

Evaluation
of
2002 Floods Operations in China
by
Red Cross Society of China
and
International Federation of Red Cross

John Wilding
Yunhong Zhang
Isabelle Sechaud
Lars Peter Nissen

April 2003

China Flash Floods Appeal 16/02
 CHF 5 044 000
 100 000 beneficiaries for 3 months



Base 802437 (545114) 2-96

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CHF	Swiss Franc
DP	Disaster Preparedness
DPC	Disaster Preparedness Centre
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (IFRC)
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
H/H	Household
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
GoC	Government of China
MoCA	Ministry of Civil Affairs
MoH	Ministry of Health
MT	Metric Tonne
Mu	Chinese area of land (15 <i>mu</i> = 1 hectare)
NS	National Society
PNS	Participating National Society
PoA	Plan of Action
RC	Red Cross
RCSC	Red Cross Society of China
RMB	Renminbi – National currency of China. Also referred to as Yuan . (USD 1 = RMB 8.3)
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDMT	UN Disaster Management Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	United States Dollar
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment Mapping
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation
WFP	World Food Programme (of United Nations)
WPT	Water Purification Treatment
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Table of Contents

Introduction	6
Executive summary	7
1. Background	9
1.1 Chronology	11
1.2 Intervention rationale	13
1.2.1 Ex-post Logical Framework	14
2. Achievements	16
2.1 Achievements against Planned (by Logical Framework)	16
2.2 Achievements against Recommended (by previous Evaluations)	19
2.3 Achievements against Recommended (by Auditors' reports)	23
3. Analysis by classical evaluation criteria	26
3.1 Relevance	26
3.1.1 Assessment and appeal process	26
3.1.2 Beneficiary selection	27
3.2 Effectiveness	30
3.3 Efficiency	31
3.3.1 The Procurement process – central v local procurement ...	33
3.3.2 RCSC Financial process/reporting lines for IFRC funds ...	35
3.3.3 Delegate deployment	36
3.4 Cost effectiveness	37
3.4.1 Transport cost	37
3.4.2 Item cost	37
3.5 Impact	38
3.6 Sustainability	39
4. Wider issues raised by the evaluation	40
4.1 Strategy of RCSC	40
4.2 Organisation of RCSC	41
4.3 IFRC Delegates	42
4.4 Fundraising	43
4.5 Choice of Relief items	43
4.6 Cash transfer v Working advances	43
4.7 Monitoring and reporting	44
4.8 RCSC Computer programme	46
4.9 Disaster preparedness – DP Centres	49
5. Findings	51
6. Conclusions	53
7. Recommendations	55

Annexes

Annex A.	Terms of Reference	60
Annex B.	Itinerary	65
Annex C.	List of People met	66
Annex D.	Bibliography	69
Annex E.	Field visit to JinXian village	70
Annex F.	Constraints and achievements of the Review Process and Lessons Learnt for future similar processes in China	72

Introduction

This report concerns the response of the Red Cross Society of China and the International Federation of Red Cross to the Flash Floods and subsequent landslides in the ten Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi, Chongqing, Fujian, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Yunan and Hubei as represented in the foregoing Map of China.

The Terms of Reference (presented in **Annex A**) required that, *inter alia*, the Team should evaluate the success of the Flood Operation against both classical evaluation criteria and the findings and recommendations of previous evaluations. It should also develop recommendations for the future scope of **RCSC/IFRC** cooperation in the field of Disaster Response.

The study was carried out between 6th.March and 6th.April by:

John Wilding, an agricultural economist with a wide experience of Relief and Development issues in Africa and Asia, who undertook the first evaluation of Red Cross Flood Operations in China (1998 Floods) in April/May 1999.

Lars Peter Nissen, a Disaster Management Specialist with a wide experience of Relief Operations in Africa, South America and Asia, who undertook the third review of Red Cross Flood Operations in China (1999 Floods) in March 2000.

Isabelle Sechaud, a political scientist and specialist in Logistics with a wide experience of Relief Logistics operations in Europe, Africa and Asia who is currently responsible for Logistics in Federation Headquarters, Geneva.

Yunhong Zhang, a Canadian citizen born in China, who has monitored both bi-lateral (on behalf of Canadian Red Cross) and Federation cooperation with Chinese Red Cross for a number of years and who contributes her invaluable insight into China to this team.

This report was prepared with financial assistance from the International Federation of Red Cross with the hospitality of the Red Cross Society of China. The views expressed herein are those of the consultants and do not represent any official view of the Red Cross movement.

Executive summary

1. This study represents the fourth evaluation/assessment/operational review of floods in China since 1998¹ and, in terms of classical evaluation criteria (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Cost Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability), tends to conclude with the same perceptions as the previous three. Accordingly, and in order not to cloud the very positive aspects of Chinese Red Cross (**RCSC**) activities in the field of disaster response, this report concentrates on the bigger issues raised.

2. The arrival of **RCSC** personnel and volunteers at disaster sites is fast, within a matter of one or two days and often in advance of that of the public authorities. While the quantity of relief goods delivered at this stage is minimal, **RCSC**' ability to raise alarm to is significant. At the same time, **RCSC** arrival represents a certain solidarity with the victims and a caring presence which is highly appreciated, not only by them, but also by the public authorities who are perceived as performing their official obligations.

3. With the exception of DREF² support, the time taken from cash request to first delivery of **IFRC** (and its donors) funded emergency items is again considerable with an average of 75 days, a range of between 37 and 135 days and eventual delivery time to some sites of up to 5 months. This raises the question of the relevance of commodities delivered and, accordingly, **RCSC/IFRC** needs to: **a)** find ways to procure and deliver truly emergency relief items expeditiously through innovative procurement methods such as the employment of local Framework Contracts; and **b)** acknowledge its response time limitations and select commodities which are appropriate to the post-emergency urgent needs situation prevailing at such time as delivery is possible.

4. The study has illustrated that **RCSC**' own-funds are faster to mobilise and more flexible to spend than those from international appeal for which, at the current level of **RCSC** development and resources, the time from request to first delivery in the field cannot realistically be reduced much below that achieved in its most successful scenario (PoA 1) which took 37 days.

5. **IFRC/RCSC** needs to identify its current strengths which may not necessarily include that of emergency relief but more those of communication and meeting post-emergency urgent needs. In this regard, opportunities exists for **IFRC/RCSC** to cooperate in the development of these strengths through such as the development of modern communications, the recruitment of a substantial volunteer force, development of a Disaster Preparedness capacity and accelerated local fund-raising.

6. At the same time, **RCSC/IFRC** needs to be more aware of scale and proportion and recognise **RCSC**' minimal potential to respond in the face of extraordinary demand.

¹ Wilding, J. *1998 Flood Operations in China*, CDR, UK, May 1999;
Seebacher, S. *China Floods 1999, Assessment Report*, IFRC, Kuala Lumpur, August 1999;
Gordon-Gibson, A., Wang, X.Y., Nissen, L.P. and Low, S, *1999 Floods*, IFRC, Geneva, March 2000

² IFRC Disaster Response Emergency Fund

RCSC' very close cooperation with the public authorities, which has changed very little since 1998, is considered to be a very positive aspect of the Chinese condition and something which should not be discouraged, at this stage, in pursuit of Independence.

7. The team considers that **IFRC/RCSC** has not maximised opportunities for mutual knowledge transfer due to a certain 'shyness' on the part of **IFRC vis-à-vis RCSC**. While there are historic reasons for the location of **IFRC** flood response delegates³, the weakness described above is not improved by the fact that such delegates do not operate with true counterparts within the **RCSC** framework and within the **RCSC HQ** offices. The result is a degree of misunderstanding and inefficiencies in areas such as donor reporting and fund management.

8. Reporting to donors by **RCSC** is simply not adequate but is perceived by them as the responsibility of **IFRC**. This is not sustainable, not acceptable and exposes the Red Cross movement (specifically the Netherlands RC, **IFRC** and **RCSC**) to the threat of demands for repayment of funds.

9. Likewise, certain **RCSC** financial and logistics procedures do not meet international standards and which would certainly not meet strict donor requirements. Applying the audit principle that 'if it is possible, someone will', then Red Cross funds have to be recognised as being in jeopardy.

10. For several historic reasons including those of convenience, speed and lack of **IFRC** banking facility and formalised legal status in China, **RCSC** has been working under a Cash Transfer system since the beginning of its various Floods collaborations with the Federation. This is not the normal status of an operating national society and leaves **IFRC** with little control of donor funds for which it is responsible. The 'normal' arrangement is one of monthly Working Advances, a reversion to which **RCSC** may understandably perceive as a retrograde step.

There are two issues here which should be addressed separately. The primary and fundamental issue, upon which all players are in agreement, implies the need to bring **RCSC** financial management up to international donor standards. The second issue, that of changing the system, would have to be seriously addressed if these standards were not brought up to international norms through application of the Federation accreditation process 'normally' a precondition of adoption of the Cash Transfer system.

11. Despite its rather negative tenor, this report recommends courses of action which, if adopted, could lead to a very optimistic future. Previous recommendations have largely not been heeded by the movement and, if this continues, the utility (or maybe validity) of studies as presented here should be questioned.

³ in the **IFRC** Regional Office located some distance across town from **RCSC HQ**. The move from the latter resulted from GoC preference that **IFRC** take on a diplomatic status and be housed accordingly in diplomatic accommodation. **RCSC** possibly preferred this arrangement as it reduced the extra work-load imposed upon them by **IFRC ad hoc** requests for assistance and, more particularly, because it reduced the demanding requests of visiting PNS.

1. Background

As China continues its transition to a modern socialist market economy, it faces enduring as well as emerging development challenges related to economic, social, ecological and governance issues. To address these challenges, China has recently adopted a new Five Year Development Plan, launched a new poverty reduction strategy, made areas in the west of the country a development priority and entrenched the principle of law in the constitution. China has also undertaken to further integrate into the global economy and international systems as illustrated by its accession to bodies such as the WTO and adoption of key international instruments.

Nevertheless, substantial challenges remain. Over 200 million Chinese constitute almost 20 % of world's poor⁴, many in remote and resource-poor areas in the western and interior regions who still live on less than **USD 1.00** a day, often without access to clean water, arable land or adequate health and education services. Furthermore, while China's environmental programme has had notable successes, challenges which have an impact on economic growth and social well-being still remain:

- 40 % of land is affected by erosion;
- 54% of the population lacks access to clean water;
- China is the second largest emitter of green house gases in the world.

Climatic and geological complications make China one of the most disaster prone countries in the world. The frequent natural hazards of the country are typhoons (about five per year along the southern and eastern coasts); damaging floods, earthquakes and drought which all play havoc on the country.

In 2002, China again was exposed to an extreme natural phenomenon. The flood season started early and lasted longer than usual. According to statistics issued by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs in early September 2002, the 2002 floods claimed 1 532 lives and affected an estimated 190 million people to a greater or lesser degrees. One million houses were destroyed and 13.15 million ha of crops were damaged. Local governments temporally evacuated more than 2.4 million people from several flood-prone areas. Direct economic loss of the 2002 floods amounts to approximately **RMB 68 billion** or **USD 8.2 billion**.

The 'abnormal' characteristics of 2002 floods were:

- they began more than a month earlier than the normal rainy season which usually extends from mid-July to mid-August;
- they hit inland provinces like Shanxi, Guizhou and Sichuan which normally suffer drought; and
- they were caused by torrential rain, which fell with exceptional speed and magnitude. Recorded rainfall in some areas reached up to 489 mm within 24 hours.

⁴ source: World Bank, 2002.

At the end of August 2002, a State of Emergency was declared by the authorities of the southern China province of Hunan while the water levels of Dongting Lake rose threatening as many as 10 million people in the densely populated surrounding area. Dongting lake is the second largest lake in China and it acts as a giant overflow for the flood prone Yangtze River. The emergency alert remained in force for almost two weeks during which hundreds of thousands of volunteers worked around the clock inspecting and reinforcing dykes with sand bags.

Of the 25 regions affected by the floods in June, seven provinces in Central and Southern China: Shanxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Guanxi, Hunan, Fujian, Jiangxi and one municipality, the city of Chongqing were categorized as having suffered the most serious losses and damage. Some of the most devastated areas are traditionally drought-affected and did not even anticipate rainfall, much less large scale flooding. Subsequent floods increased vulnerability with the two additional provinces of Hubei and Yunnan, thus qualifying them for support through funds raised within the appeal referred to in this document.

The response to this disaster of both the Federation and the Red Cross Society of China is presented below both in terms of events (**Section 1. Chronology**) and, later in this document, in terms of fund transfers from donors through Geneva and Beijing to the affected provinces (**Section 3.3 Efficiency**).

1.1 Chronology

Early June 2002:

- IFRC** Regional Delegation read newspaper reports of increasing floods.
- IFRC** alerts **RCSC** who call for a meeting.
- June 12th** First information bulletin released on **IFRC** Web-page describing severe floods and the first response of the Government of China.
- 13th** Second information bulletin – **RCSC** has already purchased and distributed **RMB** 100 000 (**CHF** 18 750) of relief items.
- 15 - 18th** **RCSC HQ** relief staff make assessment in Sichuan province.
- 15 - 19th** **RCSC** Deputy Head of International, **RCSC HQ** relief staff and American embassy staff make assessment in Xinjiang province.
- 19th** Third information bulletin – Chinese RC has launched a national appeal and is planning to launch a preliminary International Appeal.
- 17 - 20th** **RCSC** Deputy Secretary General and **HQ** Relief staff make assessment in Fujian and Hunan provinces
- 17 - 20th** **IFRC** field delegate and **RCSC** Guangxi staff make assessment in Guangxi province.
- 20th** Fourth information bulletin – Emergency stock stored in **RCSC DP** centres distributed – **IFRC** prepares Appeal
- 22th** Information delegate arrives in Beijing.
- 23 - 27th** Head of **IFRC** Regional Office and **RCSC** Deputy Head of Relief make assessment in Jiangxi and Hunan provinces.
- 24 - 27th** **IFRC** Information Delegate and **RCSC HQ** relief staff make assessment in Shaanxi province.
- 25th** **International Appeal No.16/02** launched to seek **CHF** 5 044 000 for the benefit of 100 000 victims for 3 months.
- 27th** Operations Update No.1
- 27 - 1st** **RCSC** relief staff make assessment in Chongqing municipality.
- 30th** Cash Request sent to Geneva for transfer of cash for Water Purification Powder (WPP) and Tents according to Plan of Action 1 and Quilts and Food for PoAs 3 and PoA 4.
- July 5th** Operations Update No.2
- 12th** Money transferred into **RCSC** bank account for WPP and Tents (PoA 1).
- 17th** Netherlands RC send funding application to **ECHO**.
- 21st** **IFRC** Relief/monitoring delegate arrives in Beijing.
- 24th** Contract signed between **RCSC** and Chinese WPP supplier (PoA1).
- 24th** Money transferred to **RCSC** bank account for Quilts & Foods (PoAs 3 & 4)
- 25th** Contract signed between **RCSC** and Tent supplier (PoA 1).
- 30th** Operations Update No.3
- 30th** **IFRC** Reporting delegate arrives in Beijing.
- Aug. 5th** Starting date of **ECHO** contract (PoA 2).
- 7th** WPP delivered to **RCSC** Branches (PoA 1).
- 13th** Contract signed between **RCSC** and Chinese supplier for Quilts (PoA 4).
- Aug.7th - Nov.6th**
Distribution of WPP (PoA 1)

Aug. 6th – 17th

Tents delivered to Red Cross Branches (PoA 1)

21st Second **IFRC** Relief/ monitoring delegate arrives in Beijing.

21st **IFRC** Finance delegate arrives in Beijing.

Aug.6th – Oct.30th

Distribution of tents (PoA 1)

30th Contract signed between **RCSC** and Rice supplier (PoA 3)

September 1- 20th

Quilts delivered to provinces (PoA 4)

Sep.1st - Oct.10th

Distribution of Quilts

3rd Operations Update No.4

3rd **ECHO** contract signed (PoA 2)

23rd € 738 435 transferred to **RCSC** (PoA 2)

4 – 20th Rice delivered to provinces (PoA 3)

Sep.4th – Nov.

Distribution of Rice (PoA 3)

Oct.10th **IFRC** granted extension from 4 to 6 months for **ECHO** contract (PoA 2)

15th Project agreement signed between **IFRC** and **RCSC** for PoAs 2, 3 and 4

23rd Contract Committee of contracts, company selected for **ECHO** Rice (PoA 2)

25th MoU signed between **IFRC** and Netherlands RC

25th Balance of **ECHO** funds transferred to **RCSC**

Nov.20th Money transferred into **RCSC** account for Rice and Quilts (PoA 5)

Dec.6th Contract signed between **RCSC** and Chinese supplier for Quilts (PoA 5)

19th Contract signed between **RCSC** and Chinese supplier for Rice (PoA 5)

Dec.24th - Feb.

Distribution of Rice and Quilts (PoA 5)

31st Operations Update No.5

Jan.3rd '03 Contract signed between **RCSC/Chinese** supplier for **ECHO** Rice (PoA 2)

Feb.'03 Delivery of rice to provinces (PoA 2)

Mid Feb - mid Mar.'03

Distribution of **ECHO** Rice (PoA 2)

1.2 Intervention rationale

An ex-post Logical Framework has been prepared in order to summarise the Team's perception, as a result of document inspection and stakeholder interviews, of **IFRC/RCSC**' original intervention rationale.

The **Goal** of the intervention is not clearly stated in Red Cross documentation and therefore the Team's perception of it is reflected here.

The **Purpose** of the intervention was stated in the **IFRC** Appeal document No.16/02 of 25th.June 2002, albeit under the heading of Operation Goal.

The **Anticipated Results** are stated in the same document but variously under the headings of Objective and Indicators.

The **Activities** were also stated in that document albeit under the headings of Objective.

The **inputs**, in financial and physical terms, are copied directly from the document.

The Logical Framework is presented in **Section 1.2.1** below while planned intentions compared with actual achievements are analysed in **Section 2**.

1.2.1

Ex-post Logical framework
- China Flash Floods 2002 -

Objectives	Measurable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions and risks
<p>Goal (not stated) To reduce disaster vulnerability in China through strengthening of the Chinese Red Cross institution and improvement of RCSC operational performance.</p>			<p>(Goal to Supergoal)</p>
<p>Purpose: stated To meet the urgent needs for food, shelter, and a clean water supply of women, men and children in affected communities in the Chinese Provinces of: Sichuan, Shaanxi, Chongqing (Municipality), Fujian, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Yunan, Hubei</p>	<p>No incidence of malnutrition; No incidence of morbidity; No incidence of mortality; Avoidance of household destructuration (ie. the sale of household and productive assets in order to ensure survival);</p>	<p>Household surveys, Visual/verbal reports, MoH - ditto - - ditto - Household surveys, Visual/verbal reports</p>	<p>(Purpose to Goal) People strong enough to work; People able to restructure;</p>
<p>Anticipated Results: stated 1. Food resources eliminate the need for survival strategies which could have resulted in long term negative consequences on H/H viability and livelihood; 2. Systems are in place which enable stock levels, movements and distributions to be monitored by commencement of distributions; 3. Commodities selected for distribution includes consideration of local acceptability and preparation and nutritional composition. 4. Drinking water purified for the benefit of 1 million men, women and children in areas where water sources have been contaminated;</p>	<p>80% of beneficiaries interviewed confirm that food resources eliminated the need for survival strategies which could have resulted in long term negative consequences on H/H viability and livelihood; No outbreaks of a diarrhoea epidemic in target areas throughout the duration of the operation.</p>	<p>Red Cross field monitoring reports</p>	<p>(Results to Purpose)</p>

<p>5. The covered area available per person averages 3.5 to 4.5 sq.m; 6. People have access to sufficient number of quilts to provide protection from the climate.</p>			
<p>Activities: stated</p> <p>Relief: distribution of food and basic non-food items: Distribution of food: 1. Provision of one food commodity (wheat or rice) to 100 000 women, men and children for three months in order to complement existing foods which are available and accessible;</p> <p>Water and Sanitation: 2. Provision of water purification powder and disinfectant for the benefit of 1 million men, women and children in areas where water sources have been contaminated;</p> <p>Shelter and textiles: 3. Provision of 2 000 tents to vulnerable segments of the population who have lost their homes because of the floods; 4. Provision of 20 000 quilts to the most vulnerable segments of the flood-affected population</p> <p>Programme support 5. Programme management; 6. Technical support; 7. Professional services 8. Transport and storage 9. Regular monitoring and reporting</p>	<p>Inputs CHF 5.04 million</p> <p>4 500 MT Rice & Wheat Other relief supplies (not specified)</p> <p>Water and sanitation (not specified)</p> <p>2 000 family tents</p> <p>20 000 quilts</p> <p>Personnel: 4 Expatriate staff; National staff; Travel; Information; Administration Capital equipment: 6 vehicles; computers</p>	<p>Financial outturn Red Cross financial reports</p>	<p>(Activity to Output)</p>

2. Achievements

The achievements of the operation against this intervention framework is addressed in tabular format below in which the achievements stated are not comprehensive.

2.1 Achievements against Planned (by Logical Framework)

Planned	Achieved	Comments
<p>Goal (not stated) To reduce disaster vulnerability in China through strengthening of the Chinese Red Cross institution and improvement of RCSC operational performance.</p> <p>Purpose: stated To meet the urgent needs for food, shelter, and a clean water supply of women, men and children in affected communities in the Chinese Provinces of: Sichuan, Shaanxi, Chongqing, Fujian, Hunan, Guanxi, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Yunan, Hubei</p> <p>Indicators: No incidence of malnutrition; No incidence of morbidity; No incidence of mortality; Avoidance of household destructuration;</p> <p>Anticipated Results: (stated) 1. Food resources eliminate the need for survival strategies which could have resulted in long term negative consequences on H/H viability and livelihood;</p>	<p>No reports of malnutrition; Some reports of water-borne diseases and skin infections due to physical exposure to water; Very small number of fatalities from flood induced injuries; No reported sales of household & productive assets</p> <p>Respondents stated that the food resources, although small, did constitute a supplement to their needs;</p>	<p>Respondents expressed the opinion that families and communities helped each other with food, shelter and money until victims could find some way to carry on.</p> <p>The Team considers that the food resources represent an <u>economic</u> contribution more than a nutritional one;</p>

<p>2. Systems are in place which enable stock levels, movements and distributions to be monitored by commencement of distributions;</p> <p>3. Commodities selected for distribution includes consideration of local acceptability and preparation and nutritional composition.</p> <p>4. Drinking water purified for the benefit of 1 million men, women and children in areas where water sources have been contaminated;</p> <p>5. The covered area available per person averages 3.5 to 4.5 sq.m;</p> <p>6. People have access to sufficient number of quilts to provide protection from the climate.</p> <p>Indicators: 80% of beneficiaries interviewed confirm that food resources eliminated the need for survival strategies which could have resulted in long term negative consequences on H/H viability and livelihood; No outbreaks of a diarrhoea epidemic in target areas throughout the duration of the operation.</p> <p>Activities: stated</p> <p>Relief: distribution of food and basic non-food items:</p> <p>Distribution of food:</p> <p>1. Provision of one food commodity (wheat or rice) to 100 000 women, men and children for three months in order to complement existing foods which are available and accessible;</p> <p>Water and Sanitation:</p> <p>2. Provision of water purification powder and disinfectant for the benefit of 1 million men, women and children in areas where water sources have been contaminated;</p>	<p>RCSC states that such monitoring capabilities were in place but that the situation is not always clear at the Province level due to the lack of capacity there;</p> <p>Distributed rice variety and quality was reported as being actually better than that normally eaten by the beneficiaries; RCSC states that 792 471 persons benefited from water purification;</p> <p>Tents covered 12 sq.m for average 4-person families and therefore do not meet this criterion; No</p> <p>No clear positive or negative answer but see next column (Comment) ></p> <p>No epidemics but some reported cases of water-borne diseases (incl. diarrhoea).</p> <p>399 941 beneficiaries received rice</p> <p>232 058 beneficiaries received water purification powder</p>	<p>Distribution reports received by the Team in Guangxi and Yunan provinces would indicate that monitoring was, in fact, good but these are perhaps the better organised of provinces;</p> <p>Respondents who did receive quilts reported receiving only one per family.</p> <p>The Team considers this a poor indicator in the absence of a statistical household survey and in the light of the small quantities of food planned/ received per family; According to GoC MoH practice, a disease is classed as ‘epidemic’ when more than 10% of the concerned population is affected.</p> <p>RCSC states that the price of rice purchased was lower than anticipated; The higher (4 times) number of beneficiaries is a reflection of the fact that beneficiary allocations were spread ‘widely and thinly’.</p> <p>RCSC translates this probable number of packs distributed into a directly benefiting population of 792 471 (or almost times 4).</p>
--	---	--

<p>Shelter and textiles:</p> <p>3. Provision of 2 000 tents to vulnerable segments of the population who have lost their homes because of the floods;</p> <p>4. Provision of 20 000 quilts to the most vulnerable segments of the flood-affected population</p> <p>Programme support</p> <p>5. Programme management;</p> <p>6. Technical support;</p> <p>7. Professional services;</p> <p>8. Transport and storage;</p> <p>9. Regular monitoring and reporting.</p> <p>Inputs</p> <p>Funds: CHF 5.04 million;</p> <p>4 500 MT Rice & Wheat;</p> <p>Other relief supplies (not specified); 10 MT Water and sanitation (Water Purification Powder and disinfectant);</p> <p>2 000 family tents;</p> <p>20 000 quilts.</p> <p>Personnel: Expatriate staff National staff Travel; Information; Administration</p> <p>Capital equipment: 6 vehicles Computers (not stated)</p>	<p>1 755 tents to the benefit of 9 032 victims;</p> <p>80 367 quilts to 151 440 beneficiaries.</p> <p>CHF 5.04 million;</p> <p>6 440.79 MT Rice; Cost RMB 12 199 125</p> <p>10 MT W P Powder and disinfectant; Cost RMB 1 428 535</p> <p>1 755 tents; Cost RMB 3 071 212</p> <p>80 367 quilts. Cost RMB 4 500 589</p> <p>Cost RMB 339 000</p> <p>1 Mini-bus to HQ, 1 4x4 to Fujian, 1 to Guizhou; 3 computers</p>	<p>Approximately recipients time 5;</p> <p>Approximately recipients times 2; The vastly greater number of quilts (approximately times 4) is thought to result from ‘in-kind’ donations.</p> <p>Final financial reports and audited accounts awaited in order to comment on balances. RCSC states that the price of rice purchased was lower than anticipated and thus the reason for increased quantities;</p> <p>More expensive than IFRC standard tents. 105 tents in storage and 167 tents recollected after use.</p>
--	---	---

2.2 Achievements against Recommended (by previous Evaluations/Assessments/Reviews)

Recommended	Achieved	Comments
<p>1998 Floods –Review, May '99 - Wilding</p> <p>i) A programme of training in project identification, proposal, monitoring, reporting and evaluation with subsequent handover to RCSC by end 2002</p> <p>ii) Computerisation to Province level by end 1999</p> <p>iii) Improve RCSC HQ working conditions by end 2001</p> <p>iv) In concert (IFRC, RCSC, PNS) establish appropriate DP: at branch levels, design, supporting resources, pre-positioned stocks, resources for DP centres, resources for warehouses by mid 2000</p> <p>v) Build x DP centres as result of iv) above by end 2005</p> <p>vi) Carry out <u>some</u> 'fund-matched' fund-raising for building/stocking warehouses at lower levels by end 2001</p> <p>vii) Build y warehouses as a result of iv) by end 2005</p>	<p>2 RCSC training courses since 1999. IFRC covered procedures and requirements;</p> <p>Completed in 2002; Completed with RCSC HQ moving into its national training centre;</p> <p>No No No No No No</p> <p>Little progress</p> <p>RCSC has carried out fund-raising but not 'fund matched' and not for building/stocking warehouses</p> <p>Little progress</p>	<p>Why is IFRC still performing reporting function in 2003 and RCSC is still weak in terms of detail and timeliness?</p> <p>Still in its trial stage after 6 months; Vast improvement, good working conditions. Intention to move into new building in 2003;</p> <p>Why not? Why not? RCSC has little resources; RCSC has little resources; RCSC has little resources; RCSC has little resources;</p> <p>PNS have taken a policy decision not to support future construction of DP centres;</p> <p>Have PNS have taken a policy decision not to support future construction of warehouses?</p>
<p>1999 Floods – Assessment – Aug. '99 - Seebacher</p> <p>i) IFRC Delegation should be increased by recruiting 2 monitoring/reporting delegates with efficient support staff as soon as possible (for the Flood Operation only);</p> <p>ii) RCSC should be supported with suitable 4x4 vehicles and sufficient support to ensure administrative and logistic implementation;</p> <p>iii) The DP Centres should be restocked</p>	<p>Not known</p> <p>4 locally manufactured 4x4 vehicles purchased with relief funds</p> <p>Little done. Canadian Red Cross funded some pre-</p>	<p>This is not important for the current study.</p> <p>Presumably through unwillingness of donors.</p>

<p>iv) The prioritisation process should be thoroughly documented and, together with the evaluation report, widely distributed and analyses made at national and provincial level. This could be done in connection with already planned DP and Response workshops.</p> <p>1999 Floods – Review, Mar 2000 - Gordon-Gibson Operations</p> <p>i) Study relevance of relief items, such as WPT, if mobilisation cannot be effected as an immediate emergency response. In case RC operates in a post-emergency phase, then relief assistance could be better targeted towards mid-term impact assistance (eg. the provision of staple food and warm clothing to the most vulnerable).</p> <p>ii) To increase effectiveness of operation, then the Federation must allow for a greater level of flexibility at county level, to adapt the requirements of the programme as the situation evolves. Monitoring should be developed in coordination with local village committees. There is no need to create a parallel structure to that already existing through MoCA. These committees should also be asked to provide information on vulnerable families within the village as part of preparedness measures for any further RC intervention.</p> <p>iii) Pending approval for payment from RCSC senior management, procedures should be established to allow for advance notification of an agreed PoA to provincial levels, in order to permit</p>	<p>positioned tents for two major Regional DP centres but there has been no follow up regarding the utilization of these items.</p> <p>Not done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done <u>but</u> > RCSC say that discussion of this subject has been replicated at meetings in the lower levels</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p>	<p>RCSC state that the concerned evaluation report was not received by them.</p> <p>as proven yet again (for the third time), Red Cross ‘relief’ items arrive so late (from 37 days to 5 months) that either: a) their nature has to be reconsidered/redesigned for post-emergency urgent needs assistance; or b) delivery must be assured within a very short time (eg. 1 week) which the Team considers unrealistic unless stocks are <u>very</u> locally pre-positioned or framework agreements are pre-contracted with <u>very</u> local suppliers.</p>
---	---	--

<p>advance procurement of relief goods from local suppliers. The local confidence with RCSC as auxiliary to MoCA should allow this pre-financed procurement, pending arrival of funds.</p> <p>Information/communications</p> <p>iv) There is a need for streamlined targeting of information flow and transfer of documentation to allow for ease of communication at vertical and lateral levels. County levels are unclear as to Federation/RCSC criteria and policy for selection of beneficiaries. Clearly defined criteria, must be disseminated to all levels.</p> <p>v) A better, more shared (lateral and vertical) flow of information between RCSC levels and encourage lateral communications, especially across provinces regularly affected by natural disasters.</p> <p>vi) Improved dialogue (lateral and vertical). But both the above need to be done as part of a systematic training programme under a ‘normal situation’ since resources are overstretched at the time of emergency.</p> <p>vii) Greater focus on provincial and country levels with regular monitoring and dissemination to townships and village levels. Encourage greater responsibility, and devolution of resources to provincial levels, for local procurement and flexible definition of targeting. There is a need for more open awareness of the aims and strength of programme at provincial and county levels.</p> <p>viii) The provincial RC should continue to select the list of targeted villages from statistics based on MoCA reports following the disaster, which follow the criteria as specified by RCSC Beijing/IFRC. These will be the villages programme for action by RCSC Beijing.</p>	<p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>Done</p>	
--	---	--

<p>ix) As the situation in the post-emergency phase evolves, allow a defined margin of local (provincial, county level) discretionary flexibility to adapt targeting <i>within</i> the list of villages affected by the floods, to assist the most vulnerable groups which fall outside the limitations of the strict operational criteria. A report, with reasons as to final selection, will be submitted to RCSC Beijing.</p> <p>x) The rationale and criteria for targeting of beneficiaries must be disseminated clearly to all levels of the RCSC engaged in the operation.</p> <p>xi) In coordination with MoCA, investigate the possibility of selective targeting of the most vulnerable, to ensure the greatest impact of Red Cross relief. Collective (blanket) coverage, if required, to be performed by MoCA.</p> <p>xii) Data should be gathered indicating vulnerable families within the villages, to allow flexibility at provincial/county levels to target those most in need following a natural disaster. This should be done as a planning exercise before the flood season.</p> <p>Role and development of RCSC</p> <p>xiii) Need for a clearer definition of RCSC role and identity in emergency situations and in DP to clarify its role as auxiliary to, but independent from, government actions.</p> <p>xiv) Need for a studied DP strategy, giving a rationalised and standardised mid-/long-term plan for DP, taking into consideration the size, variety and frequency of natural disasters in China. A well defined and targeted policy, taking into account role and capacities of RCSC, as well as analysing the usefulness and location of existing/projected DP centres and linked with capacity-building, dissemination and fund-raising of the Red Cross.</p> <p>xv) The supply of medicines requires further</p>	<p>Not done</p> <p>Done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done at local level</p> <p>Not done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>A well defined and targeted policy has not been developed at either National or Provincial level.</p>	<p>The Red Cross still responds to the disasters on ad-hoc basis.</p>
---	---	---

<p>studied assessment. The Federation must avoid dictating the role of RCSC in response and so remove a sense of ownership from the Appeal but, at the same time, must be careful not to encourage duplication with role of MoCA. Medical supplies should only be supplied to identifiable RCSC medical teams and should not be envisaged beyond provision of essential items as part of a first aid response at village level.</p> <p>General xvi) Findings of this evaluation should be disseminated to provincial and county RCSC levels.</p>	<p>No medicines were procured after this recommendation.</p> <p>Not done</p>	
--	--	--

The number of negative issues raised in the whole of this section (**2.2 Achievements against Recommended** by previous Evaluations/Assessments/Reviews) begs questions with regard to the utility (or maybe the validity) of such studies if recommendations are not to be followed up effectively by **IFRC/RCSC**.

2.3 Achievements against Recommended (by Auditors’ reports of previous Floods interventions)

Recommended	Achieved	Comments
<p>i) As there is not a great variety of the relief materials to be purchased, the province level of the society may make reference to contract forms of other commercial enterprises so as to design a standard form contract for the purchase of relief materials. The standard form contract should include all the necessary terms relating to the rights, duties and responsibilities of the purchaser and the supplier. This practice will protect the interest of the society, improve efficiency and reduce the risk in carrying out the contract.</p> <p>ii) Prior to the purchase of materials, the Yunan</p>	<p>Not done adequately</p> <p>Not done</p>	<p>The current contract does not include terms relating to rights, duties and responsibilities.</p> <p>Procurement has since been done by RCSC HQ</p>

<p>provincial society should design a set of standard quotation forms to include the conditions such as specifications, quality standards etc. for use by suppliers and the society should also enforce that the supplier should confirm the quotation by chopping the form with their official chops.</p> <p>iii) In order to standardise the work process and improve efficiency, the provincial society should provide training to the town and county level societies on how to fill in the work forms and carry out other related work.</p> <p>iv) We suggest that each level of the society should constantly discuss and improve work-plan among themselves to further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the relief efforts in the future.</p> <p>v) The RCSC HQ should at any time be aware of the status of the disaster area and to determine the most efficient and effective way to allocate and distribute the relief funds and materials.</p> <p>vi) The provincial society should pay attention to the management of the programmes' designated bank accounts. The remaining balance of the PCN 505 relief funds should be transferred to a designated bank account from the non-designated bank account. This will ensure the completeness of the relief fund records and the utilisation of the funds according to the donors' requirements.</p> <p>vii) The local Red Cross Society should obtain timely approval for any changes to the distribution plan from the provincial Red Cross Society and then implement the changes for distribution.</p> <p>viii) The relief materials distribution documents should be kept, sorted and filed by the designate person.</p> <p>ix) The distribution plan issued by HQ should indicate the specific project and batch references.</p> <p>x) We suggest that HQ should set up a fixed assets recording system to ensure that the assets are used solely</p>	<p>This has been done in Sichuan at least</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done through training</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>Not done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>RCSC say that this has been done</p> <p>Not done</p>	<p>This could have serious consequences in any donor audit.</p>
---	---	---

<p>for relief purposes. The assets' original cost location and use record must be properly recorded and periodically updated. Physical inspection is necessary to ensure the existence of the assets. Any changes in the use of fixed assets should be reported timely and authorised.</p> <p>xi) The county level society should report changes to the distribution plan to the provincial society in a timely manner and obtain approval</p> <p>xii) Stock in and stock of relief materials should be documented using pre-numbered goods receipt notes and goods dispatch notes in triplicate. The different should be kept by different departments to ensure effective control over stock in and stock out of relief materials.</p> <p>xiii) We suggest the provincial society to set up a fixed assets recording system to ensure that the assets are properly controlled. The assets' original cost, location and usage should be properly recorded and periodically updated. Physical inspection is necessary to ensure the existence and good condition of the assets. Any change in the usage of fixed assets should be reported in a timely manner and authorised.</p>	<p>This has not been done in a timely manner</p> <p>Not done adequately</p> <p>Not done adequately</p>	<p>This could have serious consequences in any donor audit.</p> <p>Forms exist but are not pre-numbered</p> <p>Change in usage are not reported in a timely manner if at all</p>
--	--	--

3. Analysis by classical evaluation criteria

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 Assessment and appeal process

The floods of 2002 differed from the usual flood pattern in three aspects:

- **Timing:** The floods season began in early June, approximately one month before other 'normal' years.
- **Affected area:** The areas affected by flash floods, namely the provinces of Shaanxi, Guizhou and Sichuan, are not normally affected by floods but usually suffer from drought
- **Flood pattern:** The type of flooding was initially flash floods where water entered and left the villages within a few days.

The prefecture and provincial branches of the **RCSC** carried out assessments (most often in close cooperation with the **MoH** and **MoCA**) and reported the floods to the **RCSC HQ** (see **Section 1.1 - Chronology**) who also carried out a number of field assessments.

There seems to have been little discussion between **IFRC** and **RCSC** on the development of the floods. The main source of Federations information, prior to the joint **RCSC/IFRC** assessment (between 17th. and 20th. June) was newspapers reports.

The decision to issue an appeal was taken on 20th. June following the joint **RCSC/IFRC** assessment in the field. Discussions between **RCSC** and the **Federation** were based on a draft appeal from **RCSC**. The discussions between the two centred mainly upon which relief items to include. Clothing, mosquito nets, sanitation material and cooking sets were removed from the **RCSC** appeal and only rice, quilts, water purification powder left in. The process was relatively swift and the appeal was launched after five days.

Some **RCSC** provincial branches expressed frustration that the appeal was launched more than one month after they gave their first report to **HQ** and that the initial reaction from **HQ** was that the floods were still not sufficiently serious to launch an appeal.

There was very little learning from previous operations in the assessment and appeal process. In spite of the differences in the flood pattern from previous years, the request from **RCSC** was very much a standard appeal which, apart from the names of the provinces and the quantities of goods, was virtually identical to that of previous years' operations.

Specifically, there was no recognition of lessons learnt in previous flood operations (1998 and 1999) regarding the considerable delay between the date of appeal launch to the date of first delivery of relief goods

As a consequence of not taking into account the weak capacity of **RCSC** and the **Federation** to implement a swift operation, there were two major adverse consequences in the operation:

- i) the tents and water purification powder included in the appeal, being true emergency relief goods, are only relevant in the first weeks of a disaster and by the time they arrived in the field (at least five weeks after the Appeal) they were no longer **relevant** to the needs prevailing at that time;
- ii) the unrealistic time schedule for the operation (initially a period of three months) is not considered to be appropriate to **IFRC/RCSC** capacity such that some deliveries were not carried out until some five months after the Appeal. The question of **relevance** thus became even more poignant.

IFRC/RCSC need come to terms with the actual capacity of the two institutions to implement a relief operation and plan operations accordingly. Future operations should depart, not only from an assessment of the situation, but also from a realistic assessment of this capacity. The items included in the Appeal should also reflect the considerable delay in delivering goods to the field.

3.1.2 Beneficiary selection

The questions of Scale and Proportion, with respect to the floods operation, have been major challenges for the Team. An illustration of the scale of the operation is that, of the 95 million persons affected, the Federation operation targeted 100 000. The Federation appeal thus targets approximately one out of 1 000 affected persons. This very small proportion highlights the importance of understanding how beneficiaries were selected and whether **IFRC/RCSC** were actually able to reach out to the most vulnerable amongst the affected populations.

The beneficiary selection criteria specified in the emergency appeal and the ECHO funding application were as follows:

Food: “The beneficiaries will be subsistence farmers who have lost their crops in the flash floods and who will have serious difficulties in getting loans with which they could purchase food and the most necessary items.”

Tents: “...will primarily aim to distribute tents to single-parent headed families, poor families, families with large numbers of children and the elderly who are projected to require a greater amount of time to rebuild their homes”

RCSC specified the following criteria for selecting beneficiaries:

- families who have lost their crops during the floods;
- families who have lost their homes or have had their homes seriously damaged;
- elderly without family support, physically or mentally handicapped; and
- families with very low incomes who have been affected by the floods.

The process of beneficiary selection, from HQ down to village level was as follows:

Beneficiary selection from Headquarters to village

Level	Process	Comments
HQ to Province	A total of nineteen provinces were affected by floods in 2002. Of these, the eight most affected were included in the appeal. Of these eight provinces, four were categorised as ‘seriously affected’ and four as ‘affected’. The ‘seriously affected’ provinces were allocated a quota of 15% of the overall assistance and the ‘affected’ allocated a quota of 10%.	The Federation and RCSC HQ agreed on which provinces should receive which part of each PoA. The Federation was not involved in geographical selection below province level. Interviews with RCSC HQ informed that the process of selecting beneficiaries at the national level does not reflect any negotiation/cooperation with MoCA.
Province to Prefecture	The provinces included in the appeal entered into a dialogue with RCSC HQ with regard to which prefectures should be allocated assistance. This decision is based on reports coming from the county and township levels.	In some instances, the delay in delivering assistance to the provinces meant that the prefectures identified as ‘most affected’, at the time of PoA agreement between HQ and Provincial branch , were no longer the most affected. However, it was difficult for the branches to get HQ agreement to changes in the agreed allocation at a later date. ⁵
Prefecture to County, county to township	The RCSC prefecture branch selected the most affected counties and allocated aid to them accordingly. This process was predominantly a quota process similar to the allocation process at higher levels.	At this level there may be some regional differences which have not been observed by the Team.
Township to village	At this level, several different ways of approaching the allocation of aid was observed by the Team. In one, the assistance (2 MT of rice – equal to 45 rations according to the appeal) was distributed equally between 27 villages and a population of approximately 5 000.	At this level, there may be some regional differences which have not been observed by the Team.

The division of assistance between provinces, prefectures, counties, townships and villages is a highly political one. This, combined with the very limited amounts of aid which **IFRC/RCSC** were able to deliver as compared with overall needs, meant that assistance tended to be spread evenly between the (most) affected provinces, prefectures etc. This, in turn, meant that in some places, as little as 1%, or less, of the population received assistance (eg. 3 families out of 400 in one place) and rations distributed were smaller than those planned in the appeal. In the example above, the 3 families targeted each received 30 kg per family (as opposed to the planned 45 kg per person).

This thin spread of assistance raises questions regarding the **impact** of the Federation operation. However, the idea of concentrating **IFRC/RCSC** assistance in one or two provinces in order to move towards a more efficient operation in logistics terms is not acceptable to the movement. The political environment of **RCSC** is not unlike that of the Federation (with provincial rather than national societies) and it is not realistic to

⁵ In fairness to them, **HQ** were not aware of the donor (ECHO) procedure regarding **written request for alteration**.

concentrate the assistance on fewer provinces. It would also mean that fewer provinces would be exposed to working with Federation funded goods.

While **IFRC** has a policy statement on this issue⁶, the Team considers that a clear implementation strategy with some levels of concentration should be adopted for **IFRC/RCSC** implementation, given the fact that there has been so little impact of Red Cross assistance. For further discussion of this point, reference should be made to **3.5 (Impact)** below.

Within the villages, different systems are used for targeting beneficiaries. In one instance, all families registered ‘as flood affected’ received assistance. In another, the township told each village to identify a specified number of families within the village which would be equivalent to 1% of the population.

It is thus not possible to get a full picture of the targeting methods used in the villages across different provinces. However, the case in most instances seems to be that **RCSC** assistance was distributed according to a vulnerability criterion, as opposed to the government system, in which assistance is largely distributed equally amongst all members of the community.

Very accurate records of assistance distributed are maintained by **RCSC** branches visited. Beneficiaries are chosen by the village committee and, three days prior to a distribution, the beneficiary list is published in the village so that everybody can observe who is entitled to assistance and complain accordingly if they feel that there is unfair distribution of assistance. There does not, however, seem to be a strong tradition of questioning the decisions.

The issue of duplication was raised with the review team and indeed, in some villages, rice was distributed by the **Hong Kong** branch, **IFRC/RCSC** and the Government. However, duplication is not necessarily a problem if the assistance is defined not as a nutritional input but as an economic one. In that case, it actually makes sense to duplicate efforts – to give a boost to the economy of the most affected families. This however, does pose higher demands with respect to beneficiary selection.

The issue of beneficiary selection is an extremely interesting one because it shows how **RCSC** can have an impact at the village level. The important lesson from the 2002 floods operation is not that the beneficiary selection criteria was interpreted differently in various villages, but that the criteria were interpreted.

There is a clear perception, down to the village level, of the Red Cross being something different from government and something which, as expressed by MoH and MoCA personnel interviewed, has “a human, caring face”. This aspect of the Red Cross is highly appreciated by the Ministries who perceive it as the ‘humane face of government’. The ability of **RCSC** to make this felt at the village level, in spite of not having any full time Red Cross staff below the prefecture level nor substantial supplies of relief

⁶ which has not been located by the Team – it should be located for discussion or even re-written.

commodities, is maybe where **RCSC** has its biggest potential and this highlights how **RCSC** is, in fact, an effective auxiliary to the state.

3.2 Effectiveness

This section refers to the extent to which the intervention reached its objectives in terms of Expected Results and to which achieved its Purpose. **Section 2.1 (Achievements against Planned)** indicates that:

i) 6 440 MT of **Rice** was delivered to 399 941 persons compared to the 4 500 MT planned delivery to 100 000 persons (on the basis of a three months' supply at 15 kg. per month). The increase over target was achieved because of lower than anticipated grain costs, some use of **RCSC** own funds and, specifically, through the spreading of supplies 'wider and thinner', an action which is understandable and justified in the light of the enormous needs prevailing at the time. The fact that no household destructure or incidence of poor medical conditions occurred cannot be attributed to the intervention but, more so to the fact that families/communities tended to 'look after each other'.

This food component of the intervention cannot be judged a failure because it was not carried out exactly according to plan, but should be recognised as an 'economic' contribution to the urgent needs of the victims which were more relevant at the (late) time of aid arrival. This valid argument should be remembered for future interventions when alternative 'economic' contributions (including cash) could be considered.

ii) 792 471 persons benefited from provision of 10 MT **Water and sanitation** chemicals compared with the 10 MT to 1 million beneficiaries planned and reflects the impossibility of precision in the face of the scale of such needs in the immediate aftermath of floods. The Team would, however, wish to reiterate the irrelevance of these items at the time of their eventual distribution.

iii) 9 032 persons benefited from 1 755 **Tents** compared to the 2 000 tents (presumably for the benefit of 8 000 persons) planned. This component is possibly the most contentious relief item and bears no realistic relationship with the requirement for emergency shelter nor relevance to needs at the (late) time of aid arrival when plastic sheeting may have been more appropriate. Tents cannot even be considered an 'economic' contribution since they are retrieved and stored by **RCSC** at a later date. The area of tent per person (12 sq.m for average 4-person family) does not meet the **Anticipated result** of "average 3.5 to 4.5 sq.m per person but this seems to be an insignificant issue.

iv) 80 000 **Quilts** were provide to the benefit of 151 440 victims compared to the planned 20 000 to an un-stated number of beneficiaries and reflects the possible use of **RCSC** own funds and 'in-kind donations. The rate of one quilt per family would not appear to have met the **Anticipated result** of those families "having access to sufficient number of quilts to provide protection from the climate" but does represent an 'economic' contribution and some degree of protection.

The intervention **Purpose** of meeting the urgent needs for food, shelter and a clean water supply of women, men and children in affected communities in the concerned provinces does seem to have been partially met for those victims lucky enough to benefit from the assistance, but this was very late and thus the state of urgency had already existed for far too long. What is clear is that their emergency needs had certainly not been met.

3.3 Efficiency


In order to assess the efficiency of the operation and the speed of the process, the Team has calculated the average number of days required from the cash request by **IFRC Regional Office** to the first delivery of relief items to the provinces. The procedure of funds transfer to delivery of the items to the field can be broken down in the following steps:

- i) As funds are pledged and arrive in **IFRC Geneva**, this information is communicated to the **IFRC regional delegation** in Beijing;
- ii) When there are sufficient funds available in **IFRC Geneva**, the **IFRC regional delegation** prepares, jointly with **RCSC HQ**, a Plan of Action (PoA) for a specified amount of money according to the priorities of the operation;
- iii) In its monthly cash request, **IFRC regional delegation** details the required amount of cash to fulfil the PoA. The cash requested is transferred from **IFRC Geneva** to the **RCSC HQ** bank account at the end of each month for expenditure during the following month;
- iv) **IFRC Regional Office** is informed of the arrival of funds in Beijing;
- v) **RCSC HQ** can then proceed with the procurement of items related to the PoA;
- vi) Once the contract has been signed with the supplier, the goods can be dispatched to the provinces (transport to provinces are included in the contract);
- vii) Payment is made in two steps by **RCSC HQ** Logistics Department.
 - 50% on contract signature
 - 50% upon delivery.

The movement of funds through this system is illustrated in **Table 1.** below while the time span from request of funds to first delivery of goods to the provinces is illustrated in the following diagramme:

Table 1. Time from request for funds to first delivery of goods to the provinces

	PoA 1	PoA 2	PoA 3	PoA 4	PoA 5	Average
Number of days from cash request for funds, until arrival of funds in Beijing	12 days	24 days	24 days	24 days	20 days	21 days
Number of days from arrival of funds in Beijing to procurement contract	12 days	71 days	37 days	20 days	27 days	33 days
Number of days from procurement contract to first delivery to provinces	13 days	40 days	5 days	18 days	7 days	17 days
Total Number of days from cash request to first delivery	37 days	135 days	66 days	62 days	54 days	71 days



The significant number of days taken for the procurement of PoA 2 is due to procedural shortcomings in the tendering process. The problem occurred due to a lack of clear guidelines issued by International Federation for National Societies.

In comparison with the two previous floods operations (1998 and 1999), goods were mobilised at the same speed in 2002 even though the system of mobilisation has changed. If PoA 2 were removed, which is not representative, the time from cash request to

delivery of the goods would be slightly reduced. In previous operations, most of the items were locally purchased and the transfer of cash from Beijing to provinces took considerable time (average 45 days⁷). For the 2002 flood operation, in order to ensure quality, to benefit from price reduction through bulk ordering and to avoid breaches in procurement procedures, major procurements have been made at the Headquarter level. Transport of the items to the provinces was included in the contract purchase price.

Regarding the speed of cash transfer from Geneva, it seems that there has been some improvement. In 1998, it took seven weeks from international appeal to first arrival of substantial funds in Beijing. In 2002, it took less than three weeks (18 days) from the launch of the appeal to the transfer of the money into the **RCSC** bank account. In recognition of the current financial procedures within the Federation⁸, it is not considered possible to reduce this time in the near future and plans will have to be designed accordingly until such time as the Federation system is modified to become a true Emergency Response.

In 1999, the average time from funds request to Geneva until the time when funds were available in Beijing was 27 days while in 2002 it was 21 days. With the current system (direct cash transfer, central procurement), if all procedures are respected and the process goes smoothly, the ‘fastest delivery from fund request to first delivery would be about 35 days. The next appeal should consider this data and be designed according to this reality.

Recommendations as to steps which might be taken to improve this situation may be found in **Section 7. (Recommendations – 4a. to 4j.)**

3.3.1 The Procurement process – central v local procurement

As previously mentioned, major procurement was performed by **RCSC HQ**. The main reasons were to avoid money transfer from Beijing to the provinces (a process which was a major source of delay in earlier operations) and in order to ensure that procurement procedures were respected at the tendering process in the provinces as the capacity at this level had previously proven to be limited. It also has been said that some of the goods bought by the provincial branches in the past did not always meet quality standards with the result that some beneficiaries complained⁹.

This decision had the following negative consequences in the 2002 Floods Operation:

- some provinces complained about goods damaged in transit;
- some provinces complained that they became liable for the on-cost of transportation from the railhead delivery point;
- communication problems;
- no **RCSC HQ** knowledge of what arrived and when;

⁷ **Gordon-Gibson, A.**, *Operational review, 1999 Flood Relief Operation in China*, Geneva, March 2000, p.9

⁸ The current Federation financial system that only allows monthly cash request ie. the request must be carried out at the end of the month for the following month. It is not adequate for emergency response.

⁹ Interview with Mr. Chen, Head of Logistics department, 20.03.2003

- provinces were not always ready to receive and in some cases asked HQ to stop the supply of goods.

Positive consequences, however, were:

- better control of the tendering process;
- quicker response;
- less training requirement for the National Society, which is difficult during an operation (both financially and logistically);
- easier to follow state of implementation and so easier to respond to donor inquiries

At the **RCSC HQ** level there are some written procurement procedures but these do not appear to be available in English. The process is similar to that of the Federation, which includes limited open tender (3 to 5 suppliers), opening ceremony and contract committee. However, there are some weak areas which need improvement as follows:

i) Suppliers selection: a suppliers' registration form should be implemented in order to "pre-select" suppliers and to ensure that they are registered and authorized to operate in China. A supplier survey should be carried out at the provincial level.

ii) Contract: audit reports from previous operations have mentioned that "*there was not a standard form of contract for purchase of relief materials, such as delivery method, details of specification and qualities, penalties for breach of contract, etc.* The risk is that inadequate contract terms may lead to future disputes in the performance of the contract¹⁰,"

The latter remarks were related to provincial level procurement. The contract used for the 2002 operation includes specification and delivery method but still leaves too much room for dispute. There are no detailed Terms and Conditions and there is a great deal of information missing. As stipulated in audit reports, a standard form of contract should be designed for the purchase of relief materials. This contract should include all the necessary terms relating to the rights, duties and responsibilities of both the purchaser and supplier. If transport is included in the price, clear delivery terms should be specified¹¹. This practice protects the interests of the Society, improves efficiency and reduces risks in performance of the contract.

Recommendations as to steps which might be taken to improve this situation may be found in **Section 7. (Recommendations – 5a. to 5c.)**

It is interesting to note in this section that a Logistics Delegate came to China for two weeks in order to help **IFRC** to write the procurement system and to facilitate the process. He never visited **RCSC** Logistics department. The document produced¹² was

¹⁰ KPMG, letter addressed to management of Red Cross Society of China, dated 26th of April 2001

¹¹ such as specified in **Incoterms 2000**

¹² Document name "*Summary of key International standard and specific procedures to be fully applied in Red Cross/Red Crescent Relief operations*"


translated into Chinese and faxed to the **RCSC** Relief department. Unfortunately the document never reached the Logistics department.

3.3.2 RCSC Financial process/reporting lines for Federation funds

These processes are summarised below and highlight certain alarming issues:

- i) Upon request of the Regional **IFRC** office, Geneva transfers the funds to the **RCSC** bank account;
- ii) **RCSC** Finance department informs Relief department of the transfers;
- iii) Relief department decides which items (quantity, specification) to purchase, issue a document similar to a requisition, forwards it to senior management for approval and finally sends it to Logistics department;
- iv) Logistics launches the tendering process (minimum 3 quotations, opening ceremony with senior management and relief department, contract committee) and selects the best suppliers;
- v) Logistics issues and signs the contract (including delivery);
- vi) Logistics informs the Relief department of the amount of money they need to pay the suppliers at contract signature;
- vii) Relief department requests Finance department to transfer the requested amount to Logistics' bank account;
- viii) Supplier delivers goods to the Province;
- ix) Province confirms delivery of the goods to Relief department;
- x) Logistics department pays the suppliers invoice

If the provinces undertake procurement rather than **HQ** Logistics department, the system is similar and all information goes via **RCSC HQ** Relief department while **HQ** Finance department needs **HQ** Relief department approval to transfer money to the branches. According to the branches this process also takes too much time. This process is illustrated diagrammatically below:



Problems identified with the current system include:

- i) As all information must pass via **RCSC HQ** Relief department, there is a lot of time lost between funds request and their transfer. The Relief Department is composed of 5 persons who are not Finance qualified and are already overloaded with a wide variety of different tasks;
- ii) The Logistics Department places the order, signs the contract and pays the suppliers directly. Therefore, there are no control mechanisms by an external entity (Finance Department) to ensure that everything is carried out according to procedures and law;
- iii) Logistics Department does not report expenditures to Finance Department and Finance does not receive the invoices. Finance department, however, is responsible for reporting to the Federation;
- iv) Provincial branches confirm goods receipt to the Relief Department instead of reporting to Logistics Department who is in charge of the delivery of goods and payment of the invoice.

This is a very serious issue for **IFRC/RCSC** and needs sustained capacity building and Organisational Development support. It highlights the argument that **RCSC** needs more opportunity for exposure outside China. Only one or two staff have international working experience and this is far from enough. Recommendations as to steps which should be taken to correct this situation may be found in **Section 7. (Recommendations – 5a. to 5c.)**

3.3.3 Delegate deployment

The first **IFRC** delegate assigned to the flood response was an information delegate who arrived on the 22nd. of June 2002 and accompanied an assessment team in order to prepare an information bulletin. His mission was for only two weeks.

The other delegates arrived at the end of July (one Relief and one Reporting) and at the end of August (one Finance and a second Monitoring/reporting delegate¹³). In addition, the Logistics delegate from Mongolia came for a short week to help with the procurement procedures.

Due to **RCSC**' weak finance reporting, the finance delegate should have been deployed earlier in order to work on a project agreement and financial reporting requirements from an early stage of the operation.

The relief delegate could also have been deployed quicker in order to work on the items needed and provide extra support to **RCSC** Relief Department which is overloaded. Most of the assigned delegates were professional, knew Federation procedures and were competent.

The main problem with the delegates is not the speed of deployment nor their qualifications but their place of assignment and lack of communication with **RCSC** personnel. The fact that the flood delegates were located in another part of the city did

¹³ for additional details, see **Section 1.2 (Chronology)**

not facilitate contact with the National Society. They only met their Chinese counterpart, if any, for occasional meetings and upon either party's (rather formal) request.

Delegates are instructed to apply sensitivity in their dealings with RCSC and this would seem to be misapplied in IFRC avoidance of contentious issues, something with which RCSC would appear to have no problem at all. The choice of delegates who have China experience and innate sensitivity would seem to be more the issue in the avoidance of poor relations with the Chinese. Instruction in English as a component of IFRC support would seem to be a very positive future input into resolution of relationship problems.

3.4 Cost effectiveness

3.4.1 Transport cost

The change in the **RCSC**/Government relationship and the change in the procurement location (from provinces to HQ) have resulted in increased transport costs (particularly from railhead to beneficiaries).

When **RCSC** was part of MoH, all local transportation was handled by government and free of charge. Today the situation varies from prefecture to prefecture depending upon the link and cooperation with the local authorities. In some cases, the government is still transporting goods to the final destination and bearing the cost while, in others, the prefectures/provinces have to hire commercial trucking companies (which they select through the three quotation process).

No exact cost figures have been collected by the Team but provinces have complained about that the fact that procurement was made outside their provinces and that this significantly increased the transport cost. They say that they could have procured more items if they had procured locally

3.4.2 Item cost

One of the costs which is high and could easily be reduced is that of temporary shelter. The tents (12 sq.m., plastic without groundsheet) purchased for this operation cost **CHF** 329 each while the cost of standard tents (16 sq.m., canvas with groundsheet), purchased by **IFRC**, is **CHF** 188¹⁴. The choice of the specification and supplier should be questioned. In addition, and as mentioned in **Section 3.1 (Relevance)**, the tents are considered to be inadequate for such an operation (considering delivery time) and could be easily replaced by plastic sheeting whose average cost to **IFRC** (standard plastic sheeting, 4 x 6 m, is **CHF** 18/pce¹⁵). The latter is actually manufactured in China and could therefore be an even better buy here.

An example of money wastage was found in Luzhou prefecture where 36 tents were received but only 15 distributed. The 21 tents still in stock represent a total of **CHF** 6 909 while, for the same money, 18 MT of rice could have been bought which represents three months' ration for an additional 409 beneficiaries which is a significant figure in relation to the scale of operations.

¹⁴ **ICRC, IFRC.** *Emergency items catalogue*, IFRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 243

¹⁵ **ICRC, IFRC.** *Emergency items catalogue*, IFRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 237

3.5 Impact

This section considers whether the intervention contributed to the Goal (as perceived by the Team) of ‘reducing disaster vulnerability in China through strengthening the **RCSC** institution and improving its operational performance’ and what changes (both positive and negative) were brought about.

Following the reference to impact in **Section 3.1.2 (Beneficiary selection)**, the question of whether the operation should have concentrated on small numbers and so produced a significant impact on individual beneficiaries or have spread the assistance ‘widely and thinly’ as it did is important for the conceptualisation of future appeals. This a question which the movement needs to address in the Chinese context.

Year by year, as the Chinese economy grows and with every response to disaster, **RCSC** is seen to be growing in strength and professionalism through its own efforts and not necessarily because of external assistance – this has been observed over a period of the last five years.

RCSC, however, is now in a critical phase which may last years and which threatens many dangers of:

- damage to its credibility if victims’ expectations are unfulfilled;
- loss of independent image;
- difficulty in attracting the right calibre of staff;
- always being ad-hoc (rather than pro-active) in disaster response.

This risky phase is largely due to its proposed, but scarcely launched, separation from MoH and distancing from MoCA which both may decrease **RCSC**’ financial support and render it liable to increased costs (which has already commenced at some provincial levels in the subject of local transport).

No PNS or the Federation could ever hope to afford to solve this problem for such an enormous National Society but they can aspire to support the Society in terms of morale, knowledge/experience transfer and assistance with specific appeals.

Each International Appeal gives **RCSC** an opportunity for greater exposure to the international community and media, for gaining response experience, raising awareness of itself and strengthening its image, gaining financial support not just for its response but also for building its hard- and soft-ware systems, for facilitating two-way knowledge transfer, etc., etc. It also gives an opportunity for **RCSC** to assist an, albeit currently small, increasing number of disaster victims – the proportion of foreign financial contribution to the overall costs of appealed responses is currently significant despite the published ‘locally raised funding’, much of which is ‘in-kind’ donation¹⁶.

While the launching of International Appeal is dependent on GoC political agreement as well as on donor attitude at the time, it may be considered that the more such appeals can

¹⁶ In 2002, an impressive **RMB** 205 million was raised. Ninety per cent of this was ‘in-kind’ donations, but a significant cash component of **RMB** 20 million (**USD** 2.4 million) was raised.

be made, the greater the benefit to **RCSC** until such time as it truly becomes able to ‘stand on its own two feet’ as perhaps the largest and richest National Society in the movement. One has confidence in the real possibility of such a dream but the achievement of such a goal could not be realistically envisaged before the next 10 to 15 years.

The question for this Team is to ascertain whether this specific **RCSC/IFRC** response to the 2002 Floods in China did, in fact, manage to contribute the achievement of these noble objectives and the unfortunate answer is “very little”. In the five years since the 1998 Chinese Floods, **RCSC/IFRC** have managed to resolve very few of the problems identified at the time and implement even less of the lessons learnt. The reasons are argued elsewhere in this document.

The **Super-Goal** of perhaps contributing to the achievement of the dream described above is not perceived as having been achieved through the **RCSC/IFRC** collaboration discussed here and the Team considers that it never will until such time as the ‘partners’ talk to each other, not in the cosy confines of formal meetings and dinners but as true and equal partners. This demands closeness, controversial discussion, clear definition of one another’s point of view and, finally, compromise.

While there has clearly been some positive impact of this intervention on the lives of the 2002 Floods beneficiaries and upon the strength of **RCSC**, there always lurks the threat that **RCSC** and **IFRC** will ‘veto each other’. In the event of such, not only will the Red Cross movement suffer but, more significantly and sadly, the victims of disaster will lose most.

3.6 Sustainability

This section considers whether any benefits achieved as a result of the 2002 Floods intervention are likely to last beyond that phase of **IFRC/RCSC** collaboration and beyond its delivery of assistance. With regard to the former, it is clear that lessons have been learnt and problems identified during earlier operations confirmed. If these issues are now strenuously addressed, then sustainable solutions are waiting.

With regard to the latter, the opportunities are clear for **RCSC** to build upon the good name, image and perception of its ‘caring’ nature strengthened through the operation and this through such as the conscription of more volunteers, development of wider ‘local donor support’ and awareness raising.

For the victims, receivers or non-receivers of assistance, life will be even more difficult than it already was. In order to make their recovery sustainable to at least their *status quo ante*, then the Red Cross has much more to do. There are many opportunities for work in this area and funding available through Rehabilitation and Development budget lines.

The possibilities for making the benefits of the 2002 operations sustainable are a question of whether the Red Cross is ready to seize them.

4. Wider issues raised by the evaluation

Many of the findings of this review will come as no surprise to people who have previous experience of flood operations in China. Some improvements in Red Cross performance can be noted for the 1999 as compared to the 1998 floods, but the overall picture is that most of the findings of the previous two reviews have not been addressed and are still valid for performance in the 2002 floods.

The repetition of the 19989 modus operandi in 1999 and 2002 is widely recognised within both **RCSC** and the Federation. This was reflected in the Team's ToRs and particularly in its briefing in Geneva.

The scope of this evaluation is therefore somewhat different from that of the 1998 and 1999 reviews in the sense that the study does not only look at the actual operation, but also tries to address some on the wider issues which are the root causes of the clear lack of progress in improving **RCSC/IFRC** response to flood disasters in China.

It has been a major challenge for the Team to balance a classical evaluation of the 2002 operation with wider considerations which may be summarised as follows:

At the root of the problems identified in the classical evaluation, there are repeatedly underlying wider issues which require an understanding of political issues within **RCSC/IFRC** and this requires departure from a mere detailed analysis of the actual operation.

The relationship between **RCSC** and the Federation is very much one in which both parties have the option of veto. Things will not change unless both parties really want them to change and a conscious effort made at the operational, but more importantly, at the management level of the two organisations.

While there is a high degree of awareness amongst both Federation and **RCSC** staff with regard to what the real issues are, there appears to be a lack of will on the part of both partners to confront them. This is a situation in which the two institutions seem to be embedded and which should be broken if the aim of the two organisations is to improve their work.

According to floods experts in China, the coming floods season could well be similar to that of 1998. If a meaningful Red Cross response is to be achieved in 2003, then it is essential that these issues be clarified quickly and prior to the season which could start as early as the coming June (two months' time).

The wider issues include:

4.1 Strategy of **RCSC**

One of the main challenges for **RCSC** is to position itself on the humanitarian scene particularly in the light of its changing relationship with the Government.

There is a question as to whether **RCSC** should have its interventions (in terms of both activity and beneficiary selection) determined entirely by government, in which case it accepts to be subsidiary to the Government, or determined entirely by itself so giving itself complete independence. Alternatively, **RCSC** may choose the type of intervention while government chooses beneficiaries or *vice versa*.

Currently, all the options are practised by **RCSC** as illustrated in the table below with examples of current activities and their status in relation to the Government :

		Intervention	
		<i>Determined by Government</i>	<i>Determined by Red Cross</i>
Beneficiary selection	<i>Determined by Government</i>	WatSan Project Guangxi Province	Medical teams
	<i>Determined by Red Cross</i>	Flood relief targeted to non-covered beneficiaries	HIV/AIDS programme

While complete independence from government direction (as manifested in the RCSC HIV/AIDS programme) may be desirable in the long term, the reality for large-scale operations such as the mobilisation of medical teams (wearing the Red Cross emblem) is one of Red Cross dependency whereby the response is a *de facto* MoH operation. The Team considers that any rapid move away from such dependency would have adverse effects on the Red Cross image and should not be rushed.

Equally, the support of MoCA is indispensable to RCSC in beneficiary selection and field distribution but this is already beginning to slip away as the Government distances itself from the Red Cross (viz. some Provincial branches now having to finance their own transportation from railheads). RCSC needs to keep such support for as long as possible as it builds its capacity and financial resources.

4.2 Organisation of RCSC

Almost all activity relating to the floods appeal passes through the **RCSC HQ** Relief Department and specifically through the competent and experienced but, nevertheless, completely overloaded, Head of Relief. It is clear that the department is a bottleneck in the operation.

While resolution of the Finance/Logistics' structural weaknesses (**Section 3.3.2 - RCSC Financial process/reporting lines for Federation funds**) and the appointment of an **RCSC** Reporting Officer will no doubt reduce this pressure, it seems that the **HQ** Relief

department is still left with excessive ‘micro-management’ of operations which could perhaps be delegated to the provincial levels.

The size of China, with one Red Cross Society, is such that it is like having one European Red Cross. One of the branches explained that they had to wait a substantial number of days prior getting a positive answer from **RCSC HQ** regarding an emergency response because the latter were waiting for other provinces to be flooded prior launching an appeal. The affected area covered more than the size of a European country. It would be similar if Spain waited until the flooding off Germany prior to launching an appeal.

Other provincial branches expressed frustration with the fact that the appeal was launched more than one month after they gave their first report to **HQ** whose initial reaction was that the floods still were not sufficiently serious to launch an appeal. This ‘global view’ on the part of **HQ** is understandable but has to be judged against the number of appeals made (and responded to) by Red Cross Societies from land masses not that much bigger than China (eg. sub-Saharan Africa) which may have up to eight appeals in one year.

Due to the size of the country, **HQ** should not have a big operational role. Their role should be one of developing policies, strategies, standardised operating procedures, training in those procedures and coordination.

These are very much **RCSC** internal issues but both it and the Federation must come to terms with the reality of the two institutions’ capacity to implement a relief operation. Future operations must depart, not only from an assessment of the situation, but also from a realistic assessment of this capacity. This is an area in which the two institutions need to cooperate at an early date and in which **IFRC** could lend support.

4.3 IFRC Delegates

The coy relationship between **IFRC** delegates and **RCSC** is an issue which has led to more than one lost opportunity for knowledge transfer and improved understanding.

‘Training’ is an often used term to indicate **IFRC** extension of western techniques to **RCSC** while ‘learning’ is far too little employed to evidence some degree of the practice of the reverse process. This is not the Third World. China is a major international player both in commerce and international institutions. It has experiences and methodologies relating to its own and external disasters, and it has “the Chinese way of doing things” which may be novel but often effective. The term ‘Chinese culture’ is frequently used as a screen behind which to hide ignorance.

New **IFRC** visitors are instructed “don’t upset the Chinese”¹⁷ rather than being advised to “engage closely”. The relationship is not improved by the location of Disaster Response delegates in the Regional Delegation half-way across town¹⁸ rather than in the **RCSC HQ**, sometimes without counterparts and not within the Chinese Red Cross

¹⁷ personal communications Geneva and Beijing 1999 and 2003

¹⁸ but see **Footnote 3**.

Society framework. Obviously there are some practical problems associated with correcting the location problem but they can be overcome.¹⁹

The Team consider that the only really effective means of knowledge transfer in such emergency operations as addressed here can be achieved by close ‘on-the-job’ teamwork which addresses problems and confronts differences of opinion as they arise in a spirit of cooperation and, if necessary, compromise.

4.4 Fundraising

As opposed to many other National Societies, **RCSC** is in a strong position with respect to National Fundraising. In 2002, an impressive **RMB** 205 million was raised. Ninety per cent of this was ‘in-kind’ donations, but a significant cash component of **RMB** 20 million (**USD** 2.4 million) was raised.

This money can be spent by the **RCSC** in a much more flexible and speedy manner than the funds coming through a Federation appeal. One suggestion, therefore, could be to use differently sourced funds in different ways and according to their flexibility. As Federation funding will be the least flexible and slowest to arrive, it should be used on items which are needed by the beneficiaries in the post-emergency urgent needs phase.

4.5 Choice of Relief items

Discussions between **RCSC** and the Federation centred mainly on which items to include in the appeal. Clothing, mosquito nets, sanitation material and cooking sets were removed from the **RCSC** appeal and only rice, quilts, water purification tablets and tents remained. The process was relatively swift and five days later, the appeal was launched.

In the light of delays in the **IFRC** funded deliveries and the efficient **GoC** response, **IFRC** should perhaps concentrate on ‘second-phase response’ and ignore items which are ‘only’ used in the first weeks of an emergency (water purification powder, tents etc). Rice and quilts were the most welcomed items in 2002 and can be used even if received a month or so later.

The Team considers that the value of the items to the beneficiaries was largely, and in reality, economic by the time they arrived. This would still seem to be a valid argument for such intervention but, if that is the case, then the use of cash should be considered. **IFRC** have proven elsewhere that this can be more effective, easier to administer and very much quicker to distribute.

4.6 Cash transfer v Working advances

Due to the lack of a formalised Federation status in China for a long period and the impossibility for **IFRC** to open a bank account, **RCSC** has been working under a Cash

¹⁹ The misconception that the availability of Chinese-English translators for this low-level type of work is both rare and expensive would be dispelled by any English speaker passing the Beijing students’ Arts Festival on Saturday 29th March 2003.

Transfer²⁰ system since the beginning of its various Floods collaborations with **IFRC**. According to Federation Procedure 7.05.03²¹, a National Society must satisfy certain financial criteria prior to adoption of the cash transfer system. **IFRC**' Assessment of Financial Management Capacity questionnaire process has never been conducted for **RCSC** and, under the latter's existing financial system, the requirements would not be met. While an overall Framework for Co-operation on Financial Management and Auditing issues does exist in the Federation's 'Principles and Rules' document, there is no Memorandum of Understanding between the Federation and **RCSC**.

There are some who would wish to move **RCSC** to a Working Advance system whereby monthly reimbursement of its previous month's expenditure would be released to **RCSC HQ** by **IFRC Geneva** and justified on the basis of an end-of-month report by the former.

RCSC, understandably perceives this as a retrograde step and may resist it. It is considered that there are, in fact, two issues here which need to be addressed separately:

- i) the fact that **RCSC** financial arrangements do not meet **IFRC**, donor or international requirements;
- ii) the fact that the system of money transfer does not allow **IFRC** a degree of control of funds consistent with the demands of the donors.

With regard to the former, it is a fact (not disputed by any of the partners) that this situation must change at the very earliest opportunity in order to protect the Red Cross (**IFRC**, **RCSC** and Netherlands Red Cross²²) from the perfectly legal possibility that donors could ask for the return of funds on the grounds that **a)** they had been misled on the financial competency of the recipient society; or **b)** reporting did not reflect the true situation on the ground.

With regard to the Fund Transfer system, the Team considers this to be an issue which can be resolved by correction of financial arrangements without which there would be no reasonable alternative to Cash Advances. Recommendations as to steps which might be taken to correct this situation may be found in **Section 7. (Recommendations – 5a. to 5c.)**

4.7 Monitoring and reporting

Both **RCSC** and the Federation each had their own monitoring systems in place for the 2002 floods operation.

The **RCSC**' monitoring system is based on 'the 13 forms', a number of documents used to communicate between Headquarters and provincial branches according to the structure illustrated in **Section 3.3.2 (RCSC Financial process/reporting lines for Federation funds)** above. One of the main issues regarding the **RCSC** monitoring system is that it does not allow for the Federation to follow implementation during the operation. It does

²⁰ whereby funds are transferred directly from **IFRC Geneva** to **RCSC HQ** on a tranche basis against Plans of Action (PoA) but against which reporting is not required until the end of the operation, the completion of the PoA or at such time as required by the concerned donor.

²¹ **IFRC. Cash Transfer – National Societies, Procedure 7.05.03**, IFRC, Geneva, July 2002

²² which is the contracting signatory to the current ECHO funding for the 2002 floods

provide an accurate picture upon completion of the operation but, in order to monitor the implementation of tightly earmarked funds (e.g. ECHO), it is necessary to follow the implementation during the operation.

The Federation monitoring system uses three of the forms to collect the following information:

Form 1: Questionnaire for the Branch on the disaster situation: This form is a template for a semi-structured interview. It is used to collect information on the number of affected populations, **RCSC** activities, beneficiary selection criteria, logistics, quantities distributed, constraints and lessons learned.

Form 2: Questionnaire for Beneficiaries: This is a template for semi-structured interviews regarding the situation of beneficiaries

Form 3: Questionnaire for Branch Profile: This gives the background to the branch in terms of resources and structure.

The **IFRC** system was set up without any substantial dialogue with **RCSC** and did not build on the monitoring carried out in previous years.

It has been a major problem for the Federation to obtain even the most basic stock movement information from **RCSC** and, consequently, Monitoring delegates have wasted much time tracking the movement of goods. This has left little time to consider important issues such as beneficiary selection, impact of the operation etc., etc.

The timeliness, quality and quantity of **RCSC** reporting is just not satisfactory. A key factor is the work overload of **RCSC HQ** Relief department combined with an **RCSC** misconception that reporting is the responsibility of the Federation. This is a problem that has not been addressed by **IFRC** in its 'shyness' to confront contentious issues at each point as they arise.

The poor quality of **RCSC HQ** reporting is in stark contrast to the capacity observed by the Team in some of the provinces visited which presented well-prepared reports in English and not only stated what had been distributed and to whom but also pointed out key problems within the operation.

The reporting relationship between **RCSC HQ** and the Federation is a major bottleneck which has prevented information available in the provincial branches from being freely shared with the donors. It is unfortunate to observe the Federation and **RCSC** working in isolation from each other, duplicating information collection, not sharing information and, most importantly, not learning from each other.

While it is recognised that field monitoring in China is a difficult task due to long distances, heavy protocol and the ever-presence of officials and cameramen who all make it difficult to carry out meaningful interviews with beneficiaries, **IFRC**' approach to monitoring is not satisfactory. The main issues are:

- The monitoring system should take into account the work of previous operations as an additional source of base-line information. Due to the nature of the operations, it

is difficult to measure impact indicators at reasonable . It is relatively cheap and effective, however, to measure the capacity of the provincial and lower **RCSC** levels as well as their adherence to beneficiary selection criteria;

- Apart from logistical information, much of what is collected is either irrelevant, anecdotal without triangulation, taken from a miniscule statistical population or not processed/analysed;
- Monitoring reports try to use the tracking of stock movements as raw material for the Operations Updates but are not used for identifying problems associated with the operation beyond mere logistical issues;
- As a consequence of the inadequate analysis of monitoring, there is little or no valuable information for forthcoming operations.

It is important that **IFRC/RCSC** improves its monitoring for the next International Appeal for the same reasons (with the same possible consequences) as those mentioned in **Section 4.1** above (viz. **b.** ‘reporting did not reflect the true situation on the ground’).

Recommendations as to steps which might be take to address the issues described here may be found in **Section 7. (Recommendations – 7a. to 7e.)**

4.8 RCSC Computer programme

RCSC has, with the support of the Canadian RC, developed a computerised disaster management system. The system was not used in the 2002 operation and remains in its ‘trial phase’ but **HQ** has issued a request to the provinces to use it during the next floods operation.

The system is constructed as an internet page, which the branches can log into and enter information on the impact of the disaster, request for assistance and reporting on distribution of goods. Essentially, it is an electronic version of the ‘13 forms’ which are currently used for communication between **RCSC HQ** and field.

The strength of the system is that it builds on the paper forms already known by the branches and that is an ambitious undertaking which would appear to be being led by the Yunan Provincial branch which has employed a local software company to develop the system beyond what was observed in **HQ** . It is imperative that such development be carried out in a coordinated manner throughout **RCSC** in order to avoid dual (multiple) systems.

It is clear that the system, in its current form, is a step on the road towards better and more timely reporting from the provinces to **HQ**. It should be realised, however, that the system is not a complete “push-a-button-and-out-comes-the-answer” system. This should be communicated to the management so that a clear understanding of what will and, especially, what will not be delivered by the computer system created.

There was no time for the Team to make a detailed evaluation of the data system but some insight into the project is presented below:

i) The **Purpose** of the system is: To implement a Disaster Preparedness computerisation networking system based on **RCSC** employment of a platform for transfer of information between the headquarters and provinces, cities (regions) and counties.


ii) The **Expected Results** are: An **RCSC** Disaster Preparedness and Response System which adopts advanced computer and network technology which will consequently improve the capacities of **RCSC** disaster management and information transfer.

iii) The **Activities** are: The establishment of Local Area Network (LAN) at RCSC HQ by putting in place all necessary infrastructures; and

The establishment of a Wider Area Network (WAN) within the RCSC framework. RCSC would have a dedicated circuit to the Internet to provide regional sites and DP centres with the ability to connect to RCSC HQ information system. Web based information would then be transferred to RCSC HQ, rather than being hosted at a local ISP.

iv) **Inputs** include: Hardware, software, training and professional technical services.

The Network Architecture is illustrated diagrammatically below:



The DP System Structure

The administrative **RCSC** structure is tree-shaped as illustrated, again diagrammatically, below and is composed of province, city and county branches.


The disaster reporting and response procedure follows a similar structure as follows:

- the **County Red Cross branch** in whose area the disaster takes place reports the disaster to its **City Red Cross branch**;
- the **City Red Cross branch** collects all information and reports to the **Province Red Cross branch**;
- the **Province Red Cross branch** then reports to **RCSC Headquarters**.

No leap-frogging (bi-passing) reporting is allowed.

Any international donation passes through **RCSC Headquarters** to the **Province**, then **City** and eventually to the **County** branch.

All levels of branch users will login to the DP server via Internet. The database is in the DP server. The DP system will indicate different level branch users and assign the space and tables to them. The users can only make contact with their upper and lower level users even though all users are in the same DP server and within one database.



Findings from **RSCS HQ** are that:

- The system seems sufficient to meet the needs of two-way information flows;
- Thirteen forms adequately cover the required information;
- **RCSC HQ** are keen to undertake further development of the system.

While it is recognized that it might be a long process for **RCSC** staff to fully adapt to this structure in their daily work, it is noted that, after six months' project implementation, the system still remains in the testing stage.

Yunnan Red Cross Computerization Project

This project was funded by Hong Kong Red Cross after the 1996 Lijiang earthquake. The programme's main functions include disaster reporting and management of relief goods and funds. Sixteen prefecture Red Cross branches and DP centres all installed this computer programme. The provincial branch has received 140 disaster reports via this channel since its establishment in 2000.

4.9 Disaster preparedness – DP Centres

A recurrent message at all level of the China Red Cross (Headquarter, provinces, prefectures) is that of having more DP centres with more pre-positioned stocks in order to respond quicker. Headquarters is currently managing seven DP centres located in seven provinces.

From interviews conducted, the added value of existing DP centres seems to be obscure.

Three **DP** centres were visited during the field trips. The first, Kunming City **DP** centre, Yunan province, has only few items in stock stored in 4th floor rooms reached by staircase and illustrates the reality of the term 'multi-purpose' whereby items are stored in what amount to hotel rooms. While understanding the severe limitation of funds at this level and recognising some very positive aspects of this branch (genuine, diligent and able staff etc.), such a situation cannot be seen as serious **Disaster Preparedness** and raises questions as to whether funds used in this way may be better invested elsewhere. In light of the fact that this centre is located in the middle of a Provincial capital where just about anything can be bought 'off the shelf', it would seem that the possibility of establishing framework contracts with local suppliers should be considered.

The second, Yunan Provincial **DP** centre in Kunming City, sits in a magnificent Austrian Red Cross part-funded building largely used by MoH. The 'warehouse' is located on the second floor, accessed by a heavy-duty 'service' lift and contains a quantity of relief items but which, again, bears no relation to the enormity of the demands of a province whose size and population could be compared to those of a Western European country. The question of opportunity cost²³ is raised here.

The third, Sichuan Provincial **DP** centre, is partially funded by government. There are seven full time staff, a training centre and a rather small warehouse split into two stores: the first one belongs to the provinces and the second belongs to **HQ**. The provincial stock is well managed and goods are properly stored. Stock movements are maintained in a ledger book and Document 7 (delivery notification) is properly used. For the 2002 flood, they immediately dispatched clothes, medicines, tents, shoes and disinfectant.

²³ an economic term referring to the alternative use to which funds might be put in order to produce a greater (or lesser) cost/benefit return

The Headquarter store contains about 100 tents which are poorly maintained since 2001. Surprisingly, none of the tents were dispatched in response to the 2002 flood while 180 new tents were purchased for Sichuan province.

The perception of the functions of the **DP** centres seems to vary from Headquarters to provinces. Some see the DP centre as income-generating projects (hotels, shops) while some see them as warehouses and others as training centres and, as a result, the term 'Multi-purpose DP centres' is widely employed. The result is the storage of relief items in 'hotel rooms' and the use of 'service lifts' or even staircases for stock movement within the 'warehouses'. The Team considers these a contradiction.

Provincial branches are stuck in a 'brick and stock' mentality with respect to the **DP** centres. Focus is on building large structures in order to be able to respond more rapidly. There seems to be a power game between HQ and the branches with respect to regional and provincial DP centres. Stock Control is seen as an important issue for improvement.

The investments necessary in Disaster Preparedness, in order to attain a well functioning system are enormous and not necessarily the best use of resources. This is very closely linked with the role that the **RCSC** wishes to play vis-a-vis the government. Some innovations could be made with purchase of goods via framework agreements and a low hardware approach could be modelled in other places.

Recommendations in relation to **DP** centres may be found in **Section 7. (Recommendations – 8a. and 8b.)**

5. Findings

Findings are presented here in terms of the SWOT criteria of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats as they relate to **RCSC** and concern issues raised not only with regard to the 2002 Floods Operation but also to earlier Flood Operations in China and wider Red Cross experience. The analysis for **IFRC** appears on pages four and five of the 1999 evaluation and for which little has changed.

Strengths

- i) **RCSC** is perceived by both the population and the Government of China as **caring**, manifesting a genuine humane face to the victims of disaster and showing solidarity with them;
- ii) **RCSC** is availed of good, knowledgeable and devoted people at the field level;
- iii) **RCSC** has a very early presence at the site of disaster often ahead of government agencies;
- iv) **RCSC** early assistance, although small, is highly appreciated by the beneficiaries;
- v) Red Cross accordingly has a good image;
- vi) Red Cross has good relations with the media, both national and international;
- vii) Red Cross rapidly communicates alarms and ‘sitreps’ to government agencies, the international community and donors through an existing structured network;
- viii) **RCSC** is better known than other relief players in China;
- ix) **RCSC** has an excellent working relationship with MoH, MoCA, Police and PLA (Army);
- x) Much of MoH emergency assistance is presented as Red Cross (under the emblem);
- xi) **RCSC** help is accordingly perceived as arriving quickly.

Weaknesses

- i) **RCSC** has small capacity to respond;
- ii) **RCSC** distribution of relief items is ‘symbolic’;
- iii) **RCSC** has small resources;
- iv) **RCSC** has staff shortage;
- v) **RCSC** has few vehicles;
- vi) **RCSC** has no road haulage facilities;
- vii) **RCSC** has inadequate warehousing;
- viii) **RCSC** has a negligible pre-positioned stock;
- ix) **RCSC** lacks a coherent DP plan;
- x) **RCSC** reporting is poor;
- xi) Lack of clear financial and logistical procedures and control mechanisms applicable at all **RCSC** levels (HQ, Provinces, Prefectures);
- xii) **RCSC HQ** tries to ‘micro-manage’ in an enormous disaster-prone ‘continent’;
- xiii) Lack of **RCSC** capacity in the Provinces blocks delegation of responsibility to that level;

- xiv) Communication and understanding within the Red Cross movement in China is poor.

Opportunities

- i) To make **RCSC** independent in principle and image;
- ii) To make **RCSC** operationally independent over time;
- iii) To strengthen **RCSC** communications with hardware, software and personnel development;
- iv) To increase the **RCSC** volunteer base;
- v) To increase **RCSC** fund raising;
- vi) To capitalise on the significant **RCSC** resources in the provinces;
- vii) To establish **RCSC HQ** as a facilitator not as a bottleneck;
- viii) To increase Province/PNS collaboration;
- ix) To make **RCSC** the major aid agency in China.

Threats

- i) Damage to Red Cross credibility if victims' expectations unfulfilled;
- ii) Expectations raised by other agencies may be perceived as **RCSC** promises - see i) above;
- iii) **RCSC** not perceived as independent;
- iv) **RCSC** seeing relief item delivery as being its only role in response to disasters;
- v) Fund-raising attracts inappropriate in-kind donations;
- vi) **RCSC** inability to attract the right calibre of staff as non-Red Cross employment prospects increase;
- vii) **RCSC** unable to become pro-active in disaster response (just being ad-hoc).

These findings enable conclusions to be drawn with regard to issues in which **IFRC/RCSC** may have either a comparative advantage or disadvantage in order to identify areas in which benefits may be maximised through cooperation. At the same time, those areas in which cooperation may produce little cost benefit, or even harm to both partners, may be identified.

6. Conclusions

Despite the experience of two earlier floods and three evaluation/reviews of their operational performance in the respective emergency responses, very little has changed in terms of timeliness and selection of relief items. **IFRC/RCSC** have not acted upon many of the lessons learnt/recommendations made and the working relationship between the two partners remains formal and, to an extent, unproductive.

Both institutions would, however, appear to remain committed to ongoing cooperation and have their own, but not necessarily coinciding, reasons for doing so. The issue of international appeals is recognised by both as a valuable means of gaining experience, responding to humanitarian needs and developing the National Society.

The Chinese Red Cross has enormous potential and it is considered that this will be realised in the longer term, with or without external support. The Federation has a part to play in this great challenge and will benefit substantially from its successful achievement but both are failing to find a way in which to conduct themselves. While this is considered to be due to a coy relationship in which both have a veto, it would seem to be a problem which can be resolved by close personal engagement and goodwill.

Acknowledgement of scale and proportion would appear to be lacking in the movement's perception of China disasters and this may be the result of 'looking down the wrong end of the telescope'. The Federation, from Beijing back to Geneva and PNSs suffer equally from this weakness, which is understandable for other than the most experienced 'China person'. Unfortunately, **RCSC** manifests the same problem until pressed on the issue.

Both fail to recognise that their strength does not necessarily lie in emergency response, even though it has to be accepted that this is what Red Cross is built upon. The Team has to conclude realistically that, at the current level of **RCSC** development and resources, the time taken to respond to disasters in China can be little improved upon beyond that achieved in its most successful scenario (PoA 1) which took 37 days from request for funds to first delivery in the field.

IFRC/RCSC needs, therefore, to address its international appeal to relief response which is relevant to post-emergency urgent needs.

The strength of **RCSC** lies in its 'human touch', its genuine and motivated staff, its image, its ability to arrive early at disaster sites, its national and international networks and its close cooperation with local and national authorities.

Perhaps its greatest strength is the ability to communicate from the ground directly to the heart, not only of its own government, but also to that of the international community. In this respect it is just about unique.

These are strengths which can be built upon at 'relatively' low cost through expansion of its volunteer network and improved communications in terms of radio, telephonic and electronic hard- and soft-ware.

Of course, **RCSC** must be seen as 'Red Cross' in terms of its delivery of some degree of relief and, for the time being, it can 'pass' under the emblem carried realistically by MoH doctors and nurses maybe until such time as it has the capacity to organise its own medical services (if that is the course it wishes to take).

The adoption of new procurement mechanisms such as Framework Contracts can speed up the delivery process and particularly so in the case of **RCSC** own-funds.

This operation has proved that **RCSC** has an increasing capacity to locally fund-raise cash and 'in-kind' donations and that these funds are so much faster and more flexible than those raised by international appeal. This, along with expansion of its volunteer base, is perhaps the most important factor which will accelerate the society into a successful national society.

7. Recommendations

Strategy of RCSC

Recommendation 1a :

The Team considers that any rapid RCSC move away from some degree of dependency upon MoH would have adverse effects on the Red Cross image and should not be rushed while it needs to keep the support of MoCA for as long as possible at the field level as it builds its own capacity and financial resources.

Future interventions

Recommendation 2a:

IFRC/RCSC should acknowledge their limitations and respond to disaster with items which are valid on arrival while also recognising and developing **RCSC**' comparative advantages.

Delegate deployment

Recommendation 3a:

Relief delegates should work within the **RCSC** framework and in the same building with the National Society. They should have assigned counterparts and work with him/her on a daily basis. This would enable two-way knowledge transfer, reduce misunderstanding and encourage better co-operation. While there should be a focal point (Relief Department) for Federation delegates, this should not be their only point of contact with their Red Cross colleagues. Finance should talk and work directly with Finance and Reporting should talk and work directly with a reporting person appointed within Chinese Red Cross.

Procurement

Recommendation 4a: **RCSC** should write transparent and understandable procurement procedures, including each step of the procurement from quotation request for delivery of the goods. The procedures must meet Federation and International standard business regulations. The supplier's selection should clearly identify the required criteria for suppliers able to quote in order to avoid misinterpretation.

These procedures should be approved by senior management and applicable for all National Society procurements (Headquarter, provinces, prefectures...)

Recommendation 4b: Federation Finance Department should write emergency response financial procedures that allow field offices to make requests at any time in the month.

Recommendation 4c: **RCSC** should begin its tendering processes as soon as the plan of action is signed rather than waiting for the money to be transferred.

Recommendation 4d: **IFRC** Geneva should approve the Emergency procurement procedure that have already been drafted. National Societies should then adopt the procedures.

Recommendation 4e: In order to speed up the process, some framework agreements²⁴ with reliable suppliers should be considered for major non-food items. To reduce the transport cost and improve speed of delivery, those agreements should be signed with suppliers located in the most disaster prone provinces.

Recommendation 4f: IFRC Geneva has already signed Framework agreements for kitchen sets, plastic sheeting, jerry cans, blankets, new emergency health kits and cholera kits. They are currently negotiating an agreement for family tents. The specifications of the items accord with the Red Cross Emergency items catalogue. The process of negotiating these agreements adheres to Federation and major donor procurement requirements. RCSC could use those agreements, if needed. In order to make use of these agreements, RCSC should contact the Logistics and Resource Mobilisation Department at IFRC²⁵.

Recommendation 4g: With regard to food items, framework agreements are not usually possible because of rapid price fluctuation. A possibility could, however, be to borrow food from government stock in order to fill the first month's gap and subsequently to replenish them when the procured food arrives

Recommendation 4h :

When a document is produced, it should not just be faxed but explained in detail and the Federation should make sure that it reaches the right person.

Recommendation 4i ;

A deeper analysis of procurement procedures and process should be conducted in order to avoid delays in re-launching the tender process.

Recommendation 4j:

It was mentioned during a meeting that procurement procedures should not be written by the Relief department but by Logistics department.

²⁴ A **framework agreement** is an agreement with a supplier who guarantees to maintain agreed costs for a specified time period and, in most cases, also agrees to reserve and store a certain amount of product. This means that items are ready for emergency draw-down and constitute a guaranteed stock level at any given time (except when restocking is necessary after a large-scale sudden-onset emergency).

The advantages are as followed:

- key emergency relief commodities are available at the right time for the exclusive use of the Red Cross
- these goods are strategically positioned in the right place
- the goods are available at the right price
- eliminates the necessity for a tender process

The process of negotiating these agreements must adhere to Federation/ Chinese Red Cross and major donor procurement requirements and must be done via an open tender. Offers must be received under a sealed bid system.

²⁵ Details of signed IFRC framework agreement are available in the Logistics standards CD-Rom or on the DMIS webpage (www.ifrc.org - DMIS)

RCSC Financial process/reporting lines for Federation funds

Recommendation 5a:

A close review of the responsibilities and tasks of the Relief department should be conducted by **RCSC** to see what activities should be delegated or transferred to other departments. Relief Department should concentrate on relief activities.

Recommendation 5b:

Logistics Department should not pay invoices. All money transfers and payments should be handled by the finance department. Logistics should approve (sign) the invoice and then forward it with a copy of the Requisition, a copy of the contract and a copy of Document 8 (of the 13 **RCSC** forms), confirming receipt of the goods, to **RCSC** Finance Department for payment.

Recommendation 5c:

Provincial branches should confirm safe receipt of goods to Logistics Department and copy it to Relief. To confirm, they should sign and stamp Document 8. In addition, they should confirm the condition of the goods (if there is any damage or if quantity received is not the quantity expected).

Cash transfer v Working advances

Recommendation 6a : **RCSC** should conduct the questionnaire “*working advance or cash transfer selection criteria questionnaire*” jointly with a Federation (Regional Finance Unit in Kuala Lumpur), or independent, finance expert. The result should be analysed and a financial plan designed to help **RCSC** meet the criteria within a specific timeframe. If there is no real effort invested in the improvement of financial and reporting procedures, the Federation will have seriously to consider moving to Working Advances²⁶. Moving to working advance would help **RCSC** to adapt to specific donors financial and reporting requirements.

Recommendation 6b :

Federation and **RCSC** should sign a Memorandum of Understanding stipulating the financial and procurement procedures that must be implemented. The procedures must adhere to Federation, major donor and international business standards requirements. In order to protect **IFRC**, **PNS** (on this occasion the Netherlands Red Cross) and **RCSC**, the latter should continue to work under the current (cash transfer) system but this Memorandum of Understanding must be written urgently and signed.

Recommendation 6c :

The finance delegate should be based at **RCSC** headquarter and work within its Finance department. Reports should be produced jointly and knowledge transfer achieved on a daily basis by working together rather than in ad-hoc meetings.

²⁶ **IFRC**. *Working Advance – National Societies*, Procedure 7.05.04, IFRC, Geneva, July 2002

Monitoring and reporting

Recommendation 7a :

A system should be established in which more relevant information is collected in order to provide a clear picture of the operation, to follow the development of working modalities and to measure the impact on beneficiaries' household/local economies, social issues, recovery and the environment.

Recommendation 7b :

Recognising the many constraints on monitoring (economic, logistical etc.), it is essential that **IFRC/RCSC** understands why monitoring is carried out and how best to collect key information which can provide useful inputs for the management of the operation.

Recommendation 7c :

In the latter respect, the possibility of carrying out minimal household surveys which may be semi-structured but triangulated, or preferably statistical, should be investigated.

Recommendation 7d :

RCSC should delegate reporting responsibility to staff who should work closely with an **IFRC** Reporting Delegate (within the **RCSC** management framework) and translator on the current reporting for the range of donors (ECHO, DFID, USAID etc.).

Recommendation 7e :

When an adequate level of two-way knowledge transfer (ie. mutual understanding of requirements and constraints) has been achieved, the **IFRC** Reporting Delegate should leave. All reporting responsibility should then be taken by **RCSC** who should use **IFRC** as 'proof-reader' and ultimately as 'post-box' for onward transfer to the donor.

Disaster preparedness – DP Centres

Recommendation 8a :

Prior to buying new stock for regional warehouses, a detailed stock inventory of the seven existing ones should be conducted. One person (logistics) should be appointed as the manager of the regional stock and maintain an updated stock list. This person should liaise with provincial branch warehouse managers.

No new items should be purchased prior dispatch of old stock.

As previously mentioned, rather than paying for the items in advance and paying for the cost of maintenance, framework agreements could be signed for major items. This would avoid having expensive items deteriorating in warehouses for years.

Recommendation 8b :

The roles and functions of **DP** centres should be clearly written and agreed at all levels. Some implementing procedures should be written. The response area for the regional **DP** centre should also be clearly defined.

Other recommendations

Fund raising :

Recommendation 9a :

As suggested (but not actioned) in the 1999 evaluation, ‘the Federation should assist **RCSC** in fund raising activities from grass-roots level upwards and this could be catalysed by a degree of ‘fund matching’ from Federation/PNS sources. At the higher levels, the Federation could lend its credibility in assisting **RCSC** to raise funds from ‘in-China’ commercial enterprises and from international donors.’

Volunteer recruitment

Recommendation 10a :

Equally at grass-roots level, the Federation should assist **RCSC** in increasing the volunteer resource through awareness-raising and publicity while recognising that perhaps the most effective tool for this is a ‘job well done’.

Training

Recommendation 11a :

This report has emphasised ‘2-way knowledge transfer’ as opposed to ‘training’ but would again draw attention to the 1999 evaluation in which ‘training at HQ and lower levels in project identification, proposal, monitoring and evaluation’ was suggested but not actioned. It is recommended here that, during the next operation, reporting and finance delegates (in particular) be appropriately contracted to enable them to work with counterparts and within the **RCSC** structure until such time as they can leave China in the confidence (of both parties) that **RCSC** will handle those responsibilities thereafter without the need for Federation intervention.

Annex A. Mission Terms of Reference

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES

FINAL DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE Review of Red Cross Society of China /International Federation co- operation in Disaster Management

2002 FLASH FLOODS OPERATION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

These terms of reference define the framework for the operational review of the Red Cross Society of China (RCSC) and International Federation cooperation in Disaster Response to be carried out in 10-29 March 2003.

This Review is part of an ongoing learning process, which commenced in 1997 with a roundtable meeting in Geneva between the RCSC, donor societies and the Federation Secretariat. In 1999 and 2000 reviews were conducted to evaluate the 1998 and 1999 RCSC/International Federation flood operations.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The Federation has been supporting RCSC relief operations for over 70 years. More than 123 million Swiss francs have been mobilised for China since 1931 to support those affected by floods, war, earthquakes, severe winters and cyclones.

It is apparent from recent RCSC/International Federation operations that insufficient time has been devoted to the definition of the roles and responsibilities of the different partners in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of disaster response operations.

3.0 PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW

The purpose of the review will be to:

1. evaluate the timeliness, efficiency and relevance of the 2002 China Flash Flood operation;
2. evaluate to what extent the RCSC/International Federation have been successful in terms of incorporating the findings and recommendations provided by the 1999 and 2000 Flood evaluations; and
3. based on these findings (1 and 2 above), and the recent developments related to the Strategy for Change?????, develop recommendations for the future scope of RCSC/International Federation co-operation in the field of Disaster Response.

4.0 OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW

1. To evaluate the timeliness, efficiency and relevance of the 2002 China Flash Flood operation, including:
 - assessing the relevance of the operational objectives set in the appeal by taking into account the evolution of the situation in the affected areas.
 - assessing the impact on the lives of the affected population and the appropriateness of the relief distributed to the affected population.
 - assessing the effectiveness of the targeting and beneficiary selection processes.
 - analysis of the different phases of the process, from the occurrence of the first Flash Floods in the beginning of June until the finalisation of the operation, identifying sources of delay in the operation.
 - evaluating the extent to which RCSC/International Federation relief intervention was co-ordinated with other Red Cross actors²⁷ in China and other actors in the humanitarian field and other donors to RCSC.
 - evaluating to what extent RCSC's role in disaster response is defined vis-a-vis the government and other actors in the humanitarian field.
 - evaluating the extent to which the RCSC DP-Centers were able to respond efficiently and in a timely manner to the Floods.

2. To evaluate to what extent the RCSC/International Federation have been successful in terms of incorporating the findings of the recommendations provided by the 1998 and 1999 Flood evaluations.

3. To evaluate the operational framework established over recent years between RCSC and the International Federation and its present relevance, including:
 - evaluating to what extent the RCSC logistics systems and procedures are adequate in terms of supporting effective and efficient relief operations;
 - evaluating to what extent the International Federation and RCSC financial procedures are adequate in terms of supporting effective and efficient relief operations; and
 - evaluating to what extent the International Federation and RCSC have established clear and workable co-operation procedures.

5.0 METHODOLOGY

1. The Team will:
 - Review materials from the 2002 Floods operation and previous relief operations, lessons learnt from relief operations in other countries (e.g Mozambique), International Federation policies and operating procedures. Prior to arriving in China the Team Members will specifically read the 1999 and 2000 Flood Evaluation Documents.

 - conduct interviews with:
 - RCSC staff at both HQ, provincial, prefecture and county levels,
 - beneficiary households,
 - provincial and local government officials
 - international organizations,

²⁷ For example bilateral projects supported by CanCross, NorCross, Aust Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross etc

- ❑ local missions/embassies,
 - ❑ PNS,
 - ❑ Federation Secretariat personnel from Asia Pacific, Logistics, Finance, DMC and the Management, and
 - ❑ East Asia Federation Delegation.
2. At the commencement of the Review, the Team Leader will facilitate a meeting involving RCSC/Federation Delegates/other Review Team members with the aim:
 - of building a shared vision for the purpose, scope and methodologies to be used in the Review; and
 - to generate a team atmosphere and to create a sense of ownership.
 3. At the end of the Review the Team Leader will facilitate a meeting in Beijing involving relevant groups to:
 - present initial findings and recommendations,
 - provide an opportunity for stakeholders to consider these outcomes,
 - provide an opportunity for stakeholders to provide feedback, and
 - build consensus and a sense of ownership of the findings and recommendations.
 4. Later in 2003, a meeting will be arranged in Geneva with RCSC, all relevant Secretariat Departments, the current HoRD, the new HoRD and donors. The objective of the meeting will be to agree on a plan of action deciding on the future scope of RCSC-International Federation co-operation in terms of Disaster Management.

6.0 TEAM COMPOSITION

The Review Team will consist of:

- Team Leader, External Consultant: John Wilding.
- PNS Representative with extensive China experience: Yunhong Zhang.
- Logistics Specialist, Federation Secretariat: Isabelle Sechaud.
- Disaster Management Specialist, Federation Secretariat: Lars Peter Nissen.

7.0 ASSESSMENT DATES /BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING

7.1 The in country Review will take place from 10-29 March 2003. The Team members will be in country from 10 to 23 and the Team Leader from 10 to 29 March.

7.2 The Team Leader will have an additional 7 days to develop the Final Report.

7.3 Team members will be responsible for contributing to the Final Report. This will require report writing back in their home country.

7.4 The Team Leader to brief in Geneva prior to the in country mission and debrief in GVA after the completion of final report, sometime in April.

8.0 REPORTING: FORMAT, SCHEDULE AND DISTRIBUTION

8.1 An Aide Memoire (approx two pages) will be produced in country and submitted to the Red Cross Society of China and the International Federation Delegation in Beijing at the end of the field mission.

8.2 Contributions for the Final Report from the Team Members will be provided to the Team Leader by 31 March 2003.

8.3 The Final Draft report will be submitted to the Federation Secretariat by 7 April 2003.

8.4 This Final Draft Report will be shared with the RCSC, the East Asia Regional Delegation, the Secretariat and relevant donors for comment.

8.5 The Final Report will be ready for wider distribution by May 2003.

8.6 The Final Report format will be as follows:

Introduction

Map

1. Executive summary

1.1 Findings

1.2 Conclusions

1.3 Recommendations

2. Background

2.1 Chronology

2.2 Progress since 1999 Floods Operational Review

2.3 Ex-post logical framework

3. Achievements against indicators

3.1 Relevance

3.2 Effectiveness

3.3 Efficiency

3.4 Impact

3.5 Sustainability

4. Findings

5. Conclusions

6. Recommendations

7. Annexes

7.1 Terms of Reference

7.2 Itinerary

7.3 List of people met

7.4 Bibliography

7.5 Constraints and achievements of the review process and lessons learnt for future, similar, processes in China (no more than 10 bullet points).

7.3 Management Comments (Responsibility of Secretariat)

9.0 MANAGEMENT COMMENTS PROCESS

9.1 In order for the International Federation to critically analyse and prioritise the findings and recommendations contained in the Review document a process seeking comments from RCSC, different areas of the Secretariat and donors will be undertaken.

9.2 This process will:

- ensure that there is an organization wide and genuine awareness/understanding of findings and recommendations
- provide an opportunity for partners to agree/disagree with findings and recommendations
- assess whether recommendations are acceptable/feasible
- build consensus on priority and “do-ability” of recommendations
- budget for recommendations
- assign responsibilities and timeframes for action on recommendations

9.3 Management Comments on the findings and recommendations of the Review Team by Secretariat, RCSC and donors will be finalised by June 2003.

Annex B. Itinerary

March 2003

- 6th Briefing Geneva**
- 7th Briefing Geneva**
- 8th Fly Beijing**
- 9th Arrive Beijing**
- 10th Beijing**
- 11th Beijing**
- 12th Beijing**
- 13th Fly Beijing – Nanning, Guangxi Province**
- 14th Guangxi Province**
- 15th Guangxi Province**
- 16th JW/YZ fly Nanning – Kunming, Yunan Province**
- LN/IS fly Nanning – Chengdu, Sichuan Province**
- 17th JW/YZ – Yunan Province**
- LN/IS – Sichuan Province**
- 18th JW/YZ – Yunan Province**
- LN/IS – Sichuan Province**
- 19th JW/YZ fly Kunming – Beijing**
- LN/IS fly Chengdu – Beijing**
- 20th Beijing**
- 21st Beijing**
- 22nd Beijing**
- 23rd YZ fly Beijing – Ottawa**
- JW/LN/IS - Beijing**
- 24th LN/IS fly Beijing – Geneva**
- JW Beijing**
- 25th JW Beijing**
- 26th JW Beijing**
- 27th JW Beijing**
- 28th JW Beijing**
- 29th JW Beijing**
- 30th JW fly Beijing - Manchester**
- 31st JW reporting UK**

April 2003

- 1st JW reporting UK**
- 2nd JW reporting UK**
- 3rd JW reporting UK**
- 4th JW reporting UK**
- 5th JW reporting UK**
- 6th JW reporting UK**

May 2002

- 1st JW debriefing Geneva**
- 2nd JW debriefing Geneva**

Annex C. List of People met

Federation, Geneva

Bernard Chomilier	Head Logistics Dept.
Alistair Henley	Head Coordination Dept.
Wolfgang Stockl	WatSan Officer.
Jemini Pandya	Strategic Communications
Tor Planting.	DM & Coordination
Brian Wall	SRO Evaluation
Grace Lo	Health & Care,
Graham Betts-Symonds,	DP
Luntan Bayarmaa	OD
Eunhee Cho	OD
Francois Courtade	Donor Support
Andy McElroy	Donor Support
Aurelia Balpe	Asia Pacific Dept.
Brigitte Stalder-Olsen	Unit Manager, Logistics Dept
Frank Mohrhauer	Officer. Gov. Support /Legal Dept.

Federation, Beijing

Richard Grove-Hills, Head of Regional Office for East Asia
Niels Juel, Regional Disaster Preparedness Delegate
Mari Morimoto, Field Delegate for 2002 flash floods appeal
Jesmina Petrovic, Reporting Delegate for 2002 flash floods appeal
France Hurtubise, Regional Information Delegate
Marat Yunsov, Finance Delegate for 2002 flash floods appeal

RCSC, Headquarters

Mr. Lizhong Wang, Executive Vice President
Mr. Aiming Sun, Vice President
Ms. Jiuxiang Su, Secretary General
Mr. Xiaohua Wang, Director of External Liaison Department
Ms. Yiyi Gong, Deputy Director of External Liaison Department
Ms. Ayan Zhou, Head of International Organizations Division, External Liaison Department
Ms. Yi Long, Program Officer (Translator) of International Cooperation Division, External Liaison Department
Ms. Liying Yu, Program Officer (Translator) of International Cooperation Division, External Liaison Department
Ms. Jiefang Shi, Director of Relief and Health Department
Mr. Huxin Yang, Deputy Director of Relief and Health Department
Mr. Xusheng Yang, Head of Relief Division, Relief and Health Department
Ms. Zhimin Wang, Deputy Head of Relief Division, Relief and Health Department
Dr. Jun Lan, Director of Programme Development and Support Department
Ms. Huiqin Zha, Head of Finance and Assets Management Division
Mr. Minren Chen, Director of Logistics Department

RCSC, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regional Branch

Professor Nating Fang, Vice President
Mr. Junsheng Long, Secretary General
Mr. Zihua Cai, Deputy Head of Relief Department
Mr. Jingyu Fang, Program Officer
Mr. Jing Wang, Program Officer (Translator)
Mr. Weijun Chen, Program Officer
Mr. Keguang Nong, Program Officer

Hezhou Prefecture (Guangxi)

Mr. Xiaowen Nong, Deputy Prefecture Mayor
Mr. Yaoning Liu, Vice President of Hezhou Red Cross Branch
Mr. Lingkuan Zhang, Vice President of Hezhou Red Cross Branch, Director of Civil Affairs
Mr. Xiqi Wang, Member of Board of Hezhou Red Cross Branch
Mr. Fang Chen, Deputy Director of Public Health Bureau
Ms. Ruming Li, Secretary General of Hezhou Red Cross Branch
Mr. Jiang Huang, President of Ba Bu District Red Cross Branch of Hezhou
Mr. Yuanwang Zhang, Vice President of Ba Bu District Red Cross Branch of Hezhou
Mr. Guangsheng Huang, Secretary General of Ba Bu District Red Cross Branch of Hezhou

RCSC, Yunnan Provincial Branch

Mr. Haifeng Zhan, Executive Vice President
Mr. Yongchun He, Vice President
Ms. Xia Zhang, Secretary General
Mr. Lin Pan, Deputy Head of Relief Department
Ms. Lan Zhou, Program Officer

Kunming City (Yunan)

Ms. Ruan, Vice President of Kunming City Red Cross Branch
Mr. Zheng, Secretary General of Kunming City Red Cross Branch
Mr. Ma, Deputy County Mayer of Jinjing County
Mr. Shi, Secretary General of Jinning County Red Cross Branch
Mr. Pu, Chief of Civil Affairs of Jinjing County
Mr. Yang, Head of Fagudian Village of Shuanghe Town of Jinning County

Lufeng County, Chuxiong Prefecture (Yunan)

Ms. Jingyun Li, Deputy Mayor of Lufeng County, President of Lufeng County Red Cross Branch
Mr. Decai Pu, Head of Lufeng Public Health Bureau, Vice President of Lufeng Red Cross Branch
Mr. Wizhong Liu, Head of Lufeng Civil Affairs Bereau
Ms. Shaoxing Li, Secretary General of Lufeng County Red Cross Branch
Ms. Fangxian Xia, Secretary General of Chuxiong Prefecture Red Cross Branch

RCSC, Sichuan Provincial Branch

Ms. Po Zhang, Secretary General

Ms. Qiongying Wu, Director of Relief Division

Mr. Fang Wang, Program Officer of Relief Division

Mr. Pei Yang, Program Officer of Relief Division

Luzhou Prefecture Red Cross Branch (Sichuan)

Mr. Xisen Cao, President

Mr. Jie Hu, Vice President

Ms. Xiaoping, Yu, Vice Prefecture Mayor

Mr. Liangchun Li, Vice President of Secretary Division

Ms. Kanxin Xiang, Director of Relief Division

Mr. Yingping Zhang, Director of Health Division

Ms. Li Xu, Deputy Director of Xuyong County

Ms. Hong Yang, President of Xuyong County Red Cross Branch

Ms. Yufang Liang, Full time Staff of Xuyong County Red Cross Branch

Ms. Shao Yu, Full time Staff of Mo Ni Township Red Cross Branch of Xuyong County

Annex D. Bibliography

- IFRC.** *Emergency appeal (No.16/02)*, IFRC, Geneva, June 2002
- CRCS.** *Draft appeal*, Chinese Red Cross, Beijing, June 2002
- IFRC.** *Operations update*, IFRC, Geneva, December 2002
- ECHO.** *Framework partnership agreement*, Brussels, July 2002
- Wilding, J.**, *Operational review, 1998 Flood Relief Operation in China*, Geneva, June 1999
- Gordon-Gibson, A.**, *Operational review, 1999 Flood Relief Operation in China*, Geneva, March 2000
- IFRC.** *Cash Transfer – National Societies, Procedure 7.05.03*, IFRC, Geneva, July 2002
- IFRC.** *Working Advance – National Societies, Procedure 7.05.04*, IFRC, Geneva, July 2002
- CRCR.** *Report on the project implementation of the assistance of Red Cross Society and Red Crescent International Federation in the flood relief in Guangxi of 2002*, Red Cross of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March, 2003
- CRCR.** *A report on 2002 natural calamity & the relief work by Red Cross Society of Luzhou city, Sichuan, China*, CRCR, Luzhou, March 2003
- CRCR.** *The work summary of Sichuan Red Cross on distributing disaster-relief goods and materials of International Federation*, China Red Cross, Guizhou, March 2003
- IFRC.** *Seasonal Flooding, synthesis of Recent Evaluations and Reviews*, IFRC, Geneva, 2003
- Gabriel Salas, T.L.**, *Evaluation of the Red Cross Sanitary Latrines Project – Guangxy Province Peoples' Republic of China*, November 2002
- Blomquist A.**, *End of Mission Report, Relief/Monitoring*, Swedish RC, Beijing, December 2002
- Morimoto M.**, *Final report, 2002 China Flash Flood Monitoring Mission*, Japanese RC, Beijing, October 2002
- Gudmundsson T.**, *China mission report, Information*, Icelandic RC, Beijing, July 2002
- Seebacher S.**, *China flood 1999, Assessment report, Flood Assessment Mission*, Geneva, August 1999
- Groves-Hill, R.**, *Strategic Remarks HOD of the Federation Regional Office-Beijing*, IFRC, Beijing, September 2001
- IFRC.** *Memorandum of understanding between the Netherlands Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, China Flash Flood 2002*, IFRC, Geneva, August 2002
- IFRC.** *International Disaster Response Law Project, IDRL Field Study*, IFRC, Geneva, 2003
- ICRC, IFRC.** *Emergency items catalogue*, IFRC, Geneva, July 2002
- CRCR.** *The New RCSC's 13 forms*, China RC, Beijing, 2002
- CRCR.** *Newsletter Red Cross Society of China*, Beijing, December 2002
- IFRC.** *Logistics standard, Logistics and resource mobilisation department*, IFRC, September 2002

Annex E. Field visit to JinXian village

On March 15 the Team visited JinXian village in the township of He Ji, in the County of Ba Bu.

He Ji township is one of twenty-one in Ba Bu County which has a population of 910 000 while He Ji has a population of approximately 60 000. There are 27 villages in He Ji of which 24 were affected by the floods. Jin Xian was of the most flood affected village in the Township.

Economic activities

There are 300 households in Jin Xian and approximately 1 600 inhabitants (average family size 5.2). The average annual per capita income is **RMB** 1200 to 1500. The main economic activities are cultivation of 600 Mu (40 ha.) of land in total, 10 fish ponds and vegetable gardens. Furthermore, around 100 young people from the village have left for the cities for wage labour. On average these workers are able to send home **RMB** 100 per month.

Effects of the floods

Jin Xian was affected by floods on 1st July, when a nearby hydro electrical plant opened its gates to avoid flooding of other areas. The water stayed until 3rd July and then receded.

Nobody was killed by the floods in Jin Xian but people had to evacuate to higher ground or the second and third storeys of the village's biggest buildings.

Some pigs and other livestock were lost due to the floods, but villagers managed to save the majority.

Humanitarian Assistance received

Date	Donor	Commodity	Quantity	Beneficiaries
4/7	MoCA	Rice	KG 1000	Entire village
5/7	MoCA	Rice	KG 2000	Entire village
9/7	MoCA	Rice	KG 3500	Entire village
9/7	MoCA	Roofing material	89 rolls (20mx1m)	Entire village
4/8	RCSC/Fed	Quilts	PCS 32	
4/8	RC	Mosquito nets	PCS 42	
4/8	MoCA	Rice	KG 4000	Entire village
8/8	MoCA	Rice	KG 3000	Entire village
6/9	MoCA	Rice	KG 1000	Entire village
12/9	Hong Kong RC	Rice	KG 250	
1/10	MoCA	Quilts	PCS 103	Needs basis
1/10	MoCA	Winter Coats	PCS 53	Needs basis
9/10	RCSC/Fed	Rice	KG 945	89 affected families
9/10	Middle School	Rice	KG 225	6 severely affected families
20/1	RCSC/Fed	Rice	KG 1500	89 affected families
20/1	RCSC/Fed	Quilts	PCS 50	89 affected families
20/1	RCSC/Fed	Winter coats	PCS 100	89 affected families
20/1	RCSC/Fed	Socks	Pair 400	89 affected families

Very accurate records of assistance distributed are kept. Three days prior to a distribution, the beneficiary list is published in the village so that everybody can see who is entitled to assistance.

The first distribution of rice from the government took place the day after the water had receded from the village. Rice was distributed to the 14 cells which the village is divided into.

Maybe the most impressive and surprising aspect of the operation is the way in which the beneficiary selection criteria is communicated down through six tiers of administration and respected in the individual village, in spite of the fact that once you reach the level of prefecture, the independent RC structure is at most one person without a car and often without budget.

The village suffered a severe economic loss. Not only did they lose a crop of rice, but they also lost the fish in the ponds, which swam away.

There is a marked economic difference within the village. Some families can afford to construct 3 story clad houses with tile roofs, while others live in very low-level accommodation. One family of grandmother, son, daughter-in-law and grand-daughter were still living in a pig-sty (with the pig) now more than eight months after the disaster.

**Annex F. Constraints and achievements of the Review Process and Lessons
Learnt for future similar processes in China**

1. For this evaluation, Team members were well chosen by the Federation such that they quickly settled into a cohesive entity which, working democratically, avoided any friction or need for any minority reporting.
2. The inclusion of a Chinese team member ‘with a foot in both camps’ (Canadian citizen) was invaluable in correcting western misconceptions while, at the same time, adding credibility to comments/criticisms which might otherwise have been perceived as just emanating from a western perspective.
3. It would have been useful to have included an RCSC staff member in the Team in order to have given the National Society some degree of ownership of the report. The Team accepts that this can be difficult for the individual staff concerned. As it happened, no-one was available when the Team made its request but is confident that, had the Federation requested such an input at an early date, then RCSC would have obliged.
4. The Team appreciated the willingness of RCSC to provide office accommodation within its building and this enabled closer and more personalised discussions with the National Society. It also enabled an independence (real and perceived) from the Federation.
5. Federation staff need to be more aware that an independent evaluation is independent. While no pressure was put on the Team, the latter perceived a sentiment of ‘gives us the evidence and we will bring about change’.
6. A team, if well chosen for country experience and integrity does not need to be told ‘don’t upset the Chinese’. This is not constructive.
7. The rather long list of Geneva briefing meetings appeared, on first sight, to be inappropriate but, in the event, developed into a very useful input into this study and helped to flag issues to look out for during the mission. The only negative comment which can be made relates to the WATSAN briefing which, to the embarrassment of the blameless presenter, made no contribution since the latter was not at all involved in the China operation.
8. Thirty four days (for the Team Leader) would seem to have been a correct allocation of time for this study. However, the two weeks allocated to the rest of the team was inadequate and risked a report which might not have been democratic. Further development of ideas by the other team members would have been facilitated by the allocation of a further one week.
9. It is always a problem to expeditiously bring together concerned parties for the Geneva debriefing and this risks loss of momentum. This time was no exception and,

accordingly, there is a need for the adoption of a course of action which will carry the process forward notably:

- i) the appointment of an 'ultimately responsible' being either the desk officer or the Evaluation Department;
- ii) a target list with associated indicators of success;

These can be agreed at the Debriefing Meeting.

10. Finally, the Team would wish to record its appreciation of the way in which this mission was managed. It was both dynamic and precise and something which cannot always be said of such processes.