



International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

A Review of the 2009 Tropical Storm Ida floods IFRC-led Shelter Cluster in El Salvador

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The views expressed in this review are those of the consultant, and not necessarily those of the IFRC

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CORI Societies)	Inter American Regional Committee (of the Red Cross National
CP	Civil Protection
DANA	Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ESRC	El Salvador Red Cross
FACT	Field Assessment Coordination Team
FUNDASAL	Fundación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo y Vivienda Mínima -NGO
GOES	Government of El Salvador
HQ	Head Quarters
IASC	Interagency Standing Committee
ICC	Inter Cluster Coordination
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IM	Information Management
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NS	National Society (of the Red Cross)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
RCRC	Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
RUI	Registro Único de Inscritos (GOES' Housing Beneficiaries Register)
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group
SCT	Shelter Coordination Team
TH	Temporary Housing
THC	Temporary Housing Cluster
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UTPMP	Un Techo Para Mi País (<i>A Roof For My Country</i>) – NGO
VMH	Vice Ministry of Housing
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene

1. BACKGROUND

During November 7 and 8, 2009, the passage of Tropical Storm Ida through Central America, which coincided with a low pressure system over the Pacific coast of El Salvador and Guatemala, caused heavy rainfall in El Salvador. Mudslides buried towns and overflowing rivers swept through different areas destroying water, electrical and telecommunications systems, damaging roads, health and educational centers and houses. Thus, the Salvadoran President decreed a state of national emergency on 8 November. 9,000 people were sheltered in 131 collective centers on Nov 8th.

The interagency standing committee (IASC) clusters were activated during the emergency phase and coordinated the activities of the various organizations, donors and government agencies to ensure an efficient and accountable partnership for the Ida disaster response. In accordance with its global commitment to the IASC cluster approach, the International Federation initially deployed a coordination team to convene the emergency shelter cluster. The Shelter Coordination Team (SCT) arrived in country on November 18-20th 2009 and supported the Vice-Ministry of Housing (VMH) in coordinating the work of approximately 30 operating organizations.

The SCT objective was to support the government of El Salvador and the operating organization in providing a coordinated response to shelter and contribute towards the effective provision of emergency shelter assistance to the affected population through the timely and efficient provision of required coordination and information management services.

In addition to this technical support was provided to develop simple shelter solutions, build the capacity of the government and the organizations in meeting Sphere Standards especially in the temporary settlements.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THIS REVIEW

- Appraise the service provided by the International Federation as shelter cluster coordinator to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, RCRC Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actors;
- Review and analyze the experience of the International Federation with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations;
- Provide recommendations with regard to the International Federation's leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities at both national and global levels.
- Examine if there were aspects of the Federation's cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.
- Examine the options for the IFRC to continue to have a lead role in the cluster during non-emergency periods and the resources required to perform such a role.

3. METHODOLOGY FOR THIS REVIEW

This review took place in El Salvador and Haiti, and draws primarily on interviews with those involved in the emergency shelter response to Ida in El Salvador. This included UN agencies, NGOs, IFRC, donors and the Government of El Salvador (GOES) Vice Ministry of Housing (VMH). These were lengthy interviews usually taking between 1 and 2 hours each. The key informants for the review were those proposed by the IFRC Americas Delegation and the Geneva based IFRC shelter department as well as some other informants that emerged during the course of this research. The key informants are listed in Appendix A; 19 personal interviews and 3 phone interviews were conducted. As some of the key informants (SCT's leader and IM, UN Resident Coordinator in El Salvador as of November 2009 and her assistant) were currently working in Haiti, the consultant travelled there to interview them.

Reference documentation reviewed included:

- Information available at the Ida Shelter Coordination google group site, including meetings minutes, presentations, and others)
- Reports of the SCT members and all other documents developed within the SC (kindly provided by the team members), including both STC-developed documents and GOES' and other SC actors' reports, presentations, maps, etc.
- Documents of the handover to the Early Recovery Cluster
- Letters and E-mails surrounding the request for the deployment of the IFRC team.
- Reviews of recent IFRC shelter coordination deployments

4. THE CLUSTER APPROACH IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE ROLE OF IFRC

In 2008, the IFRC undertook a Scope Study on the shelter cluster in four countries of the Central American and Caribbean region that although it did not include El Salvador, gave useful findings to understand the background to this shelter cluster activation.

This review shows that in the Central American region there is agreement on the idea that even if the Humanitarian Reform tried to put in order the response due to the gaps observed worldwide between the affected and the Governments, it is not feasible to apply the global cluster approach as the international community taking over the leadership of the response. The Central American countries have their own Risk Management Systems, even if with flaws and still weak, and there is a Disaster Management institutionalization, therefore they would not accept the international intervention under a perspective of a substitution of governmental responsibilities. This initial resistance to the cluster approach is based on a partial understanding of it, and the UN Agencies had questioned the global approach themselves, worried to be given a wider role and not having enough resources available to undertake it.

In that sense, the UN Agencies in the region have been working on a sector wide approach, promoting the creation of sector groups (*"mesas sectoriales"*) and/or supporting the existing ones, focusing on the preparation of contingency plans to strengthen the National Systems (cluster approach use recognized by UN –*Note on the cluster approach use to reinforce the*

humanitarian response. IASC, Nov.2006). OCHA made efforts to disseminate the Humanitarian Reform and the cluster approach at country levels.

The Governments and shelter actors of the countries included in that Scope Study identified added values of the shelter cluster, such as procedures and rules design, particularly for the shelter options not very used in their countries or that are not systematical assisted (i.e. host families), but agreed that it is necessary to work it out prior to the emergencies, having to work together the national institutions and the international Agencies in a permanent sector wide approach.

As of 2009, the role of the IFRC as global shelter cluster leader was not well known in the countries of the scope study; and as it will be later explained neither was it in El Salvador, by the Government or the UN.

5. EMERGENCY SHELTER IN RESPONSE TO TROPICAL STORM IDA

5.1 Shelter Coordination prior to Ida

No relevant shelter coordination prior to Ida has been identified in the review. General availability to support the possible needs was stated by donors and implementing partners, but it seems that Ida's emergency exceeded the expected by all. In El Salvador there were sector groups formed before Ida, although they were not too active. The previous years had been pretty calm *disaster-wise* (last important national emergency had been in 2005 – Hurricane Stan), and that probably influenced the low coordination prior to Ida. Organizations were more focused on development projects, and shelter sector had not had to deal with major challenges recently. In addition, the fact that it was in November 2009, when Ida hit El Salvador, the GOES had recently taken over Office (June 2009)¹ was a constraint for a better pre-disaster coordination.

5.2 Shelter Coordination post Ida and prior to IFRC's SCT Deployment

UNDP was in charge of the inter-cluster coordination (ICC), and they agreed with the GOES main actors about the convenience of the clusters activation. The previous experience working in sector groups helped the cluster approach and clusters activation by the IASC, as the GOES did not see the clusters as a replacement of their leadership in the emergency response, but as an opportunity to favour the link with international funds. A Humanitarian Country Team was activated, a UNDAC team was requested, and the clusters activation was promptly decided and communicated by the IASC to OCHA, including the IFRC as the Emergency Shelter cluster leader.

Ida being the first emergency most of the GOES' people were dealing with, helped the receptivity to the cluster approach and the coordination leadership assignments to international agencies, in support of the GOES counterparts.

¹ With the left-winged FMLN in power after over 20 years of right-winged ARENA Governments, what meant many personnel changes, both in political and technical positions, in the institutions regarding disaster response, that included the VMH

Despite their lack of experience in emergencies, the GOES responded quickly, internally installing seven sectorial Commissions: emergency services, health, shelter, security, logistics, and infrastructure and technical-scientific, with different Ministries leading them. These commissions were to be supported by the IASC cluster leaders. Regarding shelter, a difference was stated by both IASC and GOES between Camp Management & Camp Coordination (CCCM), led by Civil Protection Direction and IOM, and Emergency Shelter (ES)², led by the Public Works Ministry through the VMH and the IFRC. However, in the same UN Resident Coordinator letter to OCHA activating the cluster approach, in which CCCM and ES clusters are separated, there is an unclear scope of the IFRC-led ES Cluster as it is stated that the Sector Leads (IFRC) required global support “given the particularly difficult situation in collective centers/camps and lost and damaged housing”. This confusion may not seem relevant at first, but as it will be later explained, shows an unclear distribution of the full shelter responsibilities that was not finally clarified.

As of the GOES’ Infrastructure Commission, led by the Presidency Technical Secretariat, it seemed to work in parallel to the ES Cluster although the VMH was leading this one, more seen as the “NGO’s cluster”, making decisions in the Commission that the VMH later transmitted to the ES Cluster group. As such, from the very beginning the VMH had a clear and strong position about what should be done, that at a given moment led to conceptual discrepancies within the ES Cluster group, in which the SCT took a relevant role towards bringing positions closer and arranging agreements.

IFRC responded immediately to the emergency, supporting the El Salvador Red Cross (ESRC) in their first response actions; there was an IFRC representative in the country, and the Shelter Regional Advisor based in Panama (PADRU) was sent immediately as a liaison officer for UNDAC, with the mission to highlight ESRC role in the response and clarify IFRC’s role in the shelter cluster if activated. This allowed a close coordination with UN from the very first days, and the prompt deployment of the SCT. The Shelter Regional Advisor also helped SCT’s job as he established logistics arrangements and contacts and coordination with the IASC and the GOES.

5.3 From “Emergency Shelter Cluster” to “Temporary Housing Cluster”

As of IFRC-UNDP first talks, the ES cluster scope was more for transitional shelter. Therefore, the cluster was initially more about housing reparation and/or improvements, hosted families, transitional housing, etc., leaving the emergency shelter in collective centers to the IOM-led CCCM cluster.

However, this separation was not clear to all involved; a conceptual argument took place from the first steps of the ES Cluster, to define the scope of the VMH & IFRC led cluster. It is important to understand that in Spanish, the word shelter is used widely, and can be translated in several ways, not all of them with the same exact meaning or scope. The IFRC’s Shelter Department in Geneva promotes the use of the word “*alojamiento*” as the one that may have the wider meaning. But in El Salvador, as in other Central American countries, this word only applies when somebody gives shelter or accommodates someone else. Moreover, the more

² In the UN-RC letter, the cluster was specifically named as Emergency Shelter

extended word “*albergue*” to translate shelter is usually understood only as the physical infrastructure that shelters people, such as collective centres or camps, but is not widely used as a verb although it exists (*albergar*). Other Spanish words in which shelter can be translated, such as *refugio*, *cobijo*, *abrigo*, *techo* (nouns) or *refugiar/se*, *guarecerse*, *cobijar* (verbs) do not have a wide scope and are used mostly for the shelter solutions in the first moment of the disaster.

This discussion led to the evolution of the officially UN activated Emergency Shelter Cluster into a Temporary Housing (TH) Cluster. Of course, it was not only because of the Spanish etymology of the word shelter that this happened, but combined with the unclear responsibilities distribution and/or assumption about shelter in the National Risk Management System (where and when Civil Protection role ends and where and when the VMH role begins), and the fact that the VMH did not want to promote or provide transitional/emergency houses due to the risk of the beneficiaries staying longer than foreseen or even becoming permanent, as had happened before³, led to define the ES Cluster goal towards achieving a temporary (up to 24 months or even more) housing solution for the affected people, after they would leave the camps or for those using other shelter solutions, but not to give emergency shelter solutions (up to 6 months). The term “temporary housing” did not help with the SCT advocate for emergency shelter distribution, and the VMH and participating agencies were increasingly inclined to build temporary houses, rather than emergency shelters

Therefore, the GOES (and almost every other shelter stakeholder in El Salvador) avoided working with transitional/emergency shelter solutions fearing they might be seen as their habitat standards, and they limited their emergency shelter activity to establishing collective centres/camps or to support self-established shelter solutions with emergency aid. The VMH sees its competencies not in emergency shelter (that would be a Civil Protection concern) but in housing. And in this respect, they stood firmly for a temporary house model as the minimum standard the ES/TH Cluster group should deliver⁴, and the debate in the Cluster was centered in negotiating how this temporary house model/standard could be adjusted to meet everyone’s opinions⁵ that in finding solutions to support the people without a minimum shelter solution 2-3 weeks after Ida or who were on the verge of being evicted from the collective centres or the homes of host families.

³ After the 2001 earthquakes, the GOES gave over 175.000 “temporary houses” of less than 20 m² made of plastic or zinc walls and zinc roofs, that were popularly and derogatorily named as “microwaves”, and although they were not supposed to last more than 3-6 months they ended up lasting for years, becoming a popular reference for bad practices. (i.e. Informativo Semanal Proceso / Universidad Centroamericana (UCA). No. 949, May 2nd 2001: *The President of the Social Investment Fund for the Local Development (FISDL), Miguel Angel Simán, said the 29.04 that the number of temporary houses delivered was of 175 thousand (...). Although some of the families do not fear the Winter as they received their temporary house, they are concerned about the houses conditions. “We are fourteen in my family, in my zinc sheets made house it hardly fit the beds for the seven kids”, said Concepción Alfaro, who lives in Nuevo Tepetitán, San Vicente. The mayor of this Municipality, Evenol Funes, said that people complains about the houses because “in the day time they are like microwave ovens and in the night time they are like refrigerators”.*

⁴ See VMH temporary house model specifics in Annexes. Approximate cost of each solution: US\$ 3.500

⁵ The NGO *Un Techo Para Mi País* –UTPMP- (A Roof for my country) proposed their usual emergency house model (18 m2, wooden frame and walls, zinc roof) as a temporary house, that was not accepted by the VMH, what did not stop them in building over 30 units; although UTPMP states that their model met the ES Cluster agreed standards for temporary housing, the VMH states that they do not consider the UTPMP houses as part of the temporary solutions given to the affected people, although they consider those families rightful candidates for a GOES permanent house.

In this context, a problem soon arose: the initial timeframe expectations to deliver the temporary houses proved unrealistic, considering land tenure issues, lack of sufficient economic resources and limitations in the information of the sheltered people to ensure they fulfilled the requirements to receive a temporary house. Some ES/TH Cluster stakeholders then supported the idea to agree on an emergency housing solution, faster and cheaper to deliver, under the premise that it should meet Sphere emergency shelter standards, be knock-down units, last not over 6 months, be delivered as a self-construction kit, and that a family receiving one would not lose the opportunity to later be the beneficiary of a temporary house. The SCT had a relevant role in this matter, leading a technical meeting within the ES Cluster

The SCT tried to incorporate the emergency housing in the cluster debate, as it came up as a current shelter need for those leaving the collective centres or host families houses and those with worst emergency shelter conditions (living under tarpaulins or similar short-term solutions), but the VMH did not allow it to formally become part of the cluster's goals, although they agreed to arrange a technical meeting to develop the standards for an emergency house⁶. The results of that meeting were shared with the Cluster group as a suggestion for those who would deliver emergency housing, but no follow-up was made as the Cluster remained for temporary housing.

6. IFRC SUPPORT. THE SHELTER COORDINATION TEAM (STC)

6.1 Deployment

The SCT arrived in El Salvador on the 17th and 18th of November 2009, twelve days after the emergency began. This was an appropriate time frame considering that the cluster global support was requested the 13th. The deployment had to overcome several constraints: the lack of fluent Spanish speaking trained personnel available in the Americas forced the IFRC to move a Spanish-speaker SCT coordinator in the middle of this assignment in the Philippines. Also, the Information Manager position was given to an architect who, despite having strong technical skills, did not have previous IM background or training. Other options such as giving the coordination to a Salvadorian from the ESRC were analyzed by the Shelter Department, but dropped as it could have led to misunderstandings about the SCT and the ESRC roles.

The small size of the emergency operation and the lack of resources made the IFRC decide to deploy a small team, giving the IM also the task of technical advisor, and the team was completed with an in-training Deputy Coordinator and an IM assistant (from mid-December) recruited from the ESRC. The Shelter Cluster Global Focal Point for Information Management was also deployed in El Salvador for a few days to support the IM at the beginning of her mission.

Administrative work to hire the SCT members and logistics for their deployment were well delivered, and mission instructions (Terms of Reference) were clearly given to each member.

⁶ The SCT led the meeting; the fact that the SCT's IM was an architect helped this task; all stakeholders interviewed highly value the technical support given by the SCT.

The length of the SCT deployment was a little over two months (arrival, Nov 17th 2009; departure, Jan 22nd 2010). An IASC request for a one month extension to the initial length (from end-December) was approved by IFRC.

Summary schedule of the Emergency Shelter / Temporary Housing cluster

Date	Milestone
Nov. 5 th 2009	Ida Hurricane strikes El Salvador
Nov. 7 th 2009	UNDP organizes Humanitarian Country Team, including IFRC on it. UNDAC team deployed. IFRC's Regional Shelter Advisor arrives in El Salvador as liaison officer for UNDAC
Nov. 13 th 2009	UNDP letter formally announcing cluster activation. Water & Sanitation and Shelter clusters are activated globally.
Nov. 17 th 2009	SCT coordinator arrives in El Salvador
Nov. 18 th 2009	SCT IM arrives in El Salvador. First meeting with UN Resident Coordinator
Nov. 20 th 2009	SCT's first meeting with VMH (Vice-Minister and his team)
Nov. 24 th 2009	First SC meeting
Dec. 1 st 2009	Sector strategy approved by SC group (2 nd SC meeting)
Dec. 9 th 2009	SC meeting at municipal level (Municipalities organized)
Jan. 19 th 2010	Last SCT-led SC meeting
Jan. 20 th – Jan. 21 st 2010	SC Handover to UNDP (Early Recovery Cluster leader)
Jan 22 nd 2010	SCT leaves El Salvador

6.2 Support by the IFRC Delegations in El Salvador and Central America

Before the SCT was deployed, IFRC had been present in the country through the Country Representative and the Regional Shelter Advisor; this was very helpful, briefing the SCT and having already set the main logistics and institutional coordination, facilitated the SCT to immediately begin their work.

The IFRC Delegation in El Salvador supported the SCT, providing them with the logistics and money for their expenses, as well as facilitating the relationship with the ESRC. The Regional Delegation also provided support in institutional matters.

6.3 Services provided by the SCT

6.3.1 Mission

The ESC objective was to support the government of El Salvador (specifically the Vice-Ministry of Housing -VMH) in coordinating the work of approximately 30 organizations in providing a coordinated response to shelter.

Complementarily, the SCT had to support the harmonization of damage assessment formats, lead a Technical Working Group to develop simple shelter solutions, and build the capacity of the government and the organizations in meeting Sphere Standards especially in the temporary settlements.

6.3.2 Activities

Main activities of the SCT were (summarized):

- Calling and coordination of meetings with all cluster members, sharing consolidated information, discussing topics of interest and reaching sector agreements.
- Facilitation of a cluster strategy, including the definition of the principal implementing options
- Facilitation of a Technical Working Group for the definition of minimum emergency house standards
- Information management tasks; compilation and consolidation of the information, creation and update of a google-group webpage, production of charts, statistics, reports and other tools with the updated shelter needs; data base with contacts information
- Train cluster members in Sphere and support to the VMH in training on urban development standards for temporary housing projects.
- Support the VMH on their needs assessment (technical recommendations and –in a less extent- field assessment)
- Coordination meetings with other clusters
- Design and direct a cluster final self-evaluation

Emergency Shelter / Temporary Housing Cluster meetings

No.	Date	No. Institutions attending	No. Persons attending
1	Nov. 24 th 2009	17	25
2	Dec. 1 st 2009	18	26
3	Dec. 8 th 2009	11	25
4	Dec. 15 th 2009	11	21
4-b ⁽¹⁾	Dec 16 th 2009	5	7
5	Dec 22 nd 2009	8	10
6	Jan 5 th 2010	12	16
7	Jan 12 th 2010	11	21
8	Jan 19 th 2010	14	24

(1) Technical Working Group special meeting –agreed on 4th meeting-

6.3.3 Cluster Strategy

The SCT led the design of a strategy for the cluster. They did not use enough guidance for the task (templates, previous sector strategies, etc.), but they managed to deliver one within a few days after the SCT deployment. A first draft was developed with the participation of some of the cluster members, and after the feedback was received it was approved.

Lined-up with the cluster scope setting, the strategy was specifically designed for the temporary housing response during the emergency and rehabilitation stages, and it sought a holistic focus towards housing projects, considering the final location of the house, water and sanitation supply and psychosocial issues, among others. Its global objective was to *deliver a*

decent temporary house to the affected people, giving them common models and materials until permanent reconstruction was possible, in a coordinated way between all organizations, and considering risk reduction issues and the risk in the prior location of the families to be relocated.

As specific objectives, the strategy aimed to agree on a temporary house model, to establish risk reduction guidelines when identifying relocation sites, to identify and disseminate different implementing options promoting those with recipients' participation, and to establish coordination and information exchange lines within and outside the temporary housing sector. For these, the strategy had indicators that set generic standards and coordination mechanisms, although it did not establish a strategy group within the cluster.

It is to be highlighted that the strategy incorporated (at the SCT proposal) the concept of *bridge sites* ("terreno puente") as a possibility to build temporary houses in them, considering the constraints to allocate land for permanent housing projects. These bridge-sites would be provided mostly by Municipalities, and it appeared to be a good solution to provide transitional shelter solutions in a shorter time, but the obligation of the temporary housing to have minimum water and sanitation services (the implementing partner not being accountable for it) limited the capacity to develop this option.

6.3.4 Coordination

The SCT coordinator had a strong background in the cluster approach and shelter cluster coordination, as well as in the RCRC Movement. His Latin-American origin (Mexican) and former experience in El Salvador were also important assets.

The cluster coordination was mainly done through ordinary (weekly or more frequent) meetings. The meetings were called at first by the SCT, but later the VMH took a more leading role⁷. Other bilateral coordination activities took place, such as meetings with UNDP, IOM and other clusters' leader Agencies and GOES counterparts, as well as inter-cluster coordination meetings (SDP, UN-RC).

A Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) was not formally created⁸, although the higher profile in the sector of some actors (UNDP and ESRC) created an informal *stronger* group along with the GOES and the SCT. This was not a thought-out decision, the scope of the emergency and the size of the cluster turned it out. However, it might have been useful to choose and create this SAG in order to make the cluster coordination more effective, to apply measures against those not following the rules and agreements, and to reinforce the SCT leadership role.

6.3.5 Information Management

The SCT had an IM handover from the UNDAC team. Useful information to the SCT was also provided by the NGO MapAction, who was mapping the ongoing response actions closely with the governmental Civil Protection.

⁷ The first meetings took place at the ESRC, but later the venue was in the VMH

⁸ There was a strategic group meeting to draft the cluster strategy, but that group had no continuity.

The lack of background of the SCT's IM was compensated with the support provided through the IFRC's Shelter Cluster Global Focal Point for Information Management, who was in El Salvador the first five days after SCT deployment. An Assistant IM was assigned to the team for 6 weeks, with general IM support duties and with the specific objective of maintaining the link between the Coordination team and the shelter related activities of the NS. The profile of the selected person (ESRC staff) was not decided jointly with the SCT, and it was not the most adequate one. The review could not know how the person was selected, though it seems the ESRC did not have a clear understanding of the scope of his work and they chose a person with experience in disaster relief instead of one from their communications/public relations office if available. It seems unlikely that the ESRC could have hired an external professional as they have budget limitations and also preferred to have a staff member in the SCT.

The SCT developed and kept updated many useful tools that allowed all stakeholders to know what was going on regarding temporary housing actions. Guidelines and best practices information for the sector were also gathered (Sphere, guidelines for urban developments, etc.), and cluster coordination results (strategy, meetings minutes) were produced. The information was properly disseminated in the meetings and through the Google group website set up.

The IM or other team members participated regularly in other Clusters' meetings, especially CCCM, WASH and Health, where information on needs and activities was shared. CCCM data was especially used by the IM to highlight the number of families leaving Collective Centres and in need of assistance.

The VMH already had an information system to register beneficiaries, the RUI (*Registro Único de Inscritos*), a national data base of families with housing needs. The RUI is used by the VMH to determine the families to be potentially benefited with Government, Municipalities, Cooperation Agencies or NGOs' housing projects, and it is mandatory in order to become a beneficiary that a family is registered in the RUI. The SCT promoted the use of the RUI amongst the cluster members, and suggested the VMH improvements in the data collection (register form) and processing (prioritization of technical evaluations) to make it more efficient. The SCT also advocated with IOM to make them register the families living in collective centres and camps. This support to the RUI was an added value of the IM, as it allowed the VMH to not only update their information but also to strengthen the role of the VMH as the national sector leader.

It was not easy to make the cluster members share their information at the beginning, probably because they don't have the habit of searching for synergies and they feared that it could help other implementing partners "pinch their beneficiaries". The SCT advocacy and the VMH leadership on land allocation and the need for their endorsement to the projects helped to change this.

The GOES declared the end of the emergency on Nov. 26th, which meant no further public daily information was available, the VMH no longer inspected affected areas on a daily basis and the digitalization of data for reports became less of a priority, making it more difficult to collect data aside from the updated 4W frames provided by the cluster members; in addition, the information was progressively developed and managed more at the local (municipal) level,

hindering the consolidation of global data. However, the SCT had a good relationship with the VMH which allowed information to continue to flow despite the bigger effort this required.

Information on the policies of the VMH was not always fully shared, which disappointed many of the actors. This could be the result of policy changes; the organization chart of shelter coordination at the GOES changed three times: from the central VMH, to the Governors of the Departments, to the Municipal authorities. Due to these changes in leadership, information was often disrupted. Lack of communication between the Local and Central Government impeded the transfer of information on policies, availability of land, number and characteristics of beneficiaries, and the overall situation of the displaced population.

6.3.6 Assessment and Advocacy

It was not up to the SCT to make needs assessments. However, they provided advice, guidelines and tools to the cluster members to make their assessments, and advocated with the CCCM cluster to make a census of the people in collective centres and camps, in order to identify global needs of temporary housing⁹. Results from Initial Damage and Needs Assessments from 6 organizations were taken into consideration. All these assessments and reports followed different formats and were not coordinated. Nonfood items needs were derived from these assessments initially and from VMH inspections at later dates.

The SCT also had a relevant advocacy role in the discussion which arose in the group regarding the possibility of giving emergency housing solutions as a cluster goal, leading a technical group to establish emergency housing standards and working towards an agreement in the group¹⁰, showing flexibility and capacity to bring positions closer, although at the end that agreement did not have the desired political strength.

6.3.7 Training

Although training cluster actors was not supposed to be one of their tasks, the lack of emergency shelter experience and knowledge of the GOES and of some of the NGOs involved made the SCT realize the need to train them in Sphere and shelter technical aspects. This training was highly valued by all involved.

6.4 Handover

The IFRC obligations did not extend beyond the emergency phase, but no specific length of the coordination support had been established. Unofficially a provisional hand-over to UNDP (as Early Recovery cluster coordinator) was to be done before the end of 2009, with in-principle support from the Federation for ongoing emergency shelter coordination. However, considering that temporary housing solutions had not begun to be implemented and that there

⁹ IOM had been leading the CCCM cluster, but several of the interviewees agreed that their lack of knowledge and compromise, caused people living in informal camps or resettlement not be counted to receive support because IOM was waiting for the government to declare these settlements as official. In the same sense, IOM was not really guiding the cluster members and affected population on the track of real camp management issues; instead they focused their attention and resources to assess the collective centres again and again. These collective centres were almost closing down definitively at the end of the second month of operation and IOM still didn't react or move to the new settlements or camps, putting more pressure on the temporary housing projects' implementation.

¹⁰ See chapter "from emergency shelter cluster to temporary housing cluster"

were still issues to be developed, the IASC (UN's Resident Coordinator) asked for a one month extension, to which IFRC agreed.

The handover justification was based on the following indicators:

- The coordination mechanisms of the temporary housing sector are established (weekly meetings, google group webpage, IM distribution)
- The temporary housing sector strategy was agreed upon by all members and reflects several implementation options
- The ongoing actions have early recovery characteristics, and the families relocated in bridge sites or permanent sites can return to their normal life.

The end of IFRC coordination and handover to UNDP was not notified to all actors until it was about to be done (joint presentation of the handover process by the SCT and UNDP). Most involved still don't know how and/or who took the decision to end the IFRC services, it seems that the limited funding timeframe and the principal coordination issues already established led to it, but it is not clear if it was a well thought-out decision (IFRC Shelter Department recalls talking about the possibility of another extension, but without reaching a decision), and no one asked for the extension. However, most actors think it was the right time for a handover to the Early Recovery Cluster, even if only a small number of the temporary houses had been delivered. It is not clear that extending the IFRC cluster coordination would have helped much towards a faster implementation, but there is no doubt that after the handover the temporary housing sector coordination went down and the implementation continued to be extremely slow¹¹.

The handover process was adequate; they followed the guidelines of the IFRC (shelter sector handover formats) and the time and information exchanged were sufficient for both sides. The process included the designation of the Early Recovery Cluster coordinator, IM files transfer to the IM responsible in the Early Recovery Cluster, a presentation of the handover process and the Early Recovery Cluster coordinator to the Temporary Housing cluster and the signing of the handover report document.

After the handover to the Early Recovery Cluster, the group was much less active, and a few weeks later it was practically deactivated. The review could not clearly identify the causes for this, but it seems that it had to do with a disenchantment for the low cluster effectiveness (implementation depended more on GOES and/or Municipalities' decisions –projects approval, land disposal, etc.- than on the decisions taken within the cluster) and the lack of new budget allocation.

6.5 Cluster final self-evaluation

The SCT requested the cluster members evaluate the cluster performance before their departure, using a methodology consisting of three questionnaires related to Coordination,

¹¹ Aside from those of the NGO *Un Techo Para Mi País* –with the remarks already stated about their model-, the first houses were given to the beneficiaries in May 2010

Information Management and Shelter Provision. The members had to give a score from 1 to 5 to a number of questions¹². The methodology and tools used were appropriate, giving the results of the evaluation a high level of reliability. The average score was 3.23 (desired level of performance), with IM being the best valued aspect (closely followed by coordination) and Shelter Provision the worst valued (based on the fact that as of January 2010 very few temporary houses had been delivered).

Temporary housing cluster final self-evaluation results

Area evaluated	Average Score
Coordination	3.46
Information Management	3.60
Shelter Provision	2.63
Global	3.23

6.6 Cluster Strategy fulfillment

As per this evaluator's point of view, the strategy approved had a medium-high level of achievement. Some of the interviewees have the opinion that even though the cluster coordination was effective in order to avoid duplicities and share useful information, the cluster goals were not met as the implementation of the temporary houses took much longer than desired, showing frustration and disappointment on the cluster results.

However despite the fact of the slow implementation rhythm, the strategy did not have implementation as a short-term objective. Of course, another reading can be that the strategy itself was too limited to part of the shelter needs (temporary housing) and did not include the emergency shelter solutions.

The following chart shows the evaluation of the achievement level for each strategy objective and the grade of the efforts made by the SCT towards their achievement (either successfully or not), considering all the inputs and information gathered in the review, as from the evaluator point of view. The results show that there the SCT work had a high influence on the strategy achievement.

Cluster strategy achievement

Strategy objectives	Level of achievement (1-5)	SCT efforts towards its achievement (High-Medium-Low)
Agree on a temporary housing model to be used by implementing partners, adapted to local culture and customs, using materials that can be mostly reutilized when it is developed into a permanent house, with basic services.	5	H
Establish general DRR guidelines to be used by all implementing partners identifying temporary housing relocation sites, in order for the affected families to have a safe place to live.	4	H

¹² 1 = No action taken; 2 = Performance under the desired level; 3 = Performance in the desired level; 4 = Performance over the desired level; 5 = Performance much over the desired level

Strategy objectives	Level of achievement (1-5)	SCT efforts towards its achievement (High-Medium-Low)
Identify different implementing options of temporary housing programs, and disseminate them among the implementing partners and the beneficiaries, emphasizing those with a beneficiaries' participation component.	2	L
Establish coordination lines within the cluster (implementing partners) and with outsiders (other clusters), stressing the importance of reliable information flow at all coordination levels.	4	H

6.7 Cross-cutting issues and other shelter strategic principles application

The review also tried to identify how certain cross-cutting issues, other generally-accepted shelter principles and shelter projects design guidelines were applied on Ida shelter/temporary housing response. Cross-cutting the opinions gathered in interviews and the documents read, the following chart shows the result of this analysis.

Other emergency shelter strategic principles/guidelines application in the cluster

Principle/guideline	Level (1-5)	SCT efforts towards its application (High-Medium-Low)
Prioritization of the emergency shelter projects	1	H
That been beneficiary of an emergency shelter project should not diminish the chances to benefit from the reconstruction programs.	5	H
The shelter sector members will not be responsible for urban planning, land use or land property issues; and that these questions will be resolved between landowners and local authorities.	2	M
The shelter sector members will harmonize their responses in order to provide a similar level of aid to the different affected populations; promoting equity within and between communities affected.	4	H
The shelter sector members will avoid overlap in the assistance provided. All actors will update information through the Shelter Sector Meetings and using the Shelter Sector website to determine who does, what, where and assist in the coordination of the response.	5	H
The shelter sector members will promote positive synergies between their projects and other sectors.	2	M
The shelter sector members will try to gap coverage the total needs of the beneficiary community and avoid partial coverage of needs.	1	H
The shelter sector members will address the specific needs of most vulnerable groups (Aged, handicapped, women) through direct intervention and/or advocacy.	1	L

Principle/guideline	Level (1-5)	SCT efforts towards its application (High-Medium-Low)
The shelter sector members will consider gender and vulnerability issues, taking into account the cultural sensibilities.	1	L
The shelter sector members will identify and respond to the specific needs of people requiring assistance in resettlement following acceptable humanitarian principles, minimizing displacement and using the guiding principles on support to IDPs	4	H
The shelter cluster members will retain the focus on the indicators of the results of the strategy and provide emergency/temporary shelter (or advocacy) until those results are adequately covered.	2	M
The shelter cluster members will monitor the shelter needs of the victims and advocate covering them.	4	H

Project design guidelines application in the cluster

Project design guidelines application in the cluster	Level (1-5)	SCT efforts towards its application (High-Medium-Low)
Complementarities with GOES actions	4	H
Relevance in beneficiaries selection	3	M
Non-affected / affected integration (internal conflicts avoidance)	3	L
Promotion of the beneficiaries participation from identification in the shelter solutions	2	L
Cultural and environmental respect	3	M
Generation of positive impacts in the local economy	2	L
RDR and "Building back safer" aspects inclusion	2	H

This shows that, in most of the principles and guidelines, there is a high correlation between the SCT efforts and the level of application or achievement.

The principles "Shelter sector members will try to gap coverage of the total needs of the beneficiary community and avoid partial coverage of needs", and "Prioritization of the emergency shelter projects", had a low level of application despite the strong efforts done by the SCT, which might show the need for more advocacy capacity/authority of the SCT at the political level.

6.8 Relationships

6.8.1 With the IASC

The SCT relationship with the UN organizations was satisfactory and supportive at all times. As a matter of fact, IASC support was an important asset to the cluster and the SCT performance. The high involvement of the UN-Resident Coordinator in the clusters' activation and the ICC was key for the GOES' receptivity to the cluster approach, and specifically in the Emergency Shelter / Temporary Housing cluster she and her team gave permanent support to the SCT, being always available to them and giving enough acknowledgment and importance to their work¹³.

At first, the coordination made with the IFRC Regional Shelter Advisor facilitated the SCT deployment and cleared the IFRC leader's role in the cluster. Later, the advice and support to the SCT on the relationship with the GOES helped manage political issues. It can be said that without UN support before and during the SCT deployment, the cluster coordination would have dealt with greater obstacles and constraints.

6.8.2 With the Government of El Salvador (GOES)

The GOES was not at all familiar with the cluster approach and specifically the Emergency Shelter Cluster scope, and the IFRC coordination role was explained to the VMH in the first meeting with the SCT.

The ESTC was well received by the GOES, and the relationship was good all the way. The person representing the VMH in the cluster was an architect who had previously worked closely with the ESRC (as part of the Spanish Red Cross post 2001 earthquakes operation), so she understood from the very beginning most of the things that the SCT was talking about, and facilitated the process of trust with her colleagues. Previous VMH's meetings with UN-Resident Coordinator and IFRC-Regional Shelter Advisor also eased the way for their receptivity. The VMH saw the cluster approach and support as a helpful way to coordinate the response (avoiding duplicity and/or competition, developing and sharing methodologies and experiences), adapt it to UN standards and make the NGO's more aligned with their priorities, considering the GOES' lack of experience and the lessons learned in 2001 earthquakes, when coordination flaws led to an inadequate response.

However, the VMH did not have a clear knowledge of the SCT's role when they first met with them. After it was explained in that first meeting, they understood they were to support them as facilitators and no further misunderstandings took place. The VMH acknowledged SCT's independence and associated them more with the IASC than with the ESRC.

The SCT maintained the relationship with the GOES mainly through the VMH's team assigned to the cluster, although they had contact with the other GOES stakeholders involved in other clusters (Civil Protection) and the inter-cluster coordination (Ministry of the Presidency). As mentioned before, the GOES had sector Commissions to coordinate the emergency, the

¹³ The UN Resident Coordinator stated to the evaluator that the SC "was the best organized and capable of the clusters installed after Ida"

Ministry of Public Works (of which the VMH is part) being in the Infrastructure Commission, but the SCT did not have direct coordination with the Commission.

From the very beginning, the VMH stated their interest in the cluster being of temporary housing, leaving out of its scope the provision of emergency roofs, tents, or any other emergency shelter solution, as they stated those were Civil Protection's responsibility. This strong position led to the -already explained- change from "emergency shelter cluster" to "temporary housing cluster", and together with the fact that the VMH representatives in the cluster did not have the authority to make technical-political decisions on the spot, the reluctance to change on the VMH's political levels, and that the SCT specific mission was to support the VMH, somehow weakened SCT's leadership before the rest of the cluster members, who might have wanted a stronger negotiation position. However, the IFRC coordination surely improved the transparency of the cluster decisions and the confidence of the NGO's on the GOES.

6.8.3 With the National Society of the Red Cross (ESRC)

The ESRC knew the OCHA-IFRC MoU existed, but they had limited knowledge of it. They were confused on what it meant in practical terms, particularly as for their own role in case of the shelter cluster activation. As other NS in the Central American region, the ESRC was afraid that the global cluster leadership meant that they had to be responsible for the shelter response, particularly for the collective centres and camps management.

The Regional Shelter Advisor explained to them the IFRC role (coordination and technical support to the cluster) and the difference with the IFRC implementing role and the NS role (as one more of the cluster actors), and the confusion and fears vanished.

The ESRC supported the SCT and let them undertake the role without interfering and respecting their own role at the same level of every other NGO of the cluster. However, as the ESRC was one of the most active in the provision of temporary houses, their role in the cluster was more relevant than that of others.

6.8.4 With other cluster members

The SCT relationships with the other NGO's of the cluster were also overall good, based on the professional respect and credibility soon achieved by the team, but they had some *comings and goings*. In the cluster there were different types of NGO's, some of which were very opinionated in relation to their real capacity to give shelter/temporary housing solutions, despite which they took strong positions on the first meetings, making it harder to reach agreements. Others, like UTPMP or FUNDASAL had a more relevant role as implementing partners. They generally respected the IFRC leadership role, although at times they clashed when the group decisions and/or the GOES sector policies were not aligned with their own priorities or criteria, claimed for a stronger position of the SCT to arbitrate conflicting positions, or complained that they were too tied to the GOES' positions.

In emergencies it is usually hard to bring together the NGO's and the Government positions; even in this case, where the principal aspects were agreed upon, there were situations in which the SCT had to adopt a conciliatory stand and use their best skills to reach an agreement with which all partners were satisfied. Particularly on the argument about the

temporary houses of UTPMP and the need to work on emergency houses as part of the cluster's goals, the solutions reached were not mandatory, settling the argument in the cluster¹⁴.

6.9 Respect to the mandate and principles of the RCRC

There were no aspects of the IFRC cluster leadership that compromised the mandate and principles of the RCRC. However, there were some situations in which they could have been compromised.

As already exposed, the VMH had a very strong position on what should be done in temporary housing, and was increasingly assuming the leadership of the cluster, giving the impression before some actors that the SCT was dependent of the GOES. One of the cluster meetings was unexpectedly driven by the VMH to become a political one, by inviting all the municipal majors and giving them a speech defending the GOES emergency response, not letting the SCT run the meeting. That put the SCT in a weak position before the other cluster members, but it was later well managed and clarified and no misunderstanding was consolidated.

In another meeting they invited some private providers to present their construction materials and systems, and though it was apparently agreed previously with the SCT and they explained to the cluster implementing partners that the presentations were to help them know different options to use in their projects, it could have led to misunderstandings (i.e. that the GOES and/or the IFRC had economic interests). Considering that corruption is widely spread in Central American countries and presumptions are made on a negative way by society, this technical information dissemination could have been managed some other way, i.e. giving the chance to the private construction sector to deliver their brochures through the Chamber of Construction or doing their marketing in a specific part of the google group web page.

The SCT had to explain to the cluster members (including the NS) the difference between the IFRC cluster coordination role and the IFRC and NS implementing role in the response, to avoid misunderstandings and earn everybody's respect as an impartial cluster leader, otherwise the IFRC mandate could have been compromised.

Thus, to ensure that of the mandate is not compromised and principles of the RCRC are enforced it is recommended that (at least) the SCT leader have a strong RC background and experience in inter-institutional coordination groups (not necessarily as the group coordinator).

¹⁴ The VMH did not impede UTPMP building their model as long as they didn't acknowledge them "officially" to be temporary houses, and the emergency house standards developed by the Technical Working Group were approved as a "suggestion" to those who would work on that shelter activity, but not as part of a cluster goal.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Global conclusions

- The Ida emergency was an opportunity to test the capacity of the IFRC to coordinate the shelter cluster in America for the first time, more so given the support to the IFRC by the UN Resident Coordinator and OCHA to do it. In that sense the new experience now reviewed had to deal with unpredictable factors, regardless of the previous IFRC shelter cluster coordination experiences in Asia and Africa, as a kind of *twilight zone* in the shelter sector¹⁵. Therefore, the Ida IFRC-led shelter cluster leaves interesting lessons learned for future similar actions in America.
- With the SCT services provided, IFRC has been recognized as the focal point for Emergency Shelter Clusters in El Salvador and it placed IFRC as a coordination body, linking successfully with UN agencies, Government and NGO's. Main partners have expressed their satisfaction on the job done in the coordination, information management and technical advice. The SCT team played a role not only in coordinating inside the cluster but also facilitating the connection with other sectors like Water and Sanitation and CCCM.
- Dedication and commitment, knowledge of the context (region, country and type of emergency), impartiality and neutrality (the evaluation was unanimous in this matter), team building skills, flexibility to understand changing situations and capacity to put together the main issues to work on are the highlights of the IFRC coordination underlined by those interviewed.
- On the other hand, a relative dependence/subordination on/to VMH positions, weak political negotiation powers (i.e. insufficient advocacy capacity to open the cluster to emergency housing solutions), and lack of authority to solve disagreements with an arbitration role (some think the SCT should at least have the mandate to do it when necessary to save time) were things stated to be improved on.
- Politically, although the SCT was not invested with the authority to negotiate with the GOES nor had the mandate to represent the political positions of the international actors, it seems that it would have been good for the SCT to have had a stronger political interlocution/intermediation role, when discrepancies with the GOES arose, as these political decisions had technical consequences. For instance, the VMH position to keep out of the cluster scope any shelter solution below their temporary house model standards, led to gaps on the shelter response; the SCT pointed this out but did not have the political strength to make the GOES find the way to fill these gaps¹⁶.

¹⁵ The cluster approach was new for the GOES and most of the national and international implementing partners, the scope of the SC was not clearly defined, the GOES promptly promoted the construction of temporary houses and did not want emergency or transitional houses to be widely delivered, and the scope of the disaster was not as big as to keep an official emergency situation in which the information more often actualized and faster delivered.

¹⁶ The SCT members themselves are disappointed that those gaps were not filled.

- All partners recognized the added value of having a coordination mechanism with an independent position in front of the implementation partners. Only two clusters had a specialized and full-time coordination team with a primary focus to foster the response in a more coordinated manner; this was highlighted as an advantage to having more efficient results in the cluster.
- Without the IFRC's SCT it would have been unlikely that other Agency give the same dedication and have the same leading capacity. The IFRC, although it is seen by most of the other actors as part of the RC Movement and therefore more as an NGO than an International Agency, doesn't have the risk of being politically engaged, as RC is seen neutral, and focused on needs assistance rather than in politics.
- The inconsistency of the Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis (DANA) was an important constraint to the IM services provided and overloaded the SCT with work.
- Overall, the IFRC coordination (SCT services) was well evaluated by the cluster members; it helped to avoid duplicities, identified inequitable aid distribution amongst Municipalities and promoted assistance to all. To a lesser extent, it facilitated joint actions or inter-cluster synergies. Notwithstanding the overall good outcome, there were several constraints with which the SCT had to deal in the coordination and the information management side, the SCT was powerless to deal with some of these as they were of a political or cultural nature.

7.2 Added value of the SCT

- After Ida almost every shelter sector stakeholder sat at the same table for the first time: Government, national and international NGOs, and agreed on guidelines and standards and mapping and geographical distribution of the aid, in order to avoid duplication and/or leaving highly unassisted areas. Most interviewees agree that after the 2001 earthquakes, inter-institutional coordination had been very weak and each one had applied their own criteria.
- Improved coordination between NGOs and Government. It was not easy for a new Administration in the scope of a disaster crisis to convoke the NGOs and establish a coordination system with a common language. IFRC's credibility helped the SCT task.
- The ESC/THC beginnings were not easy but soon an effective coordination structure was implemented which allowed the Government to know the NGO's actions and to have updated information (The 4W frame) related to temporary housing deliveries.
- Sphere diffusion and training is seen as an added value of the SCT by most stakeholders. The VMH's temporary housing model was improved with the SCT advice to meet Sphere standards. The emergency housing criteria and recommendations (for both roof and camp design) developed by the cluster technical group were also based on Sphere.
- The SCT left installed capacities within the Government: useful methodologies and tools (especially in IM), technical criteria, etc. As per some of the most relevant actors

interviewed, the cluster approach meant a quality jump, making the response more people-centered than ever.

- The cluster coordination facilitated that the NGO's temporary housing beneficiaries be registered as future beneficiaries of the GOES' permanent housing projects. Otherwise, this would have been much less possible.
- It was the only cluster with a full time coordination team. Other clusters were led by persons with other responsibilities at the same time, weakening the coordination results.
- The cluster approach experience of the team leader and his institutional relationships skills helped strengthen the SCT leadership. In addition, the wide information and useful tools delivered by the SCT, combined with the technical skills of the IM, are seen as an added value of the IFRC' services.
- The IFRC-led coordination of the cluster was a good opportunity to link with the UN system and to know it from inside.
- The experience allowed the ESRC to be better positioned in the country shelter sector, as themselves (they were one of the most active actors in the cluster) and as part of the RCRC global sector leadership.

7.3 Positive aspects of the experience to be replicated

- *Team background*

As in Ida, it is advisable that the team leader has a profound RCRC knowledge and inter-institutional and interpersonal skills, even if he/she has no strong technical skills in shelter/housing. IFRC's coordination role is not easily understood by all actors (including the NS), and misunderstandings can be quickly avoided by the team leader having a good understanding not only of the cluster approach but also about the Movement structure.

The technical skills of a member of the team (shelter design, Sphere, etc.) allowed the SCT to provide feedback to VMH shelter solutions proposals and helped the cluster to agree on common minimum standards to be respected. It is highly recommended that a technical advisor is part of the STC.

Aside from their excellent interpersonal skills, the fact that they came from the LAC region¹⁷ and were native Spanish speakers promoted the good relationships with the GOES and most cluster actors. Therefore, it is highly recommended that future IFRC's SCT are composed of members who are fluent in the local language.

- *IFRC support to the SCT deployment*

The absence of the IFRC (in one way or another) as global cluster leader before the SCT deployment could represent a difficult to overcome constraint for the SCT. The work done

¹⁷ In the LAC region, and particularly in Spanish speaking countries, language is an important bond that helps develop good relationships; this in Ida was an important asset to the overall good outcome of the IFRC service.

by the IFRC El Salvador Delegation and the Zone Delegation through the Shelter Regional Advisor helped the SCT to be more effective. Previous conversations with UN, GOES and ESRC, logistics arrangements and contacts allowed the SCT to take on their mission faster. Therefore, sending an IFRC's liaison officer with UNDAC improves the coordination capacities of the STC.

When IFRC is not present in country and/or a Regional Shelter Advisor is not available to travel immediately, asking for NS support should be considered despite the risk of misunderstandings within the same RC, the Government or the international community. The support given by the IFRC's Shelter Cluster Global Focal Point for Information Management was also very helpful and it should be replicated when the SCT's information manager does not have sufficient background. Finally, although no big constraints were reported nor help requested by the SCT, the Shelter Department monitoring and support reinforced them in their job.

- *Technical advisory and advocacy*

Advocacy on the use of Sphere indicators, on support to host/hosted families, and on settlements and informal camps as a priority response, was an asset to the all-around good SCT performance. Technical recommendations to the cluster members and the GOES allowed a better quality aid delivery. Although coordination should remain the main focus of the IFRC services as cluster leader, when possible the SCT should include a skilled technical advisor, as it not only helps provide the appropriate shelter response but also highly contributes to reinforce the IFRC leadership in the sector.

7.4 Things to be improved in future experiences

- *Cluster activation communications*

The review identified a misunderstanding on how and who asked for the IFRC cluster coordination and the SCT. The UN Resident Coordinator said that she first asked the IFRC about their availability to lead the cluster; the IFRC Regional Shelter Advisor said that he reminded UN about the IFRC leadership role and stated their willingness to lead the cluster and deploy a coordination team, explaining this to the NS as well; and the NS thinks they were the ones who asked for a SCT as they agreed to its deployment and included a request for funding for it in their first appeal. The IFRC Shelter Department (HQ) unofficially knew that the global cluster was to be activated and started the SCT deployment arrangements¹⁸, but the official request from OCHA (Emergency Relief Coordinator) was received in IFRC-HQ the same day the SCT arrived to El Salvador.

In this case the misunderstanding did not have consequences since they all agreed on the need and it didn't represent a delay on the decision taking, but formal procedures to activate the cluster and arrange an SCT deployment should be clear, despite the fact that IFRC does not need the formal cluster activation to deploy a team in support of the inter-clusters coordination (even if not officially called STC or with a UN mandate to coordinate the SC).

¹⁸ When IFRC knew about the UN letter to OCHA, they started the arrangements

- *Strategic Advisory Group*

The SAG (i.e. representatives of GOES, SCT, an IASC Agency and a relevant NGO) should have been maintained after the strategy was approved, regardless of the size of the emergency and the cluster group. Letting every decision be taken by all cluster members hinders coordination, even more so if actors have different levels of communication. More thematic work groups can be also created (even if no SCT members participate on each and every group) to give each cluster actor the opportunity to contribute on their area of expertise. At a first glance it could seem that this would have meant overburdening the coordination team with more work, but at the end of the day the decision-taking could have been easier and the agreements would have carried more weight.

- *Better definition of the scope of the cluster*

The scope of the Emergency Shelter Cluster has to be clearly defined with the IASC and the government before the SCT deployment. If the IFRC-led sector group / cluster have only part of the shelter issues under their responsibility, it should not mean that the IFRC coordination efforts are limited to the scope of themes of the cluster. When this happens, IFRC should support the inter-cluster leaders (Government and IASC-UNDAC) to identify and fill the gaps in the shelter needs coverage. In Ida, although the SCT identified them and tried to point them out to the other actors, their efforts were not successful due to both lack of time and the unclear scope of their mission (for both the team itself and the other actors).

The IFRC-led Emergency Cluster includes all shelter issues, from short-term shelter solutions to housing; if the shelter responsibilities (collective centres / planned camps, hosted families, self-provided shelters, etc.) are distributed between several institutions, it does not mean that the IFRC shelter cluster coordination does oversee that all shelter needs are addressed, standards met and no gaps are left unassisted. The fact that the SCT counterpart (VMH) was so clearly assigned and that they had a strong position on what their shelter responsibilities were, on one hand helped the coordination as they had just one interlocutor, but on the other hand it led to limiting the cluster to only one aspect of the shelter needs resulting in an extremely low implementation rate of the projects since the VMH pushed to have a more permanent solution and was reluctant to deliver emergency solutions, and no other cluster was assisting those needs.

- *Clarify the role, mandate and authority of the SCT to all actors*

This should be improved in the future. In Ida, some cluster members (NGO's) were a little disappointed of the IFRC coordination because they did not confront the GOES enough in some topics in which they disagreed. But it is actually the neutrality of the SCT and their dialogue promoting attitude which allowed reaching important agreements, even if later some of the actors disregarded the agreements. The IFRC role is to articulate the shelter response, and advocate for other solutions if gaps are identified. Promoting proper coordination is the main challenge, setting the rules of the game to be sure things are done well, but if the actors do not follow those rules IFRC should not be held accountable for it.

Although it is difficult to give the SCT the authority to dictate mandates to shelter actors and this would burden them with a responsibility that might put the IFRC impartiality at risk, the authority of the SCT to negotiate political issues that have clear technical consequences to the shelter response has to be better defined, to avoid inconveniences to the team members and prevent false expectations and/or frustrations about the IFRC coordination services. For instance, the SCT could be given with an arbitrary role (even if their conclusions were not binding) that the donors could use to put pressure on the Government and/or the implementing partners.

- *Selection of the local support team for the STC*

Despite he made good efforts to support the IM of the SCT, the assistant IM's profile was not decided jointly with the SCT, and it was not the most adequate one. For future STC deployments, the scope of the position to be filled by the NS should be better defined and shared with the NS, letting the STC coordinator and/or the IFRC Shelter Department be part of the person selection. If the NS does not have a person within their staff or volunteers that meets the profile, it should be better that an external local person is hired, without prejudice to a NS's staff or volunteer joining the STC as an in-training member.

- *Visibility issues*

Even if IFRC impartiality as cluster coordinator was impeccable and one of the most respected aspects of the SCT services, initially some of the actors did not separate the SCT from the ESRC and/or the RC Movement as implementing partners, partly due to the high RC visibility of the SCT; they had to earn that respect. There is not an official position in this matter. Opinions about RC visibility of the SCT differ amongst those interviewed; most RC actors recommend reinforcing the IFRC sector leadership and the NS prominence before the Government and the Cooperation Agencies; on the contrary, RC outsiders think the SCT should have a clearer "IASC flag" and limit their IFRC visibility to the minimum, in order to avoid misunderstandings. This evaluator's opinion is that it would depend on each particular situation of the IFRC and NS roles in the country and the risk of compromising the mandate and principles of the RCRC, but that in an ordinary situation, a low RC and higher IASC visibility of the SCT would be preferable, without detriment to the IFRC leadership role.

- *Logistics*

The venue of the cluster meetings changed from the ESRC HQ to the VMH, which was helpful to strengthen the GOES sector leadership, but the venue in the VMH did not have the minimum required conditions (some meetings were even held in the cafeteria), affecting the effectiveness and the attendance to the next meeting. Also, the SCT only had one vehicle assigned, not always with a driver, making it sometimes difficult for the team members to fulfill their different agendas. IFRC should consider a bigger budget for the SCT logistics or ask the NS for supplementary logistic support, including the possibility of renting a venue for the meetings if the Government counterpart does not have a proper one or the UN cannot facilitate it (along with the point of visibility, it is more recommendable that the cluster group does not meet in the NS facilities).

7.5 Recommendations to further support to the shelter sector in El Salvador

- The shelter group (sector approach) has very recently reactivated in El Salvador, under Civil Protection leadership, with the VMH and the ESRC attending the meetings. This reactivation aims at working in “peace times” to improve future emergency responses, designing a contingency plan for the next *winter season*¹⁹ with better implementing responsibilities distribution, coordination and institutional procedures, shelter and housing options, common standards, methodologies, technical designs, etc. They seem to have difficulties to coordinate the group and reach results. IFRC may consider giving them financial and/or technical support, as a way to consolidate the achievements after Ida.
- Moving with host families is the most used shelter solution by affected population in El Salvador. However, hosted and host families are not yet considered fully entitled sheltered population in the response. CP is now working on a methodology to assess their needs and respond at the local level (municipal), but it seems to remain a burden in every emergency²⁰. As the global shelter cluster leader, IFRC can work on a strategy and methodology to assist the hosted and the host families, helping the GOES (and other LAC Governments) improving the way they address the needs of this shelter option.

7.6 Recommendations to improve the IFRC shelter cluster coordination role

- Although the cluster’s deliveries are not mandatory, the coordination efforts have to be consistent and continuous, with a permanent follow-up of the steps taken. Meetings ought to have results, agreements have to be fulfilled and lead to actions, and the cluster must have a strong commitment to follow the recommendations. If not, the cluster tends to be progressively seen as a formality and attendance will be reduced. The SCT job to promote and encourage this commitment in the cluster actors has to go beyond convoking and leading meetings with all the actors: bilateral meetings, strategies design, decisions proposals and other tasks will help the strengthening of the IFRC leadership in the shelter cluster.
- The experience was useful to brief the ESRC about the IFRC responsibilities as the global shelter cluster leader and the mandate of an SCT, and their good understanding of it and consequent attitude in the cluster helped the impartiality and neutrality achieved by the SCT. As this was the first time the IFRC led the shelter cluster in America, it could be a good way to strengthen the cluster approach knowledge amongst the other NS inviting the ESRC to share this experience, in ordinary NS’ encounters (pre-hurricane meeting, sub-regional meetings, CORI, etc.).
- The review identified that the cluster activation protocols were already drafted in 2009 (in the pre-hurricane season meeting), but apparently they were not approved yet. Make these protocols official and disseminate them among the NS could help in future SCT deployments.

¹⁹ In Central America, *winter* refers to the rainy months of the year (May-November, same as the Caribbean hurricane season)

²⁰ IFRC-PADRU’s Shelter scope study in four priority countries (2009) stated this as an issue to be improved upon, and even though El Salvador was not one of the countries in the study, its conclusions totally apply to it.

- Training of more LAC persons as Team Leaders and IM. According to IFRC staff, some were trained in the past years but no follow-up was done, and the fact that they had to bring the SCT from the Philippines (team leader) and UK (IM, and that not being her background) shows the lack of prepared potential SCT members within the LAC region.
- Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis (DANA) is usually a major issue in the countries where the global cluster approach has to be activated. Even if not as part of the SCT, the IFRC should consider a systematic strengthening of the coordination efforts supporting the Governments in the DANA (not only to the areas where the NS will act) with a Field Assessment Coordination Team (FACT) or a NS' trained person assigned to the Inter-cluster Coordination.
- Cross-cutting issues such as gender, special capacities, cultural sensibilities, etc., were not strongly taken into consideration by the GOES nor the implementing partners and the SCT efforts were not either high, because of time limitations and/or not enough knowledge on how to do it; for future SCT deployments, it might be good to give the team basic training and/or tools to incorporate these issues in the coordination services without a high time consuming.
- Also, cross-cutting issues such as gender, disabilities, cultural sensibilities, etc., were barely taken into account by the GOES and the implementing partners. SCT efforts regarding these issues were not significant either, because of time limitations and/or not enough knowledge on how to do it. For future SCT deployments, it might be advisable to provide the team with basic training and/or tools to incorporate these issues into the coordination services, not requiring much additional time.
- Funding dissemination activities about IFRC cluster leader role, and protocols and tools for the activation of the shelter cluster and the SCT request, including different situations (presence or non-presence of IFRC in the country, global activation or local activation, etc.). It has to be more explained the IFRC role as global shelter cluster leader in "peace times", and the coordination to take on the cluster coordination must begin prior to the emergency if possible (if alerts are established) or immediately after the emergency declaration, either through IFRC country or zone office or directly by HQ Shelter Department.
- Most of the documentation of the emergency shelter cluster is in English, and the SCT had to spend some time translating documents, that will serve for future deployments. Anyhow there are still several documents to be translated that can be needed in the future, so it is recommended that the Shelter Department starts working (if not yet started) in a systematic preparation/translation/compilation of shelter related documents in Spanish and other languages.
- In terms of information management tools, more user friendly formats for tracking information could be developed taking in the minimum items to follow, so they can be adapted. The examples available seemed over developed and it was challenging for the SCT to filter down the main objectives of the information requested from agencies, as an example the 3w format.

- At first it was difficult for shelter actors to differentiate between the IFRC and ESRC operations in the country and the role of the SCT team. Visibility guidelines for the SCT should be better developed. Limiting the IFRC visibility in the team members, and/or developing an SCT logo to be used during missions, could promote a better understanding of IFRC coordination role without affecting the leader role. Developing more simple tools to explain the cluster approach to actors and encouraging a more mobile team that can be based outside the NS office can also help in this matter.
- Information about a cluster closure or merger should be included in discussions with and literature for country level partners and a closing procedure introduced. The IFRC should also consider extending its coordination in response to evidence of need at country level.

8. LIST OF ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. Nov.13th 2009 letter from UN-Resident Coordinator to Mr. John Holmes (OCHA) on activation of cluster

ANNEX 2. List of interviewees

ANNEX 3. SC Strategy (in Spanish)

ANNEX 4. Report of the handover of the cluster coordination to UNDP (in Spanish)

ANNEX 5. Terms of Reference for the review



13 November 2009

Dear Mr. Holmes,

First of all, I would like to thank you for the invaluable support we have already received from OCHA during the humanitarian emergency in El Salvador caused by heavy rains and landslides due to Hurricane Ida, in particular through a cash grant and the dispatch of a UNDAC Team. Since the onset of this emergency, I have been consulting closely with national authorities and humanitarian partners regarding needs, in order to develop an effective, strategic and coordinated response.

While assessments are still ongoing, hampered by difficult access and limited information flow, the international community considers that the number of affected people varies between 15,000 to 20,000 families, or some 75000 to 100000 people. Out of those, some 14,500 people, currently in 130 temporary shelters, have lost everything. Damages to infrastructure and housing are considerable, as shown in the attached pictures and the latest Situation Report.

As a first step in organizing the response, I have convened an expanded UN Country Team, hereby denominated Humanitarian Country Team, with representation of all UN agencies in the country, the International Organization for Migration, the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations. This now constitutes the main forum for strategic and policy discussions among international actors on how to support and complement the government's efforts to respond to the emergency. I have also convened a donors meeting. The Humanitarian Country Team will ensure that cross-cutting issues, such as gender, are fully incorporated into our strategic response planning and activities

In consultation with the Humanitarian Country Team, I am pleased to inform you of the following arrangements for the coordination of the humanitarian operation, in support of the response led by the recently appointed Salvadoran Government's leadership of the response:

Mr. John Holmes

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator
OCHA
New York



Sector	Sector/Cluster Lead (UN and partners)
Agriculture	FAO
Camp Management	IOM
Coordination	UNDP
Early Recovery	UNDP
Education	UNICEF
Emergency Shelter	IFRC (with UNDP as implementing partners for CERF / Flash Appeal)
Food Assistance	WFP
Health - Mental Health	PAHO UNICEF
Logistics	WFP
Protection	UNICEF
Water/Sanitation/Hygiene	PAHO

All sector leaders have met and discussed priorities with humanitarian partners. The Humanitarian Country Team, with the support of the UNDAC Team, will work to ensure inter-cluster coordination in El Salvador. Also, any international response is being carefully planned in support of and consultation with the National Authorities leading the effort. As such, all sectors defined above are closely linked to the seven national sectoral commissions (Emergency services; Health; Shelter; Security; Logistics; Infrastructure and Technical-scientific).

So far, we have identified two critical priorities in which the Cluster Leads will require global support: 1) Water & Sanitation (PAHO), given the severe damage to water systems and sewage infrastructure; and 2) Shelter (IFRC), given the particularly difficult situation in collective centers/camps and lost and damaged housing.

As a second step, the Humanitarian Country Team in the country has agreed to request immediately a CERF grant in order to commence emergency operations. Please find attached the proposed CERF request.

Finally, based on consultations with some key donors and the Government, the United Nations and its partners have decided to launch a Flash Appeal to attend affected populations in the next six months.

I would be grateful if you could consult with the IASC Principals to ensure that the Global Cluster Lead Agencies and other partners are prepared to support these proposed arrangements, in particular in the Shelter sector.

Many thanks again for your continued support.

Yours sincerely,

Jessica Faieta
Resident Coordinator



ANNEX 2. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Sector	Institution	Name	Position (as of Nov.09-Jan.10)	Present position / location
RC/RC	IFRC	Fidel Peña	STC Team Leader	American Red Cross - Haiti
		Carolina Cordero	STC Information Manager	CARE - Haiti
		Miguel Urquia	Sr. Officer - Shelter and Settlements Department	Same
		Sandra Durzo	Sr. Officer - Shelter and Settlements Department	Same
		Alberto Monguzzi	Regional Shelter Advisor - Americas Zone Office	DM – IFRC Hungary
		Carmen Ferrer	Shelter Delegate - PADRU	Shelter Coordinator – IFRC Panama
		Harri Hakkinen	-	IFRC Program Coordinator in El Salvador
	El Salvador Red Cross	Dr. José Benjamin Ruiz Rodas	President	Same
		Mirna Zelaya	General Director	Same
		Adan Rivas	Projects Office Engineer	Same
		Ramon Perez	STC's IM Assistant	ESRC's Volunteers Department Assistant
UN	UNDP	Jessica Faieta	UN Resident Coordinator	UNDP Representative – Haiti
	UNDP	Laura Sheridan	Inter-cluster coordination Assistant	UNDP- Haiti
	OCHA	Irene Sanchez	Information Manager	OCHA - Haiti
GOES	Vice Ministry of Housing	Oscar Hernandez	Housing Department Director	Same
		Evelyn Eguizabal	Reconstruction Technical Manager – VMH's representative in the STC	VMH Housing Department Technical Assistant
	Technical Secretariat of the Presidency	Patricia Avila	STP's representative to the inter-cluster coordination	Same
		Rafael Sandoval	Chief of the Department for Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Policies and Plans	Same
	Civil Protection	Edwin Solórzano	Shelter Officer	Same
NGO	FUNDASAL	Rene Cardoza	Project Manager	Vice Ministry of Housing – El Salvador
	Un Techo Para Mi País	Gerardo Calderon	Social Director	Same
		Allan Espinoza	Assignments and Detection Director	Same

Sector de Viviendas Temporales El Salvador 2009.

Estrategia

1. INTRODUCCION

La combinación de los efectos del Huracán Ida y un sistema de baja presión en la costa del Océano Pacífico dejó lluvias muy fuertes en El Salvador, del sábado 7 al domingo 8 de Noviembre ocasionando severas inundaciones y deslizamientos de tierra en muchas partes del país. En solo unas cuantas horas, 355 mm de lluvia fueron registrados en las áreas de mayor afectación, comparados con los 400 mm registrados en 4 días durante el paso del Huracán Mitch (1998).

Según los últimos reportes de Protección Civil (27 de Noviembre de 2009) las personas fallecidas suman 199 mientras 77 se encuentran todavía desaparecidas, 4,000 personas permanecen en 56 centros de evacuación siendo la mayoría de estos ubicados en el departamento de San Salvador (2,547 al 24 de Noviembre de 2009). El número de casas totalmente destruidas está estimada en 3000, por el Vice Ministerio de Vivienda en 52 municipios.

El sistema de respuesta de Naciones Unidas representada por la Coordinadora Residente solicitó la activación y asistencia global a dos sectores específicos para atender esta emergencia: Viviendas Temporales y Agua y Saneamiento, por lo que la Federación Internacional de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja y Media Luna Roja desplazó a un equipo de Coordinación para el Sector de Viviendas Temporales.

Esta estrategia está diseñada para la respuesta durante la fase de emergencia y rehabilitación relacionada con las viviendas temporales buscando siempre tener una atención integral de todos los componentes que conforman una vivienda como lo son: ubicación final de vivienda, aspectos psicosociales, abastecimiento de agua y atención a necesidades de saneamiento básico entre otros.

2. OBJETIVO GENERAL

Proporcionar vivienda temporal digna a las personas afectadas, teniendo modelos de viviendas y materiales comunes a los actores del sector hasta que les sea posible la reconstrucción permanente, de una manera coordinada entre todas las organizaciones tomando en cuenta la reducción de su vulnerabilidad y riesgos de las familias en su lugar de origen al momento de ser reubicadas.

3. OBJETIVOS ESPECIFICOS

- 3.1. Consensuar entre las diferentes agencias un modelo de vivienda temporal, adaptable a la cultura y costumbres del país, utilizando materiales que puedan ser reutilizados (en su mayor parte) al momento de convertirse a una vivienda permanente y que tenga los servicios básicos mínimos contando con asesoría técnica, para ser utilizado por las organizaciones implementadoras.

- 3.2. Establecer los lineamientos generales para reducir los riesgos inherentes en el momento de identificar sitios para la reubicación de viviendas temporales de manera que las familias afectadas cuenten con un lugar seguro para vivir y que sean utilizados por todos los organismos implementadores.
- 3.3. Identificar los diferentes modos de implementación de programas de vivienda temporal y difundirlos tanto entre las agencias implementadoras como en los beneficiarios haciendo hincapié en aquellos donde se incluya un componente de participación de los usuarios finales de la vivienda temporal.
- 3.4. Establecer las líneas de coordinación tanto hacia el interno del sector de viviendas temporales con las agencias implementadoras, como hacia el exterior del sector como lo es con otros sectores resaltando la importancia que tiene el flujo de información verídica a todos los niveles de coordinación.

4. RESULTADOS / INDICADORES

4.1. Del objetivo de Modelo de vivienda temporal:

- 4.1.1. Las viviendas temporales deberán de tener un mínimo de 18 m² de área cubierta, respetando así los estándares internacionales marcados dentro del Proyecto Esfera. Esta área es calculada con un mínimo de 3.5 m² por persona y no incluye el área de cocina ni de saneamiento básico.
- 4.1.2. El material de la vivienda temporal deberá ser adaptado a la cultura y costumbres de las personas afectadas y deberá ser posible su reutilización en lo más posible cuando las familias tengan acceso a una vivienda temporal
- 4.1.3. El modelo de vivienda temporal deberá de contar con los servicios mínimos básicos de abastecimiento de agua potable, correcta disposición de aguas residuales, infraestructura de saneamiento, por lo que el sector coordinara con los otros sectores para coordinar lo de estos servicios y no es responsabilidad de la agencia implementadora de viviendas temporales.
- 4.1.4. En la medida de lo posible se brindara asesoría técnica a los beneficiarios a través de una supervisión directa o apoyándolos con manuales de construcción.

4.2. Del Objetivo de reducción de riesgos en la reubicación de viviendas temporales:

- 4.2.1. Se identifican tres prioridades en los cuales se proporciona la ayuda por parte de las agencias implementadoras en caso de vivienda temporal:
 - a) Construcción de vivienda temporal en un terreno final nuevo, ya sea el original si es seguro de acuerdo a los estudios del VMDV.
 - b) Construcción de vivienda temporal en un terreno “puente”, para el cual deberá de buscarse un terreno final en el futuro inmediato.
 - c) Construcción de vivienda temporal en el terreno original contando con un informe técnico de los posibles riesgos a los que se puede enfrentar la familia beneficiada.

4.3. Del Objetivo de modalidades de implementación de programas de viviendas temporales:

- 4.3.1. Se identificarán los diferentes modelos de implementación de programas de viviendas temporales incluyendo (con capacitación y/o monitoreo):
- a) Autoconstrucción (asistida y no asistida)
 - b) Contratación de compañía constructora u ONG implementadora
 - c) Construcción dirigida
 - d) Otorgamiento de “efectivo por trabajo”, “alimentos por trabajo” u otras modalidades
 - e) Otorgamiento de un sistema de bono de materiales
 - f) Otros identificados.

4.4. Coordinación interna y externa del sector de viviendas temporales.

- 4.4.1. Realizar reuniones semanales con las organizaciones implementadoras del sector de viviendas temporales con el fin de coleccionar y diseminar la información apropiada de interés para todas las agencias involucradas que nos permitan hacer una gestión clara, transparente y justa en la respuesta a las familias afectadas.
- 4.4.2. Mantener presencia en otros sectores que involucran de manera directa o indirecta la construcción de viviendas temporales y facilitar el flujo de información relevante hacia esos sectores y hacia adentro del sector de viviendas temporales.
- 4.4.3. Coordinar actividades (EDAN, evaluación, distribución, etc) a nivel nacional y hasta lo posible a nivel municipal con todos los actores.

5. PUNTOS ESTRATEGICOS OPERACIONALES.

Los puntos estratégicos operacionales que rigen a los organismos implementadores del sector de viviendas temporales enmarcados en esta estrategia son:

- Promoción y diseminación de información a los beneficiarios.
- Los programas deben buscar la equidad en todos los sentidos (de género, discapacitados, etc.) y contar con elementos de protección.
- Se establecerán mecanismos de monitoreo y evaluación en cada fase del proyecto.
- Se debe asegurar la participación activa de los beneficiarios desde las etapas tempranas del programa.
- El programa de vivienda temporal deberá de coordinar con otros sectores para tener un componente de asistencia en artículos no alimentarios necesarios para el re-establecimiento de una vida normal de las familias beneficiadas.
- La información generada en el sector deberá de ser transferida en su totalidad al sector de recuperación temprana en el componente de viviendas.
- La selección de beneficiarios deberá ser siguiendo este estricto orden:
 - Familias que viven en albergues temporales actualmente y cuya casa sea pérdida total.
 - Familias cuya casa sea perdida total y vivan con algún familiar.
 - Familias cuya casa haya sido parcialmente destruida y que no se puede habitar por estar ubicada en zona riesgo.
 - Familias que actualmente están en su casa pero que se ubica en una zona de alto riesgo.
- Se debe ayudar a la economía local en la medida de lo posible, haciendo el suministro de materiales de compañías salvadoreñas.

- Coordinara con otros sectores para promover la rápida recuperación de las familias y sobre todo de la infancia como lo pueden ser de origen psicosocial y otros.
- Se buscara que las familias se integren social y cultural al nuevo entorno con ayuda de las autoridades de todos los niveles de gobierno.

6. ELEMENTOS DE COORDINACION

- 6.1.El sector de viviendas temporales coordinara muy de cerca con el Vice Ministerio de Vivienda, el cual es el referente del Gobierno de El Salvador para los asuntos del sector. Se ha identificado que el Vice Ministerio sea un co-facilitador en las reuniones del Sector Viviendas Temporales.
- 6.2.La información que se recopile, analice y difunda estará disponible a todos las agencias participantes del Sector Viviendas Temporales, así como la representatividad en otros sectores correrá a cargo de la Coordinación en si (IFRC).
- 6.3.Para poder mantener un sistema de rastreo de información que sirva a todos los participantes en el Sector Viviendas Temporales, la sección de manejo de información desarrollará una base de datos, que depende completamente de la información proporcionada por las agencias, y será lo más precisa posible. La sección de manejo de información es responsable de diseminar esa información, así como los acuerdos técnicos a los que se lleguen dentro del Sector.

7. MATERIAL DE REFERENCIA

La implementación de proyectos de viviendas temporales deberá de cumplir con los siguientes estándares mínimos como se determina en los siguientes documentos:

- Políticas, regulaciones, y Códigos del Gobierno de El Salvador relacionadas a viviendas temporales si aplica
- Proyecto Esfera: La Carta Humanitaria y Mínimos Estándares en respuesta a Desastres, 2004; Capitulo 4 (www.sphereproject.org);
- El Código de Conducta del Movimiento Internacional de la Cruz Roja y la Media Luna Roja y ONG en la respuesta a desastres (http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp?navid=09_08);
- IASC Manual de Genero, Género y Alojamiento en Emergencias, p97 a la 104.

Sector Viviendas Temporales

(Huracán Ida) – (Nov. 2009 a Dic 2010)

(El Salvador)

Traspaso de responsabilidades del Sector de la Federación Internacional de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja y Media Luna Roja a Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo:

Coordinación del Sector de Viviendas Temporales al Sector de Coordinación de Recuperación Temprana

Propósito:

Este documento describe la transferencia de responsabilidades del Sector de Viviendas Temporales establecido para la respuesta del Huracán IDA por parte de la Federación Internacional de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja y Media Luna Roja (FICR) al Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo en El Salvador. La actividad desarrollada por el Sector de Coordinación de Viviendas Temporales se ha desarrollado siguiendo la “Guía para el uso de mesas sectoriales para fortalecer la respuesta humanitaria” del Comité Inter Agencial que reconoce que el mandato de la FICR está limitado únicamente a la fase de vivienda de emergencia.

Antecedentes:

El efecto combinado del paso de Huracán IDA y un sistema de baja presión proveniente de la costa Pacífica indujo a una lluvia muy fuerte en El Salvador, del sábado 7 al domingo 8 de Noviembre, causando inundaciones severas y deslizamientos de tierra en siete de los 14 departamentos del país. En solo 4 horas, se registraron 355 milímetros de lluvia en las áreas más afectadas, no tan lejos de los 400 mm registrados en cuatro días por el paso del Huracán Mitch en 1998.

Se han determinado que más de 200 personas fallecieron en este desastre y en su momento más crítico había 132 albergues (en escuelas, iglesias y campos) en 52 municipios, representando el 20% del total de municipales del país. En total, aproximadamente 15,000 familias (75,000 personas) deberían de haber sido asistidas recibiendo ayuda humanitaria.

El 8 de Noviembre, el Presidente de la República de El Salvador, Sr Mauricio Funes, decreto estado Nacional de Emergencia y el 10 de noviembre, el gobierno solicitó ayuda internacional. Varios equipos internacionales de diversas organizaciones, expertos en evaluación de daños y análisis de necesidades, arribaron al país, para realizar su trabajo.

Los esfuerzos internacionales se concentraron inicialmente en el abastecimiento de ayuda de emergencia (alimentos y artículos no alimentarios) a la población afectada, especialmente a aquellos ubicados en los albergues. Posteriormente de las evaluaciones y conforme paso el tiempo, los albergues fueron disminuyendo asumiéndose que la mayor parte de la población afectada se regresó a vivir a sus casas destruidas, o con familiares y muy pocos en asentamientos irregulares.

Como parte de la respuesta internacional se activaron dos equipos de Coordinación de Sectores: Vivienda Temporal y Agua y Saneamiento. El resto de los sectores utilizaron los recursos humanos disponibles en el país, de las diferentes organizaciones de Naciones Unidas en el país. Para la segunda semana de Noviembre los equipos y sectores ya se habían activado y para el 18 de noviembre el equipo de la FICR ya estaba en el país.

Descripción del proceso de Coordinación del Sector de Viviendas Temporales:

1. Las principales actividades desarrolladas durante la participación de la FICR en la Coordinación del Sector de Viviendas Temporales son:
 - a. 8 reuniones generales con todos los participantes, donde se fue actualizando la información generada por ellos y se llegaron a puntos de acuerdo en conjunto con las organizaciones implementadoras, donantes y gobierno principalmente.
 - b. Se realizó una reunión con un grupo estratégico donde se discutió la estrategia del Sector quedando plasmados los principales modelos de intervención.
 - c. Se realizó una reunión del grupo técnico especializado donde se discutieron los parámetros esenciales para el modelo de vivienda temporal mínima.
2. Se estableció una página de internet, de los denominados “grupos de google”, la cual se ha actualizado de manera periódica para consulta de los miembros participantes. De la misma manera se han producido innumerables tablas y reportes analizando desde diferentes puntos de vista los daños y las necesidades de las familias afectadas por el Huracán IDA. Se ha establecido un sistema de evaluación del sector consistente en 3 diferentes cuestionarios (Provisión de vivienda temporal, Manejo de Información y Coordinación).
3. Se cuenta con una base de datos actualizada de todas las personas de contacto de las organizaciones que están participando en el Sector, con correos electrónicos y número de teléfono para envío y solicitud de la información.

Proceso de Transferencia:

1. La transferencia de las actividades del Sector de Viviendas Temporales se hace de la FICR al PNUD a partir del día 22 de enero de 2010, como parte del Sector de Recuperación Temprana en El Salvador.
2. La FICR y el PNUD reconocen la importancia de tener un periodo de transferencia de responsabilidades del Sector de Viviendas Temporales en lo que se refiere al manejo de información y continuación de la estrategia convenida por los participantes.
3. En consecuencia y en acuerdo con la Coordinadora Residente de Naciones Unidas en El Salvador se realiza la transferencia de responsabilidades de acuerdo a las siguientes fechas calendarizadas:
 - a. Se ha determinado que la Coordinadora de la Mesa de Recuperación Temprana es Carolina Dreikorn, quien ya se encuentra trabajando en el país.
 - b. Transferencia de los archivos de manejo de información a un responsable en el Sector de Recuperación Temprana.
 - c. Transferencia de el manejo de la pagina web (grupo de google)
 - d. Presentación en la reunión del Sector de Viviendas Temporales del proceso de transferencia y de la Coordinadora de la Mesa de Recuperación Temprana.
 - e. Elaboración y firma del presente documento.

Justificación

La Federación Internacional de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja y Media Luna Roja tiene como mandato dentro del contexto del Comité Inter-Agencial y la Reforma Humanitaria, participar como “líder de sector de viviendas de emergencia” y no en soluciones de asentamientos y vivienda transicional post-emergencia.

Indicadores

1. Los mecanismos de coordinación en el sector de viviendas temporales están realizados a través de las reuniones semanales con los participantes, el grupo google basado en internet y la distribución del manejo de la información.
2. La estrategia de intervención del Sector de Viviendas Temporales fue consensuada entre los participantes y refleja las diferentes variantes de implementación.
3. Las intervenciones que ya se comenzaron tienen características típicas de recuperación temprana, ya que las familias al ser reubicadas en terrenos “puente” y terreno permanente están en posibilidades de reintegrarse a su vida normal.

Se asume que en un futuro evento de desastre natural la FICR tomara la responsabilidad de coordinar el sector de vivienda de emergencia a menos que sea acordado de manera diferente con IFRC.

San Salvador, El Salvador a 22 de enero de 2010.

Por la Federación Internacional de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja y Media Luna Roja

Fidel Peña
Coordinador del Sector Vivienda Temporal.

Por el Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo

Carolina Dreikorn



Terms of Reference (ToR) for: **A Review of the El Salvador floods 2009** **IFRC-led Shelter Cluster**

1. Summary

- 1.1 Purpose:** The Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) seeks to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the coordination services given by the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster Coordination team to the El Salvador flood response in 2009 to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future response.
- 1.2 Audience:** The IFRC and in particular the Shelter & Settlements Department will use the evaluation to improve future deployments. Shelter coordination team members will use it to learn. Cluster partners, donors, and other humanitarian actors will use it for general information.
- 1.3 Commissioners:** This evaluation is being commissioned by IFRC as Global Shelter Cluster Lead for natural disasters.
- 1.4 Reports to:** Miguel Urquía, IFRC Shelter and Settlements Department.
- 1.5 Duration:** (up to) 21 days
- 1.6 Timeframe:** from January 15th December 2011 to February 10th 2011
- 1.7 Location:** Home based with travel to El Salvador (7-10 days). The visit to the field should be arranged with key informants.

2. Background

During 7 and 8 November 2009, the passage of Tropical Storm Ida through Central America, which coincided with a low pressure system over the Pacific coast of El Salvador and Guatemala, caused heavy rainfall in El Salvador. Mudslides buried towns and overflowing rivers swept through different areas destroying water, electrical and telecommunications systems, damaging roads, health and educational centres and houses. Thus, the Salvadoran President decreed a state of national emergency on 8 November. 9,000 people were sheltered in 131 collective centres on Nov 8th.

The interagency standing committee (IASC) clusters were activated during the emergency phase and coordinated the activities of the various organizations, donors and government agencies to ensure an efficient and accountable partnership for the typhoons disaster response. In accordance with its global commitment to the IASC cluster approach, the International Federation initially deployed a coordination team to convene the emergency shelter cluster. The ESC team arrived in country on November 18-20th 2009 and supported the Vice-Ministry of Housing (VMH) in coordinating the work of approximately 30 operating organizations.

The ESC objective was to **support** the government of El Salvador and the operating organization in providing a coordinated response to shelter and contribute towards the effective provision of emergency shelter assistance to the affected population through the timely and efficient provision of required information management services.

In addition to this technical support was provided team to develop simple shelter solutions, build the capacity of the government and the organizations in meeting Sphere Standards especially in the temporary settlements.



3. Evaluation Purpose and Scope

The objectives of the review are to:

1. Appraise the service provided by the International Federation as shelter cluster coordinator to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actors;
2. Review and analyze the experience of the International Federation with respect to the **establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster**, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations;
3. Provide recommendations with regard to the International Federation's leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities at both national and global levels.
4. Examine if there were aspects of the Federation's cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.
5. Examine the options for the IFRC to continue to have a lead role in the cluster during non-emergency periods and the resources required to perform such a role.

4. Evaluation Methodology

The methodology employed by the evaluator(s) in gathering and assessing information should include:

- Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the Shelter Cluster.
- Interviews with key internal stakeholders within the Secretariat in Geneva, the IFRC Zone Office in Panama, the Regional IFRC Office (e.g. Regional Representatives, DM positions, etc.) and the El Salvador Red Cross;
- Interviews with the former members of the IFRC Shelter Cluster Coordination Team
- A field visit to el Salvador:
 - Interviews with other key stakeholders, in particular Government officials where possible;
 - Interviews with the UN Resident Coordinator's office and any other relevant people in the UN system;
 - Interviews with shelter agencies participating in the Shelter Cluster, and in particular IOM, UN Habitat, and other key actors/clusters;

Note: A suggested list of interviewees will be provided separately.

5. Deliverables (or Outputs)

1. Concise, written document with key recommendations and supporting information. This document should be of use for discussing the IFRC experiences of the cluster process internally and also with key donors and other stakeholders.
2. Additional notes, summaries of interviews etc. as appropriate or supporting documentation.
3. Summary of review activities undertaken including interviews, visits, documents reviewed etc.



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4. Short written document on the appropriateness of IFRC permanent leadership/participation in the shelter cluster and the desires of the country delegation to this effect.

6. Proposed Timeline (or Schedule)

The exercise will be implemented over a period of 21 days between January 2011 and February 2011. 7-10 days of this period will be spent in the field. The report must have been submitted, reviewed and accepted by the Shelter and Settlements Department and all financial transactions must have taken place before the end of this period.

7. Evaluation Quality and Ethical Standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Evaluation Policy: www.ifrc.org. The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics and Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality and Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at: www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

8. Evaluator(s)

The evaluation will be carried out by an external independent consultant. Support will be provided to the consultant by the Shelter and Settlements Department, Zone Office and Country Delegation as necessary and appropriate.

Experience:

- ✓ experience of working for a humanitarian aid organisation in disaster management in developing countries.
- ✓ experience of analysing, planning, and evaluating relief and shelter programmes and resources

Skills:



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- ✓ Comprehensive knowledge of the Humanitarian Reform and Cluster process
- ✓ Self-supporting in computers (designing software preferable, Windows, spreadsheets, word-processing and Skype/other online calling services)
- ✓ Strong skills in report writing and both oral and written communication.

Languages:

- ✓ English
- ✓ Spanish

9. Appendices

Key reference documents to be provided:

1. IFRC-UN OCHA Shelter MoU
2. ToRs of the IFRC Shelter Coordination Team members
3. Email to Global Emergency Cluster informing on the deployment of the SCG
4. List of relevant people to be interviewed with contact details
5. Emergency Shelter Cluster Handover document (if appropriate)
6. All documents (meeting minutes, strategy documents etc.) available from El Salvador Shelter Cluster website (if active)
7. Reviews of IFRC-led shelter cluster coordination in Nepal (Floods 2008), Myanmar (Cyclone 2008), Bangladesh (Cyclone 2007-2008), Tajikistan (Cold weather 2007), Pakistan (Floods 2007), the Philippines (Typhoon 2006), Bangladesh (Cyclone Aila 2009) and Pakistan (Baluchistan earthquake 2008). These reviews can be found at:
<http://www.humanitarianreform.org/Default.aspx?tabid=688>