

IFRC – International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Tsunami Unit

Community Recovery and Reconstruction Partnership (CRRP)



Evaluation Report

27 November 2009

(Addressing the comments on WATSAN)

Table of Contents

- 1 Introduction 10**
 - 1.1 Scope of the CRRP programme..... 10
 - 1.2 Background of the evaluation..... 10
 - 1.3 Acknowledgements..... 10
 - 1.4 Structure of the report 12
- 2 Programme Description..... 12**
 - 2.1 Brief background..... 12
 - 2.2 Stakeholders and partners of CRRP 12
- 3 Notes on the Evaluation 13**
 - 3.1 Scope of the evaluation..... 13
 - 3.2 Evaluation process and methodology..... 14
- 4 Main Findings and Conclusions 20**
 - 4.1 General..... 20
 - 4.2 Programme Design 20
 - 4.2.1 Relevance..... 20
 - 4.2.2 Coverage 21
 - 4.2.3 Appropriateness and Coherence..... 21
 - 4.3 Programme Outputs..... 29
 - 4.3.1 General..... 29
 - 4.3.2 Effectiveness 29
 - 4.3.3 Appropriateness..... 32
 - 4.4 Programme Outcomes..... 42
 - 4.4.1 Effectiveness 43
 - 4.4.2 Sustainability..... 44
 - 4.4.3 Impact..... 46
 - 4.5 Programme Management..... 49
 - 4.5.1 Appropriateness:..... 49
 - 4.5.2 Effectiveness:..... 51
 - 4.5.3 Efficiency: 54
 - 4.6 SLRCS Capacity-Building 55
 - 4.6.1 Effectiveness:..... 55
 - 4.6.2 Sustainability:..... 55
- 5 Recommendations 57**
- 6 Inputs for the IFRC Toolkit Development 65**
- 7 Annex..... 66**

List of Acronyms

AGA	Additional Government Agent
BoC	Bank of Ceylon
CAP	Community Action Planning
CBDM	Community Based Disaster Management
CBH	Community Based Health
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCD	Coast Conservation Department
CDC	Community Development Council
CHM	Community Housing Mobilisers
ConsCo	Construction Coordination
CRRP	Community Recovery and Reconstruction Partnership
CZMP	Coastal Zone Management Plan
DAT	Damage Assessment Team
DGC	Divisional Grievance Committee
DM	Disaster Management
DMC	Disaster Management Committee
DS	Divisional Secretary
FCCISL	Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries of Sri Lanka
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GA	Government Agent (District Secretary)
GN	Grama Niladari
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	International Development Association (WB)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KAP	Knowledge – Attitude – Practices (survey)
LKR	Sri Lankan Rupee
LoA	Letter of Agreement
m	million
MC	Movement Coordination
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MP	Member of Parliament
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHDA	National Housing Development Authority
NPMT	National Programme Management Team
NS	National Society
NSC	National Steering Committee
NWSDB	National Water Supply and Drainage Board
ODHS	Owner Driven Housing Scheme

ODP	Owner Driven Programme
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
PG	Primary Group
PHAST	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
PMN	Pledge Management Note
PNS	Participating National Society
PS	Pradeshiya Sabha
RADA	Reconstruction and Development Agency
RAT	Recovery Assessment Team
RBM&E	Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation
RC	Red Cross
RCM	Red Cross Movement
Rs	Rupees
SACOSAN	South Asian Conference on Sanitation
SEI	Stockholm Environment Institute
SLF	Sustainable Livelihood Framework
SLRCS	Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
SME	Small Medium Enterprises
sq.ft.	Square feet
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
THRU	Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSSC	Technical Support Service Centre
UDA	Urban Development Authority
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
USD	US Dollar
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
VRC	Village Rehabilitation Committee
WATSAN	Water supply and environmental sanitation
WB	World Bank

Executive Summary

CRRP was established by IFRC, UN-Habitat, and SLRCS to assist Tsunami affected families in reconstructing their houses, technical infrastructure and recovering their livelihoods. CRRP was designed as an 'owner-driven' programme. It includes a top-up/ full cost programme of 32.7 m USD and serves 5.500 beneficiaries.

IFRC commissioned Skat Consultancy to assess the CRRP programme. The overall purpose was to highlight the extent in which the programme has contributed in supporting selected communities after the impact of the Tsunami. The scope of evaluation included the evaluation of CRRP's design, outputs, outcomes, programme management, and SLRCS capacity-building. The analysis focuses on the aspects of relevance, appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability.

The evaluation is seen as a snap-shot of the current situation and most obvious results of the CRRP programme. The intention was to "look behind the scenes", concentrating more on qualitative aspects than on quantitative ones, with a focus also on programme management issues. This evaluation report is based on observations out of the documents' review and during the sight visits, and interviews with beneficiaries and main stakeholders (programme management team members, donor representatives, Governmental officers, etc.).

Based on the findings, the evaluation team developed recommendations for the second phase in Jaffna and future similar programmes, as well as inputs for a toolkit development. The toolkit development serves as capitalisation of lessons learnt within CRRP.

Skat Consultancy established an evaluation team, studied programme documents, elaborated questionnaires, prepared an inception report, and undertook a 3-weeks mission to Sri Lanka (August 2009) with 29 site visits including approximately visited 280 houses and 40 community projects, interviews and workshops in order to capture the views of key stakeholders. IFRC assisted in the evaluation with well organised logistics, facilitation of site visits and provision of background information. A challenge was lacking baseline data which made it difficult to compare results before and after CRRP's implementation.

As a whole the programme's design is in accordance with the local context and needs of the affected families, as well as with the strategies of the three partners. A total number of 5,354 of beneficiaries were reached through CRRP. As a whole, only 81 beneficiaries dropped out which is an overall drop-out rate of very low level of 1.5%. The design is well developed and allows for a holistic and comprehensive implementation. It covers major areas to improve living conditions after Tsunami in a sustainable manner. CRRP not only includes the construction of houses with water supply and environmental sanitation, it also addresses economic and social needs of beneficiaries in order to restart a new life after Tsunami.

Concerning the selection of beneficiaries, it seems that the beneficiary list did not always include the most affected or the poorest families. In the opinion of the evaluators, the partners had too little influence on the selection of beneficiaries.

Generally, the housing component including water supply and sanitation (WATSAN), and community development components seem to be stronger compared with the component on livelihood, which has been weaker and rather not reaching its objective. The majority of beneficiaries were able to build a permanent house for themselves – a house which serves as a new home for living and space for home business. However, it seems that, in particular, single-headed women households and the very poor families / most vulnerable ones were overwhelmed by the huge task to handle funds and organise house construction.

A positive result out of CRRP is the community mobilisation approach which was to establish Community Development Councils (CDCs). Meanwhile, CDCs have started several activities and established also saving systems. The idea of establishing CDCs was very useful to foster communities' organisational development. Formation of CDC has been meant to develop a grassroots organisation in the absence of any, following the basic principle of social mobilisation, which includes empowerment of the marginalised

people. This was a very useful participatory approach during programme implementation to empower the selected communities. Through the CDCs, communities could express their needs and take steps towards problem solving with appropriate interventions.

With regard to the selected owner-driven approach, positively, beneficiaries were very free to design and build their houses according to their preferences, nevertheless following Sri Lankan National Housing Development Authority (NHDA) standards. Families got empowered through the experience of building a new home and could obtain knowledge about construction through the daily exposure of implementation. Yet, the approach seems more useful, if beneficiaries are better-off economic-wise and if they are professional masons or carpenters. A challenge of the owner-driven approach was that poorer households tend to utilise CRRP funds to buy food or items instead to use them for construction purposes. The second phase in Jaffna should consider that risk and provide close guidance to families, where needed, in managing funds.

Positively 94% of all beneficiaries' houses are completed. Concerning the quality of the final output (housing, WATSAN, community infrastructure, livelihood support, disaster management, health promotion), quality generally differs from location to location and from household to household. As most houses are completed, it is very difficult to assess the quality and completeness of foundations. Similarly, if houses are already plastered and painted, it is hard to determine the quality of construction, walls, used materials (cement, sand, bricks, etc.) and concrete structural engineering components, such as concrete slabs, columns and beams. The evaluators observed and took notes from general impressions during site visits and observations gained in interviews with beneficiaries and programme staff.

As a whole, ring-beams, walls, floor, roof structure, doors and window frames, etc. seem to be in good shape. But, there is the problem of leaking roofs. An estimated 50% of the completed roofs, which the evaluators saw, have leakages. A further problem is that approximately 80% of all checked roofs do not have fixings of roof tiles. In Pottuvil area, constructed houses seem of lower quality compared with other CRRP locations. Common problems are incomplete ring beams, low quality of bricks and masonry work, poor structural quality, and leaking roofs. This problem is also related to the fact that parts of construction was done under the earlier base grant of the Government, where there was hardly any technical supervision.

CRRP took over houses that were half-built by the owners using the Base Grant by the Government. Sometimes, due to the time it took for donors to commit funding, houses remained half-built for several months. This had an impact on the quality of the houses, also because there was no TO involvement in the Base Grant stage, and exposed unfinished construction work deteriorated over the time. Furthermore, since people started building without TO support they tended to make their foundations well in excess of 500 sqft, and therefore ran into difficulties later.

Beneficiaries express high satisfaction with the safety aspects, functional layout of the houses, legal ownership of land plots and houses, and access to basic services. Positively, beneficiaries have secured land and own the newly constructed house, which is an essential basis for beneficiaries to start a new life and having a secure home. All CRRP communities are located outside the buffer zone or are relocated away from the coast in safe areas. The majority of the rebuilt houses are constructed according to NHDA guidelines or of higher standard. A challenge remains as beneficiaries are not sure of how to undertake repairs and how to finance them in the future.

Major difficulties for beneficiaries were delayed payments, constraints of budget to finish houses, purchasing construction material and equipment, hiring masons and carpenters, and technical supervision.

CRRP avoided the use of asbestos. Yet, environmental aspects could have played a greater role. There have been so far no efforts to use alternative building materials and technologies (e.g. earth blocks, rat-trap brick bond, etc.) or rainwater-harvesting systems.

The WATSAN component covered drinking water, solid waste management, environmental sanitation and hygiene promotion. Yet, the design should have incorporated a communication strategy, of how the most relevant facts of CRRP should be shared between programme staff and the beneficiaries. At household level, latrine designs introduced by CRRP are well appropriate to the local context of availability of water and soil structure. Water supply solutions promoted are appropriate and simple with regard to operation, maintenance, and affordability.

With regard to strategic guidance by the project management, the strategy respectively the selection and implementation of community WATSAN component was less effective though it was based on sound community management principles. Concerning access and use of drinking water supply, except in one visited community in Pottuvil area, in all of the others were covered with drinking water supply with different service levels. Absence of professional guidance (not the facilitation) during CAP workshop in project selection has resulted in un-informed decision making in selecting and implementing the priorities in community WATSAN needs in few communities.

The idea of providing beneficiaries with a livelihood programme component as complementary to the housing component was well received by beneficiaries. In fact, the livelihood component of CRRP has supported complementary or secondary income generating activities of self-employment nature only to a limited extent, as a result of the training given to a fewer number of women and the youth in the communities. The programme has not taken deliberate attempts to directly address the 'Back to Business' issue in any appreciable manner neither in its design nor as an outcome of the CAP workshop, where the practices were discussed. There is need for follow-up actions through a further social mobilisation process in order to create an enabling environment for the improvement of the livelihood situation.

With respect to programme management, responsibilities within the Partnership were clearly defined and generally well executed. The establishment of a Steering Committee and the national project team proved to be a positive for participatory decision-making. However, at local levels, the partnership was not too strong. Some of the delays in the disbursement of grants to beneficiaries were caused by a highly bureaucratic approval and disbursement system.

A further challenge was late financial commitments by donors resulted in a delayed start of programme implementation.

A useful tool was preparing mid-term reviews and end of projects reviews. But, it remained unclear how and to what extent the programme management took up bottlenecks and solved them during implementation. Furthermore, baseline information had been missing and that was a weakness in the monitoring system. Another challenge was that each partner had its own monitoring and evaluation (M&E) procedures and reporting system.

Another hurdle was that there were too few Technical Officers (TOs) to assist in the programme implementation. The majority of TOs seem to have been overwhelmed by the task of ensuring good quality construction. Often, TOs were rather young and inexperienced.

Similarly, Social / Community Mobilisers had too many families to look after. Poor professional qualification with lacking experience of social development, community mobilisation, and gender sensitivity aspects was a difficulty.

The evaluation team observed that many of SLRCS staff members within CRRP lacked skills in project management, and therefore would need a thorough capacity building including internal restructures, and clear divisions of responsibilities.

It seems that skills and capacities of Social Mobilisers are still rather weak in Disaster Management. Many mobilisers interviewed appear to be inexperienced and to lack training in social issues. It would have been good if Mobilisers had received training on community building, moderation, leadership skills, project management, coaching, gender-sensitivity, etc. Most Mobilisers received only training in home-gardening in order to pass the knowledge on to the communities. In addition, it seems that BEOs and Mobilisers did not receive a briefing on owner-driven approach, what it means and how to implement it at grass-roots level.

There are 26 CRRP communities which are already converted into SLRCS units. Yet, there are still 72 CDCs remaining to be taken care of by the SLRCS's Divisions (not the branch) who are responsible for the transformation. It seems that there is no strategy behind or plan for SLRCS's new units. In addition, once CDCs are converted into the units, it remains unclear who will finance their management and any activities. Providing trainings on first aid, blood donations, recruiting volunteers, etc. need a well organised and funded concept, proceedings, and human resources. Further, CDCs may follow a different agenda than to become units of SLRCS. Their commitment is highly needed and a thorough assessment on CDCs goals and objectives as well as capacities is recommended.

To conclude, owner-driven approach is useful in many cases, but not always. A flexible owner-driven approach could address better the needs of vulnerable families, such as single women headed and poor households. It would be good to incorporate better needs of women for example in the Jaffna – CRRP second phase. This requires experienced implementation management with intensive technical and socio-economic assistance, a thorough supervision with improved M&E procedures, and financial assistance.

1 Introduction

1.1 Scope of the CRRP programme

The Community Recovery and Reconstruction Partnership (CRRP) programme was established by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society (SLRCS) and the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) in 2006 to assist Tsunami affected families in selected districts in Sri Lanka. The aim of the programme was to rebuild their houses and support in the recovery of their lives. Programme activities concluded in early 2009. CRRP is an 'owner-driven' programme, in which the owners are in charge of rebuilding their own house¹. The support provided by CRRP followed two different schemes: a) a top-up cash grant which supplemented the basic grant from the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), a separate grant for sanitary latrines and technical assistance; and b) full cost coverage, where total grant was provided for the reconstruction of houses, in the absence of the GOSL basic grant. In addition, the CRRP provided a grant for the repair or improve community infrastructure and for the promotion of livelihoods development.

CRRP has been the largest Red Cross (RC) Programme in Sri Lanka and one of the major programmes of the Red Cross Movement (RCM) worldwide, with a budget of almost 57.7 m USD, consisting of a Base Grant Programme by the World Bank through the Government of Sri Lanka (25 m USD and approx. 11.000 beneficiaries) and the Top-Up/ Full Cost Programme (32.7 m USD and nearly 5.500 beneficiaries).

1.2 Background of the evaluation

Skat Consultancy has been commissioned by IFRC to evaluate the CRRP programme in Sri Lanka. The overall purpose was to understand the extent in which the programme has contributed in establishing resilient communities after the impact of the Tsunami.

The evaluation is seen as a snap-shot of the current situation and most obvious results of the CRRP programme. The intention was to "look behind the scenes", concentrating more on qualitative aspects than on quantitative ones, with a focus also on programme management issues. Based on the findings, the evaluation team developed recommendations for the second phase in Jaffna and similar programmes in the future, as well as inputs for the toolkit development which is based on the lessons learnt out of the CRRP programme' implementation.

Furthermore, the evaluation intended to contribute to the body of learning from IFRC's entire Tsunami operation. The study provides observations, useful data, and draws conclusions that form the basis for formulating 'lessons learned' for the involved organisations. The study is addressed primarily to the three partners: IFRC Sri Lanka, UN-Habitat and SLRCS; and secondly to IFRC senior managers in Geneva/ field operations, IFRC Shelter Unit in Geneva, and to the donor PNSs.

1.3 Acknowledgements

The evaluation team is thankful to the local communities particularly the families who shared their views and experience with the CRRP programme implementation. They helped the evaluators to understand better and learn from the practices of post Tsunami owner-driven recovery and reconstruction process and outcomes.

- Governmental officials, who took their time to share their feedback and comments
- National and local implementation teams: IFRC, UN-Habitat, SLRCS

¹ IFRC defines ODR as following: Under an ODR programme an institution (government, NGO, banks, RCRC National Societies, etc) provides assistance directly to households for the rebuilding of their lost assets. The principle of ODR is that the prioritisation of needs and the decision making is in the hands of the affected families, giving them ownership of their rehabilitation, and building their skills and self-confidence.

- Support content-wise and logistics: IFRC team in Colombo
- Other support from IFRC Geneva and Kuala Lumpur in preparing the assignment

1.4 Structure of the report

The report follows the structure proposed in the ToRs: programme design, outputs, outcomes, programme management and SLRCS's capacity building. The findings are categorised under the 'lenses' – relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, sustainability, coverage and coherence. The report provides general recommendations and inputs for the IFRC toolkit development, especially the Owner Driven Housing Reconstruction Guidelines.

In the annex the following documents are included:

- Questions for field observations
- Field visit plan
- List of people met and interviewees
- Inception Report
- TORs for evaluation

2 Programme Description

2.1 Brief background

IFRC has been taking an active part in the Owner Driven Housing Programme, through a partnership agreement named the Community Recovery and Reconstruction Partnership (CRRP) together with the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), the World Bank's IDA and UN-Habitat. Beneficiaries who are targeted for this programme are tsunami devastated coastal communities in Colombo/Kalutara, Batticaloa, Ampara and Jaffna.

The support that families received under the CRRP to rebuild their homes consisted of either a top-up cash grant which supplemented the Government base grant or a full-cost grant. Additionally, a grant was provided for the construction of water and sanitation community infrastructure, for the repair or improvement of community infrastructure through community contracts and for the promotion of livelihoods development.

The primary objective of CRRP was to assist identified communities and families to rebuild their settlements and housing, in an integrated community based approach. Specific objectives included:

- Assist tsunami affected households to rebuild their homes according to national standards,
- To participate in their community's development and improve basic community infrastructure,
- Create an enabling environment for new and improved livelihood opportunities for tsunami-affected households.

2.2 Stakeholders and partners of CRRP

The responsibility of ensuring support to the families and communities to rebuild their homes was undertaken by UN-Habitat, in cooperation with SLRCS. It was expected that SLRCS will continue to work with the recovered communities on the completion of the Programme, ensuring sustainability and consolidation of the recovery process. IFRC raised and provided funds for the Programme, monitored progress and provided feed back to the donors.

The role of UN-Habitat was basically to implement CRRP reconstruction activities including work plans and action plans, to provide technical assistance to the beneficiaries (through District Managers, Engineers and Technical Officers), to implement community contracts with the Community Development Councils (CDCs) for the implementation of community infrastructure projects, to authorise progress

payments, to assist in solving land tenure issues and to report on the progress to the National Steering Committee.

SLRCS, was in charge of community mobilisation (through the Assistant District Manager, Community Mobilisers and Volunteers), facilitating the community building process (formation of CDCs) and Community Action Planning process, conduct capacity building programmes for communities, facilitate needs assessments and implement the livelihoods component.

IFRC's major role was to organise the funding, communicate with the donors, disburse the grant instalments to the beneficiaries' bank accounts, establish and implement an effective M&E system, and implement the community Water and Sanitation component.

3 Notes on the Evaluation

3.1 Scope of the evaluation

The scope of evaluation is based on the Terms of Reference (annex) which includes the assessment of the following components of the CRRP programme:

- Programme design
- Outputs
- Outcomes
- Programme management
- SLRCS capacity-building

In particular, the evaluation looks at the quality of the final output, and the factors which had an obvious effect on quality. Likewise, it analyses the outcome of the programme from the perspective of beneficiaries and other stakeholders, especially the impact of the programme on the beneficiaries' quality of life, with comparison to their condition of pre-tsunami. Furthermore, the study observes the effectiveness and efficiency of the Partnership management function, and the strengthening of the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society with regard to increased capacity and coverage, and their positioning as an actor in disaster recovery in Sri Lanka.

The main 'lenses' for the evaluation being:

- Relevance
- Appropriateness
- Efficiency
- Effectiveness
- Sustainability

And to a lesser extent:

- Coverage
- Coherence
- Impact

The evaluation report serves as a basis for further development of lessons learned and provides also recommendations for the Federation's toolkit development.

3.2 Evaluation process and methodology

The evaluation team studied in depth the programme proposal including the community WATSAN proposal and the housing proposal (in which the household latrine is included) before and after the field work. The analysis is judged on the context, based on best practices and success stories of the sectors.

The team

Skat Consultancy established an evaluation team with the following team members:

- Team Leader / Housing Specialist: Claudia Schneider (International consultant)
- M&E Specialist: Bertha Camacho (International consultant)
- WATSAN Specialist: Palitha Jayaweera (local consultant)
- Livelihood / Microfinance Specialist: M.H.S. Dayaratne (local consultant)

Preparation

The preparation of the evaluation included:

- The revision of the relevant programme documents provided by IFRC Colombo and Geneva offices.
- The elaboration of questionnaires for the interviews, and guides for site visits and for documents reviews (in annex).
- The preparation and submission of an inception report (in annex) to IFRC Colombo and Geneva detailing the methodology and proceedings of how to conduct the evaluation. It included the above mentioned questionnaires and guides, time schedule, and structure of the evaluation report.

Site visits, interviews and workshops

The evaluation team undertook a 3 - week's mission to Sri Lanka (3 - 25 August 2009) to do interviews with key stakeholders and site visits of CRRP communities.

The most significant part in the evaluation process were the numerous site visits for an in-depth review and semi-structured interviews with beneficiary families in Kalutara, Batticaloa I & II, Ampara, Pottuvil, and Jaffna. In total, the evaluation team visited 29 locations, with an approximate number of 280 visited houses and 40 community infrastructure / WATSAN projects visited (field visit schedule in annex). Interviewees included the beneficiaries, CDC duty bearers, and few non-beneficiaries. Additionally, three workshops with CDC members and duty bearers (in Kalutara, Pottuvil, Jaffna) were carried out to verify, reflect on the programme's results, and to cover any information gaps, which were not captured through the interviews on site.

As most houses are completed, it is very difficult to assess the quality and completeness of foundations. Similarly, if houses are already plastered and painted, it is hard to determine the quality of construction, walls, used materials (cement, sand, bricks, etc.) and concrete structural engineering components, such as concrete slabs, columns and beams. The evaluators observed and took notes from general impressions during site visits and observations gained in interviews with beneficiaries and programme staff.

The evaluation team paid special attention to cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, gender and the rights of the most vulnerable. The evaluation team considered the 'Do no harm' approach and has been gender sensitive when assessing the impact on project target groups and the broader community.

Further, the evaluation team conducted several semi-structured interviews with programme staff of IFRC, UN-Habitat (National Coordination staff, District Managers², Engineers, TOs), SLRCS (BEO, Mobilisers), and Local Government officials (GA, DS, GNs, PS). In addition, telephone interviews with the former Senior Programme Coordinator (Mr. Klaus Palkovitz) and UN-Habitat's Senior Human Settlement Officer in Fukuoka-Japan (Mr. Jan Meeuwissen), and face-to-face interviews with donor representatives of

² Only the District Managers of Batticaloa I and II, and of Ampara were available for interviews.

American Red Cross, Irish Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, and Finnish Red Cross in Colombo provided further information and clarifications. A detailed list of interviewees is attached in the annex.

Triangulation of information was an important tool and was done in the form of de-briefings with the IFRC, UN-Habitat and SLRCS staff after the field visits and interviews with beneficiary families and daily debriefings within the evaluation team. These sessions helped a lot to cross check impressions, observations and interpretation of findings.



Workshops with key stakeholders

What went well?

Positively, the programme of the evaluation mission to Sri Lanka was well organised (see also detailed field visit schedule in the annex). The evaluation team is very grateful to the IFRC team in Colombo in providing transport and logistics and thoroughly facilitating site visits, interviews and workshops. Furthermore, the IFRC Colombo team assisted in numerous content-wise inputs about CRRP, providing background information and relevant documents.

- During the field visits and CDC workshops, beneficiaries were very helpful in showing their houses, giving their time for answering questions, and participating very actively in the discussions of the workshops.
- UN-Habitat District Managers and SLRCS branches were available in most districts for site visits, interviews and CDC workshops.
- Former IFRC staff members in Batticaloa and UN-Habitat staff in Ampara, Batticaloa and Jaffna were also very helpful in providing technical information.
- Representatives of the local government, such as Government Agents (District Secretaries), Divisional Secretaries, Grama Niladari and Pradeshiya Sabha were also supportive in providing information.



In-depth interview with beneficiaries on site

Challenges during the evaluation

- Lack of a thorough baseline study made it difficult to compare findings after the finishing of CRRP. Even though the programme carried out baseline surveys, they were not sufficient for making a thorough “before and after” comparison. Some of the reasons for that are: a) Information gathered in baseline surveys are mainly from secondary sources and provide with rough and general information and do not include all programme indicators; b) Baseline surveys were carried out at a later stage in project implementation. Some of them even date March of 2008.
- During the field visits interpretation was sometimes a challenge. The provided interpreter had some difficulties in translating thoroughly and fluently. Therefore, former IFRC and SLRCS staff had to interpret interviews in Batticaloa and Ampara; and UN-Habitat and SLRCS staff in Jaffna assisted in interpreting. Such situation opened space for biased interpretation and translation, compelling the team to double-check answers from beneficiaries and other sources and using more time than planned in given interviews.
- Another obstacle was getting appointments with Local Government Officials. Some of them were not available and had to cancel the scheduled meetings at last minute because of other commitments. In some cases, the team faced delays due to changes of scheduled meetings. In many cases, interviews were too short and did not allow for in-depth dialogue with some government representatives. In addition, in some cases the ‘right’ officials were not available because they were transferred to new assignments in other locations.
- Strong security measurements especially in Batticaloa II, Ampara and in Jaffna led to less time for site visits. The evaluation team in coordination with IFRC had to select a limited number of locations to be visited. In spite of such limitation, the evaluation team could visit a wide range of different CRRP sites to get various impressions and insights.

4 Main Findings and Conclusions

4.1 General

Generally, the implementation of the housing component including the WATSAN and community development parts seem to be stronger compared with the component on livelihood, which has been weaker and rather not reaching its objective.

Positively, the majority of beneficiaries could build a permanent house for themselves – a house which serves as a new home for living and space for home business. The total number of houses implemented by CRRP is 5,434 units (end of March 2009). According to IFRC-Colombo, there were 5,356 beneficiaries who benefited from community infrastructure and a total of 281 drop-outs with families that did not receive all the grant instalments.

Having the chance to receive a grant and in some cases to contribute with own private savings or additional loans, beneficiaries had to go through the process of managing a house construction. People organised themselves with a certain support by the CDCs, TOs and Mobilisers in getting a construction plan, buying building material, and hiring masons and carpenters. Thus beneficiaries learned a lot about getting organised, management of grants and construction. Most of the families interviewed feel satisfied with the programme support.

However, the evaluation team met families, in particular single-headed households and very poor families, who were simply overwhelmed by the task to manage grant money and supervise a construction site. This group of people had preferred a donor-driven approach where they had received a ready-made house.

A positive result out of CRRP is the successful community mobilisation. Most CRRP communities seem to be well organised and mobilised. Communities have started several activities and established also saving systems. Some beneficiaries have strengthened their leadership skills by having overtaken a mandate in the CDC board or as CDC duty bearers representing their community and feeling confident enough to speak in front of many people. In some cases, some of the leaders feel satisfied with the fact, that they were able to be useful and support the improvement of the living conditions of many of the families in their communities.

4.2 Programme Design

4.2.1 Relevance

As a whole the programme's design is in line with local needs and priorities of the Tsunami- affected families. CRRP positively addressed the needs of affected families, who lived within the buffer zone and launched a 'relocation' and reconstruction programme component. And, CRRP had a component of an 'in-situ' housing reconstruction programme for partially and fully damaged houses outside the buffer zone.

CRRP takes into account cultural needs and beneficiaries' way of living and is thus well targeted. The programme design foresaw a sufficient freedom to beneficiaries to build their houses according to their needs and ideas - within the legal framework of NHDA standards.

The programme's design is in line with the policies and strategies of the partners - IFRC, UN-Habitat, and SLRCS - and those of the donors (RCM organisations). CRRP builds upon important UN-Habitat principles in order to formulate goal and objectives: *needs-based, process of empowerment, recognition of community governance, developing partnerships, right to a place to live, incremental approach*, etc. In addition, CRRP follows the goals of the partners and the RCM by promoting the well-being of vulnerable people, mobilising communities, and providing relief and disaster reconstruction initiatives of housing, basic services and infrastructure delivery.

4.2.2 Coverage

CRRP covered many Tsunami affected areas, in the east, west and north of Sri Lanka. In particular, the Ampara and Batticaloa districts, which suffered most from Tsunami, received most houses³. In addition, a wide range of different ethnicities were benefited: Sinhalese (Buddhist and Christian), Tamil (Hindu and Christian), and Muslim communities benefited from the CRRP programme.

Concerning the selection of beneficiaries, it seems that the beneficiary list did not always include the most affected or the poorest families. The evaluation team could not find explicitly proactive measures or strategies to strengthen inclusiveness in terms of gender and socio-economic status or to empower marginalised population. It is evident, that CRRP supported families from the lower 'middle class'. For example, the evaluators came across one case in Kalutara, whereby the beneficiary used the grant to fix the affected "boutique", since his house was not affected by the Tsunami. There was one case in Batti I (Kalladi Uppodai), whereby the beneficiary built two shops as an annex in the front of the existing house, which suffers from severe cracks caused by the Tsunami and needs urgent refurbishment. Yet, the beneficiary decided to live in the affected house and use the grant to build an annex to improve his income. The beneficiary said that he received all instalments, although the constructed annex house is not yet finished. It lacks for instance a lockable room according to NHDA standards. Instead of the required toilet, he built a well in his garden. Another case of hurdle concerning the beneficiary list was found in Ampara where one non-beneficiary lady in Potuvil (Ullei Mihiraj) reported that she was for a longer time in the hospital and was therefore not included on the list, although her house was damaged by the Tsunami. Similarly, the team saw obviously poor families in Jaffna (Alwai West) who were left aside and did not benefit from CRRP.

In the view of the evaluators, the partners and donors had too little influence on the selection of beneficiaries. UN-Habitat could only delete names from the list received from the government, but not add any new ones to it. After the partners had screened the list and made some proposals, it was the Government (DS) having the last word on which household should be included. Apparently, in some cases, there was sometimes political pressure from the side of GNs to the DSs to support the given list.

It seems that there was even room for corruption when compiling the beneficiaries list. According to at least two programme staff members, there were complaints in particular in Pottuvil (Muslim communities), where beneficiaries received the CRRP grant to build new houses although they were not directly affected by the Tsunami. One unverified (!) information source says that in Pottuvil (Ullei Mihiraj) half of the beneficiaries paid bribes (approximately 100,000 Rp) to local government officials in order to get included in the beneficiary list. In Muslim communities there is high demand for houses as families need them as dowries for the daughters. On the positive side, UN-Habitat was able to reveal the cases where beneficiaries were registered twice or more times. As a result, double or more inscribed names were deleted from the list. In summary, CRRP should have had much more influence on the selection of the beneficiaries through own criteria and proceedings in order to guarantee that all beneficiaries were those severely affected by the emergency.

4.2.3 Appropriateness and Coherence

General

In general, the programme design is well developed and allows for a holistic and comprehensive implementation. It covers major areas to improve living conditions after Tsunami in a sustainable manner. CRRP not only includes the construction of houses with water supply and environmental sanitation, it also addresses economic and social needs of beneficiaries in order to restart a new life after Tsunami.

CRRP was well tailored to local needs. There was a pressing need to provide Tsunami affected families with adequate permanent houses, water supply and sanitation infrastructure, and livelihood opportunities.

³ CRRP supported 1,865 houses in Ampara, and 2,718 houses in Batticaloa.

The idea of designing an owner-driven approach was well intended to increase ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness of CRRP. Having talked to representatives of one of the Pradeshiya Sabha in Kalutara district, it became obvious that local authorities have been very much relieved that CRRP came in to tackle the most pressing needs of the affected communities. After Tsunami, local administrations were overwhelmed (high levels of financial flow and insufficient technical and administrative staff), to tackle such a great challenge to cover such a huge need for reconstruction; thus, were thankful to CRRP to come with this approach, “which took a burden away from their shoulders”⁴.

The existing and long-standing cooperation between the implementing agency UN-Habitat and GoSL have proved to be helpful for the successful implementation of the Programme. CRRP partners relied on GoSL to establish the beneficiary list and to assure the consolidation of results. This close relation to the GoSL had some advantages, especially when it concerned the support from the Government's side, during planning and implementation phases. A potential disadvantage out of such close relationship between CRRP and GoSL can occur when it comes to making decisions and establishing conditions.

Disaster management

The design of CRRP included disaster risk reduction measures, such as adhering to the official buffer zone as stipulated by the Sri Lankan Government. Therefore, several communities under CRRP had been relocated to new locations in-land. Similarly, houses and technical infrastructure constructed under CRRP had to stick to national standards and regulations, stipulated by the National Housing Development Authority (NHDA).

As a whole the CRRP communities follow the buffer zone regulations set by the Government. The buffer zone regulations seem well developed for the most coastal parts. Yet, in Jaffna (e.g. Revadi), the buffer zone was suspended, and houses have been reconstructed at old locations close to the seaside. It is doubted whether this suspension of regulation is meaningful with regard to potential future tidal waves or similar.

Unfortunately, tools for disaster preparedness and response, such as Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment⁵ (VCA) and community contingency planning, were not foreseen in the programme design. Community mobilisers could have been trained in those tools to guide the communities and to improve their understanding not only of the risks but also measurements against natural hazards.

It seems that communities now have a better understanding concerning the risks of natural hazards for example when it comes to buffer zones. One interviewed beneficiary lady in one of the relocated communities in Kalutara (Kahawitagehena) admitted that she is very happy to live far away from the ocean because following the Tsunami traumatic experience she fears the sea and any natural dangers there.

Timing

The Government was overwhelmed with the devastation through the Tsunami, with thousands of people who lost their home and at the same time with the influx of assistance to the affected areas with numerous relief and reconstruction projects. CRRP was designed to assist the Government in this huge challenge and to address the policy shift of GoSL from large scale donor driven programmes to owner driven recovery and reconstruction. CRRP was developed in late 2005 and was implemented only between 2006 and early 2009. In some places the Base Grants had been distributed for two years before

⁴ Representatives in Kalutara said that they were very glad that CRRP supported the reconstruction; therefore they “have one headache less”. There is a structural administrative problem in Sri Lanka: it is not the executive power (e.g. Divisions), but instead the legislative power (Pradeshiya Sabha) which is responsible for providing public services (technical infrastructure, etc.). PS are much dependent on the availability of funds through the responsible Member of Parliament (MP) who is elected for the particular area.

⁵ VCA is a useful tool to understand the level of people's exposure to natural hazards and their capacity to resist. It helps people to identify priority issues of risks and leads to the formulation of actions for disaster reduction.

CRRP started with implementation. Precious time was lost to decide on ODR while donors used funds for other projects including donor-driven ones. One of the immense challenges was that the donors did not make their financial commitments until 2007.

A second phase of CRRP is about to start in Jaffna area in September 2009.

Usefulness of Implementation Guidelines

The implementation guidelines give comprehensive and important information to programme implementers including a description of roles and responsibilities of the implementing partners, minimal standards, proceedings, checklists and sample forms. The guidelines cover all steps of the project cycle and give very useful and detailed hints on how to carry out community action workshops. An additional positive aspect is that the guidelines were revised and adapted throughout the implementation of the project, making them an adaptable and flexible tool.

However, the guidelines do not focus much on WATSAN issues except on construction of latrines. Ideally, more information on drinking water quality, quantity and the guidance on achieving the community WATSAN objectives should have included in the guidelines. In addition, inclusion of information and measures on quality control of the reconstructed houses would have guaranteed higher quality of programme outputs/outcomes.

It was expected that the Implementation Guidelines would be used by the field workers. However, it was observed that such was not the case. Many field workers interviewed, affirmed that they were not familiarised with the guidelines.

The paragraph on “Materials Procurement” (8.6) mandates positively that no asbestos roofing materials should be used. However, no alternative material is suggested such as using certified timber from sustainably kept tree plantations or other environmentally friendly materials which are low in embodied energy.

The guidelines refer to the “Guidelines for Housing Development in Coastal Sri Lanka”, issued by NHDA, which should be used for house and infrastructure construction. These technical guidelines are well compiled and give very useful and appropriate guidance for implementation. However, alternative materials and building technologies with small ecological footprint (e.g. stabilised earth blocks, fly ash blocks, rat trap bond, micro concrete roofing tiles, rain water harvesting, etc.) are mentioned rather shortly. Unfortunately, no technical details or references are provided.

Usefulness of Financial Guidelines

The *Financial and Programmatic Top-Up Programme Guidelines* of CRRP is a complete and comprehensive document, which has placed all positive ingredients together for the programme management to follow. The document covers all aspects including the most important ones as listed below:

- Actors of the programme and their role / responsibilities
- Database and beneficiaries management
- Request for payment process
- Flow of payments
- Financial, performance and risk reporting

In particular, the financial guidelines present a comprehensive account on all responsibilities and procedures, which are very useful for the programme implementation. The Financial Guidelines were a very useful tool-kit and reference guide for all programme staff and implementers in showing clearly and in detailed manner required steps and functions during all programme phases.

Owner-driven approach

It can be observed that the owner-driven approach is more useful, when beneficiaries are better-off economically and when are professional masons or carpenters. Generally, it was observed that beneficiaries, who were better off economically, said that they liked having the opportunity to contribute with own savings or loans. In such cases, they were able to assure a better completion level beyond NHDA standards. They can build the house according to their wishes, and have better control over the quality of the constructed house. In the case of carpenters or masons, beneficiaries can contribute with own labour in order to minimise costs and assure a good quality.

However, in particular, single women (widows) beneficiaries said that they would prefer to receive a ready-made house (donor-driven approach). Some of them had a lot of difficulties during house construction. Some of the interviewees stated that they were cheated by material suppliers with bad quality material and too high prices. One female beneficiary said that she was deceived by the contractor with “bad quality of construction and wrong advice”. In most cases, female beneficiaries did not have the skills and capacities to supervise the construction site and to check quality. Single ladies who had the support of brothers or other male relatives faced far less difficulties in technical questions and house construction.

Likewise, some beneficiaries, in particular the poorer ones, said that they had difficulties in managing the money which they received from the CRRP grant. They were not used to handle a large amount of money. Sometimes, they (had to) spent the grant on other priorities than the house construction, such as food or medicine. As one of the workshop participants (CDC member) in Pottuvil said: *“She would have preferred to be briefed before hand about the responsibilities she would have to take over in an owner-driven programme. She would have liked to choose, whether she can participate in an owner- or donor-driven programme”*.

Budgeting

In general, the budget (Top Up/Full Cost programme) looks quite balanced, providing the main chunk of the budget (28,417,060 out of a total of 32,777,041 USD) to beneficiaries directly in form of the housing and community infrastructure grants. The allocation of implementation costs of 4,359,981 USD, which is approximately 15% of the overall costs, seems reasonable.

Workshop and training costs with a total of 302,879 USD are sub-divided into “community workshops” and “staff training workshops”. The total Partnership training budget comes to USD 302,879 which is only 1% of total budget (USD 32.8 million). From the total Workshop & Training budget of USD 302,879, 69% was allocated to Community Trainings and 31% allocated to Staff Training.

With regard to rising prices, the programme design considered price fluctuations, when planning the budget. Prices for construction material and labour have risen during implementation. There are at least two reasons to it. On the one hand, material and labour costs increased because of a higher demand. Numerous reconstruction projects throughout Sri Lanka and in the region required a lot of building materials, and there was sometimes shortage of well skilled masons and carpenters. On the other hand, the prevailing conflicts in the Eastern and Northern parts of Sri Lanka led to a shortage of construction material and labour. Only limited number of qualified masons and carpenters had access to Batticaloa II programme sites. In Jaffna, the import of construction material was difficult for political reasons. For instance, cement prices tumbled. People helped themselves with old roof tiles which were reused from demolished houses.

According to NPMT minutes and NSC documents and budgets, the programme periodically evaluated the construction cost increased district wise and a provision was provided as localisation cost to cover this increase in cost and the rise in cost was considered when necessary even during the implementation phase.

Housing component

Beneficiaries had to adhere to NHDA standards⁶ whilst constructing the houses. This guarantees reasonably a minimal standard of houses and quality of construction. On the positive side, beneficiaries could adjust the house design to suit their individual needs within the parameters of those minimal standards giving households a certain freedom in the layout.

CRRP mandated a minimum size of 500 sq.ft. per house which is a reasonable size. However, there was no limit of a maximum size. So, an estimated number of 25% of the visited families opted for a larger house, but approximately 5% of them could not finish it because of lack of funds⁷. This must be seen in light of the fact that the households started their construction with the Base Grant of the Government/WB without any technical guidance. Then when CRRP started, foundations had already been built and thus the square footage fixed.

Concerning the programme's definition of a completed house, the minimal requirements of NHDA used by CRRP provide a good basis to finish a house and to provide a reasonable minimum standard for households. Yet, these standards are rather basic and in many cases, even if beneficiaries received the final instalment, their houses do not look like finished ones, with plastered walls, windows, doors and completed floors. However, it is important to highlight, that most beneficiaries visited have completed their houses by going beyond those standards. For example, families have installed also a lockable entrance door (mostly made of wood) and concrete flooring. Only few households have a sand floor which meets the minimal standards.

The log-frame only provides one single indicator which ensures the quality of built houses: Number and percentage of houses built by households that comply with NHDA standards. In order to monitor better the quality of construction, more refined indicators would have been needed, such as quality of the roof structure and covering, walls, structural elements and finishing.

WATSAN

The design of the WATSAN component covers drinking water, solid and liquid waste management, environmental sanitation and hygiene promotion. In addition, household sanitation was included in the housing proposal which makes the proposed interventions comprehensive.

There is a sound balance of qualitative and quantitative objective verifiable indicators which were developed during the project design process. However, there was a need for further fine-tuning of the indicators after a needs assessment was conducted. Further, CRRP could have set more realistic targets on how much to achieve during the programme time line. The log frame should have described and specified on minimum standards the communities should have in terms of drinking water, household sanitation and environmental sanitation. Absence of such has given various levels of understanding among the front line project staff on what exactly the project is supposed to achieve.

Household level:

Introduction of a latrine as a compulsory component at each household and linking it to a specific component payment provoked that in households a latrine is constructed, even if there was a functioning one already available. Such situation provoked that the latrines constructed by the project were not completed or were unused.

⁶ The NHDA minimum requirements include the following: house to be bounded by walls and covered by slab or a roof (Asbestos should not be used as roofing materials); one Lockable internal room; one Internal or external kitchen/cooking space; one Internal or external sanitary latrine with adequate effluent disposal; windows and doors as necessary for air, light and security; internal partitioning to meet beneficiary requirements; electrical network in accordance with ICTAD standards.

⁷ The figures of 25% and 5% are estimated figures based on observations and interviews with beneficiaries and main stakeholders during the evaluation mission.

The programme design should have incorporated a communication strategy, of how the most relevant facts of CRRP should be shared between programme staff and the beneficiaries. The fact that all individual household toilets and wells are to be maintained by the respective families needs to be communicated in a clearer manner.

Community projects:

The log-frame did not consider to conduct a feasibility survey before the construction of wells. Therefore, to avoid any technical complications at later implementation stage, the programme design should entail necessary feasibility studies and technical in-depth assessments.

Positively, community WATSAN structures constructed by a CDC had the provision whereby the CDC reserved 5- 10% of the costs of the project for operation and maintenance needs. All the funds for operation and maintenance have been made available to the CDCs.

Community development:

The idea of establishing CDCs was very useful to foster community organisational development. Formation of CDC has been meant to develop a grassroots CBO in the absence of any, following the basic principle of social mobilisation, which includes empowerment of the marginalised people.

Livelihood development

The idea of providing beneficiaries with a livelihood programme component as complementary to the housing component was well received by beneficiaries.

The project proposal of CRRP has seen the livelihood development component as an important catalytic initiative for sustainability. It states that *'development of sustainable livelihood programs should be thought of as opportunities to make a living and improve quality of life within the community; restoration and creation of livelihoods of individuals, households and community depend on skills, products and services.'* The livelihoods framework of the partnership covers the aspects of recovery, protection and rebuilding of livelihoods at household as well as community levels.

The key objective of the CRRP livelihood component is *'to create an enabling environment for new and improved livelihood opportunities for tsunami affected households'*. The three outputs of the livelihood objective and their identified activities and indicators are positive features worked out in the log-frame. The three outputs for livelihood development as indicated in the project proposal are reproduced for clarity and comparison with the ground situation:

- *Grants utilised to improve livelihood opportunities*
- *Linkages established between CDCs and other partners for development*
- *Increased capacity of SLRCS branches to support household livelihood security and disaster preparedness*

The key activities identified under the main three outputs are well thought of and farsighted as a livelihood development programme, since they present an appropriate sequential process. Firstly, the grant provides a basis for establishing a micro-capital within the community; secondly, CDC acts as the catalyst for linkage building, and thirdly, the increased capacity of SLRCS's field staff would work as hands-on support at the very grassroots level.

The three output indicators were also logically designed to achieve sustainable benefits to the CDC members, with a lasting institutional framework in mind.

The programme designs to mobilise the community to understand the type of resources available to them for creating livelihoods is a very good approach to create and benefit from synergies. Two types of resources are proposed, according to the programme proposal of CRRP:

- Internal resources - savings and credit programmes (Women's Bank) and savings from Community Contracts
- External resources - government or non-government organisations and the private sector

While the requirement of bringing the businesses back to its original status and beyond has been a key priority of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries of Sri Lanka (FCCISL) movement⁸ sponsored by willing international NGOs, CRRP has not recognised it as an integral part of its assistance package. Therefore, a meaningful 'Back to Business' component for providing hands-on services to restore the micro and small businesses, was not included into the CRRP's design, which has worked negatively in terms of relevance and sustainability.

The key to creating livelihood opportunities for vulnerable communities is to make links with the existing mainstream development of the government, NGO and private sectors, for which deliberate and focussed attempts need to be undertaken with the relevant authorities. And such attempts are of vital importance in order to have a sound environment for microfinance and livelihood development, which call for a comprehensive package based on a rigorous social mobilisation process.

However, the livelihood component could have been better linked with the housing and community infrastructure component⁹. Thus CRRP could have been designed in a more integrative manner in order to avoid isolation of the livelihood development component. Further, CDC members complain that the amount of Rs. 1000 (10 USD) per family was not enough to support livelihoods and project design could have allocated sufficient fund as seed capital to meet critical needs. In addition, beneficiaries felt that the limited budget for livelihood development was not sufficient to provide adequate livelihood-related training.

4.3 Programme Outputs

4.3.1 General

The first and second CRRP objectives – (1) *Assist Tsunami affected households to rebuild their homes* and (2) *Support Tsunami affected households to participate in their community's development and improve basic community infrastructure* - have been met to a great extent. The third objective – (3) *create an enabling environment for new and improved livelihood opportunities for Tsunami affected households* – was met to a far less extent. More details about reasons are described in the following paragraphs.

4.3.2 Effectiveness

A total number of 5,354 of beneficiaries were reached through CRRP. As a whole, only 81 beneficiaries dropped out which is an overall drop-out rate of very low level of 1.5% (Progress Report for the National

⁸ The 'Back to Business Programme' is a comprehensive undertaking – National Economic Rehabilitation Programme by the Chambers of Commerce in all tsunami affected districts in Sri Lanka, backed by the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries of Sri Lanka (FCCISL). This is to reorganise and rebuild the Tsunami affected Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Sector and to introduce sustainable livelihood activities. The main sectors which lost businesses included the tourism, fisheries and micro and small enterprises, resulting in losses of thousands of livelihood and income generation opportunities particularly for lower middle class and vulnerable poor communities. The performance of livelihood and business restoration during the first year after the tsunami (2005) by the chamber movement has been progressive and successful. FCCISL and its district chambers have contributed to restoration process by a sum of Rs. 3.8 million in this initial year (FCCISL Report, Dec. 2005).

⁹ The livelihood component includes the following:

- *A community can create opportunities to market existing skills or it can acquire new skills,*
- *A community may generate income through products in demand in the market or by introducing new products or value-added products to the market,*
- *Based on existing or new skills, services in demand in the market may also become a source of community livelihoods.*

Steering Committee of 4 March 2009). Drop-out occurred because beneficiaries left the half completed houses because of security reasons (e.g. Kudathanai - Jaffna), moved to other places because of unknown reason (Kalutara district), or beneficiaries did not finish the house and therefore did not receive all instalments (in all districts).

With regard to beneficiaries' satisfaction, the interviewed families are generally satisfied with the houses including sanitary facilities¹⁰. Beneficiaries expressed high satisfaction with the safety aspects, functional layout of the houses, legal ownership of land plots and houses, and access to basic services.

Some complaints were addressed with regards to delayed payments, constraints of budget to finish houses, purchasing construction material and equipment, hiring masons and carpenters, and technical supervision. Beneficiaries stated that there were sometimes delays in receiving the payments on their bank account, which led to delayed completion of construction. The community infrastructure / WATSAN projects started later and the livelihood component suffered from some delays. Additionally, concerning the livelihoods component, some beneficiaries told the evaluation team that a kind of needs assessment was done where the families expressed their wishes towards income generation possibilities but no decisive action was taken to improve their living situation. The importance of livelihood component given in the project proposal has faded away at the implementation stage; owing to the fact that the highest priority of CRRP has been given to housing with the largest share of the funds.

Concerning the quality of the houses, it was observed that there are major differences between the finished houses in the different locations. As most houses are completed, it is very difficult to assess the quality and completeness of foundations. Similarly, if houses are already plastered and painted, it is hard to determine the quality of construction, walls, used materials (cement, sand, bricks, etc.) and concrete structural engineering components, such as concrete slabs, columns and beams. The evaluators observed and took notes from general impressions during site visits and observations gained in interviews with beneficiaries and programme staff.

The quality depended first mainly on the beneficiaries' skills and experience in the building sector. If beneficiaries were masons or carpenters by profession, it was much easier for them to pay attention to adequate quality levels as it can be seen in the positive example of Kalutara – Kahawitagehena. Ring-beams, walls, floor, roof structure and tiles, doors and window frames, etc. seem to be in good shape. Very interestingly, the houses of the Sooranagar community in Batticaloa II are well finished even with neat plastering and paints. This is rather surprising as this is one of the poorer communities within the CRRP programme. And second, the performance, expertise and frequency of supervision visits by the Technical Officers, Engineers and District Managers had a great influence on the quality of implemented houses and infrastructure. In the same location, Kalutara – Kahawitagehena, it seems that the TO took a lot of time and efforts to supervise closely the construction process and the selection of building materials.

The roof structures with wooden roof truss in all cases of visited houses are in good condition. However, only in Kalutara – Kahawitagehena, the evaluators found metal bars to fix trusses and rafters against storms and strong winds.

As a whole, beneficiaries stated that a major problem is leaking roofs. The evaluation team saw at least 50% of the completed roofs where the roof leaks. A further problem is that approximately 80% of all checked roofs do not have fixings of roof tiles. The roof tiles lack any fixation with wire or similar onto the wooden roof structure. A future cyclone, depending on the magnitude, could easily blow off tiles from the roof.

In particular in Pottuvil area, constructed houses seem of lower quality compared with other CRRP locations. Common problems are incomplete ring beams, low quality of bricks and masonry work, poor structural quality, including leaking roofs.

¹⁰ This is based on in-depth discussion with the beneficiary families during the site visits and not on any statistical survey.

CRRP took over houses that were half-built by the owners using the Base Grant by the Government. Sometimes, due to the time it took for donors to commit funding, houses remained half-built for several months. This had an impact on the quality of the houses, also because there was no TO involvement in the Base Grant stage, and exposed unfinished construction work deteriorated over the time. Furthermore, since people started building without TO support they tended to make their foundations well in excess of 500 sqft, and therefore ran into difficulties later.



A good example of well constructed houses in Sooranagar Low quality of construction in Pottuvil

Concerning the house completion rate, positively 94% of all beneficiaries' houses are completed according to the Progress Report for the National Steering Committee (4 March 2009). This means that the majority of houses with water supply and sanitation facilities at household level are finished according to the NHDA standards. According to observations during the site visits, a percentage of 30 to 40% adhere to higher standards with completed concrete floorings, windows and doors, plastered and painted walls. In these cases, beneficiaries often contributed with own savings in order to reach this level of standard. As a tendency, households in Kalutara, Batti II, and Muslim communities in Batti I and in Ampara I, and Jaffna - Alwai West have finished houses according to NHDA standards with a low rate of visited unfinished houses of 0-5%. The Tamil communities in Batti I and the communities in Pottuvil area and in Jaffna (Kudathanai and Revadi) have a higher rate of 15% of observed unfinished houses with incomplete kitchens, toilets and insufficient water supply. The families in particular in Batti I (e.g. Kalladi Uppodai and Kalladi Muhathuwaram) opted for a much bigger house than they could afford. For example, one family lives with the relatives in the neighbouring house until the own house is completed. Similarly, in the Muslim community of Batti I, the evaluators saw three unfinished houses. Some of them are kept as dowry for the future marriage of the daughter. In one visited case, the family still lives in the old damaged house with severe cracks and keep the new house as an investment.



Unfinished house in Jaffna – Kudathanai (without chimney)



Incomplete house in Pottuvil

As a tendency, the poorer families possess rather unfinished houses with incomplete kitchens, toilets and individual wells, especially in Pottuvil (Pottuvil town area and Kalapukattu Hyrath) and Jaffna (Kudathanai and Revadi). Beneficiaries told the evaluation team that they had to spent part of the CRRP grant on other things than house construction. They used money for buying food, medicine or other household items. In addition, at least two of the poor beneficiaries reported that they were cheated by contractors (masons, carpenters) and material suppliers, and had to pay higher prices than normally. This happened in particular to single women (widows) who are not familiar with issues of construction.

4.3.3 Appropriateness

*Housing*¹¹

The beneficiaries gave through out a positive feedback on the appropriateness of the houses. The majority of houses fit to the users' needs. This is because beneficiaries had a great control over the design of the houses and their implementation. Mostly, beneficiaries asked technicians to draw the house plan. Most houses follow a standard rural Sri Lankan house pattern.

Traditional building technologies and designs were used by each family according to their needs, wishes and financial capacity. The house design generally shows the kind of 'standard house' in rural areas of Sri Lanka, which has sloped roofs and a veranda in the front. The families who were able to put plastering and painting of their houses have chosen various colours and decorations in order to give an individual touch to the house. Most beneficiaries opted for a conventional house construction using locally available materials. The houses were constructed using the conventional technology of cement blocks or burnt bricks, reinforced column beam structure on a rubble foundation, and a timber roof construction with clay tiles. Good quality wood was used for the door of the lockable interior room. Most beneficiaries have used wood for the entrance door and window frame work.

Each house was provided with a connection to the electricity grid according to NHDA standards. It was up to the household to distribute wiring within the house.

In most locations, beneficiaries purchased building and infrastructure materials locally so that long transport distances could be avoided. Only in Jaffna, it was hard to find regular construction material on the local market because of the conflict and difficult political situation. So, construction material was

¹¹ Issues of construction quality are covered in chapter 4.3.2 - Effectiveness

brought in via boat from Colombo and India. From the harbour to the actual site, lorries were checked by the security forces at several check points. For example, sand had to be unloaded and uploaded again for checking which resulted in delays of deliveries and therefore, delays in construction. As a whole, prices for building material and equipment in Jaffna area was much higher than in other parts of Sri Lanka due to complicated import procedures (because of the security situation) and longer transportation times.

Concerning the safety of the settlements' locations, all CRRP communities stick to the official buffer zone and are therefore are situated in safe areas, protected from natural hazards, such as floods. Only, one relocated community in Kalutara district (Weralugahagodella) suffers from regular flooding through a nearby river. The major cause for this is that beneficiaries had deposit construction waste and debris in that river. Now, it is unclear who will cover the costs for the rehabilitation of the stream.

Positively, CRRP followed certain environmental policies to avoid any asbestos roof sheets. So, beneficiaries were not allowed to use asbestos for roofing, although it is not forbidden in Sri Lanka and widely available. However, in some cases, beneficiaries asserted that they were initially not informed about the regulations regarding asbestos. Families were forced to take it out, if they used it at any point in the construction. In such situations, they had to pay for the costs of buying new material and re-building the part replaced. Additionally, such situation created some delays in the construction.

Yet, it seems that environmental aspects were not a core concern of CRRP and the beneficiaries. Houses were built with conventional construction technologies and materials. There were no efforts to use alternative materials, such as compressed earth blocks or similar eco-friendly and sustainable materials to save energy and reduce emissions. Also, the material saving method of 'rat-trap-bond' was not used to save on bricks and to achieve higher thermal indoor climate.

Similarly, alternative energy sources such as solar lanterns or solar cookers were not discussed. An estimated 20% of the visited households do composting. In particular in Kalutara, composting bins were distributed to the families, and most of the interviewed beneficiaries received training on home gardening.

WATSAN

Household level:

Latrines

At household level, latrine designs (water sealed and dry compost) introduced by CRRP are well appropriate to the local context of availability of water and soil strata in many of the communities. Though there was no demand for dry compost latrines CRRP was successful in creating the demand at least in Pottuvil.

However dry compost latrines¹² would have been recommended instead of water sealed latrines in Sooranagar - Batticaloa, Kudathanai - Jaffna and in Weralugahagodalla - Kalutara due to the higher water table, scarcity of water and the inadequate distance to the water sources.



Well completed latrine

¹² The introduction of dry compost latrines needs thorough awareness raising campaigns, trainings, and a lot of lengthy convincing of the beneficiaries to get used to this alternative kind of toilet.

Introduction of water sealed latrines and the dry compost latrine is relevant in terms of local needs. Water sealed latrines were introduced in the geographical areas in Kalutara and some parts of Ampara (Potuvil) and Jaffna districts which the ground water table is not very shallow and water was available for flushing toilets after use. Signing an MOU with Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) for the ecological sanitation component gave successful results in introducing dry toilets for some communities though it did not succeed to the extent that it would have being ideal. Dry compost latrines were introduced in Pottuvil in which the ground water table is quite high and the water is scarce for toilet flushing. This has ensured and encouraged the usage of the constructed latrines and minimised the environmental deterioration. However, attempts of the project to introduce dry compost latrines in the rest of the communities were not successful due to the non-acceptance by the beneficiaries.

Two kinds of latrine pit (septic tanks & double pit latrines) introduced by the project matches very well with the local needs and context (presence or absence of gully suckers) in different parts of Batticaloa district. However, single pit water sealed latrines constructed in the projects in Jaffna district due to higher cost of building materials (specially cement) may pollute the ground water table.

Water Supply

In general, water supply solutions (hand dug shallow wells and pipe borne water) promoted / facilitated by the programme in all districts are very well appropriate and easy to operate, maintain and afford, which has a direct positive effect on sustainability.

Pipe borne water supplies are usually managed by the National Water Supply and Drainage Board – NWSDB (or the local government authorities) in which the beneficiaries have to pay on monthly basis. Beneficiaries interviewed have expressed their satisfaction on the amount that they have to pay and the level of services received. Maintenance of hand dug shallow wells is done by the beneficiaries themselves (does not need any sophisticated maintenance methodology) which the Sri Lankan communities are very much familiar with, traditionally. Usually the quality of water in pipe borne water supplies are tested and maintained to standards by the NWSDB.

There is the example of Galewatha - Kalutara district, where beneficiaries are not satisfied with the drinking water supply. Here, a greater support by the local authorities would have been needed. In the beginning, there was no pipe borne water supply available, at the time of project design and implementation. Recently the area was supplied with the pipe borne water supply from the water board after completion of the project. During the project implementation, the community decided to build a common well, bought the land for the well, and the CDC constructed the well with labour contribution, free of charge from community members. Now after the project implementation, pipe borne water supply was given to the area, and the beneficiaries of Galewatha aspire to get access to the pipe borne water supply.



Water supply through wells

Water filters

Positively, a total of 3,995 families received ceramic water filters¹³ where there is no connection to pipe borne water supply. According to the Project Completion Report compiled by Niroshan Piyasena (Deputy Project Coordinator CRRP / SLRCS, Colombo), 2,611 beneficiaries in Batticaloa I and II, 1,198 beneficiaries in Ampara I and II, 186 beneficiaries in Kalutara and Colombo received a water filter. However, according to an estimation by two WATSAN officers in Batticaloa, 150 – 200 beneficiaries together in Batticaloa and Jaffna were not provided with the filters as there was no logistical possibility in the middle of ongoing conflicts and such distribution raised questions on national security. The Project Completion Report does not give any details about how many filters were distributed per community. More detailed information would have helped to cross-check how many of the communities with public/private wells have received water filters or not. Further, the completion report lacks an adequate description about the selection criteria. It says in a very broad manner “Beneficiaries were selected by CRRP team in the field. During the selection, priority was given to those who do not have safe drinking water”. So, the selection criteria appears to be rather general and it remains unclear on what exact criteria families were selected. Possible criteria would be (1) absence of NWSDB supply, (2) bad water quality, or (3) access to only wells.

Alternative water supply solutions

Unfortunately, rainwater-harvesting systems were not found during the site visits. The evaluators recommend this easy and low-cost option is useful to provide safe drinking water. Rainwater can be collected from roofs and can provide a useful supplementary source of good quality water. Storage tanks are usually required to make the best use of rainwater and to protect it from pollution.

Community level:

Concerning access¹⁴ and use of drinking water supply, positively all visited communities with only one exception (Pasarichchenai - Potuvil area) are covered with drinking water supply at different service levels.

With regard to the quality of supplied water, the evaluation team came across one critical case, which can be found in Galewatha – Kalutara district, where the community constructed a water well, but which cannot be used because it is contaminated. According to IFRC – Colombo, this is a result of not using the well. That well was meant for drinking purpose. The Public Health Inspector and IFRC’s WATSAN Officer told the community to cleanse the well. But so far no action has been taken to clean it. One better-off family of the same community received a house connection from the NWSDB pipe borne water scheme. As a consequence, all the other neighbour families (around 15) fetch water from that tap.

There was no strict rule concerning the type of projects that could be financed by the WATSAN budget. In some cases, the community infrastructure development project was a WATSAN project thus the allocated WATSAN funds financed other community needs. This gave a certain freedom to the CDCs how to best use the WATSAN community fund. Yet, a thorough guidance by programme staff is needed here.

Concerning strategic guidance by the project management, the strategy respectively the selection and implementation of community WATSAN component was less effective though it was based on sound community management principles. Responsibility for selection of the projects was completely dependent on the communities themselves.

The evaluators felt that the CDCs were not too strong to take a decision, whilst the community wanted to do something else with the allocated WATSAN fund. As revealed by the WATSAN officers, funds allocated for the community WATSAN component was inadequate at times, which has resulted in not implementing the prioritised needs but secondary needs. A comprehensive and effective strategy on the

¹³ Ceramic filter distribution mitigates the problem arising from poor quality of water and where there are no measures in place to monitor water quality.

¹⁴ “Access” is defined as “being available in the close proximity”.

WATSAN component would have improved the effectiveness of the interventions and also given a better understanding among front line field staff on project objectives and expected outcomes.

Absence of professional guidance (not the facilitation) during CAP workshop in project selection can easily result in un-informed decision making in selecting and implementing the priorities in community WATSAN needs. Evaluators have come across three locations, Ampara / Potuvil and in Jaffna, representing ca. 40% of all beneficiaries, in which the community WATSAN interventions have created environmental problems or failures. Revadi and Alavi West in Jaffna, Saindamarudu in Ampara face environmental problems.

The evaluation team came across one community contracted project in Revadi - Jaffna district whereby the newly constructed storm water drainage was not effective because the storm water can hardly flow off due to a malfunctioning drainage. Ideal or most appropriate locations could have been properly identified through professional assessments. Professional assessments require a certain amount of funds which should have been foreseen in the budget.

Capacity building

The capacity building component as indicated in the WATSAN proposal has not been implemented largely but was limited to only few training programmes conducted for the partner staff. Community WATSAN officers were given once a 7-day training on PHAST¹⁵, but apparently none of them were able to use the knowledge gained in implementing the hygiene awareness promotion activities at community level. As such, the hygiene promotion activities were abandoned halfway. The PHAST facilitators should have given more training, hands on experiences and sound knowledge before involving in the field activities¹⁶. It is evident that involvement of inexperienced PHAST facilitators at community meetings without a supervision of an experienced facilitator has resulted in difficulties to proceed with the chosen methodology and contributed to the abundance of the hygiene promotion activities.

Community development and participation

On the positive side, CRRP used a highly participatory approach during programme implementation to empower the selected communities. The community mobilisation process was very useful to organise communities' engagement in CRRP programme. Forming CDCs was an appropriate tool so that

¹⁵ PHAST (Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation) was named and identified as the hygiene promotion methodology at the time of the programme design and included in the log frame. This has seemingly created an atmosphere within the project as PHAST as the "one and only, the best and the must" methodology where as it's one among many. There is no doubt on PHAST as one of the most participatory and effective hygiene promotion methodologies but unfortunately did not fit in and found to be inappropriate to the prevailing ground situations, as revealed by the project managers and PHAST facilitators. As a result, hygiene promotion activities (only up to the second step of PHAST was done) were not implemented.

¹⁶ As revealed by one of the PHAST facilitators, even after following the same training 4 times, he was not confident and could not understand the process.

communities could express their needs and take steps towards problem solving with adjusted interventions.

The Community Action Planning (CAP) is a core element of participatory planning that was adopted by CRRP. Nonetheless, there was no clear evidence that this methodology has been effectively utilised in the programme, particularly in the field of livelihood development. It is doubted how professionally CAPs were carried out and to what extent they served to bring the programme forward to implementation in an effective manner. It is not obvious how the result of the CAPs were used in the further course of CRRP.

The establishment of CDCs was an essential part of CRRP, which by and large, has functioned as the vehicle to facilitate and promote livelihood opportunities for the beneficiary families. In most visited communities, CDCs have worked positively within the community for following reasons: a) It has formed small groups of organised community members (both men & women) and provided an umbrella organisation to achieve their socio-economic goals; and b) the creation of CDCs has fostered a sense of ownership of community infrastructures.

Livelihood component

What are the kind of livelihoods / income generating activities that were supported by the programme, more effective (traditional as against modern) to the beneficiaries? On average, the traditional livelihoods of the beneficiaries in the affected communities have been fisheries, arable farming, small trade, tourism related services, and waged labour. The programme has not taken deliberate attempts to directly address the 'Back to Business'¹⁷ issue in any appreciable manner either in its design or as an outcome of the CAP workshop, where the practices have been contemplated. Beneficiaries could express their needs concerning livelihood in the CAP Workshop and meetings, but a strategy to take action on that was missing, according to the information gathered in the field. There was no evidence found that CAP workshops have been used as an effective forum to plan out a systematic livelihood support programme, based on the local needs. Instead CAP has been used indiscriminately to include proto-type training programmes of SLRCS to all locations, which included first-aid, safety, health & sanitation, home-gardening, and composting.

New and directly livelihood-related training was arranged to a limited number of youth in each location (2-4 persons per settlement) by the field staff of SLRCS through the Vidhatha training programme of the government, in most of the locations in Kalutara, Batticaloa, and Ampara districts.

In some cases, CDCs have been able to create linkages between members and interested parties to harness both internal and external resources for enhancing livelihood opportunities. Mainly when a CDC was supported by a long-existing strong women bank (e.g. women bank in Kalmunai-Maligaikadu in the Ampara district), it has performed positively to support variety of livelihoods based on a strong credit line of their own.

¹⁷ The 'Back to Business Programme' is a comprehensive undertaking – National Economic Rehabilitation Programme by the Chambers of Commerce in all tsunami affected districts in Sri Lanka, backed by the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries of Sri Lanka (FCCISL). This is to reorganise and rebuild the Tsunami affected Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Sector and to introduce sustainable livelihood activities.



Home gardening supported by well irrigation in Soorinagar, Batticaloa District



A man-owned grocery shop supported by CDC/Small group, in Kalmunai, Ampara I (Maligaikadu CDC)

In fact, the livelihood component of CRRP has supported complementary or secondary income generating activities of self-employment nature only to a limited extent, as a result of the training given to a fewer number of women and the youth in the communities. These activities include home gardening, compost making, sewing, mushroom cultivation, and packaging of food items. So, the programme has foreseen only a few complementary livelihood activities for the residents with some immediate effects, and as such there is no long-term impact for sustainable income sources when a community is taken as a whole. The programme chose activities that were carried out, on the basis of government routine training (*Vidatha*) and to a lesser degree on the initiatives taken by some enterprising women, who are either members of long-standing women organisations or supported by village level Mobilisers and Volunteers. However, these complementary activities were not properly coordinated with other livelihood activities to create the all important forward or backward linkages, leading to positive results.

There are several strengths as well as weaknesses in the livelihood aspect of CRRP, which can be presented as main programme outputs resulting from implementation, as identified during the field evaluation. Main strengths are:

- The first strength and the achievement, in terms of livelihood outputs, is the ability to organise the whole communities into one umbrella under the newly formed CDC in all locations, which has paved way to obtain the desired needs of all target families, particularly the housing, water and sanitation and some direction to livelihoods, that has uplifted their daily life as a whole.

- Secondly, the programme design has sufficiently looked into complementary activities in coordination with the main livelihoods of the families, so that their income levels could be enhanced; conducting a CAP workshop is the strategy earmarked for incorporating community needs including livelihoods, even though it has not proceeded in an appreciable manner.
- Thirdly, limited and basic training in safety, health and sanitation, and livelihoods has been given, and a limited number of families in several locations have been able to harness the benefits of created opportunities for new livelihoods or to enhance their traditional livelihoods. The training in combination with self-motivation of some households have led them to home gardening (coconut, manioc, banana, chillies, vegetables etc.) in their locations, and most of the householders have revived their traditional livelihood practices (fishing, farming, small trade, skill and unskilled labour) in the visited locations, but no clear evidence was found that these communities visited have given guidance to improve their previous livelihoods by way of technical inputs.



Back to their traditional livelihood – off-shore fishing in Kalmunai

The following table summarises the achieved outputs in terms of livelihood activities (formation of micro-financing measurements and achievements in livelihoods) in the visited locations.

Livelihood Development by locations visited: Summary of Outputs

District & Location Name (Date of visit)	No. of HHs/ Families	Micro-financing / Primary Group formation	Achievements in livelihoods	Participation (% of families)
<u>Kalutara</u>				
1. Uyankele	21	No self bank formed	Traditional jobs only	< 10
2. Pinwaththa	15	No self bank formed	Traditional jobs only	< 10
3. Deshastra West	26	Women bank/PGs formed	Women do self-emp	20 – 30
4. Kalutara North	16	No self bank formed	Traditional jobs only	10 – 15
5. Weralugahagodella	23	No self bank formed	Traditional jobs only	< 10
6. Raigamwaththe	19	Women bank/PGs formed	Women do self-emp	30 – 40
7. Galewaththa	14	No self bank formed	Traditional jobs only	<10
8. Kahawegidehena	12	Women bank/PGs formed	Women do self-emp	20 – 30
<u>Batticalloa-I –South</u>				
1. Kalladi- Muhathuwaram	92	Women bank/PGs formed	WB/PG-based SEs	20 – 30
2. Kalladi-Uppodi	21	No self bank formed	Traditional jobs only	< 10
3. Pallamunai-11	80	No self bank formed	Traditional jobs only	10 – 15
4. Puthukudiyirippu	197	Women bank/PGs formed	Self-employment	20 - 30
<u>Batticalloa-II-North</u>				
1. Soorinar	187	Primary Groups formed	Self-employment	10 – 15
2. Kowilkudiruppu	167	Primary Groups formed	Self-employment	10 – 15
<u>Ampara – Kalmunai</u>				
1. Sainthamaruthu (M)	162	Women bank/PGs formed	Women do self-emp	30 – 40
2. Maligaikadu (Muslim)	130	Women bank/PGs formed	Women do self-emp	30 – 40
3. Karaithivu (Tamil)	61	Primary Groups formed	Women do self-emp	10 – 15
<u>Ampara – Potuvil</u>				

1. Ullei	98	Primary Groups formed	Women do self-emp	20 – 30
2. Potuvil Town Area	107	Primary Groups formed	Traditional jobs only	10 – 15
3. Kalapukattu	65	Women bank/PGs formed	Women do self-emp	20 – 30
4. Kundumadu	66	Primary Groups formed	Traditional jobs only	10 - 15
Jaffna				
1. Kudathanai	120	Primary Groups formed	15 new driving jobs	30 – 40
2. Alwai West	161	Primary Groups formed	Women do self-emp	10 – 15
3. Rewadi	77	No self bank formed	Traditional jobs only	< 10
4. Polikandy (at workshop)	15	Primary Groups formed	CDC-based contract	30 - 40
<p><i>Notes:</i></p> <p><i>WB/PG = Women Bank & Primary Groups based credit-lines have created investment opportunities in several locations</i></p>				

Source: Information gathered from the field visit through interviews with CDC office bearers & beneficiaries.

CDCs where they have promoted the women bank concept and procedures to encourage CRRP beneficiaries to form community savings seem to be more empowered. Women in these communities have formed primary groups that have established a saving culture among them leading to adequate micro credits systems.

Concerning any weaknesses of the programme outputs in the livelihoods aspect, it is caused by lack of deliberate attempts to introduce new livelihoods and failure to make investment opportunities for traditional livelihoods by a majority of the beneficiaries in several locations visited.

- The designed elements of the proposal have not been implemented. In spite of the fact that the programme has been well designed to create an enabling environment for new and improved livelihood opportunities for the households, it was found during the field assessment, that only approximately 10% of visited families have accrued benefits by complementary livelihood activities that were introduced through training and a credit line.
- Training given has addressed a few new activities and complementary activities, but it has not given adequate attention to enhance traditional employments (fisheries, agriculture, small trade, skills etc). This fact is evident particularly in all relocated sites in Kalutara, all locations in Batticaloa I and II, and all locations in Ampara II (Potuvil). Furthermore, the relocated families in Kalutara and Jaffna appear to be worse-off, as a result of increased travel time and cost to their previous livelihood location.
- The livelihood issues and needs identified at CAP workshops by the community members have not been addressed effectively in most of the locations in all four districts. Some exceptions were

found only in locations, where main or secondary livelihoods have been supported by a CDC-based credit scheme.

- While self-motivated CDCs have utilised the livelihood grants as basis for community saving system (Raigamwatte in Kalutara, Sainthamaruthu & Maligaikadu in Ampara, Kalapukattu in Potuvil), others have utilised these funds for community and livelihood-related training (Potuvil and Jaffna), which has weakened their capacity to build a basis for a lasting micro capital.
- Communities and the resources available to them are not homogeneous particularly from district to district, but CRRP has indiscriminately introduced the same prototypes of livelihoods related training into all CRRP locations in Kalutara, Batticaloa and Ampara Districts.

4.4 Programme Outcomes

In the site visits, most beneficiaries said, “it is good to have a nice house with toilet and water supply, but what is still missing is a sustainable livelihood”. In particular, half of the visited houses of the poorer beneficiaries look empty without any furniture. This is because they hardly can afford any beds, table or similar (field observation).

Although the relocation component within CRRP was a minor activity compared with the size of the programme¹⁸, the most important challenges should be mentioned here.

With regard to embeddedness and settlement planning, the relocation projects of CRRP are averagely embedded in their immediate surrounding and often badly to related services, such as transport, education, health facilities, markets, and employment opportunities. Most relocated communities are much farer away from important facilities than before the Tsunami and suffer from higher costs for transport and less job opportunities. In particular, fishermen mentioned relocation affecting their income due to difficulties in getting to the beach to go for fishing because of larger distances from the ocean and higher transport costs. Yet, relocated beneficiaries appreciate the higher safety living in a secure distance from the coast.

Concerning the overall timing of the CRRP programme implementation, the outcome of the project is to some extent a function of when donors committed funding. The time consuming ‘signing up’ of donors and fixing their financial commitment took place between 2005 and 2007, had an influence on the final outcome and management of the programme. SLRCS started only at later stage with livelihood initiatives. From a management point of view, it is much more acceptable that a component starts on time and finishes on time, than needs to receive multiple project extensions. The management team should examine this issue in more depth before the implementation start of the second phase in Jaffna.

¹⁸ The relocation projects of CRRP included 249 houses in Kalutara and 149 houses in Jaffna.

4.4.1 Effectiveness

Improvement of living conditions:

The Partners' aim to *support Tsunami affected households to recover, rebuild and develop their shelters, livelihoods and community structures* as stated as the overall goal of CRRP has been achieved to a great extent. Programme activities have highly supported beneficiaries to mobilise themselves, start a new life after Tsunami and to regain again their basis to improve livelihood.

Most families of the finished houses state that "they are happy to have an own house". Some of them never dreamt of moving into a built house made of bricks. Most families lived in simple mud huts before the Tsunami. Having an own house is a good basis for home business. In one of the locations in Kalutara district (Kahawitagehena), beneficiaries work as carpenters and use now the house's veranda as workshop area. There, the beneficiaries are well accepted by the host community. This is one of the positive examples, where beneficiaries are well integrated and for instance participate in community saving systems.

Community building

The formation of CDCs was an effective approach to organise people, to train them in leadership and managerial skills so that they have become strong partners for CRRP and for the local authorities. The CDCs have learned out of the CRRP experience so that they continue with own activities, such as mobilising grants in form of community saving systems, vocational trainings, etc. In addition, individuals and families got empowered through the experience of building a new home. Managing a whole construction site, supervising masons and carpenters, organising building material and equipment, handling payments, coping with delays, technical problems and other 'normal' challenges of construction, made the beneficiaries robust enough to tackle more challenges in life. In general, beneficiaries seem more empowered than in many donor-driven programmes where community development was rather weak.

Capacity building of beneficiary families

Beneficiaries could gain knowledge about construction through the daily exposure of implementation and through the guidance of the TOs and Engineers. Furthermore, selected beneficiaries received trainings on home gardening, mushroom growing, first aid, how to use a water filter, sewing, etc. The programme has created a range of opportunities for the target population to gain both knowledge and skills through its implementation and also have made sufficient room for gaining skills from external assistance. Such knowledge and skills include:

- Knowledge imparted by training of people with general packages available to SLRCS; these training packages are first-aid, safety, general health and environmental sanitation, home-gardening and composting.
- Skills gained by limited number of persons in each location organised as a part of the Government's initiatives like the 'Vidatha Programme' in some vocational fields and self-employments; most general skills that were created include, carpentry, masonry, sewing, mushroom cultivation, brick making, and bakery.

It is questioned how those trainings (first aid, etc.) were tailored to the needs of the people. Much more targeted capacity building activities are needed to improve living conditions and income possibilities of beneficiaries.

WATSAN

Concerning the provision of toilets, most finished houses have also a built toilet, which is ready for use. Only approximately 5% of the visited houses have not completed the toilet and use the one of the

neighbours or relatives. As a whole, beneficiaries expressed their happiness having a toilet and not being obliged to go to the bushes or into the sea for toilet purposes. Especially, women stated that they feel now safe to go to the toilet, in particular at night. Also positively, all checked toilets, which are in use, are well kept and tidy.

However, “improved access” to safe water and community sanitation as expressed in the programme’s objective was met in 14 out of 29 visited communities due to non implementation of community WATSAN projects, non completion of drinking water wells in some communities, wells being dried off, not conducting water quality tests or not establishing systems for water quality monitoring by local government authorities, non delivery of ceramic water filters for communities in Jaffna & Batticaloa etc. (please refer also to chapter 4.3.3). In addition, evaluators have come across projects in Kalutara and Jaffna districts in which plastic tanks were distributed to the beneficiaries as community WATSAN projects which were not in use or not available.

4.4.2 Sustainability

Housing conditions:

With regard to the legal status of the houses’ plots, positively all beneficiaries have secured land ownership. The majority of beneficiaries own the land and thus the newly constructed house, or received permission by the Government to permanently live on the allocated plot. This is an important basis for beneficiaries to start a new life and having the security of a safe home, which is entitled in their names.

All CRRP communities are located outside the buffer zone or are relocated away from the coast in safe areas. The majority of the rebuilt houses are constructed according to NHDA guidelines and should be robust enough to withstand future natural hazards.

However, sustainable reconstruction includes regular maintenance of the newly constructed houses and infrastructure to ensure their long life and thus a certain sustainability of CRRP. One of the big challenges, the beneficiaries face, is maintenance. In many cases, they do not know how to afford first upcoming repairs at the house. It seems that the question of how to maintain houses including sanitary facilities and community infrastructure has been rather neglected. Beneficiaries stated that they are not sure of how to undertake repairs and most importantly they do not know how to finance them. Currently, beneficiaries worry most about how to improve their income in order to sustain their living. The economic situation varies significantly from family to family and between the communities. A further in-depth survey is recommended to assess the available financial means of beneficiaries for maintenance purposes. It is also questioned to what extent beneficiaries know how to maintain their latrines, septic tanks, and sanitary facilities. In at least 50% of visited houses, the roofs have started to leak. This means that urgent first repairs are necessary. And several septic tanks constructed in Batticaloa district cannot be emptied by the gully suckers due to narrow access roads in addition to the same being far away from the main cities in which the gully suckers are available.

The final instalment to beneficiaries was meant for the house repairs and maintenance. Yet, interviewed families have not been aware about this fact. A better communication and closer guidance would be recommended here.

In more than 60% of the visited households, the families do not use the provided electricity connection, although all of the completed houses are connected to the municipal grid. Reasons for that include families could not install the wiring within the house because of lacking personal funds¹⁹.

¹⁹ The NHDA / CRRP standards only require a house connection, not an internal house wiring system.

Socio-economic conditions:

Generally, families who remained at existing plot are better off. Beneficiaries who were relocated to locations in-land tend to be poorer than the others. Main challenges are that they lost their social network by being resettled, spend more money on transport to working places and have difficulties to work in their old professions (e.g. fishermen) because they are far away from the sea (up to 15 km in Kalutara). With regard to continuity of families' former activities, beneficiaries who are not relocated have more facilities to pursue their original professions than the relocated ones. The resettled households, first, they have not yet many linkages to the host community and they cannot find a job because they are new in the region. And secondly, relocation sites are far away from village and town centres. In addition, they have to spend more money on transport than before when they lived closer by economic centres. In fact, there is a tendency that the actual income levels of the relocated families come down owing to the increased travel cost to the former places of employment of fishermen in Raigamwatta in Kalutara District and Soorinagar in Batticaloa North. An estimated percentage²⁰ of 60% of beneficiaries of the relocation projects appears to be worse-off from an economic point of view²¹.

CRRP lacks an explicit activity on how to identify alternative job opportunities for beneficiaries if the old job does not provide sufficient income to develop a decent living. Instead, most of CRRP communities received trainings on home gardening and mushroom growing, whereby only a minority continues with home gardening depending on the amount of free space, quality of ground, and availability of water. In any case, it was observed that such activities are not necessarily enhancing their livelihoods. However, only in approximately 10 visited households, the opportunity gained by some women for complementary employment has generated new income possibilities. In addition to this, engaged beneficiaries created well established and improved home gardens in several locations which have reduced expenditures on buying food (vegetables & fruits), so they could make savings.

Community activities:

Ensuring a continued community development even after the completion of CRRP is fostered through the established CDCs. As a first step, CDCs were officially registered as CBOs through the Divisional Secretaries. Positively, all 75 CDCs are CBOs now as they are registered under the CBO Act of the Sri Lankan Government. During the evaluation visits, the team saw quite active CDCs even after the official end of CRRP. They continue with various activities, such as community / women saving systems, women groups, vocational trainings etc. In Kalutara district (Raigamwaththa), the team met a CDC which has started with social activities in a very creative manner. They introduced even a scholarship scheme for school children. Another positive example is a CDC in Ampara district (Muslim community in Maligaikadu) where active women have founded a strong women's group with a high level of savings in their account. This Women's CBO has earned Rs. 2.3 million by realising two community contracts²². The same CDC together with some other CDCs of the area have organised themselves under an umbrella organisation in order to coordinate better any future activities and to pull together funds and benefit from synergies and a higher political lobby. There, we can say that these CBOs are really empowered!

Part of the idea to sustain CDCs is to convert existing CDCs into SLRCS units. This task has been delegated by the SLRCS branches to their divisions. On the positive side, there are 26 CDCs which are already converted into Red Cross units. However, it is still questioned, to what extent CDCs are willing and prepared to function as SLRCS units. The evaluators did not come across any strategy, why and how CDCs should become those units. Here, a clear roadmap is needed where CDCs can express their own goals for the future and how these goals can be linked with the interests of SLRCS.

²⁰ Figure is based on field observation.

²¹ The relocation projects of CRRP included only 249 houses in Kalutara and 149 houses in Jaffna.

²² Building of a 3rd floor for the DS's building for Rs. 1.3 m, and one community infrastructure for Rs. 1 m with NECORD (North East Community Restoration and Development Project).

The positive outcomes out of the implementation call for sequential follow-up actions through a rigorous and continuous social mobilisation process. It also calls for constant assistance in the field by community mobilisers and/or volunteers. In most cases the role of community mobilisers, has been undermined and not fully utilised, in terms of mobilising the community for sustainable livelihoods. Community mobilisation, particularly for livelihood development, call for a longer time, and the withdrawal of mobilisers at the end of project period, without a suitable replacement by way of volunteers, has created an obviously vacuum in the community. Except for the project locations in the Jaffna district, the services of the community mobilisers in all other districts have been terminated, with the closure of the project.

4.4.3 Impact

Derived from programme outcomes highlighted under chapter 4.3, both positive impacts and negative impacts in relation to the programme outcomes were identified. The positive impacts are related to the most significant changes in the lives of the beneficiaries that are linked directly (or indirectly) through the programme of being provided with a house, water, sanitation and electricity.

These positive changes being:

Housing

- As a whole, housing conditions of beneficiaries are significantly improved compared to the status before the Tsunami.
- Beneficiaries obtained solid houses which serve as a safe place to live and to start home businesses.
- Beneficiaries gained skills to organise and manage a house construction including sanitary facilities. This was a 'learning by doing' process.

WATSAN

- In general, beneficiaries have access to safe toilets close by and are not obliged to use bushes or the ocean for toilet purposes.
- Therefore, the environment is cleaner and more hygienic with fewer faeces because of less open defaecation.
- Concerning the environmental impact of CRRP, positively most (in all the districts) of the community WATSAN projects are able to minimise the soil erosion by means of constructing storm water drainages in community identified locations. This was one of the measures to mitigate any negative environmental impact of the new settlements of CRRP.
- Generally, households have better access to drinking water than before the Tsunami. Yet, not all beneficiaries are provided with direct access because of contaminated or dried-off wells, etc.
- With regard to positive influences on the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the population, one can say that to a large extent, communities use their latrines whereas some of them still go for open defecation. This basically derives from non completion of facilities and the absence of powerful hygiene promotion campaign.
- Some of them have two latrines in which the family uses the outside toilet and the one inside the house is kept for visitors. Toilet inside the house is more of a 'luxury' for better off families and used for bathing too.
- There is a preference for "squatting pan" though some of them have gone for "commode" in order to indicate "higher social standards" but unknowingly limited the usage of the improved facility due to non availability of water at house. Those families still use the temporally latrines provided by IOM.

Community development

- The ability to organise the whole communities into one umbrella under the newly formed CDC in all locations, where no or limited organisations as CBOs were available, especially in Ampara district.

Livelihood

- As a tendency, better-off families before the Tsunami have also better living conditions after the Tsunami. Poorer families are still poor.
- Obtaining socio-economic benefits in the form of awareness creation and knowledge that were centred on the construction of housing, toilets, wells, and training in safety measures, health and sanitation, and group formation for micro financing, by a considerable number of families.
- A limited number of families have enhanced self-employments started using the loans from CDC and group saving, which has given some complementary income to those families in the above mentioned successful locations / districts (Raigamwatte in Kalutara, Sainthamaruthu and Maligaikadu in Ampara, Kalapukattu in Potuvil, and Kudathanai in Jaffna).
- Women groups in particular have gained economic benefits through special training in livelihoods (home-gardening, sewing, and self-employments), which has generated certain immediate and short-term income to families)
- The tractor driving training supported by the CDC in Kudaththanai settlement in Jaffna has provided permanent employment to 15 families, and this serves as the only demonstration example for long term economic benefits to the resident families (basically for men); This has generated economic benefits for other actors in the community as a whole.
- CDC members have access to credit in the locations, where they have received the livelihood grant as a seed capital and micro financing channelling through self-banking (small groups) was evident (Raigamwatte and Deshastra in Kalutara, Sainthamaruthu and Maligaikadu in Ampara, Kalapukattu in Potuvil, and Kudathanai in Jaffna).
- As self-banking instances, successful CDCs have started lending the savings to a limited number of their members for investment in main livelihoods and self-employments (Raigamwatte in Kalutara, Sainthamaruthu & Maligaikadu in Ampara, Kalapukattu in Potuvil, and Kudathanai in Jaffna).
- A productive linkage has been built by one CDC in Ampara (Kalapukattu in Potuvil), to negotiate assistance for livelihoods-based credit from two international NGOs working in the area, namely SWORD and RELIEF.

The rather critical changes were more prominent in WATSAN generally, and livelihood aspects, particularly in remote and more vulnerable communities in Kalutara (Weralugahagodella and Galewaththa), Batticaloa (Soorinagar) and Jaffna (Rewadi), as there socio-economic conditions have been worse-off. Main highlights in this regard are:

WATSAN

- Evaluators came across families in Jaffna and Batticaloa who have converted the half completed latrines to store rooms and using the latrines of neighbours' or public latrines for defecation. Major reasons cited by the beneficiaries for non completion of latrines are not living in the house on permanent basis, claiming money given by the programme was insufficient due to escalation of the prices of cement etc.
- Non delivery of ceramic water filters (to filter out the bacteriological pathogens) to some of the communities in Batticaloa and Jaffna districts have made them vulnerable to unsafe drinking

water (please refer also to chapter 4.3.3). This problem concerns in particular the households where water wells are located close by (less than 5 m) the toilet pits, which might leak²³.

- Construction of seven hand dug shallow wells under the community WATSAN component in Pasarichchenai in Ampara district (Potuvil) without hydrological studies has resulted the drying up of all them. The evaluation team has visited 3 out of 7 of those well and the community confirmed that all the wells are dry. Community members are compelled to walk 45 minutes in every other third day to fetch drinking water and defecating in open spaces which are also limited. According to the Senior Coordinator Partnership and Grants of IFRC – Colombo, the wells are dry because of a very severe drought due to extreme dry weather conditions. He states that the chosen locations were the best in terms of availability of water, access and preferences of the community. When finalising this report, the wells have been filled again with water after the start of first monsoon rainfalls.

Livelihood

- The income levels have been dropped in particular in the relocated settlements concerning both higher travelling costs for Kalutara beneficiaries and the ethnic conflict related difficulties in the vulnerable locations particularly in Jaffna and Batticaloa. For example, the cost of travelling to and from their livelihood destination (fishing area at Moratuwa – Korawella for Raigamwatta and Galewatta settlers, and to fishing sites in sea/lagoons for Soorinagar settlers) has increased by a range of Rs. 50 – 200 per person per day from their present relocated villages, which are 30 - 40 km inland in Kalutara and 5 – 10 km away in Batticaloa North (Soorinagar). The deviation of beneficiaries from traditional livelihoods resulted that fishermen became fish vendors or vegetable sellers, or simple labour has undoubtedly caused income reduction, as reported by them (e.g. Galewatta in the Kalutara district).
- There are no clear evidences to prove that beneficiaries have increased their income levels, as householders in the communities visited are confined to their previous livelihoods of fishing, arable farming, and small businesses, for which no direct assistance has been given by the programme.
- Programme outcomes in relation to livelihood are limited to fewer numbers of beneficiary families even in better locations. Of the 25 locations visited, success rate is high (30 % in average) in 11 location, medium in 8 locations and low in 6 locations. When the total number of families is considered, this percentage is not all that satisfactory (if 20 percent is regarded as an average, it is only 1,120 of the total 5,600 beneficiaries reached).
- In the absence of decent livelihoods, beneficiaries themselves had to go back to their traditional livelihoods on their own, without any visible support by the programme.
- Except for one location in Ampara (Kalapukattu in Potuvil), there was no other evidence found from other locations that the programme has facilitated any visible linkages with government and other service providers in order to create an enable environment for livelihoods.

Impacts related to gender issues

On the positive side, there are female beneficiaries in all communities, and even in CRRP's Muslim locations, where houses and plots are owned by women. So, even if there was a man, it could be that the female beneficiary owns the land because she inherited from her father (example of Maligaikadu community – Ampara). The houses which are built under CRRP are owned by the beneficiaries. The

²³ Safe distance between water wells and toilet pits depend on soil conditions and ground water levels.

majority of house owners are men and the wife has no co-ownership there²⁴. Co-ownership of the house and land would better ensure equity and inclusion of women's rights.

Whenever, there was a female beneficiary, the bank account was written in her name, and she had free access to the CRRP grant instalments without asking her husband. This also empowered women being engaged within CRRP.

The majority of women have access to women saving groups providing them with micro grants or loans to improve their livelihood.

Most of the single-woman-headed households seemed being overwhelmed by the task to manage and supervise a whole house construction site with technical sanitary questions. They would have preferred a donor-driven approach where they had received a ready-made house. Only the female beneficiaries who had a helpful male relative or strong support from the CDC, they opted for the owner-driven concept.

Involvement of women in decision-making processes at CDC level is an area of challenge. There are constraints by traditional patriarchal socio-cultural set-ups. Most of duty bearers of CDCs are men, only in few visited communities, women are CDC presidents and only in one visited community (Alwai West – Jaffna), CDC President, Treasurer and Secretary are women. Therefore, it is doubted to what extent women's interests and needs are represented and addressed in the communities where the CDC board consists only of men. One interview with a lady beneficiary in Kudathanai - Jaffna revealed that she could not take part in CDC meetings because she was not allowed to attend together with her children. So, she did not attend any CDC meetings because no childcare was provided, and it seems that she could not leave the kids with any other person. Her husband attended the meetings but did not share any information or outcome with her.

4.5 Programme Management

4.5.1 Appropriateness:

Partnership:

On the positive side, responsibilities within the Partnership were clearly defined and generally well executed. IFRC has been responsible to raise and provide funds, to monitor the programme's progress, and to report back to the donor Red Cross Societies. UN-Habitat was mainly responsible for CRRP's implementation, such as the housing and infrastructure component. And SLRCS supported UN-Habitat in ensuring community development and enhancing the recovery of livelihoods.

CRRP was the first programme where the partnership between IFRC and UN-habitat consolidated on the field. The evaluating team was informed that both institutions had an agreement at the level of headquarters that was materialised in the implementation of the CRRP.

Among the challenges observed, the following can be mentioned:

- At local levels, the partnership was not too strong. In most districts, at the exception of Jaffna, technical officers, social mobilisers and WATSAN specialists / M&E specialists worked separated. In some communities, beneficiaries considered the different components of the programme as different projects.
- Concerning the financial reports, there were some differences between the reporting system of UN-HABITAT and IFRC, which needed to be adapted during the implementation.
- Some of the delays in the disbursement of grants to beneficiaries were caused by a highly bureaucratic approval and disbursement system²⁵. The time elapsed between beneficiary request

²⁴ Vice versa if the house is owned by a female beneficiary, the husband neither possesses a co-ownership.

to payment was between 14 to 30 days. Such situation can be attributed to the fact that approvals had to be done by the different head officers from UN-HABITAT and IFRC.

M&E:

With regard to monitoring and evaluation procedures within CRRP, the following issues could be observed:

- A very positive aspect was the implementation of mid-term reviews and the preparation of completion reports (end of projects reviews). It was clear that such evaluations provided with very good information regarding programme outputs and results.
- Baseline information was lacking and that proves to be a weakness of the monitoring system of the programme. Clear indicators should have guided the monitoring processes based on an initial baseline.
- Each Partner had its own M&E procedures and reporting system. Yet, this is understandable because each Partner has a different 'organisational culture' procedures, and internal reporting requirements to headquarters. However, a lot of time, personnel, and money could have been saved through a well coordinated and adjusted reporting.
- The monitoring system established was in charge of monitoring outputs: payments, construction levels, setting up of CDCs, among other things. However, the programme did not have an outcome monitoring system²⁶. With an appropriate outcome monitoring system, the programme could have guaranteed better quality of houses and results.
- It was basically the TOs and Engineers who supervised the construction works. There were at least two challenges. First, TOs had only very basic technical degrees and they lacked work experience. Secondly, there were too few TOs for the amount of houses built. TOs were overwhelmed by the amount of houses they had to supervise. Often, a TO could visit the construction sites only once in two weeks or once in a month which is obviously too little. Additionally, Social Mobilisers should have been given thorough guidance in livelihood initiatives and there should have been enough Mobilisers planned and available for this component.
- CRRP suffered from a large staff shortage in all the districts with the exception of Kalutara, because of security reasons. In Kalutara was not involved in the conflict. The ongoing conflict and thus very bad security situation was one of the main reasons for the shortage of available (qualified) staff.
- The programme had WATSAN officers on the field. However, at a later stage many of them, except for one staff member in Ampara, became M&E specialists. Such situation created confusing in terms of the roles the WATSAN/M&E specialists had on the field.
- The evaluation team was informed that only the WATSAN/M&E specialists received training in monitoring and evaluation. It would have been better if all local staff including Social Mobilisers and Technical Officers could have participated in such trainings.

²⁵ Beneficiary request for payment → CDC revision → Technical Officer control → District Manager approval → Database operator to generate payment → UN-Habitat head office revision → IFRC CRRP Finance revision and approval → Payment request/voucher → IFRC finance office → City Bank → people's Bank HQ → people bank branch → Beneficiaries account. On average the disbursement took 14 days from request to disbursement. In Jaffna it took around 20 days.

²⁶ The mid-term reviews did not include the evaluation of outcomes.

4.5.2 Effectiveness:

Despite all challenges, such as difficult conflict situations in the East and North of Sri Lanka and being overwhelmed by the magnitude of lost houses through the Tsunami and a huge demand for reconstruction, the project management through the Partnership has been well functioning.

Further, the establishment of a Steering Committee proved to be a positive mechanism for participatory decision-making. This body not only provided partners the opportunity to discuss implementation issues but also allowed donors to be involved in project implementation and to make decisions together with partnership members. Donors had a certain room to express their opinions and to be heard by the programme management team.

The establishment of a national project team had also an important function in terms of decision-making and implementation. The weekly meetings allowed for strengthening relations among the three organisations UN-habitat, IFRC and SLRCS.

One of the main hindrances in the programme management was the rather weak coordination and information exchange between programme heads and local personnel. One of the District Managers described the relationship as “us, them and they” standing for us - UN-Habitat, them – IFRC, and they – SLRCS. There was insufficient cooperation between the Partners at field level. TOs and Mobilisers had not a systematic procedure or reporting back system to each other on what is going on in the field. In some cases, TOs and Mobilisers went together to the field on the same motorbike, but often they did not exchange information about programme progress and critical issues of implementation.

A further challenge was the security situation for instance in Batticaloa. As reported by the district managers of Batticaloa I & II, regular programme level and district level coordinating meetings could not be held due to the imposing of emergency status caused by the conflict during the implementation period from 2006 to 2008.

Concerning IFRC:

IFRC had a very well functioning reporting back to the donors system with regular monitoring, mid-term and end of programme evaluation reports.

The interviewed donors expressed their satisfaction with IFRC's performance with regard to their allocated responsibilities within CRRP, such as coordination, managing relationships with the donors and the grants disbursements.

Yet, a challenge has been capacities and knowledge of WATSAN officers for implementing the intended tasks which were found to be inadequate as admitted by community WATSAN officers. Established referral system (UN Habitat Technical Officers) to obtain the technical support in the field was rather weak. However, there were significant differences in project implementation in Batticaloa district in which qualified and knowledgeable WATSAN officers were employed.

The programme had expected the WATSAN officers to obtain technical guidance from the UN Habitat Technical Officers which did not work well as the UN Habitat Technical Officers were already over loaded with their designated responsibilities. Yet, it was not obvious whether the UN Habitat Technical Officers too had adequate knowledge on WATSAN activities.

Concerning UN-Habitat:

The close linkages between programme management staff of UN-Habitat²⁷ with the Government helped positively to well anchor CRRP in the country and the local context.

²⁷ National coordinating and district managers of UN-Habitat were high rank Governmental officials before.

Yet, a challenge was that there were too few Technical Officers to assist in programme implementation. In some cases the TO could supervise the houses' construction only once in a month, which is clearly insufficient to ensure good quality and safety of building. This led to the situation that beneficiaries were sometimes left alone with technical problems of house construction.

Another challenge was that the majority of TOs were overwhelmed by the task of ensuring good quality construction. Often, TOs were rather young and inexperienced.

In Pottuvil, TOs left before the finishing of the houses construction because CRRP finished officially. So they delegated the final technical check-ups to the Social Mobilisers, who had no technical capacities for that.

There was poor coordination with local authorities in particular in Pottuvil. At the interview, all 11 involved GNs complained that they were not sufficiently informed about CRRP implementation. The concerned GNs only provided the beneficiary list to the DS, but thereafter were not any more involved in the process. They said that they knew only unofficially about the programme. Apparently, CDCs never contacted and informed them about programme progress. It seems that there was confusion about responsibilities and status between GNs and the CDCs.

Concerning SLRCS:

On the positive side, Social Mobilisers (of SLRCS) with the support of TOs have successfully formed CDCs as the main counterpart of CRRP management staff.

On the rather difficult side, it seems that there was quite poor exchange of knowledge and lack of briefings within SLRCS. For example, it seems that BEO and Mobilisers never had a briefing on owner-driven approach and what it means. There was a weak internal knowledge sharing and insufficient transmission of information. For example, it seems that BEOs and Mobilisers were not briefed thoroughly enough on the log-frame and the required activities of CRRP. Better information sharing vertically with the headquarters on Colombo and horizontally with the BEOs of the other districts had improved the performance of CRRP.

SLRCS faced major difficulties during implementation. For example, there was high fluctuation of the BEOs in Kalutara. It seems that the BEO of Batticaloa lacked capacities and knowledge about community mobilisation and disaster management.

Furthermore, it seems that Social Mobilisers generally had only low social, project management and facilitation skills. Apparently, most of the recruited Mobilisers were not familiar with the work they were supposed to do. There was insufficient coaching provided from higher staff levels to the Mobilisers. This is critical because Mobilisers had an important role in the day-to-day contact between CRRP and the beneficiaries.

Another challenge was that the Mobilisers had too many families to look after. For example, in the whole of Jaffna district, there were only two Mobilisers which were responsible for all five CRRP communities.

Mobilisers were mostly men. This fact might have had an effect on the transmission of information and acceptance by the beneficiaries. The counterparts of Mobilisers were also women. When asked how to overcome that challenge, for example, one Mobiliser in Pottuvil said that he would take with him an elder lady from the community in order to build up trust with the female beneficiaries.

The lack of continuation of community mobilisation at the later part as well as after the intervention by both Community Mobilisers and Volunteers has created a vacuum in the community development process as a whole. SLRCS needs to take actions to continue the mobilisation process for an adequate period until the desired objectives of community development are effectively achieved.

4.5.3 Efficiency:

The table below provides a summary of cost break-downs of the CRRP programme.

Financial Performance

Cost Breakdown		Distribution of Expenditures by the Three Partner Organisations								Cost share by activity
		IFRC		SLRCS		UN HABITAT		TOTAL		
No.	Description	RS' 000	USD'000	RS' 000	USD'000	RS' 000	USD'000	RS' 000	USD'000	%
1	Grant to home owners	2,704,596	27,046			54,000,000	540,000	2,758,596	27,586	88.6
2	Benefits for beneficiaries			10,500	105			10,500	105	0.3
3	Assets	2,448	24	6,211	62	19,577	196	28,236	282	0.9
4	Personnel	34,944	349	31,915	319	124,970	1,250	191,830	1,918	6.2
5	Workshops & Training	6,617	66	12,667	126	7,755	78	27,039	270	0.9
6	Office expenses	7,296	73	3,013	30	55,746	557	66,055	660	2.1
7	Transport	4,246	42	6,749	67			10,996	110	0.4
8	Consultancy fee	20,372	203					20,372	203	0.6
Grand Total		2,780,520	27,805	71,057	710	262,048	2,620	3,113,625	31,136	100

Source: Financial Report of the IFRC Office, Colombo 2009

Accordingly the bulk of the expenditure (88.6%) has been incurred for housing (top-up and full-cost grant) and the community construction works. The benefits for beneficiaries (livelihood grant) are limited to a mere 0.3 percent of the total budget, while another 0.9 percent have been used for workshops and training. The amount of 270'000 USD includes staff and community training programmes together. The total overhead cost, such as for personnel, office, transport costs and consultancy fees etc. takes a share of 11.1 percent. This is an acceptable amount considering the large coverage scope of the programme.

There are evidences to show that project deliverables meant for the livelihood development have been defined differently to one district to other, resulting in different use of financial resources as services. The livelihood grant (US \$ 10 per family) in Jaffna and in some locations in Potuvil, has been used for general training by the CDC, while in all other locations it has been used as CDC fund as initial 'seed capital' and together with membership fees. A substantial amount of funds have been accumulated for credit available to invest in livelihoods of the members. The success stories found in Raigamwatte in Kalutara, Sainthamaruthu & Maligaikadu in Ampara, and Kalapukattu in Potuvil, have been resulted from this rational use of funds.

4.6 SLRCS Capacity-Building

4.6.1 Effectiveness:

Community mobilisation was one of the main tasks of SLRCS. Social Mobilisers together with the technical staff of UN-Habitat have successfully formed CDCs as main focal points for CRRP implementation and units to report back to the partners. In general, CDCs planned and carried out construction of community infrastructure, such as internal roads, stormwater drainages, construction of overhead water tanks, wells, etc. CDCs supported the beneficiary families in obtaining materials and guidance in managing house construction. Also, CDCs took an active role in holding community gatherings for planning and implementation questions of the individual houses and the livelihood initiative. In particular, the CDCs of Sainthamaruthu and Maligaikadu in Ampara seem very active, organised and well established within the community.

In Pottuvil, the Social Mobilisers of SLRCS had to finish the work of the TOs because they left 4 to six months earlier due to the end of CRRP. The SLRCS Mobilisers were employed for 6 months beyond the timeframe of construction to assist in consolidation and thus they stayed beyond the TOs contract period. TOs delegated the final technical check-ups to the Mobilisers, who did not seem to have sufficient required technical skills. Mobilisers had difficulties managing those technical tasks and doing technical check-ups assuring quality.

With regard to the livelihood component, CDCs, beneficiaries and programme staff were not sufficiently clear about the meaning of the proposed livelihood activities as stipulated in the log-frame. One of the hindrances seemed that higher programme staff did not sufficiently communicate the content of the livelihood initiative to lower programme staff and thus to CDCs. Interviewed beneficiaries complaint a lot about the “unsuccessful” livelihood component as they expected real activities, such as vocational trainings, seed capitals for small businesses, etc. It seems that they were not sufficiently informed that the budget of 10 USD per household should have been used for establishing linkages with existing livelihood programmes and actors such as associations, local NGOs, etc.

The evaluation team has observed that most SLRCS staff members within CRRP lacked skills in project management, and therefore would need a thorough capacity building including internal restructures, and clear divisions of responsibilities.

4.6.2 Sustainability:

Concerning the SLRCS branches, there is quite a diverse picture of activity and own challenges which they have to tackle at daily basis.

The Jaffna branch looks positively very different from the other visited ones. It seems quite active, which due to the prevailing special security situation in the area. It is well organised and the staff is highly motivated. They have close cooperation with ICRC in form of several joint activities whereby SLRCS contributes effectively and efficiently, such as tracing of IDPs, transport of sick and disabled people to hospitals, for example. Further, the Assistant District Manager is well integrated in the UN-Habitat team and seems to be very committed. He said that he had received training in DM, leadership skills, accounting, and home-gardening. He uses the obtained knowledge to pass it on to the beneficiaries. However, one of the large problems has been lack of available personnel. There were only two Social Mobilisers, who were in charge of the five CRRP locations with 430 beneficiaries. In addition, the branch did neither recruit any Volunteers (although it was required in the log-frame), nor train any. SLRCS should make greater use of the possibility to hire Volunteers, train them and include them for programme activities. At least for the second phase, SLRCS should think about this opportunity.

As a whole and positively, the branch receives capacity building on organisational development by the Canadian Red Cross which will help to build up and professionalise it.

A clear challenge had been faced by the Kalutara branch as there has been a very high fluctuation of BEOs and personnel. For example, there have been five different BEOs within one year. The other

challenge which the branch faces is lack of funding in order to continue livelihood activities from the CRRP programme. When asked when they intend to take up CRRP livelihood activities they said that this kind of activities is not even included in the branch's annual plan of 2009. And it is unclear whether they can include it into the 2010 plan. Here a better personnel policy, human resources management and thorough funding with a business plan are needed to sustain CRRP's livelihood approach also in the future.

The SLRCS branch in Batticaloa looks very inactive and the staff does not seem to be very busy with activities. The interviews in Batticaloa revealed that the Assistant District Manager had apparently not a very intensive cooperation and coordination with UN-Habitat. It seems that the Assistant District Manager had a closer affiliation with the branch than identified with the UN-Habitat district office. Apparently, he did not attend thoroughly the weekly programme management meetings of UN-Habitat, which resulted in a weak cooperation and coordination between UN-Habitat and SLRCS at local level.

Concerning the response and recovery capacity of SLRCS, there is a need to revisit the communities (particularly the most vulnerable ones in Batticaloa North and Jaffna) by a volunteer at a regular basis, only by which sustainability and replicability of the established activities can be achieved. The withdrawal of SLRCS's Social Mobilisers have created a vacuum in the process of community mobilisation at a critical stage, as most of the communities have not come out of their vulnerability state or the 'poverty trap'.

It seems that skills and capacities of Social Mobilisers are still rather weak in Disaster Management. Many mobilisers interviewed appear to be inexperienced and to lack training in social issues. It would have been good if Mobilisers had received training on community building, moderation, leadership skills, project management, coaching, gender-sensitivity, etc. Most Mobilisers received only training in home-gardening in order to pass the knowledge on to the communities. In addition, it seems that BEOs and Mobilisers did not receive a briefing on owner-driven approach, what it means and how to implement it at grass-roots level.

There are 26 CRRP communities which are already converted into SLRCS units. Yet, there are still 72 CDCs remaining to be taken care of by the SLRCS's Divisions (not the branch) who are responsible for the transformation. It seems that there is no strategy behind or plan for SLRCS's new units. In addition, once CDCs are converted into the units, it remains unclear who will finance their management and any activities. Providing trainings on first aid, blood donations, recruiting volunteers, etc. need a well organised and funded concept, proceedings, and human resources. Further, CDCs may follow a different agenda than to become units of SLRCS. Their commitment is highly needed.

5 Recommendations

The recommendations below address the diverse issues, drawn from implementation, in order to improve the positive outcomes of future post-disaster reconstruction programmes and to provide recommendations for CRRP phase II in Jaffna. The recommendations touch upon the programme's concept and approach, coordination and cooperation with other programmes, human resources issues and project management, and implementation.

CRRP concept and planning:

Owner-driven

- Owner-driven approach makes sense in many cases, but not always. Therefore, it needs a more flexible approach, an adjusted owner-driven or donor-driven approach. A flexible owner-driven approach is needed for the most vulnerable beneficiaries especially for widows / single women headed households and the very poor / illiterate beneficiaries. They would prefer receiving a ready-made house, yet whereby they can determine the design of the house. It might be a mix of an owner-driven and a donor-driven approach²⁸.
- Furthermore, it would be good to incorporate better needs of single women households in the Jaffna – CRRP second phase. This would ensure that the most vulnerable are assisted more effectively. This requires in-depth technical assistance, a close and regular supervision (at least twice or three times a week) of the house construction site, improved overall monitoring and impact evaluation, and financial assistance.
- Especially for Jaffna – CRRP second phase, the evaluators recommend to make programme implementers understand what owner-driven approach means and how to implement it at grass-roots level in an effective and efficient manner.

Beneficiary list

- With regard to vulnerability issues and the establishment of the beneficiary list, there seems to be unresolved matters. Indeed CRRP has supported better-off people from the lower middle-class as well as very poor families. However, CRRP could have focused more the most vulnerable people and to improve living conditions of more families who are most in need. This would be even stronger in line with principles of IFRC, UN-Habitat, SLRCS and GoSL. For this, a clear and comprehensive selection criteria catalogue has to be formulated which defines clearly matters of vulnerability and poverty in order to select the more vulnerable, marginalised and poor people, and to ensure their inclusion.
- Selection criteria should address women's and men's needs.
- The partners of CRRP should have more influence on the establishment of the beneficiaries' lists and greater freedom to select the most vulnerable families for the programme, in particular in the second phase of CRRP in Jaffna. A vulnerability assessment is highly recommended.
- CRRP second phase should also support families without land titles. Often those families are the most vulnerable ones. For this, CRRP second phase should develop a strategy how to provide families with secure land. This needs a very close cooperation with the relevant public authorities.

Planning of programme activities

²⁸ However, this would have implications for cost and coverage. As a rule of thumb, for every three owner driven houses one could build only one donor driven house on average.

- Carrying out a thorough assessment before the programme's start provides essential information for the implementation phase. Using only Governmental information can be one-sided and might lack important detailed data.
- Any assessment should include women's and men's needs.
- CRRP's second phase should consider a more participatory approach as it is an owner-driven programme. CDCs / beneficiaries should be invited a very early stage to contribute with their knowledge and experience to the planning of the programme and activities.
- A clear strategy for community mobilisation / activities and for livelihood components would help to create better targeted programme interventions with a greater impact on improving living conditions of Tsunami affected families.
- Definition of a finished house did not consider quality issues of housing. CRRP's second phase in Jaffna should define minimum quality standards for construction of houses and technical infrastructure.

Minimal / maximum standards

- CRRP mandated a minimum size of 500 sq.ft. per house, which is a reasonable size. However, there was no limit of a maximum size. So, some families opted for a far larger house, but could not finish it because of lack of funds. Any future programme, in particular Jaffna – CRRP second phase, should set a maximum size to avoid the risk of unfinished houses.

Relocation of families

- Relocation of beneficiaries to interior sites may not be avoided completely and decisions depend on local, institutional, economic, political and environmental issues. Thus, it needs more careful and critical review to ensure that relocated communities are better advised in selecting new plots, and have thus greater control over their wellbeing and livelihoods.

Improvement of socio-economic conditions of families

- CRRP programme staff together with CDCs / beneficiaries should develop a practical concept for the livelihood component. This requires a thorough assessment beforehand.
- CRRP's second phase in Jaffna should plan for sufficient amount of funds to undertake substantial activities within the livelihood component.
- It seems that there is a lack of livelihood expertise within CRRP as for example some of the poorer households have used CRRP funds to buy food or to meet other basic necessity instead of using the instalments for the house construction. In fact, unless basic needs are met it is difficult for beneficiaries to concentrate on the construction component of the programme. It should have considered this and included a stronger, also in financial terms, component on livelihood activities. A more thorough baseline and understanding of the households and their life strategies to overcome daily challenges would have been useful.
- Stronger integration of the community building and livelihood development components into the housing and WATSAN activities would create more synergies and would improve living conditions of beneficiaries in a more sustainable manner (e.g. beneficiaries produce building materials, set up production units for cement blocks, earth blocks, etc.).

Coordination and cooperation with other programmes:

- CRRP could have been linked with other programmes, in order to include most vulnerable families, who were left out by the CRRP programme.
- In particular, the livelihood initiative of CRRP could have been strengthened much more when linking with outside activities of other programmes.

- CDCs and programme staff have to coordinate and cooperate much closer with local authorities, in order to take them on board building up a relationship with the communities and to strengthen services delivery.

Human resources and project management:**Professional guidance / personnel**

- Effective professional guidance is needed to achieve better results of the WATSAN community projects to avoid any failures and for communities to make “informed decisions”.
- Inviting an external resource person to the CAP workshop, who could professionally guide the communities in identifying most effective and appropriate needs, could have avoided such shortcomings. Yet, the role of the external resource person should be limited only to provide professional inputs but not to involve in community decision making process. Responsibility of final decision must remain with the community itself as initially set by the project.
- Concerning human resources, more Community Mobilisers, Technical Officers and other programme staff at local levels are needed to improve technical supervision and a closer support in improving hygiene / health, and livelihoods.
- As there were too few TOs for the amount of houses built, TOs were overwhelmed by the amount of houses they had to supervise. Often, a TO could visit the construction sites only once in two weeks or once in a month which is obviously too little. Instead of a ratio of one TO for 100 houses and more, the maximum number of houses per TO should be 20 to 40.
- The sudden withdrawal of Community Mobilisers with the closure of CRRP in first 3 districts fully, and in Jaffna partially, has created an obvious vacuum in the mobilisation process at its very critical stage. Therefore, relevant SLRCS branches should continue with livelihood development activities.
- There is a need for revisit the communities, particularly the most vulnerable ones in Batticaloa North and Jaffna, by a volunteer at a regular basis, only by which sustainability and replicability of the established activities can be achieved. The livelihood component needs continuation for a longer period!

Social / Community Mobilisers

- There should have been enough Social Mobilisers planned and available in order to give thorough guidance in livelihood initiatives and related social and health aspects. A recommended ideal ratio would be one Social Mobiliser being responsible for 20 to 50 households.
- CRRP's second phase should hire more qualified staff with a strong background in social work or sociology in order to plan and implement the community development component in a professional and sustainable manner.
- Community Mobilisers have not been trained in social mobilisation and as such they do not have required capacity to guide CDCs to initiate and implement livelihood activities for its members. Therefore, the Mobilisers should have a special qualification in social and livelihood development.
- It seems that skills and capacities of Social Mobilisers are still rather weak in Disaster Management. Especially for Jaffna (second phase) it would be useful if Mobilisers receive training on community building, moderation, leadership skills, project management, coaching, gender-sensitivity, etc. where needed.
- Especially for Jaffna – CRRP second phase, the evaluators recommend to recruit more qualified female (!) Social Mobilisers in order to better build up a relationship of trust between them and the women beneficiaries²⁹. A well-founded trustful relationship helps enormously to address better

²⁹ It shows that in male dominating societies, often a conversation from woman to woman is more open and attached whereby also critical issues are easier raised than in the presence of a man.

the prevailing needs and is an important pre-condition for awareness-raising campaigns and convincing for necessary behaviour changes.

Coaching / professional guidance

- Provision of guidance is needed on bringing in professional inputs through external highly qualified resource persons during CAP workshops without disturbing the community decision making process. This helps to bring the programme on the right track. CDCs need more training support from SLRCS in order to be able to realise more community and economic development work. After the CAP workshops were done, CDCs were not really aware of or could communicate what to undertake as next step. Therefore, CDCs need a closer support from social workers on how to realise community activities, also in coordination with local authorities, towards a joint community goal.

Disbursement of grants

- Concerning the second phase of CRRP in Jaffna, donors should finalise as soon as possible (if it is not yet done) their financial commitments, in order to avoid any delays in the programme implementation. In particular, it is essential that livelihood activities start right from the beginning and thus can be better integrated in the realisation process.
- CRRP's second phase should avoid any delays in disbursing money to the beneficiaries through a slimmer administration system. The programme management team should develop a grant allocation system with a minimum of required signatures, yet without taking the risk funds' misuse³⁰.

Capacity building of SLRCS

- There is room and potential to increase the capacities of SLRCS. This needs a good strategy and funding.

M&E

- On monitoring and evaluation, there is need for a more efficient and useful system, which acknowledges the different cultures and proceedings of all three partner organisations. Also, the monitoring system should be simple enough, so that CDC board members or other beneficiaries can report back to programme staff. This needs professional guidance on establishing a comprehensive monitoring system and its usage on progress and objective monitoring. It needs also an effective follow-up system to handle identified bottlenecks in the various monitoring activities.
- Future monitoring and evaluation should include a focus on the outcomes (and not handle only the outputs). An outcome M&E system would consider the beneficiaries' satisfaction with the products (houses, sanitary facilities, infrastructure, livelihood component, etc.) and the impact of outputs. Such a system would look at wider effects of the programme – social, economic, technical, institutional, and environmental – on individuals and groups. Attention needs to be placed on changes that take place in the short-, medium- and long-term.
- CRRP second phase in Jaffna should develop and use special guidelines for monitoring, quality checks and evaluation.

³⁰ According to donors' interviews, it was decided to reduce the number of signatures required to approve a payment. The database operator would send the request directly to IFRC CRRP finance department instead of sending it first to UN-Habitat finance unit. That should reduce the amount of days to disburse a payment.

- There should be sufficient staff members who are professional in monitoring and would form a M&E team.
- In order to assure quality control, it will be important to have a higher Technical Officers / house ratio.
- TOs and Community Mobilisers should be better prepared for carrying out monitoring activities. CRRP's second phase should incorporate capacity building on M&E for TOs and Mobilisers.
- For the second phase of CRRP, there should be gathered and compiled useful baseline information before the start of the programme. (The information collected during CRRP phase 1 was not adequate enough as it was based on secondary data and statistical results were presented without any analysis.)
- It is recommended to establish mechanisms to test and monitor the drinking water quality through respective local government officers especially in the relocation sites as they can be exposed to unsafe drinking water. This is very relevant for the second phase of CRRP.
- If needed, indicators (of the logframe) should be refined or adjusted in the course of the programme and during monitoring processes.

Financial reporting

- CRRP's second phase should foresee a streamlined financial reporting system in order to address the different requirements and financial systems of the partner organisations.

Local coordination

- Better coordination at local levels between partners is extremely necessary. All actors should be working closely to each other to ensure that all components of the programme are implemented in an integral manner.
- CRRP's second phase should foresee a very close coordination with the relevant local authorities and Governmental offices to ensure effective programme implementation.
- The amount of families per CDC (Primary Group) should be limited in order to ensure close and regular assistance by the CDC.

On implementation:

Professional guidance

- More guidance from advisors to CDCs and families is needed to select appropriate and affordable solutions/options, service levels in terms of housing, drinking water and sanitation.
- Assistance to families is recommended, where needed, in the management of received instalments of the grant to avoid any 'false' use of the allocated money.
- More guidance from experts to CDCs on planning, development and implementation of effective hygiene promotion campaigns is needed. There is still need to carry out extensive campaigns on sanitation, health and hygiene issues in order to enhance the outcomes on water supply and sanitation improvements.

Assessments before the start of programme activities

- Allocate larger funds for professional feasibility studies for the community contracted projects to avoid any malfunctioning storm water drainages, unusable wells, etc.

- Choosing community projects, women as men should have an equal influence in the selection process.

Housing component

- CRRP's second phase should rethink minimal / maximum standards of completed houses. The definition of a "finished house" should be adjusted to the needs of beneficiaries. Yet, the standards ought to follow the national norms.
- A sound needs assessment should be carried out prior to building to ensure practicability of houses. Each house should have included a water tank, a well or connection to tapped water where applicable, and electricity. If families already have a toilet / latrine, they do not need to build another one.
- Conducting a VCA to guide communities on measurements against natural hazards.

WATSAN

- CRRP's second phase could think about the possibility of introducing more resources saving technologies, such as rainwater-harvesting and dry toilets.
- The programme team of CRRP's second phase should have a close eye on the qualitative implementation of latrines / septic tanks (sound of an engineering point of view, ensuring minimal distances to any well or water tap, etc.).
- CRRP's second phase should include a clear strategy and funding for operating and maintaining the houses, technical infrastructure and community projects.

Livelihood component

- Programme staff needs to communicate clearly the extent and content of the livelihood component to avoid any frustration on the side of beneficiaries.
- In addition, any livelihood component should start from the very beginning of the programme in order to address basic needs of beneficiaries and to ensure smoother and better quality house construction. This means that any programme should not be seen purely as a reconstruction technical programme but should integrate also socio-economic processes and needs in order to improve living conditions in a sustainable manner.
- There is a need to develop strategies and business plans of how to maintain both, individual houses and community infrastructure facilities. This is important to ensure necessary repairs in the future and their funding for it.
- Concerning community contracted projects, communities might be overwhelmed by the task to implement community infrastructure / WATSAN projects. An assessment of communities' capacities would be recommended beforehand.

Capacity building of SLRCS

- SLRCS would need stronger guidance in improving internal management and procedures to avoid heavy bureaucracy.
- It is recommended to SLRCS to rethink and adjust policies, approaches and to clearly define roles and responsibilities internally.
- SLRCS would need to develop and implement a clear strategy to transform CDCs into SLRCS units. Here, a thorough assessment is needed whether and how CDCs can be converted. SLRCS needs to clearly communicate incentives and benefits to the CDCs.

6 Inputs for the IFRC Toolkit Development

The evaluation team developed inputs / recommendations for the toolkit development of IFRC. The inputs are based on the recommendations (chapter 5), and are summarised below.

In general:

- Provide guidance on programme management hindrances which are relevant in Owner-Driven Approaches (more details under Recommendations, chapter 5).
- Include livelihood components in a more integrated manner in the technical implementation process – construction of houses and infrastructure.
- Give guidance on communication and knowledge sharing strategies.
- Provide hints on effective M&E; introduce a result-based monitoring & evaluation (RBME) system (more details under Recommendations, chapter 5).
- Consider recommendations for efficient and tight programme coordination at the district and divisional level.
- Recommend gender-sensitive planning and implementation (more details under Recommendations, chapter 5).
- Hints on developing a realistic risk strategy (more details under Recommendations, chapter 5).
- Recommend VCA for appropriate measurements against natural hazards.

On housing approach:

- Consider the option of alternative, environmental friendly construction materials and technologies (Stabilised Earth Blocks, Micro concrete roofing, rat-trap bond, VSBK, solar systems, etc.)
- Mention minimum norms, such as the SPHERE standards
- Include maintenance difficulties and how to overcome them, such as strategies for effective maintenance to greater sustainability
- Provision of adequate temporary shelters during implementation phase
- Hints on selection of adequate sites; what kind of risk may occur and how to overcome them

On WATSAN:

- Introduce alternative tools and methodologies if the most preferable, proposed methodology/tools are proved to be in appropriate. For an example, KAP (Knowledge, Attitude and Practices) studies and community sanitary surveys as an alternative to PHAST. KAP studies are easier to conduct at community level compared with PHAST. Moreover in relocation sites KAP studies would be more appropriate than PHAST in which PHAST process evolves around where they live for sometime.
- Provide guidance on bringing in professional inputs through external resource persons during CAP workshop without disturbing the community decision making process and its ownership
- Provide guidance on establishing a monitoring system and its usage on progress and objective monitoring
- Include a list of measures to minimise environmental damages throughout the management of project cycle

- Include guidance on selection of the most appropriate and affordable solutions/options, service levels in terms of drinking water and sanitation
- Include technical information on appropriate and safe disposal methods of excreta, solid waste and liquid waste disposal methods
- Provide guidance on planning, development and implementation of effective hygiene promotion campaigns
- Provide guidance on conducting training programmes for the front line project staff related to “process” on identified mile stones of the phased out project cycle

Suggested livelihood-related recommendations are:

- Consider the need for CAP-based livelihoods development
- Mention the importance of technical support to upgrade and commercialise the traditional livelihoods
- Recommend rigorous training for both Mobilisers and Volunteers in social mobilisation and livelihoods development
- Consider the options of ‘seed capital’ made available to CDC/PG for investment and to meet demand
- Provide recommendations of how to effectively introduce community saving system, e.g. Women’s Bank

7 Annex

- Revised evaluation team field visit plan
- List of people met and interviewees
- Questionnaire for field observations
- Questionnaire for interviews with IFRC, UN-Habitat, SLRCS, and donors
- Inception report
- TORs for the evaluators