LEARNING FROM RED CROSS RED CRESCENT ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED CRises AND COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

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A research study commissioned by: Disasters, Climate and Crises department - IFRC, Geneva
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the world’s largest humanitarian network, with 191 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and around 15 million volunteers. Our volunteers are present in communities before, during and after a crisis or disaster. We work in the most hard to reach and complex settings in the world, saving lives and promoting human dignity. We support communities to become stronger and more resilient places where people can live safe and healthy lives and have opportunities to thrive.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT

**Humanity**
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

**Impartiality**
It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

**Neutrality**
In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

**Independence**
The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

**Voluntary service**
It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

**Unity**
There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

**Universality**
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.

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FOREWORD

In today’s world of humanitarian assistance, navigating the complexities of protracted crises and complex emergencies requires steadfast commitment, adaptability, and continuous reflection. National Societies, together with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), stand at the forefront of this endeavour, striving to provide effective, timely, and efficient support to those most in need.

This research study represents a critical step in our collective journey towards enhancing the provision of relevant services in the challenging contexts of protracted crises and complex emergencies. With the aim of identifying pathways for improvement, the study looks at the practices and experiences of the National Societies and its partners.

The key learnings of this study once again, demonstrate that resilience lies at the heart of effective assistance and reinforce the need for greater investment in resilience-building approaches in order to mitigate challenges, to address vulnerabilities, and to bolster capacities across all levels of society. It also becomes very clear that individual resilience alone is insufficient in the face of systemic failure and highlights the necessity for comprehensive, multi-faceted interventions.

Sustainability emerges as another cornerstone of effective assistance, emphasizing the importance of continued engagement beyond the immediate emergency but phasing into recovery and development. In this regard, we also highlight a need for meaningful investment in local actors for local action which when accompanied by quality capacity strengthening, allows for greater long-term impact.

Collaboration and coordination within and outside the Movement emerges, unsurprisingly, as paramount in addressing the multifaceted challenges of protracted crises and complex emergencies. The sharing of experiences and best practices among National Societies is vital, as is the need for greater support in areas such as sustainability, resource mobilization, corporate services, operations, analysis, and partnerships.

As we reflect on the findings of this study, it is clear that adaptation and flexibility are essential in enhancing performance and impact in protracted crises and complex emergencies. The recommendations presented throughout this document, from National Societies and its partners, donors and IFRC Secretariat, provide a roadmap for action and improvement.

In closing, I extend my gratitude to all the National Societies and people who have contributed to this research study. May our collective insights and the recommendations proposed, serve as catalysts for positive change, guiding our collective efforts toward a future where assistance in protracted crises and complex emergencies is not only effective and efficient but also compassionate and transformative.

Caroline Holt
Director
Disasters, Climate and Crises - IFRC Geneva
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The evaluation team sincerely thanks the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Colombia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Myanmar, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria and Tajikistan for their time, patience and cooperation throughout the research study. We also thank the IFRC country and regional delegations across Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe and the Middle East/North Africa for their time and support to the team.

It was truly motivating and rewarding to hear of the immense efforts, successes and frustrations of National Societies, IFRC staff and PNS in working in these very complex settings of high need. The research team learned a lot throughout the research, and we hope we’ve done some justice to highlight industry trends, challenges and ways forward for the Federation in this work.

We would also like to acknowledge the efforts made by IFRC staff in MENA to support this study despite the devastating challenges and immense escalation of the protracted and complex crises in their region. While at the time of the writing we were not able to speak with all the NS and IFRC staff prioritised for the study we tried to make best use of the learnings IFRC, and the membership have documented over their many years of working in complex and protracted settings in MENA.

We also thank the Swedish Red Cross for their generous support in seconding two full-time research associates to this work to help ensure the study was comprehensive and efficient. We could not have done as much without this excellent support.

Sincere thanks go to the PCCEFC Working Group (who seriously need a catchier name) for their constant guidance, support and patience throughout the process. We also appreciate the DCC/ Operations team and its manager and leads for their analysis and strategic input at key points throughout the study.

Our gratitude also goes to all stakeholders including bilateral donors, and INGOs, and IFRC colleagues at cluster, regional and Geneva levels who dedicated their time to participate in informative discussions and contributed significantly to the findings and recommendations of this study.

We were inspired to read/re-read the constitution and mottoes of the Movement which further inform and motivate the work in protracted crises and complex emergencies. The Preamble of the constitution -

Recalls that the mottoes of the Movement, Inter arma caritas and Per humanitatem ad pacem, together express its ideals. Declares that, by its humanitarian work and the dissemination of its ideals, the Movement promotes a lasting peace, which is not simply the absence of war, but is a dynamic process of cooperation among all States and peoples, cooperation founded on respect for freedom, independence, national sovereignty, equality, human rights, as well as on a fair and equitable distribution of resources to meet the needs of peoples.

Margaret Stansberry, Aljoscha Mayer, Olaya Ferreira, Helena Bello
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCS</td>
<td>Afghanistan Red Crescent Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHA</td>
<td>United States Gov’t Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDAC</td>
<td>Communicating with Disaster-Affected Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Complex emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Community engagement and accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRG</td>
<td>Cruz Roja Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Cultural quotient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCWG</td>
<td>Disaster and crises working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>(Australia’s) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG-ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DREF</td>
<td>Disaster relief emergency fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Emergency appeal</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency operations centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERCS</td>
<td>Ethiopian Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERO</td>
<td>Europe regional office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERU</td>
<td>Emergency response unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER4</td>
<td>Early recovery, risk reduction and resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ</td>
<td>Emotional quotient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACT</td>
<td>Field assessment and coordination team</td>
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<td>FERST</td>
<td>Federation early recovery surge team</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Grand bargain</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFFO</td>
<td>German Federal Foreign Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHA</td>
<td>Global Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>GHD</td>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMT</td>
<td>Global management team</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>German Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRCS</td>
<td>Guatemala Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>Humanitarian diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEOPS</td>
<td>Head of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRCSC</td>
<td>Haiti Red Cross Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral development bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRCS</td>
<td>Myanmar Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDRT</td>
<td>National disaster response team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NRCS</td>
<td>Nigeria Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>National Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSD</td>
<td>National Society Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWOW</td>
<td>New way of working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for economic cooperation and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Protracted crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCE</td>
<td>Protracted crises and complex emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Preparedness for effective response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGI</td>
<td>Protection, gender and inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMER</td>
<td>Planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNS</td>
<td>Partner National Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSEA</td>
<td>Prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSS</td>
<td>Psychosocial support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCRC</td>
<td>Red Cross Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDRT</td>
<td>Regional disaster response team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARC</td>
<td>Syria Arab Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCT</td>
<td>Shelter coordination team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIMS</td>
<td>Surge Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMCC</td>
<td>Strengthening movement coordination and cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOHS</td>
<td>State Of the Humanitarian System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Unified planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>Working group</td>
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</table>
Six years have passed since over 700,000 Rohingya refugees fled Myanmar. The situation in Bangladesh has now evolved into a protracted crisis, with almost a million people struggling to survive. Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. © IFRC, 2023
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

IFRC and its members have long been responding to protracted crises and complex emergencies (PCCE). Operational strategies, systems and tools have been updated and improved over time. Around 2016 IFRC began to examine their fitness more earnestly for operating in these increasingly complex, large and long-term settings. A Disasters and Crises Working Group meeting in Madrid in 2019 emphasized the need to further adapt tools and systems, capacities, and competencies to better meet the needs, ensure relevance and fitness for purpose in protracted, complex and fragile settings. The global Covid pandemic and other priorities preventing the work from moving forward in a formal way until mid-2023. This research is one of the initial initiatives designed to begin to address this opportunity.

Research Purpose and Objectives

The overall aim of this research is to identify the ways in which the IFRC and its members can continue to enhance and improve the provision of relevant services in complex and protracted settings, ensuring support is effective as well as timely and efficient.

The research had four main objectives:

1. **Objective 1:** Attain a concise but thorough understanding of the overall context of PCCE including identifying common humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities, funding trends, donor interests, and recurring operational challenges. This will primarily be conducted through secondary data review while donor perspectives will be obtained through primary data collection.

2. **Objective 2:** Identify and summarize the learning and improvements to date in PCCE operations both within the RCRC Movement and the broader industry primarily through secondary data review.

3. **Objective 3:** Identify promising practices overall as well as within IFRC operations that have been assigned to this study.

4. **Objective 4:** Through key informant interviews, capture ways in which operations can better address the gaps, challenges and other themes identified during the research. This was to include an understanding of the day-to-day challenges and gaps that NS are experiencing and clarity on what they really need and want to see addressed.

During the inception phase, the WG finalized the list of operations to be included in the research. This comprised 38 operations in 17 countries. However, given time and capacity constraints, not all National Societies were consulted, and some operations received less attention.

Key Definitions

The research team was asked to use definitions developed by the PCCEFC Working Group in 2023. See Text Box 1: Definition – protracted crises and Text Box 2: Definition - complex emergency. Note that there is considerable overlap in the definitions and that a protracted crises can be complex, and a complex emergency can become protracted. A review of the Inform Index for severity data for August 2023 revealed that the majority of protracted crises with a severity rating of 3.5 or higher – could also be considered as complex.

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2 As summarized in Presentation Protracted Crisis, Complex Emergencies & Fragile Contexts File: DCC Retreat June 2023, internal memo. IFRC, Geneva.
**Text Box 1: Definition - PROTRACTED CRISES**

**Protracted crises**: a situation in which a humanitarian emergency persists over an extended period, often years or even decades. It can be the result of conflict, natural disasters, or other causes, and they can lead to widespread displacement, loss of life, and ongoing humanitarian needs. State systems and societal norms are often weakened and fail to adequately address the root causes of the crisis; they may also fail to provide coping capacities for further, future shocks. It may be characterized by chronic food insecurity, and malnutrition and high child mortality. They may be further characterized by protection concerns for affected populations and humanitarian actors along with a lack of durable solutions and may experience funding constraints over time.

**Text Box 2: Definition - COMPLEX EMERGENCY**

**Complex Emergency**: a situation in which a humanitarian emergency is compounded by multiple factors, such as violence, displacement, natural hazards, and other crises. They often result in significant displacement, loss of life, and ongoing humanitarian needs and may involve armed conflict and compromised access, security issues and even the lack of rule of law. Moreover, CE are challenging to respond to, as they require addressing multiple and interrelated needs across different sectors.

### Research Features, Methods and Limitations

It’s important to keep in mind that this work is a research study and not an evaluation of the IFRC and National Society performance in PCCE. Research looks at how something works and attempts to generalize the knowledge; in general, the purpose of research is to advance knowledge in a specific field. An evaluation on the other hand is used primarily to determine the effectiveness of a specific program or model. While there can be similar methods used in both types of work, evaluation generally uses specific definitions, criteria and benchmarks to determine the worth of a program or model.

The research primarily employed the following methods:

- Secondary data review
- Key informant and group interviews
- Triangulation, narrative analysis and some coding and analysis

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#### Totals by Organization

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#### Gender Analysis

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<td>61%</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>39%</td>
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<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>100%</td>
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The research team consisted of a team leader, a part-time research consultant and two part-time research associates from the Swedish Red Cross. Research was conducted between September and December 2023, reviewing over 150 documents and interviewing 72 key informants including 12 out of 17 or 70% of the targeted National Societies.4

**Figure 1: Map of research focus countries**

See “Table 2: Operations details from focus countries” for full list of operations, key hazards, dates and funding.

## Context

In 2022, an estimated 406.6 million people living in 82 countries were assessed to be in need of humanitarian assistance. Of those 82 countries, 44 of them were experiencing some type of a protracted crises accounting for 83% of the total number of people in need in 2022.5 Key drivers of complex crises in 2022 were climate-related (such as drought or flooding), and situations affected by conflict and socio-economic fragility. In 2022, 54% of all people in need faced all three of these risk factors while 75% faced two.6 A report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) on internal displacement noted that in 2021, 88% of displacement due to disasters occurred in countries experiencing conflict and crisis,7 further illustrating the prevalence of complexity in emergencies.

The number of people in need is increasing each year; over the four years between 2018 and 2021, the numbers in need increased by an estimated 70% from 122 million to 201 million,8 putting an immense strain on the global humanitarian system.

Humanitarian assistance for all types of crises grew by 27% in 2022 in response to an immense scale up in needs and appeals. In contrast, growth in 2021 was 13% and 2020, 1%.9 However, needs were only 58% met in 2022 compared to 56% met in 2021. Private funding for humanitarian operations continues to increase year on year but overall remains between 18% to 20% of overall humanitarian funding.10

4 The team was not able to interview the National Societies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Honduras, Lebanon and Libya.
6 Ibid. p26.
7 https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/floods-displacement-and-violence-south-sudan
10 Ibid., p29.
Between 2020 and 2021 there has been an uptick in humanitarian assistance and a slight decrease in development assistance. Peace-building funding has remained steady.\(^{11}\)

The vast majority of funding goes to countries experiencing protracted crisis and the number of countries in protracted crisis continues to grow - 36 countries in 2021, 44 in 2022 and 52 in 2023.\(^ {12}\)

**Policy Foundation of the IFRC work in Protracted Crises and Complex Emergencies**

The IFRC work in PCCE is informed by its constitution and the Red Cross Red Crescent statues. The IFRC is also guided by resolutions of the International Conference and by directives from the General Assembly. IFRC is further guided by the Seville agreements (via the Council of Delegates), the IFRC Disaster management policy, the Principles and Rules for Red Cross in Humanitarian Assistance and other IFRC policies.

Article 4 of the IFRC Constitution notes that the general objective of The Federation “is to inspire, encourage, facilitate, and promote at all times all forms of humanitarian activities by National Societies with a view to preventing and alleviating human suffering and contributing to the maintenance and promotion of human dignity and peace in the world.” \(^ {13}\)

Article 5 further elaborates the functions which can generally be summarized as services to National Societies, specifically, through 1) coordination, 2) in supporting the development of sustainable and duly recognized National Societies with a strong capacity to address vulnerabilities, reduce risk, prepare for disasters and support relief, and promote a culture of non-violence and peace in cooperation with appropriate national authorities, and 3) represent National Societies internationally and protect their integrity. \(^ {14}\) IFRC has these mandates regardless of the context. In times of civil unrest, complex emergencies or conflict – these responsibilities still accrue to the IFRC, and some may be even more critical to address during such situations.

The Seville agreements, articulated in 1997 (replacing a previous 1989 agreement) and updated and expanded most recently in 2022 with Seville 2.0, articulate how coordination will be carried out in relation to the international activities identified in the Movement statutes. While Seville 2.0 covers a range of contexts, it also addresses the roles and responsibilities of the RCRC Movement components in times of protracted crises, civil unrest, and conflict to help ensure clarity in who does what and in how coordination will be facilitated. Importantly, and in-line with humanitarian best practices, Seville 2.0 notes that National Society Development, should be emphasized or continued during protracted crises.

IFRC involvement in PCCE is also guided by the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy. \(^ {15}\) The policy covers the IFRC (and members) approach to all kinds of disasters in myriad contexts, including fragile, protracted and conflict situations, in both urban and rural areas. Given the range of disasters and contexts, the policy further notes that IFRC (and its members) have a responsibility to strengthen their knowledge and analytical skills to inform and guide operations and practices, working with National Societies and the ICRC.

Finally, the Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance\(^ {16}\) form an important part of the statutory framework of the Movement and therefore are a critical part of the work of the Movement in some contexts also affected by PCCE. The document contains ten principles that reinforce many of the themes noted in the research including the importance of: localization, internal and external coordination, supporting recovery, and that assistance is not only needs-based but must be in line with affected populations’

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\(^ {11}\) Ibid., p90.
\(^ {12}\) Ibid.p25.
\(^ {13}\) IFRC, Statutory Texts of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2019, p9. IFRC Geneva.
\(^ {14}\) Ibid, pp9-10.
own priorities. The document also elicits a range of 'rules' between and among National Societies and the IFRC covering preparedness and readiness, principled approaches, quality and accountability and coordination with external actors. This document has been updated over the years as humanitarian learning expands and standards change.

These foundational documents clearly specify the need for the IFRC in PCCE to carry out its mandates. The complexity of these environments and the resources required necessitates that we work as One Red Cross in accordance with the normative frameworks described herein.

**FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

- **Strengthening Crisis Response**

IFRC is very familiar with who is typically most affected in PCCE settings as there are quite some similarities to sudden onset disasters. However greater awareness and emphasis on women, children, the disabled, indigenous and people on the movement is needed to support their inclusion and protection over the long-term.

Needs assessment in these settings should be more holistic, based on disaggregated data of diverse populations, on a sound analysis of the context, involve both primary and secondary data collection, be performed in partnership with external actors when possible and be repeated as crises ebb and flow.

IFRC tools, systems, human resources need to be recalibrated for their use in protracted crises and complex emergencies; overall greater flexibility is needed enabling those closest to the situation the ability to trigger tools and modify plans as relevant. Human resources in these settings need to embrace long-term strategic thinking and can be more effective if they have strong emotional and cultural intelligence. A clear auxiliary role and strong relationships with authorities at all levels is critical and requires constant communication.

Principled responses in these settings require reflection, discussion and brainstorming as the challenges will be many and what the principles look like in action may not always be clear. Constant promotion of the principles, while also ensuring the application of protection, gender and inclusion (PGI) approaches and community engagement and accountability (CEA) with staff and volunteers is critical. Humanitarian diplomacy should be evidenced-based and be conducted with even greater frequency in these settings, and this requires investment.

- **Improve External & Internal Coordination and Cyclical Planning**

In PCCE settings, there will likely be an even greater presence of international actors such as the UN, bilateral donors and INGOs. External coordination with these actors and public authorities is critical and should be continuous. The NS, supported or represented by the IFRC, should be a part of the UN coordination mechanisms to not only help inform the actors of the situation, but to also ensure the role of the NS is well understood. Internally, the NWOW and AfR tools and approaches can help foster solid analysis, longer-term thinking and ensure alignment of strategic objectives enabling coordinated approaches within the RCRC. These approaches will help also ensure authorities and external actors see the strength and comparative advantages of One Red Cross/Red Crescent.

National Societies including PNS need to fully embrace and commit to these collective approaches and ensure they are bolstered through appropriate external partnerships. Programming should be resilience-based, seeking to build or protect capacities with a strategic long-term understanding of the outcomes needed. Integrated approaches have long been valued, but planning and strategy frameworks need to clearly articulate how the various programmes work together to contribute to joint outcomes. Stakeholders should not pursue integrated programme for the mere sake of it. The IFRC needs to ensure it has the capacity to support internal and external coordination and comprehensive long-term planning with the NS. IFRC should rely on the capacity and support of PNS wherever possible.
– Better Inform Preparedness

PER remains a highly relevant framework; however, key elements such as auxiliary roles, humanitarian diplomacy, business continuity, scenario planning and safety and security need more attention to help practitioners ensure these areas are better contextualised to ensure readiness in protracted and complex settings. This requires greater in-depth reflection, analysis and more time and capacity. Other areas require greater emphasis as well to ensure better readiness and capacity – these include planning, analysis and information management.

Development and resilience approaches and the capacity needed to facilitate them helped several NS in their preparedness in PCCE settings. Several National Societies spoke of the importance of their development programmes such as livelihoods, food security, healthcare, WASH, social inclusion etc. in supporting the preparedness of communities and enhancing their resilience to withstand future shocks.

Several stakeholders spoke about the gaps in preparedness for PCCE rather than what they were doing or promising practices. Greater or differing skills and capacities were said to be needed in:

- **Analysis and planning:** Conducting a wider, more holistic approach beyond ‘just saving lives’ is necessary; this includes being able to analyse the context and all its layers as well as doing scenario planning with this complexity in mind. While scenario planning is an important part of PER, perhaps how one analyses a current or potential protracted, fragile or complex context is different. Greater capacity is needed to develop long-term plans that incorporate these future scenarios that reflect a stronger understanding of the social context within which they were occurring.

- **Volunteers:** Community-based volunteers from the affected communities or who otherwise know the context, culture, language and may even be known by the community are important in PCCE settings. Ensuring volunteers are prepared, have the right equipment, have safety and security training, understand all the duty of care protocols were noted as a key actions several National Societies were taking, while others noted more emphasis on this was needed.

Risk management needs more attention. If an organisation is serious in its commitment to localisation, especially in times of protracted and complex emergencies, then understanding the options to build capacity in risk management, identify, understand and mitigate risk and equitably and jointly share and reduce risks is critical. This is particularly important throughout the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, since a major risk failure by the last organization in the chain that accepted risk, perhaps just on paper, can negatively reverberate throughout the whole of the One Red Cross.

Safety and security in PCCE require constant attention and NS staff and volunteers are significantly more impacted than international staff. Investments in safety and security should be equitable while ensuring legal requirements regarding duty of care. IFRC and its members need to examine risk sharing approaches as part of the IFRC localisation strategy while increasing investment in NS capacity strengthening approaches.

Linking contingency, and scenario planning to HR and on-going development work would also enhance preparedness in these settings.

**DONORS AND FUNDING TO PCCE**

In 2022, protracted crises received 92% of all humanitarian funding. Most protracted crises are also complex when using a complexity threshold from the Inform Index. Three donors account for the majority of humanitarian assistance, the US Government, the German Federation Foreign Office and the EU institutions. These donors largely reference protracted crises in their strategies, support localization, are more likely to have multi-year funding for PCCE, and on paper, support flexible approaches and adaptive management.

In terms of contributions to IFRC Appeals the US Government features (USG) prominently in terms of volume but not frequency - of the 11 operations examined, the USG only contributed to two. Other key government donors may be under-represented when giving via PNS as the primary donor is not always listed. PNS contributions could be more accurately analysed if appeals consistently included Federation-wide contributions in the budgets and amounts received.
The donors interviewed truly appreciate the work of the IFRC and the RCRC network; they noted gains in working as One Red Cross, appreciate the RCRC efforts to enhance their own understanding of localisation, and noted DREFs and anticipatory action were contributing to faster and more meaningful response. Some donors felt IFRC could better prioritise where they work; that IFRC should continue to work on roles and responsibilities within the network ensuring efficiency and effectiveness based on the value-add of the different actors. National society capacity strengthening, and localisation need to be emphasised more and IFRC needs to ensure its support is facilitating strong and financially sustainable organisations. IFRC needs to tell this story of capacity strengthening more – sharing the outcomes and challenges in this work. The same goes for their important work in PCCE settings: IFRC could do a better job regularly identifying and sharing the outcomes as well as the challenges in these difficult environments.

Addressing these points could also assist the IFRC in building stronger relationships with the top government donors and enhance long-term resourcing. In addition, IFRC could invest more in their resource mobilization and strategic partner management capacity to further formalize partnerships with multilaterals and build new partnerships with development banks such as such as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and possibly private sector though noting their contributions to PCCE at this time are small. Climate funding is another avenue already being pursued but this should not come at the expense of existing donors and mechanisms.

Finally ensuring collective approaches against sound strategies – linking the PCCE operations side with the longer-term development side and giving broader roles to PNS when best placed- combined with a comprehensive M&E system to better identify and promote the difference the One Red Cross is making, should also enhance longer-term resourcing to NS working in complex, protracted and even fragile settings.

**KEY LEARNINGS**

A review of some key, external global reports of the humanitarian system, and large evaluations of protracted crises and complex emergencies reiterated what humanitarian practitioners already know but remain systemic challenges. ¹⁷

Key learnings from the external literature review include:

1. There needs to be greater investment by humanitarian actors in resilience approaches i.e., those approaches that work to mitigate the challenges, lessen vulnerabilities and enhance capacities. Practitioners need to recognize that building resilience in individuals is insufficient, particularly when those populations are facing systemic failure. Systemic resilience cannot be facilitated by a single entity. It must be a collective approach.

2. Greater attention on sustainability of results in emergencies and during the transition out or over to recovery and development is key. Numerous reports noted an over-emphasis on critical, short-term support that does little to mitigate the problem.

3. In addition to greater financial support to localization, there is an urgent need for quality capacity strengthening that enables local and national actors to be financially sustainable, accountable and able to facilitate impact in accordance with their organisational purpose.

4. Early warning/early action is helping, including in complex and protracted crisis but one-third of the world’s population is not covered by this type of support.¹⁹ Greater prioritization, funding and localization is needed to help increase this coverage.

¹⁷ See the bibliography - as various reports reiterated the same learnings; some key reports included ALNAP, SOHS 2022; Development Initiatives, GHA 2023; the Middle East Institute – various reports and Oxfam, 2015, as well as presentations and discussions at the Washington Humanitarian Forum 2022.

¹⁸ Humanitarian actors still need to prioritize life-saving approaches and ensure their work does not jeopardize their access. However, it’s not a dichotomous approach – either life-saving or resilience. Though ten years ago some would argue that humanitarians should only do life-saving and development actors focus on resilience – that argument is less prevalent these days. Regardless humanitarians need to prioritize access and life-saving while simultaneously analysing risks and impacts in supporting resilience. See [https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/03/deliver-humanitarian-aid-or-build-resilience-the-answer-is-in-the-context/](https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/03/deliver-humanitarian-aid-or-build-resilience-the-answer-is-in-the-context/) for one article on the topic.

5. In addition to early warning/early action, there needs to be greater mitigation, as this has a greater positive impact but at a lower cost than humanitarian response. This is a greater challenge in protracted and complex crises as ODA for development in these contexts is reducing and less money is going towards adaptation and mitigation.

6. There is a need for greater evidenced-based advocacy on a range of issues - including on when legal restrictions or cultural barriers prevent access to key support and services. Donors also need to hear more about what is working in protracted crises.

7. There should be greater awareness of and involvement with multilateral development banks (MDBs), noting their increasing support to social protection systems, particularly in failing states. Coordination with or at least greater awareness of MDB plans in these settings can be helpful in setting up resilience strategies, coordinating plans and informing exit or hand-over.

8. Finally, external coordination with a wide range of stakeholders is paramount to address all the learning. External coordination needs to occur on multiple levels – politically, at a policy level, and practically at the field or implementation level. Across many protracted crises there have been urgent calls for increased engagement between humanitarian, development and peace actors to address root causes and drivers of vulnerabilities. Coordination must also include state actors and authorities and should include donors, private sector and MDBs as possible.

The research team asked National Societies to name three things the IFRC/membership can do to better support them in protracted crises and complex emergencies. Responses emphasized several of the above themes, especially, strengthening local action including quality capacity-building, organizational sustainability, institutional development, humanitarian diplomacy and analysis.

See Key National Society Recommendations for further details.

The research team also asked IFRC and PNS what are the essential things the IFRC has to address to improve how it operates in these settings. Eleven themes emerged: The first four topics were raised most consistently while the remaining seven were raised with an equal level of frequency. All topics are important and are certainly interrelated. The description of the first four can be found in Key Learnings section while the remaining seven can be found in IFRC & PNS Recommendations for the IFRC Overall. The Working Group should consider all eleven themes when developing their workplan for 2024 and beyond.

**Themes**

1. Planning and analysis
2. Coordination: Internal and External and Visibility
3. Tools & the IFRC Response System
4. IFRC Corporate Services
5. Human Resources
6. Accountability
7. Roles & Responsibilities
8. Humanitarian Diplomacy, Advocacy and Principled Approaches
9. National Society Development
10. Donors and Funding
11. Safety, Security and Duty of Care

Much of the key learning and good practices in PCCE from the external literature align with what stakeholders are recommending. Many National Societies have significant experience in PCCE and have much to share with their sister Societies. This type of reflection and sharing should be encouraged and continued. National Societies working in these settings need more support in a range of things, including sustainability & resource mobilization, functioning corporate services, operations, analysis and partnerships. IFRC at all levels noted that while they receive good technical, managerial and leadership support, greater adaptation and flexibility is needed in the key themes listed above to enhance performance and impact in protracted crises and complex emergencies.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The strategic emphasis by the IFRC Secretary General on the IFRC’s core responsibilities will continue to enhance how the IFRC supports National Societies working in protracted crises and complex emergencies.

The IFRC’s core functions

The following is recommended for IFRC:

Strategic and Operational Coordination:

1. Continue to operationalize the NWOW in the various PCCE settings IFRC and PNS are supporting, ensuring alignment around a comprehensive, longer-term coherent and strategic Unified Support Plan. Help ensure the Movement is viewed as One Red Cross and that roles and responsibilities are clear, aligned and well communicated internally and externally.

2. Enable greater shared leadership amongst the PNS in these settings and work to ensure a rationalization of resources across the IFRC and membership contributing to greater efficiency and effectiveness in support.

National Society Strengthening:

3. In the PCCE settings, invest more in NSD corporate services as part of a longer-term plan that can be shared with key donors. Document the progress including challenges and successes towards the shared vision and stick with it.

4. Considering the criticality of clear auxiliary roles, strong NS legal bases and comprehensive knowledge of the legal frameworks play in influencing NS readiness and response, IFRC should invest more to strengthen NS in these areas.

5. Hold donors accountable to their localisation pledges while simultaneously documenting and promoting why the RCRC network is the premier local actor in PCCE settings.
Humanitarian Diplomacy:

6. Acknowledge more the incredible efforts of the IFRC staff working in these settings, particularly in HD. Support them with greater financial and human resource investments along with an agreed plan on the global, regional and country-level priorities and strategies in humanitarian diplomacy. This should include a greater investment to maximize the resources of the International Disaster Law unit to better support staff and NS working in PCCE.

7. Ensure staff are able to document the evidence that informs the HD messages at each level and that it is effectively used with key stakeholders.

A large number of recommendations have been shared throughout this document – from National Societies, from a few donors, and from IFRC and PNS. In addition to the above strategic recommendations, the research team makes additional operational recommendations for the IFRC.

Additional Recommendations for IFRC

8. At a minimum, IFRC must work to increase the flexibility and relevance of the response approaches and tools as in PCCE settings with a greater focus on multi-year humanitarian outcomes. At a minimum IFRC should:

i. Study the implications of modifying DREF and EA budgets and timeframes for specific PCCE settings and test it accordingly. The number, length, and impact of PCCE are only going to increase. Get approval on a Management Decision Paper to pilot more flexible approaches with these tools including modifications of budget thresholds, triggers and timing of DREF and EAs in new PCCEs and possibly some ongoing ones. This should also include more outcome-based key performance indicators to promote the right behaviour.

j. Enable regional offices to better support IFRC country offices in protracted, complex and fragile settings to ensure strategic approaches across operations and unified plans, developing sound integrated approaches where warranted and aligning with or supporting social protection systems as appropriate.

k. Continue to enhance analytics in these settings ensuring the clear value-added and sustainability of current IM investments and initiatives.

l. Work on documenting and telling a better story throughout NSD and the DM cycle and ask for more money. The money is there. UN and INGOs are not necessarily better – they are just better at documenting and sharing their results.

m. IFRC at regional and country levels in PCCE settings should continue to analyse with the NS the external partnership opportunities. The default should not be an insular approach noting that there are some exceptions but that PCCE ebb and flow and how RCRC operates should also adjust over time.

n. Work with HR to augment profiles of technical and leadership/management staff in these settings with the skills recommended. Enhance staff entry and exit procedures by ensuring formal handover. In management and leadership positions, this handover should be in-person.

9. Better document what is happening in these environments. Many of the operations did not have evaluations nor facilitated lessons learned. If the evaluations and lessons learned workshops are well done, there needs to be an agreed way forward to address the learnings and ensure key accountabilities are in place. Moreover, there should be a stronger analysis of why the learning or behaviour change is not happening. Meta evaluations should not regularly identify the same problems unless there is documentation as to what strategies were tried and failed. As much learning if not more can come from a reflection of failures as of successes.
10. The WG needs to map other IFRC/PNS initiatives that are already touching on the long list of recommendations presented here and work to ensure alignment on the most pressing themes.

11. Using this report and the January 2024 workshop, the WG should create a comprehensive multi-year workplan that involves other key departments who can augment the capacity and remit of the WG.

**Recommendations for National Societies**

12. Ensure an updated PER assessment, analysis and comprehensive workplan is in place that includes a strong reflection on current and future scenarios of likely protracted and complex crises;

13. Ensure a comprehensive NSD plan is in place that incorporates support needs stemming from the PER and balances investments in HQ with branches. This plan should be long-term and include a realistic plan for financial sustainability.

14. Continue to engage with international and local actors in addition to public authorities and the Movement. Collaborative approaches externally as well as internally are critical for alignment with and support to your long-term strategic plans that include PER and NSD.

**Recommendations for Partner National Societies**

15. Continue to invest in the NWOW and be prepared to take on larger roles in PCCE settings while helping to ensure there is one strategic plan in place to better support the NS to work in PCCE settings. These plans should not only include resilience approaches and significant outcomes for affected populations/people in need but must also be bolstered by a comprehensive NSD plan designed to enable a strong and financially sustainable NS that all Movement partners support.

16. Work more closely with IFRC to ensure back donors are not only properly identified and acknowledged but to ensure RCRC is maximizing resource mobilisation. More support from the current largest humanitarian donors is possible along with new and emerging donors.

17. Help ensure the Movement is viewed as One Red Cross including by holding IFRC accountable to one strategic, unified support plan along with one measurement and reporting plan and one communications and HD plan.

18. Support the IFRC to address the recommendations herein including the longer list from the National Societies themselves.
More than 100,000 displaced people arriving in Armenia through the Lachin Corridor. Armenian Red Cross teams have mobilized to meet them at humanitarian service points, providing them with food, water, first aid and much-needed psychosocial support.

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Part 1 - INTRODUCTION
PART 1 - INTRODUCTION

Document Purpose

The purpose of this document is to help inform the workplan and priorities of the IFRC Working Group on Protracted Crisis, Complex Emergencies and Fragile Contexts. It will do this by presenting humanitarian standards and good practices, donor funding trends and priorities and more importantly, by amplifying the voice of National Societies working in these contexts by sharing their collective experiences in myriad protracted crises and complex emergencies (PCCE). National Societies (NS) across all four regions were consulted and were able to share their practices, their challenges and recommendations to improve how the IFRC and members might better support them in very difficult environments.

Problem Statement

IFRC and her members have considerable experience in responding to protracted crises and complex emergencies. Operational strategies, systems, tools have been updated and improved along the way. Around 2016 IFRC began to examine their fitness more earnestly for operating in these increasingly complex, large and long-term settings as evidenced by a few internal memos and informed by internal interviews and group discussions with a handful of stakeholders from various regions. A Disasters and Crises Working Group (DCWG) meeting in Madrid in 2019 emphasized the need to further adapt tools and systems, capacities, and competencies to better meet needs and ensure relevance and fitness for purpose. While the DCWG and various consultations did not identify one specific problem statement it was clear that there were concerns and varied opinions on what it meant to work in these environments, how best to support the NS and how to deal with recurring challenges in analysis, planning, funding, coordination etc. that were seemingly different from those faced in sudden-onset disasters.

The 2019 global covid-19 pandemic and other priorities preventing the work from moving forward in a formal way until mid-2023. A specific working group representing Secretariat (Geneva and all regions) and PNS was formed in early 2023 and this study represents but one of their initial initiatives.

Research Objectives

The overall aim of the proposed study is to identify the ways in which IFRC and its members can continue to enhance and improve the provision of relevant services in complex and protracted settings, ensuring support is effective as well as timely and efficient.

This research was to gather and organize knowledge on humanitarian preparedness and response in protracted crises and complex emergencies, make it easily accessible and thereby contribute to institutional learning. Ideally this work along with recommendations will help IFRC and its members develop, adapt or otherwise inform improved approaches, operational practices and tools to aid in these types of operations.

These research aims are broken down into the following research objectives and associated methods:

Objective 1: Attain a concise but thorough understanding of the overall context of PCCE which should include mapping common humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities, funding trends, donor interests, and recurring operational challenges. This will primarily be conducted through secondary data review while donor perspectives will be obtained through key informant interviews.

Objective 2: Identify and summarize the learning and improvements to date in PCCE operations both within the RCRC Movement and the broader industry through secondary data review and also identify the main gaps and areas requiring further investigation.

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20 As summarized in Presentation Protracted Crisis, Complex Emergencies & Fragile Contexts File: DCC Retreat June 2023, internal memo. IFRC, Geneva.
Objective 3: Identify promising practices overall and in targeted countries that have been or are beginning to show good results, understanding to the extent possible the contributing factors based largely on key informant interviews.

Objective 4: Through key informant interviews, capture ways in which operations can better address the gaps, challenges and themes further align efforts improve performance in protracted crises and complex emergencies. This will need to include a clear understanding of the day-to-day challenges and gaps that NS are experiencing and clarity on what they really need and want to see addressed.

Study Definitions of Protracted Crises and Complex Emergencies

The aforementioned working group developed common definitions to help guide their work and this research, but note they are unofficial as they have not been fully vetted and discussed with management and membership. Those terms are summarized below.22

Protracted Crisis: a situation in which a humanitarian emergency persists over an extended period, often years or even decades. It can be the result of conflict, natural disasters, or other causes, and they can lead to widespread displacement, loss of life, and ongoing humanitarian needs. State systems and societal norms are often weakened and fail to adequately address the root causes of the crisis; they may also fail to provide coping capacities for further, future shocks. It may be characterized by chronic food insecurity, and malnutrition and high child mortality. They may be further characterized by protection concerns for affected populations and humanitarian actors along with a lack of durable solutions and may experience funding constraints over time.

Complex Emergency: a situation in which a humanitarian emergency is compounded by multiple factors, such as violence, displacement, natural hazards, and other crises. They often result in significant displacement, loss of life, and ongoing humanitarian needs and may involve armed conflict and compromised access, security issues and even the lack of rule of law. Moreover, CE are challenging to respond to, as they require addressing multiple and interrelated needs across different sectors.

It should be noted that there is considerable overlap in the definitions and that a protracted crises can be complex, and a complex emergency can become protracted. A review of the Inform Index for severity data for August 202323 revealed that the majority of crises with a severity rating of 3.5 or higher – could also be considered as protracted when defined as lasting five years or more and other characteristics as noted herein.

When asked for their understanding of the terms, protracted crises and complex emergency, many study participants echoed the difficulties in clearly differentiating between the terms, noting that both often go hand in hand. Nevertheless, the most highlighted characteristic of protracted crises was their lengthy timeframe, reoccurring nature and their tendency to continually increase the vulnerability of the affected population to further shocks.

In contrast complex emergencies were associated with a multi-faceted nature involving natural and man-made hazards, leading to cascading risks and requiring a multi-sectoral and multi-agency approaches. The difficulties of RCRC stakeholder to clearly define the terms underlines the need to introduce a shared understanding of these terms inside the Federation.

Research Methods and Limitations

This is a research study and not an evaluation. Research looks at how something works and attempts to generalize the knowledge; the general purpose of research is to advance knowledge in a specific field. Evaluations, on the other hand, are used primarily to determine the effectiveness of a specific program or model. While there can be similar methods used in both types of work, evaluation generally uses specific definitions, criteria and benchmarks to determine the worth of a program or model. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that this is a research study and not a formal evaluation of IFRC and National Society performance in PCCE.

The initial TOR envisioned the work to be conducted in two phases – the first would be largely focused on secondary data review which would then inform the second phase primarily consisting of key informant interviews with a broad range of stakeholders. Phase one focused on the ‘what’ in terms of humanitarian trends, best practices, key challenges and donor strategies and funding. Phase two focused largely on the ‘how’ e.g., how was RCRC faring in these environments and how could RCRC build on good practices, lessons and continue to improve how it informs preparedness work and response approaches in PCCE.

Given time constraints, secondary data review and key informant interviews largely proceeded simultaneously; sequencing these methods as planned may have resulted in greater understanding of the operations prior to key informant interviews, however the researchers did review some documents prior to interviews and felt that the depth of questioning was sufficient for the purposes of the study.

Other constraints included the uneveness of data across regions and countries both internally and externally. Much of the external literature review was informed by UN, western learning networks and western-based global research and accountability organizations. The team did their best to balance data review with sources from Africa and the Middle East, among others. Internally, while all operations had standard, external reports related to the operations, only a few had evaluations of the operations, while some had highly informative strategic reflections (MENA) and case studies on topics related to the study (Lebanon, South Sudan, Global). The lack of evaluation and learning data meant that the research team had to rely more on key informant interviews.

The research team consisted of a team leader, a part-time research consultant and two part-time research associates from the Swedish Red Cross. Research was conducted between September and December 2023, reviewing over 150 documents and interviewing 72 key informants 39% were female and 61% male. The research team was able to interview stakeholders from 2 out of 17 or 70% of the targeted National Societies. The team was not able to interview the National Societies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Honduras, Lebanon and Libya.

The capacity of the research team, ongoing operations and the subsequent crisis in the Middle East impacted the availability of the team augmented this with documentation where possible.
Table 1: Stakeholders consulted

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Gender Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Map of research focus countries
**Table 2: Operations details from focus countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Operation Title</th>
<th>Operation ID</th>
<th>On-going hazards</th>
<th>Interview conducted</th>
<th>Main operation timeframe</th>
<th>Funding coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>PM Operation, Cox's Bazar</td>
<td>MDRBD001</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18/03/2017 (ongoing)</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Myanmar: Complex Emergency Operation</td>
<td>MDRM0016</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM, Compounding Natural Hazards</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>01/02/2021 - 31/03/2023</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crises</td>
<td>MDRAF007</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM, Food Insecurity, Outbreaks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10/04/2021 (ongoing)</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>South Sudan Complex Emergency</td>
<td>MDRSG006</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM, Food Insecurity, Outbreaks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>01/07/2017 - 31/12/2018</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>South Sudan Complex Emergency</td>
<td>MDRSG003</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>09/11/2014 - 31/07/2015</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigeria: Complex Crisis in the North East</td>
<td>MDRNG002</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM, Food Insecurity, Outbreaks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24/04/2017 - 31/12/2018</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Tigray Complex Emergency</td>
<td>MDRTIGRAY</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26/01/2021 - 26/07/2022</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanon/MENA: Complex Humanitarian Crisis</td>
<td>MDRLE001</td>
<td>Explosion, PM, Economic Downturn</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>18/11/2021 - 31/12/2023</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanon/MENA: Complex Humanitarian Crisis</td>
<td>MDRLE007</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>25/06/2019 - 15/06/2019</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanon/MENA: Complex Humanitarian Crisis</td>
<td>MDRLE004</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30/10/2014 - 31/12/2015</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Libya/MENA: Storm Daniel</td>
<td>MDRLY005</td>
<td>Floods, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13/09/2023 (ongoing)</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Libya/MENA: Storm Daniel</td>
<td>MDRLY002</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>23/06/2020 - 31/09/2020</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Libya/MENA: Storm Daniel</td>
<td>MDRLY001</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>11/08/2015 - 11/12/2015</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria/MENA: Complex Emergency</td>
<td>MDRS007</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, Earthquake, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>07/02/2022 - 31/08/2022</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria/MENA: Complex Emergency</td>
<td>MDRS003</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, Earthquake, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>06/07/2014 - 31/12/2021</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti: Civil Unrest</td>
<td>MDRH008</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, Earthquake, Floods, Outbreaks, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13/01/2020 - 18/11/2015</td>
<td>114%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti: Civil Unrest</td>
<td>MDRH017</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, Earthquake, Floods, Outbreaks, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18/10/2019 - 18/01/2020</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti: Civil Unrest</td>
<td>MDRH018</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, Earthquake, Floods, Outbreaks, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15/08/2021 - 31/12/2023</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti: Civil Unrest</td>
<td>MDRH020</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, Earthquake, Floods, Outbreaks, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18/06/2023 - 31/12/2023</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Mexico &amp; Central America: Migration Crisis</td>
<td>MDR43008</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29/07/2022 - 31/12/2023</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Mexico &amp; Central America: Migration Crisis</td>
<td>MDR43002</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29/07/2022 - 31/12/2024</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Mexico &amp; Central America: Migration Crisis</td>
<td>MDR43017</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29/07/2022 - 31/12/2025</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Mexico &amp; Central America: Migration Crisis</td>
<td>MDR43016</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29/07/2022 - 31/12/2026</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Mexico &amp; Central America: Migration Crisis</td>
<td>MDR43008</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29/07/2022 - 31/12/2027</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Mexico &amp; Central America: Migration Crisis</td>
<td>MDR43008</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>29/07/2022 - 31/12/2028</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Mexico &amp; Central America: Migration Crisis</td>
<td>MDR43008</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29/07/2022 - 31/12/2029</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenia: PM</td>
<td>MDRAM012</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenia: PM</td>
<td>MDRAM010</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenia: PM</td>
<td>MDRAM007</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan: Border Conflict</td>
<td>MDRKG013</td>
<td>Border Conflict, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>01/06/2022 - 31/10/2022</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan: Border Conflict</td>
<td>MDRKT031</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25/09/2021 - 31/12/2022</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan: Border Conflict</td>
<td>MDRKT030</td>
<td>Floods</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24/05/2021 - 1/09/2021</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan: Border Conflict</td>
<td>MDRKT032</td>
<td>Border Conflict, PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>01/10/2022 - 31/01/2023</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Armenia: PM</td>
<td>MDRAM012</td>
<td>Border Conflict, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>28/09/2023 (ongoing)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Armenia: PM</td>
<td>MDRAM007</td>
<td>Cold wave, Explosion, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>27/09/2020 (unclear)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Armenia: PM</td>
<td>MDRAM010</td>
<td>Border Conflict, PM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>03/10/2022 - 31/01/2023</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Storm Daniel hit north-eastern Libya on September 2023, bringing strong winds and sudden heavy rainfall which led to massive flooding, devastation and deaths. Infrastructure has been greatly damaged, including dams near Derna that burst, causing flooding which has swept away entire neighbourhoods. Libyan Red Crescent teams and volunteers were first on the ground, evacuating people and providing first aid and search and rescue efforts. © Lybian Red Crescent, 2024
PART 2 – REFLECTIONS ON THE EXTERNAL CONTEXT AND RCRC EXPERIENCES IN PROTRACTED CRISSES AND COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Current Context and Scope

In 2022, an estimated 406.6 million people living in 82 countries were assessed to be in need of humanitarian assistance. Of those 82 countries, 44 of them were experiencing some type of a protracted crises accounting for 83% of the total number of people in need in 2022. Key drivers of complex crises in 2022 were climate-related (such as drought or flooding), and situations affected by conflict and socio-economic fragility. In 2022, 54% of all people in need faced all three of these risk factors (conflict, socio-fragility, economic fragility) while 75% faced two.

A report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) on internal displacement noted that in 2021, 88% of displacement due to disasters occurred in countries experiencing conflict and crisis, further illustrating the prevalence of complexity in emergencies.

The number of people in need is increasing each year; over the four years between 2018 and 2021, the numbers in need increased by an estimated 70% from 122 million to 2018 million, putting an immense strain on the global humanitarian system. Lack of sufficient resources in many of these contexts is increasing the economic challenges facing affected populations further impacting livelihoods and increasing risks to agricultural production; these challenges disproportionately affect displaced populations perpetuating the economic constraints and burdens already made by climate change and conflict. These compounded economic and conflict situations result in enormous threats for global peace, security and stability.

National and local authorities are important actors in preparing for and responding to complex emergencies and crises; however, concurrent challenges such as conflict and climate crises can impact a government’s ability to mount a meaningful response which can then further exacerbate the challenges - leading to more conflict, displacement and overall, more people in need. Protracted and complex crisis with economic and political influences have enormous implications on peace and security – such as in Haiti, Myanmar, Pakistan and many of the crises in Africa, and often leave affected populations without economic opportunities due to the lack of public services.

A review of the top ten protracted crises from the INFORM Severity index that were also considered to be ‘complex’ revealed that the vast majority are ruled by non-elected parties and/or are experiencing significant internal violence and instability (Afghanistan, Haiti, Lebanon, Sudan, Libya, Palestine, Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Nigeria). Weak governance, conflict and political instability can both drive humanitarian crises and be a result of such crises. Lack of sufficient access to goods and services, food insecurity, disruption to livelihoods, competition over resources and ongoing displacement are key features in these contexts.

26 Ibid. p26.
Policy Foundation of the IFRC work in Protracted Crises and Complex Emergencies

In an ever-changing and complex world, where challenges loom large and solutions and resources seem to be too few, it can be helpful to be reminded of the IFRC core roles and responsibilities and to know that the work that is pursued is important, meaningful and necessary.

The role and responsibilities of the IFRC are well articulated in the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Statutory Texts of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The IFRC is further guided by resolutions of the International Conference which meets in principle every four years, and by directives validly given to it by the General Assembly.

Article 4 of the IFRC Constitution notes that the general objective of The Federation “is to inspire, encourage, facilitate, and promote at all times all forms of humanitarian activities by National Societies with a view to preventing and alleviating human suffering and contributing to the maintenance and promotion of human dignity and peace in the world.”

Article 5 further elaborates the functions which can generally be summarized as services to National Societies, specifically, through 1) coordination, 2) in supporting the development of sustainable and duly recognized National Societies with a strong capacity to address vulnerabilities, reduce risk, prepare for disasters and support relief, and promote a culture of non-violence and peace in cooperation with appropriate national authorities, and 3) represent National Societies internationally and protect their integrity.

IFRC has these mandates regardless of the context. In times of civil unrest, complex emergencies or conflict – these responsibilities still accrue to the IFRC, and some may be even more critical to address during such situations. Moreover, Article 5 of the IFRC constitution further notes that in times of humanitarian assistance, the IFRC is to, “bring relief to victims of armed conflicts and internal strife, to assist in the promotion and the development of international humanitarian law and to disseminate this law and the Fundamental Principles, in accordance with the agreements concluded with other components of the Movement.”

In 1997 in Seville, Spain, the components of the Movement entered into an agreement via the Council of Delegates articulating how coordination will be carried out in relation to the international activities identified in the Movement statutes. This agreement established guidelines based on organizational statutes, competencies, and complementarity. The 1997 Seville agreement replaced a 1989 Agreement between the ICRC and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation). Supplementary measures to Seville were adopted by the Council of Delegates in 2005 to address the perception that despite some successes, Seville was still not well understood. The supplementary measures further articulated terminology such as ‘lead agency’ and further elaborated how coordination was to be carried out and the mechanisms by which it would be guided. In October of 2022 the Council of Delegates adopted The Movement Coordination for Collective Impact Agreement which came to be known as Seville 2.0. This agreement was borne out of several years of discussion on collective impact and interests in finding ways to further enhance the collective efforts and efficiency of the Movement. It was also informed by interests to replicate successes in the global Movement response to covid, and to continue to articulate how to improve coordination and cooperation.

While Seville 2.0 covers a range of contexts, it also addresses the roles and responsibilities of the RCRC Movement in times of protracted crises, civil unrest, and conflict. In times of conflict, a Movement response
is necessitated and will fall under the NS as convener and the ICRC as co-convener. Article 5.4 notes that the ICRC’s co-convener role in internal strife is triggered by increased polarization within the country and spikes in the intensity of the violence, resulting in increasing needs of affected people and requiring a collective response of the Movement to meet the consequent humanitarian needs. It also notes that in times of population movements in areas where the State is not a party to the conflict nor facing internal unrest, and after a conflict, IFRC shall support relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation, and during natural disasters and other crises (seemingly within a PCCE) IFRC shall assume the role of co-convener in coordination with the NS.

Article 6 covers the Transition from conflict but includes transition to protracted crises and describes how co-conveners will work together with the convener to ensure a smooth transition from one co-convener to the other as relevant.

In accordance with humanitarian standards and best practice, local capacity-building or in the case of RCRC Movement, National Society Development, should be emphasized or continued during protracted crises, including as well the understanding of the NS operationalizing the convener role.

This shall also include the work with National Societies to operationalize their role as convener as stated in the Seville 2.0.

IFRC involvement in PCCE is also guided by the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy as articulated the box to the right.

Finally, the Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance form an important part of the statutory framework of the Movement and therefore are a critical part of the work of the Movement in some contexts also including PCCE. The document contains ten principles that reinforce many of the themes noted in the research including the importance of: localization, internal and external coordination, supporting recovery, and that assistance is not only needs-based but must be in line with affected populations own priorities. The document also elicits a range of ‘rules’ between and among National Societies and the IFRC covering preparedness and readiness, principled approaches, quality and accountability and coordination with external actors. This document has been updated over the years as humanitarian learning expands and standards change.

Readers are encouraged to review the foundational documents noted herein which clearly specify the need for the IFRC in PCCE to carry out its mandates. The complexity of these environments and the resources required necessitates that we work as One Red Cross in accordance with the normative frameworks described herein.

36 Seville 2.0 – Article 5.4 Situations Triggering a Collective Response of the Movement pp. 11-12, Geneva, 2022.  
Strengthening Crisis Response

Who is affected?

While who is impacted by protracted crises and complex emergencies is influenced by the local context, a review of the external literature noted that there are key groups that are commonly and disproportionately impacted. These include:

- women (particularly pregnant and lactating women)
- children
- people living with disabilities
- the elderly
- people on the move, and those otherwise displaced
- those who are undocumented

These populations typically have least agency, lesser access to resources and are more vulnerable to a variety of risks. Key informant interviews with NS and IFRC staff reinforced these categories, with many highlighting how displaced persons are at constant risk of exploitation; they also emphasized the vulnerability of host communities. In one example, key informants noted how one host community of 2,000 inhabitants were deluged with an influx of 50,000 migrants in a remote area. Others noted that indigenous persons are often under-assessed, ignored or altogether missed and that it’s critically important to have a clear understanding of the crisis so that you can better assess who may be at further risk such as religious or ethnic minorities – particularly in times of civil unrest or conflict. Other key informants noted that while women and youth are highly vulnerable, they are also an important part of the solution, particularly in conflict situations. This was reiterated in the external literature - enabling livelihoods, increasing gender awareness and equity, supporting the education and development of women and youth can have huge, positive impacts in supporting social cohesion.

To better understand who is impacted and how they are recovering - collecting, analysing and using disaggregated data on gender, age and disability is key. While many organizations have long understood the importance of this, it continues to be often overlooked, not shared or otherwise not collected in both acute and chronic disaster settings. While this type of data is important in all disaster settings, it is especially critical in protracted and complex emergencies where protection issues are often pervasive.

In 2022 only a third of UN-coordinated appeals provided information on the proportions of women and children per crisis context. A recent review of sex- and age-disaggregated data in the humanitarian sector found that these gaps were due to a lack of accountability for existing standards, a lack of gender specific expertise and capacity in crisis contexts and increasing data collection at the project level that is not being communicated to the cluster or wider system level.

Development Initiatives. Challenges in gender data. 2023:48

Importance of Continuous Needs Assessments in PCCE

"Needs fluctuate constantly – so you have to constantly assess and adapt – for example – in the population movement – say you planned for 400 arrivals a day and your surge team came and helped out in the first three months and then mid-way through the operation, after surge left, you get an even bigger peak like 4,000 a day – what do you do?"

IFRC, Americas (paraphrased)

"Complex emergencies are not static. Population movements are changing, and the conflict is never static. Sometimes food items that we bring to the field are no longer adequate because there was a huge arrival of children. Other times what we respond with was no longer needed because needs change quickly. Having community volunteers ready with questions preloaded (into the phones) can help find out what the needs are. We are always trying to be ready with what is needed."

Nigerian Red Cross (paraphrased)
Assessing Needs – Good Practices and Challenges

To understand crisis impacts, humanitarian conditions and response capacities in protracted and complex emergencies requires a somewhat different approach to data collection and analysis over methods often used in sudden-onset disaster situations. In sudden-onset disasters (not within a protracted or complex crisis), crisis drivers and aggravating factors may be fairly straightforward, with the humanitarian profile and needs severity becoming clearer within the first weeks of the response. The disaster may be ‘common’ and public authorities may have significant experience in mounting a response. Whereas in a PCCE, developing and maintaining a comprehensive understanding of needs severity across all affected areas, population groups and sectors, requires a higher level of interpretive analysis for which a more nuanced and context-specific insight remains critical.

Some key differences are highlighted in the text box below.

Table 3 - Differences in Needs Assessment & Design: PCCE vs. Sudden onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protracted/Complex Crises</th>
<th>Sudden-onset Disasters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Multi-sector, multi-stakeholder</td>
<td>• Often traceable to an acute shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frequent assessments as needs, vulnerabilities and capacities fluctuate or may be cyclical</td>
<td>• May be linear (focuses on restoration not always on build back better)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Requires thorough understanding of context &amp; history including of conflict, of diverse populations and power dynamics</td>
<td>• Focus on minimum needs and what was damaged or lost (doesn’t always include vulnerabilities and capacities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recovery is non-linear</td>
<td>• What was impacted may be more visible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Requires resilience-focus and focused on people’s capacities</td>
<td>• May incorporate many of PCCE assessment and design features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adopts Do No Harm Lens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Need to understand and adopt protection principles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emphasizes participatory approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protracted/Complex Crises</th>
<th>Sudden-onset Disasters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In addition to these humanitarian good practices, key informants emphasized additional points that influence needs assessment, design and ultimately implementation. These informants noted from their experience that ‘In population movements one need to anticipate the languages and cultures of the displaced persons and try to adapt accordingly; In migrant movements you can have a huge range of languages that none of your staff or volunteers speak and yet the NS has to find a way to support them. There are multiple legal frameworks and people with different status- so it’s really important to understand what the options for them are and what the government is permitting’. In a protracted crises in particular, the needs may have been there for some time unlike in sudden-onset disasters where the needs may be traceable to a recent acute shock. In several operations, NS and IFRC in some cases have tried to address needs through the on-going development programmes because perhaps the needs were not yet reaching a DREF level of need until all of a sudden, things change significantly. In the Americas, IFRC and NS were watching and warning about the crisis in Venezuela and by the time needs were considered and the EA was launched, one million people had already crossed into Columbia. In times like these, greater flexibility with important tools like anticipatory action and DREF could help NS assess needs in a more timely fashion and respond more promptly – particularly when population movements are involved.

In another operation, when responding to a natural disaster within a protracted and complex crisis, teams could not do a needs assessment based on disaster impact as needs were so high and pervasive across affected communities. Instead, needs assessments were done based on vulnerabilities within a geographical perimeter.

Other well-known lessons highlighted by key informants emphasized:

- The importance of good coordination, including during needs assessment - particularly in big operations as there may be a lot of stakeholders involved in the same region and they may not all be aware of the role of the local Red Cross/Red Crescent; while there may be very few cases where the NS cannot coordinate with UN, international organizations due to perceptions of their non-neutrality, external coordination should always be the default position.

- Coordination also improves timely access to secondary data as the multi-sector needs assessment (MSNA) is now an IASC standard; however the RCRC has to be in the habit of accessing and using it. They should also then be doing their own data collection to enhance their understanding of the context, to fill in the gaps of the MSNA or to even counter what the UN may be promoting as it may not be based on representative, local data collection. A better understanding of the context through this primary data collection and analysis will assist in the planning, in the coordination with other actors and inform discussions with the authorities and donors.

- Stakeholders also noted needs assessments must be streamlined, focusing on the most relevant variables since the probability that survey fatigue amongst communities and affected populations may set in or already be present in protracted settings.

- In many settings, particularly where access to key areas may be severely curtailed such as in Ethiopia and Ukraine, the branches can play a critical role in providing detailed information on what is happening, in informing needs and driving the planning for that area. The work by ERCS in Tigray region has been highlighted by many as a best practice given the extensive role branches in that areas played. It's important for branches to have key capacity in advance and is one the reasons why so many NS in PCCE are requesting support in branch development.

- In PCCE, you need more than needs assessments. Regular risk analysis, scenario planning, forecasting and foresight linked to broader early warning systems and longer-term strategies will be beneficial in designing relevant and effective programming with affected communities and people on the move.

Global Tools – Key Reflections

The IFRC supports a range of tools in response programming; these have been tweaked, adapted and improved over the years and again most recently in the late teens through a concerted effort called ‘surge optimization’. Other improvements include, more regular use of anticipatory action, increased funding limits for DREF as well as improvements to the timeliness of DREF. Emergency Appeals and Operation Strategies have recently gone through changes designed to better address the contexts in which they are used. Case-for-Support and Decision papers are two additional tools (though not officially global response tools) that have been used to increase flexibility in how IFRC supports NS in PCCE operations.

This research did not include a significant review of the global tools since tools will never be perfect, will always need to be adapted to the context in which they are applied and are influenced by the capacities and biases of the users. However, the working group (WG) did ask about the tools in two contexts, one was in the transition from EA to UP (or long-term planning) and what could be improved; and how well were the tools adapted for PCCE settings? Feedback from key stakeholders, primarily IFRC, is summarized here but the research team did not deeply assess those challenges, nor investigate what solutions were needed. Rather the research team listened and have summarized the most pressing concerns and aligned where possible with the external literature review on good practices.
A few stakeholders noted that the response tools were flexible and agile to a certain extent, that they supported continuous, ongoing needs assessment, scenario planning and encouraged some assessment of secondary impacts, but many stakeholders still felt they had their limitations. Moreover, some noted that one cannot really have a tool (or even toolbox) for protracted crises, rather what is needed is greater flexibility and agility than what the tools already provide.

The IFRC Operations Team does a lessons’ learned exercise every year and a meta review every few years with the PMER team to identify the challenges, learning and way forward more formally for all operations. The top challenges from the latest meta are summarized here as many of these themes were also noted by the key informants in this research study. The operations meta findings have significant implications in PCCE and moreover many have ongoing or planned actions to begin to address them.

Figure 3 - Operations meta-analysis 2020 - 2023, p9.

TOP CHALLENGES - 2023 META-ANALYSIS

Nearly all of the top five challenges are all recurring themes from past 13 years...

1. **Lack of proper assessment and analysis, linked to operational planning**
2. **Minimal Understanding of IFRC systems and procedures amongst Membership**
3. **High turnover of surge staff, weak handovers, and short missions**
4. **Weak operations monitoring**
5. **Lack of deployable corporate services**

- **Assessment and Analysis**: Stakeholders noted that assessment tools could be further modified for the PCCE contexts; greater investments in analytics were needed; many felt the current approaches did not comprise actual analysis but simply fed into reporting. Others reported that the IFRC tools, processes, capacity and timing requirements appear to lead to an over-reliance on secondary data; while this can be efficient and effective and limit the burden on affected populations (and reiterating that the tools and analysis by bodies like UN have greatly improved), several stakeholders felt RCRC could make more effort to validate or even counter some of these analyses given the unique structure and access National Societies have.

- **Systems, Procedures and Turnover**: Some stakeholders noted the impact of significant turnover of IFRC and NS staff and volunteers contributed to a lower understanding of IFRC systems and procedures. This was having an impact in PCCE operations as users did not fully understand the gaps and how to augment their use – not to mention the time operations managers had to take briefing staff or re-doing their work.

- **Monitoring**: similar to assessments and analysis, many acknowledged that more monitoring is needed in PCCE which requires more time, more resources and more nuanced approaches as access changes, needs change, and what the NS is offering may no longer align, and that multiple, simultaneous emergencies stretch volunteers to thinly; others noted in addition, NS are not always in the habit of requesting, collecting and analysing data from their branches but that branches are uniquely placed to understand the situation better and greater investment in their capacities is needed.

40 Analytics generally refers to four main types - predictive, prescriptive, diagnostic and descriptive. It appears much of the IFRC operations data is descriptive. NS are asking for more support in the other types, so programs and risk management is better informed.
• **Corporate services**: While the meta-analysis refers to lack of deployable staff, many stakeholders consistently noted challenges in additional corporate services (procurement, logistics, finance, administration and human resources) noting quite often a lack of timely support, good customer service and what appeared to be a lack of understanding of the crises and their complexities that teams were trying to deal with.

Additional key common challenges not already included in the above noted by key informants included:

• **Timeframe**: The EA is too short (though there were some exceptions to get it extended e.g. Syria and Bangladesh to name but two). A much longer timeframe is needed to address the basic challenges; others noted that given the prevalence, scope and impact of PCCE, the tools really need to be more comprehensive and cover a much longer timeframe (response, recovery, mitigation and longer-term resilience).

• **Timing**: protracted crises and complex emergencies ebb and flow; teams need to be able to regularly modify the plan, the approach, possibly even staffing e.g. one stakeholder gave the example of a surge team finishing and after they left the NS had a big influx.

• **Costing**: Eligible costs in DREF need reconsideration as some things that are not eligible are essential (non-dedicated staff was one example raised by several key informants).

• **Flexibility**: Need for strategic tools or approaches (besides planning) that enable adjustments throughout and facilitate the transition to the Unified Support Plan (USP). This could include the ability to formulate issues and alternative approaches (like risk management and scenario planning), reasonable monitoring and feedback systems that link to a collective strategic decision-making system to enable and support pivots in the plan efficiently.

### Human Resources

What skills are need when supporting PCCE operations?

Many stakeholders referred to the skills the IFRC needed when supporting the NS in any given country, however, occasionally stakeholders also reflected on the NS, or both. Overall, a majority of stakeholders noted that what is most needed for anyone working in these settings is essentially emotional quotient (EQ) or emotional intelligence along with some technical skills. Several noted EQ is far more important than technical, particularly at leadership levels. While there are a range of definitions for EQ, it generally refers to a set of soft skills including empathy, effective communication and social skills, self-awareness, self-regulation, integrity and motivation. It’s also what is looked for in most leadership and management positions. However, for persons to succeed in diverse or cross-cultural settings, they also need strong cultural quotient or CQ. This is essentially the capacity to identify and face cross-cultural challenges and adapt appropriately, building on all the skills highlighted in the EQ definition.

Technical skills highlighted included analytical skills and the ability to comprehensively analyse the context; conflict preparation – experience in conflict settings and an idea of how to adapt approaches was important for several stakeholders; this did not happen for many agencies responding to Ebola in DRC, including the RCRC, leading to some delays in access and initial challenges in service delivery; awareness of IFRC systems, tools and key frameworks was also noted to be important – including the People-on-the-Move framework as well as capacity to understand the different status of displaced persons and the application of local legal frameworks.

Many stakeholders noted the importance of planning - linking the current context of the EA to longer-term programming while ensuring both types of planning are contributing to comprehensive resilience and social cohesion. Having an overall, long-term vision, bridging the response-recovery-development divide that builds on the NS’s long-term programming and links the donors to this strategic trajectory is a tall order but
one that is critical in these settings and a skill that has often been lacking according to some.

Strong skills in PGI and CEA was highlighted, even by donors. Finally, several emphasized the importance of linking good analysis to solid planning – highlighting the importance of planning, monitoring and again, adaptability as the context changes frequently in PCCE.

Strong EQ enables management and leadership to speak up when needed and to bring along their chain of command as well as donors in order to negotiate for needed changes as the environment fluctuates or drastically changes during the crisis.

**Auxiliary Role**

A strong, clear and well-articulated and understood auxiliary role is important for the well-functioning of an NS and in enabling principled approaches. Population movements across the Americas and their lack of widespread support by Governments in the region and donors, have severely hampered many of the NSs who have had to find workarounds to deal with steady streams of people in need of assistance. In Guatemala the RC does not have a defined role in population movements, nor is the Government taking a primary role. Service delivery is left to humanitarian organizations. The CRG branches are doing what they can, while overall, CRG keeps a low profile in that they are not overtly publicizing the services or numbers reached in fear of some sort of social and Government backlash.

The auxiliary role can be further compromised or complicated when there is no official government. In the case of Haiti, gangs have ‘ruled’ the country for several years now, yet HRCS still has mandated roles to perform and continue to work with relevant ministries as best they can. For HRCS, a solid prior relationship and understanding of their role has helped during the civil unrest. Staff noted that it was important for them to know when to take the lead and when to cede to the ‘State’ to avoid any misunderstandings in the field.

In many countries, stakeholders noted that they often have to remind their government of the NS role and the role of the government in supporting them; frequent government transitions and turnover means the NS often starts from scratch in relationship-building and ensuring awareness of and support for their role. Having a Red Cross/Red Crescent law was critical for many and still outstanding for others. It is a key tool in solidifying the role of the NS and in helping to ensure its role and principles are less likely to be compromised in times of crises.
Principled Response and Humanitarian Diplomacy

Managing access and ensuring a principled response in humanitarian crises is a continuously evolving challenge. While it clearly involves the planning and delivery of aid and related services solely based on need while emphasizing humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality – this alone is not enough to ensure a principled and effective response.

Additional approaches needed include: adopting strategies focused on resilience; having humanitarian and development actors work together as overwhelmingly called for at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit41 and as illustrated in the UN New Way of Working from 2017;42 ensuring appropriate engagement at all levels, as well as flexible approaches that readily adapt as the context, needs and capacities change.

Key lessons on principled response from the literature review include:

Engagement is Continuous: In crises involving conflict and complexity, staff need to constantly engage local actors, state/non-state, possibly armed groups and particularly local communities to ensure needs and capacities are well understood and to ensure access and safe passage. Ethiopia Red Cross (ERCS) well understood this and worked diligently at the community level to ensure accountability and transparency. At the same time they worked with public and private media to ensure the role of the ERCS, their actions and their neutrality were well understood. They engaged in roundtable discussions with various actors, and frequently published statements of ongoing challenges and successes. ERCS engagement is further bolstered by having a dedicated Humanitarian Diplomacy department and works closely with law enforcement and their ministry of foreign affairs. ICRC negotiating with 300 gangs in Haiti is another good example of the importance of continuous engagement.43

Community Engagement is Vital (and Continuous). Communities must be a part of the process - helping to identify needs, capacities and solutions. Often times this step is skipped, particularly at the outset of emergencies. Or blanket approaches may be taken because targeted approaches informed by the community may seem too challenging; regardless, communities should be consulted, informed and provide input to any potential services or support designed to assist in their recovery. Communities also need to be part of the monitoring, implementation and overall accountability system. The CDAC Network (Communicating with Disaster-affected Communities) has many tools, lessons, case studies and real time resources in conflict and protracted crisis situations for members.44 Some of these learnings are reflected in Federation guidance on communication engagement and accountability (CEA).45 Despite the CDAC name, it’s important to note that the learning and tools go beyond communicating; they also emphasize engagement, capacity building and learning from and with affected populations.

Flexibility and Adaptability is important. In PCCE, the context is fluid as noted. That means needs, capacities and options will likely change over time including in the middle of an operation; what was planned at the outset may not work 2 months in – as was noted by Tajikistan Red Crescent during the Afghanistan Population Movement response.46 Humanitarian programs must be designed to be flexible and adapt to the changing context and needs on the ground. Flexibility in design is further aided by capacity to facilitate anticipatory action and in using crises modifying financial instrument like DREF.

41 WHS 2016 identified 5 core responsibilities and 24 transformations; core responsibility number 4 and its three transformations fully illustrate the need and rationale to work differently to reduce humanitarian needs. For more information, see https://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Agenda_for_Humanity_Booklet.pdf
42 Various UN resources on what this means for the UN and partners can be found at https://www.un.org/jsc/content/new-way-working
44 https://www.cdacnetwork.org/
Managing power structures and mitigating hurdles in advance: RCRC need to continuously emphasize the seven principles, particularly neutrality and impartiality with authorities at all levels to help ensure aid is not politicized. Having clear auxiliary roles and strong relationships with authorities is an important preparedness measure that can mitigate bureaucratic hurdles and can help prevent new obstacles that could limit humanitarian access. Detailed contingency plans can also assist in identifying future scenarios in which governments might limit humanitarian access or perhaps challenge the response role of the National Society.

Stakeholders interviewed agreed humanitarian diplomacy was critical, particularly in raising awareness of the role of the NS and in supporting increased access. The term HD is not used by all NS and some NS saw it more as something IFRC does; however, many NS perform HD but use different terminology; while some, like ERCS have an HD department which has been instrumental in significant and regular communication with authorities, the military and conflicting parties.

The importance of speaking with one voice was emphasized repeatedly - that is the NS, the IFRC, ICRC and PNS need to be on the same page as to the key messages and the strategy for communicating with various stakeholders. Achieving this took longer than people would have liked but it was critical to achieve in a few operations as noted by stakeholders. A few NS mentioned the importance of actively working to maintain the trust of the people (public) particularly during protracted crises and complex emergencies. This requires a mindful application and monitoring of the principles and over-communication to all (staff, volunteers, authorities, other actors, parties to the conflict etc.) on the plans and actions of the National Society.

In situations involving conflict, IFRC staff noted that it can be difficult in general for NS to be neutral and independent and IFRC has to be aware of this and support them accordingly; another noted that this is why understanding what the principles look like in action is so crucial; in one country raising awareness on applying the principles in actions was part of the preparedness work and the emerging NSD plan; when the conflict did happen, the NS was in a better place to apply the discussions and learning.

IFRC stakeholders across the board agreed on the importance of HD capacity and not just in civil unrest or situations of conflict; it’s also critical in times of migration and displacement, when the NS may not be well known throughout the government or highly regarded among the people; when donor interest is waning or non-existent, when governments in a region keep turning over (requiring NS and IFRC to constantly remind authorities of the auxiliary role, disaster law etc.), in times of fake news bombardment including misguided assumptions of the integrity of the NS, in times of sanctions etc…..the list goes on. In other words, HD is
always needed – however the skills, analysis and capacity to generate an evidenced-informed messaging and the overall level of effort increases exponentially in situations of protracted crises and complex emergencies. And when these crises are crossing multiple borders, on top of the presence of many of the complexities listed above – significant human resources are needed. Its criticality to operations, to access and in protecting NS integrity is one of the reasons why HD is one of the three ‘legs’ of the IFRC global management team (GMT) priorities. In addition to adequate human resourcing, for more, high-quality HD to be done and for it to have a bigger impact, the evidence is needed on how the conditions, context etc. are impacting the ability to provide principled aid and reach affected populations. Stories are not enough. Evidence is needed.

**Improving Coordination and Cyclical Planning**

**What are the key sectors commonly addressed in PCCE and how do they change over time?**

Life-saving interventions are prioritized at the outset of many crises – particularly sudden onset and population movements; over-time or as soon as possible they try including more resilience-based and mitigation efforts: moving from food aid and cash to greater livelihoods investments, from water trucking to rehabilitation of WASH infrastructure, from the distribution of dignity kits to greater investments in women’s livelihoods and increasing availability of access to health services are but a few examples.

In complex and protracted crises, particularly those involving refugees, displaced persons, and the undocumented, there may be limits on what support can be provided. In many cases externally displaced persons (migrants, refugees, those otherwise detained in camp settings, the undocumented in host communities etc.) may not be allowed work, may be denied access to health care, and may not even be able to benefit from cash programming due to a lack of appropriate identification. A thorough understanding of migration and displacement issues in the country and associated legal protections and barriers is important to understand in advance and should inform contingency or scenario plans.

Slow-onset crises may occur within a complex emergency or may contribute to one. Climate crises such as drought, erosion, El Nino events etc. leading to food insecurity are some examples. These benefit from early warning, mitigation, and other early action. Whether in anticipation or in response, protection and livelihoods type interventions are generally prioritized and are often guided by an overall resilience plan.

Other common interventions in protracted and complex crises include psychological support, gender-based violence prevention and protection, and humanitarian diplomacy/advocacy to help ensure affected populations can get access to key services, that rights are protected, and to promote social inclusion where relevant.

The triple nexus (humanitarian aid - development - peace) is a key approach to addressing the multifaceted characteristics of protracted crises and complex emergencies. It reinforces the importance of combining immediate emergency aid with longer-term investments and initiatives to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities, while promoting resilience of affected populations. Ideally humanitarian actors would be coordinating with key development and peace-building actors in a given setting to maximize resources and impact. See The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: Reflections for the Federation for further details.

Climate change often sits at the core of complex emergencies, and it should be addressed in mitigation strategies, ideally through local actors. However, countries facing protracted crises and suffering greater climate adaptation challenges receive less climate mitigation assistance that climate vulnerable countries without protracted crises; while on the surface that might seem to make sense given conflict impacts and insecurity – these countries also receive less climate financing than other protracted crisis countries with lesser climate vulnerabilities.47

In 2020, three-quarters of the countries that received below-average climate finance had experienced active conflict during the previous decade. It is estimated to be a fifth of what conflict-free countries receive.

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47 Development Initiatives, GHA 2023: p18.
Countries attempting to mitigate these impacts by redirecting finances towards climate adaptation and mitigation strategies include South Sudan, Kenya and Somalia - where climate change and conflict have further destabilized the region in the past 7 years. 48

**Key Actors**

The main actors in PCCE include a diverse range of organizations and entities. These actors have traditionally comprised the United Nations, international and national NGOs, national authorities, and of course, the RCRC Movement. However, the landscape of involvement in PCCE is evolving as collaboration across the triple nexus (humanitarian, development, and peace) expands, and the impacts of climate change become more evident.

In many settings, to tackle the intricate challenges involved in protracted and complex crises, a collaborative approach that engages humanitarian organizations, development actors, climate scientists, policymakers, and government officials is needed. 49 For example the use of start-up ventures in the Democratic Republic of Congo have played a crucial role in stabilizing the still-volatile situation in the region. 50 In another example, UN, INGOs, and a multilateral development bank worked together with local and public authorities to shore up the water supply in Cox's Bazar. While the system is still not fully sustainable as long-term solutions are not in place, 51 it does begin to illustrate the type of planning and partnership that is needed to support access to services and eventual sustainability. Private sector plays an increasingly important role in humanitarian response, recovery and development including in conflict and post conflict settings as it can facilitate longer-term economic growth, transparency, trade and eventual stabilization. The Governance and Social Development Resource Center 52 has a range of tools and learnings on this and has advised many UN agencies, multilateral development banks and bilateral donors.

**RCRC Coordination in PCCE**

Coordination is a prevalent issue within UN, INGOs, and most, if not all organizations with disparate offices far afield from their HQ. Even the biggest national societies have issues with the independence of branches or poor communication upstream and down. Coordination remains a strategic priority for the IFRC and has long been a challenge for the Secretariat and its membership, but has also benefitted from major learning and strategic improvements over time. Major humanitarian events have at times, fast-tracked learning. The response to the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis of 2004 helped to usher in new models of coordination and benefitted from global learning coming out of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. 53 The major response also influenced the IFRC to invest in new coordination models with NS and ICRC after testing new approaches in Sri Lanka and Indonesia 2005 – 2007, including efforts in Federation-wide financial and programmatic reporting systems; over-time this reporting system has been improved and is now required for all major events exceeding a certain financial threshold. Seville, the Supplementary Measures, SMCC, Seville 2.0, Agenda for Renewal and the IFRC New Way of Working (NWOW) have all emphasized the importance of coordination and ways to enhance its effectiveness. Strategic Coordination is one of three major priorities for the IFRC Secretary General. The IFRC Global Plan 2023 dedicated an entire section to Strategic and Operational Coordination, reiterating the IFRC institutional mandates in protracted, complex clouds.

48 Crisis Group, 2021 https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/fair-share-of-climate-finance
52 https://reliefweb.int/organization/gsdrc
53 https://www.undrr.org/organization/tsunami-evaluation-coalition
and fragile settings. This remains a priority in the 2024 plan.\(^{54}\) In the 2023 and 2024 plans, IFRC emphasizes membership coordination, movement coordination and coordination with external actors in a variety of contexts including PCCE. Ensuring National Societies have One Plan, and that the membership in country are part of the Unified Support Plan is a key priority and one that has been welcomed and appreciated by National Societies interviewed that were part of the initial pilots.

In an environment of increasing need, heightened complexity, with challenges in access, and seemingly insufficient resources, strategic coordination is a needed and critical role of the IFRC to play in countries where they are the co-convener to the NS. In countries where the ICRC is the co-convener – per Seville 2.0, it is critical that IFRC in consultation with the ICRC, embrace its coordination role to focus plans and resources around another of its core mandates, which is also critical in protracted and complex environments, that of National Society Development. Concerns and needs around NS corporate services – financial management, accountability, risk management, procurement, logistics, PMER and resource mobilization were highlighted by many stakeholders as critical areas for long-term support and necessary to help contribute to financially sustainable national organizations. IFRC embracing their role in coordination was emphasized by numerous stakeholders consulted during this research including NS, PNS, donors and Secretariat staff. Beyond this, major concerns with coordination in these settings was not overly emphasized, just a repeated request that IFRC embrace this role more fully and consistently.

Some good practices in coordination were highlighted during key informant interviews.

In Myanmar, the MRCS taking the lead in coordination and feel that they are benefitting from the PNS trusting in their leadership and are supporting them accordingly. This included the development of the Unified Support Plan against the MRCS One Plan which has eased the reporting burden and enhanced the strategic nature of the MRCS work according to MRCS management and leadership. MRCS also highlighted the importance of NS-to-NS coordination given that often the impact of complex emergencies is felt across borders as in the case of work between MRCS and the Thai Red Cross.

In Afghanistan, the IFRC is focused on strategic coordination; engagement with ARCS and the de facto authorities, successfully negotiating cash for support for vulnerable female headed households in just one example. Another good example is Kizilay/Turkish Red Crescent signing a global agreement with IFRC to take on a major, hands-on role in investing CHF 7.4M in programmes, procurement and logistics which is significantly enhancing service delivery.

In Africa, there is much greater visibility of the NS in national coordination bodies, at key Government meetings and in various UN meetings. Ethiopia and Kenya are but two examples, but it was noted that this is happening with many NS and should continue. In Guatemala, CRG emphasized the importance of engaging various actors and coordinating at departments and the local level. CRG was active in the National Protection Network, working to build the capacity and awareness of local civil society in humanitarian issues and first response to better support people on the move.

Other learning was more of a reminder based on successful practice – noting that coordination has to be more than information sharing, that IFRC has to facilitate true coordination and help ensure whoever is best placed to lead certain types of support to the NS be encouraged to do so.

Finally, a number of stakeholders, NS, IFRC and donors alike reiterated the importance of being seen as one Movement, and one Red Cross and having clear and consistent messaging and rallying around one plan makes it easier for everyone.

**Value-Add of Development Approaches**

The value of development approaches to address needs impacted by PCCE was repeatedly mentioned by several key informants from the Americas and Africa. Respondents emphasized that addressing immediate needs alone is not sufficient in these contexts, as the causes of the crisis are deeply rooted in the context and are multi-faceted. While the primary focus of RCRC is often on immediate needs, the potential to engage
in durable solutions was seen as high and would reduce risks to future emergencies. It is therefore seen as essential to link rapid response with approaches to building local capacity and community resilience from the outset. This could include linking short-term response efforts, such as cash interventions, with long-term development and climate adaptation activities, such as agricultural support and training. While approaches such as the Unified Plan (UP) aim to bridge this gap and promote long-term planning, some key informants highlighted that they are not yet perfectly aligned with emergency response activities and are too often considered separately.

Greater engagement in development and awareness of the development components of existing activities could also help to open up new sources of resources and funding. A lesson learned for South Sudan RC (SSRC) was the need to have the transition to development and resilience building activities already in mind when designing emergency response; and that these components should logically link to a long-term strategy. A suggestion that came from the community to SSRC was to invest more in local food production or livelihoods rather than continuing to deliver food packages. Overtime and when resources allowed, SSRC supported food security through the provision of seeds, training, and agricultural inputs to enhance crop and vegetable production. Other stakeholders noted the importance of adaptation and being aware of potential negative impacts of development activities, e.g., deforestation in Liberia as a result of livelihoods programmes.

To ensure the sustainability of assistance, the NS supported by the IFRC may need to seek further partnerships with other organisations, such as regional actors like the African Union and the African Development Bank. Some stakeholders noted that RCRC branches, because of their community roots, are ideally placed to become partners of choice for international or national development initiatives while being mindful that the NS has to strike a balance managing its auxiliary role and its relevance to the communities it serves while not spreading itself too thin.

The importance of social-economic empowerment and social protection programmes were raised by a few stakeholders. Social protection programmes are described in the IFRC World Disasters Report 2022 as those that, “help individuals and families, especially the poor and vulnerable, to cope with crises and shocks, find jobs, improve productivity, invest in the health and education of their children, and protect the aging population. They include direct services, such as shelter or employment programmes, as well as financial assistance, notably through cash transfers."55 The UN defines social protection as ‘a set of policies and programs aimed at preventing or protecting all people against poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion throughout their life cycles, with a particular emphasis towards vulnerable groups.’56 While social protection-type activities are generally implemented in response and recovery, to be truly effective, they should be developed in advance and designed to be ‘shock-responsive’. The Climate Centre working with Nigerian Red Cross in 2022 and supported by the EU in partnership with IFRC and UNICEF, worked on how social protection can support anticipatory action in situations of flooding.57 As noted elsewhere in this report, multilaterals like the World Bank in partnership with Governments are working to put national social protection systems in place in countries facing extreme crises e.g., Yemen and Afghanistan. Social protection is featured in the IFRC 2024 global plan; finding opportunities to support it in coordination with external partners on a broader scale in countries facing PCCE or at risk thereof could be considered.

A majority of NS and IFRC stakeholders at the country-level emphasised the importance of resilience approaches but also noted the need to align with the auxiliary role of the NS; some noted that IFRC should not always insist on integrated approaches in every response they support; in one appeal covering seven countries, stakeholders noted it was way too much for the NSs and for the IFRC to even coordinate; Rather, some felt that it was more important to have proper analysis, alignment with other actors and work collaboratively with a clear understanding of the planned outcomes. In too many appeals we have seen integrated approaches for the sake of integrated approaches without an understanding of overall outcomes and without a clear appreciation for what interventions fit together to best inform those outcomes. The IFRC Africa Consolidated Regional Food Security, Livelihoods and Resilience Programme Approach 2023 – 2030 (PowerPoint) is a good example. It provides a strategic framework demonstrating various ways the sectors can come together to produce key outputs, intermediate outcomes aligned to the overall goal. It provides a menu of sorts and still enables each country/sub-region to contextualize the activities to produce the overall integrated outputs and outcomes; more strategic frameworks such as this may benefit NS and IFRC working in protracted and chronic crisis situations.

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57 [https://www.climatecentre.org/priority_areas/social_protection/](https://www.climatecentre.org/priority_areas/social_protection/)
Better Inform Preparedness

Preparedness in PCCE vs. sudden onset

Opinions were mixed when asked the questions, does preparedness for PCCE differ from ‘normal’ or sudden-onset response? Key capacities and skills were highlighted – they might not fully differ from the current PER approach - rather it may be a matter of emphasis; that is a function may be the same but the tools or capacity to do it may need to be different, or the level of emphasis placed on something may be different. For example, auxiliary roles, humanitarian diplomacy, business continuity and safety and security may all be part of an NS PER but addressing them in PCCE settings requires more in-depth reflection, analysis and time. This does not mean it requires a different approach, rather these areas need greater foresight and contextualisation to ensure they are geared to these complex settings.

Highlights of key actions NS were taking to improve their preparedness and readiness for protracted and complex environments included:

- Reinforcing Emergency Action Teams, expanding volunteer capacity, establishing context-specific community engagement and accountability systems for effective awareness campaigns - including capturing people's voices and concerns (South Sudan RC).
- Early action plan for migration in critical events (Guatemala RC).
- Working on long-term programming in WASH, PSS, health and resilience was critical for preparedness given the huge development needs in Tigray and the ongoing complexities and insecurities. (Ethiopia RC).
- Ensuring the volunteer NDRTs receive continuous trainings and refreshers and have the right attitudes. This has helped tremendously in working with displaced populations (Bangladesh RC).
- Having numerous response experiences helped one NS get in the habit of planning, preparing and learning. Things like having a daily meeting of different directors for the various operations was instrumental as was eventually having a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities. The NS also worked in advance to ensure the safety and duty of care to volunteers (Syrian Arab Red Crescent).

A few National Societies spoke of the importance of their development programmes such as livelihoods, food security, healthcare, WASH, social inclusion etc. in supporting the preparedness of communities (including eventual future host communities, people on the move, and others) in enhancing their resilience to withstand future shocks.

Several stakeholders spoke about the gaps in preparedness for PCCE rather than what they were doing or promising practices.

Greater or differing skills and capacities were said to be needed in:

- **Analysis and planning**: Conducting a wider, more holistic approach beyond ‘just saving lives’; this includes being able to analyse the context and all its layers as well as doing scenario planning with this complexity in mind. Of course, scenario planning is an important part of PER but perhaps how one analyses a protracted, fragile or complex context may require different, more robust tools that practitioners may be used to. The capacity to develop contingency and long-term plans incorporating all of the above was also noted as well as planning in a continuous cycle. Analysis and planning were also noted as key in population movements including understanding the social context within which they were occurring.

- **Volunteers**. Having the right volunteers with the right skills in the right places was also highlighted by several stakeholders. Community-based volunteers from the affected communities or who otherwise know the context, culture, language and may even be known by the community is important. Linking scenario planning to HR and on-going development work would enhance preparedness in these settings. Ensuring volunteers are prepared, have the right equipment, have safety and security training, understand all the duty of care protocols were noted as a key thing several were doing while others noted more emphasis on this was needed.
• **Information management.** As part of the scenario planning, a few mentioned the importance of the cross-border sharing of information as well as materials and staff. The global CP3 programme was highlighted as a good practice in this regard.

• **Visibility and awareness.** Clarity in Auxiliary roles and visibility of NS with key stakeholders – across National Government, with local authorities, with international actors such as UN and donors is important as is having a strong positive image with the general public.

Having key tools in place in advance with staff and volunteers who know how to use them was also noted; getting new tools in the middle of a complex or protracted crisis was not always helpful. Others noted that new tools were not needed but rather guidance and some examples so that delegations and NS could augment and contextualise them as they saw fit would be more helpful.

### Safety and Security

Humanitarian workers, international and national alike, face many risks and challenges when operating in protracted crises and complex emergencies - but they are not affected equally.

Attacks on humanitarian workers continue to increase. Between 2017 and 2020, there was a 54% rise in the number of aid workers attacked (947 attacks were recorded, with 1,688 aid workers known to be victims).

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<th>Types of organisations attacked, 2013-2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INGO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Insecurity and Violence:** exposure to direct violence, including attacks, kidnappings, and targeted killings, especially in conflict zones where armed groups operate.
- **Health Risks:** there may be limited access to healthcare and staff and volunteers may be at risk of exposure to infectious diseases, epidemics, and other health hazards prevalent in crisis-affected regions.
- **Logistical Challenges:** difficulties in accessing remote or isolated areas due to damaged infrastructure, poor road networks, or hostile environments.
- **Psychosocial Stress:** Continuous exposure to the suffering and trauma of affected populations can lead to emotional burnout, mental health issues, and post-traumatic stress disorder.
- **Political and Regulatory Challenges:** obstacles from local authorities, including restrictions on movement, bureaucratic hurdles, and challenges related to obtaining necessary permits for delivering goods and services.
- **Cultural and Language Barriers:** workers including national staff, may face challenges in understanding local customs, traditions, and languages in areas in which they are unfamiliar or when dealing with displaced populations which can lead to misunderstandings and difficulties in building trust with the affected communities.

Additional or heightened risks faced by national or local staff include:

- **Targeted Violence:** Local workers may be seen as representatives of the aid agencies, making them potential targets for armed groups or individuals who may have grievances with the organization. Their ties to the community might be perceived as affiliations, leading to suspicions or even retribution from opposing groups.
- **Lack of Legal Protection:** Local aid workers may not have the same legal protections and support systems provided to international workers. While they may be employed by an international agency,
they may be subject to local labour laws which may leave them unprotected or under-supported, especially in regions where the rule of law is weak which is a large portion of protracted and complex crises.

- **Limited Access to Resources, Capacity building and overall management support**: National staff may not receive the same level of security training, personal protective equipment, or resources that would help mitigate risks, potentially exposing them to a higher level of danger. Incidents involving local workers may not receive the same level of international attention and outcry as those involving foreign humanitarian workers, leaving them to figure things out on their own. Examples of these specific situations are happening in countries like Sudan, Ethiopia and Nigeria, where humanitarian staff's safety is threatened by conflict, violence, and general crime. Also, tragic incidents due to this lack of security in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Cameroon have led to kidnappings and killings of humanitarian workers, hindering organizations' ability to reach those in need and even needing to close ongoing projects for safety reasons.

### Risk Sharing

Risk sharing in humanitarian settings revolves around the idea that since humanitarian actors all have the same goals, save lives and reduce suffering, they inherently form a service delivery chain in which each has important roles and responsibilities. If humanitarians don't equitably accept those roles and responsibilities, there can be a break in the delivery chain - creating problems in efficiently and effectively supporting affected populations.

A 2023 study commissioned by Australian Red Cross[^59] found that while risk and compliance requirements are higher in complex crisis settings, they affect local/national partners disproportionately; that localization practices in these settings are inflexible, inconsistent or piecemeal and that risk sharing by intermediaries (like the UN, INGOs, IFRC or a PNS) and donors is quite limited at a time when local and national actors, like National Societies need it the most.

A 2022 study commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ICRC[^60] looked in detail at the types of risks different stakeholders face (donors, intermediaries, local/implementing organizations), the strategies and benefits in sharing risks and the enabling and limiting factors; these are illustrated in numerous case studies. This report is comprehensive, detailed and worth reviewing particularly by policymakers and leadership across the IFRC and her membership.

If an organisation is serious in its commitment to localisation, especially in times of protracted and complex emergencies, then understanding the options to build capacity in risk management, identify, understand and mitigate risk and equitably and jointly share and reduce risks is critical. This is particularly important throughout the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, since a major risk failure by the last organisation in chain that accepted risk, perhaps only on paper, can negatively reverberate throughout the whole of the One Red Cross.

Most large humanitarian organizations appear to have comprehensive security protocols, risk mitigation and security-awareness plans in place. Ensuring sufficient investment (safety, security and capacity-building)


of national staff and volunteers should feature prominently given the critical role they play in all humanitarian work but particularly in protracted and complex crisis settings. Risk management including risk sharing should form a critical part of those investments.

RCRC Security practices in PCCE

National Societies highlighted the critical role volunteers play in these settings and how their safety and well-being was paramount. Volunteer insurance, equipment, visibility items and trainings such as Safe Access have been important. Information collection and analysis from a variety of internal and external sources including from state authorities, international agencies and field volunteers is important to try and remain abreast of fluid and challenging situations. Scenario planning including in border areas was another feature highlighted by a few NS.

Safety and security well-being does not happen in a vacuum. A large number of stakeholders interviewed noted the important role principled approaches, strong external relationships, clear auxiliary roles and humanitarian diplomacy play in also contributing to a positive reputation of the RCRC in country, access to challenging sites, and the safety of staff and volunteers.

Most stakeholders noted that more effort and support is needed to ensure safety and security systems are working optimally to protect volunteers, staff and the communities they serve. Recommendations included:

- Investing in ways to share the risk burden, strengthen analysis and overall risk management
- Ensure PSP is available to staff and volunteers (in addition to communities)
- Investing more in scenario planning and analysis

Show me the Money - Engagement and Donor Diversification

Humanitarian assistance for all types of crises grew by 27% in 2022 in response to an immense scale up in needs and appeals. In contrast, growth in 2021 was 13% and 2020, 1%. However, needs were only 58% met in 2022 compared to 56% met in 2021. Private funding for humanitarian operations continues to increase year on year but overall remains between 18% to 20% of overall humanitarian funding.

Highlights of Security Practices in PCCE Settings

In Nigeria, the NRCS takes security seriously as tragically volunteers have been attacked and even killed in the past. NCRC has invested in a security team, facilitating training in safe access, conducting site assessments and even do security advocacy to create consensus in amongst the branches about the importance of following protocols.

In Guatemala, the CRG has a strong communication and monitoring system in place across the various departments given the diversity in these various settings. They ensure staff and volunteers are properly outfitted, carry identification and receive trainings in ‘Stay Safe’ and ‘Safer Access’. The EOC facilitates monitoring and information sharing and analysis between volunteers, field teams, and coordinators to ensure everyone stays updated as to the situation on the ground. In the past they have taken the tough decision to withdraw from a border area due to threats to staff and volunteers for future operations dealing with sanctions.

Protracted crisis countries received 92% of all humanitarian funding (US$32.8 billion) in 2022, an increase on 2021 when protracted crisis countries received 88% (US$24.8 billion).

GHA 2023:51.

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61 It’s important to keep in mind that in these protracted and complex settings, staff and volunteers are often victims of previous calamities themselves and duty of care approaches should ensure they receive care and support prior to helping others.
63 Ibid., p29.
Between 2020 and 2021 there has been an uptick in humanitarian assistance and a slight decrease in development assistance. Peace-building funding has remained steady. The vast majority of funding goes to countries experiencing protracted crisis and the number of countries in protracted crisis continues to grow: 36 countries in 2021, 44 in 2022 and 52 in 2023.

In 2022, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Yemen received the largest portions of donor funding. Although there were 46 humanitarian responses coordinated by the UN in 2022, ten countries received 63% of the total country-allocable assistance for that year i.e. Ukraine, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Lebanon, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo – and they all suffer from protracted crises. The United States provided the largest volume of assistance to each of the 10 largest humanitarian crises. See Map of Countries in Crisis for the full picture. NB: The IFRC has appeals for all of the top ten countries with the exception of DRC and Yemen.

In terms of financial support, the United States, Germany, and European Union institutions consistently lead in providing international humanitarian assistance, while the top ten humanitarian donors collectively contribute over 80% of the total funding.

How has the Movement fared in these contexts? This is also included in the GHA analysis for 2022. The IFRC is described as an organization that primarily responds to natural disasters and while overall the IFRC requests and funding increased over 2021, overall appeal coverage declined slightly from 59% in 2021 to 53% in 2022. ICRC is characterized as responding to mainly conflict situations, and while their overall requests and funding received also increased, their coverage increased slightly from 89% to 90%.

While the vast majority of the top 20 donors have increased their assistance in 2022, compared to 2021 in response to increasing needs, the funding gap is growing for most major actors.

**Top three donors in protracted and complex crises**

**United States Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA):** BHA is guided by the Strategic Framework for Early Recovery, Risk Reduction, and Resilience (ER4), 2022. The strategy covers a wide-range of contexts requiring humanitarian assistance including those related to PCCE – e.g. conflict, fragility and increasing complexity, food security, global migration (internally displaced populations), climate and infectious disease outbreaks. BHA funding is separate from US Government development funding (USAID), but it does contribute to broader US Government policy objectives. While much of its funding is short-term (12 months or less), the strategy notes they encourage an adaptive management approach, using various instruments to monitor and adjust to a changing environment and work to bridge connections between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development funding. BHA ER4 also notes a commitment to the triple nexus -linking humanitarian-development-peace-building approaches, the Grand Bargain as well as localization.

**German Federal Foreign Office:** GFFO is guided by the Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance Abroad 2019 – 2023. The strategy covers a range of needs or service areas (health, nutrition and food security, WASH, health, cash, anticipatory action, and forced displacement among others). The GFFO strategy notes that it is committed ‘as much as possible’ to flexible, unearmarked, multi-year funding. The German Government

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64 Ibid. p90.
65 Ibid.p25.
66 Ibid. p.53.
68 Ibid.p33.
69 Ibid., p33.
70 NB: refugee and cross-border migration situations are covered by a different USG unit, Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) which is guided by the Function Bureau Strategy: BPRM 2022. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/PRM_FR8_FINAL_Public_Version.pdf
71 BHA ER4 2022, p
is one of but a few donors that have exceeded the UN-recommended 0.7% GNI when budgeting for humanitarian assistance. While the strategy does not define protracted nor complex emergencies, it does include a list of legal and normative frameworks underpinning their assistance.

**Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO):**
DG-ECHO is guided by the Strategic Plan 2020 – 2024. Humanitarian aid is channelled through humanitarian partners such as UN, INGOs, and International Organizations such as IFRC and ICRC; the strategy explicitly notes that it requires a specific proposal from each partner according to its requirements as most donors require, (despite subscribing to both GHD and Grand Bargain commitments to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of aid including through donor coordination). Interestingly, ECHO is committed to using differential data to increase aid effectiveness and has a target of 95% of humanitarian partners reporting on age and gender markers. The humanitarian-development nexus is mentioned (not peace) whereby they systematically review operations to see if exit is possible or if revised priorities are needed. ECHO also has a stated and measured target that greater than 15% of their budget will be allocated to ‘forgotten crises’ which many protracted crises suffer from over time.

**Main donors to IFRC in PCCE**

The Research team did a cursory examination of the top donors to IFRC appeals across 11 of the operations examined in this research (some of the operations were only funded via DREFs – these were not included). The Team examined two aspects -

1. who were the top three donors in each of the operations and then looked at who were the top donors among this filtered list in terms of value of contribution, and
2. how prominently the top government donors featured in the IFRC PCCE appeals

There are limitations to this analysis. It looks primarily at multilateral contributions though some appeals did start including bilateral contributions. Clearly this only provides a small insight into the overall funding of these operations. Additionally, it was not always clear when a government is a back donor via a PNS to an appeal. For some PNS such as British and Netherlands, they seemed to consistently note when their Governments were the back donor but this wasn’t the case for all. At least one PNS acknowledged that they do not share this information with IFRC when contribution to appeals. For transparency sake and ensuring as a membership, resource mobilization opportunities are not missed, this information should be shared; it would provide a better picture of who the important back donors are and where more effort may be needed to support immensely growing needs in highly challenging situations.

The research team suggests that IFRC Finance along with the SPRM unit work together to develop a more comprehensive analysis of funding patterns in protracted crises and complex emergencies. This will generate a more accurate and useful picture of the current situation and ideally identify further opportunities for follow up. With these caveats in mind, the research team noted the following.

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**Table 4: Key Donors to PCCE Appeals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral Donors</th>
<th>Total amount of contribution</th>
<th>Top Donors*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Government - PRM</td>
<td>34,915,126</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Red Cross</td>
<td>29,053,746</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Red Cross</td>
<td>27,277,950</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands Red Cross (Gov)</td>
<td>20,360,147</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Red Cross (Gov)</td>
<td>12,920,022</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Top donors when examining who were the top three donors of each of the 11 operations and then analysing by value from that pool, who the top donors overall were. Keep in mind there are likely other just as important donors - those who may give less to operations but give more consistently across a range of operations. This analysis did not include that but is something Finance/SPRM could do more easily.

The research also examined how prominent the top global Government donors were in these multilateral appeals.

**Table 5: Prevalence of Top Global Donors to IFRC PCCE Appeals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>USAID/BHA &amp; PRM</th>
<th>GFFO*</th>
<th>ECHO**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Population Movement Operation, Cox’s Bazar</td>
<td>34,915,126</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>165,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar Complex Emergency Operation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>143,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Humanitarian Crises</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,872</td>
<td>221,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan Complex Emergency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria Complex Crisis in the North East</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia Tigray Complex Emergency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon Complex Humanitarian Crisis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>215,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya Storm Daniel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>189,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria Complex Emergency</td>
<td>15,049,690</td>
<td>270,691</td>
<td>11,727,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico &amp; Central America: Migration Crisis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia: Population Movement</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total amount of donor contributions in CHF</strong></td>
<td>49,964,816</td>
<td>277,563</td>
<td>12,663,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of times appeared</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*GFFO is likely an important donor to the German RC who is quite active and a very important partner in PCCE settings; those contributions are not captured here.

**ECHO is a very important contributor to the DREF annually. They have also made significant resources available via the global Partnership Programme Pilot (PPP). Those contributions are also not captured here - so the value of ECHO as a donor is likely under-counted.

ECHO contributed to 7 out of 11 operations examined or 63% whereas US Government and GFFO are not prominent donors in terms of frequency. The US Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) was the largest individual donor to an appeal and the US Government was the largest donor overall in terms of value when adding in the contributions of USAID/BHA to the Syria appeal.

Donor Reflections

The below reflections are a combination of a few donor interviews (3 agencies and 6 key informants) and a review of more literature whereby principals interviewed key humanitarian donors on related topics (footnoted where relevant).

More donors now are likely to have strategies for protracted crises (but not necessarily for complex emergencies though most protracted crises are also complex); however not all donors have a definition for protracted nor complex crises. Some donors unofficially follow the UN definitions of five years or more of coordinated UN appeals.

Many donors, particularly the biggest ones are very interested to see more private investment and have more bilateral donors ‘come to the table’ or start supporting complex and protracted crises in a bigger way as the top 3-5 donors have been the same for many years.

Donors by and large actively support localization and for many, the primary purpose is to ‘reduce aid dependency’ but some also note that localization is more likely to make response more effective, fast and efficient.

Donors are influenced by their national politics and priorities, by world events (e.g., Afghanistan and Ukraine are really pulling on their funding) and international sanctions despite there being many exceptions. A few donors noted they have been and will likely continue to deal with budget cuts, but they are working hard to protect humanitarian funding. National politics, budget cuts, reprioritization all make it imperative that the RCRC better document and promote their results on outcomes. Donors need to demonstrate to their parliamentarians and congress the positive impact of this funding. This is even more critical to protect unearmarked funding, something IFRC regularly advocates for. Donors want to keep this flexibility but need the success stories and outcome reporting to help protect this.

More donors give multi-year funding to their intermediaries but don’t necessarily check to see if those intermediaries are giving local partners multi-year funding. “We were shocked actually when we found out that the local CSOs [Civil Society Organization] only had 12-month agreements … which means that local organizations are … loosing staff because they don’t have any financial security, they can’t do long-term planning.”

Donors noted the importance of IFRC focusing efforts – particularly where there may be significant capacity gaps and, independence and integrity challenges in regions of high need. Some also reflected that IFRC needs to ensure they are having the difficult conversations with NS necessary to uphold their statutory obligations and for the well-being of the Movement and people in need. Donors also emphasized that it is critical that IFRC (and members) are facilitating strong NSD results in a sustainable way and sharing the outcomes. Many said IFRC needs to tell the story the better. Numerous internal stakeholders noted the same – that IFRC has to be better at telling their stories.

At least one donor was really supportive of Seville 2.0, Unified Planning and the progress in One Red Cross

75 Hagelsteen et al., International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Caught between principles and politics: Challenges and opportunities for capacity development from governmental donors’ perspectives. 70.302220 102785, p4 (of individual report, not page 4 in full journal.

"We have a general expectation that you (IFRC/NS) are working towards resilience and self-reliance. But we are not always seeing that!"
Anonymous donor
Donor recommendations highlighted the following:

**Prioritize:** Donors requested that IFRC work to really prioritize and focus on the areas with greater vulnerability and ensure that women and children are consistently prioritized.

**Clarify roles and responsibilities:** While donors know the Movement and the various components – they also requested more information on how those components work together, ensuring there is clarity in roles and no duplication. Some felt that the IFRC could better explain their unique role, their value-add and how tasks and responsibilities are distributed. This should be combined with a better articulation of collective outcomes of the Movement in a given setting e.g., operation, country or region. Some donors wanted more (and more regular) information on how IFRC is working with other parts of the Movement. ‘ICRC is huge in conflict - what is the IFRC value-add is in these environments?’ Considering the pressure on budgets and from parliamentarians, better and repeated articulation of collective plans and outcomes along with the division of labour amongst Movement components can help further reinforce the value for money the Movement represents.

**NSD and localization outcomes.** Further to the above, donors appreciate that the IFRC is a membership organization with a large network of national entities – most with their own nation-wide network. Donors also know that localization and National Society capacity strengthening are important strategic priorities for the IFRC. Donors would, however, appreciate greater information and regular reporting on how this empowerment is happening, what is being sustained and the impact this is having. Some donors also wanted to hear just as much about the challenges and failures as the successes. When there are multiple Movement actors in a given country, they also want to know who is doing what to support the National Society to respond, to do good programming, to manage risk, to ensure gender equity and inclusion etc; and in doing this, IFRC should ensure that there are synergies in the network.

**Outcomes and Reporting:** Better reporting including on outcomes has been mentioned; however, donors noted that in the case of multi-year funding, it’s critically important to report on this. It’s challenging for some donors to secure and protect multi-year funding. They need to be able to report on the difference it is making and how risks and learning is being managed; given the criticality of multi-year funding in PCCE, IFRC would do well to further enhance it’s reporting in these settings but keeping in mind that often reporting is often a function of strategy and programme design – so these also need to be examined to ensure there is a clear and logical description of expected results and outcomes, particularly in multi-year operations.

**Risk Management:** Finally, at least one donor inquired about the IFRC approach to identify and manage risks and suggested that IFRC share more about what risks they are tracking, what is happening and how mitigation is occurring. This is consistent with what donors have typically requested of other international organizations working in protracted crises and complex settings.

**Options to Enhance Long-Term Resourcing**

One of the research questions focused on the options to enhance long-term resourcing in PCCE settings; while this was not discussed in-depth with stakeholders – a few had opinions and the research team also had some reflections. These are briefly noted below.

The vast majority of humanitarian funding is going to protracted and complex crises; the top donors (BHA, GFFO and EU) do not feature prominently in the appeals examined in this research. While the US Government is the main contributor to Bangladesh PMO and ECHO PPP is benefiting numerous countries across all regions and across the disaster management cycle, the top donors don't consistently feature in IFRC multilateral appeals in PCCE settings.

Several appeals are now noting the FW contribution both financial and in-kind as these are important support. The more IFRC can ensure one comprehensive response strategy, all contributions towards it should be tracked and those donors acknowledged. IFRC may be receiving a bigger piece of the pie than appears on the surface. A common M&E approach to collective strategies can also help identify the impact – something
donors are asking for. Again, IFRC may be achieving more than appears on the surface. Two options therefore to enhance long-term resourcing are:

1. Develop a more comprehensive and consistent strategy targeting the top donors in PCCE.

2. Ensure collective appeals and operational strategies, aligning all inputs regardless of source (i.e., multilateral vs. bilateral). The alignment should not just be on paper; bilateral contributions must align to an agreed collective strategy and enabling whoever is best placed to support the NS in a given sector or geographic area. The collective strategy must include a common measurement and reporting system (as articulated in NWOW) within PCCE settings.

Some stakeholders highlighted the importance of climate funding while others cautioned having too strong a focus on climate monies. Stakeholders suggested that IFRC investigate linkages to climate funding but be careful to ‘not let the tail wag the dog and lose the resilience focus’. Some felt it was better to coordinate with the partners that have money for PCCE without having them instrumentalize the NS. They felt that climate funding might only focus on the DM cycle and not on resilience and the root causes of vulnerabilities. In reality, it shouldn’t be an either-or approach. IFRC and its members should be able to work with bilateral, multilateral and private donors on both funding streams. Therefore:

3. also investigate climate funding opportunities (for all aspects of the DM cycle) in PCCE settings, working to ensure more communities are protected by preparedness measures and crisis modifiers such as anticipatory action.

In pursuing these three recommendations, it's important for IFRC to:

4. Support the design, management and implementing of strategies and plans that better articulate the needs, capacities and expected as well as actual outcomes. Sustainability plans and results for both NS strengthening and community preparedness should be a part of this. These efforts could help ensure that the donor support comes to actual local actors, like National Societies, rather than others who then have to seek out or create local actors.

IFRC could also explore new development banks such as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as well as the private sector more; however, to do this, IFRC will likely need to invest more in the resource mobilization and partnership management capacity throughout the secretariat and network. IFRC will also need to ensure that resource mobilization and organizational financial sustainability is also a strong part of the NSD approach. At the same time, IFRC needs to ensure efficient processes guide its partnerships with current multilateral donors, like the World Bank and ADB. While it’s good to diversify the donors, keep in mind these donors and the private sector (at this time) account for only a small portion of the resources for humanitarian operations.

Investing more on the development side in fragile states with a focus on what the NS wants to do and their auxiliary role is important while also ensuring a strong role for the PNS – they have great skills, experience and important back donors. Many PNS have great relationships and are well funded. IFRC should work with these PNS more to ensure a more strategic, long-term focus with the NS in targeted countries. This must include less of a projectized approach while also ensuring it’s what the NS wants to do; many NS are tired of adding on countless strategies, interventions and activities every time a partner comes along with new, temporary funding. IFRC should be bolder in asking big and traditional donors for greater investment in NSD and localisation in prioritised PCCE contexts.

5. Invest more in partnership and resource mobilization capacity to explore more partnerships with new development banks, multilaterals and private sector.

6. Invest more on the development side in key PCCE contexts (based on needs, resources, interests and capacities) creating a strong role for PNS in facilitating strategic outcomes based on NS interests and mandates.

7. With a greater investment in the difference the One Red Cross is making, IFRC should market these results and be bolder in asking big, traditional and non-traditional donors for greater and long-term investments in NSD and localisation in prioritised PCCE contexts.
Volunteers from the South Sudan Red Cross are at border crossing points, where 118,000 people have fled neighboring Sudan after conflict erupted in mid-April 2023. A key activity is providing Restoring Family Links (RFL) so people can regain telephone contact with loved ones who they’ve been separated from due to the fighting.
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PART 3 – A WAY FORWARD?

Key Learnings

A review of some key, external global reports of the humanitarian system, and large evaluations of protracted crises and complex emergencies reiterated what humanitarian practitioners already know but remain systemic challenges.76

Key learnings from the external literature review include:

1. There needs to be greater investment by humanitarian actors in resilience77 approaches i.e., those approaches that work to mitigate the challenges, lessen vulnerabilities and enhance capacities. Practitioners need to recognize that building resilience in individuals is insufficient, particularly when those populations are facing systemic failure. Systemic resilience cannot be facilitated by a single entity. It must be a collective approach.

2. Greater attention on sustainability of results in emergencies and during the transition out or over to recovery and development is key. Numerous reports noted an over-emphasis on critical, short-term support that does little to mitigate the problem.

3. In addition to greater financial support to localization, there is an urgent need for quality capacity strengthening that enables local and national actors to be financially sustainable, accountable and able to facilitate impact in accordance with their organisational purpose.

4. Early warning/early action is helping, including in complex and protracted crisis but one-third of the world’s population is not covered by this type of support.78 Greater prioritization, funding and localization is needed to help increase this coverage.

5. In addition to early warning/ early action, there needs to be greater mitigation, as this has a greater positive impact but at a lower cost than humanitarian response. This is a greater challenge in protracted and complex crises as ODA for development in these contexts is reducing and less money is going towards adaptation and mitigation.

6. There is a need for greater evidenced-based advocacy on a range of issues - including on when legal restrictions or cultural barriers prevent access to key support and services. Donors also need to hear more about what is working in protracted crises.

7. There should be greater awareness of and involvement with multilateral development banks (MDBs), noting their increasing support to social protection systems, particularly in failing states. Coordination with or at least greater awareness of MDB plans in these settings can be helpful in setting up resilience strategies, coordinating plans and informing exit or hand-over.

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76 See the bibliography - as various reports reiterated the same learnings. Some key reports included ALNAP, SOHS 2022; Development Initiatives, GHA 2023; the Middle East Institute – various reports and Oxfam, 2015, as well as presentations and discussions at the Washington Humanitarian Forum 2022.

77 Humanitarian actors still need to prioritize life-saving approaches and ensure their work does not jeopardize their access. However, it is not a dichotomous approach – either life-saving or resilience. Though ten years ago some would argue that humanitarians should only do life-saving and development actors focus on resilience - that argument is less prevalent these days. Regardless humanitarians need to prioritize access and life-saving while simultaneously analysing risks and impacts in supporting resilience. See https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/03/deliver-humanitarian-aid-or-build-resilience-the-answer-is-in-the-context/ for one article on the topic.

8. Finally, **external coordination** with a wide range of stakeholders is paramount to address all the learning. External coordination needs to occur on multiple levels – politically, at a policy level, and practically at the field or implementation level. Across many protracted crises there have been urgent calls for increased engagement between humanitarian, development and peace actors to address root causes and drivers of vulnerabilities. However, coordination should also include state actors and authorities, donors, private sector and MDBs.

**Highlights of internal learning and common opinions**

The research team asked National Societies to name three things the IFRC and membership can do to better support them in protracted crises and complex emergencies. Responses emphasized several of the above, external themes, especially strengthening local action, including quality capacity strengthening, organizational sustainability, institutional development, humanitarian diplomacy and analysis. See [Key National Society Recommendations](#) for further details. Below is a summary of NS opinions based on their experiences in these settings.

**How can the IFRC and Membership better support National Societies faced with protracted crises and complex emergencies**

**Sustainability & Resource Mobilization**: Many of the NS interviewed reiterated the importance of having a financially strong and sustainable National Society. One of the suggested ways to achieve this was through greater investment in NS resource mobilization both locally and internationally.

**Functioning corporate services**: Several NS noted that to be strong and financially sustainable, greater investment in key corporate services was key; this included procurement, logistics, and overall policies and procedures. Some noted the importance of security protocols considering the environments the NS was often working in.

**Operations**: Greater investment in operations was highlighted including in Anticipatory Action approach to address multi-hazards; greater accompaniment in operational strategies and the overall development of the EA, and generally more investment in what NS consider to be their own specific ‘response gaps’.

**Analysis**: Several stakeholders noted their NS needed more analytic capacity to work full cycle in these complex situations; some noted that while IFRC had invested to update tools and procedures, this hadn’t yet resulted in better data or use of greater analytics.

**External Partnerships**: Coordination with other in-country actors, especially outside of the Movement was noted throughout the research. Many NS noted they needed IFRC to help position them as a partner of choice within the humanitarian & development community while also helping to manage expectations amongst these stakeholders.

**Programme support**: Greater support and capacity in key sectors were mentioned, particularly livelihoods, food security and gender mainstreaming.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NS Learning and Innovation in NS in PCCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some NS were asked “Can you think of <strong>promising practices or innovative solutions</strong> developed by the NS or other movement partners to meet the challenges posed by the operating environment?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use financial service providers to transfer funds to the field offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Preposition inputs during dry season.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deployment of volunteers to cover HR gaps at branch and unit levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have (a partnership agreement with the local mobile service provider; in one country, the service provider regularly sent messages to hundreds of thousands of subscribers daily; the community contributed money regularly hundreds of thousands of subscribers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• After each emergency operation the NS has the tradition to conduct a “lessons learned” workshop inviting all the stakeholders (including a representative of beneficiaries and local authorities) and involved staff and volunteers; The NS reported these workshops had good discussions, identify findings and recommendations. Then in the next workshop they check the progress on the results from the last workshop. The NS reported this has helped them learn and be accountable in addressing recommendations of participants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other NSD/Capacity Strengthening: Suggestions for greater branch development given the primacy of chapters, branches and sub-branches in PCCE settings was noted. Stakeholders requested IFRC to focus even more on their mandate of national society development, including a greater emphasis on coordination and new approaches like Unified Planning as some felt this approach was making a positive difference.

Principled Approaches: Some NS noted that the IFRC/ICRC presence in some cases helps them ensure a principled response; others noted that IFRC and PNS really needed to listen more to the NS while at the same time being strict to ensure that the work of the NS proceeds according to the principles. A few noted the importance of having Red Cross Law in place to help support principled approaches in these complex and difficult settings.

The research team also asked a few National Societies how they would advise a sister National Society who was going through a PCCE.79 Seven key topics emerged from this line of questioning. Direct excerpts from key informant interviews are noted in italics to help emphasize or further illustrate the recommendation.

How would the NS advise a sister NS experiencing or preparing for a protracted crises or complex emergency?

1. **Emphasize the fundamental principles & principled approaches**
   - Build up your neutrality and impartiality.
   - Follow the principles. It is important. Dissemination is key. What you say and do is so important. We focus on the neutrality and impartiality. And you have to disseminate every single time. Continuous dissemination of RCRC fundamental principles is important.
   - Impartiality in service delivery can be tough - maybe some staff are too strong - they might impose their views (be aware of this and try to mitigate);
   - You need to emphasize what it means to apply those principles in practice; and what it means to your organization to make it a principled one - at all levels. You could be independent from the government but still challenged internally.
   - Demonstrate the principles all the time; Explain to the community why you are talking with the government (and other groups), or this may impact their trust in you.
   - Be transparent - wherever you are working, and at all levels.
   - Disseminate on IHL

2. **Maximize yet balance, the auxiliary relationship**
   - Position yourself as the auxiliary to the government and ensure a good relationship.
   - Continue to keep the NS independent but at the same time you have to strengthen the auxiliary role with the government at all levels. Too much independence without a strong auxiliary role can make you less effective. It takes a lot of proactive work to be independent - you cannot take it for granted;

3. **Ensure strong external and internal partnerships**
   - Create new alliances with other partners both internally and externally to the Movement, for example, UNHCR.

4. **Positioning/visibility**
   - Build the confidence of the people in the National Society.

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79 We only thought of this good question late in the process - so did not get a chance to ask this of all NS interviewed, but we hope to get feedback from all NS during the January 2024 Workshop.
5. **Fundraising**
   - Don’t become too dependent on the international donors. Don’t neglect the local funding - this is a long-term crisis. You have to plan for the long-term.

6. **Enhance both NS and community readiness & preparedness**
   - You need better preparedness - including at the community level; if we had done more community preparedness prior to the crises we would be in a different position right now.

7. **Other**
   - Have to do advocacy on issues of concern such as access to service and security for all.
   - We need to educate the next generation. Crises are continuing all over the world. It’s important to inculcate humanity into the next generation.80

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**What are the key things the IFRC must address to improve how it operates in PCCE?**

Finally, the research team asked IFRC and PNS what are the essential things the IFRC must address to improve how it operates in these settings. This is different from what the NS were asked – which was about how IFRC/PNS can better support NS in these settings. This next question is more of an internal reflection for and from IFRC at many levels.

Eleven themes emerged from this line of questioning. Multiple stakeholders highlighted each issue (that is, there is no single topic that only one stakeholder felt it was important. The first four topics are presented in the order of frequency (and veracity) by which stakeholders raised them. The remaining seven were more-or-less raised with an equal level of frequency, however, they are all important and are certainly interrelated. The first four are presented here while the remainder are in Annex - *IFCR & PNS Recommendations for the IFCR Overall*. The Working Group should consider all eleven themes when developing their workplan for 2024 and beyond.

**Themes**

1. Planning and analysis
2. Coordination: Internal and External and Visibility
3. Tools & the IFRC Response System
4. IFRC Corporate Services
5. Human Resources
6. Accountability
7. Roles & Responsibility
8. Humanitarian Diplomacy, Advocacy and Principled Approaches
9. National Society Development
10. Donors and Funding
11. Safety, Security and Duty of Care

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80 This specific quote comes from leadership in an NS dealing with a protracted conflict and is actually also what a Human Rights Activist said in a recent Humanitarian Policy Group panel discussion on “The Humanitarian Implications of a Backlash on Human Rights” (December 7, 2023) when asked, how do you plan for the future in a failed state? “In the classroom, by educating the children”. The full discussion will eventually be available at [https://odi.org/en/about/our-work/humanitarian-policy-group/](https://odi.org/en/about/our-work/humanitarian-policy-group/)
1. **Planning and analysis:** Overall respondents noted that a much stronger approach to on-going needs assessments, detailed analysis and aligned to short-term and long-term planning focused on humanitarian outcomes and resilience was critical. Another presented it as finding a way to integrate the long-term planning with the short-term shocks based on an enhanced awareness of what could happen. In IFRC terms this could involve developing the Unified Support Plan with crisis modifiers (financial and strategic approaches enabling a quick response to the shock with an eye to protecting key development gains). While IFRC already has good experience with anticipatory action (AA), crisis modifiers may be viewed as more a more comprehensive reflection on broader development gains than what AA has supported. Given the challenges inherit in PCCE, crisis modifiers and AA in PCCE needs more attention according to a recent study by the International Water Management Institute. Several stakeholders noted the importance of solid political economy analysis to inform the strategies, plan and programmes.

In adopting these approaches, respondents emphasized the need to address root causes and not just symptoms. In doing so, integrated programming could be an important feature if the connection across sectors and how those sectors and interventions jointly contribute to outcomes is clearly analysed and articulated. Some felt that too often IFRC requests integrated approaches for the sake of it and that integrated programming means you have to bring in all programme areas of the NS regardless of their strategic importance in that setting.

Additionally planning and analysis needs to be done at many levels including at the regional level as these crises cross borders and have both upstream and downstream impacts. While planning should include more scenario and contingency planning, some tempered this, noting that the NS has so much planning that it already is doing and really - how much more is feasible and given the fluidity of most situations and limited resources; in other words, how much will it help? These stakeholders called for more pragmatism - so perhaps there is a bigger role for IFRC to play at regional, Geneva and country levels to assist with some of this planning and analyses, ensuring stronger monitoring of key triggers. Applying the lens of the principles in needs assessments and planning was also noted as critical.

Within the PCCE appeals and operational plans, NSD and PMER has to be budgeted. It shouldn’t be optional. Considering the complexity, longevity and layering that happens in these settings, IFRC cannot afford to wait for ‘blue sky’ or peacetime to support NSD.

2. **Coordination: internal, external and visibility:**

Both internal and external coordination are critical in PCCE. Internally greater alignment of the NS, the IFRC and PNS around agreed, collective goals is needed. Many IFRC stakeholders noted that PNS must take on more shared leadership roles – like in ECHO PPP. Others noted IFRC and the membership must work more as a network.

Many stakeholders noted that the NS needs to be more visible with external actors (UN, donors, INGOs, local actors) in PCCE settings. NS should not isolate themselves rather they should work with key external actors in an informed way. IFRC and the membership could do more to help position the NS as the partner of choice with these external actors who all have localization goals and commitments. Good internal and external coordination, underpinned by strong planning, strong relations with the various Movement and non-Movement as well as public authorities can the efficiency and effectiveness of longer-term strategies in PCCE.

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82 Political economy analysis is the attempt to find out what is really ‘going on’ in a situation, what lies behind the surface of the immediate problem, for example whether competing interests exist. Usually this is formulated with (and clouded by) jargon around power, rules of the game, formal and informal systems etc., all of which boils down to trying to understand the ‘lay of the land.’ PEA is therefore part of the process of being ‘politically smart’ in our work, which is not the same as being partisan (committed to one set of political actors over another). Whaites, A., A Beginner’s Guide to Political Economy Analysis, National School of Government International (NSGI), 2017, p4. [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c1a33e0ed915d0b753d157f/The_Beginner_s_Guide_to_PEA.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c1a33e0ed915d0b753d157f/The_Beginner_s_Guide_to_PEA.pdf)
3. **Tools & the IFRC Response System**: While there were a lot of divergent opinions - many said DREF and EA are too complicated and slow for PCCE and in these settings we are not analysing the right information nor taking the right longer-term lens. Others noted that DREF, EAs and ERUs are not really appropriate for PCCE; neither are full development approaches; **PCCE sits somewhere in the middle, and you need flexibility and an approach to facilitate involvement in this middle ground**. DREF and EA are too time-bound for these environments, and this is in part driven by donors. For operations involving people on the move, IFRC needs tools that are simpler and faster; others said is not about the tools but ensuring delegations and NS have flexibility and agility. That sometimes you just need the courage to create a plan and adjust as you go (some donors said they support this). Several noted that surge people need to focus more on being flexible and agile to support what is needed and not overly focused on tools and templates.

4. **IFRC Corporate Services**: Many stakeholders overwhelmingly said, ‘address the bottlenecks in the system’ and apparently there is currently another study led by Geneva examining key services. Procurement and finance were most cited, but HR and logistics were also noted. Many noted that the system is subject to a lot of personal interpretation with many requesting that these staff should better understand the PCCE context to ensure more efficient support to ideally shared goals. Staff asked for support services that were more flexible and customer oriented.

### Overall Recommendations

The strategic emphasis by the IFRC Secretary General on the IFRC’s core responsibilities will continue to enhance how the IFRC supports National Societies working in protracted crises and complex emergencies.

The following is recommended for IFRC:

**Strategic and Operational Coordination:**

1. Continue to operationalize the NWOW in the various PCCE settings IFRC and PNS are supporting, ensuring alignment around a comprehensive, longer-term coherent and strategic Unified Support Plan. Help ensure the Movement is viewed as One Red Cross and that roles and responsibilities are clear, aligned and well communicated internally and externally.
2. Enable greater shared leadership amongst the PNS in these settings and work to ensure a rationalization of resources across the IFRC and membership contributing to greater efficiency and effectiveness in support.

**National Society Strengthening:**

3. In the PCCE settings, invest more in NSD corporate services as part of a longer-term plan that can be shared with key donors. Document the progress including challenges and successes towards the shared vision and stick with it.

4. Considering the criticality of clear auxiliary roles, strong NS legal bases and comprehensive knowledge of the legal frameworks influencing NS readiness and response play, IFRC should invest more to strengthen NS in these areas.

5. Hold donors accountable to their localisation pledges while simultaneously documenting and promoting why the RCRC network is the premier local actor in PCCE settings.

**Humanitarian Diplomacy:**

6. Acknowledge more the incredible efforts of the IFRC staff working in these settings, particularly in HD. Support them with greater financial and human resource investments along with an agreed plan on the global, regional and country-level priorities and strategies in humanitarian diplomacy. This should include a greater investment to maximize the resources of the International Disaster Law unit to better support staff and NS working in PCCE.

7. Ensure staff are able to document the evidence that informs the HD messages at each level and that it is effectively used with key stakeholders.

A large number of recommendations have been shared throughout this document – from National Societies, from a few donors, and from IFRC and PNS. In addition to the above strategic recommendations, the research team makes additional more operational recommendations for the IFRC.

**Additional Recommendations for IFRC**

8. At a minimum, IFRC must work to increase the flexibility and relevance of the response approaches and tools as in PCCE settings with a greater focus on multi-year humanitarian outcomes. At a minimum IFRC should:

   a. Study the implications of modifying DREF and EA budgets and timeframes for specific PCCE settings and test it accordingly. The number, length, and impact of PCCE are only going to increase. Get approval on a Management Decision Paper to pilot more flexible approaches with these tools including modifications of budget thresholds, triggers and timing of DREF and EAs in new PCCEs and possibly some ongoing ones. This should also include more outcome-based key performance indicators to promote the right behaviour.

   b. Enable regional offices to better support IFRC country offices in protracted, complex and fragile settings to ensure strategic approaches across operations and unified plans, developing sound integrated approaches where warranted and aligning with or supporting social protection systems as appropriate.

   c. Continue to enhance analytics in these settings ensuring the clear value-added and sustainability of current IM investments and initiatives.

   d. Work on documenting and telling a better story throughout NSD and the DM cycle and ask for more money. The money is there. UN and INGOs are not necessarily better – they are just better and documenting and sharing their results.

   e. IFRC at regional and country levels in PCCE settings should continue to analyse with the NS the external partnership opportunities. The default should not be an insular approach - noting that there are some exceptions - but as PCCE ebb and flow also how the RCRC operates should be adjusted over time.
f. Work with HR to augment profiles of technical and leadership/management staff in these settings with the skills recommended. Enhance staff entry and exit procedures by ensuring formal handover. In management and leadership positions, this handover should be in-person.

9. Better document what is happening in these environments. Many of the operations did not have evaluations nor facilitated lessons learned. If the evaluations and lessons learned workshops are well done, there needs to be an agreed way forward to address the learnings and ensure key accountabilities are in place. Moreover, there should be a stronger analysis of why the learning or behaviour change is not happening. Meta evaluations should not regularly identify the same problems unless there is documentation as to what strategies were tried and failed. As much learning if not more can come from a reflection of failures as of successes.

10. The WG needs to map other IFRC/PNS initiatives that are already touching on the long list of recommendations presented here and work to ensure alignment on the most pressing themes.

11. Using this report and the January 2024 workshop, the WG should create a comprehensive multi-year workplan that involves other key departments who can augment the capacity and remit of the WG.

Recommendations for National Societies

12. Ensure an updated PER assessment, analysis and comprehensive workplan is in place that includes a strong reflection on current and future scenarios of likely protracted and complex crises;

13. Ensure a comprehensive NSD plan is in place that incorporates support needs stemming from the PER and balances investments in HQ with branches. This plan should be long-term and include a realistic plan for financial sustainability.

14. Continue to engage with international and local actors in addition to public authorities and the Movement. Collaborative approaches externally as well as internally are critical for alignment with and support to your long-term strategic plans that include PER and NSD.

Recommendations for Partner National Societies

15. Continue to invest in the NWOW and be prepared to take on larger roles in PCCE settings while helping to ensure there is one strategic plan in place to better support the NS to work in PCCE settings. These plans should not only include resilience approaches and significant outcomes for affected populations/people in need but must also be bolstered by a comprehensive NSD plan designed to enable a strong and financially sustainable NS that all Movement partners support.

16. Work more closely with IFRC to ensure back donors are not only properly identified and acknowledged but to ensure RCRC is maximizing resource mobilisation. More support from the current largest humanitarian donors is possible along with new and emerging donors.

17. Help ensure the Movement is viewed as One Red Cross including by holding IFRC accountable to one strategic, unified support plan along with one measurement and reporting plan and one communications and HD plan.

18. Support the IFRC to address the recommendations herein including the longer list from the National Societies themselves.
The Guatemala Red Cross offers guidance and assistance to the migrant population in the border.
© Guatemala Red Cross, 2018
ANNEXES

Map of Countries in Crisis

Top 20 Donors of Humanitarian Assistance in 2022

Modified from Global Humanitarian Assistance 2023, p34.
### Research Focus Countries and Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Operation Title</th>
<th>Operation ID</th>
<th>On-going hazards</th>
<th>Interview conducted</th>
<th>Main operation timeframe</th>
<th>Funding coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>PM Operation, Cox’s Bazar</td>
<td>MDRBD018</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18/01/2017 (on going)</td>
<td>65%</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Myanmar: Complex Emergency Operation</td>
<td>MDRMM016</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM, Food insecurity, Outbreaks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>01/02/2021 - 31/03/2023</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crises</td>
<td>MDRAF007</td>
<td>Civil Unrest, PM, Compounding Natural Hazards</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10/04/2021 (on going)</td>
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<td>01/07/2017 - 31/12/2018</td>
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<td>09/1/2014 - 31/07/2015</td>
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<td>Explosions, PM, Economic Downturn</td>
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<td>25/06/2019 - 15/08/2019</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Libya/MENA: Storm Daniel</td>
<td>MDRLY005</td>
<td>Floods, PM</td>
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<td>13/01/2020 - 18/11/2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenia: PM</td>
<td>MDRAM012</td>
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## Top Donors for Operations in this Study

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<th>Operation</th>
<th>Funding requirements (CHF)</th>
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<td>Population Movement Operation, Cox’s Bazar</td>
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<td>United States Government - PMR</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
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The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: Reflections for the Federation

By Aljoscha Mayer

Definition & Origin

The Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus approach refers to the interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace activities and envisages greater cooperation and coordination between actors in the different fields. At the heart of strengthening coherence between the three intervention types is the goal of effectively reducing the needs and risks of people affected by crises, promoting prevention efforts, and strengthening the resilience of particularly vulnerable populations and local structures. Central to the approach is closer coordination and cooperation of differently mandated organizations and other non-traditional partners like research bodies, public sector, and donors. It also entails a strong emphasis on localization, going even further than the RCRC approach and centering on community-based and grassroot organizations.

The HDP nexus was developed in response to the increasing prevalence of protracted and complex crises. Unlike 'traditional emergencies', addressing the great need and impacts of these crisis meaningfully requires long-term, multi-sectoral and multi-actor programming. Recently, there has been a push to emphasize the importance of including climate change (CC) alongside the triple nexus because of its significant, widespread, and persistent impacts. However, several scholars have argued that rather than adding CC as a separate stream of the HDP nexus, a more effective long-term approach is to integrate both CC and DRR measures into existing and future humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts.

Discussions on how to better link efforts in different programmatic sectors are not new. Approaches such as linking relief, rehabilitation, and development (LRRD) were developed in the 1980s. However, these approaches conceptualized humanitarian action and development as sequential, overlooking the complementarity of different interventions and approaches, including the potential of humanitarian assistance to sustain development gains, which is particularly necessary in protracted and complex crises. Considering these shortcomings, and the fact that an increasing proportion of humanitarian assistance is targeted at protracted crises, the HDP nexus was conceived. The approach gained momentum before and during the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, eventually finding its vision in the New Way of Working and the Grand Bargain. However, until then it was not clear how to operationalize the implementation of this HDP nexus. The OECD's attempt to address this in 2019 with the publication of the "Recommendation on the OECD Legal Instruments Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus" has helped to further raise the profile of the approach in policy and practice.

Challenges and Opportunities for Using the HDP Nexus in Protracted Crisis and Complex Emergencies

Despite growing attention among humanitarian practitioners, policymakers and donors, the practical implementation of the HDP nexus is still at an early stage. This is due to several challenges, ranging from lack of mutual understanding, entrenched bureaucratic structures, rigid and competing funding streams, lack of partnership with local actors and rigid compliance systems. Perhaps the most important challenge in the RCRC context is the protection of humanitarian space and mandate. It is often feared that closer cooperation with, or even involvement in, development or...
peacebuilding activities could compromise a principled humanitarian approach, particularly in terms of neutrality and impartiality. In response, the literature and some of our key informants have argued that this concern should be addressed by clearly articulating the RCRC’s role and working principles, and by adopting a broader understanding of ‘development’ and ‘peacebuilding’ to include activities such as NSD, resilience-building and youth engagement. Avoiding the terminology of ‘peacebuilding’ and referring instead to strengthening social coherence and resilience can help to overcome undesirable associations with militarized ‘peacekeeping’ operations. Engaging more in nexus activities is also governed by funding modalities. Even though it remains to be seen to what extent they will adapt to the nexus approach, some donors like EU, BMZ, GFFO, OECD and others are already adapting their funding mechanics.

What does this mean for the RCRC response in protracted crisis and complex emergencies? Due to their multifaceted nature and root causes which are incrementally linked to societal structures and often some form of violence, these contexts require approaches which are equally broad. Due to the decentralized structure and localization of its branches, RCRC societies around the world have the potential to become the partner of choice to engage in long-term multi-sectoral programming and addressing needs more efficiently while building resilient communities. This involves further investing in local response capacities, human and financial resource stability and building up expertise in fields crucial to utilizing the HDP approach. This includes coordination, humanitarian diplomacy, youth engagement, recovery, and resilience of livelihoods - all while deepening established partnerships and engaging in new ones. While RCRC its truly “a world on its own” there is much to learn from this approach.

Key National Society Recommendations

National Societies were asked, “How can the IFRC and Membership better support National Societies faced with protracted crises and complex emergencies?” Below are the more detailed responses; we’ve kept the ‘voice’ of the stakeholder where possible; this is noted in the recommendations in italics.

Sustainability & Resource Mobilization

- We depend on the partners. Without them, there is no RC. We depend on them in 90%; we definitely need a resource mobilization plan and some sort of sustainability plan; this has long been an issue here.
- Need a sustainability plan for the overall NS; including for when operations and appeals end – this impacts service delivery.
- Sustained funding for programs and even salaries (there is a high dependence on PNS and ICRC for salaries);
- Need to find ways for sustainable income and support and not just in the context of raising money from donors;
- Resource mobilization plans that include localization of funding/domestic funding

Functioning corporate services

- Procurement and logistics
- Policies and procedures to guide operations
- Development of security protocols

"We don't need to lose our neutrality to coordinate with others. We don't need to follow other policies to coordinate."

Key Informant from Africa
Operations

- Strengthen the Anticipatory Action approach to address multi-hazards
- *Accompany us more in these process - especially in the development of the Emergency Appeal*
- More support is needed in developing operational strategies and response proposals
- *Address NS response capacity gaps so we can respond faster*
- Reports and templates only in English do not help. Ensure templates, reports and orientations to the tools are in the official IFRC language

Analysis

- Greater capacity is needed in analyzing situations, especially in protracted crises. This should include how to identify, analyze, address, maybe even prevent the types of protracted and complex situations NS are responding to. Checklists for key skills and processes could help.
- *Stop changing templates - they get more complicated but don't provide any better analytics*

Partnerships

- Work to help position the NS as a partner of choice within the humanitarian & development community in-country
- *But also help us manage expectations; we may have better access than others so they want to work with RCRC but our access will fluctuate. And we cannot do everything,

Programme support

- Livelihoods, food security
- Gender mainstreaming. *We need to increase women's representation at all levels of the national society - and need help in raising awareness on the importance of this and how to do it.*
- Technical training in shelter

Other NSD/Capacity Building:

- Branch development should be emphasized more as the work of volunteers in the ‘field’ is critical in these settings.
- *PNS should fill in where IFRC cannot; they need to spread the resources better*
- Build NS staff capacity - not just of IFRC or parallel staff; it creates inequities and jealousies
- *IFRC and PNS are mandated to support NS capacity building - they should do to that*
- *IFRC focuses more on Coordination including UP and NSD now; they should continue this – this is helping.*
- *IFRC should focus on NSD – if they need to support programmes, it should come via NSD; let the PNS support programmes*
Principled Approaches

• IFRC/ICRC presence in some cases helps us ensure a principled response
• Listen to us. At all levels - not just at leadership levels.
• PNS should share their strategies
• Be strict - don’t give in if one person requests something that is not in-line. IFRC/PNS need to be strict. Be stricter - be consistent.
• Give us exposure at all levels
• Help us get red cross law in place

IFRC & PNS Recommendations for the IFRC Overall

Eleven themes emerged from this line of questioning. The first four were mentioned by the largest number of stakeholders while the remaining seven were raised by slightly fewer informants. All topics are important and are certainly interrelated. The first four were presented in detail in the main body of the report while the remaining seven are presented below.

Themes

1. Planning and analysis
2. Coordination: Internal and External and Visibility
3. Tools & the IFRC Response System
4. IFRC Corporate Services
5. Human Resources
6. Accountability
7. Roles & Responsibility
8. Humanitarian Diplomacy, Advocacy and Principled Approaches
9. National Society Development
10. Donors and Funding
11. Safety, Security and Duty of Care

HR: Numerous stakeholders noted that volunteers are key in PCCE programming as they are more likely to understand the complex context and be effective. Others commented on IFRC staff – noting that new people including surge, have to be well-oriented and trained especially before deploying. Staff need to understand the tools and the systems even if they are flawed. Respondents also noted the importance of making the most of the new way of working (NWOW), maximising membership staff to support key roles or take over support to key programmes (Syria, Bangladesh and Afghanistan are but a few good examples). IFRC should not duplicate membership capacity or that of reference centres but noting that overall, the investment in IFRC staffing is really quite thin and at a minimum IFRC needs to invest more on the food security side in regional offices like Africa, and in resource mobilization in all regions and Geneva. Finally, several stakeholders noted a lack of a handover system. ‘People just leave and take their institutional memory with them.’ In country leadership positions there should be in-person handover where incoming and outgoing HoDs overlap; for other positions, a proper handover and exit process should be regularised.
Accountability: Several stakeholders talked about a variety of issues related to IFRC and NS accountability. For IFRC, many staff at various levels noted that the performance indicators are not right for the PCCE setting – that there should be more of a focus on results and quality rather than timeframe and spending. Changing the KPIs is one way to help promote the right behaviour. Learning can be viewed as an accountability issue; several stakeholders noted that IFRC is not learning well enough in these operations and that IFRC needs to understand why. “We cannot simply identify the same things again and again, year after year.”

Regarding the IFRC relationship with the NS – a few stakeholders said IFRC should not ask the NS to do everything. Do one or a few things well. The PCCE contexts are quite complicated and IFRC should help the NS articulate their strategic role in service delivery and prioritize. Sudanese RC and Ethiopia RC did well to update their strategies, services and relationships. This has helped in the PCCE operations. Finally, a few stakeholders noted that IFRC has to be more willing to have the tough conversations with the NS when key issues like corruption are well-known.

Roles and responsibilities: Although many good examples of the IFRC and ICRC working together in PCCE settings (Myanmar, Afghanistan, Syria to name a few) many stakeholders noted there needs to be greater clarity between the Movement actors in these settings; that Seville 2.0 has helped but that it could be more detailed. IFRC needs to clarify their value-added in these settings to help manage expectations and ensure staff and membership have a clearer view of how coordination will happen with the NS at the centre. Several noted that IFRC overall has to be fit for purpose and Palestine was noted as one of the best functioning NS with minimal IFRC presence and support over years and perhaps IFRC should adopt more models like this.

Humanitarian Diplomacy, Advocacy and Principled Approaches: Although this has been well-addressed in different sections it’s important to note that IFRC stakeholder also emphasized these themes in their recommendations. Many noted that humanitarian diplomacy would benefit from an evidenced-based approach (donors and the literature also noted this); noting what is impacting access and principled approaches and what is working. Numerous stakeholders said IFRC needs to identify and tell their story better. Turkey and ESSN were highlighted as a great example of Federation’s efficiency, impact and value for money. There must be more stories out there to document and promote.

National Society Development: IFRC stakeholders noted they need to focus on NS corporate service; to enhance the focus on NSD - focusing on a few key, critical things like finance and procurement. ‘If these things work then the rest will follow.’ In doing this, IFRC and the PNS need to not just treat the symptoms but treat it like good development work by working with the NS to identify the root causes of core NS issues.

Donors and Money: Of course, everyone said better resource mobilization was needed to fund these crises, but other points came out as well. Tell the story better. Many said this at many levels. In PCCE several felt IFRC needed to better negotiate on the earmarks. ‘Don’t accept what cannot be done (e.g. too many results in too short of time). We need to sell migration (for example) differently.’ PCCE defies traditional fundraising, and we shouldn’t treat it as the same. IFRC needs to have tough conversations with the donors about the context within which new crises and emergencies are happening and why addressing root causes are important rather than just providing a band aid.

Safety, Security, Risk Management, Duty of Care: while these are differing topics they are related, and many stakeholders spoke of the need for greater IFRC investment in these areas in PCCE settings. Regarding duty of care, there is a recommendation to make it a Movement-wide standard; a few stakeholders mentioned the need for business continuity plans in PCCE and fragile environments settings along with greater investment in risk management. In Syria, the Risk Management delegate was a very welcomed and well used resource. In addition to greater investment in risk management, several seasoned stakeholders noted a greater need for risk willingness – that is have greater investments in these types of systems but then given in-country management in these settings more trust and support - including in faster and more local decision-making.
**Stakeholders Consulted**

The Research team promised anonymity to all participants, and we have done our best to refer primarily to NS (by name), to IFRC in general and to donors in general. In the introduction we have summarised the number of stakeholders by organisation, region and gender.

Following is a link for the Working Group to know who the Research team met with against the original list of stakeholders.

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<th>Title</th>
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<td>Mohammad Nabi Burhan</td>
<td>Secretary General of the Afghan Red Crescent Society</td>
<td>ARCS</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sophie Ford</td>
<td>Senior Manager - International Response, international Programs &amp; Movement Relations</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belal Hossain</td>
<td>Director and Head of Operation, PMO and MRRO Cox's Bazar</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deepmala Mahla</td>
<td>Vice President, Humanitarian Operations</td>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emma Brittain</td>
<td>Humanitarian Partnership Manager</td>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laura Nicholson</td>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>Protracted Crises Section</td>
<td>Protracted Crises, Resilience and Partnerships Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephanie Werner</td>
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<td>Protracted Crises, Resilience and Partnerships Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Susanne Mallaun</td>
<td>Head of Unit, Strategic Partnerships with Humanitarian Organizations</td>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Klaasø</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dires Desyibelew Yihunie</td>
<td>Director Disaster Risk Management</td>
<td>ERCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safina Khalique</td>
<td>IFRC and British Red Cross Institutional Lead</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlo Ortega</td>
<td>Director of Volunteering</td>
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<td>Jean Jacob Charles</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alberto Monguzzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ariel Kestens</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>Port of Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birgitte Bischoff Ebbesen</td>
<td>Region Director for Europe</td>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Bronwyn Nichol</td>
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<td>Caroline Holt</td>
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<td>Chiran Livera</td>
<td>Head of Emergency Operations</td>
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<td>Global</td>
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<td>Christina Duschl</td>
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<td>Daw Aye Aye Nyiein</td>
<td>Director Rakhine Operation Unit</td>
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<td>Dedi Junadi</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Regional Information Management Coordinator</td>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Diana Oviedo</td>
<td>Coordinator Programs and Operations Central America</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>Dorothy Francis</td>
<td>Honorary Position</td>
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<td>Edwin Armenta</td>
<td>Programs and Operations Coordinator</td>
<td>IFRC</td>
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<td>Ezekiel Simperingham</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank Mohrhauer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helen Brunt</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Hosam Faysal</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Hrusikesh Harichandan</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>Insa Moussa Ba Sané</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Jamie LeSueur</td>
<td>Head of Emergency Operations</td>
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<td>Jose Felix Rodríguez Torres</td>
<td>Migration, Social Inclusion and Non-violence Coordinator</td>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>Panama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joy Singhal</td>
<td>Head of Health, Disasters, Climate and Crises</td>
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<td>Mads Brinch Hansen</td>
<td>Head of Delegation for Syria</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Marie Manrique</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mariela Gómez</td>
<td>Planning Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting Senior Officer</td>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>Panama</td>
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<td>Martha Keays</td>
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<td>Matthew Croucher</td>
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