



Final Evaluation of the Donor Driven Housing Project



International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Final Evaluation of the Donor Driven Housing Project

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Acronyms

DDH	Donor Driven Housing
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NHQ	National Headquarters
RCM	Red Cross Movement including only the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross
SLRCS	Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSSU	Technical Support Services Unit
UDA	Urban Development Authority




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- All key interviewees for their input.
- Consultants and Contractors who took part in this evaluation.

Any errors are the author's own.



1.0 Executive Summary



This report was commissioned by the RCM to evaluate the impact of the SLRCS/IFRC DDH program during the period between March 2009 and July 2009. Ultimately the findings and conclusions of this report are likely to feed into a wider lessons learned on the housing reconstruction.

The following summarises the findings and conclusions across the five main areas of the TOR; program design, program management, program outputs and program outcomes. Macro level non-technical and technical recommendations are also included. For more detailed discussion on findings, conclusions and recommendations, refer to sections 6.0 and 7.0.

Program Design

The DDH program is clearly relevant to the needs created by the Tsunami and to the goals of the RCM. Immediately after the Tsunami, the SLRCS did not have a construction policy.

However, the program is in-line with its 2005-2010 Strategy Document which articulates the importance of providing shelter to vulnerable people.

The program approach in relation to construction was largely undertaken by the consultant and was appropriate from a technical perspective.

Overall from a technical perspective, the consultants appeared to have undertaken an appropriate analysis of site locations.

There is evidence to suggest site locations may not have been appropriate from a livelihoods perspective.

For instance, quantitative analysis of key interviewees suggested that sites were located far from places of employment, schools (68 percent), markets (77 percent) and medical facilities (77 percent). Nevertheless, DDH site selection was driven by the government and hence the RCM could not control appropriateness of site location.

1.1 Findings and Conclusions

Beneficiary involvement in the program design phase was almost non-existent. This was mainly because beneficiary selection was undertaken by the government and in many instances the government changed the beneficiary lists. Hence there was no opportunity to involve beneficiaries prior to housing construction. Importantly, this is not an oversight by the RCM per se but is instead attributable to ground realities.

The appropriateness of the program approach beyond construction alone is mixed. For instance, on a positive note, using indigenous consultants and contractors provided the program with greater knowledge on the local contexts relative to expatriate workers. Livelihood teams were also present in some sites. However a comprehensive environmental analysis or analysis of legal complexities (such as governorship of condominiums) did not appear to be undertaken during the program design phase. This could in part be due to the pressure from the government to begin constructing houses.





Other program delivery modalities, such as an owner driven housing model, did not appear to be considered at the design stage. This could be in part due to the pressure from the government to build and the initial requirement that houses should be constructed inland away from the coast.

A general consensus exists among key interviewees that the joint partnership agreement ultimately resulted in a parallel structure which detrimentally affected the capacity of the RCM to follow through in its mandate due largely to duplication of work.

The program design requirements of multiple signatures and unanimous consent for committees for tender approval appeared to decrease efficiency and effectiveness in housing construction.

The RCM requirement that the lowest most responsive bidder be selected as the contractor or consultant may not necessarily provide the best value for money. Critically, selecting the 'cheapest' firm may also involve selecting the least experienced site managers with the least previous experience developing houses.

Program Management

Key interviews and review of the project files suggest that the effectiveness of the project management by the consultant across sites was poor. Much of the problems involved a lack of a consultant on site full time, pertinent variations were missed by the consultant and had to be driven by the RCM technical team, the consultant did not deliver the required project management needs for the project as per the contract deliverables and the consultant's engineer had limited authority over the contractors to manage the project.

The effectiveness of the contractors was sufficient, illustrated in part by the fact that houses were considered 'sound' from a technical perspective. The project file review suggests that the RCM exceeded their initial agreed upon role by providing micro, rather than macro, management of the housing construction due to short-comings of consultants. In certain instances, the RCM took over management of the entire program as the consultant did not appear to have project management and decision making ability.

A general consensus exists among key interviewees that the joint partnership agreement ultimately resulted in a parallel structure which decreased efficiency and detrimentally affected the capacity of the RCM to follow through in its mandate. Management through committees was considered problematic due to the difficulty in reaching consensus across all people involved. Further, accounting, HR management and logistic functions were maintained by both SLRCS and IFRC in regards to the DDH program, ultimately resulting in duplication of work.

Decision making in terms of variation control / overall project scope of works has been a major area of lost time and possibly additional administration and project costs. The procedures for Consultants to advise the client and prepare the necessary variation documentation, forward this to the RCM for necessary approval, has at times been inexcusably slow and inefficient.

No projects have been completed within the specific contract periods. Some projects overruns have been considerable and it is difficult to pinpoint why such delays have occurred.

Due to projects time overruns and the inability of the Consultants to carry out their tasks as per their contracts, additional costs in terms administration and professional team inputs have had to be borne by the RCM.

This has aided long term efficiency in terms of getting the projects completed, but has been extremely frustrating, time consuming and costly for the Red Cross.

Due to ongoing projects absorbing so much time to finalise, the issues of administering and carrying out defects liability obligations has not been properly undertaken in most cases.

Project progress was illustrated through mid-term and final specific project reviews of selected DDH sites by the RCM.

After program completion, the management close-out with beneficiaries involved undertaking a community engagement program. This program was designed to address land ownership, dependency of beneficiaries on donors and allow beneficiaries to voice any of their concerns. As the program was undertaken concurrently with this evaluation, an analysis of its effectiveness was not undertaken.

Programme Output

End users needs and wishes were not specifically considered prior to construction as beneficiaries were not consulted at this time. Recall, this was primarily because the beneficiary lists were constantly changed and provided late by the government.

Technically, housing construction appears to be safe and in accordance with UDA requirements.

The houses are of solid masonry/concrete construction with a timber and tiled roof. The overall structure and fabric can be seen as very durable and free from toxic materials. While there are issues around the long term durability of materials such as the doors, locks, taps, the items fitted were per RCM specifications.

The large majority of regional RCM goals were met. Refer Section 6.2.2 for further details.

The RCM appears to have adhered to the MOUs it signed with the government.



Programme Outcomes

Overall 70 percent of survey respondents answered that they were happy with the house with more people happy in the south and west of Sri Lanka relative to the east Sri Lanka. Importantly, interviewers suggested that people perceive satisfaction of housing relative to what they owned previously.

Overall, 59 percent of people believe they are better off relative to before the Tsunami with no

distinctive pattern across different districts. Those who did not feel they were better off were the ones who generally had larger houses and more land prior to the tsunami. Hence clearly, people's perceptions are

relative to their own experiences, and not a criticism of the DDH program. From an objective perspective, compared with pre-tsunami dwellings, there was a 20 percent and 35 percent increase in the number of household with electricity and running water respectively in post-tsunami dwellings. Hence in aggregate, people are better off than before in relation to these aspects.

Generally, the houses were of similar quality within the sites. However there were a couple of exceptions. This was in part due to the mains not being sufficiently strong to pressure the water to houses constructed at higher elevations on some project sites. As per the MOU, this was the responsibility of the government and not the RCM. Another cause of this inequality is that the some beneficiaries have at least 4 perches¹ more than other beneficiaries. However housing plots were provided using a lottery system; hence any inequity is due to luck rather than discrimination.

¹4 perches is approximately 100 square meters.

A technical analysis reveals that houses in the East (Ismailpuram and Onthachimadam) with a predominately Tamil/Muslim population were of slightly better quality than the houses in the South and West (which has a predominately Sinhalese population). This could be attributed to the fact that sites in the East (which were much larger in size) did use higher government certified contractors to construct their houses as opposed to the smaller sites in the South and West of Sri Lanka.

Approximately 74 percent and 65 percent of people believed that the location has detrimentally impacted their income earning capacity and livelihoods respectively. This assessment appears valid. For instance, many beneficiaries were fisherman and the current sites are located far from the sea. Further, due to the remoteness of the housing sites and difficult access to transport facilities, a large number of employment opportunities are not readily available. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the RCM were given land by the government and hence it would be unreasonable to hold the RCM accountable for this issue.

Approximately 62 percent of respondents answered 'no' when asked if they feel safe in their house. While the fact that the majority of beneficiaries feel 'unsafe' is a concern, it is primarily due to the lack of street lighting on the roads (which is a government responsibility).

Legally, the ownership of houses is unclear. Firstly, none of the beneficiaries have access to a title deed. Secondly, the results from the survey process demonstrated that beneficiaries were uncertain of the requirements to prove home ownership (although this may have been rectified after the community engagement program). Of concern is that it is uncertain as to how this issue will be resolved in the immediate future.

Have the local authorities provided necessary facilities? From a sustainability point of view,

- All houses have access to electricity which is positive.
- Approximately 76 percent of households have taps connected to a running water supply which is highly correlated with the finding that 72 percent of people use tap water. It is concerning that 24 percent of households do not have running water and it is uncertain when the government will rectify this issue.
- Roads leading into the sites were still made from sand or mud and create issues for transport, especially in the presence of heavy rain. Further, the absence of street lamps is problematic at night due to the distance required to travel to the main roads in the dark. From a sustainability perspective, it is important that these facilities are developed to enable easy and safe access into villages.

Approximately 72 percent of households expect the RCM to provide services going forward. However, the community engagement program, which was initiated after the survey was conducted, addressed this issue by informing beneficiaries that the RCM will not be involved going forward.

Household income, household occupancy rates and beneficiary insistence that they are going to remain in the households suggest communities are sustainable.

Responses from qualitative interviews of survey respondents and survey data suggested the majority of people were satisfied with WATSAN facilities, the kitchen and electrical supply.



SLRCS Involvement and Capacity Building

The capacity of the TSSU has improved throughout the duration of the DDH operation. In collaborating with over 20 partner national societies to build houses throughout Sri Lanka, the SLRCS staff have gained skills relating to construction, coordination techniques, organizational capabilities and in negotiations with foreign delegates

The involvement of the SLRCS TSSU has been extensive and important. The SLRCS TSSU have been party to all major decisions involving the DDH program and were heavily involved with the process of selecting contractors and consultants. Further, the SLRCS TSSU provided important country specific knowledge to the DDH program. In particular, they took the lead when liaising with government departments and in collaboration with the IFRC, addressed issues relating to construction and beneficiary concerns.

The SLRCS branches provided support to SLRCS NHQ and IFRC primarily through offering local knowledge and volunteers. They also suggested options for contractors as and when required and indicated

coordination and negotiations with NHQ SLRCS and IFRC was generally effective. However, the SLRCS branches involvement in managing and building the houses, and liaising with the consultants, was minimal.



1.2 Recommendations

Non-Technical

The RCM should advocate more strongly, more consistently and be willing to 'pull the plug' on housing construction if site locations are not satisfactory. The immediate benefit of providing housing to people in poor sites may be outweighed by the longer term costs from lack of access to markets, employment and schools.

Ideally the Joint Partnership Agreement should be abolished and clientship retained with one organisation. This would reduce difficulties associated with amalgamating organisational goals and culture.

In the event that clientship cannot be retained with one organisation, a Joint Partnership Agreement should involve integrating both delegates and local staff members in to one unit as opposed to the current situation where a parallel structure exists. This would reduce duplication of operational units (i.e. such as Finance, Human Resources, etc.) and may help facilitate greater cohesion between delegates and local staff.

Beneficiary vetting should be a priority, regardless of when it can practically be undertaken. Even if the beneficiary lists given by the government keep changing making a vetting process repetitive and time consuming, sufficient resources should be allocated to this task.

Integrating a permanent livelihoods team within the DDH program would provide all beneficiaries with a central 'point of call' regarding their concerns and questions.

Consider hiring a 'program manager' who supervises a number of construction projects and is ultimately responsible for realising the outcomes of the projects.



Consider incorporating beneficiary safety within the objectives of the program design. This is important in the context of the DDH program where 62 percent of people did not feel safe.

Ensure that there is adequate street lighting around houses to increase perceptions of safety by beneficiaries.

Technical

Ensure that the roles and responsibilities of the consultant are constantly measured, with performance and compliance to the contract deliverables being enforced.

Although the consultants' roles and responsibilities were clearly defined in the project contracts, their ability to perform for the client in a professional and satisfactory manner was not achieved on the whole.

Ensure that key stakeholders and implementers understand that the consultant and contractor contracts only form part of the overall total project.

Ensure greater understanding that large scale infrastructure projects and programs require consistent staffing levels for long periods. Undertaking such long term recovery and development programs which are often three to five years in project cycle duration, requires more emphasis on ensuring key staff are retained for longer periods, or if possible for the complete project/program cycle durations.

Better understanding and awareness to the complexities of construction and delivery of contract led consultant and contractor infrastructure projects. Longer term recovery and development projects that are delivered through large, long and costly contracts need to be clearly understood and integrated into the RCM procurement procedures.

Ensure more acknowledgement and possible utilisation of different contract procurement paths as well as implementation models. The program outcomes should be analysed against different procurement paths (say design and build, in house project management, project turnkey contracts) as well as different implementation models such as Owner Driven Housing, combined Donor and Owner Driven Housing, government implemented projects etc. to understand and choose which is the most suitable implementation strategy for future programs needs.



2.0 Introduction

This report was commissioned by the RCM to evaluate the impact of the SLRCS/IFRC DDH program during the period between March 2009 and July 2009. Ultimately the findings and conclusions of this report are likely to feed into a wider lessons learned on the entire Tsunami reconstruction effort.

As per the TOR², the report will consider the areas of;

- Program design
- Program management
- Program output
- Program outcomes
- SLRCS capacity building

These issues will be considered across the following areas as appropriate:

- Relevance
- Appropriateness
- Efficiency
- Effectiveness
- Sustainability

This analysis will also include consideration on the efficiency and effectiveness of the movement coordination framework and whether there were any differences across geopolitical and socio-economic groups.



1) All potential areas of investigation will not be addressed in similar levels of detail. This would require a significantly large amount of resources and will likely result in superfluous information. Instead, it is recommended any areas of particular interest requiring further analysis should be investigated separately.

2) The report bases much of the findings under 'program design' (which occurred in 2005) and 'program management' (which occurred between 2005 and 2009) on information gathered from key interviewees and a review of project file information. Over a 4 year period, key interviewees may remember events differently and documentation within project files may not contain all necessary information. Hence, it is possible the report may not evaluate all aspects of the program design and program management.

The outline for the remainder of the report is as follows:

- Section 3.0 provides a background of the DDH Program.
- Section 4.0 explains the methodology.
- Section 5.0 illustrates some limitations of the study.
- Section 6.0 highlights important findings and conclusions.
- Section 7.0 presents some macro level recommendations.





3.0 Background

On December 26th 2004, a tsunami displaced over 500,000 people across 14 districts in the East, South and West of Sri Lanka³. Many of these people were initially placed in temporary shelters prior to the provision of more permanent accommodation.

The DDH housing program was initiated to provide housing for some of these people displaced by the December 2004 Tsunami. The program essentially involves donors taking ownership for the entire construction process. In the case of the SLRCS/IFRC DDH program, it involved hiring 'consultants' who would manage construction projects and 'contractors' who would undertake the construction. The consultants would report directly to the RCM and all consultants and contractors hired by the RCM were government approved.

On March 2005, it was decided by the government that beneficiaries could not live within 100 meters of the ocean in the South and West of the country (a buffer zone) and within 200 meters of the ocean in the North and East of the country⁴. Consequently, people residing in the buffer zone pre-tsunami had to be relocated outside the buffer zone. Hence, the RCM resolved to build houses on land provided by the government to beneficiaries also supplied by the government⁵.

In 2005, the SLRCS and IFRC, funded by different PNS, began the process required to build 636 houses over 20 sites spanning a stretch from Negombo to Matara on the West and South Coasts of Sri Lanka and Ampara and Batticaloa in the East. Prior to construction, an MOU was signed with the national government⁶, land was received by the national government, a tendering process for consultants and contractors was initiated, approval was gained from the RCM in both Sri Lanka and Geneva and local government bodies agreed to provide necessary utilities to new sites.

Invariably, there were delays in initiating housing construction. This was in part due to delays in land provision by the government and in part due to RCM bureaucracy. Critically however, when land was provided, there was pressure to build immediately, thus reducing the time available for social and environmental analysis. Further, beneficiary lists provided by the government routinely changed with final lists only being provided at construction completion. This ultimately removed beneficiaries from the decision making process, thus reducing the ability for the program to create a sense of ownership among housing recipients.

The majority of housing construction began in 2006. In the second half of 2009, it is expected that all houses will be completed and delivered to beneficiaries. For further information on the Background of the RCM response to the Tsunami, refer Appendix D.

-
- Source: 2007 Mid Term Review – Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Tsunami Recovery Program Housing Projects Matara District.
 - Source: Government of Sri Lanka, Refer Appendix B.
 - It is important to note that on 14th October 2005, the government revised the required distance from the sea before houses could be built. As a result, there was an increase in owner driver housing (where the land owner directs building of houses using cash grants).
 - A sample MOU is illustrated in Appendix C.

4.0 Methodology and Data Collection

The methodology used to assess the impact of the DDH program with respect to the TOR⁷ involved using a mixed methods approach where qualitative, quantitative and physically observed information was gathered. Information was largely sourced through beneficiary surveys of selected housing sites, reviews of existing evaluations, key interviews and project file review.

Survey of Selected Sites

Site Selection

Six sites were sampled using a clustered sampling approach⁸. As illustrated in table 1, the sites selected comprise of different ethnic groups, were in different parts of the country, consisted of different types of houses and were handled by different contractors and consultants. Note that the Ettinagahawatta site was initially used as a pilot study but then results were incorporated into the final evaluation.

Table 1

Project No	Geographic Location	Location	Project Name	Donor	Houses Constructed	Types of Houses Constructed	Consultant	Cotractor
01	Southern Sri Lanka	Matara	Charlimount I	American	10	Single Story	Sucith Mohotti	R.P.Associates
01		Matara	Charlimount II	American	20	Single Story	Sucith Mohotti	R.P.Associates
02		Matara	Ettinagahawatta	American	12	Single Story	Sucith Mohotti	Athulawage
03		Galle	THalagasgoda Watta	Canadian	56	Single & Double Story	Kahawita	Senkadagala
01	Western Sri Lanka	Colombo	Rathmalana I Kandawala	Canadian	32	Condiminum	Sucith Mohotti	Amil Builders
05	Eastern Sri Lanka	Ampara	Ismailpuram - Houses	HongKong	93	Single Story	Hairu	KSJ
06		Batticaloa	Onthachimadam I	American	80	Single Story	Sucith Mohotti	Mod Tech

Figure 4.1 illustrates the number of households surveyed, closed, rented and not surveyed on each site.

⁷ Refer Appendix A

⁸ A clustered sampling approach involves taking groups representative of the entire population and surveying everyone within each group.

Household Survey Characteristics

Figure 4.1



The total number of houses surveyed equals 263 which equates to 41 percent of the total number of DDH built for Tsunami reconstruction by the SLRCS/IFRC.

Questionnaire Development

The questionnaire was developed through review of other questionnaires (for example the Irish Red Cross DDH evaluation questionnaire), a review of the TOR and consultations with livelihoods and construction experts. Feedback to the contents of the questionnaire was gathered from SLRCS and IFRC personnel. The questionnaire was translated into Sinhala and Tamil using the back translation method in conjunction with a tri-lingual specialist review to ensure the contents were similar between English, Tamil and Sinhala. A pilot survey was undertaken prior to finalisation of the questionnaire.

The final questionnaire was designed to extract both qualitative and quantitative information. Surveyors also gathered information through observing certain characteristics of the household and sites. Refer Appendix E for the questionnaire used in this study.

Survey Teams

The survey team for the entire evaluation was lead by an experienced survey team leader and supervised by this report's primary author. For the sites located in the South and West of Sri Lanka, one survey team consisting of the team leader and 5 team members was used. For each site located in the East, the survey team leader and two separate teams of 5 people were used. Before each team undertook their respective surveys, they were trained survey techniques and tested on their understanding of the questionnaire.

Technical evaluation of each site was undertaken by a technical specialist.



Project File Review

The project file review was undertaken from a social, environmental and technical perspective across the sites sampled for evaluation.

The social perspective focused on whether consultants considered proximity of sites to transport, medical, schooling, markets and employment activities prior to housing construction. It also considers whether a social assessment was undertaken and whether beneficiary lists were appropriately vetted by the RCM prior to provision of houses. The environmental perspective considers whether an environmental impact study was undertaken prior to housing construction.

The technical perspective focuses on a range of issues including (but not limited to), selection of consultants and contractors, the MOU between the government and the RCM, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the Tsunami housing program, appropriateness of site locations and site orientation plans, the presence of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, consultant and contractor performance and appropriateness of beneficiary involvement throughout the DDH program.

Reviews of Existing Evaluations

A review of prior evaluations was undertaken when developing the questionnaire and the methodology for the purposes of this study. Specifically, the Quality Assessment Method for Post Tsunami Housing in Galle District undertaken by the GTZ⁹ and mid-term reviews for the RCM DDH Programs in Matara, Ampara and Kalutara districts were analysed.

Key Interviews

Key Interviews were undertaken of SLRCS TSSU construction personnel, IFRC construction personnel, IFRC management and former IFRC construction delegates. Background information was sourced through key interviews of personnel external and internal to the RCM. Key interviews were also undertaken with selected consultants and contractors. It should be noted that consultants and contractors were often unwilling to constructively criticize the RCM. Further, key interviews of government personnel were not performed as this was not explicitly desired as per the TOR. Regardless, during the survey period it was noted that government officials were difficult to access¹⁰.

⁹ The GTZ is an international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with worldwide operations. Refer <http://www.gtz.de/en/unternehmen/6360.htm>

¹⁰ Note, the failure to gather information from government personnel and the failure to gather sufficient information from consultants and contractors presents a limitation to the methodology. Refer section 5.0.

5.0 Limitations

There are some limitations to this study.

Firstly, undertaking a retrospective evaluation is difficult given that the initial MOUs were signed in 2005 and people involved in the design and management have either left Sri Lanka or are no longer employed with the RCM in Sri Lanka. Hence much of the information contained in the report was gathered from key interviewees who may have a different perception of the advantages and disadvantages of a program dating two or more years into the past.

Secondly, the evaluation is based on interviews and surveys primarily of the RCM and beneficiaries. Consultants and contractors were not always forthcoming with their views on the program performance as they were concerned their opinions will be relayed back to the RCM. Further, the government officials heavily involved in coordinating work with the RCM had either moved or were unavailable for comment. Note also that the TOR did not factor in time to speak with government officials.

Thirdly, the lack of a baseline survey (to determine pre-tsunami housing standards) and the lack of a control group (for comparison purposes with the beneficiary communities) reduced the rigour of the analysis. Nevertheless, this post-test only form of evaluation is undertaken in most evaluations worldwide and is accepted when better alternatives are not present¹¹.

Finally, beneficiaries who were offered houses but left the house unoccupied in certain sites (particularly Ismailpuram) were not interviewed. This presents a situation of 'missing data' where information regarding why people choose not to live in particular houses was not included in the report.

¹¹ Refer "RealWorld Evaluation" by Bamberger, Rugh and Mabry (2006) published by Sage Publications.



6.0 Findings and Conclusions

6.1 Program Design

Relevance

The DDH program is clearly relevant to the needs created by the Tsunami. The Tsunami devastated the coastal areas of Sri Lanka along the South, West and East of the country, resulting in the destruction of many homes. Given the large number of displaced people, and the inability of some people to build their own homes, a donor driven housing program was both timely and relevant.

The DDH is clearly relevant to the goals of the RCM. There are specific references to providing shelter for vulnerable people in the IFRC Regional Strategy 2 and the IFRC Sri Lankan Delegation Response to Regional Strategy. Immediately after the Tsunami, the SLRCS did not have a construction policy. However, the program is in-line with its 2005-2010 Strategy Document which articulates the importance of providing shelter to vulnerable people.

It is difficult to state conclusively whether the program targeted the most vulnerable people. For instance, only certain beneficiary details were noted in the project review files and there was no record of previous addresses. Further, there was no indication that after beneficiaries lists were provided by the government, lists were appropriately vetted by the RCM. Information, if it existed, consisted of determining the number of dependents, number of children and the civil status of the beneficiary. There was no consideration for income, financial standing or critically, their 'pre-tsunami' dwellings.

Nevertheless, during key interviews undertaken from surveys, interviewers were able to state with a reasonable degree of certainty that many of the beneficiaries lived in shanties near the ocean and even pre-tsunami, were the most vulnerable.

Appropriateness

This subsection will consider appropriateness of the program approach, consideration of other program delivery modalities, appropriateness of site locations, appropriateness of beneficiary involvement and the appropriateness of the Joint Partnership Agreement.

Program Appropriateness

The program approach (or scope of works) in relation to construction was largely undertaken by the consultant and was appropriate from a technical perspective¹². The scope of works broadly includes a land survey and housing designs. The land survey included information on the location, terrain, nearest facilities, existing infrastructure, sanitary disposal systems, house designs and finishes to the houses while also illustrating potential constraints for housing construction. Additionally, the construction of the single story and double story houses appeared to largely be in accordance with the designs approved by the Urban Development Authority (UDA).

However, there appears to be little in the way of redefining, value engineering and social considerations to the scope of works at project inception. For instance, there is little to show that the client looked at the site inspection report and undertook an exercise to see if the proposed design for the whole project was appropriate based around the parameters of time, cost, quality, risk and appropriateness (value engineering). The omission of these considerations may have, in part, been due to government pressure to begin project construction.

¹² Refer Appendix F, F.1.3 for further details.



However, there appears to be little in the way of redefining, value engineering and social considerations to the scope of works at project inception¹³. For instance, there is little to show that the client looked at the site inspection report and undertook an exercise to see if the proposed design for the whole project was appropriate based around the parameters of time, cost, quality, risk and appropriateness (value engineering). The omission of these considerations may have, in part, been due to government pressure to begin project construction.

Whether the program approach is appropriate given the local contexts (beyond construction service delivery alone) will be considered across livelihoods, legal complexities and environmental analysis.

- The program approach involved using indigenous consultants and contractors who would have greater knowledge on the local contexts relative to expatriate workers. Thus, in this regard, the program approach is appropriate given the local contexts.
- During the program design phase, there appears to be consideration for a livelihoods team to engage with people in some sites¹⁴. During the program itself, there was an IFRC livelihoods team working with the sites in Matara and a Canadian Red Cross team working within sites in Galle and Colombo. While evaluating the effectiveness of these teams in discharging their duties is beyond the scope of this report, there were some critical factors that fell under the purview of the livelihoods team and were not addressed. For instance, 58 percent of all surveyed people stated they did not know what the RCM would do for them going forward and 72 percent of surveyed people believed the IFRC had to provide more services to the households going forward. These percentages remain at levels above 50 percent in Matara, Galle and Colombo sites.
- The legal complexities of involving various stakeholders in the housing construction process did not appear to be considered during the program design phase¹⁵. For instance, key interviewees indicated that in many instances, the RCM acceded to the arguments of the consultants or contractors as they could not spend time undertaking legal proceedings. Another area of concern is in regards to the legality of the MOU; while the SLRCS can be held to account if it fails to meet its obligations, the recourse beneficiaries or the SLRCS have if the government does not adhere to its obligations is uncertain. Additionally, there was no consideration as to who would legally govern the condominiums after program close out.
- The project file reviews suggested a comprehensive environmental analysis was not undertaken prior to program inception and was not considered in the program design¹⁶. This may be attributed to pressure to commence constructing houses immediately after land was provided.
- There was nothing to indicate that the program approach was more or less appropriate with respect to different ethnic groups or particular geographic areas.

¹³ Refer Appendix F, F.1.3c for further details.

¹⁴ Refer Appendix F, F.1.4d to F.1.4f for further details.

¹⁵ Refer Appendix F, F.1.4g for further details.

¹⁶ Refer Appendix F, F.1.4h for further details.

Consideration of other program delivery modalities

Other program delivery modalities, such as owner driven housing programs, did not appear to be considered at the design stage. This could be in part due to the pressure from the government to build and the initial requirement that houses should be constructed inland away from the coast.

Appropriateness of Site Location

Overall from a technical perspective, the consultants appeared to have undertaken an appropriate analysis of site locations¹⁷. For instance, in the Ethingawatte site, the lack of good infrastructure facilities was clearly identified by the consultant at the time of scoping out the project. There is also evidence a clear site location and orientation plan was produced for the majority of the sites. Access roads, common spaces and in some plans, the provision for a pond and community facilities, were also clearly demarcated.

There is evidence to suggest site locations may not have been appropriate from a livelihoods perspective. For instance, quantitative analysis of key interviewees suggested that sites were located far from places of employment, schools (68 percent), markets (77 percent) and medical facilities (77 percent)¹⁸. Indeed, in regards to Charliment II, an IFRC delegate also noted that the site location may not be appropriate. Nevertheless, DDH site selection was driven by the government. Hence, given the ground realities, the RCM could not control appropriateness of site location. Further, it appears consultants undertook a superficial social analysis of facilities required by communities.

Appropriateness of Beneficiary Involvement¹⁹

Beneficiary involvement in the program design phase was almost non-existent. This was mainly because beneficiary selection was undertaken by the government and in many instances the government changed the beneficiary lists. Hence there was no opportunity to involve beneficiaries prior to housing construction. Importantly, this is not an oversight by the RCM per se but is instead attributable to ground realities. Nevertheless, there was no requirement in the program design that sufficiently rigorous beneficiary vetting, particularly in relation to pre-tsunami dwellings, should be undertaken by the RCM after beneficiary lists were provided by the government.

Appropriateness of the Joint Partnership Agreement

A general consensus exists among key interviewees that the joint partnership agreement ultimately resulted in a parallel structure which detrimentally affected the capacity of the RCM to follow through in its mandate²⁰. For instance, accounting, HR management and logistic functions were maintained by both SLRCS and IFRC in regards to the DDH program, ultimately resulting in duplication of work. Further, key interviewees suggested that the capacity of the Sri Lankan National Society at the time of the Tsunami was overestimated²¹. After the Tsunami, over 300 delegates arrived, many of whom were required to work with the SLRCS in a joint partnership agreement. Prior to the Tsunami, the SLRCS worked with only 2 delegates. Finally, the high turnover of construction delegates (some of whom only maintained annual contracts) reduced the institutional knowledge, lack of continuity and potentially resulted in reduced efficiency and effectiveness²². The efficiency sub-section in section 6.2 considers the implications of the joint partnership agreement in additional detail.

The program design requirements of multiple signatures and unanimous consent for committees for tender approval appeared to decrease efficiency and effectiveness in housing construction²³. Indeed, in some cases, this process would require the unanimous consent of over 25 people.

¹⁷ Refer Appendix F, F.1.5 for further details.

¹⁸ Refer Appendix F, F.1.4.3c for further details.

¹⁹ Refer Appendix F, F.1.4a for further details.

²⁰ Refer Appendix F, F.1.6a for further details.

²¹ Refer Appendix F, F.1.4b for further details.

²² Refer Appendix F, F.1.4c for further details.

²³ Refer Appendix F, F.1.6f for further details.

The RCM requirement that the lowest most responsive bidder be selected as the contractor or consultant may not necessarily provide the best value for money²⁴. Critically, selecting the 'cheapest' firm may also involve selecting the least experienced site managers with the least previous experience developing houses.

Finally, cross-cultural awareness training was not provided to either IFRC or SLRCS personnel and was not required per the program design, resulting in some misunderstandings between foreign and local personnel²⁵. For instance, foreign staff were unaware that local companies regularly did not use 'hard hats' when building houses. Another example is that consultants did not understand the importance placed by foreign staff on ensuring timely completion of agreed upon deliverables.



²⁴ Refer Appendix F, F.1.6g for further details.

²⁵ Refer Appendix F, F.1.6d to F.1.6e for further details.

6.2 Programme Management (technical analysis)

Effectiveness

Key interviews and review of the project files suggest that the effectiveness of the project management by the consultant across sites was poor²⁶. Much of the problems involved a lack of a consultant on site full time, pertinent variations were missed by the consultant and had to be driven by the RCM technical team, the consultant did not deliver the required project management needs for the project as per the contract deliverables and the consultant's engineer had limited authority over the contractors to manage the project. Further, in some instances, there was a lack of communication between the consultant and the contractor regarding the timeframe required for project completion. This may have pressured contractors to work at a faster pace than normal for sporadic periods, potentially reducing the quality of the final houses. Finally, adequate documentation from consultants (such as monthly reports) was not sighted in the project files.

The effectiveness of the contractors can be illustrated in part by the fact that houses were considered 'sound' from a technical perspective. As a caveat to this result, over 50 percent (and in three sites over 80 percent) of people who stated there was a problem with their house one year after houses were provided to beneficiaries were not satisfied that their complaints were adequately addressed²⁷. Unfortunately, there is no scale to address the level of dissatisfaction. Importantly, this is a beneficiary perspective on particular aspects of the housing construction (i.e. it could be the replacement of a lock) and not the beneficiary's perception of the house in its entirety. Indeed, survey results illustrate that approximately 70 percent are 'happy' with their houses (refer Table 6.2.1)²⁸.

The project file review suggests that the RCM exceeded their initial agreed upon role by providing micro, rather than macro, management of the housing construction due to short-comings of consultants²⁹. In certain instances, the RCM took over management of the entire program as the consultant did not appear to have project management and decision making ability.

From a purely construction perspective, the project file review suggests that generally, macro level management by the RCM appear to be rigorous. In many cases, the RCM appeared to regularly correspond with the consultant and government officials to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the housing construction process. The main exception to the rigor of the RCM macro-level management appears to be that some project files do not include all the required information³⁰. Additionally, project progress was illustrated through mid-term and final specific project reviews of selected DDH sites by the RCM.

²⁶ Refer Appendix F, F.2.1a to F.2.1c for further details.

²⁷ Refer Appendix F, F.2.1i for further details.

²⁸ This is discussed in greater detail under "6.5 Project Outcomes"

²⁹ Refer Appendix F, F.2.1d to F.2.1f for further details.

³⁰ Refer Appendix F, F.2.1g for further details.



Efficiency

What has become evident following the desk reviews of project files and key interviews is that all projects were very complex and different in nature to scope out, implement and close out. To measure efficiency of specific projects individually and then analyse the findings collectively to find common themes is very complex. Although the single houses in essence were very similar in specification and design and the condominium and double storey worked through the same overarching government requirements, specific project needs were very different. Due to the specific locations of sites to infrastructure facilities, topography and drainage differences, made each project unique in certain aspects. The implementation is often measured in terms of tender floating, tender closing, contract award, practical completion and management/closure of the defects liability period. This is often referred to as the *Project*; however the *Project* is much more complex than this stage of implementation. The *Projects* have to take on board so many other aspects other than the core area of contract implementation of the contractors and consultants to scope out, construct and hand over the finished contract product to the client. This area can be analysed easier as all contracts for the construction of the houses were worked through the same implementation framework. However the efficiency considerations become much more complex when areas such as associated infrastructure (water, electricity, sanitation, roads and rainwater management and drainage) are considered. As no two project sites were the same in infrastructure requirements, collective analysis is complex. To add to the complexity is the fact that at signing the MoUs with the GoSL the infrastructure components for each specific site were not fully outlined and defined as to which specific requirements and to what extent would be provided by each party. These issues have been highlighted and analysed in other part of the report but efficiency in this section centres on the delivery of contractors and consultants contracts as part of the overall projects.

To measure efficiency within the framework of the TSSU, the first real issue that was clearly shown by the desk review and key interviews was the complexities of the joint partnership agreement for consultant and contractor contracts.



The joint partnership agreement has often been difficult to administer from the initial consultant awards through to the close out of specific projects with the consultants, contractors and government actors. The joint partnership agreement has hampered fast decision making which in turn has reduced efficiency. Roles and responsibilities for key RCM staff has been difficult to keep constant with construction delegates and TSSU staff not understanding and being able to administer cohesive and fluid project management decisions for projects. Although within the TSSU operational framework there was a well defined mechanism for the usage of technical committees to meet regularly throughout contract periods, their efficiency to act fast, make and administer decisions is questionable. Due to logistical issues and the sheer amount of contracts being managed at any given time, to have regular technical committees for specific projects was not practical and coherent.

During key interviews it was also felt that technical committee recommendations and decisions were not always implemented as the joint tender board would have to be consulted for approval for many key contract changes, such as variations. The whole process from the requirement to hold a technical committee meeting to approval from the joint tender board could in some instances take weeks to finalise. This clearly hampered the effectiveness of key personnel implementing the contracts to issue client decisions to the consultants for necessary action by the contractors.

Consultants clearly have not been capable and professional to carry out micro and macro project management, especially at site level, and this has reduced overall efficiency. The Red Cross has not only had to take over and manage these critical tasks, but has also had to deal with the inefficiency and incompetence of consultants, often sending certain key staff workloads and responsibilities to unacceptable levels. This in turn has led to key staff both becoming saturated and burnt out and not extending contracts, or becoming so overstretched that projects have suffered. These issues have also meant that local key staff has had to deal with large turnovers of international key staff. It is worth noting that not a single project from the sampled projects was administered by a single project team without major key staff changes from inception to close out. The project teams often changed on several occasions, which obviously hampered smooth continuity and efficiency. It was noted during key interviews that some viewed the structure of key staff taking leave as an issue that hampered efficiency. Key International delegates often accumulate leave to take holidays of up to a month.

As key staff often have large workloads and are over-stretched, to take off long periods of leave with nobody to effectively and constantly manage their work while they are away had an impact on efficiency. As some projects have taken up to three years to implement and hand over to the client, the turnover of staff within project teams and the situation where the loss of key staff for longer periods of leave has had an impact on efficiency. During periods of staff being away or replaced, decision making to keep contracts fluid has been hampered. In theory this should have been mitigated against by the fact that professional and competent consultants were employed to oversee the macro and micro project management. As this did not happen, project delivery suffered and was exacerbated when any key client staffs was on leave.

Decision making in terms of variation control / overall project scope of works has been a major area of lost time and possibly additional administration and project costs. The procedures for consultants to advise the client and prepare the necessary variation documentation, forward this to the RCM for necessary approval, has at times been inexcusably slow and inefficient. Contracts from a house building perspective have been on the whole much easier to administer and control than the projects associated infrastructure works. A good example of this is at sites such as Ettinagahawatta, Ismailpuram and Onthachimadam, where most of the key issues to handover the projects have occurred due to problems with scoping out who is actually responsible for implementing and handing over infrastructure components such as rainwater management and drainage, retaining wall constructions, water supply and distribution and road/access provisions. These critical components were often overlooked at the house construction stages of implementation, with often differing stakeholder views of what was the responsibility of the RCM to provide, and what was the responsibility of the Government. Further, house construction has often been completed and then the issues around infrastructure have had to be addressed and closed. Houses have often been completed much earlier than associated infrastructure components, which have led to tensions from multiple angles, including beneficiaries, government authorities, consultants and contractors.

As all projects were tendered on a fixed price lump sum basis to contractors with no allowances for price escalation claims, most projects have been finalised

at a permissible amount compared to the contract tender price. For consultants their fees have been based on a percentage of the contractors final cost. There have been claims from certain consultants for additional costs for project time overruns but on the whole these have been dismissed by the RCM as being totally unacceptable and unfeasible to pay when measured against the consultants' performance and adherence to the deliverables as set out in their contracts. Due to these projects time overruns and the inability of the consultants to carry out their tasks as per their contracts, additional costs in terms administration and professional team inputs have had to be borne by the RCM. This has aided long term efficiency in terms of getting the projects completed, but has been extremely frustrating, time consuming and costly for the RCM.

Specific issues such as termination of the initial contractors contract due to slow production and inability to finalise the project at Onthachimadam One, and undertaking an independent enquiry for the Ettingawatta retaining wall collapse, have been specific examples that have led to a lot of embodied time and resources having to be utilised from the RCM to resolve. This has had a knock on effect to the efficiency of completing other current work in progress projects as key human resources have had to spend time resolving issues that are both complex and difficult to finalise without the help of competent consultants.

Due to ongoing projects absorbing so much time to finalise, the issues of administering and carrying out defects liability obligations has not been properly undertaken in most cases. Consultants have not had the project administration and professional skills to finalise this critical part of the projects properly. Several projects defects liability periods have elapsed with no inputs from the consultants and RCM to administer properly. This has led to confusion from beneficiaries as to who is responsible for what as well as Contractors not being pressured or coordinated to carry out their defects properly, in an agreed timeframe. Also key stakeholders have not understood what actually is a defect of the contractors' workmanship, what is a design defect from the consultants and what is a defect from the end user with reference to wear and tear and/or damage. Efficiency to administer this complex area of project close out has not been undertaken consistently with very differing outcomes.



Following closer analysis of the project files, to measure efficiency within the scope of consultant and contractor contract award, implementation and close out is a very complex and subjective matter, considering the unique nature of the projects sampled. The issue of what constitutes a project has to be clearly defined. Some people interviewed stated that the project should start from the inception of the initial concept and soft pledge to undertake the project from the RCM and finish at the end of the defects liability period for the contractors and consultants contracts. This project would also include formal sign off from the GoSL that the Project had been completed as per the MoU and the GoSL had now taken over the responsibility to oversee and manage the end product through the relevant government ministries. Others stated that the project should be measured through the lens of the TSSU inputs and outputs in the form of contract tender floating to the practical completion, management and closure of the defects liability period. Hence, in effect no more contractual responsibilities for the contracts within the specific projects. Due to the issues raised above it was decided to analyse the start and end of the contractors contract from the Letter of acceptance to practical completion. As the defects liability period for all contracts is twelve months, this was ignored in the analysis. Although closer analysis of key milestones within this part of the specific projects deliveries such as consultant award, tender floatation, contract award, and extensions of time over the initial contract period would have been of benefit, these would be very hard to draw collective conclusions upon. The projects sampled were so different and complex in nature to analyse this type of time management in terms of efficiency was considered as something that would need to be done outside of this paper if desired.

When looking at efficiency through the time lens of contractor's contract award to practical completion, no projects have been completed within the specific contract periods. The average construction days per household ranges from 9.4 days to 48.5 days (refer table 6.2.2) with the majority of days per household falling between 9.4 days and 22.6 days. Some projects overruns have been considerable (see for example Ethin-nagahawatte) and it is difficult to pinpoint why such delays have occurred. The RCM under the guidance of the Consultants has not kept clear and concise records with regards to Extensions of Time claims for specific project overruns. This has led to often spurious claims from Contractors that have been hard to substantiate and counterclaim. These claims have also taken long period of time to administer and award Extension of Time claims against.



It is very difficult when analysing the key correspondence in the desk reviews why such time delays did occur at critical points within certain projects. What is easy to substantiate is the fact that the decision making processes from award of contracts, variations, extensions of time and in some extreme cases the termination of contractors Contracts was a very long process. Efficiency can only be analysed through the understanding that all contracts were implemented using very traditional method of building procurement. These traditional methods are acknowledged as being time consuming and at times not the most efficient framework to deliver an end product. The clear path of consultant award, full design documentation and quantities, contractors' award has a long lead in period. To add to this the consultant was awarded as an all encompassing entity to administer the contract from the initial scoping out to the closure of the defects liability period and sign off from all parties that the contracts had been completed. Consultants were not multi disciplined or experienced to deal with such large scale projects of this nature. Consultants on the whole were much more efficient at the design components and far less professional and efficient to deliver the site supervision project management components. For example, inefficiency occurred across administration of formal government documentation relating to building approvals, certificates of completion and requirements for infrastructure components like water and electricity supply.

When looking at efficiency the discussion of other methods of contract and project delivery was discussed with several key individuals. Everyone acknowledged that the DDH projects were undertaken using very traditional procurement paths. The inefficiency was compounded by the joint partnership decision making processes, technical committee, joint tender board procedures and approvals from the committee of contracts in Geneva. These procedures added to the sheer size and scale of projects being undertaken at any one time. Indeed, requirements of the IFRC and PNSs hampered project flow and efficiency. It was acknowledged that other procurement methods such as design and build, and even a form of management contracting where the client undertook a much more hands on day to day management and decision making role, could have aided efficiency. In house client expertise was not always utilised as the consultants' contracts were designed that they would take full responsibility for the contracts delivery and management. As they were at time very poor in undertaking these obligations the responsibility ultimately came back to the client who had to then work through the joint partnership and internal mechanisms to draw conclusions, recommendations and change processes/administer decisions.

There is also the efficiency conundrum of DDH models verses forms of Owner Driven models of implementation. These forms of implementation are so different in their usage of project management measurable outcomes of time, cost and quality, analyse within the scope of this paper is difficult. Quality is subjective especially with reference to the hard engineering components of the housing structures and fabrics as well as infrastructure components, sustainability and house owner inputs.

Table 6.2.2

Site	Start	Hand Over	Days between start And hand over	Houses	Days per houses/unit
Ismailpuram	11-Mar-06	05-Aug-08	878	93	9.4
Ontachchimadam	11-Jan-06	01-Jul-09	1267	80	15.8
Rathmalana	26-Dec-05	13-Dec-07	717	32	22.4
Thalagasgodawatta	10-Jul-06	28-Jan-08	567	56	10.1
Charlimount I	13-Jul-06	24_Feb-07	226	10	22.6
Charlimount II	13-Jul-06	24_Feb-07	226	20	11.3
Ethinnagahawatte	04-May-04	04-May-06	582	12	48.5

COST ANALYSIS

Before undertaking this section of the report there were many discussions with several stakeholders of how to represent unit costs and then analyse the findings. As all houses constructed were either single storey, double storey duplexes or condominiums that conformed to the same government requirements in terms of room compositions and make up, overall minimum floor areas, amenities and finishes, the in depth analysis of each unit cost contract per project was not deemed beneficial. This was proven in the basic cost analysis as the cost per unit (house) did not deviate too greatly. As discussed earlier all projects were unique in some way, shape or form. Although the basic house requirements structure and fabric did not deviate too much except in the case of the condominium project, the cost per house remained relatively constant.

The real difference in cost per house became apparent when associated infrastructure was added into the cost analysis. However this was difficult to extract as some construction contracts were awarded with considerably more associated infrastructure needs built into the contract. For others they were awarded with critical infrastructure element either being omitted completely or not properly scoped out and incorporated. It became clear during the desk analysis of the contract bills of quantities and specifications that although they were very thorough and similar in terms of the elements measured to construct the houses as single entities, the anomalies occurred with associated infrastructure requirements. For both sites in the east of Sri Lanka (Onthachimadam and Ismailpuram) they were much larger scale new build sites where originally there was nothing in these locations except bare land.

The construction of the houses and definition of the associated infrastructure was easier to define and split into separate contracts. For the projects in the east of Sri Lanka, these were much smaller in nature and it was deemed easier to integrate the associated infrastructure into the house building contracts. To extract the infrastructure element from the bills of quantities could have been done, but then the issue arises that in the west most of the infrastructure construction centred on building heavy masonry retaining walls, due to the heavy contouring of the sites. In the east it was more the construction of surface water drainage channels and concrete roadways,

mainly due to the low lying much less contoured land. Due to these complexities it was deemed appropriate to consolidate all construction contract costs for each project (housing construction and infrastructure) and then divide these by the number of houses built.




Average Cost Per Household

Table 6.2.3

Project name	Donor	Type of House	No of Houses Built	Contractor	Original Contract Value	Final Contract Value	Average Cost per House	Average Cost per House across the sampled	Variance from the Average Cost
Charlmount	American	Single Story	10	RP Associates			1,423,924	1,533,870	(109,945)
Charlmount II	American	Single Story	20	RP Associates	45,070,594	42,717,727	1,423,924	1,533,870	(109,945)
Ethinnagahawatte	American	Single Story	12	Athulawage	27,160,701	19,927,826	1,660,652	1,533,870	126,783
Thalgasgodawatta	Canadian	Single Story Double Story	56	G.V.M.Silva	72,656,578	71,533,771	1,277,389	1,533,870	(256,481)
Rathmalana Kandawala									
Rathmalana Kandawala Units	Canadian	Condominium	32	Amil Builders	44,364,120	46,364,120			
Stormwater and Wastewater Network	Canadian	Diyantha		564,000	564,150				
Stormwater and Wastewater Network	Canadian	Diyantha		784,950	1,361,259				
Stormwater and Wastewater Network	Canadian	Diyantha		1,153,310	826,539				
Total Cost					46,866,380	49,116,067	1,534,877	1,533,870	1,008
Ismailpuram									
Ismailpuram - Houses	HongKong	Single Story	93	KSJ	123,538,768	99,041,835			
Ismailpuram - Infrastructure	HongKong	Single Story		Daya	62,744,080	68,199,102			
Total Cost					186,782,848	167,240,936			
Onthachimadam I									
Onthachimadam Houses	American	Single Story	80	Mod Tech	117,385,165	112,479,594			
Onthachimadam - Balance Works	American	Single Story		Buddhika	16,962,840	16,962,840			
Total Cost					134,348,005	129,442,434			

Average Cost Per House



Although it was an aim to evaluate the cost of the houses constructed under the IFRC DDH programme with other similar projects implemented by other organisations using similar models as well as the IFRC Owner Driven Model, this was not finally undertaken. This was in part due to the fact that other external organisations are not prepared to disclose such information freely. An analysis between the IFRC owner driven model, which is being evaluated separately, and the IFRC DDH program should be analysed as a separate entity.

This analysis only considers the actual cost per unit based on the actual construction cost. To interweave the actual cost of other inputs such as direct staff costs, organisational cost etc would require a lot more analysis and cost engineering. It is debatable if this information is easily available and would need considerable agreement as to how to build up and apportion such costs.

For the sampled cost analysis above, there were no great deviances in the cost of each housing unit to construct (approx. 1,533,870 rupees).

This is mainly due to the fact that the sampled house types fall into three main categories (single storey single units, double storey duplex units and condominium housing). The houses constructed in the West of Sri Lanka (Charlmount, Ettinagawatta and Thalagasgodawatta) were all similar in construction cost mainly due to the fact that they were all single storey units construction within the same country location. The cost variances can be attributed mainly to the fact that Ettinagawatta was a smaller project in size and therefore preliminary costs for the Contractor as well as associated infrastructure costs were proportionally higher due to economies of scale. In actual house unit construction costs, they could be assumed to be similar in cost.

The Condominium project at Ratmalana was interesting as when compared to both single and double storey constructions across the West and East of Sri Lanka, their cost was very close to the average cost per housing unit for the sampled projects. This proves that the cost of Condominium construction is not always cheaper than single /double unit constructions over a larger project area. Ratmalana was also constructed very close to the capital, so the location factor should reduce the cost of construction compared to constructing in locations in the East of Sri Lanka, such as Ampara and Batticaloa. The Condominium project could therefore be considered an expensive model to choose in terms of cost per unit.

Both projects in the East, Ismailpuram and Onthachimadam One, were very similar in construction cost. This is due to their location, type of project and the time they were constructed. Ismailpuram was more expensive due to the high cost of constructing the associated infrastructure in the form of concrete roads and stormwater drainage. The actual house constructions were similar per unit. This reinforces the fact that the added cost of infrastructure to the project has been the critical factor and in most cases the real unknown in terms of final scope and actual requirements to please the Government actors and Beneficiaries.

Thalagasgodawatta represented the best value for money in terms of cost per unit. This can be attributed to the fact that the houses are duplex in nature and therefore share some common elements that reduce the cost of construction. Onthachimadam Two, which was not included in the sample analysed, had a slightly lower value of cost per unit (at 1,171,490 rupees).


Houses on this site were also duplex and as they were constructed at a later date, the Consultant incorporated some lessons learnt/value engineering based on previous projects. This obviously has an effect on the final cost per unit when compared to other and previous models.




Sustainability

As previously discussed, beneficiary were not involved throughout the program due to constantly changing beneficiary lists by the government. After program completion, the management close-out with beneficiaries involved undertaking a community engagement program³¹. This program was designed to address land ownership, dependency of beneficiaries on donors and allow beneficiaries to voice any of their concerns. As the program was undertaken concurrently with this evaluation, an analysis of its effectiveness was not undertaken. Nevertheless, in at least two sites, the engagement program was executed approximately 2 years after the houses were initially handed over. Hence some of the beneficiaries were unaware of important issues such as documentation required to prove ownership, the defects and liability period and RCM involvement going forward for a period of 2 years. Indeed, prior to the community engagement program, 72 percent expected the RCM to provide more services in the future.

³¹ Refer Appendix F, F.2.3a for further details.



TYPICAL FIRST ,SECOND AND THIRD FLOOR PLAN



6.3 Programme Output

Appropriateness

End users needs and wishes were not specifically considered prior to construction as beneficiaries were not consulted at this time. Recall, this was primarily because the beneficiary lists were constantly changed and provided late by the government.

Technically, housing construction appears to be safe and in accordance with UDA requirements³². The houses are of solid masonry/concrete construction with a timber and tiled roof. The overall structure and fabric can be seen as very durable and free from toxic materials. While there are issues around the long term durability of materials such as the doors, locks, taps, the items fitted were per RCM specifications.

Effectiveness

The RCM appears to have adhered to the MOUs it signed with the government³³. Specifically

- The number of houses to be constructed were constructed (note in some instance MOUs changed to accommodate a reduction in the number of houses being built).
- The houses constructed were in accordance with UDA guidelines.
- Sufficient space was left for road side tree planting and proper drainage.
- The RCM entered into a contractual agreement with Institute for Construction Training and Development registered contractors.

Further, the houses constructed had a minimum floor area of 500 square feet with two bedrooms, a living room, kitchen and toilet with running water, electricity, sanitation and drainage facilities. Clearly the quality of such facilities varied between sites with some houses not having access to running water and electricity. Finally, in some instances MOUs changed to alter the timeframe for construction.



The majority of regional RCM goals were met³⁴. In particular:

- There is evidence to suggest that the majority of houses have sufficient WATSAN infrastructure.
- A technical analysis of households revealed that overall, the construction quality of houses at least meet local technical standards. Further, in most cases, the houses are well planned and have adequate spacing and support services.
- Evaluation of progress was undertaken by the RCM.
- The housing sites were constructed a distance over 200 metres from the ocean and hence are not as susceptible to future Tsunamis.
- There was evidence to suggest community planning requirements were considered as part of the site designs. For instance, hospitals and community centres were built near some housing sites.
- The programs, and funds allocated by the PNS, were specifically directed to Tsunami affected groups. Hence the RCM met its mandate to provide relief to these communities.
- Generally, the quality of beneficiary houses has been equitable across different sites. Nevertheless, the houses in the East, which require a more qualified government contractor due to their larger size, are of slightly better quality.
- When asked whether they were happy with the housing construction, the majority of beneficiaries answered 'yes'. Hence, in relation to the main priority of provide housing that satisfies beneficiaries, the RCM has largely achieved its objective.
- The majority of beneficiaries stated they are better off with their current housing relative to the housing they had prior to the tsunami.
- Overall, housing and WATSAN facilities can be maintained and managed by beneficiaries as demonstrated by the running water and presence of electricity in the majority of the houses.
- In most cases the government provides running water and electricity. Exceptions are that some houses, particularly those located on top of hills, in certain sites do not receive running water.
- The vast majority of beneficiaries continue living in the tsunami housing sites.
- The majority of people surveyed believe housing and WATSAN facilities meet their needs and priorities. The main exception appears to be that some beneficiaries complain that the septic tanks are too small across some houses in most sites.
- Responses from qualitative interviews of survey respondents suggest that in general, the beneficiaries understand and respect the Movement's programs and decisions even if there are differences of opinion.
- Review of minutes from project files suggest that the IFRC/SLRCS responded to beneficiary issues and concerns by relaying them to the consultant.
- Overall, 70 percent of beneficiaries are happy with the houses and believe they have contributed to improvements in their lives.

³⁴ Refer Appendix F, F.3.2b for further details.

- Work was outsourced to local consultants and contractors as the Movement did not have the necessary resources and local knowledge to implement activities.
- The project file review suggests linkages were established with local governance and government policy, planning and regulation systems.

There were some goals that were not quite met. For example:

- A livelihoods program did not appear to be considered as part of the program design, during the construction process or immediately after houses were provided to beneficiaries.
- A contractor performance management system was not noticed during the project file review.
- Infrastructure relating to well developed roads and street lighting have not been provided by the local authorities.
- The majority of people surveyed do not feel safe in their homes (62 percent)³⁵ due mainly to the lack of street lamps (which was not the responsibility of the RCM) and the inadequacy of the locks.
- There is nothing to suggest that housing designs specifically considered major environmental or health risks. This lack of pre-construction analysis can be in part due to government pressure on the RCM to beginning building quickly.
- There is no evidence to suggest that specific community feedback mechanisms were established throughout the program design.
- The majority of people who had complaints stated that their complaints regarding the houses were not adequately addressed by the consultants/contractors during the period one year after they received houses (the defects and liabilities period).



³⁵ Refer Section 6.5, Program Outcomes.

6.4 Program Outcomes

Relevance

This subsection considers the relevance of the program outcomes across beneficiary needs relating to WATSAN facilities, safety, kitchen use, electricity and other design/specification issues. It will also consider the equity of housing quality within and between sites as well as whether beneficiaries are happy with the houses.

WATSAN ³⁶

Responses from qualitative interviews of survey respondents suggested the vast majority of people were satisfied with WATSAN facilities. Moreover, all of the houses had fitted kitchen taps, plumbing and drainage facilities. Toilets have been appropriately fitted and pipes were available in bathrooms. Most of the houses also had effective sewerage facilities. This supports the analysis that overall, WATSAN facilities across houses were technically sound.

There were some exceptions however these were not extensive. For instance, the size of septic tanks was a concern across some people across almost all sites. In some sites it resulted in water filling the toilets and in others it resulted in the septic tank overflowing. In certain cases, the smell from overflowing septic tanks was overwhelming. It is possible that the RCM did not build bigger septic tanks due to cost considerations. Whether the cost/benefit tradeoff was appropriate in this instance is uncertain.

Safety ³⁷

Approximately 62 percent of respondents answered 'no' when asked if they feel safe in their house. From qualitative analysis, a primary reason appears to be that there are no street lamps and hence, there is a lack of visibility around the sites. The provision of street lamps is the responsibility of the government. Another concern for survey respondents was the lack of grills on the windows. Note that the RCM made a conscious decision not to place grills on the houses due to cost considerations. Finally some beneficiaries complained that the locks were easily broken.

While the fact that the majority of beneficiaries feel 'unsafe' due to the lack of street lighting on the roads is understandable, if beneficiaries feel very strongly about the lack of grills and susceptibility of locks to be broken, then they are likely to have purchased these relevant items instead of for example televisions (which are contained in 55 percent of households³⁸). Further, the cost of replacing a lock will fall below the beneficiaries' average monthly household income of 9,151 rupees³⁹.

Kitchen Use ⁴⁰

Approximately 86 percent of respondents indicated that they use the kitchen of whom 61 percent stated that the kitchen was of sufficient size. Importantly, only a very small number of the 39 percent who indicated their kitchen was too small supported their claims with specific reasons. Hence, this implies that the majority would simply have 'preferred' a bigger kitchen out of preference rather than necessity. Moreover, the size of DDH kitchens are not unrealistically small and do meet local standards.

Survey results suggest that the lack of chimneys in household kitchens in certain sites may have been problematic as beneficiaries have traditionally used firewood to cook their food. This figure is complimented by the fact that only 74 percent of households use the gas cooker. Arguably, the environmental considerations should outweigh the cultural ones; i.e. while people are used to cooking with fire, it is more environmentally friendly to use gas. Further, as the communities develop, there is a greater financial scope for people to use gas cookers. Nevertheless, there was no training provided to beneficiaries on how to use gas cookers which is concerning from a safety aspect as people in rural settings do not generally use gas cookers.

³⁶ Refer Appendix F, F.4.1d for further details.

³⁷ Refer Appendix F, F.4.1e for further details.

³⁸ Refer Appendix F, F.4.3e for further details.

³⁹ Refer Section 6.1.

⁴⁰ Refer Appendix F, F.4.1f for further details.

Electrical wiring

The light switches work in 92 percent of households implying that in these houses, there is a constant supply of electricity. The fact that light switches do not work in the remaining 8 percent of households could be because the globes do not work. Any electrical problems were minor and isolated and generally involved the voltage being too low for tube lights.

Other design/specification issues

Qualitative survey results suggest that there were some problems caused by rain. For instance, the soil erodes into housing plots when it rains, particular in sites that are located on steep slopes. Soil erosion also prevents vehicles from entering the vicinity of the site. Arguably, the potential of this occurring should have been noticed by the consultant when they were undertaking the land survey. Further, beneficiaries in some households across certain sites suggested that rainwater enters the house through gaps in the roof, chimneys and the front door. Importantly, this was more the exception than the norm and should not be seen as an overarching issue in relation to the quality of roofs, chimneys and front doors.

Relative quality of houses within and between sites⁴¹

Generally, the houses were of similar quality within the sites. However there were a couple of exceptions. This was in part due to the mains not being sufficiently strong to pressure the water to houses constructed at higher elevations on some project sites. As per the MOU, this was the responsibility of the government and not the RCM. Another cause of this inequality is that the some beneficiaries have at least 4 perches more than other beneficiaries. However housing plots were provided using a lottery system; hence any inequity is due to luck rather than discrimination.

A technical analysis reveals that houses in the East (Ismailpuram and Onthachimadam) with a predominately Tamil/Muslim population were of slightly better quality than the houses in the South and West (which has a predominately Sinhalese population). Importantly, the sites in the East (which were much larger in size) did use higher government certified contractors to construct their houses as opposed to the smaller sites in the South and West of Sri Lanka. The technical assessment is backed by the results of the survey which illustrates that in the East, there was an average of 33.8 percent of households who had complaints one year after houses were donated⁴². This is compared to the South and West where an average over 90 percent of households had complaints one year after houses were donated.

Beneficiary Satisfaction with House⁴³

Are beneficiaries satisfied with the houses? Overall 70 percent of survey respondents answered that they were happy with the house with more people happy in the south and west of Sri Lanka relative to the east Sri Lanka. Note that the level of 'happiness' with the house is not necessarily indicative of the quality of the house. For instance, the quality of houses in Onthachimadam exceeded the quality of houses in Rathmalana however beneficiary perceptions of happiness were in the reverse order. Indeed, interviewers suggested that people perceive satisfaction of housing relative to what they owned previously.

In hindsight, a 5 point scale from 'very happy' to 'very unhappy' should have been provided to the respondents. Moreover it is uncertain how many people were 'satisfied' with the house. Potential reasons for unhappiness have been considered in this section (i.e. people feel unsafe, issues with septic tanks, etc.).

⁴¹ Refer Appendix F, F.4.1i to F.4.1j for further details.

⁴² Refer Appendix F, F.4.1b for further details.


⁴³ Refer Appendix F, F.4.1a for further details.

Effectiveness

Overall, 59 percent of people believe they are better off relative to before the Tsunami with no distinctive pattern across different districts⁴⁴ (refer Table 6.4.1)

Table 6.2.3

Do you believe your housing situation is better or worse than before the Tsunami?



Those who did not feel they were better off were the ones who generally had larger houses and more land prior to the tsunami. Hence clearly, people's perceptions are relative to their own experiences, and not a criticism of the DDH program per se. From an objective perspective, compared with pre-tsunami dwellings, there was a 20 percent and 35 percent increase in the number of household with electricity and running water respectively in post-tsunami dwellings. Thus in aggregate, people are better off than before in relation to these aspects.

Approximately 74 percent and 65 percent of people believed that the location has detrimentally impacted their income earning capacity and livelihoods respectively⁴⁵. This assessment appears valid. For instance, many beneficiaries were fisherman and the current sites are located far from the sea. Some beneficiaries indicated that their husbands would stay in a shanty near the sea during the week and come home on weekends. Further, due to the remoteness of the housing sites and difficult access to transport facilities, a large number of employment opportunities are not readily available. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the RCM were given land by the government and hence it would be unreasonable to hold the RCM accountable for this issue.

Legally, the ownership of houses is unclear. Firstly, none of the beneficiaries have access to a title deed. This has wide ranging implication such as their not being able to verify ownership and use the house as security for loans. Secondly, the results from the survey process demonstrated that beneficiaries were uncertain of the requirements to prove home ownership (although this may have been rectified after the community engagement program). Some believed the RCM is responsible, others believed the government is responsible and many were uncertain. None of them knew when they would receive formal title deeds. Of concern is that it is uncertain as to how this issue will be resolved in the immediate future.

⁴⁴ Refer Appendix F, F.4.2a to F.4.2b for further details.

⁴⁵ Refer Appendix F, F.4.2d for further details.

Sustainability

Water supply, electricity provision and road development is the responsibility of the government.

All houses have access to electricity. Approximately 76 percent of households have taps connected to a running water supply which is highly correlated with the finding that 72 percent of people use tap water⁴⁶. Of the people who do not receive water, some complained water is not pumped to the houses on top of the hill on a regular basis and suggest that the only time they can collect water is at 2am. In other sites, the local authorities have not as yet provided flowing water. From a sustainability point of view, it is concerning that 24 percent of households do not have running water and it is uncertain when the government will rectify this issue.

Roads leading into the sites were still made from sand or mud and create issues for transport, especially in the presence of heavy rain. Further, the absence of street lamps is problematic at night due to the distance required to travel to the main roads in the dark. Hence, infrastructure relating to well developed roads and street lighting have not been provided by the local authorities. From a sustainability perspective, it is important that these facilities are developed to enable easy and safe access into villages.

As previously illustrated, 72 percent of households expect the RCM to provide services going forward⁴⁷. However, the community engagement program, which was initiated after the survey was conducted, addressed this issue by informing beneficiaries that the RCM will not be involved going forward.

Are communities able to thrive? Ultimately, given that the houses are technically sound and that the beneficiaries do not farm their own land, the ability of a community to thrive would largely depend on their ability to access employment, markets, schools and medical facilities.

The Rathmalana site (in Colombo) would be most likely to thrive given its proximity to the heart of the city.

⁴⁶ Refer Appendix F, F.4.3a to F.4.3c for further details.

⁴⁷ Refer Appendix F, F.2.3a for further details.



As the city centre continues to develop, greater employment opportunities will be available to residents. Further, transport to markets schools and medical facilities are readily available. Conversely, Charliment I, II, Thalgasgodawatte and the Ethinnagahawatte sites are located far from employment opportunities, markets, schools and medical facilities. The ability of these communities to thrive will largely be dependent on the economic and infrastructure developments around the sites. These in turn will be driven by the government and local business. Of critical importance will be provision of transport and the upgrade of roads which is traditionally the purview of the government. If people can readily access transport then they can travel to schools, markets, medical facilities and their places of employment. Indeed, travelling long distances for work (up to 4 hours one way per day) is not uncommon in Sri Lanka.

Onthachimadam in the East has access to a market (walking distance) however schools and medical facilities are not located in close proximity to the site. Further, given the infrequent transport options to the main city of Batticaloa, the lack of industries and the over one hour travel time to the ocean, access to employment opportunities are poor. Consequently, the development of this community will largely be dependent on large economic developments in the area surrounding the site and improvements in transportation facilities. These factors are clearly out of the direct control of beneficiaries, at least in the short-term.

The Ismailpuram site (in Ampara) is close to the main town of Ampara (about a 10 minute drive) and transport facilities can be reached (even though it may require some walking). Hence there is access to medical facilities, schools and employment opportunities. However, many beneficiaries are ethnically Muslim while Ampara is predominately Sinhalese. Indeed, beneficiaries have voiced concerns as to whether they would be accepted in the town. Thus, the ability of this community to thrive is dependent on its ability to effectively integrate with other communities in Ampara.

Ultimately, the ability for a community to 'thrive' is driven generally by site location, transportation facilities and quality of roads all of which fall (or in the case of site location, fell) under the responsibility of the government.



The importance of these factors are underscored with beneficiaries themselves believing that communities are isolated and most are at least 3 km away from important facilities. Recall over 70 percent of people stated that facilities were too far away⁴⁸.

There has been evidence of development from within the community itself such as the appointment of a community leader and the presence of little shops within sites. Further, the average household monthly income was stated as 9,151 rupees⁴⁹ which, while being lower than the total mean rural household income nationwide of 24,039⁵⁰, is still higher than the rural mean monthly household income from wages. This is telling as only 27 percent of households claimed they were self-employed, implying the majority of households derive income from a wage. Thus, when examining monthly household income, there is evidence to suggest that the communities are sustainable.

Additionally, approximately 89 percent of households were occupied by beneficiaries⁵¹, of whom approximately 96 percent stated that they intend to remain in the households for the foreseeable future. Thus, if beneficiaries are to be believed, there is further evidence to suggest that communities are sustainable.

⁴⁸ Refer Appendix F, F.1.4.3c for further details.

⁴⁹ Refer Section 6.1 for further details.

⁵⁰ Refer Department of Census and Statistics (Sri Lanka) http://www.statistics.gov.lk/HIES/HIES2006_07Website/Publications/HIES200607Final%20ReportWeb%20.pdf

⁵¹ Refer Section 6.1 for further details.


6.5 SLRCS Involvement and Capacity Building

The capacity of the TSSU has improved throughout the duration of the DDH operation. In collaborating with over 20 partner national societies to build houses throughout Sri Lanka, the SLRCS staff have gained skills relating to construction, coordination techniques, organizational capabilities and in negotiations with foreign delegates.

The involvement of the SLRCS TSSU has been extensive and important. The SLRCS TSSU have been party to all major decisions involving the DDH program and were heavily involved with the process of selecting contractors and consultants. Further, the SLRCS TSSU provided important country specific knowledge to the DDH program. In particular, they took the lead when liaising with government departments and in collaboration with the IFRC, addressed issues relating to construction and beneficiary concerns. Whether the capacity will be retained within the SRLCS is uncertain, given the winding-down of the tsunami reconstruction operations.

The SLRCS branches provided support to SLRCS NHQ and IFRC primarily through offering local knowledge and volunteers. They also suggested options for contractors as and when required and indicated coordination and negotiations with NHQ SLRCS and IFRC was generally effective. However, the SLRCS branches involvement in managing and building the houses, and liaising with the consultants, was minimal.







7.0 Macro-Recommendations

The following provides some macro level recommendations based on the findings and conclusions.

Non-Technical Recommendations

Ensure that a detailed site location analysis is undertaken to ensure that reasonable employment opportunities, medical facilities, educational institutions and transport infrastructure exists, or will exist, in the area surrounding the proposed site. Unfortunately, in the post-tsunami Sri Lankan context, sites were imposed by the government on donors. In situations where there is a choice of site location, the selection of more appropriate sites will assist beneficiaries in the long run.

The RCM should advocate more strongly, more consistently and be willing to 'pull the plug' on housing construction if site locations are not satisfactory. The evaluation conclusions noted that many beneficiaries, and in some cases IFRC delegates, found sites to be too far from facilities. Moreover, the immediate benefit of providing housing to people in poor sites may be outweighed by the longer term costs from lack of access to markets, employment and schools.

Beneficiary vetting should be a priority, regardless of when it can practically be undertaken. Even if the beneficiary lists given by the government keep changing making a vetting process repetitive and time consuming, sufficient resources should be allocated to this task. Clearly, it is important to ensure that the most vulnerable people who are targeted as the ultimate beneficiaries of the DDH program are properly identified. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to suggest that an adequate vetting process was undertaken as part of the DDH program.

Integrating a permanent livelihoods team within the DDH program would provide all beneficiaries with a central 'point of call' regarding their concerns and questions. These may include, general comments on housing construction, gaining an understanding of the legalities of housing ownership, responsibilities of the Red Cross, government and the beneficiaries going forward, complaint feedback mechanism and assistance with other livelihood concerns relating to education, medical facilities and markets. In the DDH program, many of these issues were not addressed or were addressed too late.

Ideally the Joint Partnership Agreement should be abolished and clientship retained with one organisation. This would reduce difficulties associated with amalgamating organisational goals and culture. To increase the probability of a favourable outcome, each organisation should agree on clearly defined and different roles from the outset, thus reducing duplication of work.

In the event that clientship cannot be retained with one organisation, a Joint Partnership Agreement should involve integrating both delegates and local staff members in to one unit as opposed to the current situation where a parallel structure exists. This would reduce duplication of operational units (i.e. such as Finance, Human Resources, etc.) and may help facilitate greater cohesion between delegates and local staff. To ensure an appropriate mix of local country experience and objectivity is available, it may be prudent to appoint a co-leadership structure with a delegate and local counterpart equally responsible for the operation of the team. If such an approach is undertaken, team building exercises and cross-cultural awareness training would be an important factor to ensuring a smooth operating environment.

Consider hiring a person in the role of an 'in-house' consultant to manage the contractors. During, the DDH program, there were instances where the RCM exceeded its mandate and managed the consultants who were supposed to manage the contractors. Indeed, in some instances, the RCM effectively took over the consultants' role. A team of people, who are hired 'in-house' to specifically manage contractors may provide a more efficient and effective alternative to independent consultants.



Consider hiring a ‘program manager’ who supervises a number of construction projects and is ultimately responsible for realising the outcomes of the projects. This person would oversee the procurement/contract management functions (including the ‘in-house’ consultants) and pay attention to important aspects throughout the project life such as selection of site location, livelihoods, securing deeds, community engagement and liaising with local officials. The program manager would have responsibility for both livelihoods ‘software’ and engineering ‘hardware’ operations. Ideally this person would not be an engineer but a generalist disaster recovery/reconstruction manager.

Consider incorporating beneficiary safety within the objectives of the program design. This is important in the context of the DDH program where 62 percent of people did not feel safe. Currently, safety has not been used by the RCM as a ‘lens’ through which to view project design and implementation.

Ensure that there is adequate street lighting around houses to increase perceptions of safety by beneficiaries. While the ultimate responsibility for this may lie with the government, there should be an onus by the RCM to ensure that street lamps are erected. In the DDH evaluation, many beneficiaries sighted the lack of street lamps as a major safety concern.

Technical Recommendations

Ensure that the roles and responsibilities of the consultant are constantly measured, with performance and compliance to the contract deliverables being enforced. Although the consultants’ roles and responsibilities were clearly defined in the project contracts, their ability to perform for the client in a professional and satisfactory manner was not achieved on the whole. Stronger program project management in the form of more human resources within the RCM technical teams, coupled with more robust methods of measuring consultants’ performance, may have improved projects outcomes. Further, a strong and cohesive mechanism to impose penalties and costs to consultants who did not perform as per their contracts may have improved project outcomes, especially in the areas of time, cost and quality.

Ensure that key stakeholders and implementers understand that the consultant and contractors contracts only form part of the overall total project. In many instances the consultants and contractors contracts were considered as being able to cover all the needs to implement, deliver and close out the specific projects needs.

As projects progressed usually through the contractors' projects to deliver permanent houses, it became evident that additional infrastructure was either left out of the contracts completely or only partially covered. The need for associated infrastructure was then either incorporated into the contract as variations or awarded as a second contract. This sometimes caused issues with some donors not understanding the need to supply key infrastructure as a part of the projects and having to pay for its costs. Stronger co-ordination frameworks within the RCM could have ensured that projects needs were identified during implementation and additional infrastructure and close out requirements were delivered in a consistent manner across all individual projects.

Ensure that any form of joint partnership agreement tries to keep parallel structures to a minimum and ensures decision making and implementation is cohesive and coherent. The evaluation and project outcomes have clearly shown that the joint partnership has been difficult to administer, and has hampered implementation of some consultant and contractor contracts. Should joint partnership agreements be utilised or desired in the future, the role of joint Technical Committees to identify project housing and infrastructure shortcomings, and make key decisions to administer and implement contracts needs to be strengthened. The timeframes for Technical Committees to identify issues, make recommendations and find solutions to overcome ongoing Contract issues need to be as expeditious as practical. Approval frameworks need to be kept to a minimum with key decision makers and specialist project management teams and individuals having more freedom to administer budgets and issue instructions and variations.

Ensure greater understanding that large scale infrastructure projects and programs require consistent staffing levels for long periods. Undertaking such long term recovery and development programs which are often three to five years in project cycle duration, requires more emphasis on ensuring key staff are retained for longer periods, or if possible for the complete project/program cycle durations. Large staff turnovers within this program have decreased consistency and impeded project and program delivery as well as reducing institutional knowledge.

Better understanding and awareness to the complexities of construction and delivery of contract led consultant and contractor infrastructure projects.

Longer term recovery and development projects that are delivered through large, long and costly contracts need to be clearly understood and integrated into the RCM procurement procedures. Many existing procurement procedures that are based more on relief and shorter term recovery procurement needs require enhancing to meet the specific requirements of housing and infrastructure project needs. Issues around open tendering, prequalification, contract award, value engineering, variation award and financial control need to be clearly defined, understood and easily administered. The need for more senior management with experience in large scale contracting, construction project management, construction conflict resolution and cost control could improve implementation of future programs similar in nature.

Ensure more acknowledgement and possible utilisation of different contract procurement paths as well as implementation models. The evaluation clearly showed that all the projects were very complex and different in nature, even though they were delivering the same permanent shelter requirements as end products. To work all the different project requirements through the same traditional consultant and contractor contract award process may not have been the most suitable implementation model. The program outcomes should be analysed against different procurement paths (for example, design and build, in house project management, project turnkey contracts) as well as different implementation models such as Owner Driven Housing, combined Donor and Owner Driven Housing and government implemented projects to understand and choose which is the most suitable implementation strategy for future program needs.





Draft TOR for IFRC Housing Final Evaluation

Purpose

The overall purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the SLRCS/IFRC's tsunami recovery multilateral donor driven housing programme in Sri Lanka.

Background

The SLRCS/IFRC is currently in the process of completing construction of 636 houses and apartments in 20 sites spanning a stretch from Negombo to Matara on the West Coast of Sri Lanka and Ampara and Batticaloa in the East. 5 sites are still under construction in Ampara, Batticaloa and Negombo but are already over 50% underway.

Objective

The client is primarily interested in analysing four components of the programme through differing 'lenses'. The components are (i) programme design; (ii) programme management; (iii) outputs; (iv) outcomes; and (v) SLRCS involvement and capacity-building. The main 'lenses' that the analysis will utilise for this analysis are:

- a. Relevance
- b. Appropriateness
- c. Efficiency
- d. Effectiveness
- e. Sustainability

The interaction of these components and 'lenses' can be considered as a matrix (see section 0).

On a secondary level, the client is interested in understanding how contextual issues affected the programme. These include issues such as (i) the management and coordination structures that the Movement had adopted (referred to as the Movement Coordination Framework, MCF) affected programme delivery. It is acknowledged that the MCF is complex and the analysis of its performance is a substantial task in itself. The consultants should not be drawn down this line of in-depth analysis of this function but should nevertheless provide sufficient analysis to elucidate the macro-level influence of the MCF on programme management. (ii) The varied geopolitical and socio-economic contexts in which construction was undertaken.

The housing sites vary from those close to Colombo that are accessible to all the construction services the capital city can provide, to those in very remote post-conflict areas on the east coast. The effect of the greatly varying context will require analysis to the extent deemed necessary. , ETC.

It is anticipated that a detailed file and field study of every multilateral construction project will not be required. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, this evaluation focuses on the programmatic level and thus data from the project level (whether that be field or document analysis) should be sampled to the extent necessary to conduct a rigorous analysis. Secondly, data and analysis already exists. Some donors have conducted evaluations. Some third parties (notably GTZ) have done similar, and results are available. Therefore it is anticipated that in-depth further field study will be required for a sample of project sites only.

This analysis will contribute to the body of learning from the client's entire tsunami operation. This analysis is in itself not a 'lessons learnt' exercise. (That will undertaken separately.) However, this analysis will provide useful data, observations and draw conclusions that will form the basis for formulating 'lessons learnt'. The analysis should therefore be conducted not as a 'lessons learnt' exercise, but in a manner that is mindful that the final report will be used as a basis for further development of such lessons.

The report should be formulated in a way that is considerate of the primary stakeholders the analysis. The perspectives of these stakeholders have been taken into consideration during the formulation of these TOR. These stakeholders are: (i) The Sri Lanka Red Cross Society; (ii) IFRC Snr managers in Geneva / field operations; (iii) IFRC Shelter Unit in Geneva; and (iv) PNS's.

Scope of work

The concept of a matrix of programme components and analytical lenses was referred to in the opening paragraph of section 0 above. The following matrix elaborates on this to give an indication of the varied weighting that each lens could be given under each component. Questions are suggested. These should be taken as indicative, and added to at the discretion of the evaluation team as they deem necessary.

Component	Lens
Programme Design	<p>Relevance: Is the programme relevant to the needs created by the tsunami? Is the programme relevant to the achievement of the global goals of the RCM, the regional tsunami operational goals, the delegation strategic goals and the goals of SLRCS?</p> <p>Appropriate: Is the programme approach appropriate given the development of the Sri Lankan economy in relation to the construction sector? Is the programme approach appropriate given the local contexts (beyond construction service delivery alone)? Where other delivery modalities considered at the design stage? Are the site locations appropriate? Does the programme design permit maximising the benefits for beneficiaries? Was the level of beneficiary involvement in the maximising the benefits for beneficiaries? Was the level of beneficiary involvement in the programme design appropriate? Was the programme in line with the policies of SLRCS? Is the programme approach in line with the RAT report?</p>
Programme management	<p>Effectiveness: From a sample of five project files, how effective was the project management of each? What were the internal and contextual factors that appear to have permitted successful project management, and what factors resulted in sub-optimizing or constraining of effectiveness? Where M&E mechanisms effective? For a sample of files, were macro-level contract management decisions by the client rigorous?</p> <p>Efficiency: For each project, when were the milestones of tender floating, tender closing, contract award, practical completion and end of defects liability period reached? What percentage over-run in time and budget did each project have? Analysis of the unit cost per project and across the programme. What contextual or management factors affected unit cost? Was programme implementation well coordinated within RCM, with local authorities and with beneficiaries?</p> <p>Sustainability: Comment on the management of the close-out of the programme from the perspective of sustainability. Was the level of beneficiary involvement throughout the programme appropriate?</p>

Component	Lens
<p>Programme Outputs</p>	<p>Appropriateness: Are the houses and sites appropriately designed and built mindful of the end users' needs and wishes? Are designs and construction sound from purely an engineering perspective?</p> <p>Effectiveness: Have the targets of the regional/national tsunami response strategy been achieved?</p>
<p>Programme outcomes</p>	<p>Relevance: Are beneficiaries satisfied with the houses? Are the houses relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries? Do the outcomes for beneficiaries differ with gender, age, ethnicity, etc.</p> <p>Effectiveness: Have the goals/outcomes articulated in the RCM regional tsunami strategy been achieved? What has been the most significant change for the beneficiaries since the tsunami? With reference to the five capitals of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, what changes has the programme brought for beneficiaries. Comment on the legal status of the ownership of the houses.</p> <p>Sustainability: Can beneficiaries access local services, facility maintenance, and infrastructure support from local authorities or services providers? Are the beneficiaries, as communities, expecting further support from RCM? How do communities view themselves? Are the communities able to thrive?</p>
<p>SLRCS involvement and capacity building</p>	<p>Sustainability (organisational): In what ways has the project contributed to the improvement in the response and recovery capacity of SLRCS? Identify how and what ways in which the capacity of SLRCS Branch/s has increased? What changes in capacity building has taken place in line OD policy?</p> <p>Effectiveness: How effective was coordination with the branches?</p>

Methodology

It is anticipated that the following broad areas of work shall form the process of analysis and report preparation:

Portfolio file review and stakeholder interviews. In order to comprehend the programme design access to all stakeholders involved in the management, snr management, and advisory functions will be available for interview. Access to all files will be necessary in order to elucidate details of programme design and where specific project-level data is required for the full portfolio, particularly in relation to timings of project milestones and cost-related analysis. This phase will require a contract management, programme management and finance management perspective.

Sample identification. A sample of five projects are identified in agreement with the client for in-depth review. This review looks in detail at matters of design, project management, beneficiary and other stakeholder perspectives, in-depth output and outcome analysis.

Review of existing project-level data. Some evaluation related data already exists. A review will be required of this to identify gaps in data that will need to be filled during the consultancy by site and stakeholder visits.

Site visits. Data not available from other sources will be gathered first hand. Standard participatory approaches will be employed with communities, and technical staff appraise the completed structures. Local SLRCS branches shall be involved as stakeholders supplying data and as participants at site meetings.

Report formulation and presentation. A draft report will be presented for review. With due consideration of the comments of stakeholders the consultant shall then prepare a final report.



Timeframe and Schedule

The final report is to be completed before 10th July 2009.

Available Documentation

The evaluation team will undertake their assessment using the following resources of information:

1. The overarching Government MoU / implementation agreement mechanisms.
2. Project Concept Papers and Project Proposals
3. Log frame, detailed project plan, designs and cost estimates as detailed in the project proposal and Contract Documentation (Consultancy Agreement, Contactors Contract Documentation).
4. Regular progress reporting on the project and all other available documentation on project progress.
5. Findings based on perceptions during site visits.
6. Interviews based on a standard list of questions and indicators with all stakeholders involved in the project inclusive but not limited to the following:
 - Project Management (e.g. Construction delegate, Local engineer, Consultants, Contractors etc.)
 - Beneficiaries
 - Local government authorities
 - SLRCS branch representatives and local staff
 - Representatives of other RC Agencies working in the area if appropriate
- Mid Term Reviews





Composition of the Evaluation Team

Roles and Responsibilities

Evaluation Team

The evaluation team will be composed of the following members:

1. Team Leader (External to the RC/RC)
2. Technical (Construction Management) Representative (External to the IFRC Donor Driven Housing Projects)
3. Social Development Representative and overall administration coordinator (External to the IFRC Donor Driven Housing Projects)
4. SLRCS Branch representatives
5. Data Collection Assistants (administer questionnaires).

The following two ground rules should be followed regarding the team composition:

- Team members should not be directly involved with the projects they review in order to avoid biased perceptions and conflicts of interest and to foster cross district lessons learning.
- To address a gender balance the team should have at least one female member.

Below is a broad outline of the roles and responsibilities of the different evaluation team members which will be dealt with in detailed ToRs for the Team Leader as well as the Team Members.

Team Representatives' roles and responsibilities

- Provide their expertise in the evaluation as assigned by the Team Leader
- Familiarize themselves with Evaluation Methodology and Tools used
- Study the provided documents on the projects subject to evaluation

- Participate and act as resource persons in the review and the adjoining meetings and workshops
- Support the Team Leader in compiling the necessary information
- Draft report covering their field of expertise as assigned by the team leader on basis of standard templates, questions and indicators
- Provide advise based on findings to implementing parties of the evaluated projects

The following fields of expertise will need to be covered by the team members:

- Technical Expertise (Construction Management) will need to cover
 - Provide technical expertise in the course of the assessment
 - Provide expertise on project management issues looking into project plan, cost plan, efficiency of resource usage etc.
 - Impact of intervention within the affected communities as well as the host and surrounding communities
 - long term impact of the project on SLRCS and linking of the project into SLRCS core activities development
- Technical Expertise (Social Development) will need to cover
 - all social aspects as, beneficiary involvement and ownership as well as social sustainability issues
 - aspects of community consultation and participation
 - Impact of intervention within the affected communities as well as the host and surrounding communities
 - long term impact of the project on SLRCS and linking of the project into SLRCS core activities development

ToR Team Leader – Evaluation

The Team Leader Evaluation, under the direction of the IFRC Senior Management Team will lead a team in their evaluation activities, ensuring the timely execution of the planned evaluation of the IFRC Donor Driven Housing Evaluation.

The Team Leader Evaluation is expected to—

1. carry the overall responsibility for conducting IFRC Evaluation as outlined with in this document
2. plan and initiate all activities necessary to carry out the actual evaluations in coordination with all stakeholders at Colombo level as well as within the relevant district levels
3. coordinate the work of other team members
4. Serve as a point of information to all involved stakeholders in all matters regarding the Evaluation
5. ensure a common understanding amongst all stakeholders involved on goals, objectives and rationale of the IFRC Evaluation
6. advise and assist the IFRC in fine tuning methodology, evaluation criteria and documentation of the Evaluation
7. brief the members together with relevant stakeholders on the tasks and the project specifics
8. manage and guide the evaluation team members during the evaluation process providing them with clear explanations regarding their roles and responsibilities within the evaluation team and providing all information necessary for their input into the evaluation
9. prepare the necessary material, plan and facilitate the presentations and focus group discussions accompanying the evaluation in each of the districts in which IFRC is present
10. coordinate the formulation of the written report and ensure the quality of the report.

11. have the final say on the contents of the report
12. present the evaluation results to the involved stakeholders on a national level

ToR Technical Team Member

The Team Members of the Evaluation, under the direction of the Overall Coordinator, in collaboration with the Team Leader for the Evaluation, will participate in the planned evaluation of the IFRC Donor Driven Housing Evaluation.

The Team Member is expected to—

Team Members roles and responsibilities

1. Provide technical expertise in the course of the project evaluation as assigned by the Team Leader. This will include, but not be limited to, providing technical input into the impact assessment matrix, developing technically focused questions for the survey process and undertaking site visits to perform technical analysis.
2. Extract ‘technical side indicators’ from project files as applicable to the impact assessment matrix and document results.
3. Document results from site visits.
4. Study the documents provided by IFRC and the team leader on the projects subject to evaluation
5. Participate and act as resource persons in the review and the adjoining meetings and focus group discussions
6. Support the Team Leader in compiling the necessary information
7. Plan and implement the process of data gathering and analysis.
8. Draft a report covering their field of expertise as assigned by the team leader on basis of standard templates, questions and indicators

9. Support the team leader in preparation of the overall documentation for each individual project evaluated.
 10. Provide advice based on findings to implementing parties of the evaluated projects
 11. Prepare necessary presentation material and support the team leader in facilitating the focus group discussions and presentations accompanying the evaluation
 12. Present the evaluation results to the involved stakeholders on district level
8. Study the documents provided by IFRC and the team leader on the projects subject to evaluation

ToR Team Member – Evaluation

The Team Members of the Evaluation, under the direction of the Overall Coordinator, in collaboration with the Team Leader for the Evaluation, will participate in the planned evaluation of the IFRC Donor Driven Housing Evaluation.

The Team Member is expected to—

1. Assist in training survey team members
2. Assist in updating the questionnaire after the initial one week pilot study
3. Undertake the ‘survey team leader’ role during the evaluation. This will involve being in charge of two separate five member teams for between 5 to 6 weeks.
4. During the fieldwork phase, coordinate with IFRC administrators to ensure accommodation and transport has been arranged for all personnel
5. Collate quantitative data and gather patterns in qualitative data during for the week after the survey process.
6. Maintain in regular contact with the team leader of the evaluation.
7. Provide their expertise in the course of the project evaluation as assigned by the Team Leader



Appendix B – Buffer Zone



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கரைபேரார்ம் பேணல் திணைக்களம்
COAST CONSERVATION DEPARTMENT

කැ. සෙ. 556, නව මහලේකම් කාර්යාලය, මාලිගාවත්ත, කොළඹ 10.
த.பெ. 556, புதிய செயலகம், மாலிகாவத்தை, கொழும்பு 10.
P. O. Box 556, New Secretariat, Maligawatta, Colombo 10.

මගේ අංකය }
எனது தலை. }
My No. }

CC/P/GEN/386

ඔබේ අංකය }
உமது தலை. }
Your No. }

27-12-2005

District Secretary, Trincomalee
District Secretary, Mannar
District Secretary, Mullativu
District Secretary, Batticaloa
District Secretary, Jaffna

Relaxing of buffer zone for reconstruction of houses affected by Tsunami

In considering the destruction caused by the Tsunami waves struck in Sri Lanka coastal line on 26th December 2004, the Government has decided to declare 100 m and 200m buffer zone (no built zone) for the Western, Southern, Northern and East coast in respectively. Base on this decision, the Coast Conservation Department has prepared interim guidelines for the development activities within the coastal zone. (Annex No. 1).

Due to the scarcity of lands outside buffer zone areas for the implementing Doner driven housing projects and owner driven housing projects, Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply and TAFREN requested Coast Conservation Advisory Council for reducing the set back areas (buffer zone).

The Coast Conservation Advisory Committee considered the request and approval was given for the construction of above housing projects according to the set back standards stipulated in the costal zone management plan 1997. The list of the reservation areas (set back) stipulated in the coastal zone management plan 1997 is annexed. (Annexed No. 2)

It was also decided by the Coast Conservation Advisory Council to issue the coast conservation permit for the proposed housing project case by case basis after carrying out a joint inspection with representatives from Divisional Secretariats, Coast Conservation Department, Urban Development Authority, Survey Department.

In addition, the advisory council held on 19.12.2005 decided to consider the other individual applications for the constructions of all the other development activities within the coastal zone subject to coast conservation advisory council recommendation.

Annex II

දුරකථන/தொலைபேசி/Telephones :

අධ්‍යක්ෂ }
இயக்குநர் } 449197
Director }

කාර්යාලය }
அலுவலகம் } 449754
Office }

ෆැක්ස් අංකය }
பெக்ஸ் தலை } 438005
Fax No. }

I draw your attention to the above guidelines and decisions, and request to implement these coast conservation guidelines in the reconstruction process in your districts.



Dr. R.A.D.B. Samaranayake
Director/Coast Conservation

- CC : 1. Mr. Lalith Weeratunga
Secretary to the President
2. Dr. P.B. Jayasundara,
Secretary to the Treasury
3. Mr. E. Jinadasa,
Secretary,
Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources

Appendix C – Example MOU

IFR.C

Kalpale. 2011

MOU/RADA/Hous /KAL/KAL /161106/

Memorandum of Understanding

Between

The Government of Sri Lanka

And

Sri Lanka Red Cross

And

Reconstruction and Development Agency

This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is entered into between -

THE DISTRICT SECRETARY (hereinafter referred to as "the District Secretary") of the Divisional Secretariat Division of Kalutara in the District of Kalutara for and on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as "the GOSL") ;

AND

THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (hereinafter referred to as "the RADA") an Agency appointed by the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in terms of Article 33(f) of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and presently having its Principal Office at No.41, Janadhipathi Mawatha, Colombo 01 (hereinafter sometimes collectively called and referred to as "the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART")

AND

Sri Lanka Red Cross having its Registered/Principal Office/Place of Business at No370 2/1, T.B Jaya Mawatha, Colombo 10.(hereinafter referred to as "the Donor") (hereinafter sometimes called and referred to as "the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART")

WHEREAS -

- (i) the Tsunami tidal waves that hit Sri Lanka on 26th December 2004 devastated a large part of the coastline causing immediate displacement of up to one million people and the destruction of private and public property of an unprecedented scale in the areas affected; and
- (ii) the **GOSL** acting through the **District Secretary** for an effective reconstruction and development of disaster affected areas and the **Donor** for the above purpose is desirous of undertaking the implementation and development of a Housing Project herein mentioned to provide permanent shelter to those displaced by the Tsunami disaster of 26th December 2004.

NOW THE PARTIES HERETO HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: -**1. Subject of the MOU**

- 1.1 The **Donor** has offered and undertaken to develop a Housing Project with the construction of **20 (Twenty)** Single Housing Units (hereinafter referred to as "the **Project**") on **Beneficiaries own Lands** in the Divisional Secretariat Division of **Kalutara and Beruwala** in the District of **Kalutara** for the displaced and/or homeless people affected by the Tsunami disaster of 26th December 2004.
- 1.2 The **District Secretary** for and on behalf of the **GOSL** and in consultation with the relevant state institutions and local authorities and in recognition of the generosity of the **Donor** is desirous of reciprocating by providing all necessary non-monetary assistance to ensure the smooth and speedy implementation of the **Project**.

2. General Responsibilities of the Parties


- 2.1 The Donor shall implement the Project by constructing 20 (Twenty) Single Housing Units on **Beneficiaries own Lands** in the Divisional Secretariat Division of **Kalutara and Beruwala** in the District of **Kalutara** (hereinafter referred to as "the Land") provided for the said purpose by the **DONOR**.
- 2.2 The Donor shall transfer the ownership of the Housing Units free from all encumbrances to the deserving recipients on completion of the project.
- 2.3 The selection of recipients for the Housing Units of Project shall be the responsibility of the **GOSL** and the **GOSL** shall make such selections in consultation with the Divisional Secretary/Secretaries and other state institutions and local authorities, the Donor and other organizations and persons associated with disaster relief activities and in accordance with the guidelines of Community Centered Consultative Planning Process for permanent housing in Post Tsunami Housing Reconstruction (PTR) provided by the **RADA**.
- 2.4 The Donor shall construct the Housing Units of the Project in keeping with the planning guidelines, designs, specifications and standards provided for the said purpose by the Urban Development Authority.
- 2.5 The Donor in the preparation of layout plans shall provide sufficient space for roadside tree planting and for the proper drainage systems.
- 2.6 The Donor shall ensure that each Housing Unit shall have a minimum floor area of **500 Square Feets** with front verandah, two bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen and a toilet with a minimum valuation of Rs. 650,000.00 and the Donor shall facilitate the provision of water, electricity and adequate sanitary and drainage systems including all internal infrastructure.
- 2.7 For the successful and timely completion of the Project within the stipulated time period, the Donor shall enter into a Contractual arrangement with a contractor registered with the Institute for Construction, Training and Development (**ICTAD**).

- 2.8 The **Donor** shall make available to the **District Secretary** a copy of the Contract entered into with the **contractor** in respect of the Project.
- 2.9 Specifications for building construction, land reclamation, plumbing, electrical wiring, quality of materials and all other related installation and workmanship shall be in conformity with the ICTAD specifications. The **Donor** shall be entitled to the certificate of completion from the **Divisional Secretary** only on satisfactory compliance with the specifications mentioned above.
- 2.10 The **District Secretary, Divisional Secretary, RADA** and **District Engineer** shall monitor the construction of Housing Units of the **Project** to ensure due compliance of the planning guidelines, designs, standards and specifications mentioned above.
- 2.11 The **District Secretary** shall facilitate in obtaining all statutory approvals and licenses required for the construction and implementation of the Project and the **GOSL** shall be responsible for providing infrastructure facilities and amenities including water, electricity and access to the Project site and to the Housing Units of the Project.
- 2.12 The **Donor** shall prepare and submit a detailed implementation program of the Project upon signing of this **MOU** and shall complete the Project within a period of **six (06) months** from the date of handing over the Land to the **Donor**.
- 2.13 In the event of a failure and/or inability on the part of the **Donor** to complete the Project in accordance with the stipulations in this **MOU**, the **Donor** hereby agrees to complete the Project or any part remaining thereof and in such event the **Donor** shall cease to enjoy any privilege, benefit and/or other facility made available towards the successful and timely completion of the Project and the **GOSL** shall give prior notice in writing, to observe or perform as the case may be and if at the expiration of the said notice, such performances shall not have been observed, **GOSL** shall be entitled to take action against the **Donor** in accordance with the rules and regulations established by law.
- 2.14 The Party of the First Part and the Party of the Second Part hereto shall use their best endeavours for the implementation of the Project in a timely and satisfactory manner as hereby agreed.

2.15 In the event of disagreement so as to any dispute, controversy or claim between the parties arising out of this MOU or breach, termination or invalidity thereof, unless settled amicably shall be referred to an Arbitrator appointed in accordance with the Arbitration Act No. 11 of 1995.

2.16 Neither of the Parties shall be responsible for non-performance or breach of its obligations under force majeure situations. Notwithstanding the foregoing the Parties hereto shall act in good faith to fulfill each of their respective obligations

Signed at Kalutara on this 16th day of November 2006.


.....

For and on behalf of the
GOSL

Name: *Mr S.Hapuarachchi*

Title: District Secretary
(Kalutara)

එස්. හපුආරච්චි
දිස්ත්‍රික් ලෙකම්/දිසාපති
කළුතර.
ස්වදේශ කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශයේ
අතිරේක ලේකම්,

Witness 1) 

Witness 2) 


.....


For and on behalf of the
RADA

Name: *Mrs.Shanti Fernando*

Title: Chief Operating
Officer

Witness 1)

Witness 2)


.....

For and on behalf of
the Donor

Name: *Neville Nanayakkara*

Title: **Director General**
Neville Nanayakkara

Director General
Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
No. 307 2/1, T. B. Jayah Mawatha,
Colombo-10.

Witness 1) 

Witness 2) 

Appendix D – Background of the RCM response

Mid-Term Review Report Part I / Common Sections / Kalutara 2006

Part 1 Common Sections

The Part 1 Common Sections outlines the cross-cutting issues, objectives, applied methodology, common findings, conclusions and recommendations that are applicable across the board for the projects reviewed. It is followed by Part 2 Project Specific Sections, which have the focus on the particular issues of each of the projects in the review.

1.1 A Background for the RC/RC Projects

1.1.1 Overview of the tsunami recovery programme

The tsunami of 26th of Dec. 2004 devastated over two thirds of Sri Lanka's coastline, affecting about one million people, with 35,322 registered fatalities¹ and 21,411 injured persons, furthermore displacing 516,150 people in 14 districts. Overall, 65,275 houses were fully damaged and 38,561 were considered to be partially damaged. An estimated 150 thousand livelihoods in the coastal areas were adversely affected, with 75% of the fishing fleet damaged² (16,919 boats). Educational facilities were extensively damaged (195 facilities damaged or destroyed, including 182 schools) and health facilities (100 affected) were also hit hard. To make things worse, approximately 60,000 wells were contaminated, and 23,449 acres of agricultural lands were affected by the disaster, in addition to extensive overall damage to infrastructure³.

The immediate response to the disaster was unprecedented. The influx of internal and external assistance to the affected areas was massive, and (according to the GOSL) the relief operation and the immediate recovery of infrastructure were successful in averting further loss of life and in the provision of emergency accommodation for the affected populations, with a further commissioning of 60,000 transitional shelters at a later stage. It has been reported⁴ that 80% of the fishing industry was restored to pre-tsunami levels quite rapidly, and the health facilities and schools also managed to gear up within manageable timeframes.

In the first instance the GOSL assigned the coordination function of the relief operation to Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), later rolled into the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA), while the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and the locally set up Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) were at the core of the information sharing between the local and international non-government organizations (NGOs/INGOs).

1.1.2 The Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement Response

In conjunction with the Sri Lankan Red Cross society, over 70 National Societies pledged their support to the tsunami response, totalling over one billion US dollars. As an immediate response, eight Emergency Response Units (ERUs) were deployed, and thirty-two Participating National Societies (PNSs) were active in-country. Out of these, 23 PNSs have since committed to mid- and long term support to the recovery programming.

The Federation Recovery Assessment Team (RAT), in its report of February, 2005, proposed the reconstruction of housing (both temporary and permanent), together with water and sanitation, and livelihoods as key components of the Recovery Strategy and Operational Framework for the RC/RC Movement in Sri Lanka. This evaluation has a specific focus on permanent housing, however taking note of the links that this component has with water and sanitation and livelihood-linked efforts.

¹ Source: Government of Sri Lanka, December 2005

² Source: FAO, Ministry of Fishing and Agriculture

³ GOSL (2005) Post Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction. Joint report of the Government of Sri Lanka and its Development Partners, December, 2005.

⁴ Telford, J. and Cosgrove, J. (2006) Joint evaluation of international response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) (www.tsunamireports.org)

The RC/RC Movement coordination in the tsunami response is institutionally framed through the Movement Platform, a joint body of the National Society, the IFRC and the ICRC, where strategic and policy decisions are made, serving as the voice for the RC/RC operation and providing public communication guidelines for the RC/RC in-country partners. The Movement Task Force, involving also the partnering PNSs, in turn ensures the strategic direction and compatibility of the RC/RC operations in conjunction with the Movement, the National Society and the GOSL, maintaining an operational overview with a continuous assessment of changing humanitarian needs, and the monitoring of the response. On a more operational level, Technical Committees (with joint SLRCS/IFRC/PNS participation) bring together programme managers and technical experts from specific areas, to develop, adopt and promote coherent, relevant and appropriate approaches and solutions to address the needs of the most vulnerable.

1.1.3 Permanent Housing

To date, the RC/RC Movement has committed itself to supporting fully or partially the construction of 29,714 houses. Out of these, 5,347 houses are fully donor funded with donor managed implementation (so-called "donor-driven"), 3,297 houses are fully donor funded with owners taking the implementation lead (referred to as "owner-driven"), with a further 607 houses being funded by the RC/RC Movement but implemented by a non-Red Cross partner. A total of 6,200 are co-financed by the RC/RC Movement with the owner-driven approach (4,000 (est.) through the SLRCS/IFRC/UN-Habitat partnership and another 1,200 through PNS-led initiatives). Still another 10,778 (est.) owner-driven houses are co-funded through the IFRC/World Bank/IDA partnership, and 4,485 through the Swiss-Austrian RC and SDC initiative.

In total 9,251 houses are being fully funded and 20,463 are being co-funded. As of 30 November 2006, RC progress reports indicate that 6,083 (21%) houses have been completed, another 9,894 (33%) are at foundation level or greater, and 13,737 (46%) are either in process or planned. Project plans indicate that the majority of the housing projects will be finalized during 2007.

In 2006, 21 PNSs, the IFRC and SLRCS are working in Sri Lanka in implementing housing construction projects. As seen from the above, the implementation strategies range from cash grants with owner-driven implementation and beneficiaries themselves reconstructing their damaged or destroyed houses, to extensive relocation projects involving the construction of several hundred new units including infrastructure development and construction of community facilities, implemented through consultants and contractors. The policy environment has seen an opening from centralized donor driven approaches towards owner driven initiatives.

Like most of the tsunami reconstruction effort, the RC/RC construction program has also suffered from considerable delays in implementation, inflated prices for material and labour in the construction market, and a lack of competent and reliable consultants and contractors in the country. Additionally, the basic assumptions that have driven the planning of the projects have changed – sometimes radically – since the start of the RC/RC operation. The identification of available land, the changes in the regulations on restriction of construction and reconstruction within the coastal belt, and the identification of beneficiaries, has put huge challenges on the implementing agencies.

The RC/RC partners are under increasing pressure from the beneficiaries, the GOSL, donors, and the media to expedite the projects and demonstrate that their usage of resources within the construction program is effective, efficient and creating adequate results for the Tsunami affected population.

Appendix E – Questionnaire

Questionnaire

Site Selected:

Name of Interviewer: Date:

Demographic information

- 1 What is the interviewee's sex?
- 2 What is your age?
- 3 When did your family move into the household?
- 4 How many people live in the household?
- 5 How many children live in the household?
- 6 How many working adults live in the household?
- 7 What is the main source of income for the household?
- 8 What would be the average household monthly salary?

Section A - Plot layout and Location

Show a layout of the plot to the beneficiaries

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|-----|----|------|
| A | 1 | What aspects do you like about the plot layout? | | | |
| A | 2 | What aspects do you dislike about the plot layout? | | | |
| A | 3 | Do you and other household members have enough space on your plot to carry out your daily activities? | | | |
| | | | Yes | No | |
| A | 4 | What do you, or the other household members, need extra space for? | | | |
| A | 5 | How would you rate the access to schools from your house? | Bad | Ok | Good |

A	6	How would you rate the access to a doctor from your house?	Bad	Ok	Good
A	7	How would you rate the access to the market from your house?	Bad	Ok	Good
A	8	Do you and other household members have sufficient privacy?	Yes	No	
A	9	If yes, proceed to question 1B . If no, proceed to question 10A			
A	10	Why don't you have sufficient privacy?			

Section B - Beneficiary Consultations prior to Housing Construction

B	1	Were you or any member of your household interviewed by someone before the house was built?	Yes	No	
		If yes, proceed to question 2B . If no, proceed to question 3B			
B	2	Which organisation did this person represent?			
B	3	Were you consulted about the design of your house?	Yes	No	
B	4	Were you consulted about the location of your house?	Yes	No	
		If yes to questions 3B and/or 4B , proceed to question 5B . If no, proceed to question 1C			
B	5	If you were consulted about the design and location of you house, did you want anything changed?	Yes	No	
B	6	What did you want changed?			
B	7	Was it changed?	Yes	No	

Section C - Household Satisfaction Analysis

C	1	Are you happy with the house? If yes, proceed to question 3C . If no, proceed to question 2C .	Yes	No	
C	2	Why are you not happy with the housing?			
C	3	How would you improve the housing design?			

- | | | | | |
|---|----|--|--------|-------|
| C | 4 | Has the location of your house affected the household's income earning ability?
If yes, proceed to question 5C .
If no, proceed to question 6C . | Yes | No |
| C | 5 | How has the location of your household effected the household's income earning ability? | | |
| C | 6 | Do you believe your housing situation is better or worse than before the Tsunami? | Better | Worse |
| C | 7 | Can you please elaborate on why? | | |
| C | 8 | Do you currently use the kitchen?
If yes, proceed to question 10C .
If no, proceed to question 9C | Yes | No |
| C | 9 | Why don't you use the kitchen?
Proceed to question 12C | | |
| C | 10 | Is the size of your kitchen sufficient for your needs?
If yes, proceed to question 12C .
If no, proceed to question 11C | Yes | No |
| C | 11 | What would you do with a larger kitchen? | | |
| C | 12 | Do you use the gas cooker?
If yes, proceed to question 14C .
If no, proceed to question 13C | Yes | No |
| C | 13 | Why don't you use the gas cooker? | | |
| C | 14 | Is the fact that houses look similar for everyone cause you concern? | Yes | No |
| C | 15 | Do you feel safe in your house?
If yes, proceed to question 16C .
If no, proceed to question 17C | Yes | No |

C	16	If yes, why do you feel safe?		
C	17	If no, why don't you feel safe?		
C	18	Do you or any member of the household use the house for income generating activities? If yes, proceed to question 19C . If no, proceed to question 21C	Yes	No
C	19	What income generating activity do you and/or a household member undertake?		
C	20	Is there enough room in or around the house for the purposes of this income generating activity?	Yes	No
C	21	Did you have option to add extra items to the house, like an additional toilet, if you provided the money?	Yes	No
C	22	Did moving into the new household make it easier or more difficult for household members to continue their livelihoods?	Easier	More Difficult
C	23	How did it make it easier or more difficult?		
C	24	Is there enough storage space in the house? If yes, proceed to question 25C . If no, proceed to question 1D	Yes	No
C	25	What would extra storage space be required for?		

Section D - Post Tsunami Discussions

D	1	Were you ever visited by anybody after your house construction to discuss housing satisfaction, locality of schools, community centres, shops, government offices and medical services? If yes, proceed to question 2D . If no, proceed to question 4D	Yes	No
D	2	Were these discussions beneficial?	Yes	No

- D 3 What would you liked to have changed regarding these discussions?
- D 4 If you had any complaints about how the house was being built, did you know who to contact? Yes No
If yes, proceed to **question 5D**.
If no, proceed to **question 1E**
- D 5 Who would you contact?

Section E - Roles and Responsibilities

- E 1 Have you been informed what the Red Cross will do (or not do) for you from now onwards? Yes No
- E 2 When were you told this?
- E 3 Who would be responsible if there are problems with the house from now onwards? You The Red Cross
- E 4 Under the agreement to build your house, is the Red Cross expected to provide anything else to you? Yes No
If yes, proceed to **question 5E**.
If no, proceed to **question 6E**
- E 5 What are they still to provide?
- E 6 Do you know who to contact if you have further questions regarding construction related problems? Yes No
If yes, proceed to **question 7E**.
If no, proceed to **question 1F**
- E 7 Who would you contact and what are their contact details?

Section F - Complaints and Problems

- F 1 Did you have any complaints within one year immediately after moving in? Yes No
If yes, proceed to **question 2F**.
If no, proceed to **question 3F**

- F 2 What were your complaints?
- F 3 Were these adequately addressed? Yes No
 If yes, proceed to **question 5F**.
 If no, proceed to **question 4F**
- F 4 If not, please explain what areas were not adequately addressed
- F 5 Do you have problems with electricity, water and/or toilet drainage?
 If yes, proceed to **question 6F**. If no, proceed to **question 7G**
- F 6 What types of problems do you have in relation to these?
 If problems are the same as the answers to question 4, write "see q. 4"

Section H - Pre-Tsunami

- H 1 Where did you live pre-tsunami?
- H 2 Is the place you lived pre-tsunami near the ocean?
- H 3 What were the walls of your pre-tsunami house made from?
- H 4 What kind of lighting did you use in your dwellings pre-tsunami?
 candles lamps electrical lighting
 Other (please specify):
- H 5 Pre-Tsunami, where did you get drinking water from?
 Tap connected to government water supply Outside water catchment
 Well River
 Other (please specify):
- H 6 What kind of toilets did you use pre-tsunami?
 Flush Toilet Outside toilet
 No toilet Inside non-flushing toilet

H	7	Did someone associated with the Red Cross Movement explain how to use toilets, water systems and electricity? If yes, proceed to question 8H . If no, proceed to question 10H	Yes	No
H	8	Was this explanation adequate? If yes, proceed to question 10H . If no, proceed to question 9H	Yes	No
H	9	What was wrong with the explanation?		
H	10	Do you currently use the lights in your home? If yes, proceed to question 12H . If no, proceed to question 11H	Yes	No
H	11	Why don't you use the lights in your home?		
H	12	Do you currently use the water from the taps? If yes, proceed to question H14 . If no, proceed to question 13H	Yes	No
H	13	Why don't you use the water from the taps?		
H	14	What was the main source of income for the household prior to the tsunami?		

Section I - Explanation of utility payments

I	1	Did someone explain to you how to pay the electricity, gas and water bills? If yes, proceed to question 2I . If no, proceed to question 1J	Yes	No
I	2	Was this explanation adequate? If yes, proceed to question 1J . If no, proceed to question 3I	Yes	No
I	3	What was wrong with the explanation?		

Section J - Budgeting and affordability

J	1	Did someone explain how to budget for water, gas and electricity? If yes, proceed to question 2J . If no, proceed to question 4J	Yes	No
J	2	Was this explanation adequate? If yes, proceed to question 4J . If no, proceed to question 3J	Yes	No
J	3	What was wrong with the explanation?		
J	4	Have you paid the most recent electricity bill?	Yes	No
J	5	Have you paid the most recent gas bill?	Yes	No
J	6	Have you paid the most recent water bill?	Yes	No

Section K - Government Response

K	1	Have you needed to contact a government agency regarding electricity, water, toilet or gas problems? If yes, proceed to question 2K . If no, proceed to question 1L	Yes	No
K	2	What service (electricity, water, toilet or gas) did you need to contact them about?		
K	3	Did you contact them? If yes, proceed to question 4K . If no, proceed to question 1L	Yes	No
K	4	Did they respond? If yes, proceed to question 5K . If no, proceed to question 1L	Yes	No
K	5	Were you happy with this response?	Yes	No

Section L - Sustainability

- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|-----|----|
| L | 1 | Did the Red Cross or any other donor provide you with household items?
If yes, proceed to question 2L .
If no, proceed to question 4L | Yes | No |
| L | 2 | Which donor provided this material? | | |
| L | 3 | What items did they provide? | | |
| L | 4 | How long do you think you believe you will be living here? | | |

Section M - Ownership

- | | | | | |
|---|---|--|-----|----|
| M | 1 | Do you know what kind of document you require to prove ownership?
If yes, proceed to question 20 .
If no, proceed to question 1P | Yes | No |
| M | 2 | What is the name of the document and where do you get it from? | | |
| M | 4 | Do you, or any other household member, own another house or building?
If yes, proceed to question 5P | Yes | No |
| M | 5 | What other houses or buildings are owned? | | |

Section O - Observations

Ask permission to observe various aspects of the house

- | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| O | 1 | Observe that the walls of the room you are in are straight | Walls are straight | Walls are not straight |
| O | 2 | Observe whether the walls in the room you are in are free from structural cracks | Walls have cracks | Walls free from cracks |
| O | 3 | Observe whether the floor in the room you are in is free from structural cracks | Floor is not free from structural cracks | Floor is free from structural cracks |

O	4	Observe whether the roof does not sag	Roof Sags	Roof does not sag
O	5	Observe whether the taps leak or not	Leaking Taps	Taps do not leak
<i>After gaining appropriate permission</i>				
O	6	Turn on a light switch	Light turns on	Light does not turn on
O	7	Go to the kitchen and open the tap	Water flows	Water does not flow
O	8	Visually inspect whether the household has at least one couch	Couch present	No couch present
O	9	Visually inspect whether households contains a dining table	Dinning table present	No dining table present
O	10	Visually inspect whether households contain at least one television	TV present	No TV present
O	11	Observe and note down if there were any add-ons or extensions inside or outside the house (like an extra kitchen)		

Section P - Technical Measurements

P	1	What are the measurements of the toilet in feet?
P	2	What are the measurements of the kitchen in feet?

Section P

P	1	If you could change how the entire housing donation scheme was undertaken, what would you change?
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F.1 Programme Design

F.1.1 Relevance Tsunami Needs

F.1.1a Finding: The Tsunami devastated the coastal areas of Sri Lanka along the South, West and East of the country, resulting in many deaths and human displacement. Furthermore, as communicated during key interviews from surveys, many of the communities that were affected lived in shanties near the ocean and even pre-tsunami, were the most vulnerable. ‘

F.1.1a Conclusion: The DDH program is relevant to the needs created by the Tsunami and targets the most vulnerable people.

F.1.2 Relevance to RCM goals

F.1.2a Finding: There are specific references to providing shelter for vulnerable people in the IFRC Regional Strategy 2 and the IFRC Sri Lankan Delegation Response to Regional Strategy. At the time of the Tsunami, the SLRCS did not have a Tsunami response strategy.

F.1.2a Conclusion: The Shelter program is clearly relevant to the goals of the RCM.

F.1.3 Appropriateness of Program Approach (in relation to construction)

The scope of works, which outlines the program approach to construction, was largely undertaken by the consultant. It includes, among other things a land survey and housing designs. Note that there were some RCM scoping out documents in the project files, however they were sporadic and not coherent across the sampled projects.

F.1.3a Finding: The land survey included information on the location, terrain, nearest facilities, existing infrastructure, sanitary disposal systems, house designs and finishes to the houses. Constraints were also illustrated. For example, in areas where the terrain is very flat, the need to construct access roads and the difficulty relating to the disposal of storm water was noted. Additionally, in areas with large slopes, dense vegetation and minimal infrastructure, the costs of construction were explained.

Some proposals also highlighted overall community needs. To illustrate, the Ismailpuram proposal presented the need for a pre-school, community centre, playgrounds and commercial areas within the overall site plan.

F.1.3a Conclusion: Overall the land survey appears appropriate given the development of the Sri Lankan economy in relation to the construction sector.

F.1.3b Finding: Evidence from site inspections suggest houses were largely designed in accordance with local requirements and cultural norms. For instance, in regards to the single story house, there was a decision to supply either mains water or single overhead plastic tanks to each housing unit. Note an exception appears to be on the Ontachimadam site, where a communal overhead tank was used for the first phase and then single overhead tanks for each house were utilised for the second phase.

Further, all waste water was designed to be disposed of through separate soakpits and septic tanks for each house. Other infrastructure components such as retaining walls, which were required due to the heavy contouring and slope of some of the sites, were ultimately incorporated into the housing design (including infrastructure).

F.1.3b Conclusion: The construction of the single story and double story houses appeared to largely be in accordance with the designs approved by the Urban Development Authority (UDA).

F.1.3c Finding: There appears to be little in the way of redefining, value engineering and social considerations to the scope of works within the projects inception. For instance, there is little to show that the client looked at the site inspection report and undertook an exercise to see if the proposed design for the whole project was appropriate based around the parameters of time, cost, quality, risk and appropriateness (value engineering)³². Even if the project was seen to be fully meeting the client's requirements at the time of submission of the site investigation report, it may have been prudent for the client to have undertaken technical evaluation meetings that address the key value engineering requirements and agree that they meet the client needs. The project proposal checklist does make reference to a Technical Committee meeting and minutes, but they are not in the files.

F.1.3c Conclusion: Redefining, value engineering and social considerations were not adequately addressed in the program design.

F.1.4 Appropriateness of Program Approach (beyond construction service delivery alone)

Beneficiary Involvement

F.1.4a Finding: Beneficiary selection was undertaken by the government with little or no input from any of the Red Cross Movement Partners. This was verified through key interviews and review of the project file. Nevertheless, the correspondence in the project file review indicated that the Red Cross wanted to be involved in beneficiary selection prior to housing construction (see for example Thalgasgodawatte file). It appears that in many cases, the main obstacle preventing this occurring was that the government wanted to manage the beneficiary selection process.

F.1.4a Conclusion: Beneficiary selection was not undertaken by the Red Cross prior to construction due largely to government instance on managing the beneficiary selection process.

F.1.4b Finding: The government kept changing beneficiary lists and in some instances, beneficiaries who were initially selected houses with other organizations.

F.1.4b Conclusion: The government changed beneficiary lists throughout the construction process.

F.1.4c Finding: There was no indication that after beneficiaries lists were provided by the government, lists were appropriately vetted by the RCM. Information, if it existed, consisted of determining the number of dependents, number of children and the civil status of the beneficiary. There was no consideration for income, financial standing or critically, their 'pre-tsunami' dwellings.

F.1.4c Conclusion: Sufficiently rigorous beneficiary vetting was not undertaken by the RCM after beneficiary lists were provided by the government.

³²In one of the project files (Ismailpuram), there is a single document written by the IFRC to redefine, value engineer and overview social considerations to the scope of works within the projects inception. However it is not evident that the suggestions and recommendations were followed up and incorporated into the overall project design as deemed appropriate.

Livelihoods Considerations

F.1.4d Finding: There appears to be some consideration for a livelihoods team to engage with people in sites during the program design phase. During the program itself, there was an IFRC livelihoods team working with the sites in Matara and a Canadian Red Cross team working within sites in Galle and Colombo. While evaluating the effectiveness of these teams in discharging their duties is beyond the scope of this report, there were some critical factors that fell under the purview of the livelihoods team and were not addressed. For instance, 58 percent of all surveyed people stated they did not know what the RCM would do for them going forward and 72 percent of surveyed people believed the IFRC had to provide more services to the households going forward. These percentages remain at levels above 50 percent in Matara, Galle and Colombo.

F.1.4d Conclusion: While livelihood teams were present in some sites, they did not appear to convey important information relating to the roles and responsibilities of the RCM to the beneficiaries. Note, a comprehensive evaluation of the livelihoods team was not taken as part of this report.

F.1.4e Findings: From a livelihoods perspective the clay brick industry is an informal and formal employer in rural areas for manufacture, supply and delivery. Hence, if houses were constructed using clay bricks, the local economy may have been boosted. Indeed, nearly all owner driven houses are constructed using clay bricks for the issues of cost, supply, livelihood enterprise etc and would be durable if they are manufactured in a controlled manner and plastered on the outside. However, DDH were built primarily from cement blocks that were transported large distances and produced in much larger workshops. Thus, the amount of local enterprise and cash flow into communities is reduced.

F.1.4e Conclusion: The use of clay bricks as opposed to cement may have been more appropriate from a livelihoods perspective.

Cultural Considerations

F.1.4f Findings: There were some cultural issues in relation to the design of the house that were noted during the qualitative process of beneficiary surveys.

- Many of the survey respondents could not afford to buy gas for their stoves and some had never previously used gas stoves. Hence, they usually cook with firewood. However, this requires a chimney which was not available at all housing sites. In the absence of a chimney to relieve the kitchen of smoke, some families began building an 'outside' kitchen, leaving the inside kitchen primarily for aesthetic purposes. Further there is a safety issue in relation to people who have never previously used gas stoves and have not been trained in their usage.
- In the Charliment II site, people stated that the houses faced west which was inappropriate when funerals are undertaken. Further, the number of timber fascia/valance boards (or wood panels) on the roof were even when the 'auspicious' number is odd.
- There was evidence that consultants working on more recent housing sites, in conjunction with RCM personnel, incorporated lessons learnt from prior cultural issues into their designs. For instance, in Onthachimadam phase II, which was designed after other sites, the houses have separate overhead water tanks, canopies over windows, plastic doors to the bathrooms, chimneys and storage spaces.

Further, in regards to the Ratmalana site, the building of condominiums for people who have previously lived in shanties is relatively new and uncharted territory in Sri Lanka. Moreover, living in and maintaining this building is not something that these beneficiaries naturally understand and there is no evidence to suggest the consultants or the RCM considered this within the program design.

F.1.4f Conclusion: Some design specifications, particularly relating to the lack of an outside kitchen and chimney as well as the provision for gas stove or solid fuel usage instead of space for firewood, were not appropriate from a cultural, practical and safety perspective. Further, the appropriateness of providing beneficiaries with condominiums when their previous experience involved living in shanties was not considered from a cultural perspective.

Legal Considerations

F.1.4g Finding: The legal ramifications of a contractor, client, the SLRCS or the IFRC not fulfilling their obligations is complex and time consuming given the time required to settle arbitration in the Sri Lanka court system. For instance, key interviewees indicated that in many instances, the RCM acceded to the arguments of the consultants or contractors as they could not spend time undertaking legal proceedings. Furthermore, given the IFRC is immune from prosecution, legally the consultants and contractors could only sue the SLRCS. Whether such a situation is fair to the SLRCS, the consultants and contractors is uncertain.

Another area of concern is in regards to the legality of the MOU; while the SLRCS can be held to account if it fails to meet its obligations, the recourse beneficiaries or the SLRCS have if the government does not adhere to its obligations is uncertain. Additionally, there was no consideration as to who would legally govern the condominiums after program close out.

F.1.4g Conclusion: The legal complexities of involving various stakeholders in the housing construction process did not appear to be considered when designing the DDH program.

Environmental Considerations

F.1.4h Finding: Key interviewees insist that the DDH program considered environmental factors by ensuring materials used met National Building Research Organisation standards and that asbestos was not used. Further, roof structures were imported from Malaysia instead of using coconut from local trees due to the potential upward pressure on the price of coconuts in the local market. Note; no supporting documentation was cited to corroborate these claims.

F.1.4h Conclusion: RCM claimed they followed environmental friendly policies by ensuring materials used met national standards and asbestos was not used.

F.1.4i Finding: The project file reviews suggested a comprehensive environmental analysis was not undertaken prior to program inception. Further this was not required under the agreement with the consultant. As a caveat to this finding, key interviewees suggested that senior management did want to undertake environmental analysis but did not have time as they were pressured into building houses by the government.

F.1.4i Conclusion: A comprehensive environmental analysis was not undertaken prior to program inception due in part to government pressure for expediency in the construction process.

F.1.4j Finding: If considerations of other program and project modalities existed, they were not documented.

F.1.4j Conclusion: Other program and project modalities did not appear to be considered at the design stage.

F.1.5 Appropriateness of Site Locations

F.1.5a Finding: Some housing sites were located far from the ocean, thus detrimentally affecting the livelihoods of household members. People in the Charlimont sites, Ethinagahawatte and Ontachimadam sites have a large concentration of fishermen who complained that the distance from the ocean detrimentally impacted their livelihoods. Further, information gathered from surveys revealed that beneficiaries were concerned at the distance to all forms of employment, markets, schools medical facilities and transport facilities.

Importantly, there was pressure to accept any land that was given by the government as land was scarce at the time of the Tsunami. Further, review of Charlimont Project file indicates that issues relating to housing location were highlighted by an IFRC delegate who suggested that the Charlimont site should only be taken as a last resort.

F.1.5a Conclusion: Although the housing sites may not always be appropriately located from a livelihoods perspective, the selection of DDH sites was not controlled by the IFRC but were instead, driven by the government.

F.1.5b Finding: The site locations were earmarked for development by the government. Hence, the pressure to commence construction overtook evaluation of other site locations (if available), cost comparisons, value engineering and the cost of associated infrastructure (such as roads) to the houses on site locations.

F.1.5b Conclusion: The RCM had little control over site location and hence could not control site 'appropriateness'.

F.1.5c Finding: An analysis of the site locations by consultants were undertaken prior to housing construction. For instance, in the Ethingawatte site, the lack of good infrastructure facilities was clearly identified by the consultant at the time of scoping out the project. The site was deemed to be difficult to construct on from the design stage, due to its location, accessibility and topography. In Thalgasgodawatte, the steep slopes, dense vegetation and clay soil were also noted by the consultant as a factor constraining housing construction. Further, they also ensured careful consideration of rainwater management in terms of surface water drainage.

There is evidence a clear site location and orientation plan was produced for the majority of the sites. Access roads, common spaces and in some plans, the provision for a pond and community facilities were also clearly demarcated.

F.1.5c Conclusion: Overall from a technical perspective, the consultants appeared to have undertaken an appropriate analysis of site locations.

F.1.5d Finding: The appropriateness of the site locations from a social perspective were very briefly considered by the consultants. These generally included availability of transport facilities, medical facilities, schools and markets. There was no specific consideration of employment facilities.

F.1.5d Conclusion: The consultants undertook a superficial social analysis of facilities required by communities.

F.1.6 Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Movement Coordination Framework

Joint Partnership Agreement

F.1.6a Finding: A general consensus exists among key interviewees that the joint partnership agreement ultimately resulted in a parallel structure which detrimentally affected the capacity of the RCM to follow through in its mandate. For instance, accounting, HR management and logistic functions were maintained by both SLRCS and IFRC in regards to the DDH program, ultimately resulting in duplication of work. Further, management through committees was considered problematic due to the difficulty in reaching consensus across all people involved.

F.1.6a Conclusion: Operating a parallel structure within the joint coordination framework decreased efficiency and duplicated work.

F.1.6b Finding: Key interviewees suggested that the capacity of the Sri Lankan National Society at the time of the Tsunami was overestimated. After the Tsunami, over 300 delegates arrived, many of whom were required to work with the SLRCS in a joint partnership agreement. Prior to the Tsunami, the SLRCS worked with less than 50 delegates.

F.1.6b Conclusion: The capacity of the SLRCS to engage effectively in a joint partnership agreement did not appear to be adequately addressed.

F.1.6c Finding: Key interviewees indicated that there was a high turnover of construction delegates. Indeed some construction delegates only maintained one year contracts. Considering the learning curve and in-country knowledge required, longer term contracts may have provided a more effective and efficient approach to construction.

F.1.6c Conclusion: The high turnover of construction delegates reduced the institutional knowledge, lack of continuity and potentially resulted in reduced efficiency and effectiveness.

Cultural Differences

F.1.6d Finding: Key interviewees indicated instances where foreign and local employees were not aware of other countries' cultures and customs. For instance, foreign staff were unaware that local companies regularly did not use 'hard hats' when building houses. Another example is that consultants did not understand the importance placed by foreign staff on ensuring timely completion of agreed upon deliverables.

F.1.6d Conclusion: Cross-cultural awareness training was not provided to either IFRC or SLRCS personnel, resulting in some misunderstandings between foreign and local personnel.

F.1.6e Finding: Assumptions were made regarding safety standards of local workers. For instance, the IFRC assumed that locals would be required to adhere to international safety requirements even though this may not be a requirement under local law. As such, these requirements were not included in the agreements signed with contractors. Hence, expenditure on additional safety equipment was not factored in by contractors.

F.1.6e Conclusion: Levels of safety standards were assumed and thus not included in the agreement with contractor.

Tendering for Consultants and Contractors

F.1.6f Finding: Key Interviewees claimed that the procedures required for approval to hire consultants and contractors were onerous and contributed to delays in housing construction. Approval for a new project involved first ensuring the concept paper and project proposal was approved by a task force. Subsequently signatures were required from logistics, finance, the line manager and head of department. Approval for a consultant then required the unanimous consent of a 10 member technical evaluation committee and a 10 member tender board in Sri Lanka followed by a 5 member committee for contract in Geneva. Key interviewees claimed this process resulted in delays in commencing housing construction.

Further, the head of delegation can only approve expenditure up to 50,000 USD. This amount represented a small percentage of funds available and spent on Tsunami related construction projects.

F.1.6f Conclusion: The requirements of multiple signatures and unanimous consent for committees for tender approval decreased efficiency and effectiveness in housing construction.

F.1.6g Finding: The IFRC policy requires that lowest most responsive bidder be selected as the contractor or consultant. Hence M3 level contractors were selected, while the more expensive M2 and M1 contractors were ignored.

Critically, selecting the 'cheapest' firm may also involve selecting the least experienced site managers with the least previous experience developing houses. To illustrate, the correspondence in the Charlimont project file indicates that at times, site managers were not present on the sites while the project file review also suggests inadequate social analysis was conducted prior to program implementation.

While it cannot be empirically proven that a more expensive consultant or contractor would have produced a better result, the probability of issues relating to site manager presence and excessive construction cost over-runs may have been reduced if the consultant and contractor selection process involved providing greater weight to factors other than cost.

As a caveat to the above finding, it is noted that contractors and consultants were 'government approved'. Hence arguably, the IFRC expected that all met a minimum competency benchmark. Nevertheless, the requirements of the Tsunami reconstruction effort far exceed the previous volume handled by the construction industry⁵³ and it is uncertain as to whether this was taken into account when considering competency of contractors and consultants.

F.1.6g Conclusion: The RCM requirement that the cheapest consultant and contractor are selected may not necessarily provide the best value for money.

⁵³ Prior to the Tsunami, the housing industry was producing approximately 10,000 houses a year. For the year beginning February 2005, an additional 35,000 houses were constructed. This information was gathered from a key interview of Mr. Nirosha from the SLRCS TSSU.



සුනාමි ව්‍යාප්තියෙන් විනාඩි පැවැදිලිවීමේ වෙනම කොමරන් සේව් කිවීම ප්‍රදානයයි

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The Dedication of a Permanent House to Victims Displaced by the Tsunami Catastrophe

The Sri Lanka Red Cross Society, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Operation Red Cross are pleased to dedicate the house bearing no. 10/10, Rathmalana, Colombo, as a beneficiary under their Food Stores Land Tsunami Community Housing Project implemented for the victims of the Tsunami catastrophe of December 26, 2004 in the district of Colombo in the Rathmalana East Grama Niladhari area of the

We wish you a very bright future!

ආශ්වාතියෙන් විනාඩි වැඩි වශයෙන් මරණයට පත්වූ අයගේ ස්මාරකයක් ලෙසින් මෙම නිවස ඉදිකර දීමට මා සතුටු පවතිමි.

6.3.1 Effectiveness of Program Management

Consultants

F.2.1a Finding: Key interviews and review of the project files suggest that the effectiveness of the project management by the consultant across sites was poor. Much of the problems involved the following issues;

- In most cases, there was a lack of a consultant on site full time. This reduced the consultant's ability to manage the contractors effectively. Some key interviewees claim the time taken for contracts to begin (due to government delays providing beneficiary lists and land allocation) reduced the ability of consultants to 'hold' onto their staff in a cost effective manner. Hence arguably, under these circumstances, the inability of consultants to ensure consistent site presence of staff is some what excusable.
- Pertinent variations were missed by the consultant and had to be driven by the RCM technical team. For example, in the Onthachimadam site, the consultant missed out a crucial piece of house design (roof tie beam).
- It is clear from the lack of information and records in the project files, that in many cases, the consultant did not deliver the required project management needs for the project as per the contract deliverables. For instance, issues around active project management, key site supervision, monitoring and weekly and monthly reporting are lacking from the files. Indeed, in some cases (for example the Ethingawatte site), the only progress reports in the files were produced by the RCM engineers. Further, there are no specific sections in the files to show risk apportioning or variation award, except for the integration of chimneys and kitchen worktops.
- The consultant's engineer had limited authority over the contractors to manage the project.

F.2.1a Conclusion: Effectiveness of project management by the consultant was poor mainly due to lack of consultant presence on site, lack of management ability by some consultants, lack of records provided by the consultants and a general lack of authority the consultants had over contractors.

F.2.1b Finding: Key interviewees highlighted that the consultant would suggest a timeframe for project completion without discussing this with the contractors. Hence, the contractors may agree to finish construction faster than their normal timeframe.

F.2.1b Conclusion: Lack of communication between the consultant and the contractor in the timeframe required for project completion may have pressured contractors to work at a faster pace than normal for sporadic periods, potentially reducing the quality of the final houses.

F.2.1c Finding: Monthly reports were not consistently available in project files and only a few progress reports were filed. Minutes of meetings were also very sporadic and in instances when they existed, were driven largely by the SLRCS/IFRC.

F.2.1c Conclusion: Adequate documentation from consultants was not sighted in the project files.

Red Cross Movement

F.2.1d Finding: Mid-term and final specific project reviews of selected Tsunami Housing sites were undertaken by the SLRCS/IFRC construction units.

F.2.1d Conclusion: Mid-term and final specific project reviews of selected DDH sites were undertaken by the RCM.

F.2.1e Finding: The project file review suggests that the RCM exceeded their initial agreed upon role by providing micro, rather than macro, management of the housing construction due to short-comings of consultants. In certain instances, the RCM took over management of the entire program as the consultant did not appear to have project management and decision making ability. To illustrate, the meetings of minutes for Ismailpuram note that the construction management for the overall project of 93 IFRC homes was being led by the German RC with close collaboration with the SLRCS and IFRC field project staff.

F.2.1e Conclusion: The RCM demonstrated adaptability to ground realities and took over management of certain projects from the consultants when required.

F.2.1f Finding: From a purely construction perspective, the project file review suggests that generally, macro level management by the RCM appear to be rigorous. In many cases, the RCM appeared to regularly correspond with the consultant and government officials to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the housing construction process. The most obvious evidence for successful macro level management is that most designs are sound from a purely technical perspective (refer finding 6.4.1b).

An exception to the rigor of the RCM macro-level management appears to be that some project files do not include all required information. For instance, in some project files, there were over three month periods where minutes of meetings were not maintained. Another example is that there are 180 beneficiaries on the list for Thalgasgodawatte however the site only has 56 houses.

A construction related exception may be the early decision by the RCM to ignore a consultant's recommendation to have larger septic tanks in the Rathmalana site. Failure to include this resulted in the overflowing of septic tanks after houses were provided to beneficiaries. Another exception is the decision by the RCM to not include grills on windows of houses. Beneficiaries indicated the lack of grills was a safety issues. Nevertheless, these decisions were made based purely due to cost considerations and not oversights by the RCM per se.

F.2.1f Conclusion: Overall, the RCM appears to have undertaken rigorous macro level management decisions even though all these decisions may not have been adequately documented.

Effectiveness of the Client, Contractor and Consultant Relationship

F.2.1g Finding: From a review of the files maintained by the Red Cross, documentation and information sharing from the consultant appears to be inadequate. Documentation based around time, cost and quality from scope of works to project completion is evident, but not consistent in project flow. In the majority of cases, the consultant clearly did not prepare and submit the required deliverables to monitor and contractually administer the project. Few records seem to approach the implementation of the project from a practical decision making angle.

Assumptions have to be made that a lot more recording and correspondence was prepared and possibly submitted to the RCM to implement and finalize such large projects. For example, in relation to the Onthachimadam project progress photos, labour charts, weather reports, expenditure details, actual and planned progress information are not attached to minutes of meetings or located anywhere else in the project file.

F.2.1g Conclusion: Per review of the project file, there appears to be inadequate documented correspondence between the consultant and client.


F.2.1h Finding: Responses from key interviews and review of correspondence in all project files indicate that a large portion of time was required managing the consultants. This is worrying from the perspective that the consultants were employed to manage the entire operation with little support from the Red Cross.

F.2.1h Conclusion: RCM Resources were drained and diverted due to the unanticipated requirement to micro-manage consultants in relation to project management and site control.

F.2.1i Finding: Figure 6.5.1c illustrates whether the concerns of people who had complaints about their house one year immediately after moving into their homes (defects and liabilities period) were adequately addressed by the consultant from the beneficiaries' perspective.

Figure F.2.1i

If you had complaints in the defects and liabilities period, were these adequately addressed?



- Complaints of most people in the Charliment sites, Thalgasgodawatte and Rathmalana sites were not adequately addressed. In the remaining sites, only half of the people were satisfied that their complaints were adequately addressed.

F.2.1i Conclusion: Across the majority of sites, during the defects and liabilities period, the complaints of most people were not adequately addressed from a beneficiary perspective.

⁵⁴ Quantifying the extra time spent managing the consultants is difficult given the deficiency in paperwork and that the majority of the delegates have left Sri Lanka before the time of this consultancy.

F.2.3 Sustainability

F.2.3a Finding: The RCM undertook a community engagement program after houses were handed over to beneficiaries. This program was designed to address land ownership, dependency of beneficiaries on donors and allow beneficiaries to voice any of their concerns. However in at least two sites, the engagement program was executed approximately 2 years after the houses were initially handed over. Hence the beneficiaries were unaware of important issues such as documentation required to prove ownership, the defects and liability period and RCM involvement going forward. These findings are illustrated in the quantitative findings from the surveys (which were undertaken before the community engagement program). Refer figure F.2.3aa, F.2.3ab and F.2.3ac.

Figure F.2.3aa

Have you been informed what the Red Cross will do (or not do) for you from now onwards?




Figure F.2.3ab

Whose responsibility are household issue going forward?





Figure F.2.3ac

Is IFRC expected to provide any future services?



F.2.3a Conclusion: While the RCM undertook a community engagement program to ‘close out’ the housing programs, in certain cases beneficiaries had to wait two years after being issued with houses before being briefed by the RCM.

F.2.3b Finding: The level of beneficiary involvement throughout the program was minimal. This was in part due to the fact that complete beneficiary lists were not provided by the government to the RCM prior to housing construction.

F.2.3b Conclusion: Beneficiary involvement throughout the construction process was minimal due to delays in receiving beneficiary lists from the government.

F.3 Programme Outputs

F.3.1 Appropriateness

F.3.1a Finding: End users needs and wishes were not specifically considered prior to construction as beneficiaries were not consulted at this time.

F.3.1a Conclusion: End users needs and wishes were not specifically considered prior to construction.

F.3.1b Finding: Technically, housing construction appears to be safe and in accordance with UDA requirements. The houses are of solid masonry/concrete construction with a timber and tiled roof. The overall structure and fabric can be seen as very durable and free from toxic materials. While there are issues around the long term durability of materials such as the doors, locks, taps, the items fitted were per RCM specifications.

Despite the generally sound design of the housing projects, in the Ethingawatte site there was a serious structural failure to one of the retaining walls within the site. Specifically a section of the wall collapsed creating a mud slide following heavy rains. An independent investigation illustrated in the relevant project file apportioned the blame largely on the design and supervision, with poor workmanship also a contributing factor.

F.3.1b Conclusion: Designs and construction appear to be sound from a purely engineering perspective. Note that the designs were not complex from an engineering point of view.

F.3.2 Effectiveness


F.3.2a Finding: The RCM appears to have adhered to the MOUs it signed with the government. Specifically

- the number of houses to be constructed were constructed
- the houses constructed were in accordance with UDA guidelines
- sufficient space was left for road side tree planting and proper drainage
- the RCM entered into a contractual agreement with Institute for Construction Training and Development registered contractors


The houses constructed had a minimum floor area of 500 square feet with two bedrooms, a living room, kitchen and toilet with running water, electricity, sanitation and drainage facilities. Clearly the quality of such facilities varied between sites with some houses not having access to running water and electricity (refer finding 6.5.2b). Further, in some instances these MOUs changed due largely to changes in the number of houses to be built and the time frame for construction.

F.3.2a Conclusion: The RCM appears to have adhered to the MOUs signed with the government. The major exception involves the time frame given to construct houses however in many instances, delays were outside the control of the RCM.

Refer finding 6.2.2 for information on whether the targets of the regional/national Tsunami response strategy have been achieved



GROUND FLOOR PLAN








FIRST FLOOR PLAN

Adherence to RCM Regional Strategic Goals










F.3.2b: The following table considers whether the objectives of the IFRC Regional Strategy 2 and the IFRC Sri Lankan Delegation Response to Regional Strategy were met. At the time of the Tsunami, the SLRCS did not have a Tsunami response strategy.




Objective	Reference		Comment	Reference
Livelihood should be fully incorporated within the shelter program.	Diagram 4, page 5 and page 7 Response to Regional Strategy		A livelihoods program did not appear to be considered as part of the program design, during the construction process or immediately after houses were provided to beneficiaries.	Refer finding 6.2.5d
Health and disaster management program should be incorporated partially with the shelter program	Diagram 4, page 5, Response to Regional Strategy		After the houses were offered, (sometimes 2 years after the houses were offered), The IFRC engaged in a 2 day community engagement program at each site	Refer finding 6.3.3a
Household should have sufficient health and watsan infrastructure	Diagram 4, page 5, Response to Regional Strategy		There is no evidence to suggest that beneficiaries were provided with training from the health and disaster management section of the IFRC. The only interactive discussion with the IFRC/SLRCS was undertaken through the community engagement program.	
The construction of quality houses that meet or exceed technical standard	Page 7, Response to regional strategy		There is evidence to suggest that the majority of house have sufficient watsan infrastructure	Refer finding 6.5.1d
Strengthened contractor performance management system	Page 7, Response to regional strategy		A technical analysis of households revealed that overall, the construction quality of houses at least meet local technical standards	Refer finding 6.4.1b
An internal review is undertaken	Page 7, Response to regional strategy		A contractor performance management system was not noticed during the project file review	
Evaluation activities and documentation of key lessons learnt	Page 7, Response to regional strategy		An review of activities undertaken was continuously performed by the SLRCS and IFRC delegates through 'update' meetings with consultants and contractors. An internal mid-term review of some SLRCS/IFRC DDH sites was also conducted.	Refer finding 6.3.1d
	Page 7, Response to regional strategy		The evaluation of activities is being performed as part of this review	
Disaster Risk Reduction				
Targeted beneficiaries currently in emergency or transitional shelter live in safe, permanent houses.	Page 30, Regional Strategy		A analysis of households revealed that from a technical perspective, most houses were safe and most met local technical standards	Refer finding 6.4.1b
Housing settlements are well planned and have adequate space and support services, including appropriate water and sanitation facilities.	Page 30, Regional Strategy		The majority of people surveyed do not feel safe in their homes due mainly to the lack of street lamps and inadequacy locks.	Refer finding 6.5.1e
	Page 30, Regional Strategy		A technical analysis concludes that overall, the houses are well planned and have adequate spacing and support services. The only exceptions are that some houses still do not have running water, garbage collection facilities or electricity.	Refer finding 6.5.1d

Objective	Reference		Comment	Reference
Housing design incorporate adequate safety features against major environmental, health, and other hazards.	Page 30, Regional Strategy		The housing sites were constructed a distance over 200 meters from the ocean and hence are not susceptible to future Tsunamis.	
Shelter standards are expanded to include seismic safety, environmental sustainability and community planning requirements	Page 30, Regional Strategy		There is nothing to suggest that housing designs specifically considered major environmental or health risk. This lack of pre-construction analysis can be in part due to government pressure on the RCN to beginning building quickly	Refer finding 6.2.4i
Standards for compliance/inspection programs are developed through national reconstruction agencies and local government	Page 30, Regional Strategy		Some environmental sustainability factors were considered prior to housing construction. For instance, asbestos was specifically not used and roof tiles were imported from Malaysia instead of using materials from coconuts which may have adversely impacted the local coconut industry.	Refer finding 6.2.4h
			No specific environmental seismic study was undertaken prior to housing construction. This lack of pre -construction analysis can be in part due to government pressure on the RCM to beginning building quickly	Refer finding 6.2.4i
			There was evidence to suggest community planning requirements were considered as part of the site designs. For instance, hospitals, community centers and schools were built near some housing sites.	
Equity and Conflict Sensitivity	Page 30, Regional Strategy		A technical review concluded that in most cases, housing designs were in accordance with standards set by the agency in-charge of tsunami housing reconstruction. Local government agreed to provide electricity and watsan services to houses in sites already fitted with electrical wires and pipes. Hence the electrical wires and pipes in these houses had to meet local government standards.	Refer finding 6.4.1b
Program includes both tsunami affected groups and other vulnerable groups within the community.	Page 31, Regional Strategy		The programs, and funds are allocated by the PNS, were specifically directed to Tsunami effected groups. Hence the RCM met its mandate to provide relief to these communities.	
Programs are designed and implemented so as not to provide different quality housing, services or support to different groups or not to reinforce socio-cultural differences.	Page 31, Regional Strategy		A contractor performance management system was not noticed during the project file review	Refer finding 6.5.1j
Joint community planning and implementation approaches are put in place for services of common benefits.	Page 31, Regional Strategy		Generally, the quality of beneficiary houses has been equitable across different sites. However exceptions involving plot size and water distribution sometimes exists.	Refer Finding 6.5.1i and finding 6.5.1i
			There is no evidence to suggest that joint community planning and implementation approaches were put in place.	

Objective	Reference		Comment	Reference
Livelihood should be fully incorporated within the shelter program.	Diagram 4, page 5 and page 7 Response to Regional Strategy		A livelihoods program did not appear to be considered as part of the program design, during the construction process or immediately after houses were provided to beneficiaries.	Refer finding 6.2.5d
Health and disaster management program should be incorporated partially with the shelter program	Diagram 4, page 5, Response to Regional Strategy		After the houses were offered, (sometimes 2 years after the houses were offered), The IFRC engaged in a 2 day community engagement program at each site	Refer finding 6.3.3a
Household should have sufficient health and watsan infrastructure	Diagram 4, page 5, Response to Regional Strategy		There is no evidence to suggest that beneficiaries were provided with training from the health and disaster management section of the IFRC. The only interactive discussion with the IFRC/SLRCS was undertaken through the community engagement program.	
The construction of quality houses that meet or exceed technical standard	Page 7, Response to regional strategy		There is evidence to suggest that the majority of house have sufficient watsan infrastructure	Refer finding 6.5.1d
Strengthened contractor performance management system	Page 7, Response to regional strategy		A technical analysis of households revealed that overall, the construction quality of houses at least meet local technical standards	Refer finding 6.4.1b
An internal review is undertaken	Page 7, Response to regional strategy		A contractor performance management system was not noticed during the project file review	
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			The evaluation of activities is being performed as part of this review	
Disaster Risk Reduction				
Targeted beneficiaries currently in emergency or transitional shelter live in safe, permanent houses.	Page 30, Regional Strategy		A analysis of households revealed that from a technical perspective, most houses were safe and most met local technical standards	Refer finding 6.4.1b
Housing settlements are well planned and have adequate space and support services, including appropriate water and sanitation facilities.	Page 30, Regional Strategy		The majority of people surveyed do not feel safe in their homes due mainly to the lack of street lamps and inadequacy locks.	Refer finding 6.5.1e
			A technical analysis concludes that overall, the houses are well planned and have adequate spacing and support services. The only exceptions are that some houses still do not have running water, garbage collection facilities or electricity.	Refer finding 6.5.1d

Objective	Reference		Comment	Reference
Communication and Advocacy				
Beneficiaries / communities understand and respect the Movement's program and decisions even if there are differences of opinion.	Page 33, Regional Strategy		Responses from qualitative interviews of survey respondents suggest that in general, the beneficiaries understand and respect the Movement's programs and decisions even if there are differences of opinion.	
Beneficiaries feel Movement personnel understand and respect their needs and priorities even if there is a difference of opinion.	Page 33, Regional Strategy		Responses from qualitative interviews of survey respondents suggest that in general, the beneficiaries feel Movement personnel understand and respect their needs and priorities even if there is a difference of opinion.	
The public and donors feel information on programs is relevant, timely, clear and useful.	Page 33, Regional Strategy	N/A	The public or donors were not interviewed as part of this evaluation.	
The government's awareness of housing / water and sanitation issues is increased.	Page 33, Regional Strategy	N/A	Government servants were not interviewed as part of this evaluation. This was largely due to the difficulty involved in locating these officials.	
Quality and Accountability				
Donors and the public feel information provided to them by the Movement on delivery of programs is timely, accurate and honest.	Page 34, Regional Strategy	N/A	The public or donors were not interviewed as part of this evaluation.	
Beneficiaries feel information provided to them by the Movement on delivery of programs is timely, accurate and honest.	Page 34, Regional Strategy		The RCM movement did not provide information to beneficiaries until community engagement program (which in some cases was provided two years after beneficiaries received houses). Hence the information beneficiaries received was not timely; for instance at the time of the evaluation, the majority did not understand how to claim ownership of their homes and expected the Red Cross to provide further services. The accuracy and honesty of the information provided can only be ascertained after the community engagement program is completed.	Refer finding 6.33.a and 6.3.3c.
Risk Management, monitoring and evaluation and quality and assurance systems and procedures are in place functioning.	Page 34, Regional Strategy		Monitoring and Evaluation was performed as part of an internal mid-term review of Tsunami housing construction programs.	Refer finding 6.3.1d
			No specific risk management and quality and assurance systems and producers appeared to be incorporated into the program design.	

Objective	Reference		Comment	Reference
Quality and accountability (continued)				
Corrective action is taken as soon as realistically possible where issues or problems are identified.	Page 34, Regional Strategy		Review of minutes from project files suggest that the IFRC/SLRCS responded to beneficiary issues and concerns by relaying them to the consultant. Evidence from the project files also suggests the RCM attempted to motivate and pressure the consultants into taking corrective action.	
Beneficiaries feel programs are relevant and contribute to improvement in their lives (i.e. feels safer).	Page 34, Regional Strategy		The majority of people who had complaints started that their complains regarding the houses were not adequately addressed by the consultants/ contractors during the period one year after they received houses (the defects and liabilities period).	Refer finding 6.5.1c
Beneficiaries feel programs are relevant and contribute to improvement in their lives (i.e. feels safer).	Page 34, Regional Strategy		Overall, beneficiaries are happy with the houses and believe they have contributed to improvements in their lives.	Refer finding 6.5.1a
			Some cultural issues were not considered in the housing design. For instance, some households did not have chimneys and gas has not been traditionally used by rural villagers.	Refer finding 6.2.4f
			The majority of people surveyed do not feel safe in their homes due mainly to the lack of street lamps and in adequacy of locks.	Refer finding 6.5.1e
			The majority of people feel that the location of housing sites detrimentally affects the livelihoods of household members (i.e. because houses are located too far from the ocean). It is important to note that the RCM did not have much control over the site locations as they were provided by the government.	Refer finding 6.2.5a
Coordination and Collaboration				
Movement partners work together within an agreed strategic programming framework.	Page 35, Regional Strategy		A joint partnership agreement exists which mandates the movements partners to work together within an agreed strategic programming framework.	Refer finding 6.2.5a
Movement partners use resources in a combined or complementary way that reduces cost and / or increases the efficiency of program delivery.	Page 35, Regional Strategy		Key interviews suggest that a joint partnership agreement, where there is a parallel structure, detrimentally affected the capacity of the RCM of follow through in its mandate. For instance, management through committees was considered problematic due to the difficulty in reaching consensus across all people involved.	Refer finding 6.2.6a
Beneficiaries feel Work is outsourced or external partnership are in place with credible agencies in areas here no or Limited capacity exists within the Movement to implement activities or where other agencies can implement the activities more cost-effectively than the Movement. provided to them by the Movement on delivery of programs is timely, accurate and honest.	Page 35, Regional Strategy		Work was outsourced to local consultants and contractors as the Movement did not have necessary Resources and local knowledge to implement activities. Whether these activities could have been undertaken more cost-effectively if the Movement had hired in-house managers instead of consultants cannot be definitely determined. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the project file review indicates much time was spent on micro-managing the work of consultants	Refer background information, section 3.0


Objective	Reference		Comment	Reference
Coordination and collaboration (continued)				
Linkages are established between community level rebuilding work and local government policy, planning and regulation systems.	Page 35, Regional Strategy		The project file review suggests linkages were established with local governance and government policy.planning and regulation system. For instance, the local government is involved in providing electricity, watsan facilities and garbage collection across the majority of surveyed sites.	Refer finding 6.5.3a
Organisational Development				
The role of shelter/water and sanitation is clearly defined in the HNS's strategy.	Page 36, Regional Strategy		Immediately after the Tsunami, the HNS did not appear to have shelter strategy. However, the HNS 2005 to 2010 strategies framework ford clearly articulate the role of shelter and watsan within its strategic objective.	
Organisational Learning				
Recommendations from reviews and assessments are implemented in a timely manner.	Page 36, Regional Strategy	N/A	An internal review of some of the SLRCS/IFRC DDH housing construction units was undertaken. The findings and the recommendations of the review largely focus on what factors could be improved the current program. Hence whether the recommendations from reviews are implemented in a timely manner is not applicable.	
Recomandations from reviews and assessments are carried out.	Page 36, Regional Strategy		This evaluation forms an impact assessment	
Results from impact assessments are shared widely.	Page 36, Regional Strategy	N/A	It is uncertain as to whether the results of this impact assessment will be shared widely.	
Operations personnel apply approaches and ideas learned from workshops, web exchanges and local feedback to program implementation.	Page 36, Regional Strategy	N/A	It is uncertain as to whether operations personal apply approaches and ideas learned from workshops, web exchanges and local feedback to program implementation.	

F.4 Programme Outcomes

F.4.1 Relevance

F.4.1a Finding: Figure F.4.1a breaks down perceptions of happiness by district.

Figure F.4.1a



Across all housing sites, most people state they are happy with the house provided to them by the RCM. Note that the level of 'happiness' with the house is not necessarily indicative of the quality of the house. For instance, the quality of houses in Onthachimadam exceeded the quality of houses in Rathmalana however beneficiary perceptions of happiness were in the reverse order. This is likely because people perceive satisfaction of housing relative to what they owned previously. Residents in Onthachimadam stated they had previously lived in nice houses while residents in Rathmalana stated they used to live on shanties by the beach.


F.4.1a Conclusion: Overall 70 percent of survey respondents answered that they were happy with the house with more people happy in the south and west of Sri Lanka relative to the east Sri Lanka.

Defects and Liabilities Period

F.4.1b Finding: Figure 6.5.1b illustrates whether people had complaints about their house within one year immediately after moving into their homes (defects and liabilities period).

Figure F.4.1b

Did you have any complaints about your house within one year immediately after moving in?



The majority of people across most sites had complaints after one year after moving into their homes. The only exception was from people in the Ismailpuram site where only 14 percent of people had complaints during the defects and liabilities period.

R.4.1b Conclusion: The majority of people across most sites had complaints during the defects and liabilities period.

Water and Sanitation

F.4.1d Finding: Responses from qualitative interviews of survey respondents suggested most people were satisfied with water and sanitation. Moreover, all of the houses had fitted kitchen taps, plumbing and drainage facilities. Toilets have been appropriately fitted and pipes were available in bathrooms. Most of the houses also had effective sewerage facilities. Nevertheless, qualitative interviews suggested that there were some minor problems relating to water and sanitation:

- The combination of bathrooms and toilets was considered a problem by beneficiaries in 3 sites as some houses have multiple people and at no one time can two people use the bathroom and toilet.
- The lack of benches and sinks in bathrooms was considered problematic as there was no place to wash hands or keep bathroom items.
- While fungus was only present in bathrooms in the Rathmalana site, its presence was extensive.
- The size of septic tanks was a concern across some people across almost all sites. In some sites it resulted in water filling the toilets and in others it resulted in the septic tank overflowing. In certain cases, the smell from overflowing septic tanks was overwhelming.
- In the Rathmalana site, water is pumped to a tank situated on top of the condominiums. However dirt can easily enter the tank as it is not covered.


F.4.1d Conclusion: The most common issues relating to water and sanitation involved the lack of benches or sinks in the bathrooms, the overflowing of septic tanks and the fact piped water did not have sufficient pressure to reach houses constructed on higher elevations. Nevertheless the majority of people surveyed did not have problems associated with water and sanitation.

Safety

F.4.1e Finding: When asked do you feel safe in your house, the majority of people stated no. Refer figure 6.4.1ea.

Figure F.4.1ea

Do you feel safe in your house?



The safety issues gathered from qualitative interviews largely relate to lack of visibility at night, lack of fences around the houses, lack of grills on the windows and the backdoor being made of plywood:


- As the sites are generally located away from main roads, there are no street lamps and hence, there is a lack of visibility around the sites. This was particularly concerning for female respondents who travelled around alone at night. Note this the government’s responsibility per the MOU.
- The lack of grills on the windows was also concerning for many survey respondents. Indeed, in the Charliment site, some people demonstrated how the windows could be opened from the outside. Note that the RCM made a decision not to place grills on the houses due to cost considerations.
- In relation to the backdoor of the house, it was generally made out of plywood and weaker than the front door.
- The lack of fences was noted as an issue by some people in most sites. Most people in the Is mailpuram site noted the lack of fences as issues as this particular site was susceptible to elephant attacks.
- While it was only at the Charliment I site where one key opened all doors, this is still concerning from a construction point of view. That people in three other sites surveyed also indicated that locks were easily broken is also concerning.

F.4.1e Conclusion: Approximately 60 percent of people did not feeling safe in their homes. The issues of safety related primarily to lack of visibility at night, lack of fences, lack of grills on windows and the ability of the backdoor of houses to be easily broken.

Kitchen

F.4.1f Finding: Figure 6.5.1f illustrates questions relating to the relevance of the kitchen as perceived by beneficiaries.

Figure F.4.1f



F.4.1f Conclusion: The majority of the beneficiaries indicate they use the kitchen and it is of a sufficient size. However only a quarter of beneficiaries indicate they use the gas cooker.

F.4.1g Finding: Qualitative survey results suggest that there were some problems caused by rain. Specifically

- The soil erodes into housing plots when it rains, particular in sites that are located on steep slopes. Soil erosion also prevents vehicles from entering the vicinity of the site.
- Beneficiaries in some households across certain sites suggested that rainwater enters the house through gaps in the roof, chimneys and the front door.

F.4.1g Conclusion: Qualitative analysis suggests there was significant soil erosion on sites located on hills and rainwater enters through the roof during heavy downpours.

Other Design/Specification Issues

F.4.1h Findings: Some other design/specification issues were noted during the survey:

- The electrical problems related to the voltage being too low for the tube bulbs and the electrical connections in some houses not being operational.
- The external plastering of sand and cement (rendering) used on the walls started eroding slightly when scratched.
- It was difficult for old people to climb the stairs to their rooms in the double storied houses in Thalgasgodawatte.
- In the Ratmalana site, pipes were visible inside the bedrooms, along the top of the roof and the walls.

F.4.1h Conclusion: Other design/specification issues related mainly to the voltage being too low to supply electricity to the tube lights in houses.

Equity of Housing Quality within a Site

F.4.1i Finding: Generally, the houses were of similar quality to others within the sites. However there were a couple of exceptions. This was in part due to the mains not being sufficiently strong to pressure the water to houses constructed at higher elevations on some project sites. For instance, when considering the Ethinagahawatte, Charlimont and Thalgasgodawatte sites that were all built on a hill, the houses at the bottom of the hill received a relative consistent flow of water while the houses at the top of the hill had to wait until night to receive water. In the Charlimont sites, the beneficiaries with houses at the top of the hill complain that they have to wake up at 2am to collect water. Another cause of this inequality is that the some beneficiaries have at least 4 perches more than other beneficiaries.

F.4.1i Conclusion: While in general, the houses were of similar quality to others within the sites, there is some evidence to suggest that inequality between houses within the sites existed. Inequality related largely to water access and plot size.

Equity of Housing Quality between Sites (and hence across ethnic groups)

F.4.1j Finding: Results suggest that there was some differences in the housing quality between sites located in different ethnic groups (the sites in the East predominately house Tamil and Muslim citizens while the sites in the South and West Sinhalese citizens). A technical analysis suggests that houses in the East (Ismailpuram and Onthachimadam) were of slightly better quality than the houses in the other districts surveyed. Importantly, the sites in the East (which were much larger in size) did use higher government certified contractors to construct their houses as opposed to the smaller sites in the South of Sri Lanka. The technical evaluation is backed by the results of the survey which illustrates that in the East, there was an average of 33.8 percent of households who had complaints one year after houses were donated. This is compared to the South and West where an average over 90 percent of households had complaints one year after houses were donated.


F.4.1j Conclusion: The qualities of the houses in East Sri Lanka (with predominately Tamil communities) are slightly better as they were built using higher government certified contractors relative to smaller sites in the South and the West (with predominately Sinhalese communities).

F.4.2 Effectiveness

Pre-Tsunami versus Post-Tsunami


F.4.2a Finding: The following illustrates whether survey respondents believed their housing situation is 'better' or 'worse' relative to how they were before the Tsunami. Overall, 59 percent of people believe they are better of relative to before the Tsunami with no distinctive pattern across different districts.

Do you believe housing situation is better or worse than before the tsunami?



F.4.2a Conclusion: majority of people believe they are better off in regards to their housing situation relative to before the Tsunami.

F.4.2b Finding: The following illustrates the pre-tsunami and current sources of water and lighting.




F.4.2b Conclusion: Quantitative survey results suggest that overall, in regards to electricity and water supply, people are statistically significantly better off than they were pre-tsunami.

F.4.2c Finding: F.4.2c illustrates the composition of the households Pre-Tsunami.

Figure F.4.2c

Household composition Pre-Tsunami



F.4.2c Conclusion: Overall, beneficiaries appear to have households of better quality relative to households pre-tsunami.

Livelihoods

F.4.2d Finding: Figures 6.5.2da and 6.5.2db reveal the quantitative survey results relating to how beneficiaries’ current locations have influenced livelihoods.

Figure F.4.2da

Has the house’s location determinately impacted livelihood?





Figure F.4.2db

Has the house's location detrimentally affected income earning ability?



- Livelihoods and income have been adversely affected as many people were fisherman and the current sites are located far from the sea. Some beneficiaries indicated that their husbands would stay in a shanty near the sea during the week and come home on weekends. Further, due to the remoteness of the housing sites and difficult access to transport facilities, a large number of employment opportunities are not readily available.


6.5.2d Conclusion: Almost three quarters of the people surveyed indicated that the house's location has detrimentally affected their income earning ability.

F.4.3 Sustainability

F.4.3a Finding: As per the MOU, the government is required to provide water and electricity supplies. The majority of survey respondents indicated that they receive local services from the government. As illustrated in figures 6.5.2b, 73 percent of household had access to government supply of water and 92 percent of households had access to electricity respectively. Garbage collection is undertaken on some sites. The main issues related to water supply:

- In the Onthachimadam and Ismailpuram sites, there is no water supply (water supply is the government's responsibility). At Onthachimadam this is due to the fact that the communal tank was not fully finished and commissioned at the time of the site visit and interviews. At the Ismaipuram site, there is full provision at the site to deliver water to each house but the Water Board do not have the infrastructure to supply water with enough pressure and flow to the houses at a higher level. Instead the local council fills tanks with water on an irregular basis or people source water from common wells. Some people complained water is not pumped to the houses on top of the hill on a regular basis and that the only time they can collect water is at 2am.
- Figure F.4.3ab illustrates the percentage of houses that had leaking taps, flowing water and use water from the taps.

Figure F.4.3ab



It is uncertain when water and electricity supplies and garbage collection services will become available to the remaining residents.

F.4.3a Conclusion: Water, electricity and garbage collection services have been provided to the majority of beneficiaries although it is uncertain when these services will be completely provided to all beneficiaries.


F.4.3b Finding: Roads leading into the sites were still made from sand or mud and create issues for transport, especially in the presence of heavy rain. Further, the absence of street lamps is problematic at night due to the distance required to travel to the main roads in the dark.

F.4.3b Conclusion: Infrastructure relating to well developed roads and street lighting have not been provided by the local authorities.

F.4.3c Finding: As illustrated in figure 4.1, the majority of houses were occupied by beneficiaries. Almost all respondents (97 percent) stated they intend to remain in the homes given to them. Clearly, this result cannot be verified for the long-term. Further, 92 percent stated they were happy with the surrounding communities and many stated that if employment opportunities, medical facilities and schools were available, the Tsunami housing communities could develop. Currently approximately 70 percent state that schools, doctors and markets are located too far from their homes (refer figure F.4.3c).

Figure F.4.3c

Convenience of Access to facilities and Schools



F.4.3c Conclusion: It appears beneficiaries will remain in the households for the short-term. Further, given local government support to improve ease of access to facilities and schools, there is every possibility that the Tsunami housing communities could prosper.

Legal Ownership of Properties Donated

F.4.3d Finding: Results from the survey process demonstrated that beneficiaries were uncertain of the requirements to prove home ownership. Some believed the RCM is responsible, others believed the government is responsible and many were uncertain. None of them knew when they would receive formal title deeds. One of the objectives of the RCM community engagement program, which was undertaken after the surveys were completed, was to inform beneficiaries of their land rights.


Of concern is that some beneficiaries have been informed by the government that they will not receive deeds for 15 years as the government is concerned the beneficiaries will sell the land. This is problematic from the perspective that beneficiaries cannot use houses as collateral when undertaking loans.

F.4.3d Conclusion: Prior to the community engagement program (which in some circumstances was undertaken two years after houses were handed over), beneficiaries did not understand their rights and responsibilities regarding home ownership.

F.4.3e Finding: It is assumed the more household items that are present, the greater the livelihood factor. Refer figure F.4.3e for details regarding the presence of some household items.

Figure 6.4.3e

Presence of Household Items



- Results show that while almost 80 percent of households do not have couches or dining tables, just over half have television sets.
 - All households surveyed had basic kitchen utensils (i.e. plates, cups, etc.)
 - Couches and dining tables were not gifted to the beneficiaries by any donor.
- F.4.3e Conclusion: While items that demonstrate a basic level of livelihoods are present in households, more expensive items are not present.

F.5 SLRCS Involvement and Capacity Building

F.5.1a Finding: The capacity of the TSSU has improved throughout the duration of the DDH operation. In collaborating with over 20 partner national societies to build houses throughout Sri Lanka, the SLRCS staff have gained skills relating to construction, coordination techniques, organizational capabilities and in negotiations with foreign delegates.

F.5.1a Conclusion: The project has contributed to the capacity of the TSSU.

F.5.1b Finding: The SLRCS branches provided support to SLRCS NHQ and IFRC primarily through offering local knowledge and volunteers. They also suggested options for contractors as and when required and indicated coordination and negotiations with NHQ SLRCS and IFRC was generally effective. However, the SLRCS branches involvement in managing and building the houses, and liaising with the consultants, was minimal.

F.5.1b Conclusion: The capacity of the SLRCS branches improved primarily through the development of their coordination and negotiation skills.



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