External evaluation of the disaster-management capacity of the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan

International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies,
Tajikistan Country Representation, Dushanbe

Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan volunteers at work in the temporary displacement camp that was established in the football stadium in the city of Kulyab after the devastating spring floods in 2010. (Photo: Hasan Nozimov/RCST)

This evaluation was commissioned by the Country Representation office in Dushanbe of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, principally on behalf of the most recent supporters of the disaster-management programme of the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan: the Finnish, German, Netherlands, Norwegian and Swedish Red Cross, the UK Department for International Development, and DIPECHO – the disaster-preparedness arm of the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection office. It draws on the testimony of Red Crescent personnel from Tajikistan itself and from other National Societies based in the country, from Tajik citizens affected by disasters, from Tajik officials in the capital and elsewhere, and on desk-based research in Dushanbe and the UK. The opinions expressed herein are the author's alone, as is responsibility for any errors.

Alex Wynter, Dushanbe

December 2011

Alex Wynter consultancy
alex.wynter@btopenworld.com

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express sincere gratitude to all those people in disaster-affected communities throughout Tajikistan and to the RCST, IFRC, ICRC and other agency personnel who contributed to this evaluation in one way or another – by taking part in the questionnaire, by agreeing to be interviewed and giving their views openly and generously, by providing comments in writing, or by pointing to other sources of information. Especial thanks are owed to Shukhrat Sangov, the RCST's head of disaster management, and Shamsudin Muhudinov, IFRC disaster-management coordinator in Dushanbe, and their teams without whose support over nearly a month this evaluation would not have been possible; particularly Umed Aminov who travelled with me throughout Tajikistan and translated, and Islom Rajabov for extraordinarily safe and cautious driving on some very difficult mountain roads; also to the Kulyab RCST volunteers who turned out in freezing rain and sleet to conduct the beneficiary questionnaire. Last but by no means least, it would be very remiss not to mention the kindness and hospitality we met from Tajik people everywhere (nothing was ever too much trouble), which made the evaluation a pleasure to conduct from start to finish.

'The importance of safety is best understood by those who face some hardship.'

– Dari (Tajik) proverb

Alex Wynter consultancy
alex.wynter@btopenworld.com

Table of Contents

Alex Wynter consultancy
alex.wynter@btopenworld.com

Abbreviations and acronyms

This evaluation follows IFRC house style throughout: acronyms have been kept to a minimum for readability. All acronyms, including those in footnotes only, are expanded on first use, and separately in the executive summary. "PNS" is used in the sense of Partner (as opposed to Participating) National Societies, which are listed alphabetically in the text.

3G	"Third-generation" mobile telecommunications, enabling mobile handheld internet, email and audio-visual content
ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CoES	(Tajik) Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence
CR	(IFRC) Country Representation
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DG-ECHO	Directorate General, European Commission for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness ECHO
DM	Disaster Management
DMC	(RCST) Disaster Management Centre
DP	Disaster Preparedness
DRCP	(RCST 2011–14 national) Disaster Response and Contingency Plan
DREF	(IFRC) Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
GADRR	Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction
GSHAP	Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program
HF	High-Frequency (Radio)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDRL	International Disaster Response Law
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cross Societies; also "International Federation"
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
LDMC	(RCST) Local Disaster Management Committee
MiFi	USB modems that double as routers for wireless-equipped devices
NDRT	(RCST) National Disaster Response Team
NFI	Non-Food (relief) Items
OD	Organizational Development
PNS	Partner National Societies
RCST	Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan
REACT	(Tajikistan) Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team
RFL	Restoring Family Links
SAH	(Tajikistan) State Administration for Hydrometeorology
SEMP	(US) Suburban Emergency Management Project
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TIEES	Tajik Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USGS	US Geological Survey

TAJIKISTAN

With Dushanbe the ten other towns and cities shown on this map are the locations of the 11 RCST Disaster Management Centres; *oblast* capitals are shown in upper-case letters.
(Map credit: Eszter Saródy)

Executive summary

Although climatic disasters in Tajikistan may cumulatively account for more destruction and human casualties, there is a clear perception that *seismic* risk presents the greatest single hazard – and one from which no part of the country is immune. Roughly two-thirds of Tajikistan's national territory appears in the highest category of risk on the 1999 Global Seismic Hazard Map.

Alongside the earthquake hazard is climate change – a destructive cycle of drought-flood-drought and generally topsy-turvy seasons. This plays havoc with agriculture and horticulture, even when it doesn't cause an event actually classifiable as a disaster. In the decade to 2007, there were an average of 14 major flood-events (and 21 major earthquakes) *a year.*

Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics – 127th out of 187 countries in the latest (2011) Human Development Index of the United Nations Development programme (UNDP). This is only just behind its immediate neighbour to the north, Kyrgyzstan, at 126, but compares unfavourably with Kazakhstan (68), Turkmenistan (102) and Uzbekistan (115).

By one estimate, before the world financial crisis that began in 2008 a higher proportion – 45 per cent – of Tajikistan's gross domestic product comprised remittances from migrant workers than in any other country. An economic downturn in Russia and a depreciation in the value of the rouble caused a fall in the dollar value of remittances to Tajikistan of 31 per cent in 2009 over the previous year – US$ 800m or *one sixth* of GDP.

Tajikistan also has the highest rate of population growth in Central Asia: 1.83 per cent per annum in 2001–2, compared to the next-highest rate, Kyrgyzstan's, at 1.43 per cent, and an average for all five countries of 1.19 per cent.

In 2003, with the assistance of the National Society's long-standing donors like the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Partner National Societies (PNS) like the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Red Cross, the first of what are now 11 Disaster Management Centres (DMC) were set up in Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) branches in strategic locations around the country, including all the capitals of the three *oblasts* and Dushanbe. The rationale for this was the sheer frequency and severity of disasters the RCST had to deal with.

The National Society's disaster management department was recreated from scratch in the same year, when the European Commission's disaster risk reduction (DRR) projects also got underway with the first of what are now six completed rounds of projects.

The DMCs vary considerably in the size of the areas they take responsibility for. There is a division of opinion in the DMCs over whether to accede to recent advice from Dushanbe not to respond to "small-scale" disasters – mainly house fires – in order to preserve their very limited disaster preparedness (DP) stocks. Some DMC interviewees were reluctant to accept any distinction between small-, medium-, and large-scale disasters.

Yet at a typical DMC, disaster stocks can easily be whittled down to zero over the course of a few months by responding to all small-scale disasters; they are expensive to replace – a complete family kit, not including a tent, costs around US$ 350 in Tajikistan.

There is a lack of clarity in most of the DMCs about which Local Disaster Management Committees (LDMCs) are active. The view at RCST headquarters in Dushanbe is that *two* LDMCs per district is the ideal number, but

DMCs vary considerably in both exceeding and falling short of this ratio.

From January 2012, as things stand, a majority of the DMCs will have to function on a voluntary basis; donor funding for several paid DM coordinators will end.

Red Crescent first-responders are given the use of (military) Ural trucks and drivers for disaster response by the National Society's most important domestic operational partners: the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES). None of the DMCs have any fuel or cash reserve.

Some DMC catchments include significant numbers of trained volunteers apart from LDMCs; some don't.

One of the Red Crescent's great successes is to have achieved a high degree of *gender balance* in its volunteer base, in a country where culture and society do not always conduce to this; this does not necessarily mean all gender-balance issues in disaster response, and the position of women as both victims of disaster and later as humanitarian beneficiaries, are automatically settled.

None of the DMCs surveyed for the evaluation had anything like the level of DP stocks they felt it would "economically rational" to hold – defined in the evaluation survey as the quantity of relief goods they would be able to distribute expeditiously in an emergency given their known volunteer-base

The old high-frequency radio system has not worked properly anywhere for years. Yet while only one branch is equipped with a USB modem, there is a good 3G mobile-telephony signal throughout Tajikistan's populated regions.

The disaster-management department at national headquarters in Dushanbe is characterized by an atmosphere of "everybody does everything".

But at the senior level – "Disaster Response (Manager)", "Disaster Preparedness (Manager)" and "Climate Change Adaptation Adviser" – people have drifted away from their job titles and descriptions amid the exigencies of real disaster-response and the effort to provide donors like ECHO with value for money.

Much of what is recommended in this evaluation renders de jure what is already de facto – and has be shown to work.

At present all senior posts are at least partly funded from the annual appeal for Tajikistan of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); although it operates in extremely straitened economic conditions, the emphasis the National Society places on disaster in general is not reflected in its willingness and/or ability to pay for senior disaster management (DM) posts out of core funds.

The fundamental conclusion of this evaluation is that while the absolute (quantitative) level of the RCST's humanitarian impact may be limited by the low resource-level the National Society struggles with, in qualitative terms it adds up to more than the sum of its parts. The DMC system has proved to be a success, and individual DMCs have done most of what, and sometimes more than, could reasonably be asked of them; the humanitarian impact of the relief goods and hardware they have at their disposal has often been amplified by the speed and agility of their response, as with (most recently) the flash flood in the centre of the city of Kulyab on 7 May 2010.

A limited multiple-choice beneficiary survey conducted for this evaluation and based on one already done by the RCST is appended and suggests the aid given was relevant, timely, and (with no one having to travel very far to get it) convenient.

The Red Crescent has formed productive partnerships with several other agencies and

PNS, especially in the context of the ongoing DIPECHO series of disaster risk reduction projects. Final negotiations were recently underway for another round of DIPECHO projects, the seventh, that it's hoped will start in spring 2012.

Though ECHO is known to view some of the Tajik DRR projects as "repetitive", none has been judged a complete failure and Tajikistan may be better than most other Central Asian republics in providing the donor with some visibility for DRR work.

But more could have been done to "market" the projects post hoc, and the PNS community in Dushanbe would like to see tighter and more detailed monitoring and evaluation of DIPECHO projects, as well as more attention to external communications to promote them.

The (most recent) DIPECHO VI projects have involved expansion of the local LDMC network, first-aid training, scenario planning, awareness-raising through retail media, and regional Red Crescent workshops and training.

In one recent disaster the evaluation team was able to track by visiting the site, the mudslide last June in the village of Bobodarkhon, DIPECHO-supported LDMC volunteers were partly responsible for ensuring the village was evacuated promptly and no lives were lost.

Another project visited for the evaluation, the four-kilometre dyke near the village of Dusti, in Asht district, Sugd region, is extremely impressive: local people say that in 2011, for the first time in many years, no houses or market gardens have been lost to floods, and they add that working on the dyke has helped bind the people of Dusti together.

Evaluation methodology, goals and constraints

This evaluation of the Tajik Red Crescent's disaster-management capacity was researched and written in Tajikistan over three weeks from November to December 2011. It was commissioned by the Tajikistan Country Representation office of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) on behalf of the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) and the donors involved. As will be seen, the Red Crescent in Tajikistan faces very challenging circumstances, and is fully cognizant of its duty to make the best use of limited available resources – be they human, financial or material. But the National Society and some of its close international partners have became aware over the last few years or so that a degree of adhocracy has crept into the Red Crescent disaster-management network – especially at the level of the grassroots Local Disaster Management Committees (LDMC) – while the disaster-management (DM) department in Dushanbe is itself under new management and looking to make changes.

It is an *ex post* exercise in the sense that, under the terms of reference (TOR), the period examined dates back to 2003. However it is not, and was not, intended to be a full historical account of all the intervening years, nor of the impact of every humanitarian response undertaken during that period. Rather, as per the TOR appended below, it seeks to evaluate the *current capacity* of the RCST Department of Disaster Management in the light of recent operations, and make recommendations about how resources might best be deployed. It is participatory inasmuch as one group of Red Crescent beneficiaries, in the flood-affected area of Kulyab city, took part in a new questionnaire conducted by RCST volunteers, and Red Crescent beneficiaries were interviewed in several other locations.

The evaluation follows standard practice in not attributing any quotes directly to speakers, but a complete list of interviewees is given as an appendix.

All documents consulted are mentioned in footnotes, not listed separately. Numbered lists are used to indicate an explicit order of priority; bulleted lists otherwise. Wherever possible, information derived from documents and interviewees in Dushanbe has been triangulated in the course of three separate field trips conducted as part of this evaluation, in chronological order: to Kurgan-Tyub and Kulyab cities on 4–6 December 2011 by road; to Rasht city and the village of Navdi on 7–8 December by road; and to Khudzand city (by air) and Shaidon city, Asht district, and the villages of Dahana, Bobodarkhon and Dusti on 9–11 December.

Once again, throughout this exercise we were met with the highest imaginable degree of openness and cooperativeness by everyone we encountered. People spoke freely about the issues they faced, about past responses – including shortcomings, and about their hopes and fears for the future. The chief (in fact only real) constraint was provided by the *weather:* the second of the field trips listed above, which had been intended to include Vanch, had to be cut short when the road from Kulyab that for much of its length runs along the Afghan border proved impassable.

As this evaluation was being conducted, no fewer than seven of the 11 RCST Disaster Management Centres (DMC) were cut off from the capital by road: all the DMCs at the eastern edge of the Pamir mountains – Vanch, Khorog and Ishkashim, as well as Sagirdasht in the centre of Tajikistan, and Khudzand, Pendzhikent and Ayni in the north west (*see map,* page 5). Indeed, seasonal planning for disaster preparedness emerged as one of many important DP issues for the National Society.

At the time of writing, Vanch and environs was suffering almost constant minor earth tremors, though there was no scientific consensus on what

Rocks, boulders and a newly formed waterway mark the site of the village of Dahana, in Asht district, Sugd region. It was virtually wiped from the map by a landslide in 1999 that killed 23 people. Just visible on the ridge in the distance is the cemetery where many of them are buried. (Photo: AW)

exactly this might mean in terms of the imminence of a major quake. But were a humanitarian response to be required there in winter, it could only be reinforced by means of an *air bridge* – something which the Tajik military's capacity to mount is limited at best. This reality – and the geography of accessibility in general during the Tajik winter – surely adds weight to one of the principle conclusions of this evaluation: that Red Crescent DP stocks should be significantly augmented above their current level.

This evaluation was also conducted with the administrative and financial support of the IFRC's Europe and Central Asia Zone office in Budapest,[1] Hungary, and has throughout been guided by the International Federation's latest *Framework for Evaluation,* February 2011.

Tajikistan: a challenging legacy

Tajikistan faces a daunting array of disaster hazards – in effect, with the possible exception of a major nuclear accident, encompassing the entire spectrum of natural and man-made dangers that humanitarian agencies must deal with.

Although in any one year climatic disasters may cumulatively account for more destruction and human casualties, there is a clear perception in Tajikistan that it is the *seismic* risk arising from the collision of the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates that presents the greatest single hazard – and one from which no part of the country is immune.

"Most of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, including their capital cities Almaty, Bishkek and Dushanbe respectively, lie in a region with very high seismic hazard," measured by peak ground acceleration, according to the US Geological Survey (USGS). These countries, on average, are exposed to a destructive earthquake causing damage to infrastructure every three to five years and a catastrophic one every 35 years.[2]

Moreover, roughly two-thirds of Tajikistan's national territory appears in the highest category of risk on the 1999 Global Seismic Hazard Map, with the remaining area in the next category down – a proportionate risk only exceeded by Kyrgyzstan.[3] In some parts of the centre of Tajikistan, for example, local people regard minor tremors as an almost daily fact of life, akin to showers of rain, as in – at the time of writing – Vanch. There is no scientific consensus on whether these continual tremors point to the imminence of a major quake or the opposite (as seismic tension is gradually released), but humanitarian first-responders in Tajikistan believe they have little choice but to assume, and plan for, the former.

The last major earthquake with its epicentre in Tajikistan to cause any deaths (at least 12) occurred on 22 July 2007 in the central Rasht district.[4] The most serious quake in what might be termed the modern humanitarian era (but before the birth of Tajikistan as an independent nation) came in 1989, when a quake with its epicentre in Gussar district just outside Dushanbe killed nearly 400 people.

But one quake, now at the outer edge of living memory, is still much talked about within the Tajik disaster-management community, despite the relatively low death-toll (some 90 people),[5]

[1] "IFRC" or "International Federation" correctly denote the organization's Geneva and field offices *and* member National Societies together; IFRC or International Federation "secretariat" refers to the Geneva and field offices – zones, regions and delegation or country-representation offices. However, "IFRC" and (as an adjective) "Federation" are commonly used, including here, to refer to the secretariat alone, and the reader should infer the sense from the context.
[2] USGS, Seismic Hazard Mapping of Central Asia at http://nsmp.wr.usgs.gov/centralasia/about.html.
[3] Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program (GSHAP).
[4] All spellings of Tajik place names in this evaluation and the accompanying map on page 5, except some contained in quoted material, are those used by the Land Management Geodesy and Cartography Agency of the Tajik government. Spellings of country names follow the house style of the IFRC.
[5] A 1907 quake in the Rasht valley (sometimes referred to as the "Karatag" earthquake) killed some 12,000 people.

and its legacy serves to emphasize the seismic hazard faced by the country and the Central Asia region as a whole. A 1911 earthquake in the Pamir Mountains triggered a vast landslide that blocked the River Murbag and, in time, created the high-altitude Lake Sarez. The Usoi Dam (as it is known) is now by far the largest in the world, natural or man-made: at nearly 600 metres, for example, it is nearly three times the height of the Hoover Dam in the US. Scientists are again divided on whether it is stable or not, but there can be no doubting the Pamir plateau is one of the most seismically active parts of the world – or the severity of the catastrophe that would befall Tajikistan were another quake to cause a serious breach at Usoi.[6]

A closely related factor which disaster planners must consider in Tajikistan, where 95 of electrical energy is hydropower, is the sheer number of man-made dams in the country. It is, ironically, the biggest producer of hydroelecticity per capita in the world,[7] and is concomitantly yet more vulnerable to earthquakes – especially one that occurred in winter when many people depend on electricity for heating. In the 2007–8 winter emergency, for example, strict rationing of electricity had to be enforced, greatly adding to the hardship people faced.[8]

Alongside the earthquake hazard is climate change, which seems to be manifesting itself in Tajikistan – as in so many other parts if the world – as a destructive cycle of drought-flood-drought and generally topsy-turvy seasons. This plays havoc with agriculture and horticulture, even when it doesn't cause an event actually classifiable as a disaster, which it does frequently. In the decade to 2007, there were an average of 14 major flood-events (and 21 major earthquakes) *a year*, according to the country's lead agency for disaster response, the "Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence" (CoES), which traces its origins to the Soviet-era civil defence infrastructure.

In the words of one Tajik interviewee in Dushanbe, the hydrometeorological disasters, especially, are "just endless, constant, and it's absolutely impossible to live away from this."

At the time of writing, the RCST had recently completed a field- and desk-based simulation of a new national contingency plan for flood emergencies in an exercise involving three separate communities and all its major national partners; nearly 4,000 Tajik disaster-responders were directly involved in the exercise, which has now produced a standard operating procedure (SOP) agreed by the National Society's executive council.

The RCST was one of four Central Asian countries (and 64 worldwide) which participated in the (two-part) 2006–11 Preparedness for Climate Change programme, designed by the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre in The Hague and hosted by the Netherlands Red Cross – a key Partner National Society (PNS) of the Red Crescent's with offices at the RCST headquarters in Dushanbe. The RCST, still somewhat unusually anywhere in the world, employs a full-time Climate Change Adaptation Adviser (his exact job-title), based in Dushanbe.[9] The climate issue has important implications for what the RCST loosely regards as its third priority: *health care* (with disaster preparedness and response comprising the first two and dissemination the fourth), and it greatly exacerbates the landslide danger in Tajikistan – a very mountainous country where this hazard was already considerable.

The Tajik people, including humanitarian responders, are engaged in essentially the same battle being fought in many places around the world that are prone to climate-based disaster: a never-ending struggle to shore up one of the four planetary elements, earth, against the growing onslaught from another: water. In Tajikistan, they have reported some success: "The risks

[6] For a full account of scientific opinions on the Usoi Dam hazard, refer to the website of the US Suburban Emergency Management Project (SEMP): www.semp.us.
[7] Economic Commission for Europe, Committee on Environmental Policy, *Environmental Performance Reviews, Tajikistan*, 2004.
[8] IFRC. *Review of the Tajikistan Cold Wave Response, Shelter and NFI Working Group.* External evaluation by Timothy Foster, 2008.
[9] There is an ongoing debate within the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement on whether to devote effort to campaigning for climate "mitigation" – reducing greenhouse-gas emissions – or "adaptation" to climate impacts now considered inevitable regardless of what happens to carbon in the atmosphere.

of mudflows, landslides and floods facing 13,500 people living in the most disaster-prone areas were reduced through the implementation of riverbank reinforcement, clearing mudstream [sic] ways and tree-planting projects in Kulob, Kurghonteppa, Gharm, Tavildara and Vahdat," according to the IFRC's *2011 Mid-Year Report* for Tajikistan.

Tajikistan is also well known as statistically the poorest of the former Soviet republics – ranked at 127th out of 187 countries in the latest (2011) Human Development Index of the United Nations Development programme (UNDP).[10] This is only just behind its immediate neighbour to the north, Kyrgyzstan, at 126, but compares unfavourably with Kazakhstan (68), Turkmenistan (102) and Uzbekistan (115). There is also a strong consensus within the country, shared by many of the interviewees consulted for this evaluation, that the legacy of the 1992–7 civil war has both drastically impeded the country's economic development and, from the humanitarian point of view, greatly exacerbated the vulnerability of the population to the multiple hazards they face.

One issue frequently identified by Tajiks today is the dearth of professional people from all disciplines, many of whom left the country during the war and never returned. Somewhat ironically in that light, by one estimate, before the global financial crisis that began in 2008 a higher proportion – no less than 45 per cent – of Tajikistan's gross domestic product comprised remittances from migrant workers (almost all of them in Russia) than in any other country.[11] Having undoubtedly contributed to significant reduction in poverty in the early years of the 21st century, an economic downturn in Russia and a depreciation in the value of the rouble caused a fall in the dollar value of remittances to Tajikistan of 31 per cent in 2009 over the previous year – US$ 800m or o*ne sixth* of GDP, according to a World Bank specialist on Central Asian economies.[12] This is an extraordinary loss for any country to sustain, from whatever cause.

Officially, there are 800,000 Tajik migrant workers in the Russian Federation, but recent Russian media reports given credence in Tajikistan quoted the Federal Migration Service in Moscow as saying the true number is now 1.7 million (out of a total Tajik population of some 8 million people).

As in other parts of the former USSR, disentangling the effects of the sudden collapse of state-supported industry and welfare provision from the physical destruction wrought by war is difficult if not impossible, and reliable statistics are few and far between. But one unofficial estimate shared with the author is that 60 per cent of Tajik infrastructure was destroyed in the 1990s and has yet to be fully replaced or repaired. A recent detailed report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) on this issue in the Central Asian region as a whole is worth quoting at length:

> *Quietly but steadily Central Asia's basic human and physical infrastructure – the roads, power plants, hospitals and schools and the last generation of Soviet-trained specialists who have kept this all running – is disappearing. The equipment is wearing out, the personnel retiring or dying….All countries in the region are to some degree affected, but the two poorest, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are already in dire straits. Their own specialists say that in the next few years, they will have no teachers for their children and no doctors to treat their sick. Power cuts in Tajikistan each winter – twelve hours a day in the countryside, if not more – are already a tradition.*[13]

This decline has some specific implications for the humanitarian community. Many of the "constant" small- to medium-scale flood disasters

[10] UNDP. Human Development Statistical Annex. 2011.
[11] Danzer, A. and Ivaschenko, O. *Migration Patterns in a Remittances Dependant [sic] Economy: Evidence from Tajikistan during the Global Financial Crisis* at www.siteresources.worldbank.org.
[12] Sudharshan, C. *The impact of the global crisis on remittances: [the] case of Russia and Tajikistan,* at blogs.worldbank.org.
[13] ICG. *Central Asia: Decay and Decline.* 3 February 2011.

in Tajikistan, for example, are attributable to the collapse of Soviet flood defences.[14] And the logistics of moving relief goods around the country are a nightmare in the winter, when many of the country's poorly maintained roads quickly become impassable because of landslides, snow and ice, or floods.[15]

In one area the Tajik government says it has been able to maintain some Soviet-era standards: earthquake-proof construction methods. As a Soviet republic, Tajikistan was used as research centre for quake mitigation and experimental buildings were tested to destruction at a facility in the Rasht valley using tremors simulated with underground explosions. All major building-projects are now at least claimed to be monitored for adherence to building codes, but this is of little relevance in the countryside, where many houses are simple mud-brick structures.

Finally, Tajikistan has by quite a significant margin the highest rate of population growth in Central Asia: 1.83 per cent in 2001–2, compared to the next-highest rate, Kyrgyzstan's, at 1.43 per cent, and an average for all five countries of 1.19 per cent.[16]

Makhsuda Azizova,director of the Tajik Red Crescent's Asht district branch, explains 'DIPECHO VI' projects in her area at her office in the district's main city, Shaidon. (Photo: AW)

[14] Anvar Sabzaliev, RCST *Baseline* study, 2009.
[15] The mountainous part of the road between Rasht and Dushanbe is partly maintained by elderly community volunteers who shovel away snow and minor landslides through sheer public spiritedness.
[16] US Census Bureau, International Data Base.

The environmental and socio-economic legacy that confronts the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan is, thus, challenging, to put it mildly, and that challenge is essentially fourfold. The National Society must:

1. Respond effectively and promptly at least to medium-scale seismic and climatic disasters, between them averaging just under three a month.

2. Maintain the highest-possible level of conventional disaster-preparedness to do this.

3. Roll back vulnerability in the country by making the best use it can of funds available for disaster risk reduction (DRR) from international donors.

4. Engage in credible contingency planning for the very large-scale seismic disaster – perhaps involving tens of thousands of casualties in the capital, Dushanbe, including a business-continuity plan for its own operations.

The Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan

Introduction

Like other National Societies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan, which dates back to 1927, arose from the old Tajik branch of the Soviet National Society and it joined the International Federation in 1997. Today, possibly to an even greater extent than in other disaster-prone nations, disaster management in its widest sense – encompassing preparedness and risk reduction, response, and to a limited extent recovery work – is the core and the principal focus of this National Society. The other priorities identified by interviewees are health care and the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

There are, arguably, two distinct factors working to the advantage of the National Society which were mentioned very frequently by Tajik interviewees who contributed to this evaluation:

- The exceptionally high degree of communal and family spirit characteristic of Tajik society, even by Central Asian standards, which means, for example, that the social problem of the "lone elderly" barely exists outside the small ethnic-Russian community. This has also made it relatively easy for humanitarian agencies to establish the LDMCs on which some of the effectiveness of the National Society depends.

- The Soviet-era tradition of civil defence and the key role of the Red Cross Red Crescent within it, which has largely survived the transition years. Senior CoES officers happily acknowledge this: "We cannot work without them [Red Crescent volunteers]," said one. "They are part of the community."

Red Crescent disaster management: programme objectives

Developments in the following five years are those that have given the RCST disaster-management effort its overall shape today. In 2003, the first of what are now 11 Disaster Management Centres (DMC) were set up in RCST branches in (from the humanitarian point of view) strategic locations around the country, including all the capitals of the three *oblasts*

and Dushanbe. The rationale for this innovation was simply the sheer frequency and severity of disasters the RCST was having to deal with, and it was done was with the assistance of the National Society's long-standing donors like the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Partner National Societies (PNS) like the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Red Cross.

The National Society's disaster management department was also recreated from scratch in the same year; the same year the European Commission's DRR projects got underway with the first of what are now six completed rounds of "DIPECHO" projects in Tajikistan, and with the Red Crescent involved from the outset.

In 2007, the RCST signed the five-year memorandum of understanding with CoES under which its disaster-response effort is conducted. This had the effect of cementing an already very close relationship which dated back to the civil-defence infrastructure of the Soviet era. Although no interviewee told this evaluation that the Red Crescent's independence is compromised by this intimate working relationship, senior Committee officers said they regard the RCST – for all practical purposes – as effectively a part of the CoES system.

The RCST joined the International Federation's Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction (GADRR), which seeks to integrate DRR into the work of nearly half of all National Societies worldwide, in 2008; and in 2011, a 76-page national Disaster Response and Contingency Plan ("the DRCP") was published which set a course for DM until 2014 and established new operating procedures for collaboration with the government disaster-response infrastructure and other partners.

Other ongoing processes contributed to forming the overall National Society DM picture as of late 2011. In 2000 the RCST began a process of decentralization that placed more responsibility for the management of emergencies in the hands of branches, and a major consultation with national and international stakeholders and partners began in 2006 that produced a set of strategic directions with the building of *resilience* at the top of the list.

The RCST network of 69 branches, meanwhile, mirrors the administrative structure at *nohia* (district) level.[17] (Tajikistan is divided firstly into three *oblasts* [regions] – Gorno-Badakshan,[18] Khatlon and Sugd – and the *oblast*-level group of *nohias* directly administered from Dushanbe: the "Regions Under Direct Republican Jurisdiction".)

Eleven of the RCST branches, including each regional capital, host one of the Disaster Management Centres that began to be established in 2003 and are now the backbone of the National Society's DM effort. They are the principal focus of this review and four of them – Kurgan-Tyub, Kulyab, Rasht and Khudzand – were visited. The DRCP succinctly expresses the objectives of this network of emergency hubs, as they are agreed to be in practice, as follows:

1. Disaster-response assets available within the country are developed and coordinated so as to be readily available for rapid deployment in the event of a disaster anywhere in the country.

2. The National Society makes the optimum use of the full range of the International Federation's global disaster-response resources, tools and mechanisms when these are deployed in the country during an international disaster-response.

3. The RCST maintains its capability in disaster-response operations, including coordination, information management, and accessing additional human and material resources.[19]

[17] *Nohia* is the Tajiki word for "district", equating with the somewhat more familiar Russian word *rayon* – the second administrative level in Tajikistan after the three *oblasts* (the Russian word for "region" that is still widely used) and the area under direct administration from Dushanbe, and above, thirdly, *jamoats* (administrative centres) and finally *kishaks* (villages).

[18] Gorno-Badakshan is an autonomous mountainous region that makes up 45 per cent of Tajikistan's land mass but only three per cent of the population.

[19] The text of these three points has been edited slightly here without the sense being changed.

In other words, the Red Crescent will maintain the highest degree of readiness and preparedness that resources – human, material and financial – will allow. As a statement of intent, this is a very forward-leaning agenda but, as will be seen, not one that is fully underpinned by the level of conventional material and electronic preparedness the National Society is able to maintain.

The survey of DMCs which provides this evaluation's chief data-set suggests that the level of effectiveness and humanitarian impact the RCST is able to register now centres on the question of disaster-preparedness *stocks*. This component of its DM profile – rather than human resources, transport, or even money – is what provides the limiting factor in this area.

The current DM structure: effectiveness and efficiency

All the research conducted for this evaluation suggests that the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan is justly regarded as a highly effective disaster-response player in the country; its relatively new network of Disaster Management Centres, embedded in pre-existing branches, is at once compact enough to be easily managed and directed from the Dushanbe headquarters yet probably as genuinely community-based as any National Society branches anywhere in the world.

Distances in Tajikistan are not great compared to most central Asian countries: if the roads are open, all the DMCs are driveable from Dushanbe in a day, with the single exception of Ishkashim in the far south. Although there may be issues with the recent proliferation of LDMCs, the DMCs' geographical catchments are not so great as to be difficult to "keep tabs on".

Ten (excluding Dushanbe itself) is a manageable number, whereas 69 was much less so, meaning the DMC network is about the right size to provide an efficient interlinkage between national headquarters, where the National Society's international partners are based, and the branches, volunteers and Local Disaster Management Committees around the country.

The National Society, surely to its credit, also seems to have found a workable balance between the decentralization process referred to above, which is prevalent during "peacetime", and the agreed need for centre to take over during disasters that approach, or reach, the status of national emergencies – as happened with the floods and mudslides in many areas in spring 2010, especially in Kulyab.

The National Society "human factor", which coalesces around the DMCs even if not formally part of them, has also been strengthened through training and drills in recent months – partly as a result of the intimate and successful partnerships with Dushanbe-based PNS and the IFRC Country Representation team. In addition to the finalization of the content of the DRCP listed above, with other *structural* changes:

- A contingency plan for a refugee influx to Sugd region was designed and desk-simulated in an exercise involving two vulnerable communities and their LDMCs and more than 1,400 people.

- A three-day basic course in disaster management and first aid, including components on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation (CCA) was held for 440 volunteers from more than 20 LDMCs in Khatlon region.

- Finnish Red Cross logisticians conducted a specialist workshop for 17 RCST staff and the eleven 12-strong National Disaster Response Teams (NDRT) centred on the DMCs.

- A workshop on governance and management was held for new branch chairs and executive secretaries from Kulyab and Gorno-Badakshan regions that included humanitarian diplomacy and "integration and unity".

- Refresher workshops have been held for 132 new NDRT members.

- As of 2010, with the assistance and encouragement of the IFRC Country Representation office, the RCST bookkeeping, accounting and reporting system has been automated using "1C Enterprise" software;[20] financial staff at headquarters and the four regional branches have been trained in management, tax and law issues; and the regions now have computers (if not internet)." [21]

This list is far from exhaustive and includes only the most recent important developments in training, exercising and organizational development (OD). It is not an unimpressive record, and it reinforces the positive aspect of DMC readiness that arose from the survey carried out for this evaluation, namely that the DMC network comprises a relatively small number of specialist branches, led by clearly dynamic individuals, many of whom have been tested in real disaster-responses, who are supported by a subsidiary network of LDMCs and *trained* volunteers that might at worst be described as adequate (in number) and at best, abundant.

The less positive aspect centres on the issue of contingency stocks, as highlighted by the survey carried out for this evaluation, and the general paucity of what might be termed "hardware" in the DMCs.

Water from the River Yakhsu pours through homes in Kulyab at the height of the emergency response in spring 2010. (Photo: Hasan Nozimov/RCST)

[20] A Russian software development company, regarded as a local market leader.
[21] Sources: IFRC 2010 *Annual Report* and 2011 *Mid-Year Report* for Tajikistan.

For this evaluation, four DMCs were visited: Kurgab-Tyub, Kulyab, Rasht and Khudzand; two, Vanch and Khorog, were canvassed by phone; and information on all three Sugd-region DMCs – Khudzand, Ayni and Pendzhikent – was gathered during the field trip to Khudzand and in some of its detail triangulated by phone. It would have been ideal to visit or at least canvass all 10 DMCs (other than Dushanbe), but time and resources did not allow this; nevertheless all concerned felt the eight whose core operational data is presented in the table produce a representative picture, and throw up all the major issues facing the DMCs as of late 2011.

Working down table 1 (*see below*) from top to bottom, it can be seen that whether measured by number of *nohias* (row 1) or population (row 2) in their catchments, the DMCs vary considerably in the size of the areas they take responsibility for. Vanch, for example, whose catchment consists of only one district (six *jamoats*) was allocated a DMC mainly because of the combination of its remoteness and the virtual certainty of being cut off by road from Dushanbe for much of the winter. The same logic applies to some of the other smaller DMCs, measured by catchment area.

The larger DMCs, by contrast, take responsibility for very considerable numbers of people: nearly 2 million in the case of Khudzand.

Rows 3 and 4 reflect a fairly stark division of opinion in the DMCs over whether to accede to recent advice from Dushanbe not to respond to "small-scale" disasters – mainly house fires – in order to preserve their very limited DP stocks. Some DMC interviewees, in Rasht, for example, were reluctant to accept any distinction between small-, medium-, and large-scale disasters of the kind that cause significant destruction, arguing (to paraphrase only slightly) that people's houses are just as destroyed after a fire as after a flood.

House fires are a perennial problem in Tajikistan, and although this evaluation was unable to obtain nationwide statistics from the Tajik fire service, it can safely be assumed that cumulatively they add up to at least a medium-scale disaster annually, if not a large-scale one – much in the way that road accidents are now viewed by the humanitarian community. Many are directly attributable to the post-Soviet decline in infrastructure and the built environment. The wiring in houses often dates back to before the Second World War; people use dangerous stoves burning solid fuel *indoors*; and during frequent power-cuts electrical appliances are left switched on that cause a hazard once the power comes back.

The Red Cross Red Crescent Movement recently highlighted the problem of small-scale disasters, defined as incidents in which fewer than ten people are injured and none killed, with only localized damage; these are said to account for 23 per cent of all disasters worldwide,[22] and Tajikistan would be a textbook example of this issue. It places some DMCs in an almost impossible position. The story is told at one of a mother who turned up at the front door of the branch in her nightdress asking for help after she, her husband, and their three children were burnt out of their home and left with only what they all stood up in.

Yet at a typical DMC disaster stocks can easily be whittled down to zero over the course of a few months by responding to all small-scale disasters (sometimes at the behest of CoES); they are expensive to replace – a complete family kit,[23] not including a tent, costs around US$ 350 in Tajikistan – and national headquarters is not in a position to guarantee they will be.

To say that this presents the National Society with an acute dilemma would be an understatement – but it is one this evaluation feels should be

[22] Carpentier, B., Lucard, M. and Jaquemet, I. 'Out of sight, out of mind' in *Red Cross Red Crescent,* issue 2, 2011, available at http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2011_2/18-23.html.

[23] Virtually none of what goes into a typical humanitarian family kit – hygiene items, a kitchen set, bedding, shelter tools, jerrycans – is manufactured in Tajikistan. It must all be imported.

Table 1. Evaluative survey of RCST Disaster Management Centres.

DMC:	Kurgan-Tyub	Kulyab	Vanch	Rasht	Khudzand	Pendzhikent	Ainy	Khorog
1. Number of *nohias* and towns in DMC area.	15	10	1 (6 *jamoats*)	5	15	1 (14 *jamoats*)	2 (9 *jamoats*)	5
2. Estimated population.	More than 1.7m	More than 1.2m	33,000	309,000	1.8m	203,000	93,000	118,000
3. Annual average total number of disasters.	25	18	9	15 (incl. small-scale)	26 (incl. small-scale)	8 (incl. small-scale)	9 (incl. small-scale)	27
4. Annuals average number of disasters RCST respond to.	5	5	4	15	26	8	9	5
5. Number of active LDMCs in DMC area.	20	12	5	24	24	14	8	15
6. REACT present? (CoES present in all locations.)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
7. Number of paid DMC coordinators.	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
8. Number of trained volunteers in (excl. NDRT).	235	240 (in LDMCs)	70	440	480 (in LDMCs)	280 (in LDMCs)	160 (in LDMCs)	400 (mainly in LDMCs)
9. Proportion who are women.	More than half	At least 40%	25%	10% (but 50% NDRT)	More than half	More than half	More than half	35%
10. DP stocks at DMC (number of full family-kits).	20	30	16	30	24	19 tents + some other items	41 tents + some other items	101 tents + some other items
11. 'Economically rational' maximum DP stocks.	100	200	50	100	250	50	50	150
12. Warehousing.	Four standard containers	Two large storerooms	Two standard containers	253 cubic-metre w/h + 1 std. container	700 cubic-metres in 2 w/h's	260 cubic-metre w/h	720 cubic-metre w/h	9 small cont's (270 cubic metres)
13. Fuel reserve.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
14. Cash reserve.	None	Small local reserve	None	None	None	None	None	None
15. High-frequency radio at DMC.	Has not worked for three years	Has not worked for three years	Has not worked for three years	Has not worked for four years	Not reliable	Not reliable	Not reliable	Has not worked for three years
16. Local 3G signal (EDGE/GPRS).	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17. RCST USB-modem internet (mobile telephony).	None	One	None	None	None	None	None	None

Notes: "w/h" = warehouse; the Khudzand disaster-count includes house fires.

brought to the notice of its donors. There is no recommendation here one way or the other, except (*see* Conclusions and recommendations) that the issue should be revisited *and aired publicly.*

Row 5 shows the number of *active* Local Disaster Management Committees in each catchment and although the figures are clear enough, there was considerable discussion in most of the DMCs about which LDMCs were truly active and which dormant, generating a further recommendation of this evaluation: that the LDMCs should now be thoroughly mapped. The view at RCST headquarters in Dushanbe is that two LDMCs per district is the ideal number, but the survey shows that the DMC vary considerably in both exceeding and falling short of this ratio. In Sugd (Khudzand, Pendzhikent and Ayni), for example, most LDMCs have been created specifically to implement DIPECHO VI projects; in fact, much of the entire volunteer base in that region is now said locally to be dependent on DIPECHO.

Row 6 is self-explanatory and shows that like CoES, the Tajik Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Teams (REACT) are present almost everywhere. The DRCP describes REACT thus:

> *"…the Government of Tajikistan and the international community work together through REACT, Tajikistan's Disaster Risk Management partnership. Chaired jointly by the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES) and the United Nations, it involves 40 organizations of civil society, national and international NGOs, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the United Nations and donor agencies. REACT partners meet regularly to share information and experiences on issues related to various areas of disaster management, including risk reduction, preparedness, response, and capacity-building activities with national bodies."*

Row 7 is a reflection of the reality the RCST faces that from January 2012, as things stand, a majority (six) of the DMCs will have to function on a voluntary basis; donor funding for several of the paid DM coordinators will end.[24]

The ubiquity of CoES is an important consideration for the DMCs, and explains why transport has not been included as a variable in the survey. The practice, now amounting to a fully fledged SOP has been established whereby DMC and other Red Crescent first-responders are given the use of CoES (military) Ural trucks and drivers amid the exigencies of very short-notice disaster response. As one DMC interviewee put it: "If we ask CoES for trucks, they say 'Sure, how many do you need'."[25]

Fuel (row 13), however, *is* an issue, and none of the DMC has any kind of reserve; or, for example, any vouchers to use in disaster response. All emphasized that CoES does not supply fuel on an ongoing basis, although the Urals tend to arrive with at least a few litres in the tank that the DMCs are not required to replace. Only one DMC, Kulyab, had any financial reserve.

Row 8 reflects another division between those DMC whose catchments include significant numbers of trained volunteers apart from LDMCs and those which don't. Again, the relatively large number of volunteers in the Sugd DMCs is a reflection more of the importance there of the DIPECHO projects than of the fundamental strength of the National Society in that region. In fact, the evaluation team was told by several interviewees that if DIPECHO were to end, only around half of the LDMCs (and a similar proportion of volunteers) would still be online a few months later.

[24] Specifically, the relevant components of the Netherlands Red Cross branch-development programme (Vanch, Sagirdasht and Ishkashim) and the Japanese government funding (Kulyab).

[25] It is conceivable that this might give rise to issues involving fundamental principles, especially given the recent outbreak of armed conflict in the Rasht valley; this was not mentioned by anyone to the evaluation team, but it is something for the National Society to be aware of.

Row 9 is surely evidence of what the Red Crescent in Tajikistan might claim to be one of its great successes: achieving a very high degree of *gender balance* in its volunteer base, and in a country where culture and society do not always conduce to that. Even in Rasht, where there is a higher degree of social and professional separation between men and women than elsewhere, half the local NDRT members are women. For further confirmation of what might fairly be regarded as a *claim* rather than a *fact*, one need only consult the large amount of audio-visual material (still photographs and video) captured during recent RCST operations by both the National Society's own communications staff and independent Tajik journalists in which female volunteers are very visible; not to mention the IFRC's own photo library going back many years, of which the same can be said. This does not, of course, mean that all issues of gender balance in disaster response, and the position of women as both victims of disaster and later as humanitarian beneficiaries, are automatically settled. But notwithstanding that male labour-migration is said to explain an actual *preponderance* of women volunteers in the Sugd (Khudzand, Ainy, Pendzhikent) branches, it is to the National Society's great credit.

Rows 10–12 are a key part of the survey and reveal just how limited is the capacity of all the DMCs in terms of disaster stocks currently held (row 10), especially when set against the population of some of their catchments. None of the DMCs surveyed had anything like the level of DP stocks they felt it would "economically rational" for them to hold – defined in the survey as the quantity of relief good they would be able to distribute expeditiously (within roughly 48 hours), given the volunteer base they could be sure of (row 11). Quite apart from the financial issue, augmenting the DMCs' stocks would entail varying degrees of expansion of the storage (warehousing) capacity too (row 12); but as things stand, this is a long way off in any case.

Rows 15–17 highlight what is probably the most easily and cheaply rectifiable deficiency in the DMCs' response profile: *communications*. The old high-frequency radio system has not worked properly anywhere for years – the HF sets are gathering dust in corners of branch offices. Yet while only one branch, Kulyab, is equipped with a USB modem, there is a 3G mobile-telephony signal all over Tajikistan – including in some extremely remote and/or mountainous areas visited by the evaluation team where it was difficult to see where it might be coming from. (*See also* Conclusions and recommendations).[26] At present, the Rasht DMC use what they call "taxi post": entrusting local taxi drivers to take RCST documents to Dushanbe along with their passengers.

Zayniddin Olimov, leader of the Kulyab DMC, who led the branch's response to the 2010 flash foods there, together with other incidents in the *oblast* the worst disaster in Tajikistan for a decade. Behind him is a RCST beneficiary who was helped in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and now lives in her old house, rebuilt by her family. (Photo: AW)

[26] TCell in Tajikistan, with the best network coverage, offer a 2Gb a month service for 128 *somoni* (about US$ 28); Beeline offers 3Gb for US$ 5 a month. The charge for the modem from both is around US$ 35.

There are two levels of seniority below director in RCST's small disaster-management department, and this evaluation has considered only the most senior. The junior of the two comprises ICRC-oriented roles[27] or project-specific jobs that will only last as long as the projects.

The department is characterized by an atmosphere, in many ways laudable, of "everybody does everything". But at the senior level – the three roles are "Disaster Response (Manager)", "Disaster Preparedness (Manager)" and "Climate Change Adaptation Adviser" – people have drifted away from their job titles and formal job descriptions amid the pressures and exigencies of real disaster-response and the effort to provide donors like ECHO with value for money. This brief discussion is in no way intended to imply any comment on the individual staff-members concerned or on human-resource issues; it is simply an analysis of the logic behind the organigram.

In practice what now happens in the department is that the disaster "response" manager looks after everything to do with actual disaster – before and after the event; the disaster-preparedness manager has evolved into a full-time programme manager for the DIPECHO DRR projects – of "DR" and "DP" the latter being closer to "DRR"; and the CCA adviser does a bit of everything as well as his own job, including, for example, compiling inventories of local DP stocks – something done twice a year by whoever is available as an unwritten rule of the department.

On the basis that CCA might be equated with what is now called "climate-smart disaster risk reduction", there is one glaring omission in this line-up: in one of the most earthquake-prone countries in the world, no one is doing *seismic* DRR. Or at least, it is not the province or the responsibility of any one person.

Notwithstanding this single serious gap, it is important to emphasize: *things get done.* (With the assistance of the department, for example, this evaluation and all the field trips and interviews it entailed proceeded almost astonishingly smoothly.) Using simple common sense and a basic principle of "doing what works", the senior staff of the department have developed an effective modus operandi which there is now no reason to seriously disrupt. The recommendation of this evaluation, therefore, is essentially just to render de jure what is already de facto (*see below* Conclusions and recommendations).

From a purely managerial point of view, it cannot be entirely healthy for people to be working so far adrift from what is in their job titles and descriptions. There needs to be a record of what's expected of people, and managers need to be able to make demands on them based on what's on paper. This, it should be stressed, is for the sake of clarity and accountability, not bureaucracy.

The main purpose of this recommendation, as will be seen, is to expand one of the senior roles to explicitly encompass seismic DRR. It is also the view of the evaluation team that some of the problems that have been encountered in the past with the "marketing" of DIPECHO projects back to the donor might be solved if monitoring, reporting and communications were tightened up and expanded under the aegis of an explicitly nominated programme-manager.

The question of how these senior posts should be funded also arises. At present they are all at least partly financed from the IFRC's annual appeal for Tajikistan; although it operates in extremely straitened economic conditions, the emphasis the National Society places on disaster in general is *not* reflected in its willingness and/or ability to pay for senior DM posts out of core funds. This

[27] Mine Awareness, Restoring Family Links, Safe Access.

is a judgement that only the National Society can make, based on everything it knows about its domestic circumstances, about its finances (and their dependence on expatriate donors), about disaster patterns, and about also about its *image*. There is no concrete recommendation about this here, except that the issue should be revisited at a suitable juncture – perhaps an annual finance or HR round of some kind – especially if the RCST takes up another of this evaluation's recommendations: that a bespoke effort be launched to address the issue of small-scale disasters.

Humanitarian impact: the 2010 Kulyab flood disaster

The fundamental conclusion of this evaluation is that while the *absolute* level of the RCST's humanitarian impact may be limited by the low resource-level the National Society struggles with – in Khudzand's case, for example, DP stocks are held for only 0.008 per cent of the families in the catchment, using the standard Tajik family-size ratio of 6/1 – in *relative*, or qualitative terms, it adds up to a lot more than the sum of its parts. In other words, the DMC system has proved to be a success, and individual DMCs have done most of what, and sometimes more than, could reasonably be asked of them as first responders; the humanitarian impact of the relief goods and hardware they have at their disposal has often been amplified by the speed and agility of their response.

Several DMCs reported to the evaluation team that even though its precise dimensions are now somewhat hazy, the network of LDMCs as well as other branches act as a highly effective alerting service. Interviewees at Kurgan-Tyub said that the RCST were often the first on the scene of disasters, arriving at about the same time as CoES personnel.

The background and mentality of RCST volunteers are also conducive to effective *rapid* response. They are described as "genuine" volunteers – often with relevant professional backgrounds like doctors, nurses, teachers and community leaders – who only inquire about per diems (as one interviewee put it) after they have been in the field for five days and have to choose between going back to work and staying with a response.

In general, the ethos of the Red Crescent volunteer also dovetails very effectively with the strong communal spirit in Tajik society already referred to in this evaluation to produce a powerful humanitarian force in the country.

In few responses can this have been more evident as with the flash flood in the centre of the city of Kulyab on 7 May 2010. Serious spring floods in much of southern Tajikistan, including Kulyab city, had already triggered one grant from the IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) the previous month. But the calamity that struck the centre of Kulyab on 7 May, when the River Yakhsu that flows through the middle of the city suddenly burst through a relatively confined stretch of man-made embankment near the bridge carrying the main road to Dushanbe, was in a very real sense a "sudden-onset disaster".

The crowded district of small shops and houses in the way of the torrent, in effect a small tsunami, was obliterated; little of these structures now remains in this part of the city. People, including many children, were swept away and seriously injured or lost. One Red Crescent beneficiary told the evaluation team that her daughter was only recovered some distance downstream after two days, alive but with broken bones; the rest of her family took refuge in a *tutovnik* (mulberry) tree in their garden and watched their house being

demolished by the waters. They were eventually plucked to safety by Red Crescent NDRT members.

All this was happening virtually on the doorstep of the DMC, which can have asked for no more severe a test of its response capacity. Although in theory it was against the rules (RCST volunteers are not trained in search and rescue – the province of CoES), the Kulyab NDRT members took part in rescuing survivors and recovering bodies in the first 48 hours after the river outburst – and were filmed doing so by the local TV station. By some accounts, the precise number of dead and missing in Kulyab city from the 7 May disaster remains unclear. The volunteers now say they recovered the bodies of seven children themselves and saw at least 30 other bodies being recovered.

One RCST volunteer was filmed clambering on to a rooftop to attach a safety line to a man who had been cut off for more than 24 hours and was about to traverse along a pole that had been thrown across the road that had become a raging torrent.

The DMC was quickly reinforced on 8 May by staff from national headquarters and the IFRC's disaster-management team, and relief distributions began in earnest the next day. A DREF for nearly 200,000 CHF was awarded in 12 May. The DMC's records now show that they distributed their own DP stock for 20 families within 48 hours, relief supplies sent from Dushanbe for a further 40 families within five days, and another 120 family kits financed by the DREF within 20 days. Two Ural trucks were used in the emergency phase, and the LDMCs proved their usefulness in gathering early assessment information on needs and the precise location of beneficiaries.

Esojon Rahimjonov, a community leader in Dusti village, Asht district, stands on the four-kilometre dyke built partly under DIPECHO VI. It now protects the village from the annual floods that regularly washed away houses and crops. (Photo: AW)

The people displaced by the flash flood in Kulyab were accommodated initially in a tented camp in the city's football stadium which the Red Crescent took responsibility for managing (again, against standard IFRC procedure), and were later properly relocated in what is effectively a new suburb on the edge of the city built by the Tajik private sector at the direction of the government.

The full results of a limited multiple-choice beneficiary survey conducted for this evaluation and based on one already done by the RCST is given at Appendix Four. This was not an entirely independent exercise in that it was carried out by RCST volunteers. But it triangulates the results of the National Society's own "beneficiary satisfaction survey", mentioned in the DREF reports at the time, inasmuch as it was carried out during working hours and involved mainly women, whereas the volunteers had initially asked to speak to the "head of the household".

In brief, a comparison between responses given to Q2 and Q3 suggests the aid given was relevant; Q5 indicates that it was timely, with 20 respondents saying they got relief supplies up to five days after the disaster; and Q7 also shows that it was convenient, with no one having to travel very far to get it.

Again, in *absolute* terms this may not seem like a great amount of humanitarian impact; taking the DREF figures at face value, the National Society "reached" nearly 7 per cent of the people affected by the second series of spring floods in Khatlon region in 2010. But in qualitative terms it is hard to fault, and it surely reinforces any case the RCST might decide to make for help from donors to augment their disaster-preparedness resources.

Coordination with partners, DIPECHO, visibility

In the context of actual disaster-response, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan collaborates with other actors chiefly through the REACT structure, while its main operational partner in the field – as noted above – is CoES. Although no international comparative study has been attempted for this evaluation, it is ought to be true to say that because of CoES and the Soviet-era legacy of strong civil defence, general coordination of domestic and international responders should be better than a theoretical average. The evaluation of the shelter and non-food items (NFI) cluster which was activated in the February 2008 cold-wave emergency found that

> *although much is made of the fact that REACT is chaired by [the government], the chair is held by [CoES] rather than a ministry and therefore lacks the political power to make things happen, and to ensure government engagement in REACT's work. The lack of government engagement is in all fairness not restricted to REACT; it was a common concern among many of those interviewed, some blaming the government and some the agencies. The clusters therefore certainly bolstered REACT; the larger question is whether REACT will have learned how to respond better to future crisis with or without cluster activation.*[28]

The inter-agency cluster system has not been activated in Tajikistan since then, so that "larger question" remains moot. The interviewees consulted for this evaluation, including senior CoES officers themselves, insist that the relationship between the Red Crescent and its CoES partners remains strong and is if anything getting stronger, and this is evidenced by successful collaborations in responses over the past two years.

[28] Foster op. cit.

The Rasht DMC, for example, say that thanks to the availability of local-authority trucks, they were able to distribute tents and NFI *on the same day* as the 22 July 2007 earthquake, and they went on to provide assistance to more than 150 affected households.

In any case, the Red Crescent has formed partnerships with several other agencies and PNS – including with ACTED, for example, which engages in a "community participatory flood-management" project, funded by the Asian Development Bank, and especially in the context of the ongoing DIPECHO series of DRR projects, which began as a fully multilateral exercise under the IFRC Country Representation's aegis, continued through DIPECHO III, IV and V with the Netherlands Red Cross, and is now fully multilateral again.

At the time of writing final negotiations were underway for another round of DIPECHO projects, the seventh, that it is hoped will start in spring 2012. It is also common knowledge in Dushanbe that the previous head of the DG-ECHO office in Dushanbe was extremely critical of the sixth round of projects, questioning the ability of the programme managers concerned to demonstrate their impact (nor was any secret made of this view).

The general ECHO view now is that though the Tajik projects are "repetitive", none has been a complete failure: "Very little visibility has been generated for European publics and decision makers from the DIPECHO projects in Central Asia as a whole, but Tajikistan is probably better than most on the question of visibility."

It seems to this author, having visited several of these projects, that this view – which has to some extent soured the atmosphere around the Tajik DIPECHO projects – was actually the product of several factors, not least of which is the well-established difficulty of demonstrating the impact of any DRR programme anywhere. It is a "hard sell", as the recent IFRC analysis put it: "With mega-disasters, donors can see results. From complete devastation, the emergency response phase provides clear, visual examples of food distribution, shelter, first aid or improving lives. With prevention, risk reduction and capacity building, it's hard to show *and prove* [emphasis added] that projects are working."[29]

Having said that, it is also equally clear that more, probably much more, could have been done to "sell" the projects post hoc, and the PNS community in Dushanbe would like to see tighter and more detailed monitoring and evaluation of DIPECHO projects, as well as more attention to external communications to promote them.

DIPECHO VI was carried out in the northern Sugd region, and headquartered at the Khudzand branch of the RCST, which also hosts a highly active DMC. Sugd, a region of just over 2 million people, is a roughly even mix of flat land and mountains; people earn their living from textiles, light industry, agriculture and horticulture. The Red Crescent in Khudzand acts as the first source of reinforcement for the Ayni and Pendzhikent DMCs, which can be completely isolated by road from November to May. Even in what are regarded as favourable conditions, it can take up to three days to get from Khudzand to Pendzhikent. The Khudzand branch is now lobbying Dushanbe for an additional DMC to be established in Istaravshan roughly halfway to Ayni. The RCST in Sugd faces a range of disaster hazards: floods, landslides of all types, ice storms and, at the same time, drought.

The RCST personnel in Khudzand who have been closest to them are more sanguine about the impact of DIPECHO VI in 46 communities their area, which has suffered as much as any from the decline in Soviet-era infrastructure which is

29 Carpentier, B., Lucard, M. and Jaquemet, I. op. cit.

so typical in Tajikistan. In just over a decade, for example, there have been no fewer than three disasters involving the collapse of Soviet-built dams: in Dahanasai in 1999 when it's known only that "many" people died; in 2007 when the dam at Oshabasay collapsed, leaving 23 dead; and in 2011, when a dam in Asht district crumbled but did not kill anyone. The fourth prominent flood-defence, at Gudassai, remains intact.

The DIPECHO VI projects have involved expansion of the local LDMC network, first-aid training, dykes, scenario planning, awareness-raising through retail media, and regional Red Crescent workshops and training.

In one recent disaster that this evaluation was able to track by visiting the site, the mudslide last June in the village of Bobodarkhon, DIPECHO-supported LDMC volunteers were partly responsible for ensuring the village was evacuated promptly on the orders of CoES and no lives were lost. (That incident was part of a wider disaster in Sugd province that triggered a 60,000 CHF DREF-award on 16 June 2011.) Given the admittedly ad hoc expansion of the LDMC network that is the direct result of DIPECHO, this is very unlikely to have been the only recent incident of its kind; but with the level of monitoring as it currently is, it is difficult to evidence, let alone prove.

Another project visited for this evaluation, the four-kilometre dyke near the village of Dusti (the Tajiki word for friendship) is one of the most impressive and convincing DRR projects this author has ever seen is several years of reporting on DRR (*see photo* page 24). Chosen by the DIPECHO project managers in Dushanbe from a community-generated shortlist, it began with a grant of 4,000 euros for fuel and "hard core" (rocks for filling), while the Dusti villagers borrowed a mechanical digger and other equipment from local businesses. The first kilometre was soon dug out, and the villagers then used their own resources to dig a further three – providing almost complete protection from the annual floods that sweep across the vast plain separating them from the mountains in the distance. People now say that in 2011, for the first time in many years, no houses or market gardens have been lost to floods, and they add that working on the dyke has helped bind the people of Dusti together

The Dusti dyke, to be sure, is difficult to reach. It is a 12-hour drive, at least, from Dushanbe to Khudzand (or a flight in winter), the regional capital, followed by a further three hours to Shaidon, the main city of Asht district, then an hour or so to Dusti, and finally about two kilometres across open country to the dyke itself. It is not entirely surprising that very little word of this success has reached the outside world – in the form of either reporting or external communications. But it is surely a model of community-based DRR at its best, and one that could have done a great deal for the visibility of DIPECHO VI had the story been captured in good time.

The RCST has an able communications unit based at its headquarters in Dushanbe. But as always they depend on their operational colleagues to either tell them what is going on or flag it clearly in routine reporting. By the same token, the latter need guidance from the former on the kind of things their looking for. But in the DRR sphere it can be summed up easily in three words: *evidence of impact.*

Conclusions and recommendations

The Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan is an effective humanitarian actor in the country that "punches above its weight". Its volunteers, a good proportion of whom have had some form of training, are highly motivated and responsive, and it has achieved a higher degree of gender balance than might reasonably be expected. It is an extremely effective partner to Tajikistan's lead agency for disaster response, the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence; it has also proved its ability to make effective use of DREF funds from the IFRC; and in relative terms – although not always recognized – it provides good value for money to donors to longer-term projects such as the DIPECHO series. Using the National Society's own figure for recent DREF operations, given below as Appendix Three, the RCST has been reaching an average of 16 per cent of all people affected by disasters in recent years.[30]

However, the National Society faces increasingly straitened economic circumstances and a large proportion of its disaster management personnel are dependent on IFRC funding from the annual appeal. From 2012, much of its highly effective network of Disaster Management Centres will lose funding for full-time professional disaster managers and have to be run on a voluntary basis. Because of the ceaseless flow of small-scale disasters to which branches feel compelled to respond, it is struggling to maintain, let alone augment, its disaster-preparedness stocks. And the disaster-management department is run on an ad hoc basis, which in the past has reflected an admirable willingness to improvise, but it would now benefit from a sharpening of its purpose.

The recommendations presented below are intended to address these issues. The reasoning behind them should be mostly clear from the preceding discussion; where this is not the case, brief additional reasoning is given as part of the recommendation.

1. *The basic de facto structure of the senior tier of the disaster-management department should be retained, but the job titles should be brought more into line with what people are actually doing and the job descriptions revised and reissued: namely, "Emergency-Response Coordinator", the present DR role; "Coordinator, Climate DRR" (including the climate CCA adviser role); "Coordinator, Seismic DRR" (assuming full official responsibility for DIPECHO VII, assuming it goes ahead).*

2. *The Emergency-Response Coordinator should be focused year-round to the exclusion of almost everything else on the DMCs and NDRTs, both before and after disasters.*

3. *The new DRR coordinators should expand and strengthen relationships with local centres of expertise like the State Administration for Hydrometeorology and the Tajik Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, as well as Movement agencies like the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre in The Hague and others relevant to DRR.*

4. *The Coordinator, Seismic DRR should lead a general tightening up of monitoring, evaluation and communications focused on DIPECHO projects, intended to generate evidence of impact (human lives and livelihoods protected and saved) as well as just the number of workshops and training sessions held, etc. The coordinator should feed promising media angles to RCST communications in Dushanbe for possible use both nationally and – perhaps via the IFRC Zone office in Budapest – internationally.*

[30] Excluding from the calculation of the average those operations where either the figure for those affected or reached is missing.

Recommended new structure for RCST Disaster Management Department



5. The first-aid training and water and sanitation project-officers should be brought under the aegis of the DM department since a) the former organizes training in a manner uncoordinated with other first-aid training conducted as part of, for example, DIPECHO projects, and b) "watsan" expertise is always required in the context of emergency responses – especially those involving a humanitarian-shelter component.

6. *The now-overdue updating of the DP/DR plan should be expedited.*[31]

7. Given that it has already been established as a successful, if to date only de facto SOP, the principle that national headquarters takes over the running of responses to incidents that constitute national emergencies, or are judged to be comparable, should be enshrined in writing.

8. The name of the RCST Disaster Management Centres should be changed to "Red Crescent Emergency-Response Centres", again to reflect the work they actually do and to distingush them clearly from CoES, as well as the latest thinking of the National Society about their role.

9. New "mission statements" or TORs should be issued for the centres, among other things to make it clear that while they are free to choose what level of disaster to respond to, they may face a trade-off in terms of their DP stocks between small-scale disasters

[31] TRCS. *National Plan on Disaster Preparedness and Response.* 2007.

like house fires and medium- to large-scale disasters.

10. The National Society should find a way to air the problem of small-scale disasters publicly, especially in the light of recent publicity given to this issue by the IFRC.[32] This might help engender a climate in which it would be possible to approach national and international donors for earmarked assistance with the humanitarian consequences of small-scale disasters.

11. The National Society should consider merging the catchments of the one or two DMCs that have never been used with their neighbours, especially in view of the probable loss of financial support for full-time disaster managers expected at the beginning of 2012. This would probably also include the Dushanbe DMC, which can be merged with the pre-existing DM structure at national headquarters.

12. The Local Disaster Management Committees should be thoroughly mapped, mainly to find out which are truly active and which are not; if the branches do not know this, national headquarters certainly cannot.

13. The planned National Society domestic fund-raising strategy for LDMCs and DMCs, intended to maintain the level of support currently provided by traditional PNS donors, should be reinvigorated.

14. The view at national headquarters that two LDMCs per district is enough should be advocated more strongly to branches, PNS and donors alike. There seems little point in creating a large number of local committees, many of which – all agree – will disappear as soon as the project that inspired them ends and of whose ongoing capacity no one is sure.

15. As a matter of urgency, the DMCs should be equipped with USB modems, paid for out of the IFRC annual appeal, and MiFi as soon as it becomes available in Tajikistan.

16. Given the importance – and the acknowledged difficulty of demonstrating the impact – of DRR in Tajikistan, the National Society should consider applying to the IFRC communications department or an English-speaking PNS for a training secondment for one of its communications officers.

[32] Carpentier, B., Lucard, M. and Jaquemet, I. op. cit.

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE
DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME
Deadline: November 2011

Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan Disaster Management programme funded by the Finnish, Norwegian, Netherlands, and Swedish Red Cross Societies, DFID and DIPECHO

Introduction

This terms of reference covers the background, brief programme description and objectives for a short-term consultancy contract for a qualified disaster management specialist to evaluate the established Disaster Management capacity of the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) from 2003 to 2011. During the consultancy, the consultant is expected to work closely with the Federation Tajikistan Country Representation, PNSs working in bilateral bases, RCST staff including headquarters leadership, Disaster Management programme coordinators, branch officers, Committee of Emergency Situation and Civil Defence of Tajikistan (CoES) representatives, Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT) members, National Disaster Response Teams (NDRTs) and community volunteers to develop report with recommendations on further development of the National Society disaster response and preparedness capacity.

The RCST was established in 1927 and has constantly supported communities over the ensuing decades. Since 1992, it has acted as a humanitarian organisation on the basis of the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. In 1997, the National Society became a member of the International Federation. The RCST, as auxiliary to the government, has a key role in disaster preparedness and response activities in Tajikistan. The RCST has extensive experience in emergency response. Many of its branches in 69 districts throughout the country were involved in supporting internally displaced people during the civil war of 1992-1997 as well as in repatriation since the secession of hostilities. Since early 90's the RCST plays a significant role in providing humanitarian assistance to victims of frequent floods, landslides, mudflows, avalanches and earthquakes. The RCST Disaster Management Department was set up in 2003 according to the IFRC strategy (*more information will be in ANNEX 1*).

The evaluation is scheduled to take place in November 2011.

Tajikistan is located in a zone of tectonic interaction between three major mountain chains – the Pamirs, the Hindukush, and the southern Tian Shan. With its poverty and poor disaster coping mechanisms, Tajikistan is one of the Central Asian countries most vulnerable to natural disasters. The most frequent hazards are floods, earthquakes, avalanches, land- and mudslides. The country is also prone to drought, particularly in Khatlon where some 3,000,000 people were affected by drought in 2000. Floods are becoming increasingly devastating in terms of lives lost and damage to livelihoods, particularly in mountain areas where flash flooding is a common occurrence in the upper reaches of some valleys.

The most frequent causes of localized damage are landslides, where over 170 dangerous sites have been identified. Earthquakes are also a substantial and ever-present threat to a high proportion of the population.

Purpose of the evaluation

1. To evaluate and assess the practical suitability of the National Society disaster management set up to the needs identified at the programme inception.
2. To provide a clear view on the degree to which the objectives have been achieved.
3. To analyse the impact of the implemented operations, the concrete impact/incidence of activities undertaken in the event of a disaster.
4. To assess the local impact of the implemented projects on the community beneficiaries and the National Society.
5. To evaluate the coordination mechanisms used with the national authorities, local and international organisations and all relevant actors.
6. To draw the lessons learned and develop practical recommendations to improve and enhance the National Society Disaster Management capacity.

Specific evaluation objectives

- National Society Disaster Management system as a management tool for quick, accurate and effective response to disasters and integrated into the national disaster response system.
- Emergency Operation Centres are established and operational in the strategic locations of the country.
- Local disaster committees are established in the NS primary organization basis and operational

The evaluation will cover both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the disaster management programme, including programme strategies, objectives, implementation processes & results, approaches.

- Analysis of the relevance of the programme objectives, suitability of the aid provided in the context of local practices, of the choice of beneficiaries, of the strategy, and of DRR measures and tools, in relation to local needs and capacity.
- Examination on coordination and coherence of the actions carried out, in Tajikistan, with local authorities, local and international organisations (REACT).
- Analysis of the effectiveness of DM programme in quantitative and qualitative terms.
- Analysis of the efficiency of the DM programme. The analysis should cover planning of activities, involvement of beneficiaries in the implementation, relevance of the community-based and participatory approach and elements such as logistics, selection of recipients, maintenance of accounts, etc.
- Analysis of the impact of the DM programme and sustainability. Indicative list below: Contribution to the reduction of vulnerability, effect on the environment of the local population, effect on local capacity-building.
- Analysis of the visibility of the donor and viability of the DM programme.
- Analysis of the integration of gender issues.
- If relevant, drawing-up of operational recommendations for the follow-up of the programme continuation.

Work plan and methodology

The evaluation will be carried out over one month.

The process will be undertaken in line with the local context and will encourage active participation of Red Crescent staff, local authorities, and people from respective communities where the DM projects are implemented. It will also consider a gender sensitive ways in its approaches.

The consultant will have to carry out field visits in 11 RCST emergency response centres and primary organisations.

A briefing will be held at the Federation CR and RCST headquarters, during which the necessary information and documents will be provided.

Review of data and briefing. RCST/ Federation CR and movement partners working in the country.

Discussions with the Federation CR project coordinator in Dushanbe and with the National Society DM team.

Discussions with the RCST leadership and staff.

Analysis of the documents related to the programme: review of the project documents (DP/R and Contingency Plan, DM structure).

Preparation of the evaluation tools and action plan for the field visits in country.

Primary data collection:

- Interviews with the key actors of the project (technical and administrative team) and other institutional actors.
- Interviews with direct project beneficiaries and use of participatory tools (maps, diagrams, matrices, etc.).
- Group interviews with the technical team of the project and use of participatory appraisal techniques.

Direct observation, visit of different sites and communities and participation to activities of the project.

Secondary data:

- Review of the RCST documents.
- Review of the documents of other institutions working in the same field.

Preliminary analysis of the data collected:

Preliminary presentation of the results of the evaluation to the team of the project and to the key partners in each country. A debriefing at the Federation CR in Dushanbe.

Report submission and discussion:

- The report will be drafted in English
- The draft report will be submitted to the Federation CR and RCST Headquarters at the latest 20 days

- If possible, a debriefing with the DM coordinator at the headquarters in Dushanbe will take place upon reception of this first version to clarify misunderstandings and inaccuracies.
- Once the necessary amendments to the draft report have been incorporated, the revised text will be resubmitted to the Federation Tajikistan CR.
- The consultant will have a week maximum to submit a final report in a computer format.

The total duration of the consultancy should not exceed 25 days including the field visits and the drafting of the final report.

Evaluation report

The report will have the following format:

- Cover page
- Table of contents
- Executive summary
- The main body of the report should start with the method used and should be structured in accordance with the specific objectives formulated under point 3 above.

The recommendations will be divided as follows:

- Consolidated recommendations applying to the whole programme
- Specific recommendations/issues regarding the RCST DM activities
- Annexes as needed.

The consultant will be responsible for the coherence of the report, both in terms of content and presentation.

[ENDS]

APPENDIX TWO

Interviewees consulted as part of the evaluation (except beneficiaries)

DUSHANBE

(Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan)

Zafar Muhabbatov, Secretary General
Shukhrat Sangov, Head of Disaster Management
Umed Sayduniev, Disaster Preparedness Coordinator
Umed Aminov, Climate Change Adaptation Adviser

(IFRC and PNS)

Eric Michel-Sellier, IFRC Country Representative
Shamsudin Muhidinov, IFRC Disaster Management Coordinator
Elzat Mamutaliev, Senior Representative in Central Asia, Netherlands Red Cross
Ikrom Soliev, Programmes Manager, Regional Office for Central Asia, German Red Cross
Mari Paajanen, Programme Delegate for Central Asia, Finnish Red Cross

(ICRC)

Severine Chappaz, Head of Mission
Saidumar Jononaev, Cooperation Field Officer
Murodjon Soliev, Cooperation Field Officer

(Others)

Abdusator Gafurovich Khusnvakhtov, First Deputy Chairman, CoES
Shahio Rahimova, Manager, Disaster Risk Management Programme, UNDP
Srdan Stojanovic, Head of Office for Central Asia, DG-ECHO

RCST KURGAN-TYUB DMC

Nusratullo Aliev, community mobilizer and NDRT member
Islom Mukhtojov, Organizational Development Coordinator and NDRT member
Khairiddin Khodjaev, volunteer

RCST KULYAB DMC

Zayniddin Olimov, Executive Secretary
Parviz Majidov, Disaster Management Coordinator
Habibullo Mirzoev, Organizational Development Coordinator
Hasan Mozimov, NDRT member

RCST RASHT DMC

Mahmadjon Odinaev, Executive Secretary
Mahmadazim Jomiev, Disaster Management Coordinator
Sayumron Giyosov, NDRT team leader
Kudratullo Ismatou, NDRT member
Vanjali Shafiev, NDRT member
Sharbatkoja Saidkhojaev, Restoring Family Links Coordinator

RCST KHUDZAND DMC

Makhsuda Azizova, Executive Secretary
Kakhriddin Karimov, Disaster Management Coordinator

RCST ASHT BRANCH

Mutabar Kayumova, Executive Secretary
Firuz Yuldashev, staff member
Akmal Kiromiddinov, LDMC member
Jamshed Turdiev, volunteer

APPENDIX THREE

Grants to the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan from the IFRC Disaster Response Emergency Fund 2006–11

DREF date: disaster (grant in CHF)	People affected*	People reached by RCST*
16 June 2011: floods, high winds in Sugd *oblast* (59,406 CHF)	1,278	522
12 May 2010: floods in Khatlon region (184,879 CHF)	16,000	1,086
30 April 2010: poliomyelitis in 20 districts, including Dushanbe (260,221 CHF)	705 (cases of acute flaccid paralysis)	664,256 (children vaccinated)
15 April 2010: floods in 20 districts (107,849 CHF)	3,720	720
6 January 2010: earthquake in Vanch district (95,705 CHF)	6,706	890
12 February 2008: winter emergency (172,062 CHF)	Nationwide	10,246
25 July 2007: earthquake in Rasht valley (55,000 CHF)	8,358	720
19 April 2007: floods and mudslides in five eastern districts (85,115 CHF)	17,174	Unknown
14 August 2006: earthquakes in Qumsangir district (100,000 CHF)	21,057	1,000

*Source: RCST disaster-management department.

The Kulyab questionnaire

As part of this evaluation, 24 Red Crescent beneficiaries, all but four of them women, were interviewed on Monday 5 December 2011 about the help they received after the floods in the centre of Kulyab city last May. Five of these families were led by the mother of the household; four included one disabled member. The questions were edited and abridged from an early "beneficiary satisfaction survey" carried out by the RCST and can be regarded as a partial triangulation of the results of that survey. The respondents were free to select more than one option, so not all the numbers in any one question add up to 24.

1. How were you most affected by the disaster?

I was almost killed (11)
I was injured (2)
My property was damaged (22)
A family member was injured (9)
A family member died (2)

2. What did you need most?

Food (15)
Shelter (17)
Clothes/blankets (10)
Water (6)
Other items (7)

3. What did you actually receive?

Food (17)
Shelter (15)
Clothes/blankets (11)
Water (9)
Other items (7)

4. Were you asked about your needs in advance?

By the Red Crescent (17)
By the government (15)
By neighbours (3)
By others (5)
No (1)

5. When did you receive support from the Red Crescent?

Twelve hours after the disaster (4)
One day after (4)
Two days after (2)
Up to five days after (10)
One week after (2)
Don't know (2)

6. Where did you receive assistance?

At home (5)
Other (22)

7. How long did you have to travel to receive it?

Half an hour (18)
An hour (5)
Two hours
Three hours
Don't know (1)

8. When did the distribution take place?

Early in the morning (10)
During the day (12)
In the evening (11)

9. How did you first hear about the distribution?

Radio
TV
Newspaper (1)
Neighbour/friend (21)
Other (mostly RCST volunteers in the street) (7)

10. Did you know in advance what would be distributed?

No (22)
Yes (2)

11. Did you transport the relief good yourself or pay to get them home?

Self (23)
Paid for transport (5)

12. How was the behaviour of Red Crescent staff and volunteers during the distribution?

Very good (13)
Good (10)
Average
Bad
No opinion (1)

[ENDS]