing expectations regarding the delivery of new activities such as CVA while making changes to the structure of the organization.

#### The Extent results were achieved based on the operation's stated results.

The operation largely achieved its results based on the stated indicators. There are instances of the operation sometimes surpassing stated results or slightly underachieving them. There are components where certain outputs were not met due to the operation lacking funding such as **Output 1.2, regarding technical support, guidance and awareness raising in safe shelter design and settlement planning and improved building techniques are provided to affected households.**

However, assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the La Soufrière response should not be judged simply by whether target indicators were reached. As already noted, this operation was by no means large-scale. This is apparent in comparison to the resources that were made available by organisations such as the WFP. It is important to assess the operation's results differently. For example, while the operation had a stated objective of distributing 300 CVAs and largely met this successfully, this also involved introducing a new tool to the National Society and completing the corresponding capacity building to support the use of the tool. At the same time, the decision was taken to focus the support in providing families with a larger number of children, three or four as opposed to two to increase the strategic impact of SVGRC CVA activity.

To put the CVA component into context, the WFP's CVA experience should be considered. The National Society CVA activity was ended prior to WFP rolling out a CVA initiative with the intention of distributing 20,000 CVA through Western Union in coordination with the MoNM.

Through the resources of the operation, only 25 homes were assisted with repairs, this was half of the stated goal. However, the SVGRC used additional bilateral funds (churches and the Jamaican RC) it received for the repair of another 13 homes. Again, this activity was carried out in the background of NEMO putting in operation a much more ambitious housing repair and building initiative.

Starting in September 2021 upon request from the national government, four hundred monthly grants were provided to families to allow them to move out of the collective shelters into private housing. Transitioning people out of the schools acting as shelters allowed the schools to reopen. Again, the number of families being assisted is not large but the action carries additional importance.

#### The Extent Interventions were integrated across different Operation Sectors

The operation can be credited with establishing linkages between different activities while leveraging different resources and capacities. While the experiences of beneficiaries or displaced people could be very different, it is possible to identify a continuum of supports that the National Society made available

to help beneficiaries weather the fallout of the eruption. For some displaced people support would be limited to the initial assistance in evacuating their community. However, for other beneficiaries more comprehensive support was made available at different points of time. Beneficiaries could be assisted with the evacuation, brought to the shelters and eventually transitioned to private housing and along the way, receive supermarket vouchers and NFI packages and CVA. Upon returning to their communities there could be additional support for matters such as housing repair and/or reestablishing livelihoods. There were criteria that could limit certain supports to for example, more vulnerable people. Some people could receive benefits indirectly for example, a mother or a sibling could be the recipient of the CVA that would be shared. School teachers that were also farmers would not qualify for livelihood support. These possibilities to obtain Red Cross support were described in discussions with beneficiaries.

It was also possible for displaced people to benefit from support provided by multiple organizations. This includes the shelters that were managed by NEMO, numerous organizations such as church groups providing food and NFI and CVA. While volunteers and National Society staff and government representatives recognize that duplication took place, it was not substantial. No evidence was provided to the evaluator that the problem was widespread enough to be a concern. It was also reported that evacuees and their families could receive parcels from a variety of organisations and at times it was possible to lose track of how the provider was.

Integration across sectors could be observed in other ways: For example, an effort was made to ensure that important messages were communicated to volunteers using different platforms. A package was purchased through Zoom to explain different issues to volunteers. WhatsApp was also used to communicate other forms of information. Information from the UWI Seismic Research Centre in Trinidad & Tobago, which conducted technical and arial monitoring and would change alert levels of the volcano warning as needed, and NEMO's information on seismic and emergency issues, were communicated to National Society staff and volunteers. This helped to ensure volunteers and National Society staff were up to date with the most recent analysis regarding volcanic activity and other developments.

#### [The contributions of regional/global assets \(Regional Intervention Teams, Emergency Response Units, Surge, etc.\) in this response](#)

Stakeholders have different opinions regarding the effectiveness of international staff. Overall, a positive contribution is noted through this evaluation process regarding the support provided by IFRC delegates and the Surge response related to its appropriateness and the integration of international staff. However, opinions were not always unanimous regarding the contribution of individuals that were part of the international staff as in some cases the usefulness of their contribution could be questioned. However, these cases were relatively isolated.

Travel restrictions associated with COVID-19 and conditions created by the eruption that limited flights into SVG created challenges for international technical support to enter the country and become operational quickly. The Head of the Country Cluster Delegation in Port of Spain (POS CCD) deployed to support the operation along with other regional staff. They arrived by boat from Trinidad and Tobago. The eventual long-term Operation Manager for the La Soufrière response, who was in the Bahamas

working on the Dorian operation took over and remained in place until the Surge deployed team was able to arrive in the country and pass through the quarantine period. In addition to this, PIRAC was able to send two Water and Sanitation technical delegates during the initial two-week period.

The Head of the POS CCD and his team were able to assist the SVGRC leadership in understanding procedures and prepare them for the challenges of implementing an emergency operation funded through the IFRC appeal system. This included quickly developing a new organizational structure to improve the management of programs and to create improved efficiencies in terms of the support service structure. The Senior Finance Officer and Disaster Preparedness Coordinator from the POS CCD proved to be effective as both brought knowledge to the SVGRC team and were able to work well with the team to move things forward during those initial chaotic first few weeks. Upon returning to Trinidad & Tobago, both were able to continue to provide support.

Throughout the operation, support related to administrative and financial matters was of critical importance but had to be learned during implementation. This included understanding administrative and finance emergency procedures that differ from standard procedures. This support was also important to the process that was initiated to consolidate the financial management of all projects into one system overseen by a single National Society finance officer.

There were two operation managers assigned to support the SVGRC. Setting aside the early support provided by the Hurricane Dorian Operations Manager, the initial operation manager came as a Rapid Response manager from the CRC who is typically deployed to surge positions through the IFRC. He arrived in early May 2021, during the emergency phase. Among other contributions, he is credited with including tweaking the information system, and introducing structure through for example, the use of templates to organize information to better follow IFRC and National Society procedures. The chaos of May 2021 was overcome and eventually systems for collecting and categorizing data were put in place. Once this occurred, it became easier for instance, to distribute packages and NFI items and bring improvements to field-level monitoring. Nonetheless, it should be noted that collecting monitoring data remained a problem in some parts of the island notably on the Leeward side.

The initial Operations Manager who first came to SVG to cover for the Surge team would return and remain with the operation to its completion in December 2022. He is credited with providing useful practical support such as assisting in updating the IFRC GO platforms, which are used to capture and analyze information and shared it in real-time data during event responses.<sup>34</sup> He is also recognized for promoting the digitalization of office documents and a more effective use of indicators and improving

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<sup>34</sup> <https://www.ifrc.org/happening-now/emergencies/ifrc-go>

reporting procedures to donors. Other positive influences include making matters clearer, picking up on and carrying forward useful ideas, and being a problem solver that was critical given the circumstances.

There are examples of other IFRC Delegates or other RC personal deployed to SVG whose contribution were viewed positively. CVA support was provided by a delegate from Dominica (who arrived with regional experience notably in the Bahamas and understanding on how Caribbean National Societies work). He is credited with integrating easily into the SVGRC operation and being able to quickly understand the challenges and local context. This helped make sure that the CVA component was able to roll out at a reasonably fast pace. In total, he was able to provide 10 weeks of support through his Surge deployment and subsequent return as an IFRC delegate. He worked with a CRC delegate who was deployed to support the CVA initiative.

The Surge Livelihoods delegate spent only a month (including two weeks in quarantine). This was seen by the SVGRC as an inefficient use of time and money. A further complaint about IFRC was that the Livelihood surge delegate did develop a plan and to a certain extent the National Society was quite happy with this livelihood plan. However, by the time the IFRC livelihood delegate arrived (September 2021), the plan and much of the groundwork and discussions with different stakeholders had been lost and could not be actioned. This created frustrations with the National Society and challenges for the livelihoods delegate. Once the IFRC livelihood delegate was in place, he introduced a structured approach to involve communities, and build on the experience of other organizations such as Caritas in the area of national financial organizations.

A communication officer was viewed as being effective in helping to communicate ideas on matters like how to keep water clean and making a grab bag. There were at least two instances of international staff deployed to La Soufrière response being viewed as being too rigid or wanting everything to be done by the book when flexibility was in order. However, as often was the case, other stakeholders would identify positive impacts by these same people.

It is worth noting some international staff were deployed both as part of the Surge team and as IFRC delegates. The CVA delegate from the region who first arrived as part of the Surge team returned as a delegate. The operation manager first arrived in SVG as a Surge deployment for an initial four weeks from his full-time position in the Bahamas to assist in mitigating the gap that COVID-19 and the airport closures were creating as he was also able to travel more easily and access SVG via boat. He subsequently returned as a delegate. As well, an IFRC communications delegate had been working in SVG the prior year and was brought back during the Soufrière response. This familiarity was deemed to have been very beneficial.

Delegates felt their experience in other countries whether in the Caribbean or elsewhere, were helpful in their participation in the Soufrière response. One IFRC delegate stated that his experience in difficult situations helped him prepare for the SVG although recognizing that the La Soufrière operation was free of more extreme circumstances. It was acknowledged broadly that the Caribbean experience was very helpful.

The efficiency of cooperation and coordination between IFRC with SVGRCS and external partners Before the eruption, the SVGRC was a very small entity and needed to grow to respond to the challenges related to the eruption and to integrate practices such as CVA that are now commonplace in the field of emergency response. IFRC was in part responsible for guiding the National Society to becoming an organization better suited to current circumstances. It can be said that this was successfully achieved although with a number of important caveats.

International staff deployed to the operation felt it was important to underline that the Soufrière response was a National Society driven initiative with international expertise meant to support specific challenges as they arose. The IFRC was the driver behind new concepts such as CVA and PGI but they were integrated into the National Society on its terms. The POS CCD is credited by stakeholders for establishing good coordination and communication mechanisms with the National Society and providing effective support.

Considering the circumstances of a rapidly evolving context and shifting demands, the evaluation process could not identify any serious concerns related to cooperation or coordination. SVGRC staff and volunteers and IFRC delegates are credited with working very hard and largely collaborating effectively. It was felt that between the human resources provided by the National Society and IFRC, there was a very good mixture of skills and experience. All in all, the operation was set up very quickly and people were able to adapt quickly. Except for a few people associated with the National Society who experienced the 1979 eruption, a volcanic eruption was a new experience for all.

One element that was viewed as being very important was the consistent IFRC messaging regarding priorities and coordination. For example, two operation managers sent out similar messages on matters like encouraging National Society staff and volunteers to remain positive and not become overwhelmed by the situation.

During the operation, there were between 15 to 18 external RC staff who came to SVG for very short visits. A system was set up in the National Society headquarters to keep track of the visits. For the most part, these visits were beneficial exposing the National Society to an array of knowledge and experience relating to how such an event should be handled. The Surge concept is a mechanism that relies on IFRC and National Societies having the capacity to provide skilled people from their pool of contracted staff. As a few stakeholders noted, this works in theory but, ***it is creating a system where people deploy for 4 – 6 weeks or even shorter periods, which for anything other than relief distributions and relief CVA, is too short a period for people to make a real and substantive contribution.*** The frustration of the high rotation of international deployments was expressed repeatedly by National Society staff.

Timing was also a consideration. For example, it was felt that activities related to PGI were appropriate, but some people questioned their timing feeling they should be integrated into National Society operations in a non- emergency period. There was frustration expressed by an IFRC delegate feeling there is an issue where a delegate is sent to the field to complete a minimum number of tasks and that a person is going to be evaluated on it.

There were delays in transferring funding to the National Society that caused issues with National Society liquidity however this was not a debilitating problem. In these circumstances it was felt that it is

important to separate emergency funds from existing financial debt or propose IFRC separate status in the country to run the operation themselves. IFRC delegates also pointed out moments of needless pettiness on the part of people involved in external support mechanisms that would return documents to the National Society in moments of greater pressure in Saint Vincent for grammatical reasons.

As noted throughout this report cooperation and coordination with government partners, the only consistent partner over the entire operation, and is viewed as being highly successful. Between the SVGRC and government partners there was considerable mutual support and consensus-based decision making through the SVGRC's participation in a number of mechanisms such as subject matter working groups. Attempts to speak to representatives of organizations such as UNICEF regarding collaboration with the SVGRC were not successful. A representative from USAID/BHA expressed the opinion that both IFRC international staff and the staff and volunteers of the SVGRC had been excellent partners and as a donor, expectations had been successfully met.

#### The Effectiveness of the National Society in contributing to the Response

With limited but effective support from International RC staff, the National Society was at the centre of all actions undertaken during the operation and is to be credited for its success. The National Society oversaw a plan to engage community teams, manage the office and carry out a plan to support NEMO and corresponding government departments under its auspices for the emergency response such as Ministry of Education.

Some of the key strengths of the National Society that were often mentioned by stakeholders and have already been highlighted in this report were the trained and highly motivated group of volunteers and strong relations with national partners such as NEMO. **The 234 volunteers that were actively involved in the La Soufrière response were highly engaged and worked with a strong understanding of the local population and circumstances. These attributes were essential in allowing the La Soufrière response to define an important niche for itself as part of the overall response to the eruption.** Organizations such as the WFP may have been better financially resourced, but the National Society was able to provide invaluable capabilities such as communication channels with local communities. International delegates noted that because of these attributes, NEMO was highly reliant on the National Society. In return for example, the government would provide access to SVGRC to warehouses.

There were also strong relations with the SVG diaspora community that were called upon during the response, and church groups that made donations both financially and in-kind. It was noted that these types of contributions could be small but collectively, made a difference. NEMO, the Ministry of Environment, CWSA and the Ministry of Agriculture noted that the experience of collaborating with the National Society in response to the eruption further entrenched the good relations with the RC.

The quality of volunteers that are available to the National Society that are sometimes even employed in important and relevant positions in their professional life, was also noted. A National Society volunteer who is also a CWSA employee played an important role in defining the strategy for the National Society in supporting the water authority. The National Society office is enhanced by volunteers with strong backgrounds either as long-standing volunteers and capable younger volunteers, a small number of whom were awarded contracts to join National Society staff. One of these young volunteers who became an employee, was deployed in 2023 (January to February) to Belize as a Rapid



Response Personnel to support the response to Tropical Storm Lisa as the Planning Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (PMER) specialist. In the communities visited in the orange and red zones, it was noted that many volunteers are employed as teachers or public servants serving in technical capacities such as agricultural extension workers.

The National Society would normally have an operational budget of about USD \$200,000 USD a year and for the eruption, it increased to over USD \$1,900,000. It was agreed that this was a lot to manage for the National Society. It wasn't a small matter. It provided a chance to learn and develop capacity, but it also demonstrated that there was no need to bring in a large IFRC team and that the National Society was capable to make and act on decisions on its own. There are team leaders across SVG that are capable of working with external experts.

While the SVGRCS was a very good example of what could be accomplished through working with a National Society, there were weaknesses such as the lack of capacity to write proposals, collection and data management, documentation of what was taking place and, in some circumstances, production of justification for payments that were being made. How financing for the operation is tied to reporting had to be emphasized. As noted by one IFRC delegate, managing money was never the problem, it was more the narrative information that has to go along with it.

It was noted by a number of international delegates that one could always see the potential and capacity of the SVGRCS. There was strength in areas such as Office management and logistics and finance. On the programming side there were people with considerable experience. The structure had to be reshaped related to how many people were being assisted. The National Society staff and volunteers have known what they had to do. However, it was important to make sure the identity of the person being assisted was being properly documented. There is a familiarity with people, so it is not hard to double back but it requires more formality.

There were gaps in the data in terms of how matters are managed. It is a situation whereby there are not many technical advisers doing reports. There was room for nitpicking. Data collection and documentation might have been done better but essentially it was getting done but it was largely understood that practices had to change. There has been growth in terms of understanding that some things like data collection may not need to be done perfectly but it cannot just happen. As noted, there is a fine line between learning and building on existing practices. Despite their weaknesses, practices used by the National Society have worked, and imposing conditions was not viewed as being constructive.

International staff and government officials note that the National Society has somehow functioned despite a number of competing silos within the organization. After the eruption, a direction was established to better share resources. That is where the National Society was as of December 2022. The finance manager has now been put in a position to manage multiple projects as opposed to having multiple finance officers. Before, each new project would result in the creation of a new administrative structure. For example, a number of project-based finance managers would be employed managing different projects. There is a capacity building Initiative being funded by USAID through the IFRC that is currently funding three key positions; the PMER, the finance officer and the operations manager which are meant to support all project activities.

There were deeper issues within the National Society that were tied to the silos and were acknowledged by stakeholders during the evaluation. International staff noted that conflicts between members of the National Society leadership were openly discussed and that this could have a debilitating impact on the National Society operation. For example, it would be necessary to gain the approval of two different factions within the National Society to move an idea forward. Overall, as one stakeholder mentioned, getting anything done could require a great deal of negotiations such as was the case with CVA before it was accepted. As one international staff member noted, it could be very strange and difficult during the first three months. Eventually, a better working situation emerged, and one started to see the influence on the National Society but trying to steer the team in the same direction was not easy when not everyone was in agreement.

### The effectiveness of Community Engagement and Accountability mechanisms

Respective Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) mechanisms were established that were used to different degrees. The main mechanism was a Hotline in support of the CVA. Overall, the use of a CEA mechanism was new to the National Society and at first, the CEA *mechanism was seen as a potential a communication tool. Hence, there were difficulties including Prevention and Response and Sexual Abuse (PSEA) and Beneficiary Communication feedback and complaints mechanisms. In the end, the CEA for the CVA was viewed as an opportunity to obtain feedback and make sure people felt they were a part of the recovery.*

The CVA hotline was set up to troubleshoot and explain how to use an ATM. It also supported PGI focused activities such as the Child Friendly Spaces that occurred during the emergency response (first 6 months) period. A pamphlet was distributed to promote the use of the hotline. Whatever volunteer was on the line provided set answers to people calling in. The hotline worked quite well. Two beneficiaries who were spoken to said that either they or a family member used the hotline and could confirm its usefulness. The National Society did not have a local counterpart to carry out the CEA and has never had a dedicated staff person on the topic of CEA.

There were also post-distribution monitoring calls. The questions asked were straightforward. “What do you remember receiving and what was the most useful?” In addition, the Livelihood delegate created a hotline system that was in place during the beneficiary selection process and while the grants were distributed. A longer-term CEA hotline structure was proposed, however, the SVGRC did not feel that it was an efficient way to use funds.

Overall, it was felt that the CEA was not a perfect system, however, the SVGRC believes that they carry out CEA just not in a structured way that one might like to see. As one stakeholder noted, it would often be said that the country is small, and the Red Cross office is well known. People would regularly call the President or Director General (or a number of other people) or just visit the office to raise issues, concerns and complaints.

### 7.3 Findings on other Evaluation Questions

As per the Terms of Reference, the evaluation was expected to report in greater detail on specific programming elements of the operation. This included support provided to the Shelter System, the

appropriateness of emergency items/household items, Cash Volunteer Assistance and support provided to livelihood activities.

### 7.3.1 Supporting the Shelter System

The collective shelters were expected to shut down 31 March 2022 and while they were still operating, the SVGRC was viewed as being very supportive providing important reinforcements and needed flexibility during the process towards a complete closing. The shelter system was overseen by NEMO in coordination with a number of partners but mostly the Ministry of Education as schools acted as communal shelters. The shelters were a large issue. In the early stages, there was overcrowding yet at the same time, people were afraid to enter the shelters due to the legitimate fears of falling ill with COVID-19 and for women the threat of physical assault. As one National Society volunteer who ended up staying in a shelter noted, it was a messy situation. In some shelters untrained people were being relied upon to manage the sometimes-chaotic shelters.

The Ministry of Education credits SVGRC for going beyond what was expected providing human and other resources and bringing stability to the situation. SVGRC participated in a Shelter working group and was the only organization going into the shelters to ensure people were receiving their packages.

With distribution affected by COVID-19, keeping distance and masking were required. In the evenings the National Society provided training on psychosocial support specifically on GBV and Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) awareness sessions for managers responsible for the shelters. One National Society volunteer who served as a shelter manager shared at the Lessons Learned Workshop for National Society staff and volunteers felt strongly that the GBV training was very useful and employed effectively in the management of the shelters. The value of the training and information sessions was corroborated by the Ministry of Education. It is important to note that at the workshop a number of volunteers confirmed their volunteer involvement in assisting in the day-to-day operations of the shelters. Another National Society volunteer who also managed a shelter noted that she made a point of giving National Society volunteers staying at her shelter responsibilities.

The child friendly spaces established in collective shelters served 1,018 children. The Ministry of Education felt the children's spaces fulfilled their role and this was supported by National Society volunteers. However, other stakeholders question how substantive the spaces actually were seeing them more simply as a place to distribute information.

The Ministry of Education noted that SVGRC assistance helped support the shelter system and once the schools needed to return to holding classes for children, SVGRC facilitated the movement of people to private residences. Throughout this process SVGRC is credited for being pro-active, asking if assistance was required in an effort to anticipate situations in the shelters.

The shelter experience is viewed by the Ministry as being a good experience for it and its staff and the ministry was able to navigate what was seen as the "unknown" prior to the eruption. The Ministry also felt that now it has a culture of responsiveness when it comes to matters such as housing displaced people and a good working relationship with the SVGRC. It noted that the Ministry provided a teacher's house in the red zone to SVGRC that the organization was able to renovate and repurpose as a distribution base.

It is important to note that while it is accepted that people were better off in private homes and felt safer, National Society volunteers who found themselves living in private homes noted that conditions were not always ideal and sometimes issues such as personal safety could also be a consideration. Some of these homes could have large numbers of people staying in them. One volunteer mentioned being aware of one home where relatives were staying along with 50 other people. Control from a safety standpoint could be lost in such conditions.

### 7.3.2 Appropriateness of emergency items/household items

#### a) Emergency and Household items

In the first two months after the eruption, the Red Cross distributed food, water, and emergency items such as hygiene kits, cleaning supplies, blankets, and baby supplies to 702 families. In the final report for the response, the following table was included outlining the distribution of these items through the emergency shelter response and number of beneficiary households:

Kitchen sets	117
Water bottles (purchased with bilateral funds - distributed by the Appeal)	20,037
Mosquito nets	324
Cleaning kits	3,348
Shelter tool kits	257
Jerry cans	1713
Tarpaulins	191
Buckets	200
Blankets	1,128
Rental grants (XCD800/grant)	392

In order to understand if the Red Cross was meeting the needs of evacuees, a survey of 100 recipients was conducted. There were 74 female, and 18 male respondents with 8 people declining.

People who received emergency support were both hosts and evacuees and came from across the red, orange, and yellow zones. A majority of respondents said they were satisfied with the items saying they either partially or completely met their needs at the time.<sup>35</sup> The most useful item according to respondents was food, with 80 percent of women calling it the most useful, with cleaning and hygiene kits in a distant second and third (6 per cent and 3 percent respectively). According to the men that were surveyed food was the most useful at 60 percent, followed by water (13 percent).

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<sup>35</sup> La Soufrière Eruption Response. Post Distribution Monitoring Report. SVGRC and IFRC. 2021

Many male and female respondents said they found everything useful.<sup>36</sup> The packages distributed by the National Society were credited with having been put together with some thought in terms of wanting to ensure the packages were beneficial to recipients in different ways. This was largely in reference to **the NFI packages that were considered to be multi-purposeful where for example, personal hygiene items were prioritized alongside food items.** There were also the tools that were provided to remove volcanic ash. Moreover, there was a commitment to ensuring that different types of packages or parcels were put together that were distributed to over 1,800 households. This included food and NFI parcels, cleaning kits and tools associated with ash removal.

Respondents to the survey were clear that they continued to have needs as many evacuees had not been able or allowed to return to their homes. The survey did highlight some mixed opinions. Some beneficiaries said they were happy with the speed of the Red Cross response. Others sought the assistance of other organizations while waiting for the Red Cross to provide its assistance. Former evacuees that were interviewed for this evaluation noted they were not necessarily sure what they received from the SVGRC versus what other organizations provided. IFRC delegates noted that the distribution in communities in the orange and red zones in the aftermath of the eruption could be disorganized with distribution carried out haphazardly from the back of a truck.

#### b) Rental Assistance

One hundred households were targeted for rental support grants. In the end, due to budgetary limitations, only 75 households were assisted. The distribution of the rental support was highly timely as it assisted families that had to vacate the communal shelters. According to two individuals that transitioned to the private households the support provided by the National Society was very good. There were regular visits by National Society staff to monitor living conditions in the private homes. While in the private homes, they were provided food, money and water from the SVGRC.

#### c) Home Repairs

The issue with home repairs was more to do with its limited scope as opposed to the effectiveness or timeliness of the support. The evaluator was able to speak to two people who benefited from Red Cross support to repair their homes. The housing repair component was designed to avoid structural repairs. The objective was to help people with a small amount of money. A team went out to conduct assessments of homes regarding their eligibility. 72 homes were assessed before settling on an objective of repairing 50 homes with basic repairs. Money was provided to purchase cement blocks, lumber roof shedding and window doors. It was noted that this activity was carried out rather informally. Not something that could be replicated.

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.,

One person who was interviewed remembered a quick response in making the basic repairs to the family home through the purchase of galvanized roofing. One woman explained that she and her husband a National Society volunteer, had more substantive repairs made to her home, notably a new roof. This would not have been possible from the money that was being made available to most households for repairs. Other parts of her home were also repaired such as the entry. She said that the repair came about after speaking to the National Society president. At the time she was still in a government shelter and made repeated visits to the National Society even though she was to be a part of the government rehabilitation as this was the response done for people in public shelters. The president of the National Society agreed to send out an assessor to her home. This speaks to what some stakeholders saw as the sometime arbitrary way people were assisted by the operation.

The repairs and construction of homes was and remains the responsibility of NEMO. In fact, a number of individuals who were interviewed who were RC beneficiaries and/or volunteers found themselves in the public shelters were promised support in repairing their homes. As of June 2023, they were still waiting. In many cases due to the toxic nature of the ash, the condition of many roofs has continued to worsen.

The evaluation process came to understand that the housing repair was a very complicated issue due to a number of factors beyond the purview of the National Society. Nonetheless, given the capacity that the SVGRC possessed, notably an operations manager with extensive construction experience including home repair and building new housing stock, the number of houses repaired by the operation is underwhelming. It is understood that the office tried to communicate this organizational strength to NEMO. At the same time the government, communicated to the evaluator that the housing repair file would have benefited from the involvement of an independent third party such as the Red Cross.

### 7.3.3 Cash Volunteer Assistance

Overall, 291 households received CVA support. The number of households was not particularly large, but the support was directed at supporting larger families from the red zone which were determined to be in greater need. Stakeholders agreed that under different circumstances, it would have been possible to assist a greater number of families. The majority of the recipients were from the communities of Georgetown and Sandy Bay. Some households that received the CVA had multiple evacuated families living in them from different households. Interviews with beneficiaries revealed that there would be an array of family circumstances with multi-generational families being a key defining feature.<sup>37</sup>

Based on feedback provided by beneficiaries and other stakeholders to the evaluator and the exit survey, the different forms of CVA can be viewed as being efficient in their use. There were some

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<sup>37</sup> CVA Post Distribution Monitoring Report 2021.

challenges with the IFRC VISA. The initial plan to do a single distribution at the stadium in Kingstown was not followed through on as a number of worries were expressed related to having all recipients gather in the same place during a pandemic and the possibility of attracting unwanted attention were two key reasons why it was decided to go directly to individual homes to distribute the cards. This required more time and transportation.

Recipients were advised on how to use the cards, Nevertheless, there were cases that even with the initial guidance, by the time some recipients made it to the ATM, they would have forgotten important details. For example, some would forget what bank they were supposed to go to, showing up at Scotia Bank when they had an account with the National Bank. Another challenge was landlords who were housing evacuees would want money beyond the rent that the evacuees were paying. The hotline that was set up to allow people to call in to ask for help proved to be effective in providing additional explanation. Volunteers were also available to assist beneficiaries to withdraw their CVA at the ATM machines that are largely located in the green zone where people were evacuated to.

According to the beneficiaries, once they were prepared to use the IFRC Visa debit card, the transaction went smoothly. In the end, according to the CVA Post-distribution Monitoring report, this was viewed as the preferred transaction method, followed by cash. As one stakeholder noted, having beneficiaries use the ATM machines was a feeling out process while at the same time the National Society was learning a new tool. The Bank partners were able to manage the cards. One stakeholder felt there may have been a better way to explain how to use the cards without providing any suggestions on how this might happen. The use of other types of CVA such as supermarket vouchers were easy to use by the beneficiaries who were consulted regarding their use.

At the time of the Operation, the National Society had very limited management capacity to take on the CVA programs, and there was a hesitation to recruit a team to manage it. Collaboration between the IFRC delegates with the National Society in the beginning on CVA was challenging. CVA was a tool that the National Society had never worked with before and it met with some resistance. Eventually, attitudes began to change, and it started to work. Given this situation and the limited budget, the more focused objective was agreed to in coordination with the government. IFRC also attended and coordinated with a CVA working group that ended in September 2021. Overall, the CVA was coordinated with WFP but not to a large degree given the timing of each organization in rolling out their CVA activity and the different volume of beneficiaries.

The timing of the rolling out of the CVA was considered to have been a bit late, and in the end, had to be rushed. There was a good-sized sample of about 300 so it was not easy to completely avoid duplication. Nevertheless, it is a small island, so it is relatively easy to identify people to determine who received the CVA. Most of the time the targeted beneficiaries that the operation was trying to reach were found near the homes they were supposed to be living in. While NFI parcels were being distributed, the CVA operation was able to join in these distributions to visit CVA recipient families.

IFRC delegates felt that there was probably little or no duplication with WFP. The CVA operation did more in-depth study of potential beneficiaries. Significant resources were used to work closely with NEMO to focus on the people most impacted. There was a short interview to understand how people were going to use the money. Most people stated that purchasing food (53 per cent) would be the main

priority. Other planned uses included clothing, shelter, household items, and repair/clean up. In terms of levels of satisfaction with CVA, the following was reported:

- 95% of the respondents were satisfied with the distribution of the cash system which was through the Bank of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (BOSVG) where beneficiaries had to visit the bank on the day the payments were being issued, present their national ID then collect their installment.
- 5% however were not satisfied mainly because they would have preferred to go to a BOSVG branch that was in close proximity to where they lived.
- 5%, indicated their dissatisfaction with being informed about the livelihoods programme mainly because the team digitized the majority of the work (for example the submitting of receipts/invoices via the livelihoods WhatsApp chat before a set deadline) as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. These few respondents were not technologically savvy.
- 96% of the respondents reported that they were satisfied with the availability of the Red Cross staff in regard to attending to their concerns during the program. Four percent however, mentioned that their calls were not returned in a timely manner, thus, they expressed their dissatisfaction.

There was no evidence of any transfer of CVA to local counterparts other than within the National Society. It is true banks were called upon to facilitate the cashing of the vouchers. This is experience with an institutional partner that is now a point of reference for future events. The introduction of CVA was however, more about the National Society learning and developing some capacity related to the use of CVA.

### 7.3.4 Livelihoods

#### Number of targeted beneficiaries given available Resources and Capacities

Twelve additional beneficiaries were assisted beyond the targeted 300. As a new activity for the National Society and with resource limitations for implementation, this was a reasonable number of beneficiaries to target to allow for the outreach while the National Society became more familiar with how to work within the sector. As well, compared to other operations such as the Hurricane Dorian Recovery Operation, the Soufrière Operation was relatively short. Given these circumstances, consideration had to be given in terms of how livelihoods could be supported to come back.

#### Identification of Livelihoods Beneficiaries and Subsequent Usefulness of the Support

There was limited continuity between the Surge and IFRC livelihoods specialists. The IFRC livelihoods delegate who was in SVG for a longer period of time, was able to work in a more coordinated manner with National Society staff and volunteers. Once an updated picture of circumstances in the country was established, areas in Saint Vincent were prioritized for livelihood assistance.

The identification of livelihood beneficiaries involved creating community committees of between five to ten people to select the most affected people. It was felt that using the committees would help to avoid bias. The work of these selection committees was complemented by random field checks.

In identified locations, community committees were established, and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were carried out to triangulate information. These Committees were comprised of women and men of



different ages, and livelihood backgrounds and assisted in selecting the most vulnerable persons in the community. In the Red zone, the evaluation process noted widespread impacts on livelihood activity with people still struggling to reestablish themselves economically. With the livelihoods support an effort was made to go to villages where there were no other activities had taken place. Initially, Overland, Sandy Bay, Fancy, and Owia on the windward side of the island, and Rose Hall, Fitz-Hughes, Chateau Belair on the Leeward side were identified for livelihood support. Ultimately, only three of these affected communities were retained Rose Hall and Fitz-Hughes on the Leeward, and Sandy Bay in the windward side.

Farming (including agro-processing, fishing and livestock), as a long-standing economic driver, was the most affected sector. Other sectors of the economy (small businesses, salaried workers, and other) were also impacted. It was, therefore, recommended that any person whose livelihood has been affected would be eligible for assistance. Due to the limited economic resources, households were prioritized for support rather than individuals. It was determined to use cash transfer as the means to assist in the restoration of the livelihoods. At this time, it was decided to reinforce the restoration of livelihoods with additional actions specifically in relation to adaptation to climate change and disaster preparedness. This was considered to be in line with Government policies.

A baseline was established of beneficiary households, to understand current household income compared to pre-eruption levels. This happened rather quickly and appears to have been effective in ensuring the cash transfers had a chance of having an important economic impact.


The objective was to provide entrepreneurs, fishers and farmers the latitude to make purchases they viewed as priorities to reestablish their livelihoods. Small businesses could restock their shops by for example, purchasing beverages or other items they normally would sell. Fishers might purchase gasoline to fuel their boats and farmers could purchase fertilizers. The objective was to enable a quick turnaround and it is agreed that this was an effective and direct form of support that did not place any unnecessary burden on the National Society in terms of requiring additional staffing or resources to support livelihood activity. Fishers and farmers were allocated XCD 2,000 or roughly USD \$738 with small businesses receiving XCD 1,500 or USD \$555.00. Below are some results from the livelihoods Post Distribution Monitoring report with 75 beneficiaries participating in the survey.<sup>38</sup>

→ 89.9% of the respondents indicated that the grant quantity received was enough to get their livelihoods back to a pre-disaster level as they were able to restore their livelihoods by replenishing what they had lost.

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<sup>38</sup> Livelihoods Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) Report Moesha Thomas May 2022.

→ 11.1% were not satisfied with the quantity they received to get them to a pre-disaster level because the damages they sustained were too great compared to the livelihoods grants they received. Few indicated that if the assistance was not only a one-time assistance, then they may be able to get to a pre-disaster level. The following graph was taken from the PDM report:



→ The PDM found that after receiving the livelihoods grant the majority of the respondents were able to reduce their level of debt and some were able to clear all their debts. However, there were a few grant recipients whose debts remained the same as before due to the grant not being sufficient for them.

The evaluator did not encounter any evidence of beneficiaries substantially improving the performance of their livelihoods through the grants but nor was this the objective of the intervention. There were reports of beneficiaries using the money to change their occupation. There is also a community level seed bank that has been started in Rose Hall and the surrounding area with a group of beneficiary farmers to help members cope with the increasing cost of seeds for tomato, okra, peas, cabbage, peppers and other vegetables. It was also reported to the evaluator that some livelihood beneficiaries worked together to remove ash collectively.

The analysis of the data indicates that the livelihoods assistance was appropriate to the context and timely. The support was quick and directly impactful even though it was a small amount of money.

#### Coordination and Involvement of Local Partners

There was coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and participation in the Livelihood Working Group that the WFP also participated in as it also supported livelihoods in a similar manner. CARITAS, a religious NGO had done a financial service provider mapping of financial institutions in the country. The operation made use of CARITAS mapping exercise to conclude that the ideal partner would be the Bank

of Saint Vincent. According to the IFRC livelihoods specialist, a priority was made by the operation to avoid reinventing or unnecessarily repeating the same processes. It was also recommended to use the same over the counter system that was used with the CVA distribution.

There was no transfer of skills to local implementing counterparts. The nature of the activities, short-term transactions meant to provide immediate assistance, did not lend themselves to transferring capacity. The livelihoods monetary transfer, benefited directly from the experience of CVA with some transfer of capacity including borrowing from the expertise of the IFRC CVA delegate while he was still deployed in Saint Vincent. This was where the recommendation to use the same over the counter system came from.

There was an opportunity for some building of relations with local expertise and the building of additional capacity. For the farmer beneficiaries, there was the intention to provide organic farming training as a means of building climatic resilience through support to be provided by the Richmond Vale Academy in SVG. The proposed training was met with indifference with only a small number of farmers showing any interest before it was decided to cancel the activity. There were a number of reasons for this failure: The training module was originally introduced in the Bahamas through Operation Dorian where it was part of a lengthier programme and implemented in a farming community with considerable exposure to organic farming. There were also reputational issues with Richmond Vale Academy that made beneficiaries hesitant although the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed as far it was concerned, the Academy is a credible organization.

In speaking to farmers, the issue of communication and approach appear to have been major issues. One of the components of the proposed training was to turn ash into fertile soil. This would have been of direct and immediate interest to farmers had it been presented as the priority of the training. Some farmers have had great success turning the ash rich soil into productive soil while other farmers are still dealing with the high level of toxicity that the ash introduced into their soil. Some farmers have not returned to the land due to the ash that has seriously impaired the ability of their land to cultivate fruit and vegetables. The overall training module had a number of laudable components such as encouraging farmers to move away from the practice of burning land as an agricultural practice.

The livelihoods money was distributed through the banking system with people being brought to Kingstown. There were two payments and beneficiaries had to produce receipts to prove that the money from the installments was used for their intended purpose. As seen below only a small number of beneficiaries did not produce the necessary receipts.

Programme target	# of families who received only one payment	# of families who received both payments
300	312	291

**Table 1: Total number of families who received livelihoods grants.**

### 7.3.5 Sustainability

*The extent long-term sustainability has been taken into consideration.*

In coordination with the IFRC, a decision was made to focus on introducing a more structured and professional approach to managing the day-to-day business of the National Society. This new structure was to improve the day-to-day management capacity, establish the efficient use of a small staff that was put in place to manage the financial, administrative and operational responsibilities of the SVGRC. This was deemed necessary to ensure there was a consistent functional structure to better position the National Society to approach donors for funding in all circumstances and ensure that duties such as report and proposal writing could be carried out more effectively.

In addition to the changes brought to the management structure, there have also been improved PMER capacities and new tools introduced, reduced operational costs through the installation of solar panels, improved capacity in terms of digitalization of National Society documents, and what was hoped strengthened, governance with a new President being elected with statutes under revision for submission to the IFRC Statute commission.

#### Exit Strategy

The operation structure was designed with SVGRC in mind and specifically aimed to build its core structure and capacity. From the beginning, the National Society and IFRC actively looked at the exit strategy for the operation so as to minimise the disruption to SVGRC once activities were completed and the downsizing of staff was required. According to stakeholders, this was managed well, with the National Society being involved throughout the processes of upsizing and downsizing. There was indeed a more structured approach in place with the National Society having better capacity to manage.

The Capacity Building Initiative (CBI) is funded by USAID, through the IFRC approved project for SVG. Among other components, this capacity building project is covering the salaries of three staff members, PMER, Finance and Operations Officers that are core positions and integral to the new management structure.

The new organizational structure was more or less in place and functioning as of December 2022. However, since the closing of the La Soufrière response, some of the gains made in establishing this new management structure appear to be in jeopardy.

During the operational phase of the La Soufrière response, it was noted by a number of stakeholders that there was some resistance to changing the management structure of the National Society. Eventually, though, it seemed that for the most part, National Society staff and volunteers were supportive of the new direction. However, circumstances would begin to change.

In January 2023, there was an election of a new board and president of the National Society. The management's orientation changed and according to some stakeholders, it began to question the practices and approaches that were learned and integrated during the response and started returning to previous ways prior to the eruption. These older attitudes were suitable as a few stakeholders pointed out, at a period of time when there was less knowledge and understanding about how to assess and respond to events like La Soufrière eruption. Since that time, some long-term staff and volunteers have been questioning their place in SVGRC or have left. It is difficult to articulate what is currently

taking place and why. A number of experienced volunteers and staff that were interviewed are dismayed.

There was always an internal struggle within the National Society related to the control of the organization. This was very apparent during the evaluation and as noted earlier, would sometimes oblige international staff to build consensus on critical matters through two factions within the office. As one person involved in the National Society noted, “somehow, we managed.” However, after the election, the conflict shifted into a new set of circumstances with different dynamics. Partner organizations, notably government departments, are aware of the emerging situation and are concerned as they are seeing decisions being made under these circumstances that are not viewed as being in the interest of the government and their efforts to build long-term response capacity.

As one stakeholder pointed out, much of what was learned from the appeal, is still in place, but it is increasingly becoming a struggle to maintain it. Recently, it was possible to include the use of CVA in a winning proposal for a USD \$400,000 project to be funded by the Church of Latter-Day Saints, but it required an internal struggle to convince members of the new National Society management team regarding the validity of CVA even though everyone should have understood the importance of the practice from what was learned through the Soufrière response. There is the feeling that some of the experience gained from the recent response is not being taken seriously anymore.

#### [Aging Volunteer Corp](#)

As noted elsewhere in the report, the National Society was greatly enhanced by volunteers performing a wide variety of duties throughout the response from assuming positions of responsibility to more basic duties such as assembling NFI packages for distribution. Also as noted earlier in the report, a number of exceptional younger volunteers were met during the field phase of the evaluation. It is also known that the National Society routinely networks with youth groups in high schools to build linkages with young people. As well, the National Society created a Youth Commission in 2022 that has yet to become active. It was also communicated that that proposals are being contemplated to support youth engagement through the Capacity Building Fund (CBF) and Danish funding through the Youth Engagement in Leadership and Living (YELL). In speaking with National Society representatives that are currently and/or previously responsible for youth engagement, they are fully aware of the need to appeal to the interest of young people to retain and expand an enthusiastic base of youth volunteers.

However, overall, this is an aging group of volunteers and for a number of reasons this is a concern. Younger adult volunteers who were spoken to were very clear with the evaluator they would like to see more younger volunteers involved in the National Society who share their interest. One younger

volunteer also expressed her unhappiness with the current direction of the National Society management not seeing youth being properly represented. It was recognized by older volunteers that due to evolving circumstances, younger volunteers have a very different orientation to the world around them. This was said without judgement. There are considerations such as social media and more broadly technological advancements where younger people have an inclination towards their use. Drones for example, were used by the Government as part of the national effort, monitoring volcanic activity, and across the Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC), the use of drones is increasing.<sup>39</sup> There are also concepts such as social inclusion, and climate change and new tools such as CVA, that are not necessarily new but have to be fully embraced by the National Society.

### Training

There is agreement that all volunteers should have a chance to better themselves through training. However, there are some training opportunities that stakeholders feel, notably government representatives, require longer-term vision. It was pointed out by two important government partners, that a recent decision regarding what National Society volunteers would attend a Red Cross training session was not done in the best interest of the country in terms of building long-term disaster readiness. While relations with the government are currently as strong as they have ever been, there is a worry that there could be more decisions made where unsuitable candidates receive training where there is limited potential to see these trained National Society put these newly acquired skills to use over the long-term. It was expressed by other National Society stakeholders that the National Society may be returning to an approach to training where it is more about everyone deserving a chance to travel and getting a taste of training as opposed to what is in the best interest of the country and in maintaining the long-term operational capacity of the National Society.

In support to the transition away from the emergency operation, training and support were provided to key positions such as the financial officer and the national operation manager in areas related to their responsibilities. Based on recent decisions, there does not appear to be any connection to this approach. It is important to highlight as well, that training is an essential element of the IFRC-supported St. Vincent and the Grenadines' Country Plan for 2022 to 2025.

### Building on local Capacities and Structures

The SVGRC La Soufrière response was part of a national effort coordinated by NEMO based on the national volcanic eruption plan. The National Society has a long-standing record of actively supporting the National Plan. This includes among other activities participating in the Tradewinds Exercise simulation of 2019, which was meant to test the National Emergency Response Mechanisms in

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<sup>39</sup> <https://americanredcross.github.io/rcrc-drones/activities.html>

case of a volcanic eruption. As such, the SVGRC effort should be viewed as a critical complementary component in helping to build the national system as opposed to acting on its own to build on local capacities.

As well, the operation was able to support a number of initiatives that over time, could become features of emergency response practices. This includes introducing PGI into the operations of shelters, involving the bank sector in CVA distribution and establishing a well-defined approach to livelihoods support in SVG that is well-suited to the rapid response required in the aftermath of a major event.

Certainly, the key local capacity for the country in relation to responding to an event such as the La Soufrière eruption, is the National Society local committees located across the SVG and which was critical to the National Society operation and the national government during the preparatory stage and the early days of the eruption. This experience provided important lessons in a current context on how to evacuate people through community outreach. This would include the benefits and use of modern communication tools compared to what was available during the 1979 eruption such as WhatsApp which was used to prepare local committees and give access to important updates from NEMO and the UWI Seismic Research Centre regarding alert levels.

## 8. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The feedback from stakeholders was that as beneficial as the support from international staff felt that it could have been managed differently. Surge deployments in this type of context (safe, limited hardship, small NS) should emphasize longer term surge deployments. Having 2 or 3 rotations over a 2 – 3 months period in this type of context creates confusion and frustration for staff, volunteers, and delegates, and can create longer-term problems for the recovery. At the same time, although the concept of PGI found its footing within the operation, it was not without difficulties, and they could have been avoided had the topic been introduced to the National Society in a different context when tackling a challenging topic can be more easily absorbed.

### For IFRC

1 & 2. The National Society was able to largely carry out the La Soufrière with minimal outside assistance. However, it was a long process of making changes, building capacity and dealing with internal matters. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the transformation to a more professional operation would encounter difficulties and that additional guidance and support may be required.

**Recommendation:** Review procedures regarding the deployment of international staff for smaller National Societies to determine how international support can be more attuned to local circumstances. As was demonstrated by the experience of CVA, relatively longer-term placements hold the possibility of avoiding a lot of challenges. At the same time procedures should be reviewed for how and when new concepts and practices are introduced to the National Society especially those that will take time to adopt and absorb.

**Recommendation:** Over the medium-term, maintain those aspects of the current CBI project that are helping to provide stability within the SVGRC and that are essential to ensuring a complete transition to the new management structure that was established as of December 2022. This could include

continuing to fund the positions of the PMER specialist, financial officer and national operation manager.

### **For IFRC and SVGRC**

3. The National Society volunteer corps deserves an incredible amount of credit for bringing the National Society to the place where it currently stands. However, it is important to not stand still and to embrace opportunities to ensure SVGRC volunteers as a group continue to evolve. Evacuation, and feeding and providing shelter to people during events will remain the foundation of SVGRCs' work during a crisis providing a broad spectrum of possibilities for volunteer engagement. However, an influx of youth in a changing context that is increasingly connected by technology in different ways beckons.

**Recommendation:** Develop and implement a viable youth recruitment strategy (18-35) that is focused on the targeted training of new volunteers to reinforce the capabilities of the National Society to contribute useful skills to national efforts to build national risk reduction capabilities. This should complement efforts to build the traditional volunteer base that supports National Society activities such as first aid training and maintaining the network of community level committees. Building on recent efforts to ensure the Digital Transformation of the National Society and technological innovations such as integrating the use of drones into the National Society operations could be tied to the youth strategy. As well, practices such as CVA and livelihood support that were integrated during the Soufrière response could also be tied to this volunteer strategy.

### **For SVGRC**

4. It is very difficult to prepare for an event that may not occur again for decades even though knowing that its impact could be significant. Nevertheless, the Tradewinds simulation training exercise that preceded the eruption by a couple of years showed how preparations can be beneficial. Given that SVGRC is rather alone in the region in terms of dealing with the risk of a volcanic eruption, the impetus should be for SVGRC to continue to develop volcanic readiness capacity on its own as opposed to simply following the lead of other National Societies. This reflection should recognize that any future eruption will occur in very different circumstances. This will include the technological capabilities that the SVGRC will be able to call upon.

**Recommendation:** Establish a volcano readiness strategy that would involve the periodic testing of potential practices and tools that could enhance the ability to prepare and operate in the aftermath of a volcanic eruption. As volcanic eruptions are rare, the volcano readiness strategy should contribute to developing capabilities that can be used in other circumstances such as during the hurricane season. This should involve technological innovation with a particular interest in exploring different applications of drones from monitoring conditions, to transporting goods such as NFI into areas that are challenging to reach. The establishment of a volcano readiness strategy should have linkages with the youth recruitment strategy. As well, this should be done so important national partners such as NEMO can also learn and possibly modify national policies and practices.



## For SVGRC

5. This evaluation process recognized that the SVGRC did an effective job of maintaining effective communication channels with all stakeholders. Nevertheless, there was one area, volunteers from the orange and red zones who were displaced by the eruption felt they were left out of the information sharing loop after they had played an important role in ensuring people were evacuated. Given everything that was taking place during the La Soufrière response, it is not unexpected that something like this would occur. Nevertheless, given the constant improvements in the capabilities of communicating via means such as social media platforms, forgetting an important segment of the operation can be avoided.

**Recommendation:** Ensure that all volunteers remain up to date through communication tools during all stages of major events. While communication with volunteers in the orange and red zones was consistent and strategic leading up to the eruption, according to volunteers it ceased during the subsequent stages of the response. A plan should be established to avoid this happening again.

## For SVGRC

6. One of the more outstanding discoveries of this evaluation was that RC volunteers from the 1979 eruption were able to recall and share their experience and important lessons related to the need for a backup transportation plan and to prioritize the evacuation of the elderly and disabled people. Although circumstances had changed greatly, there were still important lessons to be drawn from 1979.

## For SVGRC

**Recommendation:** Given the important contribution that the memory of long-term volunteers involved in the 1979 volcanic eruption played in the Soufrière response, the National Society should document the experience of this response that could include for example, testimonies from volunteers, staff and beneficiaries to ensure that there is a point of reference for future responses to volcanic eruptions that would include lessons learned and other pertinent information. It could take the shape of a multimedia document.

## 9. Lessons Learned

- With limited resources, the SVGRC response to the eruption could have been much different. However, a great deal of planning and building of capacity ensured that the outcome was positive. This underlines the importance of long-term investment in the capacity of the National Society and maintaining relations with important national and international partners.

- The promotion of Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGI) in the context of the Soufrière eruption made a valuable contribution. However, it was not without its problems. There is a need to be more realistic about introducing what for national stakeholders is sensitive subject matter in the context of an emergency when a National Society may have limited capacity for new ideas.

- The advantages and value in deploying regional staff to assist the small National Societies was recognized by stakeholders. Having familiarity with a country's culture and the challenges shared across

Caribbean islands is clearly an advantage. Nevertheless, it must also be recognized that IFRC Delegates and members of the Surge Team from outside the region made important contributions including in the critical position of operation manager who was widely praised for his management ability and people skills. While experts from the region should be prioritized, all operations should be looking for the person who is the best fit for a given situation.

- For IFRC there is a lesson learned with the La Soufrière operation regarding the benefits of being less hands-on. Trying to find a way to implement the activities and manage the operation and not make mistakes is not a reasonable expectation. For the Bahamas Dorian operation, the international staff left early leaving it to the National Society to take over. It took longer but there was more learning. That lesson was largely applied to the experience with the Soufrière response.

- It is important to find a balance between assisting a National Society to become more professional and administratively and operationally capable while allowing it to continue to evolve respecting the characteristics of its staff and volunteers. However, there are matters that should not be overlooked especially when there is a risk of enabling long-term reputational damage.

## 10. Lessons Learned from the Stakeholder Workshop

On 2 June 2023, a group of 35 staff and National Society volunteers, many of whom were also displaced because of the eruption, gathered to examine their experience in the operation and to identify strengths and weaknesses of the eruption response and practical areas where improvements can be made. The overall results of the workshop can be found in Annex I. Some of the lessons learned that were highlighted by the workshop included using community groups to identify the most vulnerable in communities, consistently updating community plans and the list of the most vulnerable, improving communication to the public, all organizations working more closely with community groups like the National Society committees to better understand local circumstances, the importance of evacuees and volunteers having proper identification, the value of being able to improvise when delivering key activities/programming, and ensuring psychosocial supports are available to staff who were also impacted by the eruption of the volcano.

## ANNEX A. Final Work Plan

Activity	Date	End Date	Duration	Deliverables
<b>PHASE 1</b>				
Document Review/start up meetings	April 3	April 10		
Inception Report Submission	April 14	April 24		<input type="checkbox"/> Inception Evaluation Report
Interviews (completed remotely)	April 25	May 26		10 to 15 Interviews
Travel to SVG	May 27	May 29		

PHASE II- Draft Data Collection and Visit to the Field Schedule – 11 days						
Day	Date	Time	Activity	Location	Requirements	Notes
	Sunday May 28	TBD	Arrival of Consultant	Kingstown	Assistance with airport pickup and transportation to hotel	
1	Monday May 29	8:00 AM to 5:00 PM	Interviews and FGD with National Society volunteers and evacuees assisted through the emergency response	Sandy Bay area. Ovia, Fancy	Ground transportation	
2	Tuesday May 30	9:00 AM to 5:00 Pm	Interviews with National Society staff and volunteers	Kingstown	Transportation to and from national headquarters	
3	Wed May 31	8:00 AM to 5:00 PM	Interviews and FGD with National Society volunteers and evacuees assisted through emergency response	Wallibou, Richmond, Chateau Belair Rose Hall	Ground transportation	
	Thursday June 1st	9:00 AM to 5:00 PM	Interviews with NS staff and volunteers and national government stakeholders	Kingstown	Ground transportation	
5	Friday June 2nd	9:00 am to 4:00 PM	Lessons Learned Workshop with National Society Volunteers and Staff	National Headquarters	Transportation to and from national headquarters and meeting space and refreshments for 30 to 40 participants	
	Sunday June 4 <sup>th</sup>	PM	Departure for Canada		Ground transportation to airport	

Activity	Start Date	End Date	Duration	Deliverables
<b>PHASE III- Report Writing &amp; Follow up Activity</b>				
Writing of Draft Report	12 June 2023	23 June 2023	10 days	<input type="checkbox"/> Draft Evaluation Report <input type="checkbox"/> Final Evaluation Report <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation Dissemination Template
Draft Report Submission	26 June 2023			
Feedback on Draft Report			1 day	
Integration of Feedback			1 day	
Submission of Final Report	14 July 2023		1 day	

## ANNEX B. Evaluation Matrix

Relevance and Appropriateness	Tool Application	Additional Sources for triangulation
1.0 <i>To what extent has the response achieved the expected results, and relevant and appropriate to the needs of the target groups?</i>	KII, FGD, LL Workshop, Interview with IFRC focal points.	Document Review, Appeal documents and Updates, monitoring reports
1.1 Was the number of targeted people served estimated in line with capacities and resources available?	KII (government representatives, donors and partners, IFRC focal points, SVGRC staff)	Document review, appeal documents, internet research
1.2 How relevant was the operation to the needs identified and aligned with the mandate of Saint Vincent & the Grenadines Red Cross?	KII with IRFC focal points and SVGRC staff and FGD with beneficiaries	Document review, appeal documents,
1.3 Through the needs assessments, how were vulnerabilities and capacities of communities considered? To what extent was the response designed to consider the needs and vulnerabilities of the affected population & capacity of the SVGRCS?	KII (government representatives, FGD with beneficiaries and SVGRCS) LL Workshop	Document Review, Appeal documents and Updates,
1.4 How did the response adapt to changes in need, capacity, and context throughout the operation?	KII (government representatives, IFRC and SVGRC staff, SVGRCS) FGD with beneficiaries, LL Workshop	Document Review, Appeal documents and Updates,
1.5 To what extent did the operation consider the protection, gender and inclusion of persons targeted?	KII Operation stakeholders, FGD with female beneficiaries	Document Review, LL Workshop, data on beneficiary selection criteria and beneficiaries targeted and reached by activities
<b>Efficiency/Effectiveness</b>		
2.0 <i>To what extent has the response achieved its intended immediate results in an effective and efficient manner?</i>	KII and FGD, LL Workshop	Document Review/ Beneficiary Data/ reports
2.1 According to the intervention design, to what extent have results been achieved based on the indicators? How are differences between expected and actual results explained?	FGD- KII LL Workshop	Document Review (monitoring reports and reports to donors)
2.2 To what extent were interventions integrated across the different operation sectors?	KII LL Workshop	Consultation with Sector Delegates
2.3 How effective were the contributions of regional/global assets (Regional Intervention Teams, Emergency Response Units, Surge, etc.) in this response?	FGD, KII,	Document Review- indicators/targets/actuals LL Workshop

2.4 How efficient was the cooperation and coordination between IFRC with SVGRCS and external partners? What could have been improved?	KII IFRC and SVGRC staff and external partners	Document review (donor reports correspondence with donors)
2.5 Were there Community Engagement and Accountability mechanisms in place? How effective were these?	FGD and KII (government and community leaders, operation staff)	Document review
<b>Sustainability</b>		
<b>3. To what extent have the interventions taken long-term needs into consideration?</b>	LL Workshop KII Government Staff	KII- Community Leaders
3.1 To what extent did the operation build on local capacities and structures inclusively? How did the operation build on community level and government capacities differently if at all?	KII community leaders and government representatives	FGD beneficiaries
3.2 To what extent did the past work of the IFRC with the SVGRCS help to support the operation? How applicable was this experience given the particular circumstances created by the eruption?	KII with IFRC and SVGRCS	Document review
3.3 How did interventions build on/strengthen/preserve existing structures and systems in place prior to the eruption?	KII Government representatives and SVGRCS	KII IFRC staff
3.4 How has the response resulted in enhanced institutional capacity of the National Society?	KII SVGRCS	KII IFRC staff
3.5 How has the exit strategy been planned, and how does it ensure transfer of assets and technical know-how to the National Society/target population?	KII (SVGRCS and government representatives)	FGD beneficiaries
<b>Shelter</b>		
4.1 How did the selected shelter interventions continue to meet the evolving needs of those affected throughout the operation?	KII (government representatives, SVGRCS, IFRC) FGD beneficiaries	Document Review (monitoring and progress reports and reports to donors)
4.2 Were the emergency items/household items delivered appropriate to the context?	KII (government representatives, SVGRCS, IFRC) FGD beneficiaries	Document Review (monitoring reports and reports to donors)
4.3 To what extent was delivery of the following effective and timely? a) Emergency and Household items b) Rental assistance c) Home Repairs	FGD beneficiaries	KII (government representatives, NS staff and volunteers, IFRC)
4.4 Was the technical decision regarding shelter activities	KII (government	Document Review

suitable for the given situation, taking into consideration the use of local and imported resources?	representatives, SVGRCS, IFRC)	(monitoring and progress reports and reports to donors)
<b>Cash Voucher Assistance</b>		
5.1 How proportionate was the number of target beneficiaries for CVA in line with the capacities and resources available, given the needs and gaps identified? How geographically proportional was this to the needs of the target groups?	KII (Government representatives, WFP, IFRC and national staff)	Document review
5.2 How did assistance provided recognize and prioritize highly vulnerable groups in terms of gender, age, disability, socio-economic standing, or other conditions of vulnerability?	KII Government representatives, WFP, IFRC and national staff, FGD beneficiaries	Document review
5.3 How efficient were the different models of CVA used throughout the operation and what were the positive & negative benefits of each (IFRC VISA, Bank of SVG cheques, Supermarket vouchers)?	KII Government representatives, WFP, IFRC and national staff, FGD beneficiaries	Document review
5.4 How effective was coordination with other partners regarding allocation of CVA in terms of coverage and targeting specific needs such as larger sized families?	KII Government representatives, WFP, IFRC and national staff	Document review
5.5 Were the target groups identified in a timely manner and included in the needs assessments for the design of the CVA interventions? And how robust was the process of verification of identified people (focus on VISA card & Cheque disbursements)?	KII Government representatives, WFP, IFRC and national staff	Document review KII community leaders
5.6 How were the different dimensions of addressing basic needs, emergency food needs and livelihoods protection under the CVA component coordinated? How effective was it?	KII Government representatives, WFP, IFRC and national staff	Document review
5.7 How were capacities transferred to local counterparts to ensure local leadership roles as CVA implementing partners in possible future operations?	KII Government representatives, IFRC and national staff	Document review, KII community leaders.
<b>Livelihoods (early recovery programme)</b>		
6.1 How proportionate was the number of target beneficiaries for Livelihoods in line with the capacities and resources available, given the needs and gaps identified?	KII government representatives, operation staff, community leaders and	Document review (progress reports, donor reports)
6.2 <i>Were the target groups identified in a timely manner and included in the needs assessments for the design of the Livelihoods interventions?</i>	FGD beneficiaries, KII government representatives and community leaders, IFRC and national staff	Document review (progress reports, donor reports)
6.3 <i>Specific to livelihoods recovery programming:</i> <i>a) Was the objective appropriate to the needs and preferences of the target population and capacity of the National Society?</i> <i>b) Were the modality and delivery mechanism appropriate to</i>	FGD SVGRCS, KII (SVGRC leadership, IFRC staff)	Document review (correspondence, operation progress reports)

<p><i>the needs and preferences of the target population and capacity of the National Society?</i></p> <p><i>c) What were the major impacts of the assistance provided?</i></p> <p><i>d) How will the livelihoods recovery activities help persons be better prepared, and more able to respond and recover from future disasters and/or continue to thrive?</i></p> <p><i>e) How strong is the evidence that targeted beneficiaries have adapted practices introduced by the operation into their Livelihood activities?</i></p>		
<p><i>6.4) How were capacities transferred to local counterparts to ensure local leadership roles as Livelihoods Recovery Programme implementing partners in possible future operations?</i></p>	<p>KII local community leaders, NS, IFRC and FGD beneficiaries</p>	<p>Government representatives</p>

ANNEX C. Information Summary Table (Example)

<p><b>Information Summary: Livelihoods (agriculture, fishers, shopkeeping etc.,)</b></p> <p><b>Description and details:</b> The information contained below is largely drawn from Focus Groups Discussions with beneficiaries and contribution from Key Informant interviews related to the issue of the support provided on matters related to livelihoods. Information on topics such as shelters, and CVA support will be aggregated in information summary tables covering those topics. A concluding section is available for findings and if applicable, recommendations.</p>
<p><b>Relevance and Appropriateness</b></p>
<p>1. Relevance and Appropriateness: <i>To what extent has the response achieved the expected results, and relevant and appropriate to the needs of the target groups?</i></p>
<p>1.1 Was the number of targeted people served estimated in line with capacities and resources available?</p>
<p>1.2 How relevant was the operation to the needs identified and aligned with the mandate of Saint Vincent &amp; the Grenadines Red Cross?</p>
<p>1.3 Through the needs assessments, how were vulnerabilities and capacities of communities considered? To what extent was the response designed to consider the needs and vulnerabilities of the affected population &amp; capacity of the SVGRCS?</p>
<p>1.4 How did the response adapt to changes in need, capacity, and context throughout the operation?</p>
<p>1-5 To what extent did the operation consider the protection, gender and inclusion of persons targeted?</p>



<b>Effectiveness and Efficiency</b>
<b>2. Effectiveness and Efficiency:</b> To what extent has the response achieved its intended immediate results in an effective and efficient manner?
<b>2.1</b> According to the intervention design, to what extent have results been achieved based on the indicators? How are differences between expected and actual results explained?
<b>2.2</b> To what extent were interventions integrated across the different operation sectors?
<b>2.3:</b> How effective were the contributions of regional/global assets (Regional Intervention Teams, Emergency Response Units, Surge, etc.) in this response?
<b>2.4</b> How efficient was the cooperation and coordination between IFRC with SVGRCS and external partners? What could have been improved?
<b>2.5</b> <i>Were there Community Engagement and Accountability mechanisms in place? How effective were these?</i>
<b>Sustainability</b>
<b>3. Sustainability:</b> <i>To what extent have the interventions taken long-term needs into consideration?</i>
<b>3.1</b> To what extent did the operation build on local capacities and structures inclusively? How did the operation build on community level and government capacities differently if at all?
<b>3.2</b> To what extent did the past work of the IFRC with the SVGRCS help to support the operation? How applicable was this experience given the particular circumstances created by the eruption?

<b>3.3 How did interventions build on/strengthen/preserve existing structures and systems in place prior to the eruption?</b>
<b>3.4 How has the response resulted in enhanced institutional capacity of the National Society?</b>
<b>3.5 How has the exit strategy been planned, and how does it ensure transfer of assets and technical know-how to the National Society/target population?</b>
<b>Shelter</b>
<b>4.1 How did the selected shelter interventions continue to meet the evolving needs of those affected throughout the operation?</b>
<b>4.2 Were the emergency items/household items delivered appropriate to the context?</b>
<b>4.3 To what extent was delivery of the following effective and timely?</b> a) Emergency and Household items b) Rental assistance c) Home Repairs
<b>4.4 Was the technical decision regarding shelter activities suitable for the given situation, taking into consideration the use of local and imported resources?</b>
<b>Cash Voucher Assistance</b>
<b>5.1 How proportionate was the number of target beneficiaries for CVA in line with the capacities and resources available, given the needs and gaps identified? How geographically proportional was this to the needs of the target groups?</b>
<b>5.2 How did assistance provided recognize and prioritize highly vulnerable groups in terms of</b>

<b>gender, age, disability, socio-economic standing, or other conditions of vulnerability?</b>
<b>5.3 How efficient were the different models of CVA used throughout the operation and what where the positive &amp; negative benefits of each (IFRC VISA, Bank of SVG cheques, Supermarket vouchers)?</b>
<b>5.4 How effective was coordination with other partners regarding allocation of CVA in terms of coverage and targeting specific needs such as larger sized families?</b>
<b>5.5 Were the target groups identified in a timely manner and included in the needs assessments for the design of the CVA interventions? And how robust was the process of verification of identified people (focus on VISA card &amp; Cheque disbursements)?</b>
<b>5.6 How were the different dimensions of addressing basic needs, emergency food needs and livelihoods protection under the CVA component coordinated? How effective was it?</b>
<b>5.7 How were capacities transferred to local counterparts to ensure local leadership roles as CVA implementing partners in possible future operations?</b>
<b>Livelihoods</b>
<b>6.1 How proportionate was the number of target beneficiaries for Livelihoods in line with the capacities and resources available, given the needs and gaps identified?</b>
<b>6.2 Were the target groups identified in a timely manner and included in the needs assessments for the design of the Livelihoods interventions?</b>
<b>6.3 Specific to livelihoods recovery programming:</b>
<b>a) Was the objective appropriate to the needs and preferences of the target population and capacity of the National Society?</b>
<b>b) Were the modality and delivery mechanism appropriate to the needs and preferences of the</b>

<p><b>target population and capacity of the National Society?</b></p> <p><b>c) What were the major impacts of the assistance provided?</b></p> <p><b>d)How will the livelihoods recovery activities help persons be better prepared, and more able to respond and recover from future disasters and/ or continue to thrive?</b></p> <p><b>e) How strong is the evidence that targeted beneficiaries have adapted practices introduced by the operation into their Livelihood activities?</b></p>
<p><b>6.4) How were capacities transferred to local counterparts to ensure local leadership roles as Livelihoods Recovery Programme implementing partners in possible future operations?</b></p>
<p><b>Conclusions, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations</b></p>

## ANNEX D. Livelihoods Guide: Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

Note: This guideline is intended to facilitate Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Key Informant interviews that are largely focussed on livelihoods. Some questions are meant for stakeholders at an institutional, operational or broader community level. In addition, the guide is to be used with FGD with beneficiaries largely focussed on livelihood activity. As beneficiaries may have also benefitted from other supports such as those related to shelter provided through the operation, the guideline has made allowances for this.

Introduction: If we could take a moment to introduce ourselves and describe our respective involvement in the Red Cross volcanic eruption response operation. Beneficiaries, please describe the different services that the operation has provided to you such as shelter and/or livelihood supports. It is important to ensure that FGD participants clearly identify CVA, livelihoods, shelter or gender and PGI related support that is associated with the operation and not another project such as the WFP's response and recovery activities.

### **For Institutional and operational Stakeholders**

1. How proportionate was the number of target beneficiaries for Livelihoods in line with the capacities and resources available, given the needs and gaps identified?

### **For Beneficiaries**

2. Please describe in greater detail the benefits you received from the Red Cross operation

### **For Beneficiaries and other Stakeholders (question to be rephrased for direct beneficiaries)**

3. Were the target groups identified in a timely manner and included in the needs assessments for the design of the Livelihoods interventions?

### **For Beneficiaries and other Stakeholders (question to be rephrased for direct beneficiaries)**

4. Was the objective appropriate to the needs and preferences of the target population and capacity of the National Society?

### **For Institutional and operational Stakeholders in particular National Society Stakeholders**

5. Were the modality and delivery mechanism appropriate to the needs and preferences of the target population and capacity of the National Society?

### **Beneficiaries**

6. What were the major impacts of the livelihood assistance provided to you? Where could improvements have been made?

### **Other Stakeholders**

7. From an overall perspective, what do you see as the major impacts of livelihood activities? Where could improvements have been made?

### **Beneficiaries and other Stakeholders**

8 How will the livelihoods recovery activities help you be better prepared, and more able to respond and recover from future disasters and/ or continue to thrive?

**Beneficiaries and other Stakeholders**

9) How strong is the evidence that targeted beneficiaries have adapted practices introduced by the operation into their Livelihood activities?

**Beneficiaries and other Stakeholders**

10) How were capacities transferred to local counterparts to ensure local leadership roles as Livelihoods Recovery Programme implementing partners in possible future operations?

**Beneficiaries and other Stakeholders**

11) How has the operation sought to involve women livelihood activities and what have been some of the key objectives and challenges in this regard?

**Beneficiaries only Questions**

**Shelter**

12) How did the selected shelter interventions continue to meet your evolving needs throughout the different stages that you were provided support?

13) Were the emergency items/household items appropriate to your circumstances? Please elaborate.

14) To what extent was delivery of the following to you effective and timely?

a) Emergency and Household items

b) Rental assistance

c) Home Repairs

15) How did assistance provided recognize and prioritize highly vulnerable groups in terms of gender, age, disability, socio-economic standing, or other conditions of vulnerability? In other words, where the most vulnerable assisted?

**CVA**

16) How were you identified for CVA? Was it done in a timely manner and included a needs assessment? And how robust was the process of verification (focus on VISA card & Cheque disbursements)?

17) How were the other dimensions other than livelihoods such as addressing basic needs, emergency food needs under the CVA component coordinated with Livelihood support you were provided? How effective was it?

18) Do you have any else you would like to share at this time?

Thank you for your time and participation.

## ANNEX E. Remote Stakeholder Interviews

Completed 15 May to 26 May 2023

Name	Title	E-mail and Confirmed Interview time
Rhea Marie Pierre	Technical Lead Evolving Crises and Disasters	<a href="mailto:rhea.pierre@ifrc.org">rhea.pierre@ifrc.org</a> May 15, 2:00 pm
Maria Teresa Sebastian Moncho	Protection Gender and Inclusion (PGI)	<a href="mailto:mtsebastian-moncho@icali.es">mtsebastian-moncho@icali.es</a> Wednesday May 17, 8:00 am
James Bellamy	Former Operation Manager	<a href="mailto:james.bellamy@ifrc.org">james.bellamy@ifrc.org</a> Monday, May 15 8:00 am
Stacy Ann Gavin	PMER Officer (Former)	<a href="mailto:stacyanngavin@gmail.com">stacyanngavin@gmail.com</a>
Horace Glaze	Disaster Management Coordinator	
Abdul Nasir Khan	Former Operations Manager/Appeal Manager	<a href="#">Contacted not interviewed</a>
Bernard Morgan	Former President	<a href="#">Contacted not interviewed</a>
Maria Martha Tuna	Regional Manager, Operations, Evolving Crises and Disasters	<a href="#">Contacted not interviewed</a>
Mario Medina	Consultant Livelihoods and Basic Needs	Contacted not interviewed
Daniela Funez	Coordinator, Cash and Voucher Assistance	Contacted not interviewed
Denisse Solis	Former Regional Shelter focal point	Contacted not interviewed
Sherise Gomez	Finance officer	Contacted not interviewed
Rudy Magirena	Former Operations Manager	<a href="mailto:Rodolfo.Magirena@redcross.ca">Rodolfo.Magirena@redcross.ca</a> Provided answers to questionnaire and follow up questions
Dante Moses	CVA Delegate	<a href="mailto:dcrmoses@gmail.com">dcrmoses@gmail.com</a> Wednesday May 17, 9:30 am
Joel Cachera	WASH Delegate	Contacted not interviewed
Angela Philips	CEA Coordinator	<a href="mailto:alhill.photos@gmail.com">alhill.photos@gmail.com</a> May 19 9:00 am
Maria Catalan	Livelihoods & basic needs Coordinator	Contacted not interviewed
Nikola Latinovic	Cash and Voucher Assistance	<a href="mailto:Nikola.Latinovic@redcross.ca">Nikola.Latinovic@redcross.ca</a> Friday May 19, 1:00 pm

## Interviews completed After Field Visit

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Dora James	Director General	SVGRCS
Vernon Alston Anderson	President	SVGRCS
Rita Alexander- Franklyn	PMER Officer	SVGRCS
Moesha Thomas	Former Livelihoods Specialist	SVGRCS
Julia Simmons	Operations Manager	SVGRCS
Joselle Sutherland	Finance Officer	SVGRCS
Jarwayne Laidlaw	Vice President and past Volunteer coordinator	SVGRCS
Una Sayers	Youth and Volunteer Manager	SVGRCS
Kathy Badenock	Communications Director and former Volunteer coordinator	SVGRCS
Arn Edwards	District Supervisor for Kingstown Area	SVG Central Water and Sewerage Authority
Mr. Myccle Burke	Permanent Secretary	SVG Ministry of Education
Josie Anne Small	Assistant Secretary	SVG Ministry of Education
Hon. Saboto Scofield Caesar	Minister of Agriculture	SVG Ministry of Agriculture
Michelle Forbes	Director	SVG National Emergency Management Organisation
James Bellamy	Former International Operation Managers	IFRC
Adrián Martínez Ferrandis	Livelihoods Delegate	IFRC
John Kimbrough	Regional Advisor Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)



## ANNEX F. Terms of Reference

### International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

# TERMS OF REFERENCE

## Final Evaluation St Vincent & the Grenadines Red Cross Society's (MDRVC005)

### 1. Summary

- 1.1 Purpose:** This final evaluation will assess the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and St Vincent & the Grenadines Red Cross Society's (SVGRC) response to the initial La Soufriere eruption on 9 April 2021 through to 30 November 2022. Its purpose is to assess the achievements and quality of the programmes and services delivered to the affected population targeted by the Emergency Plan of Action. It is expected that the final outcome will provide specific lessons that can be clearly identified from the response operation and, more importantly can be considered both valuable & transferable for the IFRC and SVGRCS to use when implementing and/or supporting similar response operations in the future.
- 1.2 Operation:** MDRVC005
- 1.3 Participants:** Saint Vincent & the Grenadines Red Cross, volunteers, beneficiaries, CDEMA, PIRAC, IFRC and key government stakeholders.
- 1.4 Audience:** Findings of this final evaluation will primarily be used by the SVG Red Cross, IFRC and other key stakeholders as determined by IFRC & SVGRCS leadership.
- 1.5 Review team:** An independent evaluation consultant will be supported by an IFRC staff both at the Country Cluster Delegation and Regional Office who comprise the evaluation management team.
- 1.6 Commissioner of the evaluation:** Regional Deputy Director, IFRC.
- 1.7 Duration of consultancy:** 25 working days.
- 1.8 Estimated period of consultancy:** February 15 to April 5, 2023.
- 1.9 Location of consultancy:** Virtual meetings using online platforms; Field visit to St Vincent & the Grenadines (main island of St Vincent only) to meet with key stakeholders, partners, Government agencies etc. and with visits to the leeward & windward side of the island, plus specific locations in Kingstown and the surrounding parishes.

### 2. Background and context

#### Summary:

Since 29 December 2020, the La Soufrière volcano alert level in St. Vincent and the Grenadines was elevated due to increased volcanic activity. By 8 April 2021, the alert level increased to Red, with government authorities issuing immediate evacuation orders. On 9 April 2021, La Soufrière erupted for the first time in 40 years, sending an ash plume up to 10km into the sky. Subsequent multiple eruptions occurred, with several severe tropical storms and rain events which hampered the initial clean-up operations and slowed down the recovery phase of the operation. While heavy ashfall did initially impact the surrounding islands, it not however continue and the surrounding islands of Barbados, Grenada and St Lucia avoided having significant damage or evacuation notices.

At its peak, the eruption displaced more than 22,000 persons (7300 families) who were dispersed among public and private collective centres, host families and private rental arrangements. Almost all of St. Vincent's 110,600 population were indirectly affected by ashfall, water restrictions, loss of income, and house rental shortages.

The red and orange zones were designated as being safe for people to return in September 2021 by the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO). Upon this decision being confirmed, the Red Cross was able to work with the Ministry of National Mobilisation (and Education), supporting families with rental support so that they could move out of the collective shelters and into dignified shelter options through the rental support project. Through this program and through close collaboration with the Ministries listed above, the closure of collective shelters could be strategically coordinated, allowing those located within schools to be prioritised and handed back to the MoE for use as a school (2021).

Despite the significant amount of work that was completed, a number of families continue to live with host families, or in transitional arrangements while they work to repair or rebuild their homes damaged by the eruption. Furthermore, it is important to understand that the COVID 19 pandemic provided additional challenges for the implantation of all activities throughout the response with a particular challenge to gather community groups for the livelihood programme carried out as part of the recovery phase of the response.

**Target population:**

1,800/5,400 people

**Areas of Intervention:**

- Emergency shelter response and the provision of essential household items
- Multipurpose Cash Grants (VISA card)
- Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion (WASH)
- Health & PSS
- Protection, Gender & Inclusion
- National Society Development

**Overview of Red Cross Red Crescent Movement Actions in country**

The Americas Regional Office (ARO) supports the Port of Spain Country Cluster Delegation (POS CCD) and other regional Movement partners. Through these offices the IFRC has continued working closely

with SVGRC to implement and monitor activities under the La Soufriere operation. An operations manager from the IFRC POS Delegation remained towards the end of the operation to support the SVGRC in implementing the remaining activities and to build capacities within the current structure. This has included the development of an exit strategy for the National Society to specifically address issues faced during the appeal closing, providing a clear path that involves reducing staff as required, and providing trainings for staff that will remain as the core structure. Further work with the leadership to develop a strategy of financial sustainability, while also identifying the core minimum team that the National Society would like is being developed in close collaboration with the NSD team out of the Delegation in Trinidad.

Additionally, the Canadian Red Cross and the Government of Canada have been working with the SVGRC for the past several years on the Community Resilience Building Caribbean (CRB) project. This project targeted several different communities and officially ended on 31 March 2022.

## Implementation progress

### 1. Overview of Emergency & Recovery Response (April 2021 – November 2022)

The St. Vincent and the Grenadines Red Cross Society (SVGRCS) worked closely with the national authorities supporting families to evacuate from the red and orange zones and was able to provide food parcels and other in-kind donations received through bilateral donations and partnerships during the immediate aftermath of the La Soufriere eruption.

The IFRC and SVGRC worked together to make sure that the Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) was designed to support the operation to transition through the different phases; from the emergency response, through to recovery phase and the eventual exit and closure of the operation in 2022.

The strategy, EPoA and operation updates were led by SVGRCS (with support from IFRC), allowing for improved coordination with NEMO, Ministry of National Mobilization, and other relevant ministries & public utilities. Creating improved outcomes for impacted households by aligning activities were possible and creating secondary benefits for the impacted population. This has included some of the following successful actions:

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Target support to households and families living with host families, in non-government managed shelters and for vulnerable and elderly households that had been impacted by the evacuation orders. Allowing the government to focus on supporting Government managed shelters & the SVGRS to use its volunteer base to reach people living in widely dispersed area (including some of the Grenadine Islands). |
| 2. Support the creation and management of Child Friendly Spaces in 11 collective shelters (coordinated and partnered with the Gender Affairs unit & UNICEF).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 3. Support households with rental grants which helped close school based collective shelters & help the Ministry of Education to open the facilities back up as schools in 2021.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 4. Support schools to reopen after the La Soufriere closure, and linking the reopening with Covid awareness actions, and support through activities such as sanitizer units installed in classrooms and providing messaging around hygiene promotion & COVID transmission mitigation.                                                                                                                             |

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5. Link livelihood activities and first aid trainings and provide increased first aid capacities in the more remote communities and with fishers.                                                                                                                  |
| 6. Support SVGRCS to have the required HR structure in place at the outset of the emergency, allowing them to lead and learn throughout the operation, and where possible providing support in the form of trainings, policy development and longer-term planning. |

### 3. Evaluation purpose, scope, and methodology

The overall objective of the IFRC emergency operation was to provide **immediate life-saving and longer-term support for recovery to 1,800 households (5,400 people) affected by the La Soufriere eruption** focused in the areas of Shelter (including distribution of household items), Health & Psycho Social Support, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion; Livelihoods and Basic Needs through multi-purpose cash grants; Protection Gender and Inclusion; Disaster Risk Reduction; and National Society capacity strengthening.

#### 3.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Final Evaluation is to determine the overall effectiveness of the operation, its relevance to the needs of the affected population and to determine any lessons learned and recommendations which could be applied to future emergency operations within the region.

Several assessments and surveys have been carried out throughout the operation such as needs assessment reports, and post-distribution monitoring surveys. A list of related evaluation and survey reports will be made available to the consultant.

#### 3.2 Scope

The Final Evaluation will address the following issues:

- vii) the **relevance and appropriateness** of the humanitarian assistance delivered to people affected based on needs and context.
- viii) the **efficiency and effectiveness** of the IFRC and National Society response.
- ix) the **coverage** in terms of which population groups were included in or excluded from the intervention. This will include the selection process and the extent to which the response considered and addressed the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly children, pregnant women, elderly people, and people with disabilities.
- x) the **efficiency** of the coordination mechanisms implemented.
- xi) Sustained benefits from the Operation at the National Society and Community levels.
- xii) Environmental considerations related to the operation.

The final evaluation will consider all decisive factors during the operation (i.e., what went well and what did not go well with recommendations for improvement) taking into consideration the context and capacities of the National Society and other Movement components.

**This Final Evaluation will also consider the operation in a “Compounded Disaster” setting** as at the time of the Emergency there was also the Covid 19- Global Pandemic and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was also affected by Dengue Fever.

The Evaluation should also consider lessons learnt from previous operations in the region and whether these were applied to the operation.

The timeline to be evaluated in terms of this emergency response is 21 months, from the beginning of the operation (April 2021) through the completion of most interventions (December 2022).

### **3.3 Key Evaluation Questions**

Below are suggestions for key questions to be addressed in this final evaluation. These suggested questions provide initial guidance and can be further elaborated by the Evaluation Management team and clarified by the consultancy team. The evaluation should follow the DAC criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability

#### **1. To what extent has the response achieved the expected results, and relevant and appropriate to the needs of the target groups?**

- i. Was the number of targeted people served estimated in line with capacities and resources available?
- ii. How relevant was the operation to the needs identified and aligned with the mandate of Saint Vincent & the Grenadines Red Cross?
- iii. Through the needs assessments, how were vulnerabilities and capacities of communities considered? To what extent was the response designed to consider the needs and vulnerabilities of the affected population & capacity of the SVGRCS?
- iv. How did the response adapt to changes in need, capacity, and context throughout the operation?
- v. To what extent did the operation consider the protection, gender and inclusion of persons targeted?

#### **2. To what extent has the response achieved its intended immediate results in an effective and efficient manner?**

- i. According to the intervention design, to what extent have results been achieved based on the indicators?
- ii. To what extent were interventions integrated across the different operation sectors?
- iii. How effective were the contributions of regional/global assets (Regional Intervention Teams, Emergency Response Units, Surge, etc.) in this response?
- iv. How efficient was the cooperation and coordination between IFRC with SVGRCS and external partners?
- v. Were there Community Engagement and Accountability mechanisms in place? How effective were these?

#### **3. To what extent have the interventions taken long-term needs into consideration?**

- i. To what extent did the operation build on local capacities and structures inclusively?
- ii. To what extent did the past work of the IFRC with the SVGRC help to support the operation?
- iii. How did interventions build on/strengthen/preserve existing structures and systems in place prior to the eruption?
- iv. How has the response resulted in enhanced institutional capacity of the National Society?
- v. How has the exit strategy been planned, and how does it ensure transfer of assets and technical know-how to the National Society/target population?

#### **4. Other Evaluation Questions**

##### Shelter

- i. How did the selected shelter interventions continue to meet the evolving needs of those affected throughout the operation?
- ii. Were the emergency items/household items delivered appropriate to the context?
- iii. To what extent was delivery of the following effective and timely?
  - a) Emergency and Household items
  - b) Rental assistance
  - c) Home Repairs
- iv. Was the technical decision regarding shelter activities suitable for the given situation, taking into consideration the use of local and imported resources?

##### Cash Voucher Assistance (CVA)

- i. How proportionate was the number of target beneficiaries for CVA in line with the capacities and resources available, given the needs and gaps identified? How geographically proportional was this to the needs of the target groups?
- ii. How did assistance provided recognize and prioritize highly vulnerable groups in terms of gender, age, disability, socio-economic standing, or other conditions of vulnerability?
- iii. How efficient were the different models of CVA used throughout the operation and what were the positive & negative benefits of each (IFRC VISA, Bank of SVG cheques, Supermarket vouchers)
- iv. Were the target groups identified in a timely manner and included in the needs assessments for the design of the CVA interventions? And how robust was the process of verification of identified people (focus on VISA card & Cheque disbursements)?
- v. How were the different dimensions of addressing basic needs, emergency food needs and livelihoods protection under the CVA component coordinated? How effective was it?
- vi. How were capacities transferred to local counterparts to ensure local leadership roles as CVA implementing partners in possible future operations?

##### Livelihoods (*early recovery program*)

- i. How proportionate was the number of target beneficiaries for Livelihoods in line with the capacities and resources available, given the needs and gaps identified?
- ii. Were the target groups identified in a timely manner and included in the needs assessments for the design of the Livelihoods interventions?

- iii. Specific to livelihoods recovery programming:
  - a) Was the objective appropriate to the needs and preferences of the target population and capacity of the National Society?
  - b) Were the modality and delivery mechanism appropriate to the needs and preferences of the target population and capacity of the National Society?
  - c) What were the major impacts of the assistance provided?
  - d) How will the livelihoods recovery activities help persons be better prepared, and more able to respond and recover from future disasters and/ or continue to thrive?
- iv. How were capacities transferred to local counterparts to ensure local leadership roles as Livelihoods Recovery Programme implementing partners in possible future operations?

### 3.4 Methodology and processes

The methodology applied in this evaluation will adhere to the [IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#)<sup>40</sup>, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

An **IFRC evaluation management team** will manage and oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensuring that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of three people including the Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation Senior Officer from the IFRC Americas Regional Officer, the Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Officer from the Port of Spain Country Cluster Delegation (POSCCD) and the Disaster Coordinator from the Operations Team of the POSCCD.

The **evaluation consultant** will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience in evaluations, and be the primary author of the evaluation report. The consultant will not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence, ethics, and integrity for this evaluation. The evaluation consultants will report on progress or challenges to the evaluation management team.

The specific **evaluation methodology** will be proposed by the consultant in close consultation with the Evaluation Management Team, but can draw upon the following primary methods:

1. **Desk review** of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, and any relevant sources of secondary data, such as findings from previous surveys and evaluations.

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<sup>40</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>

2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites in Saint Vincent & the Grenadines.
3. **Key informant interviews:** community members, RCRC Movement, Government agencies, institutional and private sector as appropriate.
4. **Focus group discussions** (beneficiaries, RCRC Movement, institutional and private sector) to inform recommendations and collect lessons learned from the operations.
5. **Conduct a participatory Lessons Learned workshop** with key personnel from the National Society.
6. **Virtual presentation of findings** to IFRC and SVGRC personnel.

The Evaluation consultant is encouraged to use creative and cost-effective methods for obtaining information on outcomes and lessons learned from the operation.

The evaluation consultant will meet with, and interview persons served under this emergency operation as well as key Red Cross Red Crescent stakeholders in-country, partner National Societies, and relevant IFRC Secretariat offices. The team will also consult with other partners and organizations such as government, UN agencies, INGOs/NGOs, private sector, etc. as appropriate according to the evaluation's objectives.

Initial findings will be shared with IFRC for review prior to further sharing with key stakeholders and partners where appropriate.

## 4. Consultant outputs and timeframe

### 4.1 Evaluation Deliverables

- **Inception report:** Following an Inception meeting the consultant will be able to provide feedback and amend interview questions for clarity and suitability. This will be done in coordination with the IFRC Evaluation Management Team. The inception report will reflect the agreed methodology and data collection tools, sample size and a detailed workplan for the survey and report, with allocation of clear roles and responsibilities within the team, firm deadlines for deliverables and the travel/logistical arrangements for the team. It will be presented to IFRC Evaluation Management Team at the beginning of the consultancy.
- **Virtual session** to present the initial findings of the evaluation and receive input and feedback. This will inform drafting of the report. The workshop should include IFRC, BRCS and other key stakeholders.
- **Draft report:** A draft report identifying key findings, conclusions, and recommendations will be submitted by the consultancy team within two weeks of the team's return from the field visit. This report will be sent to IFRC focal points for feedback and comments.
- **Final report:** The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 500 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 5,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, and clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed, the data collection tools used, and any other relevant materials. The final evaluation report will be submitted five days after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.



The final report will be submitted for final approval to:

- International Federation of the Red Cross – Head of Country Cluster Delegation.

All products from this final evaluation survey and report are owned by IFRC. The consultancy firm is not allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as their own work or to make use of the survey results for private publication purposes.

#### **4.2 Consultancy Timeframe**

The proposed timeframe for this evaluation is a maximum of 25 working days, which includes an estimated days in-country. The consultant will submit a proposed timeline in the Inception Report and a draft timeline for field visit.

The review process for the draft report should take place within two weeks of submitting the draft report to the evaluation management team (EMT), and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

- Draft report review:
  - a. EMT to check content is in line with this TOR and IFRC evaluation standards.
  - b. Stakeholders who participated in the evaluation to provide feedback on any inaccuracies or clarifications (differences of opinion should not be put forward here but outlined in the management response).
  - c. Following this, the evaluation consultants will prepare a final draft according to agreed deadlines.
- Week 2 post review:
  - a. EMT to review the report and compile a management response to be included as an appendix to the final published evaluation report.

**The Consultancy will be paid as follows:**

- 40% with the presentation of the inception report
- 60% with the Approval of the Final Report.

\*This payment schedule is subject to modification after inception meeting to a schedule mutually agreed upon by both the consultant and the IFRC.

### **5. Evaluation Quality and Ethical Standards**

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation consultants should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost-effective manner.
3. **Ethics and Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality and Independence;** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that considers the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technically accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at: [www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp).

## **6. Requirements**

### **Education**

- Minimum qualification of a master's degree or equivalent combination of education and relevant work experience

### **Experience**

- Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programs responding to major disasters
- A minimum of 7 years of experience in monitoring and evaluation of projects
- Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders
- Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner
- Experience in qualitative data collection and data analysis techniques, especially in emergency operations
- Knowledge and experience working with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and knowledge of the IFRC's disaster management systems

### **Knowledge, skills and languages**

- High capacity to organize and fulfill on time deadlines Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a team
- Knowledge of the LAC region and previous experience in the Caribbean.
- Immediate availability for the period indicated
- Technical knowledge about Shelter (supports by previous working experience and/or trainings) will be an asset
- Excellent English writing and presentation skills in English

### **Competencies and values**

- **Values:** Respect for diversity; Integrity; Professionalism; Accountability
- **Core Competencies:** Communication; Collaboration and Teamwork; Judgment and Decision Making; National Society and Customer Relations; Creativity and Innovation; Building Trust
- **Functional Competencies:** Strategic Orientation; Building Alliances; Leadership; Empowering others.

#### **Comments**

Interested candidates should submit their application material by January 10, 2023, to Officer, Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting, POS CCD at email: saara.ali-browne@ifrc.org. Application material is non-returnable, and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process.

Application materials should include:

1. **Curriculum Vitae (CV)**
2. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing the experience of the consultant(s) proposed as it pertains to this evaluation, daily rate, and three professional references.
3. Short methodological proposal to address in this evaluation. Please include data collection method, data analysis method, among others.
4. At least two examples of an evaluation report most similar to that described in this TOR.

#### **Notes**

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- The consultant will be contracted by the IFRC, and the standard contractual terms will apply.
- Consultant to provide proposed travel costs and details as part of the submission. Final travel arrangement will be negotiated prior to contract signing.
- Consultant to provide details of what availability they have to travel to St Vincent & the Grenadines for a minimum period of 6 consecutive days between February and March of 2023.

## ANNEX G Bibliography

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IFRC & SVGRCS (2021) La Soufrière Eruption Response. Post Distribution Monitoring Report: Relief. La Soufriere Eruption Response. Appeal number: MDRVC005.

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Thomas, Moesha (2022) IFRC & SVGRCS Livelihoods Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) Report. La Soufrière Volcanic eruption. Appeal Number: MDRVC005. Date of Assessment: 05.05.22 – 19.05.22

Martinez- Ferrandis, A & Thomas, M (2021) Livelihoods Needs Assessment Report. Emergency: La Soufrière Volcanic eruption. Appeal number: MDRVC005. Date of Assessment: 23.09.21 – 21.10.21

SVGRCS (2021) Community feedback database - for managers or identified feedback focal points. La Soufrière Volcanic eruption. Appeal number: MDRVC005.

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USAID (2022) USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance Biannual and Final Reporting for Public International Organizations: IFRC Name and USAID Award Number: M2106025/720BHA21IO00132. St Vincent & the Grenadines Reporting Period: 05/2021 – 03/2022

## ANNEX H. Acronyms

ARO	Americas Regional Office
BRCS	Barbados Red Cross Society
CCD	Country Cluster Delegation
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CDRTs	Community Disaster Response Teams
CFS	Child Friendly Space
CRB	Community Resilience Building Caribbean project
CVA	Cash Voucher Assistance
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
EMT	IFRC Evaluation Management Team
EPoA	Emergency Plan of Action
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GRCS	Grenada Red Cross Society
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
KII	Key Informant Interviews
MoNM	Ministry of National Mobilisation, Social Development, Local Government, Gender Affairs, Family Affairs, Housing and Informal Settlement
NEMO	Ministry of Social Development, National Emergency Management Agency
NFI	Non-Food Items
NSD	National Society Development
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PED	Planning and Evaluation Department
PGI	Protection, Gender & Inclusion

PIRAC Regional Intervention Platform for the Americas and the Caribbean

POS Port of Spain

POSCCD Port of Spain Country Cluster Delegation

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PRD Partnerships and Resource Development

RCRC Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

SLRC Saint Lucia Red Cross

SVG Saint Vincent and Grenadines

SVGRC Saint Vincent and Grenadines Red Cross Society

TOR Terms of Reference

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USD United State Dollar

WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

## ANNEX I. Lessons Learned Workshop

	What went well (strengths)	What didn't go well (weaknesses)	What could be improved?
<b>Preparation and carrying out of evacuation procedures</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Persons were informed by the Red Cross about what would happen, what they needed, etc.</li> <li>● Vulnerable persons were especially catered to- they were evacuated earlier than the other members of the community.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Evacuation notice was too late of a notice</li> <li>● Transportation wasn't on time. Persons had to use their personal transportation. Transportation didn't come for persons.</li> <li>● Too many messages from different organizations</li> <li>● Communication between the different organizations was poor</li> <li>● Long Hours of working</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Community Group meetings to identify the <b>most</b> vulnerable persons</li> <li>● Following the community plans and updating it accordingly</li> <li>● Ensuring that the community <b>is aware</b> of the plan</li> <li>● Specialized messages about medications</li> <li>● Better communication to the public</li> </ul>
<b>Package distribution</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Persons worked as a team</li> <li>● Staff and volunteers were flexible in their duties</li> <li>● Packages were tailored to specific groups (vulnerable persons, children, women) Eg- hygienic kits for women</li> <li>● Packages were distributed in a timely manner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Long Hours of working</li> <li>● It was difficult to get the food locally as the Government had already purchased a lot of the food</li> <li>● Duplication of recipients</li> <li>● Locating persons in private shelters was an issue as they were not from the area, so they were not familiar with the directions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Sharing of database between different organizations</li> <li>● Organizations should work along more with community members to identify the most vulnerable persons</li> <li>● Preparation ahead of time to have food and non-food items readily available for when disaster hits</li> </ul>
<b>Shelter assistance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Volunteers gained experience</li> <li>● A "community" was created amongst the volunteers and evacuees in the shelters</li> <li>● Use of skills learned from previous</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The shelters didn't receive much support after persons became infected with COVID-19.</li> <li>● For Child friendly spaces, Parents and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Equip the shelters with necessary basic items (eg. Cots)</li> <li>● More volunteers should use their personal skills to help evacuees</li> </ul>



	<p>trainings (eg. Psychosocial support)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Involvement of evacuees in the day-to-day running of the shelters</li> </ul>	<p>guardians were not engaged enough when it came to the programme.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Managing the vulnerable persons (diabetics, hypertension, elderly)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Getting extra support in cases of secondary crises- eg. COVID-19 outbreak.</li> <li>● Proper documentation of evacuees</li> </ul>
<b>Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Able to meet the immediate needs of persons affected</li> <li>● Reputation of the red cross made it easy to use the supermarkets and banks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Persons not being home when volunteers went to distribute</li> <li>● Locating persons in private shelters was an issue as they were not from the area, so they were not familiar with the directions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ability to improvise delivery of important activity/programme</li> <li>● Make Psychosocial supports available to SVGRC staff as well.</li> </ul>
<b>Livelihoods</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Most beneficiaries thought it was valuable to be a part of this programme</li> <li>● Most used the funds for its intended purpose</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Persons spent the money on other things- not on livelihoods</li> </ul>	
<b>Home Repairs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Recipients were grateful for assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Unable to reach the persons whose houses were severely damaged</li> </ul>	
<b>Targeting the most vulnerable (women and other vulnerable groups)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Packages included additional items that other organisations didn't give (eg. Sanitary napkins, that catered to women</li> <li>● The Red Cross catered to the most vulnerable persons</li> <li>● Assistance was very broad and comprehensive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Some persons feel as though the most vulnerable persons were not targeted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Community Group meetings to identify the most vulnerable persons</li> <li>● Update the list of vulnerable persons when the community plan is being updated</li> </ul>
<b>Role of the IFRC (support, direction and training provided)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Trainings were sufficient to meet the needs of staff</li> <li>● Built resilience</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Short time spent by delegates</li> <li>● COVID-19 restrictions (affected face to face trainings)</li> </ul>	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Many training opportunities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Late arrival of delegates due to COVID-19</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ensure psychosocial supports are available to staff who were also victims of the volcano.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Capacity Building (training and new practices, what has been gained?)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Designing of programme for PGI</li> <li>● Good training for Gender-Based violence (as many persons were coming to the shelters)</li> <li>● Implementation of Livelihood programme was very positive in terms of building capacity of the NS</li> <li>● Implementation of CVA was very positive in terms of building capacity of the NS</li> <li>● Volunteers were involved in the child-friendly spaces, displaying their skills and engaging the children</li> <li>● “Library” was built in South Rivers</li> </ul>		
<p><b>Volunteer-staff relationship</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Good relationship with volunteers</li> <li>● Volunteers were involved in the child-friendly spaces, displaying their skills and engaging the children</li> <li>● Volunteers and staff were flexible in the roles they played during the response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Lack of proper identification for volunteers</li> <li>● Poor communication between staff and volunteers in some instances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Proper identification of volunteers (volunteer tags, t-shirts)</li> </ul>