Lessons Learning Review of Movement Coordination in Operations Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) Ukraine and Pakistan

Final Report

Executive Summary

5 February 2024

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Commissioning: SMCC Steering Committee
Executive summary

The subject matter of this lessons learning review is the Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) initiative. SMCC aims to improve the way Movement partners work together and enhance coordination and cooperation, especially in response to medium to large-scale emergencies. The SMCC initiative is anchored in the Statutes of the Movement which affirm that all partners shall cooperate with each other according to their roles defined by their respective mandates. The roles and responsibilities, as well as the interaction between Movement partners are therefore defined by the Seville Agreement 2.0.

The six SMCC Priority areas may be summarised as:

1. Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management
2. Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems
3. Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components
4. Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools
5. Promoting complementary domestic and international response
6. Enhancing the scalability of the response

Efforts to work together better as a Movement are not new. The process to strengthen coordination and cooperation within the Movement gained significant momentum in 2013, with the adoption of Resolution 4 at the Council of Delegates (CoD) in Sydney, Australia. This launched a comprehensive and inclusive Movement-wide consultation process in 2014–2015, with the participation of over 140 National Societies (NSs).

The results of the consultations and ensuing recommendations were presented to the 2015 CoD in a progress report[1] which identified the necessity of enhanced Movement coordination in humanitarian crises and a strong willingness among Movement components to work together to fulfil the Movement’s common goals. This positive momentum and spirit are reflected in Resolution 12, which was adopted by consensus at the CoD in 2015 and tasked the Movement with implementing the SMCC Plan of Action (PoA) for 2015–2017.3

By 2017, the initiative had gained significant momentum, improving the Movement’s capacity for efficient large-scale emergency responses. Directly supported by over 40 NSs, implementation of SMCC has initiated a gradual change process and fostered a positive “SMCC spirit” among Movement components, positioning the Movement on the “front foot” in the evolving humanitarian ecosystem.4 A significant achievement has been the development of the SMCC Toolkit5 endorsed by CoD resolutions in 2013, 2015, 2017 and 2019, and its subsequent incorporation into the Seville Agreement 2.0 - thereby institutionalising the use of SMCC tools.

From the onset of SMCC in 2013, mainly anecdotal evidence has been gathered from the implementation of Movement coordination in operations and it has been difficult to measure the results of the initiative. Subsequently, it was agreed to gain more substantive evidence of what is working and what is hampering Movement coordination through learning lessons from two main Movement operational responses - Ukraine (a conflict response) and Pakistan (a disaster response) - which have either started after and/or continued after the adoption of the new normative framework, the Seville Agreement 2.0.

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4 ibid.
5 https://smcctoolkit.org/
The purpose of the review was to highlight best practices and identify challenges of Movement coordination in large-scale emergencies and to inform areas for improvement. The specific review objectives were to:

- Assess the extent to which Movement components are fulfilling their commitments to SMCC in emergency operations and across the SMCC initiative.
- Identify whether the SMCC Ambitions are relevant and how they have been fulfilled in both selected emergencies.
- Identify key SMCC enablers and challenges at country, regional and headquarters levels.
- Assess the relevance of SMCC guidance and tools used to support Movement coordination.
- Propose recommendations for strengthening SMCC implementation in current and future responses to crises.

The review was commissioned by Members of the Steering Committee of the SMCC process. The primary audience for this review is the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) leadership and senior management, leadership of NSs involved in the response contexts, plus the Movement as a whole as signatories to the SMCC initiative. The review will contribute to informing and framing the way forward for Movement coordination in future large-scale emergencies and be used to report on SMCC implementation during the current CoD period.

The review was conducted between June and November 2023 by an independent external consultant. The review method combined a literature review with sixty-one (61) semi-structured interviews (ICRC 12 female, 15 male; IFRC 9 female, 13 male; Partner National Society (PNS) 2 female, 5 male; Host National Society (HNS) staff, 1 female, 4 male). SMCC country case studies were developed for both contexts.

The countries selected for the review in terms of a Movement Coordination context were very different in type. Ukraine exhibited Movement Coordination in its fullest form, with a complex intertwining of the HNS, IFRC, ICRC and PNSs, whereas Pakistan was a context exhibiting primarily Membership Coordination (HNS, IFRC and PNSs) with very limited ICRC engagement other than in its exclusive geographical area of operation (and was thus not representative of a collective response context). In Ukraine, SMCC tools and processes were employed extensively (benefiting from being an original SMCC laboratory since 2016), whereas in Pakistan few tools or processes were employed.

The synthesis of review findings and key learnings is as follows:

**Priority 1 - Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management:** while Ukraine fared considerably better than Pakistan in terms of effective data sharing modalities largely due to the IFRC’s GO Platform[^6], the overall limited level of data sharing between partners in both contexts weighed negatively on efforts to establish accurate Movement footprints and improve operational response. There were no SMCC joint outcome/impact indicators at the strategic level, which inhibited opportunity to better guide the operational responses and indicate the ‘collective’ intended positive outcomes for affected populations. Coordinating ICRC and IFRC appeals proved a challenging process due to different budgeting/financing modalities.

Summarised learnings:

1. A lack of open data sharing between partners negatively weighs on efforts to establish accurate Movement footprints and improve operational response.

[^6]: https://go.ifrc.org
2. Different IFRC and ICRC budgeting processes make coordinating appeals challenging.
3. The high amounts of funding pouring into Ukraine and the pressure on PNSs to have visibility in high profile areas was predictable.
4. SMCC potential is being limited by a lack of joint outcome/impact indicators.
5. A HNS with good SMCC understanding is in a stronger position to coordinate its partners.

**Priority 2 - Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems**: the SMCC PoA represented a strong tangible, collective effort to address key systemic interoperability challenges with both Logistics/Supply Chain and Surge making good progress towards PoA objectives. In both contexts, good interoperability practice was exhibited by joint IFRC and ICRC Logistics and Supply Chain coordination, thus ensuring agile and flexible support to operations. Delays in finalising the resource mobilisation table in Ukraine primarily due to IFRC/ICRC alignment challenges negatively impacted early interoperability aspirations and weighed on response efficiency and effectiveness in the early stages (later stages were considerably improved).

Summarised learnings:

1. Logs interoperability objectives and activities provide a useful template for other Movement Implementation Team (MIT) interoperability aspirations, contributing to a more strategized Priority 2.
2. Improving resource mobilisation table processes and early cross-institution alignment is key to interoperability and securing a more effective/efficient response.

**Priority 3 - Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components**: in neither contexts were Movement Contingency Plans (MCPs) developed to any meaningful extent prior to the emergencies and thus had limited utility at emergency/crisis onset. MIT work related to understanding/unpacking the use of relevant Movement capacities/competencies has lacked traction. Combined, this has led to a limited understanding of Movement component capacity to effectively respond to the emergencies, and a less than clear, collective Movement SMCC coordination position to guide operations, and support partners to provide a more coherent response.

Summarised learnings:

1. The initial lack of IFRC/ICRC ‘coordination positioning’ clarity affected the partners ability to provide a more coherent response.
2. MCPs are not thorough – this limits real time understanding of how capacities of Movement components can be utilised to contribute to a response.
3. Few review key informants expected MCPs to have utility.

**Priority 4 - Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools** - and the review ‘deep dive’: operational response efficiency and effectiveness was greatly enhanced where SMCC tools were used and contributed to increased accountability levels. Mini-Summits and Joint Statements were amongst the most relevant and valuable tools to frame the initial emergency response. The extent to which NSs fulfilled their convenor roles differed considerably between the two contexts, with the Ukraine Red Cross Society (URCS) taking a much fuller and lead role in contrast to the Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) which played no role (noting that the emergency in Pakistan took place just after the approval of the Seville Agreement 2.0 and the change in PRCS leadership took place in the midst of the operation).
SMCC initiative conceptual understanding was strongest at Geneva levels and weakest at branch levels. In Pakistan, effective SMCC preparation and application was hampered by relatively new NS senior management/leadership understanding and buy-in for the initiative, as well as the emergency taking place just after the approval of the Seville Agreement 2.0. Although MCP’s were not developed to an extent that conveyed full Movement contingency capacity, and held limited utility in this regard, the associated planning processes were seen as valuable contributors to preparedness arrangements (although qualitative differences existed between contexts). The Movement Coordination in Operations’ Advisor (MCO)\(^7\) role deployed to Ukraine added considerable coordination value to the operational response.

Summarised learnings:

1. SMCC preparation and application is conditional on NS leadership understanding and buy-in.
2. NSs in both contexts found it challenging to accomplish their full convenor roles as expected.
3. The SMCC initiative (conceptual understanding) becomes more dilute the further it travels from Geneva.
4. The occupier of the co-convenor role might not necessarily be the ‘strongest’ actor in the partnership arrangement. This has implications for ‘power and influence’ dynamics.\(^8\)
5. MCP’s might be better suited to smaller scale emergencies with less Movement partners; and considered more a progress planning document than a definitive plan.
6. Mini-Summits and Joint Statements are valuable tools to framing the initial emergency response.
7. The MCO function has a greater coordination potential than is currently being utilised with a case made for mandatory/automatic deployment in any large-scale emergency.
8. An elective approach to the SMCC toolkit can diminish relevance and accountability.
9. There is opportunity to simplify the SMCC coordination mechanism.
10. Effectively supporting NS leadership transition is key to SMCC.

**Priority 5 - Promoting complementary domestic and international response:** the URCS’s knowledge and application of SMCC tools ensured it was in a strong position to better coordinate its partners by insisting on a spirit of ‘non-competition’ and needing to work together, which permitted the NS a much clearer control of the resource mobilization and localization agenda. This was not the case for the PRCS. However, in both contexts different partner funding modalities negatively weighed on good resource mobilization practice. The way in which partner and HNSs tended to engage in separate programming/funding negotiations, while at times pragmatic, only served to inhibit effective coordination and reinforce division.

Summarised learnings:

1. The more the HNS leads the resource mobilization and localization agenda, the stronger its control of the outcomes.
2. Different partner funding modalities can conspire against good resource mobilization coordination practice (thus reinforcing the ‘divide and rule’ approach).

**Priority 6 - Enhancing the scalability of the response:** in both contexts opportunities were missed to secure response multiplier effects and leverage synergies due to a lack of

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7 Previously called ‘Movement Coordination Officer’.
8 Power being based on positional authority and influence being based on relationships.
consideration for other cooperation modalities than those used. While the media related controversies centring on the ICRC in Ukraine affected perceptions of overall SMCC effectiveness, this did not materially impact Movement scalability aspirations and opportunities.

Summarised learnings:

1. Multiplier effects could be secured by PNSs leveraging synergies through consortia and other cooperation modalities.
2. Priority 6 may provide inspiration for outcome indicator modelling for the SMCC initiative.
3. Ensuring effective response in future emergencies and crises will increasingly rely on being able to influence the narrative discourse (past, present, and future) surrounding the emergency/crisis.

The three SMCC Ambitions - 1: Change practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination; 2: Deliver well-coordinated and predictable operational responses; and 3: Reinforce the visibility of the collective response - were considered to be highly relevant to both contexts. However, achievements were mixed with Ukraine fairing considerably better than Pakistan due to the URCS’s greater application of SMCC tools.

In terms of whether the SMCC initiative has been effective in achieving intended coordination objectives and efficient in facilitating the better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels, the overall picture is complex and contrasting. In Ukraine, SMCC tool application to frame the emergency response, including during the preparation/laboratory stages had a positive impact on coordination behaviour, which translated to a good effectiveness rating at operational level. This is not the case for Pakistan.

In terms of efficiency in Ukraine, unfortunately, due to the unprecedented scale of the response and ensuing coordination challenges that centred on an inadequate understanding of the ideal coordination mechanism for Movement actors, the use of Movement resources cannot be said to have been efficient (inter alia coordination not being optimised under a single plan9). An efficiency judgement on Pakistan cannot be made as SMCC tool application to frame the response was extremely minimal.

Aside from the multiple SMCC process-type challenges related to e.g. effective data sharing, MIT functioning, coordinated appeal alignment, effective interoperability, tool application etc. raised in the synthesis/findings section that affected both contexts, the biggest factor preventing more efficacious Movement coordination in Ukraine was the fact that the operation started in the middle of the revision of the Seville Agreement process, being affected by both operational realities and ‘political wrangling’ at the senior leadership levels.10 This negatively impacted the higher-level normative coordination aspirations as per Seville Agreement 2.0, had adverse implications for ensuring a well-coordinated operational response, and will likely continue to affect Movement response efforts unless resolved.11

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9 Additional examples include initial IFRC Surge being less than efficient. Positively, overall coordination later improved with the advent of the URCS One Plan 2023-2025.
10 Indeed, the SMCC 2.0 Resolution noted that ‘coordination remains a complex endeavour, and principal challenges include ensuring that the right mindset is cultivated across the Movement, that political leadership is appropriate and sustained, that the benefits of coordination are well understood . . .’ (p.2).
Frustrating for many KIs was the fact that such politicking was happening at all, when given the frequency and magnitude of humanitarian emergencies and crises, Movement energy (funds, expertise, and time) should be focused on the IFRC and ICRC coming together rather than drifting apart.12

There will be many reasons why the above might be happening. Of overall central importance is the recognition that the IFRC and ICRC are not 'as one' when it comes to interpreting the Seville Agreement 2.0 or applying SMCC tools. Contributing factors include the ICRC being perceived by some interviewees to have a 'limited SMCC mindset' because of its priority focus on delivering on its conventional mandate.13 In contrast, the IFRC is better equipped to play a coordination role, but nonetheless was seen to have an overly transactional focus on Membership Coordination when interpreting the Seville Agreement 2.0. This said, there is strong evidence to indicate that SMCC continues to positively and constructively improve the way Movement partners work together through enhanced coordination and cooperation, especially in response to medium to large-scale emergencies as intended.

The review makes ten recommendations:

1. The ICRC and IFRC should collectively agree how the SMCC initiative will be mainstreamed in practice within each organisation to ensure functional complementarity.

2. The ICRC and IFRC should consider invoking a protocol for all large-scale emergencies that requires the ICRC Director of Operations and the IFRC Under Secretary General - National Society Development and Operations Coordination to convene and issue minimum SMCC parameters.

3. The ICRC and IFRC should consider reframing the SMCC initiative into a clearer concept and clarify how it fits into the Movement operational coordination system established by the Seville Agreement 2.0, to facilitate better understanding and promotion of Movement coordination roles, expectations, and tools across the Movement.

4. The ICRC and IFRC should consider conducting a status review of the MITs with a view to informing a more streamlined, agile and resource efficient structure and supporting Plan of Action.

5. The ICRC and IFRC should consider reviewing the SMCC toolkit with a view to determining if some tools should be mandatory during emergencies/crises.14

6. The ICRC and IFRC should ensure that that their managers in-country are performance managed to deliver on SMCC objectives or that a mandatory deployment of Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisors is made for all large-scale emergencies.

7. The Movement should step up SMCC and Seville Agreement 2.0 awareness raising and promotion (particularly for NS leadership/senior management levels).

8. The ICRC and IFRC should consider establishing a joint cadre of social media/media experts to proactively monitor media content in all emergency/crisis situations that involve a Movement response.

12 The main ‘sticking points’, as the reviewer understands, appear to be Seville Agreement 2.0 Articles 5.2; 5.4.1; and 6. It is beyond the remit of this review to explore this issue further. The review acknowledges these issues are recognised by IFRC/ICRC senior management with efforts underway to address them.

13 Acknowledging that the ICRC has to deliver both on its conventional operational mandate as well as on its coordination role, whereas the IFRC’s mandate is NS coordination, including National Society Development, in support of Host NSs.

14 In addition to tools that are already mandatory as per the Seville Agreement 2.0 e.g. Movement Coordination Agreement (Article 4.2).
9. The IFRC should commission and enable a series of structured ‘Partner Review Talks’ that engage all Movement partners in Pakistan as a mechanism for how to improve coordination and cooperation in the country.

10. The ICRC and IFRC should consider commissioning a lessons learned exercise focusing on understanding ‘partnership dimensions’ during the emergency response (including build up) in the Ukraine context.
### Lessons Learning Review (LLR) of Movement Coordination in Operations: Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) Ukraine and Pakistan

**SMCC Steering Committee update on recommendations** (date 23.05.24).

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<th>Recommendation</th>
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<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>The ICRC and IFRC should collectively agree how the SMCC initiative will be mainstreamed in practice within each organisation to ensure functional complementarity.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agreed.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Finalisation of the SMCC 10-year final report to the 2024 Council of Delegates.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Drawn from: conclusion.</strong>&lt;br&gt;This involves agreeing how such implementation is informed by the normative framework for Movement coordination (the Seville Agreement 2.0). There is a need to resolve how both organisations inter-face with each other to seek alignment and agree on communications and decision-making processes. See Recommendation 2.</td>
<td><strong>Current status:</strong>&lt;br&gt;The SMCC Steering Committee started this discussion already in autumn 2023 as the main elements are to be included in the SMCC 10-year report to be submitted to the CoD in 2024. These discussions will continue in 2024 for the purpose of mainstreaming the initiative.</td>
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<td>An SMCC Operational Checklist has been drafted between ICRC and IFRC and disseminated to both institutions’ delegations. It has been integrated into the ICRC Cooperation Integration Course, and short version of it is part of the Rapid deployment training. It has also been included in key IFRC trainings, including main surge standard trainings, such as the Managing IFRC Operations Training (MOT).</td>
<td>The two organizations are in the final stages of discussions on a joint table meant to instruct the</td>
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<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>The ICRC and IFRC should consider invoking a protocol for all large-scale emergencies that requires the ICRC Director of Operations and the IFRC Under Secretary General - National Society Development and Operations Coordination to convene and issue minimum SMCC parameters.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agreed.</strong>&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Current status:</strong>&lt;br&gt;With the adoption of the Seville Agreement 2.0, SMCC tools such as the MCA, the Mini-Summit, and the Joint Statement, has already become mandatory. A checklist was prepared and included in the SMCC toolkit.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The Mini-Summit guidelines addresses the points suggested.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;This recommendation is therefore already addressed.</td>
<td><strong>ICRC-IFRC joint SA 2.0 in operations working group has been set up: Final deliverable being Agreement / Guidelines on Roles and responsibilities for who is doing what in large-scale operations.</strong></td>
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The ICRC has drafted a 4-pager instructing its delegations on how to operationalise its responsibilities as co-convener, including the relevant SMCC tools.

In essence, this might involve the two positions immediately convening following receipt of the Mini-Summit decision table and Joint Statement, and to endorse institutionally - based on country level advice/decisions - how the emergency response will be framed e.g. co-convener, security lead, logs/sector leads, geographical demarcations, roles and responsibilities, focal points for country, region and Geneva. This agreement (say 2 pages) then forms the guidance for all country operations henceforth (re-visit able) and should be issued within 48 hours.
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| **3** | **The ICRC and IFRC should consider reframing the SMCC initiative into a clearer concept and clarify how it fits into the Movement operational coordination system established by the Seville Agreement 2.0, to facilitate better understanding and promotion of Movement coordination roles, expectations, and tools across the Movement.** | **Agreed.** | **Refer to observations on recommendation 1.**
| **Current status:** | The SMCC tools have been incorporated into the Seville Agreement 2.0 (MCA, Mini-Summit...etc) and templates/tools adapted accordingly. | **Drafting of the SA 2.0 progress report to the 2024 Council of Delegates.**
| | “Integrating all SMCC efforts and legacies into overall Movement coordination” is one of the main recommendations of the upcoming final 10-year SMCC report to the Council of Delegates. | | |
| | Common indicators for the SA 2.0 progress report to the Council of Delegates have been agreed upon. | | |
| **4** | **The ICRC and IFRC should consider conducting a status review of the MITs with a view to informing a more streamlined, agile and resource efficient structure and supporting Plan of Action.** | **Agreed** | **Dismantlement of MITs, as also indicated in the upcoming final SMCC report to the 2024 Council of Delegates.**
| **Current status:** | This was already done and completed with the internal review in December 2022. Two of the MITs were closed, whilst the activities of the others reduced to a few, tangible deliverables. ICRC, IFRC and NS staff (assigned to these working groups on a voluntary basis) have struggled to commit sufficient time to the MIT work (due to existing job priorities, high turnover) and the SMCC structures were not conducive to strong follow-up. | | **Continuation of good technical collaboration on key thematic areas (communications, surge, logistics,**

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1 This could involve looking to the innovation sector for tools on measuring efficiency on collective impact. e.g. [https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/collaboration_and_collective_impact_-_geoff_mulgan.pdf](https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/collaboration_and_collective_impact_-_geoff_mulgan.pdf)
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<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td>The ICRC and IFRC should consider reviewing the SMCC toolkit with a view to determining if some tools should be mandatory during emergencies/crises.(^2)</td>
<td>Agreed.</td>
<td>Security, among others) as a matter of normal practice between the Movement components.</td>
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<td>Drawn from: Section 4.1.4; 4.1.4.6; and 4.1.4.12; Priority 3 lesson 2; Priority 4 lessons 6, 7, 9, and 10. Evidence indicates that a more efficient and effective response is possible when SMCC tools are used. Mandating tools use also increases accountability.</td>
<td><strong>Current status:</strong> Already done (i.e., MCA, Mini-Summit, Joint Statements or Mini-Summit decision table are mandatory under SA 2.0 and relevant instructions have been passed to delegations in both institutions in this respect).</td>
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<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td>The ICRC and IFRC should ensure that that their managers in-country are performance managed to deliver on SMCC objectives or that a mandatory deployment of Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisors is made for all large-scale emergencies.</td>
<td>Agreed /Partially agreed.</td>
<td>Further efficient mechanisms (through job descriptions and performance framework) to be put in place and implemented within ICRC and IFRC to ensure accountability of management (and all relevant staff such as programme</td>
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<td>Drawn from: Section 4.1.4.9 and Priority 4 lesson 8. This will require training/equipping people in charge to deploy tools in large-scale emergencies. The MCO in Ukraine role was central to delivering SMCC and greatly facilitated effective response coordination. It is reasonable to assume this would be the</td>
<td><strong>Current status:</strong> Responsibility for Movement coordination has been included in both ICRC and IFRC HoDs job description and performance framework. The introduction by all Movement partners of accountability towards Movement coordination in their human resource management systems is among the recommendations of the upcoming final 10-year SMCC report to the Council of</td>
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\(^2\) In addition to tools that are already mandatory as per the Seville Agreement 2.0 e.g. Movement Coordination Agreement (Article 4.2).
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<td>7</td>
<td><strong>The Movement should step up SMCC and Seville Agreement 2.0 awareness raising and promotion (particularly for NS leadership/senior management levels).</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agreed.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Develop a Movement coordination training module for relevant Movement staff (National Societies, ICRC and IFRC).</strong></td>
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<td>Priority 4 lesson 1 and 4; and Priority 5 lesson 1.</td>
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<td>SMCC awareness across the Movement is not as strong as it needs to be. The IFRC and ICRC leadership/senior management should be at the</td>
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<td><strong>Current status:</strong> This will be one of the priorities for ICRC and IFRC from the fall of 2024 onwards.</td>
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<td>The MCO pool was increased with 25 trained members in November 2023 in Oslo.</td>
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<td>Delegates.</td>
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<td>Strong focus and investments will be put on accountability but also dissemination and knowledge among all Movement components of the SA 2.0 and its tools, and Movement coordination in general, e.g., recycling the relevant parts of the MCO training (see also recommendation 7 below) to reach as many Movement leaders and staff as possible.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>The ICRC and IFRC should consider establishing a joint cadre of social media/media experts to proactively monitor media content in all emergency/crisis situations that involve a Movement response.</td>
<td>Priority 6 lesson 3. This function should be reflected in MCAs and Joint Statements. The purpose of the experts should, if necessary, to work to neutralise harmful media content. The ICRC and IFRC could look to established social media organisations for advice.</td>
<td>Not applicable to SMCC initiative. Recommendation may be valid in general terms, but we do not see it fit within the SMCC process or the implementation of SA 2.0.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>The IFRC should commission and enable a series of structured ‘Partner Review Talks’ that engage all Movement partners in Pakistan as a mechanism for how to improve coordination and cooperation in the country.</td>
<td>Drawn from case study. Initially, Talks should be held bi-laterally e.g. IFRC-PRCS; IFRC-Norwegian Red Cross (followed by separate talks with all other PNSs); IFRC-ICRC etc. A final multi-lateral Partner Review Talk should be held from which a synthesis should be drawn. Results could feed into Recommendation 11 learning.</td>
<td>Not applicable to SMCC initiative. Recommendation essentially related to Membership Coordination and not to SMCC/Movement Coordination.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>The ICRC and IFRC should consider commissioning a</td>
<td>Drawn from review reflection.</td>
<td>Partially agreed.</td>
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Note: this needs to be discussed at the
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<td>lessons learned exercise focusing on understanding ‘partnership dimensions’ during the emergency response (including build up) in the Ukraine context.</td>
<td>Such analysis would complement this SMCC review and provide additional insights into the partnership dynamics that shape effective and efficient coordination and cooperation during large-scale emergencies. The results would help improve all future emergency responses.</td>
<td>While relevant recommendation, it may be not considered a priority at country level due to competing needs and priorities in country.</td>
<td>Strategic Tripartite Coordination Platform in Ukraine.</td>
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**Legend:**

- **Implemented.**
- **In progress.**
- **Pending implementation.**
- **Not applicable to SMCC initiative.**