



International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Asia Pacific Zone

Review of Red Cross Red Crescent Disaster Response Capacity

FINAL REPORT

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Global Emergency Group

Brian Majewski, Team Leader

Iain Logan, Technical Expert

Langdon Greenhalgh, Technical Expert



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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AHA	Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
AP	Asia Pacific
APZ	Asia Pacific Zone
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BHCU	Basic Health Care Unit
BDRC	Bangladesh Red Crescent Society
CAS	Cooperation Assistance Strategy
CHF	Swiss Francs
CIMCORD	Civil Military Coordination
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DM	Disaster Management
DMIS	Disaster Management Information System
DMU	Disaster Management Unit
DP	Disaster Preparedness
DR	Disaster Response
DREF	Disaster Response Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
EQ	Earthquake
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Teams
GVA	Geneva
HNS	Host National Society
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
HOD	Head of Delegation
HR	Human Resources
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDRL	International Disaster Response Laws
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Secretariat and Member National Societies)
IFRC Secretariat	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Offices, Systems and Staff at Global, Zonal, Regional, Country and Operational Levels)
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IRCS	Indian Red Cross Society
IT	Information Technology

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KL	Kuala Lumpur
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
Movement	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IFRC Secretariat, ICRC and National Societies)
MRCs	Myanmar Red Cross Society
NDMA	National Disaster Management Agency
NDRT	National Disaster Response Team
NFI	Non-food Items
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NS	National Society
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OD	Organizational Development
OSV	Other Situations of Violence
PMER	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
PRC	Philippines Red Cross
PNS	Participating National Society
PRCS	Pakistan Red Crescent Society
PSSR	Programme and Supplementary Services Recovery
RCRC	Red Cross Red Crescent
RDMC	Regional Disaster Management Committee
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
RFL	Restoring Family Links
RLU	Regional Logistics Unit
RTE	Real-time Evaluation
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SARD	South Asia Regional Delegation
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VCA	Vulnerability Capacity Assessment (tool)
VNRC	Vietnam National Red Cross
WPNS	Well Prepared National Society (self-assessment tool)



1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 PURPOSE

This review was commissioned by the Asia Pacific Zone Disaster Management Unit to assess the disaster response capacities of the IFRC Secretariat and selected National Societies (NS) in Asia Pacific and efforts to build these capacities over the past five years. It is intended to form the basis for long-term plans of action, within a framework of prioritized interventions, to further strengthen response capacities of the IFRC Secretariat and its membership through collective actions of the IFRC, NS and their partners.

1.2 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The review took place between June and July 2011 and followed a mixed methods approach employing a combination of qualitative interviews with more than 120 stakeholders, observation during site visits, and desk review of documents and past evaluations. Six countries, two regional offices, the Zone office, and Geneva Secretariat were selected for visits and intense focus during the review.

Interview notes were carefully recorded and data was coded and analyzed to identify common themes across stakeholders and sites. Interview data was triangulated with findings from the desk review including comparison of current capacities against a baseline from 2006.

Country specific findings may not be generalizable to all countries within the Zone, particularly given the focus on countries within South and South East Asia. However, the key findings and recommendations presented are focused on themes and good practices which should be useful at various levels throughout the Asia Pacific Zone.

1.3 KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Key Trends

1. NS and governments within Asia Pacific are more self-sufficient and many are potential new emergency donors. They increasingly insist on self-management of all aspects of response including the triaging and coordination of international humanitarian assistance. Though NS may perceive themselves as self-sufficient they still depend on some level of support from Movement partners during medium to large disasters. Regional inter-governmental initiatives (e.g. ASEAN) present both threats and opportunities. *IFRC Secretariat approaches to supporting NS and engaging with governments have not always adapted to these trends and thus are behind the curve.*
2. Fast growing Asian economies have resulted in significant new fundraising yields for NS. At the same time competition and expectations at the national levels are also growing, fueled in part by easy access to information through new technologies. *Ensuring quality and accountability in NS response will be increasingly important.*
3. Global trends such as climate change and rapid urbanization were universally quoted in all countries visited as more widely impacting disaster response needs within Asia Pacific. Specific hazard risks including earthquakes and social/civil unrest are areas of concern for NS. *However, practical tools and approaches to preparing for related disasters are only in the early stages of development.*



NS Response Capacity, Progress and Lessons

4. ***Capacity for response has increased within NS*** due to increased overall resources. Most stakeholders feel NS response is generally effective within the Zone specifically in hydrological disasters up to and including medium to large scale events. ***However key NS response systems, expertise and capacities need to be strengthened and made more sustainable*** (including DR systems, NDRTs and Logistics).
5. Most IFRC Secretariat, PNS and partner investments have shifted to what at times seem fragmented community-based DRR projects resulting in a ***lack of focus and long-term resourcing for response capacity building***. Project based funding approaches are often seen as detracting from the development of core capacities.

IFRC Secretariat Response Capacities

6. IFRC Secretariat resources are concentrated at levels furthest away from NS (Geneva and Zone). Total IFRC Secretariat resources in Asia Pacific for disaster management are very significant but ***few of these resources are available for practical and systematic response capacity building at the country level***.
7. Sophisticated and lengthy technical documents appear to be underutilized and total volume of such products is seen as somewhat overwhelming. Along with a heavy focus on ad hoc training these efforts have often failed to create sustainable response capacity. ***Imbalances between Secretariat/PNS supply (Push) and NS demand (Pull) threaten to limit the utility of products and***

efforts of most staff. Regional disaster management network meetings and country pre-disaster meetings are good platforms for assessing and balancing supply and demand and can support IFRC Secretariat planning.

8. Decentralization efforts within the IFRC Secretariat have progressed further in Asia Pacific than in other Zones and the Zone is highly capacitated with an admirable international mix of well-qualified delegates and staff. ***However, some confusion remains over the division of responsibilities and roles for preparedness and response across Zone, regional and country levels***.
9. ***Coordination within the Zone has benefited from the development of the DMU SOPs but some gaps and areas of confusion remain***. A recent review of the APZ SOPs found that some significant numbers of NS and IFRC Secretariat staff remain unaware of the procedures and that some role and authority clarification is required. In addition regular IFRC Secretariat/HNS/PNS/ICRC coordination meetings were often seen as too ad hoc and some recommendations were made for a more structured and inclusive approach. This review's interviews confirmed these findings.
10. In-country coordination mechanisms (government, NS, UN, NGOs and civil society) vary in strength and levels of IFRC Secretariat and NS engagement. Some countries have put "Cluster-like" systems in place permanently and most have some form of inter-agency response coordination platform which include permanent seats for the NS. ***In some contexts stakeholders felt that the IFRC***



Secretariat and NS, both regarded as important key partners, could participate more frequently and effectively in these national coordination platforms, and in doing so strengthen preparedness and understanding of their role.

Understanding, Access and Use of the IFRC Global Disaster Response System

11. DREF allocations have almost doubled in the Zone and the RDRT system is well established in South and South East Asia. However key global IFRC tools for disaster response such a *FACT and ERU are not fully understood nor appreciated by key IFRC Secretariat staff and NS because they are seen as somewhat static, rigid and non-inclusive.* Recent initiatives by the zone to raise awareness of the tools by the DMU in KL demonstrate understanding of this.
12. *The effectiveness of coordination mechanisms at a global level between Geneva, PNS and the Zone appears to vary between disasters* and concerns have been raised in a number of recent evaluations. The growth of the Asia Pacific Zone compared to others has resulted in different levels of delegated authority and communication and coordination approaches. Some concerns were noted about the quality and amount of communication between the Zone and Geneva. Improvements over the past three years were cited by some stakeholders. A current effort is only recently under way to develop global SOPs for response which should link the use of global tools to the new Zonal structure and standardize approaches.

1.4 CONCLUSION

Disaster Management within the Zone is on a good path. There is a culture of seeking constant improvement. Continuing to refine processes, build a Zone-wide DM team, strengthen capacity building for response and seeking feedback on NS needs will result in increasingly high performance in response.



1.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop an Ongoing Response Capacity Assessment Process to Monitor NS Readiness and Support Needs. The Zone DMU should establish a pool of people from NS (from among RDRT members), IFRC Secretariat and PNS and train them to conduct capacity assessment missions. Using the indicators for basic minimum NS response capacities these teams would review readiness and identify priorities for support once every five years. IFRC Secretariat Zone, Regional and Country offices should utilize the results of such assessments to guide capacity building investments in consultation with PNS, ICRC and external partners.
2. Reallocate Resources to Better Support NS Response Capacity Building and Bridge Critical Gaps. Within the Zone, the DMU and Regional Offices should collaborate to deploy existing DM staff to the country level for longer-term assignments which support building basic minimum NS response capacity. Zone DMU staff could also be reassigned to cover critical vacant country/operational positions while recruiting progresses. Globally the IFRC Secretariat should identify existing and new financial and human resources to support country level programs for response capacity building to balance project funding dependency.
3. Prioritize Response Capacity Building Focus on Developing Key NS Systems including: NDRTs, SoPs and protocols, logistics systems and expertise, fundraising, quality and accountability mechanisms, and NS positioning within their national response system (e.g. national laws and platforms). Time and resources should be reallocated towards coaching, mentoring and facilitating practical country level and Zonal simulations and exercises to "test the system".
4. Respond to Trends in the External Environment by Continuing to Develop Practical Tools and Partnerships for NS. Special projects focused on helping NS and IFRC Secretariat systems adapt to climate change, urbanization (and in particular earthquake risk) and civil unrest should be continued and reinforced with emphasis on practical guidance and development of scenarios for use in simulations and exercises.
5. Work with PNS and donors to build appreciation and program funding for response preparedness as a core pillar of DRR. Without detracting from community-based DRR, the IFRC Secretariat as a leader in response should proactively seek to ensure greater balance in donor funding to ensure national response systems are capacitated and sustainable.
6. Enhance Country Level IFRC Secretariat Coordination Efforts to Maximize Strategic Benefit of DM Investments. IFRC Secretariat country offices and PNS should redouble their efforts to synchronize and coordinate the myriad DRR and disaster preparedness efforts taking place in AP countries. Work towards shared objectives, based on NS strategies and assessment of NS basic minimum response capacities, should be monitored and reviewed in collective partnership meetings with the NS to increase mutual accountability and coherence.

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2. INTRODUCTION

This review of Red Cross and Red Crescent disaster response capacity in Asia and Pacific assesses the disaster response capacities and efforts to build the capacities of the IFRC Secretariat and selected National Societies (NS) in Zone. It is intended to form the basis for long term plans of action, within a framework of prioritized interventions, to further strengthen response capacities of the IFRC Secretariat and its membership in the Zone through collective actions of the IFRC Secretariat, NS and partners, well coordinated with external stakeholders such as the UN INGO and donors.

The IFRC Strategy 2020 builds on decades of initiatives to enhance performance for disaster response at international and national levels. It outlines the obligations of all NS to be prepared to respond to disasters and confirms this as a core area of IFRC work. The IFRC Asia Pacific Disaster Management Strategy 2010-2014, agreed by NS within the Zone, focuses on three strategic directions:

1. Enhance existing National Society disaster management performance and capacities,
2. Work effectively together to maximize Red Cross Red Crescent assistance to vulnerable and disaster affected communities, and
3. Work with external partners in disaster management for vulnerable communities.

Over the past five years a series of very large scale disasters have resulted in significant scaling up, and in some cases scaling back down, of disaster response and recovery efforts in some Asia Pacific countries and at the regional and Zonal levels of the IFRC Secretariat. At the same time many countries have experienced a growing frequency and impact of small and medium scale disasters requiring NS response. Following adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action by governments NS have also participated significantly in the growing number of donor funded Disaster Risk Reduction efforts in many parts of the Zone.

Internally the IFRC Secretariat has simultaneously implemented a series of organizational structure changes meant to enhance the capacity of the organization and, specific to this review, to bring the Secretariat disaster management services, systems and tools closer to individual countries and their RC/RC societies. This “decentralization” process has led to creation of the Zone office and some realignment of staff and financial resources, roles and responsibilities.

This review seeks to analyze progress towards the objectives of the AP DM Strategy within the context of the factors cited above and identify ways of building on the strengths of the



IFRC Secretariat and NS within Asia Pacific to continue to enhance disaster response preparedness and performance.

3. METHODOLOGY


The 2011 IFRC Secretariat Framework for Evaluation developed by the Planning and Evaluation Department of the Geneva-based Secretariat identifies the criteria, standards and processes by which the IFRC Secretariat evaluates its programs and systems and develops analytical products to enhance learning and performance. This framework identifies “reviews” as a distinct form of assessment which can complement evaluations in purpose and scope and defines them as: “Reviews are periodic assessments of performance, emphasizing operational issues”. While this review is perhaps not a formal evaluation as defined by this framework, the review team has sought to fulfill the standards outlined for evaluations and stress the utility standard first and foremost.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) (see Annex 1) for the review were prepared by the AP DMU and outline the purpose, scope, key questions, suggested methodology and deliverables. The methodology focuses on use of desk review of key documents and records as well as interviews and observations collected during field visits. The review team developed its detailed methodological approach in the form of an Inception Report (see Annex 2) using the ToR as a starting point. The key components of the inception report were presented to the Technical Reference Group established by the DMU to guide the review and incorporated feedback before beginning its data collection.

3.1 REVIEW PHASES

The review was organized into four distinct phases with specific outputs as shown below.

Figure 1 – Review Phases and Outputs






The data collection matrix presented as an annex to the Inception Report explains how each of the key questions for the review would be answered based on source of data and type of indicators. Based on the matrix a detailed interview questionnaire was developed along with a template for electronically transcribing recorded notes.

Over 120 stakeholders and informants were interviewed during the data collection phase. Interviews took place and observations were made during visits to 6 countries, 2 regional offices the Zone office and the Geneva Secretariat. In a few cases phone interviews were conducted with staff not available. Interview notes were all typed and saved to a shared folder for cross referencing by other review team members.

Data analysis for this review took place on a rolling basis, beginning with the first set of interviews in Kuala Lumpur. When all but one of the field visits was completed and prior to leaving the region two of the review team members assembled their initial draft findings based on observed trends in responses and briefed members of the technical reference group to solicit feedback. Once all field visits and phone interviews were completed all of the interview notes were reviewed, coded and manually sorted into the categories of key questions and based on sub-themes in the responses for further analysis. The results were compared against literature and documents to triangulate findings and identify baseline comparisons where possible.

The actual review timeline for each phase and key deliverable is shown below.

Figure 2: Review Phase and Deliverable Timeline



3.2 PROGRAM THEORY

To help focus the review analysis and determine whether implicit logic matches with the observed activities and results the review team has developed a program theory for IFRC Asia Pacific Disaster Response and Capacity Building. To complement the knowledge of review team members about the Movement, and the key questions in the ToR, widely accepted definitions and theoretical frameworks related to capacity development and organizational performance were first reviewed. The most comprehensive set of organizational performance factors is best represented in the diagram at right (Lusthaus et al, IDRC, 1999).

Figure 3: Elements of Organizational Performance




Applying this conceptual framework to IFRC Secretariat and NS Disaster Response capacity is admittedly complex given the multitude of Movement and non-Movement actors working with and through one another, as well as with and through government and non-governmental partners. However, the following diagram attempts to establish the logic underpinning the myriad efforts to build sustainable NS response capacities.

This model builds on the assumptions articulated in IFRC policies and strategies as well as observations of the full range of Movement, external partner and national context factors. While not intended to represent a theory developed through participatory processes it could serve as a basis for future discussions between IFRC Secretariat offices, PNS and member NS in the Asia Pacific Zone and as a template for the zone to routinely monitor and evaluate both its and APZ National Societies progress in DR capacity growth.



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Figure 4: NS Disaster Response Capacity Building Logic Model





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3.3 LIMITATIONS

Transferability and Representativeness of the Sample: Based on the terms of reference, the review team visited six countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia selected by the DMU to more closely examine the current capacities for disaster response and trends from the country perspective. Although this provides a snapshot of capacities in these countries it is not possible to generalize these results to represent the diverse whole of the Asia Pacific Zone. Some attributes of the NS visited in particular may make generalization difficult. For example, most of the six NS visited are in relatively stable countries and might be seen as well established, “strong” organizations. On the other hand, all six NS visited could also be seen as having certain challenges with independence and image.

Mitigation: Where general findings are presented regarding trends and IFRC Secretariat capacities these results are based on triangulation from document review and interviews with stakeholders that hold a broader perspective based on their roles and experience.

Program Theory and Logic: Given the breadth of activities, projects, contexts and actors involved in IFRC disaster response there does not seem to be a single articulated logic model or program theory linking all of the topics and key questions articulated by the terms of reference for this review. Therefore the review is aimed at assessing a number of topics with the implicit suggestion that these all lead towards fulfillment of the ultimate objective of the IFRC Secretariat – to build sustainable NS capacity. However, it is apparent that in some cases activities, projects and resources are focused on intermediate or even competing stakeholder interests which may not relate to NS capacity while mitigating factors within a country or NS also complicate the potential for capacity building.

Mitigation: The review team has attempted to document the observed program theory or logic model (see above) using the AP DM Strategy objectives as desired outputs, however numerous structural levels of the organization, mediating and mitigating factors that often affect success are not documented given the complexity. Since this is a review which seeks to help enhance processes, fidelity and performance – and not summatively judge performance against a single agreed set of measures – the development of this logic model can be unpacked and components used by the IFRC Secretariat to monitor specific project and initiative performance and design measures for future outcome evaluations.



4. FINDINGS

The findings from this review are presented below under the main categories of inquiry developed in the ToR and data collection matrix as follows:

- Key Trends in the Humanitarian Environment and Their Implications
- Disaster Response Preparedness of Selected National Societies and Lessons
- Disaster Response Capacities of the IFRC Secretariat
- Understanding, Access and Use of the IFRC Global Disaster Response System

Case studies are embedded in these sections to illustrate examples of findings. While pertinent to the sections where they are placed, most case studies demonstrate cross-cutting themes for learning and improvement.

To the extent possible these findings attempt to utilize a “strengths-based” approach by highlighting progress and demonstrated success. However, to maintain balance and ensure that gaps and deficiencies are not ignored, findings related to challenges are also presented throughout the text.

4.1 KEY TRENDS IN THE HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Disaster response preparedness depends upon the ability of organizations to keep pace with changes in the external environment linked to risks (vulnerability x hazards). A number of key trends are apparent from stakeholder interviews and the desk review which will continue to affect the disaster response work of the IFRC. While certain global trends such as urbanization and climate change are included in the findings a number of specific trends related to Asia and Pacific regions have been identified as well. Where clear, the review team has incorporated findings on the implications of these trends.

4.1.1 Key Trends and Implications

Fast Growing Economies: The “tiger” economies of Asia continue to outpace economic growth in other parts of the world presenting both opportunities and challenges for Red Cross Red Crescent disaster response. Rapid economic growth presents a significant opportunity to increase domestic fundraising, especially for disaster response, to the benefit of NS as seen through recent fundraising successes in Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, India and China among others. Economic growth is also paralleled by an explosion in public and individual use of new information communications technology which can also fuel rapidly increasing public expectations of NS during a disaster response operation.



In many ways the economies of countries in South and South East Asia are growing and modernizing much faster than the national societies in these countries. Despite economic growth, overall public sector reform is often a low priority within these countries as they adjust market based systems and economic regulations. National societies in some cases are hindered in their own evolution by government regulations related to human resources, financial systems and resource mobilization and with public sector reform lagging behind the affected national societies are at a disadvantage. This presents a risk as growing economies have enabled increasing resource mobilization and along with increasing donations for disasters the NS can expect to face increasing expectations which can quickly outpace ad hoc capacity development.

Decrease in Institutional Donor Support: The rise of economically powerful nations in Asia has already lead to decreased funding from traditional institutional donors as they start to view certain countries as less in need of international support with their own economic strengths. A number of donors interviewed noted that they are consolidating their focus based on the belief that certain countries have “graduated” from needing foreign assistance and this is further confirmed in the recent UK DFID Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (March 2011) report by Lord Ashdown. This increases the need for NS to be prepared to seek funding from domestic donors (particularly corporate entities and through large-scale fundraising campaigns during emergencies).

Climate Change: The increasing impact and scope of occurrences generally attributed to climate change is already being felt by NS and their partners throughout Asia and the Pacific in terms of increasing variability of climactic events and increasing numbers of small and medium size natural disasters. In the countries visited consistent feedback from both international humanitarian agencies and government also indicated that areas not previously impacted were now becoming more commonly inundated especially by hydrological events. Agricultural growing seasons are shifting and disasters that are striking earlier are destroying or threatening crops and livelihoods more frequently in some countries. This results in aggravating food security and in turn can trigger population movements either into areas where tribal and cultural stress results or to urban areas significantly increasing the existing stress and vulnerability in those populations¹. While some NS have incorporated climate change information into their DRR projects, systematic

¹ Interviews in Bangladesh specifically identify this chain of events in the Chittagong Hill Tracts as just one example of their most worrying dynamic resulting in enormous urban congestion in Dhaka.



linkages between climate monitoring, early warning, contingency planning and readiness efforts are not well developed.

Urbanization: Rapid economic growth is concentrated primarily in cities and similar to other parts of the world Asian countries are experiencing a massive internal migration to urban areas. Some of these urban areas, particularly those in coastal and flood prone areas and subject to seismic hazards are particularly risk prone as urban development has often outpaced smart and safe growth measures such as strict building codes. In three of the capitals visited the NS and government confirmed that the combined impact of aging and degrading infrastructure in “The Old City” coupled with massive new construction in the “New City” were increasingly resulting in regular significant urban response needs even under modest rains and flooding² With the migration to urban areas many people lose their traditional community networks and thus reduce their self-coping mechanisms to handle any shock. In addition, in at least one capital visited and likely more in the zone, the increasing urban migration, economic or disaster induced, brings with it the inevitability of increased social, caste, tribal and family tensions, overcrowding and competition and the probability of other situations of violence (OSV) that the NS should respond to but acknowledge they have limited knowledge or capacity to address³.

Increasing populations of urban poor are at greatest risk, have the fewest coping mechanisms and are often the most difficult for humanitarian organizations to reach partly due to their likelihood of living in unsanctioned areas or participating in unregulated economic activities. While NS usually have branches in urban areas it is widely believed by key stakeholders that the capacity of urban NS branches has not grown commensurate with the pace of urban populations. At the same time, most stakeholders feel that the IFRC Secretariat, as well as the UN and INGOs, lack the knowledge and adapted tools to effectively serve these increasing vulnerable populations.

Competitive Environment: Many countries in Asia are beginning to see the rapid growth of the civil society sector. Human rights, development, environmental and public advocacy organizations of all types are growing in numbers and importance in the countries visited for this review. In many, these organizations still play a largely informal role and remain unrecognized (formally) by national disaster response laws and systems. Both indigenous NGOs and new members of INGOs previously focused on development are increasingly

² During the review team field visit to Manila a minor typhoon hit outside Manila but still resulted in significant inundation, burst sewers and knee high flooding in both Old Manila and Makati the New City. The response required a full mobilisation of both government and PRCS teams supported by the IFRC country office.

³ Feedback from Interviews with ICRC HoD, Dhaka & Manila.



involved in disaster response operations. Some are raising significant funding already from within countries in competition with NS, while many continue to partner with NS to deliver assistance locally. As economies continue to grow and government policies begin to enable more formal recognition of civil society NS may, and in some cases already are, find themselves increasingly competing with NGOs for publicity and funds. If NS are not able to modernize and increase their basic institutional capacity for delivering high quality disaster response they are likely to find themselves at a disadvantage as younger more nimble competitors establish themselves and begin to directly deliver assistance based on needs arising from disasters.

4.1.2 Government and Inter-Governmental Capacities

Growing Government Capacities: Government Disaster Management capacity is increasing throughout Asia for disaster response and new systems, structures, laws and capabilities are evolving within government structures or are being created within regional assistance bodies such as ASEAN and SAARC. Disaster Management Laws and national policies are inclusive of all of the Red Cross/Red Crescent societies within their country but vary in terms of the significance of roles and responsibilities assigned to national societies before, during and after times of disaster.

It is also clear that an increasingly significant role within the humanitarian context is evolving for the military establishments of these same governments and at the least this demands an increased understanding within the Asia Pacific RC/RC agencies, complimented by close communication with the ICRC, of the CIMCORD functions of these entities. Alongside the growth in capacity and legal structures an increasing desire, even insistence, to “self-manage” is apparent in countries visited. While this self reliance is linked to both recent major events that triggered massive international interventions there and some increasing sensitivity about requesting international assistance, most governments view the Movement through its links to national societies as an acceptable face saving way to admit international assistance through existing in-country partners. Expanding capacity is also leading to an increasing interest in deploying NS and government assets and teams together, regionally and potentially internationally when large-scale disasters strike other countries in the region and to a lesser extent major disasters elsewhere in the world.

Governments do see the IFRC Secretariat/NS combined as an asset and expressed in all countries visited an interest in advice from the IFRC Secretariat on how to best establish, improve and better manage their DM systems. They also hope the IFRC Secretariat can help



to link them with other governments and access knowledge about best practices for national DM systems. However there were some warnings from interviewees that this status should not be taken for granted and that even existing representation of IFRC Secretariat and PNS assets may come under scrutiny for reduction or even closure.

Potentially Important Regional Inter-governmental Initiatives: Virtually all stakeholders, but in particular major donors such as DFID, ECHO, AusAID and USAID, believe that the ambitions of regional inter-governmental bodies represent an important trend, specifically as an alternative and, in the near future, preferred “international” response and coordination option to the UN/IASC system (OCHA/UNDAC/Clusters) and possibly even the IFRC coordination structures.

ASEAN in particular with its Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response and planned and evolving Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) was frequently cited as an important interlocutor for the IFRC Secretariat in coming years. While the AHA Centre is still only in the planning stages, and much of its strategy and tactical tools are aspirational, important institutional donors are supporting its development. As national societies are frequently perceived by government and ASEAN leaders as part of the government disaster management system there are potentially positive and negative scenarios that could develop under which ASEAN expects to coordinate, or hopefully coordinate with, Red Cross and Red Crescent entities during future response operations.

The IFRC Secretariat, ICRC and OCHA and more interestingly the INGOs⁴ are each engaged with ASEAN in different ways. The IFRC Secretariat is developing a tripartite agreement with ASEAN and South East Asia NS to shape future engagement. Coupled with the growing and at times quite assertive intentions for governments in the region to self-manage and coordinate not just national but regional and international response assistance assets, ASEAN could facilitate or complicate IFRC assistance depending upon how the RC/RC actors coordinate and engage with it in these early stages of development. In the case of interviews with the national DM centers of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam governments clear indications were that in the future they see ASEAN as the primary decision-making and coordinating body for triaging international assistance (*if indeed it was even to be asked for*) rather than UN OCHA or UNDP. In addition it was made clear that these agencies and ASEAN increasingly (regardless of some questions and reservations

⁴ “OXFAM as the lead for a consortium of NGOs called the ASEAN Partnership Group has established a “desk” inside ASEAN where they are regarded and welcomed as a positive asset in assisting ASEAN develop its Regional DM coordination strategy” APZ DR Review interview with OXFAM Humanitarian Programme Coordinator, Manila 23rd June 2011



expressed by each as to the others predictability and level of engagement and capacity) see the mobilization of the DR capacity of the NS of the region first and foremost as an “ASEAN asset” not the Movement’s.⁵ Close attention and study is also being focused on how Japan managed and prioritized international offers for assistance post the earthquake and tsunami earlier in 2011.

4.1.3 National Coordination Mechanisms

In each of the countries visited there is some form of national coordination mechanism in place. These systems are mostly established in law and involve different levels of inter-agency coordination as well as engagement with external actors. In addition to the government led coordination mechanisms a number of informal coordination bodies exist in the selected countries to coordinate among non-governmental international and national organizations. National Societies are incorporated into national coordinating bodies and participate in external coordinating mechanisms as do the IFRC Secretariat and ICRC. In some cases, however, stakeholders noted concern that NS and the IFRC Secretariat don’t participate as actively as they could or should. A summary of national structures and systems for coordination disaster response is presented in the table below.

⁵ During a visit to a National DM Operations Center photographs on the wall were titled “ASEAN Emergency Response Teams” all of which were in fact uniformed Red Cross NDRT team members.



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Table 1: National Coordination Mechanisms in Selected Countries

	Bangladesh	India	Malaysia	Philippines	Thailand	Vietnam
Laws, Policies, Plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National DM ACT has existed for 10 years but still not final, under consultation • Standing Order on Disasters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2005 DM Act (National Calamities and Relief Fund) – sets 11-13 priority states for response • Principle of subsidiarity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Various laws (Land Conservation, Environmental, etc.) form DM framework. • NSC directive: Policy and Mechanism for National Disaster and Relief Management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New DM Law 121 strengthens and updates previous legislation – more holistic approach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overarching DM Law • Many agencies have mandates for response and preparedness under laws • Principle of subsidiarity • All-hazards approach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New DM, Mitigation and Prevention Law being developed • New national strategy for DP and prevention
Structure of National Coordination System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National DM Agency • DM Committee • DM system led by Min of Food and DM • Military plays significant role • Gov't adopted own cluster system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) – political • NIDM - practical • Crisis Management Group (CMG) • Inter-agency groups being est. by States 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System for DM coordinated by National Security Council (NSC) • National coordinating body • Establishing National DRR platform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NDRRMC • DR Center • Gov't adopted own cluster system • Close reliance on the military as a humanitarian surge force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Department of Disaster Preparedness and Mgt (DDPM) set up 10 years ago – inter-agency coordinator • NDPMC –integrates agency efforts and prepare systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control serves as primary coordinator • Integrated provincial Flood and Storm and S&R committees • Considering national DRR platform
Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National contingency plan written but not highly operational • CPP system for early warning/evacuation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No national system of disaster declaration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central coordination systems including some early warning and response plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well developed central coordination system • Multiagency Operations Coordination Center 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tiered system of disaster declaration • Actively developing Incident Command System (ICS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government updating national disaster response plan
Government Response Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National • Local committees – being strengthened by UN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National and State DR Forces • 11,000 trained national personnel • Search & Rescue INSARAG certified and well equipped • Current ongoing review of govt capacity • Capacity varies by State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malaysian Armed Forces assets and personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Armed Force Personnel • Cluster system • NDRRMD /IASC HCT Technical Working Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18 Regional DPM and 76 Provincial DPM structures • Prepositioned supplies at regional level • Rapid response teams ready to deploy within 24 hours - 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good search & rescue capacity • Military often manages relief and evacuation • Good dyke system • Coast guard centers for search & rescue (fisherman)

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	Bangladesh	India	Malaysia	Philippines	Thailand	Vietnam
External Coordination Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •UNDP coordinates a DER coordination group with Gov't of Bangladesh – NS, IFRC Secretariat and ICRC participate •DRR Platform in place supported by ECHO – NS, IFRC Secretariat, ICRC participate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sphere working group with many international aid agencies participating 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •IFRC Secretariat agreement to sit on NDRRMC •Joint Gov't/UN HCT meetings – NS and IFRC Secretariat participate 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •A number of joint UN/INGO/RC/NGO committees for DR and other topics – coordinated by UNDP – IFRC Secretariat and NS participate •Joint assessment process in place •National NGO/civil society coordinating body
Auxiliary Role of NS and Participation in Coordination Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •NS sits on DM committee •Mandated role for disseminating early warning information •Auxiliary role is recognized •Some NS/Gov't political links help and complicate •Strong links with Flood Warning and Meteorological Depts •No IASC but participate in a UNDP/GoP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •NS is incorporated into system for relief •NS chairs NDMA advisory body on health •Link to CMG through Health Ministry •Aux role means NS only responds when it is a gov't priority 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •NS defined clearly as an auxiliary •Role is to support rescue teams, provide relief, provide doctors and 1st Aiders to augment MoH •Strong relationships with Ministries of Welfare and Health •NS sits on coordinating bodies under NSC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •NS has role in NDRRMC •NS more active at local levels •Good new agreement with government on RC roles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •NS sits on NDPMC and coordination bodies at all levels •NS link primarily through wives of governors who chair their local NS branch •Expect NS will have liaison officer in ICS •Auxiliary role – not first responder – help as they can •Blood only specific mandated role •Informal role in evacuation •NS participates in simulations and exercises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •NS sits on Flood and Storm Control Cmt •NS part of provincial coordinating cmts •New RC Law put in place which defines role of NS well •Good NS connection to meteorological center for early warning •New DM law could affect NS space •Government decrees regulate fundraising – both allows for limited competition and restricts use



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4.2 DISASTER RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS OF SELECTED NATIONAL SOCIETIES AND LESSONS

4.2.1 Selected National Society Capacities - Themes

National Societies in Asia and the Pacific appear to have developed some increased capacities for response over the past five years⁶. Volume of response activity seems to have increased in parallel to increased fundraising for response. However, in most of the countries visited for this review, significant gaps still exist in core response systems and capacities (including broader organizational development elements such as human resources, volunteer management, organizational management and finance). However, the Zone OD unit is currently undertaking important initiatives to address some of these gaps in the areas of OD and volunteer management in disasters. Further focus on addressing these shortfalls in HR and finance management should follow in the selected countries. While NS are increasingly capable of raising adequate funds for response within their own countries for all but catastrophic disasters, capacities have not kept pace with funding to enable self-sufficient response in a professional, effective, efficient, accountable and high quality manner.

A number of key themes have emerged in terms of NS response capacities which are summarized below. A specific comparison of the findings from the 2006 AP DM Review⁷ with observations and data collected during this 2011 review is presented afterwards in tables for each of the 6 countries.

Rise of new PNS in Asia-Pacific region: Economic growth is providing resourcing and some capacity. There is an increasing desire among many of the South and Southeast Asian NS to mobilise their domestic humanitarian assistance capacity beyond national borders, often driven by new fundraising successes and by their government and public demand to see their country as a responder (donor). However, much like RC/RC international assistance, the desire to deploy regionally, is often greater than a related willingness to receive help. RDRT still remains the primary RC/RC vehicle for channeling this interest in a coordinated way, though the Zone DMU is promoting participation through the use of the mobilization table, cash contributions using the pledge management system and where possible deployment of NS personnel from within the Zone who are members of the FACT and ERU rosters.

⁶ "We no longer "lead" the assistance operation to the population in the conflict areas. The NS is fully competent to do so now and we support very much from behind" ICRC HoD Interview. Indian RC has gone from 0 to 40 NDRT since 2006. IAPZ DR Capacity Review Delhi June 2011.

⁷ Overview of Asia Pacific National Society Disaster Management Resources, Capacities, and Experience (John Humphreys 2006)



Development of specialized national response resources by AP NS: Many national societies within the Zone are developing specialized national response resources, with support from PNS and the IFRC Secretariat, for deployment during disasters within their own countries. Some of these resources are also viewed as having potential value in regional responses when required. The table below shows some of the specialized equipment and skills developed in AP NS. While likely not a complete list, this provides evidence of increased capacity and focus on particular needs for response within their national context.

Country	Unit
China	Health, water and sanitation
India	Water and sanitation
Indonesia	Health, water and sanitation, field kitchen, volunteer base camp
Myanmar	Water and sanitation, water purification unit
Malaysia	Health teams, field kitchen
Papua New Guinea	Water purification unit
Pakistan	Water and sanitation
Philippines	Health, water and sanitation
Vietnam	Water purification unit
Samoa	Water purification unit
Solomon Islands	Water purification unit
Thailand	Health, water and sanitation, field kitchen

Frequent operational bottlenecks with NS management not delegating or able to delegate enough operational responsibility: Often NS leadership takes the lead when anything happens. Final approvals of key operational elements frequently have to be made by the secretary general. This often impedes a rapid response and capacity building of mid-level disaster managers. Most of the NS visited candidly acknowledge the need to delegate more authority and build their DR staff capacity to the point where “down-stream” decision making empowerment is possible. This will require the enhanced focus on strengthening disaster HR selection, training and mentoring noted earlier.

Significant gaps in basic response capacity: Of the NS visited for this review, three have functioning national disaster response teams in place that incorporate branch members and respond to disasters when branch capacity is exceeded. The three others have some form of national teams either for very specific purposes (e.g. medical assistance or evacuation) or are in the early stages of setting up a system. While many staff have



attended IFRC Secretariat and external trainings over the past five years the impact is varied and often they do not have an opportunity to apply any learning given assigned roles and other areas of focus. Logistics capacity in terms of pre-positioned stocks, well organized and managed warehouses, supplier and transportation agreements and arrangements are accepted as in need of strengthening in four of the six countries visited. Attrition from high staff turnover, lack of forward career planning and opportunities and competition from other agencies were among impediments to sustaining response capacities cited in interviews.⁸

DM Departments lack sustained funding and focus on response preparedness: NS disaster management departments increasingly spend their time focused on managing and providing counterparts and focal points for the IFRC Secretariat and PNS projects for DRR. Institutional funding streams and related programming for disaster response preparedness are not well developed in many NS, even though many of these same NS are responding to increasing numbers of disasters. Funds raised for response are in some cases restricted for direct relief and thus little is left to build response capacity.

At the same time the amount of available funding for DRR projects supported by PNS and the IFRC Secretariat has increased significantly in recent years, most of which is focused on community based work in a few branches rather than the strengthening of national systems for response within the NS. With multiple PNS and the IFRC Secretariat running multiple DRR projects through a NS (sometimes with very different approaches) NS staff are focused on supporting this work primarily as their salaries are mostly funded from such projects. A number of executive staff cited the fact that they see the IFRC Secretariat (Geneva Secretariat, Zone through the country office) as an important source for core funding to support their desire to develop and empower more effective response capacity.⁹

4.2.2 Basic Minimum NS Response Capacities

To assess the capacities of the selected NS the review team developed the following key indicators for basic minimum NS response capacities. These indicators build upon information analyzed through desk review, including key IFRC tools such as the Well Prepared National Society self-assessment tool. Indicators have been revised throughout the review to reflect apparent priorities and standards raised by stakeholders during

⁸ “By far my greatest concern around DR capacity and our priority need is the development of more professional DR staff especially at branch level” Interview with NS Head of Disaster Response. June 2011.

⁹ “The DRR projects are important but our priority is to reinforce the base capacity at branch level in disaster response competences. We want and prefer to do that through the country delegation but... (HoD) has no up-front funds to help us do this” Interview with HNS President and SG June 2011.



interviews. In the following section information is presented to show, to the extent possible, the state of capacity in each category for selected national societies.

Capacity Category	Key Indicators
Response Mandate, Planning, Systems, Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NS role defined in National DM Law and actively engaged in national coordination mechanisms (e.g. coordination meetings and ops centers). • Contingency plans cover range of like scenarios, relationships and roles and are reviewed, tested and then updated regularly. • NS has capability to conduct DANA (damage and needs assessment), VCA and monitor key risks. • SOPs are in place and observed - effectively identify roles, responsibilities, authorities and approach to managing response at national to local levels. • The Code of Conduct , SPHERE and Safe Access are integrated into plans. • Emergency Info Management and Reporting systems and capabilities.
Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained and dedicated logistics officer in NS supporting DM. • Adequate owned, rented or contracted transport support available. • Transparent procurement system and procedures in place and staff dedicated to managing procurement, monitoring and reporting on the supply chain. • Warehouses with pre-positioned well-maintained stocks of appropriate items in strategic locations based on risk, adequate supply to respond to immediate needs for average small disaster. • Knowledge and mapping of suppliers - supplier and transport agreements in place to rapidly procure additional relief goods to augment or replenish stocks. • Staff trained to manage, track and transfer stock to relief dept for distribution.
Financial Resources & Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic fundraising program with capabilities to raise money for preparedness and response (and possibly recovery). • NS disaster response fund, with rules and procedures, maintained at level adequate to cover small to medium disasters. • Financial and management systems in place that provide accurate, detailed information on relief expenditures. • Annual audit which covers use of disaster funding. • Reporting and communication processes that enable demonstration of accountability to key stakeholders.

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<p>Human Resources & Systems</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NS HQ has dedicated DM unit (permanent or task force model) with adequate professional staff to maintain readiness of systems and resources. • NDRT system and related SOPs established and well-functioning, composed of volunteers and staff from all levels of NS. • Procedures in place to allow NS to add temporary “surge” staff . • Volunteer management system in place at HQ and branches to train and deploy regular and spontaneous volunteers for response including mentoring & coaching support. • Learning and career development approach employed by management which emphasizes application of learning and experience gained during disasters and helps retain key staff.
<p>Scale and Duration Prepared to Handle</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NS capable of meeting immediate needs of a substantial or agreed percentage of vulnerable people affected by small to medium disasters. • NS branches in all geographic areas trained for first response, needs assessment and to understand national NS response SOPs and systems. • Adequate trained staff and volunteers to sustain an average small to medium size relief operations until basic immediate needs are met. • Criteria on how and when to appeal for international RC/RC support. • Partnerships and agreements in place with other organizations to maximize impact and define how non-mandated roles are addressed.
<p>Preparedness to Accept and Absorb Int'l Assistance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NS disaster training includes information on how IFRC Secretariat can support NS. • Pre-disaster meetings and relief agreements identify potential options, priorities and roles & responsibilities of support and coordination. • Contingency plans include IFRC Secretariat coordination and identify ways of protecting and building capacity by having Movement and non-Movement partners manage non-mandated functions. • NS has educated government on unique capacity it has to leverage IFRC partners and global tools and to include the NS contingency plans in National Disaster Plan.



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4.2.3 Bangladesh Red Crescent Society

DR Capacity Category	2006 AP DR Review Observations	2011 AP DR Capacity Review Observations
<p>Planning, Systems and Procedures</p>	<p>§ Recognized as the most significant relief organization in the country.</p> <p>§ Auxiliary to government. Role of BDRC formally recognized, and the NS is represented in the national coordinating body for disasters.</p> <p>§ BDRC has written disaster plan and policy, which covers disaster reduction, DP, DR, recovery and rehabilitation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remains a key partner to government but there are concerns that along with the government planning remains well developed in policy and strategy but less so in operational and delivery capacity. • GoB “Standing Orders for Disasters” and BDRC standing orders are good examples of Response SoP -which would benefit from a more active testing and simulation component. UNDP along with the BDRCS and IFRC Secretariat participation are developing such exercises. • The contingency plans noted in 2006 have been updated in 2008 , specifically the CPP PoA • An Earthquake Preparedness and Response workshop in 2008 updated DP in the earthquake risk sector of concern. • The introduction of the Pre-Disaster Meetings is a positive new initiative that allows a greater opportunity for the BR DRCS to take additional “ownership” of planning and Movement coordination and to positively influence the “Demand” side of the DP/DR equation. • An important initiative is to review and enhance the “flagship” CPP programme and to introduce up-to-date technology that is applicable at both HQ and unit levels whilst retaining the grass roots low tech components that have served this programme so well. • Positive early recovery programming post Sidr in shelter support
<p>Logistics</p>	<p>§ System of pre-positioned stocks under development, along with enhancement of stocks at HQ, with provision for building buffer stock at unit branch level.</p> <p>§ Good warehousing and stockpiling facilities, with regulations for emergency stocks established.</p> <p>§ Fleet of 48 vehicles.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Still no logistics department in place and the system remains much as it was in 2006. • However consultations with the Zone RLU have now been initiated with a view to establishing a MoU to further combine develop the societies existing warehousing and transportation capacity in Dhaka and Chittagong and to



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		<p>recruit and train logisticians to manage this asset.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Along with intentions to empower unit/branch capacity the buffer stoking noted would be a part of this initiative.
Financial Resources and Systems		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current leadership commitment that resources for response will be collected and set aside but so far no plan in place. Contingency Fund not yet developed which sometimes leads to delays in funding and decisions. • Management Recovery and Support Cost system being instituted and a portion is meant to go to response fund.
Human Resources and Systems	<p>§ BDRCS has 68 units (branches) covering all administrative districts and major urban centres.</p> <p>§ Over 300,000 volunteers and close to 2,000 staff.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Branch and staffing numbers have remained mostly consistent overall. Approximately 26 staff under DM (including CPP, EPRP, CBDRR/CCA, CEP, Relief & Recovery and Tracing) however 80% of these staff salaries are covered by IFRC Secretariat, PNS and ICRC. • The BDRCS overall DR capacity remains similar a however there was consistent feedback that the middle and Unit level DR management skills set requires to be enhanced and that capacity building at these levels remains the highest of the priorities of the BRCRS DM managers. • Capacity in DRR/DP has benefited from the surge in programming in this sector but equally capacity to absorb the inputs from these programmes is testing the society. • Increased focus has been developed from the OD department in KL in developing useful tools that will assist the IFRC Secretariat country team and the DM department to address both OD in Emergencies and volunteers in emergencies. • An important aspect of the BDRCS governance management and staffing that has caused concern for many years are the vulnerability of the NS when major governance and management changes occur after major political changes. If successful recent efforts supported by the IFRC Secretariat and the ICRC to amend the BCRCS constitution to overcome this will be or major and positive influence in the overall capacity of the NS to perform in a more stable management environment.



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<p>Scale and Duration Prepared to Handle</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BDRC is in unique position to respond to disasters through country-wide network. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The network is still recognized but increased competition from emerging agencies for staff is a fact. • There is an increased recognition that anything beyond a short term mid range event will see that capacity rapidly absorbed and that external assistance may be required. • New NDRT Training was initiated in 2008.
<p>Preparedness to Accept and Absorb Movement Assistance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> § IFRC Secretariat and ICRC delegations and sub-delegations. § Considerable PNS activity. § CBFA, CBDP, CBDM. § Links to RDRT. § DMIS. § VCA. § WPNS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are three active PNS supporting the BDRCS all have a strong DRR component • Relations with the IFRC Secretariat and ICRC appear rather strong but there is a consensus that more regular Movement coordination meetings would benefit closer engagement. • BDRC is generally positively inclined towards accepting Movement assistance but many staff have a low level of knowledge about global tools. • The “ASIA PACIFIC GLOBAL DR SYSTEM PROMOTION” initiated in 2011 and rolled out later this year by the zone will address many of the issues opportunities and challenges in engagement with the IFRC global DM system.

Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses:

Bangladesh Red Crescent appears to have strong general experience and competence in relief and strong operational capacity especially in hydrological impacts. Damage and needs assessment, distribution management and DRR skills are strong, though impact assessment and targeting skills need further development. Basic emergency logistics capacities are in place but need strengthening. BDRC has a procurement department but does not yet have a fully operational logistics department and pre-positioning should be strengthened through an expanded warehouse network.

Wat/San is seen as a critical sector for response in Bangladesh and BDRC often needs support in this area – it is unclear if the NS is interested in developing more expertise in this area or if it should instead focus on clearly incorporating expectations for Wat/San ERU deployment into its contingency plans.



Fundraising for response is generally seen as weak and the lack of a disaster contingency fund causes delays in response.

In human resources, BDRC has a number of excellent DM managers but acknowledges that it's overall staffing for response and depth of its rosters needs to be further developed. Sustainability of capacities is challenging given retention concerns for key staff and due to the nature of funding for most DM staff (project and IFRC Secretariat dependent).

The national society is recognized by its government for certain key roles but not all traditional DM functions. Changes in government leadership following elections appear to disrupt the NS at national and local levels and staff note a loss of continuity and institutional memory due to changes and turnover following elections.

Priorities and Opportunities:

A number of key priorities and opportunities were raised during the review by staff and partners. The top three priorities from the standpoint of the NS are in Human Resources (recruitment, retention of high quality skilled staff), Logistics (establishing a department and related capacities) and Funding (establishing a relief contingency fund).

Addressing human resources issues includes both recruitment and retention as well as further developing the skills of key staff. In addition to the general issues raised, the review team feels that strengthening monitoring, assessment and targeting skills should be a priority and would help to improve effectiveness and timeliness of relief and improve confidence among partners. Given the great concern broadly expressed both inside the BDRCS and government DM agencies on possible seismic risks, most specifically in the capital, the inclusion of global and regional urban risk, and response lessons learned into DR training is recommended.

Increasing the ongoing collaboration with the IFRC Secretariat global logistics system through the country delegation and RLU could provide opportunities to develop priority capacities for logistics, including establishing a dedicated logistics department, expanding and updating the system of warehouses and greater pre-positioning of relief supplies in high risk areas.



Establishing a relief contingency fund is a critical priority and undertaking such an effort could be aided by learning lessons from other NS in the region and Zone who have recent significant fundraising experiences.

Additionally, determining how the NS wants to address the critical need for Wat/San assistance during most disasters in Bangladesh is a priority and should either lead to a commitment to develop its own competencies in this sector or strengthening its contingency plans to ensure rapid ability to call on Movement partners for such assistance.



4.2.4 Indian Red Cross Society

DR Capacity Category	2006 AP DM Review Observations	2011 AP DM Review Observations
Planning, Systems and Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> § Provincial branches in 31 states/territories and more than 650 district and sub-district branches. § National HQ and 22 of the provincial branches own their office and administrative buildings. § Member of the crisis management group of the government – nodal agency for managing natural disasters. Role in DP at district and state levels. Auxiliary to National Disaster Management authority. § Country-wide CBDP initiated in 1999, and an overall strategic plan was formulated in 2000. § DP plan drafted. DM Department acts as focal point in coordinating DP activities. § Disaster Management Centre in New Delhi for EWS, information collection and dissemination purposes. § Disaster mitigation programme implemented in Orissa State following 1998 cyclone. § Setting up a post graduate diploma 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provincial branches in 35 states today with more than 700 district and sub-district branches. • SoPs and manuals relatively standardized in Priority States (12-13) which receive HQ and international resources. • <i>Policies & Strategies:</i> Disaster Management Strategy (2009-2012) created and in use. Disaster Risk Reduction Programme Implementation Guidelines (2009-2012) established. • <i>Technology:</i> IRCS has an increasing desire to use technology to close distance gap given large geographic coverage area. Evidence that video conferencing is being used to connect disparate branches. However, in general operations are hindered by IRCS use of paper based systems, lack of email usage/acceptance and bureaucratic processes.
Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> § One central, three zonal and two regional warehouses, owned and administered by HQ. Additional 25 warehouses at state level. Also run a number of service institutions (e.g. medical dispensaries, vocational training centres, welfare centres). Operates one of the largest voluntary blood banks in India since 1962. § Large fleet of vehicles and 85 boats for use in flood emergencies. § Emergency stocks (including medical supplies), with replenishment plan and warehousing system in place. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Warehousing:</i> 6 regional warehouses (West Bengal, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Haryana, Tamil Nadu and Assam) on a total of 68 acres. Further, IRCS has 7 rubhalls available. Managed by HQ logistics department. Branches at State level keep some stocks but less standardized. • <i>Fleet:</i> IRCS has 6 trucks (3,7 & 5 tonne capacity). IRCS has arrangement with Indian Railway so that IRCS relief supplies can be shipped to any destination in country free of charge. • <i>Mobile Disaster Unit:</i> NDRT support facility for staff accommodation so that NDRT can conduct a one week assessment and response mission without replenishment in an environment where there is no electricity, clean water, telecommunications or accommodations.

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<p>Financial Resources and Systems</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IRCS maintains a budget of \$5-6 million annually. There is no IRCS emergency response fund. National appeal for disaster funding tested in 2009 (Andra Pradesh flooding). • National government maintains a relief calamity fund. • Range of income generating activities being established by branches. • Some local fundraising and high expectations for diaspora support during disasters.
<p>Human Resources and Systems</p>	<p>§ Some 500 staff at national HQ (branch staffing is independent of this).</p> <p>§ An estimated 12 million volunteers/members.</p> <p>§ Volunteers involved in programme activities at branch level, particularly disaster relief.</p> <p>§ Regular training in DP and tracing services for staff. Well-equipped central training institute near New Delhi and centre in Bhubaneswar.</p> <p>§ First RDRT training in South Asia, 2002.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are some 360+ staff at national HQ (branch staffing is independent of this). • <i>Headquarters Disaster Management Team</i>: 10 members with disaster management, DRR, DP and administrative roles. Led by assistant director (1); section officer (1); coordinators/project officers in DM, DRR and DP (4), section assistants (2) and clerical staff (2). However, this is a weaker than desired disaster response and preparedness team at the headquarters level. Thus there is a mid-level management gap in the national society requiring more operational involvement of the SG than may otherwise be optimal. The result is centralized decision-making with SG needed to make operational decisions. • <i>National Disaster Response Team (NDRT)</i>: 40 members with expertise in health, Wat/San, relief, logistics and family linking. • <i>State Disaster Response Team (SDRT)</i>: 240 members • <i>District Disaster Response Team (DDRT)</i>: 450 members • NDRT and State disaster response teams have been further established and improved over past 3 years, stemming from learning after the Tsunami. • Further, IRCS now operates a one year post graduate diploma course in Disaster Preparedness and Rehabilitation.



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<p>Scale and Duration Prepared to Handle</p>	<p>§ IRCS has built some 250 cyclone shelters along the coastal belt (along with 25 relief warehouses and 32 dispensaries). DM and DR activities concentrated in eight most disaster-prone states.</p> <p>§ Disaster response teams (SDRTs) in 4 states. Also, 6-7 water purification, base camp, health facilities.</p> <p>§ Experience in tracing.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Non-Food Items</i>: 100,000 family packages reported to be in-stock. Each family package is designed to serve five persons and consists of a kitchen set, bed sheet, dhoti/lungi, saree, tarpaulin, bucket, mug, bed net, blanket and towel. • <i>Water Supply</i>¹⁰: 24 water purification units are being pre-positioned in regional warehouses though most is currently concentrated in one warehouse outside Delhi. Equipment is at various levels of functionality with consolidation process in-progress. Collective capacity of units is to deliver 50,000 liters of water per hour. Water storage tanks with capacities ranging from 1,500 to 10,000 liters. Trained National Disaster Water and Sanitation Response Team (NDWRT) members (30 persons) operate these units. The NS has just received money from the Indian government to develop these capacities further. Training in Wat/San provided by Zone DMU to use handed over ERU equipment. • <i>Hygiene</i>: Hygiene kits pre-positioned in warehouses, decisions on use must be approved by HQ. Localized hygiene promotion boxes are under development.
<p>Preparedness to Accept and Absorb Movement Assistance</p>	<p>§ IFRC Secretariat regional and country delegations in New Delhi, with DM delegates.</p> <p>§ NS has expressed interest in providing sub-regional facilities for coordination of DM in South Asia.</p> <p>§ Links developed with RDRT, ERU, FACT, EWS and DMIS.</p> <p>§ VCA in use.</p> <p>§ CBFA, CBDP, CBDM, CBSR.</p> <p>§ WPNS.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditionally the IRCS has had challenges accepting Movement assistance. However, there is some evidence of an increased IRCS understanding and acceptance of wider Movement and humanitarian community role in disaster response and preparedness domestically.

Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses:

The Indian Red Cross has an extensive functioning branch system in most places with the greatest disaster risks. Branches are largely autonomous and capable of handling most small and medium-scale responses. However there does appear to be

¹⁰ Note that the NS and IFRC reference Wat/San but there is little evidence of a sanitation capacity with resourcing focused primarily on water supply.



variance in capacity among branches and those which are located in the priority states for the government seem to benefit most from resources and support.

The NS has a growing capacity for mass water supply during disasters and with IFRC Secretariat and PNS assistance it has trained staff to utilize handed over Wat/San equipment. A strong commitment from NS leadership to continue growing this capacity is beneficial. Wat/San capacity is seen as filling a key gap in the national system and provides the NS with a comparative advantage over other domestic actors.

Pre-positioning of relief supplies has reportedly increased over the past few years and decentralization of warehouses is likely to improve response efficiency and effectiveness. However, along with other relief functions, modernizing administrative systems and approval procedures could further enable rapid response and is a priority for further improvement.

Human resources capacities benefit from a large group of trained people and a strong volunteer network throughout the country. The headquarters disaster response and preparedness team at some levels should be strengthened and reinforced to improve effectiveness. Decision making appears to still be highly centralized at senior management levels – whether this is due to weaknesses in middle management or causes such weaknesses - such centralization can impede organizational development and negatively affect response. Staff retention issues were raised by some stakeholders as an impediment to further increasing the NS's response capacities – the primary issue raised in conjunction with retention were lower than comparable (externally) staff salaries.

The NS fleet and certain other assets are highly decentralized and managed by branches (though not the larger warehouses which are managed centrally). While this decentralization is potentially beneficial, the systems for centrally tracking and monitoring fleet capacity should be strengthened so HQ knows when and where it will need to augment capacities during an emergency.



Priorities and Opportunities:

The Indian Red Cross has a number of key opportunities and priorities for building on its strengths in disaster management. Developing domestic fundraising, modernizing administrative systems, continuing to expand its Wat/San capacities and strengthening core disaster management human resources will allow IRCS to solidify its role as the preeminent disaster response organization outside the government.

The economic growth of India and success of other countries in the Zone in fundraising for disasters suggests that IRCS has a significant opportunity to strengthen its ability to respond by building a sustainable fundraising platform. Fundraising should be centered around the development of a disaster contingency fund primarily to enable rapid response to sudden onset disasters. The systems and relationships this will require would also allow IRCS to systematically appeal for funds domestically to support specific disasters when they strike. Corporate sector donors should be a key initial focus for building fundraising relationships.

While the IRCS has developed a sophisticated video conferencing system for communicating between HQ and branches most other administrative systems remain paper based and slower than necessary. Use of electronic communication, via email and other means (e.g. an intranet) should be adopted throughout the society given their already widespread use in private settings. Automated inventory tracking and use of information technology for public communications should also be developed to leverage the strengths of the society and increase its efficiency. Decision-making systems should also be reviewed to identify how the principle of subsidiarity, a core disaster response principle, can be applied to ensure that authority is delegated to the lowest level appropriate for the type of decision.

The development of IRCS water supply capacities is a key comparative advantage and can help to prove the value added of IRCS in domestic response. IRCS should continue to develop these capacities while also working to add sanitation promotion capacities building on its strengths in the health sector and its significant volunteer base.

IRCS management should also seek to review its human resources systems, including compensation and other staff retention and career development approaches, with emphasis on developing a core group of middle managers and potential middle



managers with key disaster response skill sets. Given competition for talent in such a fast growing country the need for ensuring a deep pipeline of talented, trained and skilled DM staff is critical, especially given the frequency of medium to large scale disasters in the country.



4.2.5 Malaysian Red Crescent Society

DR Capacity Category	2006 AP DM Review Observations	2011 AP DM Review Observations
Planning, Systems and Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Functioning branches in all 13 states and two federal territories of Malaysia § For DR purposes country is divided into zones with a ‘hub’ in each of these. § Auxiliary to the government. MRCS only humanitarian organization to work alongside government agencies in event of natural disasters and is a member of the national coordinating body for disasters. MRCS is an active participant in the Southeast Asia RDMC, and a strong proponent of the further development and coordination of sub-regional DR resources, including an expansion of RDRT. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Branch and chapter structure extends throughout country and systems and procedures are in place to augment local response with national and regional resources. 15 branches and 148 chapters. Each branch has a DM focal point. Use and adapt IFRC tools and documents. Share M&E and lessons learned with IFRC Secretariat regional office. ICRC is helping to develop RFL and IHL dissemination. SOPs in place. Has contingency planning officer and plans. Auxiliary to government – role is to support in relief – help with early warning. Public relations and communications increasingly important and capacity growing.
Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MRCS owns buildings in 7 states. It has 16 ambulances at HQ and 36 at branch level, 46 additional vehicles and 23 boats. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 19 ambulances at HQ, building in 7 states. Some relief stocks.
Financial Resources and Systems		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong resource mobilization capacity but competitive environment. Have financial management systems and controls in place. Reporting for accountability stressed by NS. Receives government grants (ambulance service) and private donations.
Human Resources and Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> § Over 250,000 members / volunteers and over 100 staff members. Most programmes are managed by volunteers at branch and chapter levels, especially in the fields of disaster relief and first aid. § Rapid Deployment Squads in each MRCS chapter (i.e. each of 15 branches has 60 such squads). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 500,000 volunteers. 300 trained Rapid Deployment Squad personnel (NDRT). 62 staff trained in RDRT, 1 FACT. Specialized trainings for national and branch staff in relief, health, shelter, Wat/San, logistics. Developing branch Rapid Deployment Squads. Have youth volunteers trained in relief. 52 paid EMS ambulance staff. Program to train a 1st Aider in every home by 2020 – goal of

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<p>Scale and Duration Prepared to Handle</p>	<p>§ Main natural disasters include forest fires, landslides and, primarily, flooding.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate assistance – relief and psychological support - provided in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami, as well as ambulance services, setting up of temporary shelters, mass cooking and family re-unification. <p>§ Medical teams working in association with Basic Health Care ERUs and field hospitals during emergency operations (e.g. 2003 Bam earthquake in Iran, first MRCS emergency mission in foreign country).</p> <p>§ RDRT members mobilised immediately following Indian Ocean tsunami and deployed within 48 hours to neighboring Indonesia, for assessment and provision of immediate medical and relief services. Triage medical unit in Aceh. MRCS relief volunteers also part of Malaysian Government’s search and rescue team in Aceh. Also involved in tracing, disease surveillance, etc.</p> <p>§ Most recently, provided assistance during the Pakistan earthquake (2005) and the Philippines mudslide (2006); participated in RDRT deployment to Pakistan/Kashmir earthquake operation (2005).</p>	<p>5 million people trained – have trained 500,000 so far.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country not particularly disaster prone but increasing # of small disasters. • NS is capable of responding to these within its mandate. • Catastrophic disasters might require international assistance. • To date, 22 international response deployments in 15 countries.
<p>Preparedness to Accept and Absorb Movement Assistance</p>	<p>§ MRCS staff works as IFRC Secretariat or ICRC delegates in other countries.</p> <p>§ Activities partly based on VCA.</p> <p>§ Volunteer participation in IFRC Secretariat disaster response training.</p> <p>§ RDRT trained members.</p> <p>§ MRCS teams experienced in working in conjunction with ERUs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WPNS. • Interest in developing a Basic Health Care ERU. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NS staff and leaders understand global system and tools – staff experienced with them from working in other countries. • Due to lack of large scale disasters contingency plans only lightly consider accepting international assistance. • 35 of 62 trained RDRT members have deployed. • 2 FACT trained staff.



Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses:

The Malaysian Red Crescent Society is generally very strong and competent in relief. It has a well structured NDRT type system, regularly updated contingency plans and SOPs, a strong core DM staff at headquarters and disaster managers in each branch and many RDRT members with deployment experience. Its volunteer system is strong and well linked for response through a system based on subsidiarity and volunteers have access to basic and specialized response training. Although its human resource systems appear strong, the NS is challenged with keeping staff and volunteers engaged and enabling them to gain hands on experience given the infrequency of domestic disasters.

The MRCS logistics capacity appears adequate to deliver assistance when required domestically. Linkages with the government for domestic response are strong, though the NS plays a true gap filling auxiliary role without always having a significant niche in direct response (often supporting first responders).

Internationally the MRCS has significant deployment experience in other countries (22 deployments to 15 countries) which has deepened the understanding among a cadre of key staff about the roles and systems of the Movement. However in some past cases the MRCS has felt pressure to deploy bilaterally to international disasters causing some friction with Movement partners. Senior leaders and key DM staff appear to be aware of the challenges this raises for other NS and Movement partners and seem to be working to strengthen their constructive participation within the Movement.

The NS auxiliary role could also pose challenges to its ability to respond in some types of domestic disturbances or violence if its proximity to the government were to be perceived as preventing it from being independent.

Priorities and Opportunities:

MRCS's strengths in disaster response and relatively strong resource base position it to be a strong contributor to regional IFRC Secretariat initiatives. Its proximity to the Zone (geographically) and its consistent participation in the regional disaster response network meetings provide it with opportunities to identify initiatives where it can help lead development of other NS response capacities. In particular the strong NDRT type system in place within MRCS should provide it with knowledge to help mentor other NS during the preparedness phase rather than only in response.

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MRCs resources and skills also suggest that it has potential to identify and invest in developing more FACT trained staff and potentially specialized staff who could join other NS ERU rosters. These same strengths also suggest the NS could seek to identify staff with skills that could allow them to be seconded to IFRC Secretariat operations and country offices for recovery and capacity building work.



4.2.6 Philippine Red Cross

DR Capacity Category	2006 AP DM Review Observations	2011 AP DM Review Observations
Planning, Systems and Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperates with government counterparts in the disaster coordinating council. PRC national headquarters and local chapters are members of disaster coordinating councils that aim to ensure a well-coordinated disaster response effort. • Provides emergency assistance in the form of food, temporary shelter, first aid and health social services in the event of fires, typhoons, floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and armed conflict situations. Has earned a reputation for its ability to undertake assessments and mobilize speedy response following disasters. • Extensive experience in conducting relief and rehabilitation programmes in the wake of natural disasters. • Emergency response fund to mobilize fast initial response to disasters. • DP plan updated in 1996. Separate Operational Plan for specific disasters, regularly up-dated. Disaster Management Service at HQ as DP focal point. • Integrated community disaster-planning programme (ICDPP) set up in 1994, targeted at building the capacities of disaster-prone communities in disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness. Has gained recognition among Local Government Units who have assumed responsibility for sustainability of projects (e.g. sea walls, dikes, mangroves, etc). Also, community-based DM programme, designed to strengthen local capacities in high risk areas. • Activities based on VCA, make use of CDBP, CBFA, PRA and mapping. PRC has continuing programme on increasing public awareness of hazards and risks (guidebooks, video, radio, etc.). • Need quality facilitators to train volunteers and DM staff. Also, assessment, information gathering and reporting capacities need development. • Strong in DR, need for greater emphasis on DP noted. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This role continues but the Government agency feels that a stronger more consistent engagement, participation and information sharing culture with the PRC are needed, particularly between disaster actions. • Latest version of Philippines disaster response Act underlines PRC role in conducting DM – PRC has seat on three sub-committees of NDRMC and chapters have representatives on local committees. • The PRC focus remains on “relief skills” rather than recovery but the governance and executive wish to further enhance core DR branch/volunteer skills and empowerment across the DM cycle. • Intention to further develop logistics capacity through engagement with the IFRC Secretariat Global Logistics System (GLS) • Emergency Response Policy is in place and has been updated since 2007 and is recognized by the GoP. • PRC has adopted the Safer Access and is aware of the initiatives in OSV and would include the as part of their preparedness training. • The PRC is a party to the new Disaster law presently being drafted for the GoP. • All main DM tools VCA, Contingency plans SoP etc are in quite good standing but more focus is planned on middle management, empowering branches and volunteers. • Concerned to develop an Earthquake contingency Plan in conjunction with NDRMC. Buying into IFRC Secretariat new Contingency Planning training, energetic participation in recent IFRC Secretariat facilitated workshop, CP draft developed and being refined • Develop closer MoU with partners including hospitals in Manila and provinces including RFL • Currently enjoys a higher level of independence from the

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		<p>government than in the past whilst still acting as an important auxiliary.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has signed coordination agreements with key internal RC/RC partners and externals.
Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Logistics department based at HQ. • Maintain a radio communications network and warehouses for the pre-positioning of relief supplies. Warehouse management system and replenishment plan in place. <p>§ Owns a fleet of 151 vehicles and have a total of 152 communication facilities throughout the country.</p> <p>§ Under the preparedness programme, nine regional and 25 chapter warehouses have been constructed. The headquarters has a central warehouse.</p>	<p>§ The logistics capacity has developed since 2006 but remains based around the same structures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have a good base but are now investing in developing a system linked into the IFRC Secretariat Global Logistics System (GLS) • Sees themselves as a supplier and manager for others in logs including government system. • Need to professionalise their logs. <p>§ ToR and MoU with GLS under review with the SG/Chairperson and Zone RLU staff.</p> <p>§ Further development of warehouse capacity. 2008 inventory</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency stocks pre-positioned in strategic areas • Emergency stocks stored in secure and well managed warehouses • Warehouses in locations outside known high-risk hazard zones; • Warehouses have adequate transportation capability to quickly distribute emergency stocks • A national telecommunications system
Financial Resources and Systems		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need to devote more time to raising level of finance dept. • Get good public support can raise millions but need to be better at managing those funds • Don't get a lot of GoP support in funding at national level but chapters do receive some support from local government and through proposals to NDRMC. • Could use more capacity building in financial management have well qualified staff. • Priority for NS is to develop capacity in DM and fund management. • 5% of government budget goes into a national disaster response fund and PRC chapters can access these funds by submitting proposals to NDRMC.

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<p>Human Resources and Systems</p>	<p>§ PRC has 93 branches throughout the country. Each chapter has a professional administrator who acts as manager in charge of operations and administrative functions.</p> <p>§ Total membership estimated at 1.7 million in 2005.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Volunteers regularly trained in disaster preparedness and response. The preparedness component also includes yearly training in DM for staff and core volunteers for Regional or Chapter DR Teams (DRTs). • PRC is an active participant in the Southeast Asia RDMC and RDRT; participated in RDRT deployment to Pakistan/Kashmir earthquake operation (2005). • PRC has proposed the use of facilities in the Philippines (specifically the former US military facility at Subic Bay in Luzon) for regional activities including logistics and training. • PRC is a proponent of further development and deployment of regional DR resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairperson wants to build a new PRC based on a stronger empowered grass volunteer base with a lighter executive and governance. (143 initiative) • More leadership training and mentoring. • Chairperson promoting a mentoring system for staff. • Priorities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HR capacity building and professionalization of volunteers and staff. • OD in disasters and volunteer development • Internal senior management is planned to reduce HQ some vacant positions need to be filled. • Most training and response team organization work has continued.
<p>Scale and Duration Prepared to Handle</p>	<p>§ The Philippines is considered to be one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Located within the typhoon belt, usually affected by 15 and struck by five or six major storms per year. Landslides and floods occur with varying frequency every year and the country is also vulnerable to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.</p> <p>§ As the country's leading humanitarian organization, PRC regularly deploys experienced teams to conduct search and rescue operations, emergency food and relief distributions, and assessments. Rehabilitation programmes are conducted depending on the extent of the disaster and donations received. Tracing and psychological support activities are also carried out by the NS.</p> <p>§ Recent disasters include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Landslides and floods (Feb. 2006) • Landslides and floods (Dec. 2004) • Typhoon (Jan. 2004) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DM Ops manual being developed which will set minimum standards for scope and scale of response at local and national levels. • Closely engaged in discussions with Japan RC post Tsunami watching closely how the GoJ and JRCS manage international offers of assistance as a potential model. • Looking at an Ops center including their own logistics unit • Have a 2.9 hectare Site they are considering in consultation with RLU. • Up to mid size hydrological events • Limited expertise and have major concerns in seismic event in populated or urban setting. • Lead the RC/RC in the conflict and insecure areas like Mindanao (ICRC confirm this and work from behind to support PRC) • Good reputation supported by ICRC comments that they have PRC lead in conflict areas. Better at relief response rather than recovery, especially at the local and community response widely recognized as the primary response agency in the country but perhaps more for impact that effect and follow up. .

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IT communication needs strengthening • Shelter roles now clearer and interested in this sector more and overall understanding of the cluster has improved.
<p>Preparedness to Accept and Absorb Movement Assistance</p>	<p>§ Has adopted IFRC policies in DM, which are integrated into national framework, as per governmental auxiliary role.</p> <p>§ Make effective use of DMIS and FACT.</p> <p>§ Experienced with RDRT.</p> <p>§ Wishes to further develop global-standard WatSan DR capacity.</p> <p>§ Experienced international delegates serving with the IFRC Secretariat overseas.</p> <p>§ IFRC Secretariat representative based in-country.</p> <p>§ WPNS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Much the same as 2005 but concerned about the roles and responsibilities for coordination through the zone system. • More” Self management” inclination with Indonesia and India and Thailand see more Asia based coordination. • Closely engaged in discussions with Japan RC post Tsunami watching closely how the GoJ and JRCS manage international offers of assistance may well follow that lead. • PRC knows the systems well have good agreements with PNS and with a small but expert country delegation can address 90% of any disasters and know when and how to have the delegation draw down international assistance. GoP and PRC will lead more forcefully in the future so need longer term, balanced agreements. • Main need is in OD capacity building to manage any assistance. Building capacity and exchanging expertise. • ASEAN will become a more important coordinator in the future for regional partners. Myanmar demonstrated it has a ways to go but is getting the support from big donors.

Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses:

PRC is well established with an overall excellent reputation domestically for relief activities both in response to natural and conflict challenges. The NS has a huge volunteer base that is well trained. Staff and volunteers are highly regarded both for basic relief and response skills but also embodying the Fundamental Principles as evidenced by the key role they play in sensitive conflict prone areas. The NS is engaged in the national coordination systems and contingency planning processes and well positioned to represent its interests and influence decisions related to disaster response. More consistent engagement in all national disaster management fora is desired by some partners and would further enable PRC to reinforce the key role it plays.



Information systems and knowledge management can be strengthened, in particular ensuring that lessons learned are well documented and shared between responses. Use of information technology is growing within the NS quickly and several innovative initiatives are being considered for rapid reporting of damage and needs assessment information which could help to further improve efficiency while also providing critical information for public relations purposes.

The NS logistics and procurement systems should be further strengthened, beginning with consolidation of the functions which are currently dispersed across departments.

Early recovery skills could be further developed if the NS decides it has a role to play in augmenting what the government already provides.

Priorities and Opportunities:

The NS should further increase its engagement with the NDRRMC and government response coordinating agencies to help influence operational and preparedness policies and decisions.

As in other parts of the Zone, the grave consequences of an urban earthquake are very much of a concern. The PRC can both benefit from and contribute to enhanced awareness of urban risk reduction response and recovery in the region.

The IFRC Secretariat RLU assessment recommendations should be adopted and the NS should seek to actively collaborate with the RLU and PNS who are ready to help support further capacity development for PRC in logistics.

Development of a national disaster response contingency fund is a priority for the PRC. The NS has had success at raising funds for some disasters and the establishment of such a fund would help to rapidly start up operations.



4.2.7 Thai Red Cross Society

DR Capacity Category	2006 AP DM Review Observations	2011 AP DM Review Observations
Planning, Systems and Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> § Represented in all of the country's 75 provinces and in 216 districts. § Represented in the National Coordinating body for disasters and plays a formal role in the national Disaster Plan. § Disaster Operations Centre set up in case of disasters and emergencies, to act as a source of information and coordination. In a state of readiness 24-hours/day. § The 'Nightingale' Communications Network ensures on-going contact with personnel throughout the country, in particular to mobile health units and RC health stations. § Relief assistance is carried out by the Relief and Community Health Bureau, in association with other departments, such as the Volunteers Bureau. § TRCS has a DP focal point and a written DP Plan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintains province and district branches. • Represented throughout most of country – linked to local governments through governor's wives. • Included in national disaster coordinating bodies facilitated by government. • Maintain Disaster Operations Center with 24-hours/day communications capability linked to government command and info centers and national weather warning center. As needed brings together staff from all functions and sectors. • Relief and Community Health bureau leads on DM issues. • Have national response plan in place. • NDRT currently only includes members from permanent national staff, mostly medical backgrounds. • 4 mandates in law, including relief assistance, blood, medical support and requesting international assistance (if approved by government).
Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> § Runs 2 hospitals in Bangkok, 1 in Chon Buri Province and 12 RC health stations in the provinces, as well as 9 regional blood-testing laboratories. Medical care is one of the NS's most important core areas of activities. § Stockpiling of essential relief goods. § Availability of fleet of flat-bottom boats, vehicles and telecommunications equipment. § Emergency stocks pre-positioned in strategic areas and warehouse management system and a replenishment plan in place. § ERU Watsan equipment has been donated by German RC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> § Continues to run major hospitals, blood centers, snake venom farm. § 4 warehouses with 500-1000 family relief kits in each. § Essential relief goods stockpiled and prepositioned – have supplier relationships in place. Use private companies for most transport and some distribution. § Maintain fleet of 20 boats, 25 trucks, 1 trailer with generator, 9 ambulances for emergencies. § 7 water purification units (1 with 10,000 liters/hour and 6 with 1,000 liters/hour) donated by German RC which trained HQ for 2 years. IFRC Secretariat provides regional training but TRCS feels it needs more support. § 5 mobile kitchens (one at HQ, 4 at health centers).
Financial Resources and		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well positioned for fundraising. Raised over \$3 million for Haiti. • Hospitals primarily funded by government.

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Systems		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong corporate support, annual fundraising events (fair, diplomatic mission events etc.) – strength of results highly linked to royal patron. • Some competition from local NGOs, foundations, public broadcasting during disaster fundraising.
Human Resources and Systems	<p>§ Has over 380,000 members / 24,000 volunteers and some 8,500 staff. RC Youth in over 7,400 schools (with 900,000 members).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8000 employees, 400 in Relief and Community Health Bureau. • Often spontaneous volunteers at provincial and local level for response. • Health stations in 12 places have response teams. • TRCS is moving to have at least 1 permanent staff person in each of its 75 branches (initially funded by IFRC Secretariat and ICRC).
Scale and Duration Prepared to Handle	<p>§ Regularly occurring disasters include floods, wind-storms, and droughts.</p> <p>§ Thailand was seriously affected by the 2004 Tsunami. TRCS provided immediate emergency relief – including dispatch of medical teams, blood donations, relief distribution and provision of temporary shelter. Short and long-term recovery programmes have focused on livelihoods, child welfare, housing, public health (including WatSan) and NS capacity building in the affected areas.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seen by some major international donor governments as very capable and effective in response – prepositioning, structure at local level, logistics, feeding and evacuation • Some capacity to use Wat/San equipment • Limits to ability to work in certain areas (borders/south) and in civil disturbances and other situations of violence • Aware of limits and challenges to neutrality and independence following 2010 disturbances • NS interested in capacity building support for DM • Government usually determines beneficiaries and capacity of NS for targeting is seen to be weaker than needed.
Preparedness to Accept and Absorb Movement Assistance	<p>§ Active member of the Southeast Asia RDMC/RDRT; participated in RDRT deployment to Pakistan/Kashmir earthquake operation (2005).</p> <p>§ Developing WatSan ERU with assistance of German RC.</p> <p>§ WPNS.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination with IFRC Secretariat and PNS has grown significantly since the Tsunami. • Some key management staff familiar with global tools. • 18 RDRT Trained staff active. 4 have deployed. • Know that in catastrophic earthquake or other such disaster they would be an important conduit for international assistance but don't yet have clear plans

Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses:

The Thai Red Cross has significant capacities in the health sector first and foremost with very well equipped and skilled medical staff and facilities. The NS' national blood center excellence is recognized by WHO through its designation as a



regional reference center. In many ways TRCS exhibits the original shape and nature of a medical relief society as initially envisioned in the early years of the Movement.

The NS enjoys strong support from the public and corporate sector and is very well positioned for fundraising at national and local levels, thanks in part to its links to the royal family and governor's wives who serve as chairs of the provincial branches. International donor governments view the TRCS as strong in response and believe it can be largely self sufficient while willing to contribute for specific responses.

The TRCS has a national disaster operations center which functions 24/7 and a national response plan. A decentralized system of warehouses and stocks as well as supplier/transport agreements allows the NS to rapidly scale up to provide relief supplies (mostly family parcels) when needed. The NS also has its own fleet of trucks and boats. However the role of the NS, traditionally as a true auxiliary providing limited relief, has to some extent limited the ambitions of the NS to build significant capacities for needs assessment, systematized relief distribution and types of assistance beyond basic immediate relief supplies. Currently the NS does not have a significant role in beneficiary selection as the local government identifies those who will receive relief. The handover of Wat/San equipment and subsequent training by PNS and IFRC Secretariat experts has established some capacity but this is seen as somewhat diminished from its peak a few years ago due to insufficient focus and investment.

The NS disaster human resources system is somewhat limited to a core cadre of medical response staff and some response teams located in a dozen health clinics around the country. At a local level disaster response depends almost completely on ad hoc and spontaneous volunteers who usually do not benefit from training in response skills and methods. It appears there is not a fully developed NDRT system in place drawing from the branches of the NS and organized based on SOPs for response as needed throughout the country. The ongoing initiative to establish at least one permanent staff person in each branch should benefit response as well as overall organizational development objectives if fully implemented and funding can be sustained once Movement support ends. ICRC is also supporting development of RFL and IHL capacities in the NS.



Priorities and Opportunities:

The Thai Red Cross has the opportunity to become one of the strongest NS in the region and certainly the preeminent domestic disaster response organization outside the government given its strengths and significant resource base. To do so, the NS should focus on developing its disaster human resources system, invest in developing key skill sets and response programming capacities, and increase its participation in national coordination mechanisms to help identify and grow its niche.

The current NDRT type system should be expanded to fully incorporate branch volunteers and staff and establish local, provincial and national teams with a full range of response skills. Initially skills needed should focus on disaster damage and needs assessment, targeting of beneficiaries, relief distribution and early recovery. Additional logistics skills will be required if the NS decides to expand and grow its role.

If Wat/San continues to be a priority area for the NS, additional commitment of resources and external technical support will be required. The strength of the NS in medical/health sectors suggests that the NS could have a niche to play in sanitation and public health in emergencies as specialized areas for response.

The Thai government has over the past 10 years developed a very robust national coordination system for response and provided TRCS with a seat on key coordinating bodies. Increasing the regularity of participation, combined with a vision for greater TRCS contributions to domestic response, would enable the NS to better influence response priorities and allow it to be an independent voice for those vulnerable to disasters.

Whilst less vulnerable to seismic events than Manila, Dhaka and Jakarta, Bangkok and other Thai urban centers are acknowledged to be at risk from possible socio-political unrest and OSV and along with the other countries of the zone with large metropolitan centers increased engagement in the inclusion of urban risk management capacity development would be valuable.



4.2.8 Vietnam Red Cross

DR Capacity Category	2006 AP DM Review Observations	2011 AP DM Review Observations
Planning, Systems and Procedures	<p>§ Country-wide network of local branches in all 61 provinces and is widely represented down to district and commune level (some 24,270 branches in communes, as well as 12,700 sub-branches in schools).</p> <p>§ Works as an auxiliary to the humanitarian and social welfare activities of the state authorities of Viet Nam. VNRC has a key position in the national disaster emergency response mechanism. Focused on damage assessment.</p> <p>§ Second National Strategy (2001-2010) shifts focus from disaster response and relief to disaster preparedness and forecasting as its foremost objectives. Written DP plan recognized by government, and DP focal point at HQ.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Branches throughout country. • Provinces have 10-15 staff – encouraging them to focus on DM and set up volunteer programs – target of 500 volunteers and teams of 10 people trained in response. • Linked to government coordination system through CCFSC. • Contingency plans in place. • District/branch – target of 10-15 trained volunteers. • Beginning to establish NDRT with Spanish RC and IFRC Secretariat support – SOPs for NDRT completed and training to commence soon. • Plan to establish Branch Disaster Response Teams. • VCA in some high risk provinces. • Participate in joint needs assessments with UN/INGOs. • HQ system to set up task force in disasters – response usually led by provinces and branches. • Recent strategic plan helping to align external projects but still mostly driven by outside donor interests.
Logistics	<p>§ Resources at provincial level vary widely – some chapters are well equipped with vehicles, computers, buildings, rescue gear, etc., while others less so.</p> <p>§ Well-equipped HQ in Hanoi, with well-maintained and reasonably-sized vehicle fleet.</p> <p>§ Network of preparedness centers and maintenance of relief stocks (has 43 DP centers and 26 emergency response stations, and a stock of 20,000 household kits).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National warehouses near Hanoi, Central and Ho Chi Minh City – each contains 10,000 household kits, blankets, mosquito nets – physical infrastructure not well maintained and stock management and replenishment slow/weak. • No logistics department or officer, no procurement staff. • Some provinces have stocks, mostly food and water – logistics capacity still poor but currently developing guidelines for provinces to establish pre-positioned stocks. • Some vehicles and pre-identified lists of suppliers.
Financial Resources and Systems	<p>§ Emergency funds in separate account.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total NS operating budget total between \$60-80 m/year. • Significant domestic fundraising capacity – NS raised \$3-4 million of total \$6-7 m for 2010 Khetsana operation in 2010. • NS raised \$1m through SMS donations in 1 month in 2010.



		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raised \$8m for Japan EQ/Tsunami. • Government restrictions on use of funds raised for relief – must use for direct relief. • IFRC Secretariat working with NS to review and update its financial systems (currently tied to government regulations and difficult to use for reporting/transparency). • Provincial branches have cash emergency response funds. • NS receives operating budget support from government and rest from PNS/IFRC Secretariat projects. • NS branches mostly supported financially by local gov't .
Human Resources and Systems	<p>§ Approximately 5.2 million members / volunteers and over 2,000 staff, as well as 3.8 million RC youth/junior members.</p> <p>§ Training in DP carried out by VNRC HQ with IFRC Secretariat and PNS support.</p> <p>§ Community health and first aid programmes consolidated in 1999 – with over 10,000 community-based first-aid brigades.</p> <p>§</p> <p>§</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 140-150 HQ staff. • Most staff working on multiple PNS/IFRC Secretariat projects – assignments sometimes difficult to understand – frequent rotation and some turnover issues. • NS trainers at provincial and branch level considered great asset by external partners. • At HQ 2 deputy directors in charge of DM and social welfare – no other permanent DM program staff – others only assigned on basis of funded projects – no specialists. • Staff perceived as overloaded with multiple projects.
Scale and Duration Prepared to Handle	<p>§ Unique mix of geography makes Viet Nam one of the most vulnerable countries to natural disasters throughout Asia/Pacific region (over 3,000km of coastline and 5,000-6,000km of dikes). Regular natural disasters include typhoons, flash floods, prolonged drought, and annual flooding of delta areas. Each year, the number of people requiring emergency relief ranges from 1 to 1.5 million.</p> <p>§ Historic floods in 9 provinces in 1999. VNRC carried out rescue activities and provided emergency shelter, food and relief items – as well as reconstruction of homes.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Branches and provinces in most disaster prone areas tested frequently and mostly capable of responding – some concerns raised about quality of response and response standards. • Damage assessment capabilities strong, needs assessment capabilities need improvement. • NS is in the process of working with local manufacturers to develop water treatment equipment and hopes to expand these capacities.
Preparedness to Accept and Absorb Movement Assistance	<p>§ VNRC is active member of Southeast Asia RDMC/RDRT</p> <p>§ Activities based on VCA (e.g. mangrove project).</p> <p>§ Linked with ERU, FACT, DMIS and Early Warning Systems.</p> <p>§ IFRC Secretariat delegation in-country.</p> <p>§ WPNS.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contingency plans incorporate possible deployment of FACT, ERU, RDRT. • Leadership understands tools at basic level. • International department serves as liaison for outside assistance in support of DM. • HQ staff trained by IFRC Secretariat.



Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses:

VNRC has significant experience responding to disasters, especially in the most disaster prone coastal areas. Branches are well linked with local government committees and usually provide the NS with a high profile during initial response to disasters. VNRC is seen as strong in providing rapid damage assessment information and delivering relief assistance in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.

Branch capacity for response varies significantly and depends to a degree on the frequency of disasters and the investment of IFRC partners for disaster preparedness and risk reduction activities. Each provincial branch in high risk areas has a contingency fund and some locally managed relief stocks in place, though mostly food in the form of rice.

The NS has experienced growing success at raising funds domestically to support immediate response, as well as some recent international disasters. However, government rules restrict the use of such funds to provision of direct relief so these fundraising successes have not allowed the NS to invest in building and sustaining systems and structures for response on its own.

VNRC has a well regarded pool of trainers at the Provincial level which are sought out by outside partners eager to scale up disaster preparedness initiatives. Strong PNS presence in Vietnam has led to a significant investment in certain branches for disaster risk reduction projects which appear to have some positive effects on local organizational and community readiness.

Needs assessment skills are viewed as weaker than required throughout VNRC though some branches have benefited from PNS sponsored training in an adapted VCA tool.

The NS has benefited to an extent from a significant number of PNS and IFRC Secretariat sponsored trainings in various aspects of disaster management over the past five years and many HQ and branch staff have gained experience through working on PNS and IFRC Secretariat projects, primarily in DRR. However, the human resources system and structure of the NS does not lend itself to an effective application of these skills over the long term as staff are frequently shifted from one unit



to another based on project assignments rather than a career and skill development system. The DM department of the VNRC has a permanent deputy director but few other permanent staff and no one with a specialized relief or sectoral focus.

National society financial and administrative systems are reportedly somewhat antiquated and overly complex. VNRC is currently working with the IFRC Secretariat country office to review the accounting and financial systems in an effort to identify potential improvements.

The logistics capacities of the NS are underdeveloped at present after many years of atrophy. The three warehouses managed by VNRC were established in the late 1990's, which is also cited as the last period of time when partners significantly invested in the institutional response capacities of the NS. Warehouses hold some significant relief stocks but are in need of better maintenance and stock management systems. Currently there is no dedicated procurement/logistics officer in place.

VNRC has identified Wat/San as an area of particular interest and is working with IFRC partners and outside suppliers to develop its own water filtration equipment.

Recent efforts to update the NS strategy show promise for helping to identify NS led priorities and help coordinate IFRC partner investments in a more systematic way. The IFRC Secretariat country office has recently increased its focus on trying to help the NS build response capacities and systems and is supporting a Spanish Red Cross led initiative to establish the NDRT system for VNRC which has not previously existed (branch and HQ).

The recently adopted Red Cross law helps to clearly articulate the role of the NS, including its response functions. An ongoing effort by the government to update the national disaster management policy/law may also give the NS a chance to strengthen its role and mandate in response.

Priorities and Opportunities:

The rapidly growing economy in Vietnam presents VNRC with an opportunity to establish a sustainable resource base for its disaster response function if the NS is able to identify an allowable way to direct public and corporate support towards



establishing and maintain response systems and assets. Corporate partnerships for institutional preparedness should be established, potentially as part of a fundraising campaign linked to developing a more robust national disaster contingency fund.

The NS should develop a human resources strategy which deliberately seeks to grow its core pool of disaster response and preparedness staff based on career development plans which link experience working on DRR projects, response operations and DM training to job placement and responsibilities. This can and should include those staff and volunteers trained for the NDRT system as well as permanent branch and HQ staff.

Efforts to establish the NDRT system should be reinforced with additional support from other PNS and IFRC Secretariat. Support for practical simulations and exercises and expanding the initial NDRT pool would help to sustain momentum and give those who have been recruited and trained a meaningful way to remain engaged between responses.

VNRC has an opportunity with the development of the updated national disaster management policy/law to further strengthen its mandate for response and potentially take on a more formalized role in coordinating civil society actors in response. With support from the IFRC Secretariat the NS should work to ensure it remains well positioned in the system that is revised under this law.

Efforts to develop Wat/San equipment should be continued and supported as this appears to be a key area of need during many disasters in the country. Extra emphasis should however be placed on establishing a permanent technical expert in Wat/San within the NS headquarters to manage this project and coordinate development of staff/volunteer skills and systems to sustain the program once established.



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4.2.9 NS Capacity Development Progress and Lessons Learned

A number of key success factors and lessons learned from IFRC Secretariat efforts to build NS response capacity have been identified based on interviews and review of past evaluations. Dozens of initiatives were cited by key stakeholders as being implemented with NS response capacity building as at least one of many stated objectives. However the same stakeholders frequently noted that this fragmented and voluminous approach is likely having minimal impact partly due to the volume and lack of focus of such initiatives.

Key Success Factors cited by stakeholders interviewed which increase the potential for response capacity building and lessons learned from IFRC Secretariat efforts in recent years include:

- § Willingness of NS to change – in most cases capacity cannot be built, and certainly not sustained, if key NS managers and leaders are not open to change
- § IFRC Secretariat (including Geneva) and PNS rapport with NS leadership and staff – trust based on competency and established relationships opens the way to change – requires right people in right place - consistent high quality international staff with DM skills and experience actually managing response systems
- § A facilitation and coaching style, including exposing NS to examples from other NS (including other zones) and establishing opportunities for NS to learn from one another
- § True partnerships - Developing plans and initiatives to support NS through a true partnership involving all partners, where the NS' ambitions and strategies establish the priorities and support efforts of PNS, IFRC and other partners are integrated under a single plan¹¹
- § Set realistic goals and commit to providing advice and support over a long period of time – quick interventions (such as ad hoc trainings and 1-2 week technical advisory deployments) not linked to concrete goals and longer-term capacity building plans tend to have little impact
- § Dedicate resources to response capacity building – frequently stating NS should build and maintain response capacity isn't enough, NS notice what the IFRC Secretariat and PNS have money for and discern that these are the true priorities

¹¹ The Danish Red Cross Partnership Review Talk Process (P RTP) initiative carried out as a pilot in Myanmar is a useful tool that warrants wider consideration.



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- § Plan for handover - Incorporate transition plans from the beginning of an emergency or project and ensure NS will have the resources, skills and systems to sustain and maintain a capacity built
- § Focusing on resolving underlying challenges and removing obstacles to NS capacity building, rather than choosing simpler more expedient approaches (e.g. focusing on a few branches) that may have more immediate results
- § Emphasizing learning and practicing (practical simulations, exercises) for key staff with actual or likely roles in a NS DM system, rather than ad hoc trainings
- § Focus on capacities that fit within an NS' mandate, rather than technical sectors and roles the NS is not working in
- § Build systems and structures (both response focused and general institutional such as finance and reporting), rather than focusing on building capacity through giving "stuff" (equipment, buildings, vehicles including inappropriate ERU handover material)
- § Prioritize and minimize the volume of written materials, guidance, and policies conveyed to NS and ensure translation of key materials into languages used
- § Acknowledge and show appreciation for an NS' strengths, unique history and mandate even when the majority of their capacity may not related to DM – presumptive judgments and attitudes suggesting that some of the programs of an NS are not important is viewed as arrogant and prevents openness to learning and change
- § Health, Shelter and Wat/San in DR capacity building. Whilst the review did not delve in detail to sectoral details on these activities it would be beneficial for the Zone to consider a complimentary, focused review of such specific sectoral DR activities. It was clear from interviews in the DMU and in HNS that relative DR capacities in these areas varies between HNS.
 - Health services are a long-term core activity in many APZ NS, ranging in form from first aid teams to community health teams and medical services from clinics up to an including hospitals. In certain NS visited large scale institutional health capacities represent a major, long-term component of their DR capacity. Some NS have also expressed an interest in strengthening their specialized skills and abilities to provide emergency health services beyond first aid, EMS and hospital care.
 - Water and Sanitation is again embedded at varying levels across the zone and the provision of a Wat/San focal point in the Zone Health Unit is clearly a key service to support ambitions in those HNS that have the skill and motivation to develop these activities. The provision of Wat/San ERU



- support with the transfer of equipment and training has seen specific benefits in some HNS (See Pakistan Case study)
- Shelter: many HNS see shelter strictly in terms of emergency supplies (relief items) however the experience of the major disasters in the region such as the Pakistan/India earthquake and especially the Indian ocean Tsunami along with the IFRC Secretariat role in the cluster system as convener of the Emergency Shelter Cluster have added a new dimension. Some NS such as Indonesia have developed considerably more capacity in this sector. Consequently the presence of two shelter delegates one focused in shelter as a response relief activity and one on the cluster coordination aspects is a valuable asset in the DMU.

An operational example which exhibits a number of the key factors and lessons learned above can be found in the way the Movement responded to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. This example shows that enhancing capacity of NS is possible if the right combination of pre-existing relationships and trust are combined with a well coordinated set of IFRC Secretariat and PNS inputs and all partners are ready to seize opportunities during and immediately following emergencies through planning and early recovery initiatives.

4.2.10 Case 1: OD in Emergencies – The Case of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar

This operation demonstrates that well-coordinated and resourced disaster response can build significant capacity even in challenging operational and political circumstances.¹²

When Cyclone Nargis made landfall the special pre-existing situation and political complexities of affecting an international response in Myanmar were potentially insurmountable. The country and the MRCS had not faced the prospect of absorbing such significant mobilisation of international assistance and their respective capacity to manage and benefit was never guaranteed.

However, despite the formidable challenges a full cadre of IFRC Secretariat Zonal and global tools, including FACT, ERUs and RDRT, were eventually deployed and the overall impression was that this mobilisation was successful and beneficial to the Myanmar authorities, contributed to considerable NS capacity building achieved during and after the relief phase and into tangible initiatives in the transition stage. Significantly the MRCS,

¹² To compile this vignette the team drew from interview and discussion feedback and then researched existing available documentation e.g. *The “Mid-Term Review of Cyclone Nargis March 2010 (Richard Tracey et al)”* as well as additional material sourced from the IFRC Myanmar Office, the ICRC and from dialogue with the outgoing IFRC Myanmar Head of Operations.



building on its pre-disaster competencies, has derived significant and measurable strengthening of its DR capacity in a wide range of skills and competencies as a direct result of this intervention.

The following points are opinions, quotes and observations of some of the situational challenges, decisions, actions, results and challenges that emerged from this unique operation.

Mobilization and deployment:

- This was a major natural disaster requiring international assistance in a complex political and operational situation where such assistance was traditionally declined.
- The expectation, correct initially but resolvable later, was a near impossibility for free access to affected areas.
- All IFRC Secretariat/ICRC/PNS and the MRCS as well as external partners(OCHA/USAID/ECHO) have a positive view that, complex as it was given the context and country involved, the outcomes were positive and good progress made for possible future international engagement with Myanmar.

National Society initial capacity:

- Its positive relationship with the Myanmar Government and its ability to rapidly mobilize a large volunteer force at the township level facilitated an effective first response to the disaster within hours of the cyclone,
- Logistics:
 - The pre-positioning of a contingency stock contributed to the effective first response which ensured 283,000 households received relief items, appropriately adapted to their needs within the first 2 months of the disaster.
Interview IFRC Secretariat Delegate
 - The IFRC Secretariat's logistics procedures functioned well.

“Though modest and in need of strengthening nonetheless the MRCS, using a contingency stock left over from the tsunami response, was the first agency to begin distributions of basic non-food items (NFI) in some affected areas”.

Review documentation

IFRC Secretariat support and Coordination:

- The IFRC Secretariat country representative quickly acknowledged that response was not their core skill set and sought immediate deployment of an operations manager. The zone recognized the critical value of the Representative's personal



local knowledge and relationships that ensured a key ongoing role for the Rep in the response.

- Insistence at the earliest stage of the response to include the preexisting IFRC Secretariat office OD expert, supported by Zone OD experts, within the operation made a significant step forward to building closer relationships between the NS and IFRC partners and proved invaluable in building a platform that resulted in tangible benefits both during and post relief phase.

“The technical support provided by ICRC and the French, Austrian and German Red Cross in emergency water supply quickly built capacity within MRCS WatSan staff to implement a highly effective water distribution component”

Mid- Term Review Cyclone Nargis
March 2010

- The Zone OD department has and continues to develop an in-depth focus on volunteering and OD in emergencies with a knowledge and training component that links and mainstreams multiple tools and services (Global and Regional DR tools such as ERU, FACT, RDRT; gender and youth in emergencies) and this resulted in a well placed asset on the ground to support a complex HNS faced for the first time with a significant operational and organizational challenge.
- The IFRC Secretariat was able to rapidly provide a significant number of high quality delegates to support the operation from the zone and internationally. However the turnover of these delegates posed some challenges. *“While this was an intense period for capacity building of MRCS staff and establishing accountable systems to cope with the large volume of activities being undertaken, reports from staff revealed the turnover did not lend itself to supporting continuity and the building of close working relationships between colleagues from MRCS and the IFRC Secretariat in the early stages”* Quote from review document.
- The general feedback from IFRC Secretariat and PNS interviews supported in the documentation was that overall given the complexity and sensitivities of the international presence the operation was extremely well coordinated;
- Coordination with the Myanmar government agencies was effective due to the MRCS access and standing in the national disaster management and preparedness plans.

“Coordination within the Federation has been strong. In the WatSan sector, the operation has benefited from capacity building from participating National Societies (PNS) such as the Austrian and German Red Cross and ICRC while the Danish Red Cross (DRC) have provided technical assistance for the development of an M&E framework”
Desk Review documentation



- The transition process has been a key focus for the Delegation From the drafting of the emergency appeal, it is therefore necessary to have the early recovery task force in place in order for appropriate tools such as logical framework matrices, work plans and M&E tools, as well as training programs to be developed to ensure a demand-driven process and a smooth transition.

“Another very positive feature of the Nargis op has been the Lessons Learning process, which started over the concluding year, and which is under production so that MRCS and AP zone will have a toolbox of key procedures and documentation to enable the NS to respond more independently in future emergencies of a similar nature. “Excellent resources in IFRC reporting and NS reporting and media.”
Interview with IFRC HoOps

- The formulation of a comprehensive transition plan early in the operation was a fine achievement.
- While the operation successfully contributed to strengthening community resilience through asset recovery, it has been less effective in areas requiring a greater level of technical expertise.

- Whilst this is not strictly following the PSP of traditional IFRC Secretariat interventions, but focusing on community-based social welfare activities, in a context where there are little opportunities for entertainment and relief, reports from villagers interviewed in the field claim this program is contributing to building community spirit.

....”The Nargis operation benefited from a very skilled and motivated team of IFRC delegates and support staff in the (country) delegation, which gave continuity to the op and ensured a high level of confidence with NS. The close integration with the core delegation, notably support from HOD, meant a well coordinated and coherent emergency action, with a clear identification and delegation of roles and responsibilities, and mutual support - with no ‘territorial’ frictions.”

Interview and reports from Myanmar

Improved DR Capacity benefits from the operation:

- Due to its expertise in relief operations, as with the Nargis emergency, IFRC Secretariat should take a very strong role in establishing and training a MRCS task force / emergency unit to manage the relief program.

“In addition, the Nargis operation has vastly expanded the base of Red Cross volunteers in the delta area and proposals have been received to recruit many of these volunteers into the brigade”



- The growth in capacity, confidence and public acknowledgement of the work of the MRCS in providing such a wide-ranging level of support across 13 cyclone-affected townships.
- The consensus that “*MRCS leadership and direction*” from the earliest stages has focused on identifying which long term benefits and learning can be gained to strengthen core national activities.
- Staffing:
 - MRCS HQ HR have benefitted from “On-the-job training and capacity building” and the branch level capacity has improved dramatically
 - At the central level, the capacity of senior National Society staff has improved as a result of the operation.
 - Improved and motivated volunteer base as a surge capacity to respond to future disasters.
- Two of the most successful components of the operation to date have been the community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) and community-based health and first aid (CBHFA) components. *Desk Review*

“Also notable and unique to Nargis was the high-level of finance responsibility delegated to MRCS HQ”

Interview with Federation HoPs

- MRCS have been allocated key roles in the IASC contingency plan, MAPDRR and the standing order on disaster management of the government.

Other benefits:

- A well-managed closure of the operation on the field, with all Hub Offices (MRCS field offices, equivalent to IFRC Secretariat sub-delegations) going through a phased and coordinated close-down.

4.2.11 Case 2: The Importance of a Rapid Response – The Case of Improved Response Times from the National Level in India

This case demonstrates how systematic investments in response human resources, planning, policies and integrating good practices can help a national society improve its response timeliness.

In 2008 the IRCS was called upon to respond to the flooding in the state of Bihar. State and branch level response mechanisms were immediately activated. IRCS accessed DREF funding to support the mobilization of response staff. However at that time the IRCS



national system only mobilized response staffing support to the operation 15-20 days after the crisis reached its apex.

These national level teams during major disasters should be more rapid. In 2009, the IRCS national level response to flooding in Andhra Pradesh was noticeably faster and within a week the IRCS had national level team's on-site conducting assessments, distributing and potable water in support of the state and district level teams. By 2010 there was an even more rapid and robust response from the national level when responding to the flash floods in Leh. The Secretary General of the IRCS was in situ one day after the apex of the crisis with the deployment of NDRT and pre-positioned stocks shortly thereafter (within 5-7 days) in support of state and district level staff and volunteers.

This progression highlights the improvements made in the capacity of the IRCS national level response mechanisms to respond to large-scale national emergencies. Factors cited as contributing to this improved progression and national response times include:

- A stronger core of trained NDRT response staff.
- Standard practices (assessments, logistics etc.) have led to greater consistency in response.
- Increased understanding and experience by senior leadership as to the importance of a rapid response.
- IRCS strategic DM plan and contingency planning.
- Government policy (discussion started in 2003, act finalized in 2005 and policy finalized in 2009).

4.2.12 Case 3: Vietnam Typhoons in 2009 – The Importance of Learning Lessons from Past Emergency Operations

The observations of VNRC activities and focus two years after Typhoon Ketsana demonstrate how lessons from operations can be used to guide future response preparedness and lead to continuous improvement.

In September of 2009 Typhoon Ketsana hit the central coast of Vietnam seriously affecting 12 provinces causing significant destruction. 179 deaths, 1,140 injuries and the evacuation of 27,778 households were reported. Additionally approximately 43,000 hectares of rice were damaged causing significant loss of livelihoods and economic capacity.



One month later Typhoon Mirinae hit 9 provinces in central Vietnam, many of which were just beginning to recover from Typhoon Ketsana. 124 additional people died, 188 were injured, 12,606 households had to be evacuated from their homes and an additional 19,000 hectares of rice were damaged. VNRC requested international assistance from IFRC partners and the IFRC Secretariat launched an appeal covering both Typhoons.

During the response to the 2009 typhoons, VNRC local chapters immediately responded by helping evacuate and rescue families and distributing relief items to the effected population. Based on the request for international assistance the IFRC Secretariat and six PNS provided VNRC with financial and technical assistance to support the response.

The evaluation of the typhoon responses found that VNRC was able to mobilize significant resources from within Vietnam and from IFRC partners. Importantly over half of the total amount of financial resources sought for the operations were mobilized by VNRC from within Vietnam thanks to an increasingly effective response fundraising effort.

Local chapters of VNRC were found to be able to handle the initial evacuation support and most initial relief distributions, mostly with spontaneous volunteers and existing staff during the typhoon response evaluation. In total the evaluation found that with the support of IFRC partners overall relief objectives were met. Furthermore, the selection and deployment of a strong operations manager appears to have effectively reinforced the IFRC Secretariat country office and enabled coordinated action among PNS, IFRC Secretariat and VNRC which avoided overlaps and duplication.

The piloting of a cash transfer response mechanism, supported by the American Red Cross, demonstrates VNRC willingness to adapt to changing circumstances. Given the fast growing market economy in Vietnam it appears that relief distributions were less needed than in the past after the initial few weeks of the operation as local markets and access to food and non-food items was quickly restored. VNRC and IFRC Secretariat are currently developing lessons learned from use of this cash relief tool to identify ways to further adapt to changing needs and circumstances in Vietnam.

However, the evaluation of the typhoon response also noted that national VNRC systems need to be reinforced support in critical functions and logistics support. In particular additional capacity for logistics and pre-positioning, assessment and targeting skills (emphasizing beneficiary selection based on poverty and vulnerability), and an NDRT system linking trained volunteers from throughout the country to adequate technical support and operational support from headquarters were recommended.



Since the 2009 operations VNRC, IFRC Secretariat and PNS partners have demonstrated an understanding of these recommendations by initiating a number of positive efforts. The IFRC Secretariat RLU conducted an assessment of VNRC logistics in 2010 and along with PNS are continuing to discuss ways of reinforcing the NS logistics capacities. Workshops have been held in some provinces to strengthen emergency assessment skills, which appears to have had a positive impact on VNRC response abilities during the 2010 flood responses. With support from the Spanish Red Cross and IFRC Secretariat, VNRC has developed SoPs for an NDRT system and is beginning to recruit and train staff and volunteers from across the country. In 2010 and 2011 VNRC also held a pre-disaster meeting with its Movement partners. Based on shared learning and decisions in these meetings VNRC has shared a pre-disaster agreement with its partners for signing which aims to improve coordination and joint-preparedness planning.

4.2.13 Findings on Priority Capacity Building Needs for NS

The selected national societies visited for this review are largely self aware of their capacity building needs and priorities. The common areas of capacity building support highlighted by NS and their partners as key priorities fall into four key categories:

1. **NDRT and NS Response Systems** – While the selected NS all have trained RDRT members not all have robust well functioning NDRT systems in place. These NS recognize the need for a NDRT system with a clear set of attributes and indicators including:
 - a. a standardized NDRT Guide supported by a NDRT training work shop syllabus with module options and a Field Guide¹³;
 - b. number of staff that pass NDRT training test;
 - c. training and coaching system in place;
 - d. number of coordinators in the pool;
 - e. technical qualifications (including sector and technical teams based on the NS mandate for DR within their country);
 - f. functioning NDRT SOPs;
 - g. volunteer management protocols

For the NS that either already have a base system in place or that achieve the set-up of this base NDRT system, ongoing advice on improvements through dedicated technical support is desired.

¹³ Most of these tools are available to APZ NS from the zone.



2. **Logistics** – A strong logistics and supply chain system is the foundation for any disaster response operation. Most NSs in the Asia Pacific region would benefit from an upgrade in their logistics systems as evidenced by the shortage of logistics systems and trained logistics professionals in the NS visited¹⁴. Over the past few years the RLU has engaged with selected NS based on risk and interest to assess their logistics capacities and gaps and support targeted capacity development. These initiatives have in some cases evolved into joint DM/logistics programmes supporting NS. Per the Global Logistics Strategy 2015, logistics capacity building of NSs will be a focused priority. Dovetailing future NS capacity building with this strategy priority could be of significant benefit to many NSs in the Asia Pacific region.

3. **Disaster Fundraising, Quality and Accountability Mechanisms** – Every country should have a national level capacity to proactively raise funds during disasters. While the NS visited are experiencing increasing success at raising money during disasters this is often on an ad hoc basis and not grounded in effective and enabling policies, procedures and reserve funds. With new economic advances, rise of a middle class in many Asian nations, there will be an opportunity to secure disaster funds from domestic funders but also greater competition from new organizations responding to disasters. NSs could ensure that certain percentage of funding is retained for longer-term disaster response and preparedness capacity building of national society so that funding for capacity building is more sustainable and consistent over time. IFRC Secretariat support to NS is needed for the development of innovative public and corporate disaster fundraising, standing disaster response funds and procedures for their management.

With increased funding comes an increased expectation related to accountability and transparency. As competition grows and technology and new media enable more people to witness the immediate aftermath of a disaster the pressures on NS to report on their effective use of funds will also grow. IFRC Secretariat support to NS is needed to establish effective communications, finance and M&E systems to enable NS to demonstrate accountability. Simultaneous efforts to help NS adhere to response standards and continually improve quality are also required.

4. **NS Positioning Within Their National Response System** – While most NS visited have some response role articulated in their national laws some are overly vague. As government capacity increases laws are likely to be revised and further developed along with national response plans, formalization of national platforms and establishment of operating procedures. The IFRC Secretariat has access through its network to knowledge and experience regarding lessons and options from various national systems and can significantly help NS to position themselves

¹⁴ Several of the NS visited were engaged with the APZ RLU in drafting ToR and MoUs to this effect.



by actively advising governments on their options while advocating for a significant role for the NS based on its history, capacities and ambitions.

In order to support these priority response capacity needs of NS the IFRC Secretariat needs to systematically monitor the specific needs and state of response capacity in NS throughout the Zone. Currently such information appears to be collected through a combination of ad hoc missions by Zone and regional office staff, informal communication with country offices and review of the self-reported WPNS survey each 1-2 years. The Zone DMU has embarked upon a methodical process of assessing NS throughout the Zone based on a number of capacity, vulnerability and willingness criteria to help support in focusing NS capacity building assistance.

One possibility for expanding upon these approaches to more systematically assess NS capacities and needs for support was identified in meetings with OCHA. UN OCHA has a system which utilizes UNDAC personnel to undertake national disaster response capacity assessments in selected countries. These assessments make use of the diverse skills of assembled UNDAC members to analyze the state of capacity in terms of systems, human resources, policies/procedures, financial mechanisms and other factors and the teams make recommendations to the national government as well as UN agencies on areas for improvement.

Such a system could be put in place within the IFRC Secretariat, facilitated by the Zone DMU, and utilizing a combination of IFRC Secretariat, PNS and RDRT members to conduct 4-5 reviews per year. If conducted consistently over time the DMU would be able to establish a clear baseline of capacity throughout the Zone and then start the cycle over again. During the second cycle teams would be able to measure progress in NS towards building key response capacities.

4.3 DISASTER RESPONSE CAPACITIES OF THE IFRC SECRETARIAT

4.3.1 IFRC Secretariat Response Capacities

Geneva

At a global level the IFRC Secretariat response capacity in Geneva consists of the Disaster Management team, the Global Logistics Service, the Health department and myriad staff in other units which support particular elements of disaster response and response capacity tools (e.g. Communications). The DM team and some other departments have experienced some consolidation and reduction of resources in the last three years while the Global



Logistics Service which has maintained a strong capacity given its strategic focus and cost recovery model. The Disaster Management Team is in the early stages of developing a global strategic framework as well as global SOPs to take account of the establishment of the Zones. The Global Logistics Service is beginning to implement its Strategic Plan 2011-2015 which is based on a consistent, data driven, and rolling annual planning process involving internal and external stakeholders. Importantly this new plan explicitly adds capacity building for NS in logistics to its priorities.

AP Zone

Decentralization efforts within the IFRC Secretariat appear to have progressed further in Asia Pacific than in other Zones and the Zone is highly capacitated with an admirable international mix (50% from AP countries) of well-qualified delegates and staff. The Zone DMU alone has grown from approximately 3 staff to 11 staff over the past 5 years and this cadre of staff appears to have significant DM experience and skills. Additionally, within the Zone offices a number of staff support disaster response from within the health, logistics, RM/PMER, OD, communications and other units.

Since 2008 the Zone DMU has developed an impressive range of processes and systems to conduct its work in coordinating international response and providing technical assistance. The staff capacities and working processes have resulted in greater delegation of authority from Geneva to the Zone in terms of technical review and sign off for operational plans, Emergency Appeals and DREF requests which are then shared with the DREF or Appeal Manager or Secretary General for final approval. The DMU exhibits a culture of constant improvement, seeking to consistently analyze and monitor system performance and update processes and approaches accordingly as evidenced by this review, the recent review of the SOPs and a number of ongoing and upcoming studies linked to their annual planning cycle.

The Zone DMU also performs a critical function in information management regarding emergencies within the Zone. The DMU and Geneva Secretariat have confirmed in the past year that the Operations Coordinators in the DMU should serve as the primary PNS point of contact for information about ongoing disaster operations. The DMU has encouraged NS and country delegations to report information more frequently than the minimum standards for DREF and emergency appeals. It has also increased the frequency of Information Bulletins for NS actions that are reaching affected populations but do not receive international funding or resources. A systematic approach has been established over the past three years by the DMU to ensure regular informal communications within the RCRC family through email updates. Given the pressure that is likely to emerge for



information during large scale disasters from PNS and Geneva this function will require continued prioritization and possibly specialized information management staffing/skills.

Knowledge Management is another core function for the Zone DMU as well as other units in the Zone office. Recently the DMU introduced a new contingency planning tool which has been well received. The Zone OD unit is also engaged in useful work related to OD in Disasters and Volunteering in Emergencies. The DMU has initiated a number of other analytical and thematic knowledge management initiatives to help advise NS and contribute to planning including:

- a GIS based resource mapping system
- beneficiary accountability
- response in urban environments
- gender in emergencies
- climate change and early warning
- effective assessment practices

Knowledge management is an important function for the DMU, however, the review team notes that the DMU should guard against producing too much information which cannot be translated into practical action by NS given their ability to translate documents and absorb the volume of information.

Technical assistance to NS is seen as a core activity of the DMU between disasters including deploying DMU staff to help facilitate trainings and workshops and support pre-disaster meetings. The Regional Logistics Unit also has embarked on technical assistance missions to help assess and build NS response capacities.

There appears to be a gap in terms of providing technical assistance from the DMU (as well as regional offices and country delegations) to “test the system” and to support practical simulations and exercises, advise NS and governments on mandate and national response system development and positioning and development of key NS response processes and systems such as NDRT. The DMU has however recently supported some external simulation exercises including the annual ASEAN SimEx and intends to increase such efforts.

Some confusion remains over the division of responsibilities and roles for preparedness and response across Zone, regional and country levels. This confusion was noted and expressed by many stakeholders at internal Zone, regional and country office as well as



Geneva/NS/PNS/ICRC and at the external UN/INGO/Government/Donor level. However, some of the comments regarding confusion on roles and responsibilities appear to be concentrated among staff who were in place before the creation of the Zone. Where positions have seen turnover people appear to have a clearer sense of the division of roles.

Coordination within the Zone has benefited from the development of the DMU SOPs but some gaps and areas of confusion remain. A recent review of the APZ SOPs¹⁵ found that some significant numbers of NS and IFRC Secretariat staff remain unaware of the procedures and some role and authority clarification is required. In addition regular IFRC Secretariat/HS/PNS/ICRC coordination meetings were often seen as too ad hoc and some recommendations were made for a more structured and inclusive approach. This review's interviews confirmed these findings and substantively the draft report on SoP reinforces most of the findings of this review on the subjects of SoPs and operation coordination.

Regional Offices

Regional offices have shifted their primary focus to supporting DRR and some preparedness for response though they remain well capacitated in terms of funding and staff. Many of these staff still have significant response experience and sometimes serve as an important source of surge support to operations (though reporting lines are shifted to the operation and country office as specified in the SOPs). The one remaining response function residing at the regional office level is the recruitment, roster maintenance and deployment of RDRT. During this review many stakeholders at regional, Zone and country levels questioned why the rosters remain decentralized to the regional level, while deployment decisions are made by the Zone, now that the DMU is in place.

Regional offices also provide important ongoing support to response capacity building of NS. These services often take the form of advice, training and linking NS to technical specialists for specific capacity building initiatives. However, the response capacity building efforts of the regional offices appears somewhat limited based on an ad hoc approach and limited funding outside of larger scale DRR projects and recovery operations.

Country Offices

At the country-level IFRC Secretariat response capacity varies but is much weaker than would be expected. However, country offices have a clear lead responsibility for managing response operations and coordination in their countries in support of the NS. While some

¹⁵ A preview by the team, sanctioned by the DMU, of the draft of "The First Annual Review of Asia Pacific Standard Operating Procedures for disaster response & early recovery" Jasna Djordjevic June 2011.



country offices have a number of DM staff who ostensibly are responsible for working across the full spectrum of disaster management. However, their day-to-day focus (outside of medium to large scale disasters) seems primarily oriented towards implementing DRR and community based preparedness projects given funding allocations.

In-country coordination mechanisms (government, NS, UN, NGOs and civil society) vary in strength and levels of IFRC Secretariat and NS engagement. Some countries have put “Cluster-like” systems in place permanently and most have some form of inter-agency response coordination platform which include permanent seats for the NS. *In some contexts stakeholders felt that the IFRC Secretariat and NS, both regarded as important key partners, could and should participate more frequently and effectively in these national coordination platforms, and in doing so strengthen preparedness and understanding of their role.*

Overarching Structural Issues

Despite significant efforts and energy spent to clarify, there remains some significant and consistent confusion as to the roles and responsibilities within IFRC Secretariat and its partners as well as external stakeholders such as the UN and Donors as well as government DM agencies, regarding disaster preparedness and response. However, this seems to be diminishing with time as new staff take up key positions and everyone becomes more familiar with the SOPs.

While IFRC Secretariat response support to NS during emergencies is the responsibility of the country delegation and Zone DMU¹⁶, all of the key IFRC Secretariat entities (Zone, Regional Delegations and Country Delegations as well as the ICRC and many PNS bi-lateral projects) have roles in capacity building for disaster response. These roles are differentiated at different level, and should be complementary (e.g. Zone ensuring quality and adherence to global standards, Zone and Region providing specialized technical inputs and tools, and country offices providing project management and generalized support.) Some stakeholders noted that there remains potential for overlap and even some competition amongst internal IFRC Secretariat entities for resourcing and turf. Further, there is clearly a lack of adequate resourcing of the IFRC Secretariat country level support which diminishes the ability of the IFRC Secretariat to support NS who want and need response capacity building assistance (and to convince those NS who need but don't necessarily want such support that it is important).


¹⁶ “Where additional support or assistance is requested the NS SUPPORTED by the IFRC Representative of the country team will have the operational lead” APZ Standard Operating Procedures 2010.



In examining the Zone as a key component in NS capacity building across the board and specifically in DR, consideration was given as to if and how its physical structure and “shape” (zone, regional and country organograms and staffing establishment) had a positive or negative influence. The question often rose when discussing Zone structures with interviewees, both internal and external, was a feeling that this Zone, perhaps more than others, had the “Right people” but questioned the physical numbers and if they are all in the “Right place” and in the “Right job”. Whilst a challenge for the zone to consider, this is a far better situation that the “Wrong people, in the wrong job and in the wrong place”.

As many stakeholders at the country level cited their perceptions that “the Zone is still very far away” (apparently referencing familiarity with the people and function rather than geographic location) and “resource allocation does not match the stated ambition to get closer to NS” the review team analyzed the staffing levels and resource allocation approaches for the IFRC Secretariat related to DM. The results of this analysis are shown below.

Figure 5: IFRC Secretariat Staff and Financial Capacity at Various Levels





The current allocation of human and financial resources results in a system where country offices, while delegated responsibility for managing response and response capacity building as well as being the Secretariat “operational lead” when response assistance is requested, must focus their time on securing project-based funding from donors to “keep the doors open” and pay salaries. Because funding is more readily available for DRR and community based disaster preparedness than response capacity building most country office staff are focused in this direction and work on implementing such programs (similar to PNS).

“I and the IFRC HoD want the country office to support some of my core DR needs but they simply have no “up-front funds”

NS Senior Executive Officer

Country offices report that they lack the human and financial resources to develop core capacity building programs. Country office staff and other stakeholders stressed that IFRC Secretariat country staff cannot afford to focus their time on identifying and addressing gaps in key response capacities. Nor can they focus on coordinating PNS approaches to NS development or actively participate in country coordinating mechanisms. In some cases the IFRC Secretariat Country Representatives have worked hard to devote their time and identify ad hoc small amounts of money (mostly from PNS) to focus on the key gaps in coordination and response capacity. The Zone DMU has also sourced some multi-year funding for response preparedness and coordination since 2007 which is used to help fill gaps at the country level when possible. However few current examples (e.g. Wat/San in Pakistan, China and Nepal) of well funded long-term response capacity building projects led by the IFRC Secretariat were identified and most stakeholders cited the funding and staffing structures of the IFRC a Secretariat s a primary reason for this.


4.3.2 Balancing IFRC Secretariat Membership Services Supply vs. Demand

The 2008 Global Disaster Management Services Improvement Project assessed the balance of resources between Geneva, Zones and NS with particular focus on the challenge of over-supply (Push) of technical products and policies and lack of capacity at the Zone level to balance supply with HNS demand (Pull). The project recommendations included shifting resources to the Zone level to establish DMUs to help address this imbalance.

Since 2008 the Asia Pacific Zone has grown significantly, while Geneva has remained virtually the same size in terms of staff numbers. While other Zones have consolidated regional offices the existing regional structure was kept in place in Asia Pacific to provide shared technical services and cover countries without offices. Based on observations and interviews with stakeholders the review team believes that the evolution of supply/demand balance and resourcing can be depicted as shown below.



Figure 6: Current Flow of IFRC Secretariat/NS DM Supply and Demand



The Zone DMU, regional and country offices have developed a few key mechanisms to gauge demands and needs of NS for response capacity building support and international support during emergencies. The country-level pre-disaster meetings and regional disaster management network meetings offer solid platforms for ensuring critical feedback loops to balance supply and demand. AP Zone and regional offices have also initiated efforts to integrate needs assessment methods and tools which respond to NS feedback about the overlap between prior methodologies and duplication of effort at NS branch levels. Ongoing efforts to improve the use of recommendations and outcomes from numerous evaluations and reviews of DREF, Emergency Appeal and DM programs by the DMU and RM/PMER units in the Zone should also help to improve learning and matching support to needs.

Pre-Disaster Meetings: *“The overall goals of the meetings are to assist National Societies and IFRC partners to be better prepared to respond to future disaster events through timely and efficient coordinated humanitarian assistance to affected populations.”* - Pre Disaster Meeting Concept Paper

As noted there is evidence of a significant imbalance between the IFRC Secretariat/PNS service and product supply (PUSH) and the National Societies’ priority needs (PULL). Steps to address and counter this dynamic must be taken into account when building NS DR capacity. In an effort to both enhance DR effectiveness, coordination and in particular to address and incorporate the priority needs of the HNS the Asia Pacific Zone has instituted a




useful Pre-Disaster Meeting initiative, mirroring aspects of the earlier IFRC CAS process, that adds to other preparedness efforts and which specifically allows for NS inputs to the “Demand” side of this equation. The pilot phase seeks to target 11 countries in 2011.

The Pre-Disaster Meetings, held at country level bring together the HNS and the IFRC Secretariat Zone, regional and country office, the in-country PNS and where possible the ICRC. According to the concept paper, *“They provide a platform to review disaster preparedness measures, identify gaps and prioritise preparedness measures and increase the awareness of the global disaster response system through identifying the complementarity of regional and global tools and ... review the existing coordination mechanisms and work towards agreement on the roles and responsibilities of all Red Cross and Red Crescent partners in times of crises.”*

The objectives shown in the figure below allow for a process in which the identified priority needs and the capacity of the NS to meet the demands of sudden or predictable events prior to high risk seasons, can be matched to the funding, resources and services and added value of the Movement’s partner components. This addresses priorities, avoids gaps and duplication, maximizes coordination and resource mobilization as well as improves economy and effort and enhances efficient and effective service delivery.

In addition it permits planning flexibility, establishes where, at least indicative, roles & responsibilities can be shared and allocated as best suites the given situation and information sharing and exchange vertically and horizontally can be maximized. The meetings are also a forum to review and reinforce SOPs and other guidelines, update and adjust response team rosters and to disseminate current initiatives from each level of the network from country to region zone and Geneva or PNS and ICRC HQ levels.

Figure 7: Pre-Disaster Meeting Objectives






Through this regular forum a constant monitoring of the rolling capacity of the RC/RC assets in any given country is possible. This in turn gives strength, coherence and improved predictability. It also adds quality to contingency planning and response preparedness, allows for pre-procurement and positioning of human and material resources. In turn HNS and partner credibility and confidence with external stakeholders including the UN system, INGO, donors and government authorities are enhanced.

Stakeholders and the review team view this as a positive and practical initiative taken by the Zone that addresses both the imbalance noted and adds to DR capacity enhancement. The logical extension of this initiative, and one that has been successfully launched in some countries in other Zones, is a more structured planning and coordination tool – a Pre-Disaster or Relief Agreement. Such agreements are already planned as an outcome of ongoing AP Zone efforts.

Coupled with the pre-disaster meetings and other preparedness and operational activities the figure at right shows a basic flow chart of effective capacity building and preparedness logic.

Figure 8: Use of Pre-Disaster Meetings in Combination with Other Efforts



Regional Disaster Management Network Meetings: In South and South-East Asia the IFRC Secretariat has facilitated annual Regional DM Network meetings for many years as another mechanism for balancing supply and demand and setting joint objectives for the coming year.

Regional DM Network meetings include IFRC Secretariat regional, country and sometimes Zone DM staff as well as senior leadership and Disaster Managers from NS within a region. The meetings are meant to serve as a mechanism for conveying important information from the IFRC Secretariat to NS as well as engaging the NS in establishing priorities for regional initiatives.

Based on interviews during this review it is apparent that the Regional DM Network meetings serve these purposes well. The regional office “DMU” uses the meetings to develop and confirm its annual work plan, ensuring that priorities are in synch with the



needs and interests of NS. The meetings seem to have a positive effect on educating NS leaders and Disaster Managers about standards, policies and global tools to some extent. Additionally, the Regional DM Network meetings seem to serve an unstated purpose of creating dialogue between NS Disaster Managers and their own senior management on topics that might not get attention in the day-to-day course of their work.

4.4 CASE 3: THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING LEADERSHIP & STAFFING CONTINUITY – THE RESPONSES TO THE 2005 EARTHQUAKE AND THE 2010 FLOODING IN PAKISTAN

In analysing the Movement responses in Pakistan to the 2005 Earthquake and the 2010 floods the critical importance of timely DM staffing and in particular leadership continuity and the respective roles of the Secretariat in Geneva and the zone/regional offices is evident. These two events were consistently referred to by a very wide range of interviewees during the review and there are, and remain, differing opinions as to the successes of the response components. Although Pakistan was not a country selected for a field visit, it is felt there is value in looking at some lessons from that vulnerable and complex part of the zone. We have endeavoured to fairly record and represent these divergent views in so much that, as varied as they are, they all strongly identify and support for various reasons one critical factor: the over-riding importance of ensuring, however difficult it can be, consistent and continuous high-calibre staffing in these especially sensitive, at risk and intricate areas of operation.

Effective and efficient recruiting for key posts in high risk countries and Zone strategies for assigning staff to bridge temporary HR vacancies continues to be a serious gap within the IFRC Secretariat and presents significant risks for the organization in corporate level large scale disasters¹⁷.

In 2005 all components of the Movement responded to the massive earthquake that struck Pakistan and parts of India. This included the mobilisation of what was up to that time the biggest activation of the IFRC global DR tools (FACT, ERU/RDRT/DMIS/ DREF, the Base Camp) as well as the NDRT. The IFRC Secretariat and ICRC quickly established a coordinated working methodology with the PNS and the HNS. Both

“Fast, coordinated and effective Movement response is extremely challenging and requires clear objectives, mutual trust and knowledge of respective capacities, which cannot be left for development at the time of disaster.”

Evaluation of ICRC Response to the Pakistan Earthquake: Channel Research Nov 2006

¹⁷ The current review underway commissioned by Geneva Secretariat into the establishment of a Head of Emergency Operations Roster may go a long way to addressing this global challenge.



IFRC Secretariat and ICRC rapidly mobilised ERUs and a joint logistics network was also established.

“Coordination meetings quickly took place in GVA with IFRC and in Islamabad”

“The joint logistics operation was generally efficient but the levels of staff experience and formats for reporting varied and there was some duplication of effort”.

“Overall, IFRC and ICRC’s collaboration was timely, open, positive and consistent, and built upon a mutual understanding of their respective limitations”.

Evaluation of the Rapid Response of the ICRC to the Pakistan Earthquake. Channel Research Nov 2006

This response *“has been called one of the most successful relief operations in recent history”* (Channel Research ICRC Rapid Response Review Nov 2006) widely recognized across the humanitarian community as a well-coordinated international response to this disaster. Given the scope of the disaster, the complexity and logistical demands this was never going to be perfect or without problems. Combined with the sensitivity of the two countries impacted, their intent to lead the response and the

traditional reluctance in recent years for either of them to accept international assistance the challenges were considerable.

Nonetheless the outcome for the IFRC and specifically the AP Zone was positive and reinforced during this review in both RC/RC, UN and donor interviews and often quoted The Secretariat in Geneva was involved, the South Asia Regional Delegation in Delhi, but most importantly, the country office in Islamabad had solid response capacity in the staffing, the ICRC and the PNS were engaged. In short the Movement was well resourced to provide appropriate coordinated levels of assistance. Equally and eventually those same resources were deployed to support the massive flood operations in Pakistan in 2010.

The activation of the global tools in coordination with the regional office structures (which were leading response at the time), the positive response to the appeal, the recovery phase and the engagement with the PRCS throughout is judged by all to have resulted in real increased capacity within the NS and the zone to address disasters in the future. Community preparedness benefitted from post emergency projects and the PRCS HQ were able to objectively address both the challenges but also the benefits of leading and coordinating within a major RC/RC international response. The understanding and acceptance of the value of a timely well coordinated call up from the menu of resources available to the NS through the management structures was deemed to have been well learned.



However in 2010 when massive flooding struck Pakistan the results of the IFRC Secretariat operation are viewed far less positively as seen in evaluations and the interviews for this review.

The Context of the events:

The Earthquake was a sudden onset event within a defined geographical area and the impact known relatively quickly. The floods took place over an extended period, 3+ weeks, and impacted on nearly the entire country. It appears that no single agency or combination of agencies were able to fully understand the extent of the impact and needs.

What elements were present that differentiated the responses and what can be learned from them?

Feedback from both this and previous review interviews, desk reviews and comparative analysis of the “RTE Real Time Evaluation of IFRC Secretariat response to 2010 Pakistan floods” (Burton et al January 2011) and the “Evaluation of the Rapid Response of the ICRC to the Pakistan Earthquake” (Channel Research Nov 2001) offer a number of reasons. High among these seem to be DM Staffing, leadership, coordination mindset and communication challenges at various levels.

“The lack of clarity regarding leadership roles appears to have affected strategic decision-making processes in the operation”.

Real time evaluation of IFRC response to 2010 Pakistan Floods

- At the time of the disaster, the only IFRC Secretariat delegate deployed in country at the time of the floods was an OD delegate, who did an excellent job in the situation faced, with no disaster response experience and despite universal agreement that Pakistan is one of the most high risk countries in the Zone from a social, security and natural disaster risk stand point. From feedback received during the review there was and had not been for some time any HoD or experienced senior level delegate in place.
- Whilst there were some feelings from external partners as well as observations in documents reviewed that there was a gap in decision making, the Zone feel that there was no misunderstanding within IFRC Secretariat on assessments nor on the Delhi Office role though they have since addressed an accepted need to further clarify and enhance that relationship.
- Unfortunately, a series of both planned and unexpected and unavoidable absences at Zone, regional and country level coincided at the time of the alerts.



- Agreement on decision making functions at various levels of the IFRC Secretariat and specifically the APZ DM structure, have proven to be one of the global challenges in the transition from the previous Regional Delegation structure to the Zone system. However the Zone, and specifically the DMU, feel these issues have already been well identified and significantly resolved and continue to be further enhanced and strengthened in the review of the DM SOPs. Unlike the Earthquake where the global tools were rapidly and successfully deployed and used by the IFRC Secretariat, ONS and ICRC there appear to have been more challenges with decision making in this case. *“This contributed to protracted negotiations over the deployment and/or functions of various secretariat global tools by field or zone-based secretariat personnel with the PRCS. Valuable time was lost in up scaling the early relief response while all of these issues were resolved.”*
- The result was a longer delay in deploying those same assets than for the earthquake response with a subsequent dilution of the overall quality of the response.
- The absence at the beginning of a dedicated HoD /DM to manage day to day relationships, communication and coordination between the IFRC Secretariat and the PRCS as well as with the ICRC, PNS was a risk that may have had a negative impact, however there are differing opinions on how significant that was.
- There was also a differing level of opinion as to whether the APZ SoPs were fully utilized. Some observers feel they were not fully operational however the observations from the DMU are worth noting.
 - The operation was guided by the AP SOPs.
 - There had been education on the SOPs prior to the disaster
 - While the SOPs allow for someone to be sent to the country level, this is not mandatory.
- It is agreed the decision not to send someone from the DMU to cover is questionable. However this was made within a context that the Deputy HoD was to return 2 days after the disaster i.e. launching of DREF, meaning a short gap before someone who had a trusted relationship with the NS to return. It should also be noted that this

“The IFRC Secretariat’s operational structure was not well geared to deliver timely, efficient and effective response for a disaster of this scale. The operation was adversely impacted by the lack of clarity of roles, responsibilities and reporting relationships between the different levels of the secretariat’s decentralised decision-making structure, between the secretariat and the PRCS and between the ICRC and the secretariat.”

Real time evaluation of IFRC response to 2010 Pakistan Floods



was at the very beginning of the disaster when the only impact was in KPK and the extent of the disaster to unfold in Punjab and Sindh was yet to happen. (APZ SOP: page 2, *“In situations where additional support is requested or required, the NS supported by the IFRC Secretariat representative in the Country Team will act as the operational lead and be responsible for managing the implementation of the response to a disaster situation.”*)

- However in the 2011 Annual Review of the SoPs a IFRC Secretariat representative is quoted as saying, *“Decision-making is the responsibility of the people in the country. We are there not to make decisions but to propose options”* and a PNS representative stated, *“in the Pakistan operation, some people sent me messages stating that they reported to Delhi and not to KL.”*

What lessons can be drawn from these two events that can enhance DR capacity?

The APZ is a well resourced and competent representative of the IFRC Secretariat in Asia Pacific and has demonstrated that since its creation real and tangible progress has been made in DM in the region both for the Zone and the APZ NS. However and in particular when major “corporate” level disaster events strike, it has both rights and obligations among which to effectively engage with the Geneva Secretariat and the wider Movement partners. Again feedback and comments in reviews of these operations and in interviews from this study vary in opinion as to how quick and effective the flood response was compared to that in the earthquake. The zone believe and have stated that there was a wide engagement with the Geneva Secretariat, PNS and the ICRC both inside and outside Pakistan and that early dialogue with the Delhi office was initiated but that with limited staffing there was also limited input. Discussions were also timely in establishing DMIS reporting. The GVA operations coordinators were informed of the evolution through taskforce notes, and emails and phone calls at key points – but not around every single operational issue or point that required consideration which was supported by the technical capacity at the zone. Nonetheless different opinions persisted to some degree from country, regional and Geneva levels and among both internal and external commentators. Specifically these noted the gap that was evident at the IFRC Secretariat country leadership level and questioning the admitted decision not to quickly deploy an Operations Coordinator or DM officer from the DMU.

Even the temporary absence of the deputy HoD and the other unavoidable hurdles that the zone faced in staffing the country office to meet the demands contributed to vulnerability at the moment of the flooding.



- Gaps in such key leadership and coordination posts have posed serious concerns, not just in the IFRC Secretariat Zones but in many other response agencies and in many other operations. Haiti, Tunisia and The Horn of Africa are just a few most recent examples. This absence in retention and succession of such staff diminish response preparedness for large scale disasters because trust and mutual understanding between the IFRC Secretariat and NS are such a critical element. If prolonged this can begin to undermine previous relationships, capacity gains and joint contingency plans for use of global tools as a safety net.
- Identifying a suitably experienced HoD and senior staff for this challenging country is and will remain fraught with difficulties. However the alternative of leaving such a critical post vacant poses even greater risks.
- Unlike the situation at the time of the floods, there is now a significant roster of experienced DM staff at the Zone, Regional and other country levels that the DMU confirm are can and would now be tasked to be temporarily re-assigned and in place where there is a high DM risk and an absence or shortage of coverage until an operational team or FACT was deployed. The APZ is rightfully regarded as one of the strongest links in the IFRC Secretariat DM system but it is just that... a link...it is not and cannot be a stand-alone entity, in the face of major disasters that will surge well beyond the Zone's sphere of operations The zone sees itself as having addressed these issues even if some aspects of that process remain "under construction" and would disagree with the statement expressed occasionally about the zones both in AP and elsewhere as evolving more as "a mini IFRC Secretariat" PNS representative APZ DR Capacity Review June 2011.
- In the Earthquake operation the respective country, regional, of both the IFRC Secretariat, ICRC and the PRCS and PNS at both Asia and Geneva levels rapidly engaged in a constructive dialogue that resulted in a more effective decision making culture that endured, not without challenges, throughout the response. The opposite seems to have been the case, at least in the relief phase, in the floods.

"Several interviewees questioned why surge capacity had not been immediately mobilised in late July from the zone office, SARD or Geneva offices, given the unusual staffing circumstances in the Pakistan country delegation at the time of the disaster.

Pakistan Floods RTE

In summary and despite differences of views on some issues the great concern expressed by almost all stakeholders, including many staff members in the Zone, the DMU, regional and country offices, was the acute and ongoing need to identify a more stable, dependable and qualified and well managed cadre or roster of "Surge DR experts" drawn from all



possible sources in the IFRC and from which the Zone and DMU could rely on to augment its own dedicated resources without negatively impacting on ongoing business and priorities and address the need to rapidly escalate a response. . An added fear expressed by some stakeholders interviewed for this review, and shared by the review team, was the fact that at the time of this review (we believe now subsequently addressed) this same situation of no HoD in Pakistan had prevailed for some time and only one IFRC Secretariat DM staff position exists in the delegation. Given the ongoing profile of Pakistan this was deemed an extraordinary high risk to the Zone and IFRC Secretariat as a whole.

Further with what we understand is the completion and tentative acceptance of the recommendations of the recent study of a Head of Emergency Operations Surge Roster this critical element of the IFRC Secretariat's global operations management Systems will address such risks.

4.5 OTHER MOVEMENT RESPONSE CAPACITIES

4.5.1 Participating National Societies

Within the selected countries PNS have a significant presence as well. For the most part PNS country-based staff are in place to support bilateral projects with the HNS, with significant emphasis on DRR programming. In a few cases these PNS offices are providing support for response capacity building of the NS, including one case of working to establish an NDRT and several cases of PNS support to technical response capacity building projects (e.g. Wat/San).

While most PNS staff appear to have development, health or project management backgrounds the presence of the PNS often constitutes a commitment to support the HNS. As such these PNS are often the first to offer support to an NS during a disaster in the form of funding (directly or through the IFRC Secretariat appeal) and sometimes ad hoc deployments of technical expertise.

The significant PNS investment in DRR programming observed in the selected countries is laudable. However, in a number of the countries visited stakeholders raised concerns that PNS approaches and methodology for DRR programming varies across PNS, often driven by back-donor requirements. This can lead to a fragmented and confusing operating environment for the HNS. In some cases PNS have taken the initiative to form consortiums and establish common technical strategies to address this issue which is clearly appreciated by IFRC Secretariat and HNS staff.



While DRR programming is likely having a significant positive impact for branches and communities at the local level it seems that due to funding restrictions and amounts most projects are only being implemented in a few communities and most learning and skill development remains at the local level when projects are completed (if sustained).

4.5.2 ICRC

The ICRC maintains a presence in 5 of the 6 countries visited and has ongoing humanitarian operations and capacity development projects for NS in some. ICRC capacity building focus with NS revolves primarily around establishing IHL dissemination, restoring family links and conflict (and other situations of violence) preparedness capacities.

The ICRC structure in Asia and Pacific differs significantly from that of the IFRC Secretariat. ICRC capacities and authorities are highly concentrated at the country-level with only a small regional office in Kuala Lumpur. Country offices have significant budgets based on programmatic goals and plans (rather than project based funding) allowing them to make strategic commitments to building NS capacities in their areas of focus when it meets NS needs and interests. The regional office serves a primarily representational and coordination function (coordinating with the IFRC Secretariat Zone office) but also contains some technical experts who support country offices on demand. These technical experts allocate and track their time based on direct support requests from the country offices, which pay a proportional amount of the technical expert's salaries commensurate with requested support. This approach inherently balances supply and demand and is planned in advance through the ICRC's annual global planning process.

ICRC country office budgets are allocated from the headquarters based on budgets and plans approved through the annual planning process which also minimizes the need for country-based staff to spend time seeking resources for program needs throughout the year.

4.6 UNDERSTANDING, ACCESS AND USE OF THE IFRC GLOBAL DISASTER RESPONSE SYSTEM

In times of major or complex disasters, the IFRC's Global Response tools, FACT, ERUs, RDRT, DREF and DMIS have become a valued and often critical resource in support of affected national societies. The timely and efficient mobilisation, deployment, coordination and operational management of these complex tools are not without its challenges.

Once on the ground the international teams must be integrated into what is inevitably a challenging, stressful and usually confused scenario. The Host NS is under huge pressure as



will be the assisting IFRC Secretariat and PNS resources at all levels. The added value of these systems is therefore closely related to the pre-disaster understanding and acceptance of all parties to the mobilisation process, as to their utility and worth, the SoPs and deployment protocols that facilitate and expedite their delivery and the operational application of the tools in the field. Achieving this consequently adds to the overall DR capacity of the Host NS, the zone office structures, the PNS who provide the resources human and material, the Geneva Secretariat and the ICRC, who now deploy them more frequently.

The review team has studied the use, acceptability and effectiveness of the tools where activation has been taken and what the overall understanding and awareness of the stakeholders is in the system. Specific focus was on RDRT, FACT and ERU and DREF.

From 2005-2011 there were 10 FACT deployments including 65 people total in the APZ to Pakistan (3), Philippines (2), Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Samoa. A total of forty five ERUs were deployed from 2007 to 2011 in the APZ - to Pakistan and Bangladesh in 2007; Myanmar, China and Philippines in 2008; Indonesia in 2009; and Pakistan in 2010.

Some of the AP NS have FACT and ERU trained staff and have worked alongside these tools through their RDRT and bilateral deployments in other countries. RDRT deployments have on the other hand increased almost 100% within the Zone over the past 5 years and most NS have numerous RDRT trained staff. DREF allocations appear universally appreciated by NS.

“FACT, ERUs are great. But tools are meant to address a gap. However the tools are not always deployed to just address the gap”
IFRC Regional Officer

Based on the data reviewed there is a broad awareness among the IFRC and external partners and to a lesser extent the national governments, not always accompanied by a detailed understanding, of the global tools and specifically FACT and ERU. There was a general acceptance that, where there had been some dissemination of them, the ToR and SoPs for FACT, ERU and RDRT indicated their deployment would be a positive inclusion

“FACT and RDRT can be perceived as political and their value may depend on the situation”
HNS DM Coordinator

option for response and operational effectiveness. Among some PNS (from within and outside the Zone) and IFRC Secretariat staff there remains some concern about appropriate use of global tools.



The global tools were often referred to, and in the eyes of many stakeholders both within the IFRC Secretariat and PNS, as not an Asia Pacific resource or asset but rather an “outside intervention”.

The idea was enlightening to many interviewees when expressed that these tools, whilst being funded, developed and at least partially resourced by PNS, were in fact for the exclusive benefit and at the call of a HNS affected by overwhelming pressures.

“These teams have little if any utility in our own countries they are solely for support to the affected NS and as such are effectively theirs to use”
PNS Representative

“We know understand and can identify when ERU FACT etc may have value but see contradictions in zone systems. Too many “templates” SoP mixed and at cross purposes. See ERU with some suspicion as a platform to get the “PNS foot in the door” at any cost PNS using NS as a guinea pig”
NS DM Coordinator

There is a certain level of suspicion that the FACT, ERU and to a much lesser extent RDRT, are primarily a delivery platform for PNS to “get in on the ground floor” “fly their flag” “pour delegates into the operation” “Geneva tools (FACT and ERUs) too static and rigid” As quoted from Zone HNS and IFRC Secretariat.

On more detailed investigation it was clear that there was often a misunderstanding of and reluctance to accept what the HNS responsibilities and benefits might be when ERU arrived.

“We don’t think we really need them”
“they don’t understand our environment”
“They don’t speak our language”
Quotes: From interviews and from desk review of various APZ reports and evaluations.

There was some resistance even bordering on hostility to recognising let alone facilitating the activation and engagement of these “outsiders”.

There are both excellent and poor examples of Zone/Geneva/PNS/HNS communication and coordination in the activation of the global tools in APZ but in each the importance and consequences of the presence or lack of trust, professionalism and mutual interest and objectives cannot be understated.

“The IFRC and ICRC quickly established a coordinated working methodology with the PNS and the HNS. Both IFRC and ICRC rapidly mobilised ERUs and a joint logistics network was also established”.
Evaluation of the ICRC Response to the Pakistan Earthquake. Channel Research Nov 2006



Responses were considerably more positive where the experience of the interviewees, particularly the IFRC Secretariat delegates and HNS staff, included direct engagement with the global tools such as previous FACT, ERU, RDRT training and particularly deployment; direct involvement of the mobilisation process the arrival and operational tasking or the FACT/ERU/RDRT handover protocols after the response.

However once these issues (Communication and coordination) had been resolved... majority of receiving NS were pleased with the decision and in many cases gained valuable lessons and added to their DR capacity as a result. Stakeholders acknowledged the important need for these global tools and, in particular, the key roles being played by the ERUs/BHCUs and the RDRT in the flood response. RTE Pakistan Floods 2010

In these cases there was an acceptance that the decision to call in global tools is not always an easy one and personality and opinions can often override SoP and response guidelines. Where good communication and contingency planning between the involved parties was manifest reactions were very positive. This included acknowledging and planning

for situations under which FACT, ERU and RDRT may be utilised in pre-disaster meetings, relief agreements or other proactive dialogue.

There was also an acknowledgement that the arrival of these resources could add to the coordination and management tasks of all and that integration could be challenging.

The ERU Team was working hard to maintain excellent relations with all partners involved in the Pakistan Flood operations. The PRCS volunteers at district and provincial branch level, the local authorities at district level (District Coordination Officers), the other ERU's deployed in the area of operations. Of course we have seen different level of competencies and professionalism. However, it should be mentioned in this report, the fantastic leadership throughout the Sindh provincial PRCS branch."

End of Mission ERU Report

"The PRCS-led water and sanitation team, trained and equipped through a previous ERU deployment to another disaster response (Pak/India Earthquake), was reported to have performed very well"
RTE Pakistan floods

Despite some reservations about the teams, many of the APZ HNS have DM staff trained for RDRT, FACT and in ERUs indicating a fundamental belief the tools have value to them.

This analysis and evidence suggests that with good training and promotion of IFRC Secretariat, PNS and HNS staff the global tools can be well integrated and valued by the HNS.



Final Report

5. CONCLUSIONS

Disaster Management within the Zone is on a good path. There is a culture and strong evidence of seeking constant improvement which will be enhanced through initiating, engaging in and maintaining open dialogue with all partners. Continuing to refine processes, building a Zone-wide DM team, and strengthen capacity building for response and seeking feedback on NS needs will result in increasingly high performance in response.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop an Ongoing Response Capacity Assessment Process to Monitor NS Readiness and Support Needs. The Zone DMU should establish a pool of people from NS (from among RDRT members), IFRC Secretariat and PNS and train them to conduct capacity assessment missions. Using the indicators for basic minimum NS response capacities these teams would review readiness and identify priorities for support once every five years. IFRC Secretariat Zone, Regional and Country offices should utilize the results of such assessments to guide capacity building investments in consultation with PNS, ICRC and external partners.
2. Reallocate Resources to Better Support NS Response Capacity Building. Within the Zone, the DMU and Regional Offices should collaborate to deploy existing DM staff to the country level for longer-term assignments which support building basic minimum NS response capacity. Globally the IFRC should identify existing and new financial and human resources to support country level programs for response capacity building to balance project funding dependency.
3. Prioritize Response Capacity Building Focus on Developing Key NS Systems including: *NDRTs, SoPs and protocols; logistics systems and expertise; fundraising, quality and accountability mechanisms; and NS positioning within their national response system* (e.g. national laws and platforms). Time and resources should be reallocated towards coaching, mentoring and facilitating practical country level and Zonal simulations and exercises to “test the system”.
4. Respond to Trends in the External Environment by Continuing to Develop Practical Tools and Partnerships for NS. Special projects focused on helping NS and IFRC Secretariat systems adapt to climate change, urbanization (and in particular earthquake risk) and civil unrest should be continued and reinforced with emphasis on practical guidance and development of scenarios for use in simulations and exercises.
5. Work with PNS and donors to build appreciation and program funding for response preparedness as a core pillar of DRR. Without detracting from community-based DRR the IFRC Secretariat as a leader in response should proactively seek to ensure



greater balance in donor funding to ensure national response systems are capacitated and sustainable.

6. Enhance Country-Level IFRC Secretariat Coordination Efforts to Maximize Strategic Benefit of DM Investments. IFRC Secretariat country offices and PNS should redouble their efforts to synchronize and coordinate the myriad DRR and disaster preparedness efforts taking place in AP countries. Work towards shared objectives, based on NS strategies and assessment of NS basic minimum response capacities, should be monitored and reviewed in collective partnership meetings with the NS to increase mutual accountability and coherence.